{"id":"court_ctb_4034_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4034,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":null,"title":"IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\nDebtors.[1](#page-0-0)\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nFebruary 7, 2025\n\n## **G CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC'S OBJECTION AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO EXTEND FEBRUARY 15, 2025 DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS**\n\nG Club Operations, LLC (\"G Club\") respectfully objects, and files this memorandum of law in opposition, to the *Second Supplemental Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee to Extend February 15, 2025 Deadline For Trustee To File Avoidance Actions* (ECF No. 4004, [2](#page-0-1) the \"Third Extension Motion\"), filed by Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\"), seeking a **third** six month extension of time following the Court's granting of the Trustee's prior two requests meaning the Congressionally established two (2) year statute of limitation to file avoidance actions will now be amended to three years and six months.\n\nOver the objections of several parties, including G Club (ECF No. 2563, the \"First Extension Objection\"), the Court granted this extension. ECF No. 2921 (the \"First Ruling\"). G Club then appealed the Ruling, and the appeal is pending before the District Court. *See In re: Ho Wan Kwok*, Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-01514-KAD (the \"Pending Appeal\"). Thereafter, again over G Club's and other objections, the Court granted a second extension (ECF No. 3329, the \"Second\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595) (the \"Debtor\"), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> All ECF references are to entries in the Bankruptcy Case, Case No. 22-50073, unless otherwise stated.\n\nExtension Motion). The Court granted that motion too (ECF No. 3417, the \"Second Ruling\") and G Club appealed.[3](#page-1-0) For the following reasons, the Court should deny the Third Extension Motion.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nThe Court has granted two (2) previous requests by the Trustee to extend the statute of limitations to August 15, 2024, based on its view that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) provided authority to do so: \"[t]he Court concludes for these reasons that Rule 9006(b) could provide a mechanism to extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\" First Ruling at 12. The Court further concluded that, at that time, the Trustee has shown sufficient cause for the six-month extension the Trustee chose to seek, relying largely on *IBT Int'l, Inc. v. N. (In re Int'l Admin. Servs.)*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005). First Ruling at 8, 17-18. The Court applied the same logic and granted the Second Extension Motion. Second Ruling at 3.\n\nThe Court should deny the Trustee's new motion for a six-month extension because there cannot possibly be any further justification for extending the time further on the facts proffered in the Third Extension Motion. First, Mr. Kwok has been incarcerated for years, his lack of cooperation in the case will continue forever. Second, Mr. Kwok's conviction occurred in August 2024, there will always be developments in Mr. Kwok's criminal case, which should not be the basis of an extension applying the standard set forth in the First Ruling. Third, the suggestion that G Club, which produced documents in response to a 2004 examination request in December 2024, has caused delay is absurd; but even if true, the Trustee received compliance two months ago and, as set forth below, would have recourse through long-established tolling and a blanket extension to the statute of limitations is unnecessary. The Trustee cannot contravene specific statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or alter the balance struck by the statute. *Law v. Siegal*, 571\n\n<span id=\"page-1-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> G Club's opening brief in both appeals is due February 28, 2025.\n\nU.S. 415, 421, 427 (2014). The Court, therefore, must put an end to the Trustee's view that it has an open-ended limitless time to bring avoidance claims, even against parties, such as G Club, which has already been sued. Thus, the Court should deny the Third Extension Motion.\n\n#### **II. ARGUMENT**\n\n## **A. The Trustee Has Not Shown Cause to Further Extend the Statute of Limitation Based on the Standard Established by the Court**\n\nIn the First Ruling the Court held it could extend the statute of limitations to bring avoidance actions if \"there is 'cause,' on the facts and circumstances before the Court to extend the statutes of limitation in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b).\" First Ruling at 12. The Court further explained that it would look to the same standard as for equitable tolling to determine whether cause existed to extend the two-year statute set forth in Bankruptcy Code §546: \"as courts have observed, albeit in the context of equitable tolling, the equities to consider in determining whether to extend or toll a statute of limitations in a bankruptcy proceeding often involve whether the debtor failed to cooperate with the bankruptcy trustee or indeed sought to impede the trustee's investigation and liquidation of assets for the benefit of creditors.\" First Ruling at 13. The Court also considered notice to potential defendants and the diligence of the Trustee's investigation. First Ruling at 15-17.\n\nNow, seeking a third extension, the Trustee again relies on the same reasons proffered twice before: that Mr. Kwok is a criminal and failed to adhere to obligations as a debtor, the ongoing criminal case, the Trustee's continuing investigations, and impedance of his investigation by third parties. The Court previously held that it needed to review the \"very specific and extraordinary facts\" of this case to find the requisite cause. Under this reasoning, it cannot be that an alleged persistent matter is \"extraordinary.\" For example, Mr. Kwok will *never* cooperate with the Trustee and the criminal case may well be ongoing for years; does this mean that the Trustee\n\nhas an endless statute of limitations based on these facts? It cannot be the case that Congress intended the applicable statute of limitations only to apply where no person asserted their Fifth Amendment rights, otherwise refused to cooperate, or was subject to a criminal prosecution. If it was, Congress would have included those exceptions in the statute. It did no such thing. In any event, the criminal trials have ended and Mr. Kwok has been in jail for years. Clearly, that fact has been known to the Trustee for at least the extra year he has had to bring avoidance actions.\n\nThe Trustee claims that the \"criminal trial\" was also outside of his control. Third Extension Motion at 3. But that is not the standard set by the Court. It is neither surprising nor extraordinary that the criminal trial occurred. Moreover it concluded in July and August of 2024. The criminal proceedings may well continue for years. All of the criminal evidence is now public and available to the Trustee. The fact that more information may come out following sentencing is not \"extraordinary\" either. Id. More information can always come out in the future. Indeed, more information may be learned from discovery in any of the hundreds of cases already commenced by the Trustee (should they not be dismissed), but that does not mean an extension of the statute of limitation is justified. It cannot be that the possibility (or even probability) of knowing more in the future can justify cause to extend a statute of limitations. Such an argument is tautological, would promote passivity rather than diligence by trustees, destroys the limitation established by Congress, and should be rejected. As the Trustee admits \"each thread of the investigation often leads to yet another thread to be pulled.\" Id. at 8. According to the Trustee then, he will always have more to learn and the statute of limitations can never close. But that is not the law.\n\nIn fact, the cases cited by the Trustee do not support the open-ended extension that the Trustee seeks. Although *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014), extended the trustee's request to extend the statute of limitations deadline, the court\n\nthere imposed strict limitations granting the trustee a 30-day extension, not the years long request (similar to the Trustee's third request here). The *Fundamental Long Term Care* explained:\n\nthe Court does not believe the Trustee requires an additional year (the time she requests). While it is true her investigation has been impeded, the Trustee has nevertheless been able to conduct a substantial amount of discovery. For instance, she has concluded at least ten Rule 2004 exams and concedes that she has received tens of thousands of pages of documents. Not to mention, she does have the benefit of the investigation the creditors undertook before filing this involuntary case.\n\n501 B.R. at 792.\n\nLikewise, *In re ThermoView, Indus.*, 381 B.R. 225, 226 (W.D. Ky. 2008) merely extended the statute of limitations deadline by thirty (30) days, not years as the Trustee functionally received and further requests here. While the Trustee states that he \"expects that, *absent unexpected developments*, this will be the last such blanket extension\" (Third Extension Motion at 1), no such assurance exists that this is the last extension request. (Emphasis added).\n\nAs a result, no reason or \"cause\" exists to extend the statute of limitations further. This is not to say that denying the motion would eliminate all recourse available to the Trustee under appropriate individualized facts, since he could still assert equitable tolling to claims brought later under appropriate circumstances.\n\nIn addition to equitable tolling, the Trustee could interpose other exceptions to the statute of limitations, such as the discovery rule. The discovery rule applies where, despite diligence, he Trustee later discovers facts supporting a claim that he could not have discovered earlier with reasonable diligence, he can argue that those claims are not barred because they had not yet accrued during the limitations period. \"[A] statute of limitations is intended to prevent plaintiffs from unfairly surprising defendants by resurrecting stale claims.\" *City of Pontiac Gen. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. MBIA, Inc.*, 637 F.3d 169, 175 (2nd Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit has explained that a claim is not barred by a statute of limitations if it hasn't accrued:\n\nOnly after a plaintiff can adequately plead his claim can that claim be said to have accrued, and only after a claim has accrued can the statute of limitations on that claim begin to run. Based on this analysis, we hold that a fact is not deemed \"discovered\" until a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about that fact to adequately plead it in a complaint. In other words, the reasonably diligent plaintiff has not \"discovered\" one of the facts constituting a securities fraud violation until he can plead that fact with sufficient detail and particularity to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.\n\n*Id*. Stated differently, there are ample avenues existing in the law to provide relief from statutes of limitations based on particularized factual showings and long-standing doctrines. There is no basis in law for the Court instead to change the statute of limitations based on the Trustee's generalized narrative.\n\nThis concern is very real for G Club. Since June 2023 G Club has been independently managed by FFP (BVI), Ltd. and cooperated with the Trustee and U.S. Attorneys' Office regarding the investigation of Mr. Kwok. G Club is concerned that even though it has already been sued several times by the Trustee, the Trustee could sue it again. While the Trustee persists on making illogical and false arguments concerning G Club's *present* management, the record shows that G Club has not acted improperly or obstructed anything at any time relevant to this case.\n\nIn sum, continued extension of the statute of limitations under the standard established in the First Ruling has not been met. There is nothing \"extraordinary\" about the \"specific facts\" proffered by the Trustee to support the Third Extension Motion, which should be denied.\n\n#### **B. Reservation of Rights to Challenge First and Second Rulings on Appeal**\n\nG Club has appealed the First and Second Rulings and believes that the Court should not have extended the statute of limitations as set forth in the First or Second Ruling. G Club further contests the Third Extension Motion on the same grounds as set forth in its previous objections. However, the undersigned is cognizant that the Court has already ruled on these issues and will\n\nnot rehash arguments already made and rejected by the Court. However, to be clear for the appellate record, G Club reserves and reasserts and adopts by reference all arguments made in its previous objections. *See* ECF Nos. 2969, 3458.\n\n## **C. Reservation of Rights to Cross Examine and Challenge the Trustee's Evidence**\n\nAs set forth above, the law does not permit a prospective general extension, regardless of the facts. But even if it did, under the standard applied by this Court in the First and Second Ruling, the Third Extension Motion fails to present facts that meet that standard's requirement of specific and extraordinary facts. Thus, in the event the Court rejects the above legal arguments, G Club reserves the right to obtain discovery, call witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses and otherwise challenge any evidence offered by the Trustee concerning a showing of \"cause\" for the requested extension. First Ruling at 20.\n\n## **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Third Extension Motion.\n\n# **G CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC**\n\nBy: */s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz* Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Kellianne Baranowsky (ct26684) GREEN & SKLARZ LLC One Audubon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served via CM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDate: February 7, 2024 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz","body_zh":"United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n案件审理：\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。[1]\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并审理）\n\n2025年2月7日\nG Club Operations, LLC 反对第11章受托人关于延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼之2025年2月15日截止日期的第二次补充动议的异议及反对法律备忘录\n\nG Club Operations, LLC（「G Club」）谨此提出异议，并提交本反对法律备忘录，反对由第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins（「受托人」）提交的《第11章受托人关于延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼之2025年2月15日截止日期的第二次补充动议》（ECF No. 4004，[2]「第三次延期动议」），该动议在法院批准受托人前两次请求之后寻求第三次为期六个月的延期，这意味着国会确立的提起撤销权诉讼的两（2）年诉讼时效现在将被变更为三年零六个月。\n\n尽管包括 G Club 在内的若干当事方提出了异议（ECF No. 2563，「第一次延期异议」），法院仍批准了该延期。ECF No. 2921（「第一次裁定」）。G Club 随后对该裁定提起上诉，该上诉目前在地区法院审理中。参见 In re: Ho Wan Kwok，民事诉讼案号：3:23-cv-01514-KAD（「待决上诉」）。此后，再次在 G Club 和其他各方的异议下，法院批准了第二次延期（ECF No. 3329，「第二次\n\n1 这些第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）（「债务人」）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产受托人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于通知与联络目的）。\n\n2 除非另有说明，所有 ECF 引用均指破产案件（案号：22-50073）中的记录条目。\n\n延期动议」）。法院亦批准了该动议（ECF No. 3417，「第二次裁定」），G Club 提起了上诉。[3] 基于以下理由，法院应驳回第三次延期动议。\n一、引言\n\n法院此前已批准受托人提出的两（2）次将诉讼时效延长至2024年8月15日的请求，其依据是认为《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》（Fed. R. Bankr. P.）第 9006(b) 条提供了这方面的授权：「基于这些理由，法院得出结论，第 9006(b) 条规则可以提供一种机制来延长第 108(a) 条、第 546(a) 条和第 549(d) 条所规定的诉讼时效。」第一次裁定第12页。法院进一步认定，在当时，受托人为其选择寻求的六个月延期指出了充分的事由，主要依赖于 IBT Int'l, Inc. v. N. (In re Int'l Admin. Servs.), 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 案。第一次裁定第8、17-18页。法院适用了相同的逻辑并批准了第二次延期动议。第二次裁定第3页。\n\n法院应当驳回受托人关于延期六个月的新动议，因为根据第三次延期动议中提供的事实，绝不可能再有进一步延长时限的正当理由。第一，Kwok 先生已被监禁多年，他在本案中不予配合的情况将永远持续下去。第二，Kwok 先生的定罪发生于2024年8月，Kwok 先生的刑事案件总会有新的进展，按照第一次裁定所确立的标准，这不应成为延期的依据。第三，认为在2024年12月响应 2004 规则调查请求并出示了文件的 G Club 造成了拖延的说法是荒谬的；但即便属实，受托人也在两个月前收到了答复，并且如下文所述，受托人可以通过长期确立的时效中止机制获得救济，根本没有必要对诉讼时效进行一揽子延期。受托人不能违背《破产法典》的具体法定条款，也不能改变法律所确立的平衡。Law v. Siegal, 571\n\n3 G Club 在两起上诉案中的开庭主辩状均应于2025年2月28日前提交。\n\nU.S. 415, 421, 427 (2014)。因此，法院必须终止受托人认为其拥有无限期、不受限制的时间来提起撤销权诉讼的观点，即使是对已经遭到起诉的当事方（例如 G Club）亦是如此。因此，法院应当驳回第三次延期动议。\n二、论证\nA. 根据法院确立的标准，受托人尚未证明有进一步延长诉讼时效的正当事由\n\n在第一次裁定中，法院认定，如果「根据法院面前的事实和情况存在『正当事由』来延长第 108(a) 条、第 546(a) 条和第 549(d) 条中的诉讼时效。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)」，则法院可以延长提起撤销权诉讼的诉讼时效。第一次裁定第12页。法院进一步解释称，它将参考与衡平法时效中止相同的标准，以确定是否存在延长《破产法典》第 546 条规定的两年时效的正当事由：「正如法院所指出的那样，尽管是在衡平法时效中止的语境下，在确定是否在破产程序中延长或中止诉讼时效时需要考量的衡平因素通常涉及债务人是否未能配合破产受托人，抑或确实试图阻碍受托人为债权人的利益调查和变现资产。」第一次裁定第13页。法院还考量了对潜在被告的通知情况以及受托人调查的勤勉程度。第一次裁定第15-17页。\n\n现在，在寻求第三次延期时，受托人再次依赖于此前两次提出过的相同理由：Kwok 先生是一名罪犯且未履行作为债务人的义务、正在进行的刑事案件、受托人的持续调查，以及第三方对其调查的阻碍。法院此前认定，需要审查本案的「非常具体且非同寻常的事实」才能认定存在必要的事由。根据这一推理，声称长期持续存在的事项绝不可能是「非同寻常的」。例如，Kwok 先生永远不会配合受托人，且刑事案件很可能会持续数年；这是否意味着受托人\n\n基于这些事实便拥有无休止的诉讼时效？国会绝不可能有意让适用的诉讼时效仅在没有人主张其第五修正案权利、或以其他方式拒绝配合、或未受到刑事起诉的情况下才适用。如果是这样，国会本应在法律中包含这些例外情况。但国会并未这样做。无论如何，刑事审判已经结束，Kwok 先生已经入狱多年。显然，受托人至少在他已经获得的额外一年的撤销权诉讼起诉期内就已经知晓该事实。\n\n受托人声称「刑事审判」也是其无法控制的。第三次延期动议第3页。但这不是法院设定的标准。发生刑事审判既不令人意外，也非异乎寻常。而且它已于2024年7月和8月结束。刑事诉讼程序很可能会持续数年。所有的刑事证据现已公开并可供受托人获取。判决后可能会出现更多信息的事实也绝非「非同寻常」。同上。未来总是会有更多信息浮出水面。诚然，在受托人已经提起的数百起案件中的任何一起案件的证据开示中，都可能会了解到更多信息（只要这些案件未被驳回），但这并不意味着延长诉讼时效具有正当性。未来了解更多信息的可能性（甚至是盖然性）绝不可能构成延长诉讼时效的正当事由。这种论点是同义反复，会助长受托人的消极怠惰而非勤勉尽责，破坏了国会确立的时效限制，应当予以驳回。正如受托人所承认的那样，「调查的每条线索往往会引出另一条需要追查的线索。」同上，第8页。那么按照受托人的说法，他将永远有更多的东西要了解，诉讼时效就永远无法闭合。但这并非法律规定。\n\n事实上，受托人引用的判例并不支持受托人所寻求的无期限延期。虽然 In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 501 B.R. 784 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014) 准许了受托人延长诉讼时效截止日期的请求，但该法院\n\n在判决中施加了严格的限制，仅给予受托人30天的延期，而非长达数年的请求（类似于受托人在此提出的第三次请求）。Fundamental Long Term Care 案解释道：\n\n法院认为受托人不需要额外的一年时间（她所请求的时间）。虽然她的调查确实受到了阻碍，但受托人仍然能够进行大量的证据开示。例如，她已经完成了至少十次 2004 规则调查，并承认她已经收到了数万页的文件。更不用说，她还受益于债权人在提起本非自愿破产案之前所进行的调查。\n\n501 B.R. at 792.\n\n同样地，In re ThermoView, Indus., 381 B.R. 225, 226 (W.D. Ky. 2008) 仅仅将诉讼时效截止日期延长了三十（30）天，而不是受托人在此实际获得并进一步请求的长达数年。虽然受托人声明他「预计，在没有意外进展的情况下，这将是最后一次此类一揽子延期」（第三次延期动议第1页），但没有任何保证能确保这是最后一次延期请求。（强调为原文所加）。\n\n因此，不存在进一步延长诉讼时效的理由或「正当事由」。这并不是说驳回该动议就会消除在适当的个别事实下受托人可以获得的所有救济途径，因为在适当的情况下，他仍然可以对随后提起的诉讼主张衡平法时效中止。\n\n除衡平法时效中止外，受托人还可以提出对诉讼时效的其他例外抗辩，例如发现规则。发现规则适用于受托人尽管尽到了勤勉义务，但随后发现了支持其主张的事实，而这些事实是他此前尽到合理勤勉也无法更早发现的情况，他可以辩称这些主张并未被禁止，因为它们在诉讼时效期间尚未产生。「诉讼时效旨在防止原告通过重新提起陈旧的主张来给被告造成不公平的突袭。」City of Pontiac Gen. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 175 (2nd Cir. 2011)。第二巡回法院解释称，如果一项主张尚未产生，则该主张不受诉讼时效的限制：\n\n只有在原告能够充分阐明其诉由之后，该诉求才能被称为已经产生；并且只有在诉求产生之后，针对该诉求的诉讼时效才能开始计算。基于这一分析，我们认定，在合理勤勉的原告拥有关于某一事实的充分信息以在起诉状中充分主张该事实之前，该事实不得被视为已被『发现』。换句话说，在合理勤勉的原告能够以足够的细节和具体性主张构成证券欺诈违规行为的事实以经受住根据 12(b)(6) 提出的驳回诉讼动议之前，该原告并未『发现』该事实。\n\n同上。换言之，基于具体化的事实陈述和长期确立的法理，法律中存在充足的途径来提供免受诉讼时效限制的救济。法院没有任何法律依据仅仅根据受托人的泛泛叙述来改变诉讼时效。\n\n这种担忧对 G Club（G俱乐部）而言是非常现实的。自 2023 年 6 月以来，G Club 一直由 FFP (BVI), Ltd. 独立管理，并就针对 Mr. Kwok（郭先生）的调查配合受托人以及 U.S. Attorneys' Office（美国联邦检察官办公室）。G Club 感到担忧的是，尽管受托人已经多次起诉它，受托人仍可能会再次对其提起诉讼。虽然受托人执意就 G Club 目前的管理层提出不合逻辑且虚假的论点，但记录显示，在与本案相关的任何时间内，G Club 均未有任何不当行为或阻碍任何事项。\n\n总而言之，在第一份裁定所确立的标准下继续延长诉讼时效的要求并未得到满足。受托人为支持其第三次延期动议所提出的“具体事实”并无任何“特殊”之处，该动议应当予以驳回。\nB. 保留在上诉中对第一份和第二份裁定提出质疑的权利\n\nG Club 已对第一份和第二份裁定提起上诉，并认为法院本不应按照第一份或第二份裁定中所述延长诉讼时效。G Club 基于其先前异议中陈述的相同理由，进一步对第三次延期动议提出异议。然而，下述签字人知悉法院已就这些问题作出裁决，因此\n\n不会老调重弹已向法院提出并被法院驳回的论点。然而，为了在上诉记录中予以明确，G Club 保留、重申并通过援引方式采用其先前异议中提出的所有论点。参见 ECF Nos. 2969, 3458。\nC. 保留对受托人的证据进行交叉询问和提出质疑的权利\n\n如上所述，无论事实如何，法律都不允许进行预先性的全面延期。但即使允许，在本院于第一份和第二份裁定中所适用的标准下，第三次延期动议也未能提出符合该标准所要求的具体且特殊事实的事实。因此，在法院驳回上述法律论点的情况下，G Club 保留就受托人提出的关于所申请延期之“正当理由”证明，进行取证、传唤证人、交叉询问证人以及以其他方式对受托人提供的任何证据提出质疑的权利。第一份裁定第 20 页。\nIV. 结论\n\n基于前述理由，法院应当驳回第三次延期动议。\nG CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC\n\n签署人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Kellianne Baranowsky (ct26684) GREEN & SKLARZ LLC One Audubon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n送达证书\n\n我在此证明，在下列日期，前述文件的副本已通过 CM/ECF 送达。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅此份备案文件。\n\n日期：February 7, 2024 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2563,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3329,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3417,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4004,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2362,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:12:09"}