{"id":"court_ctb_4040_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4040,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"NOTICE","filed_date":"2025-02-07","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors.\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **NOTICE OF FILING**\n\nApple Inc. (\"Apple\") files this notice of filing of its objection to the *Second Supplemental*\n\n*Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee to Extend February 15, 2025 Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance*\n\n*Actions* in Adv. Proc. No. 24-05060. A true and correct copy of Apple's objection is attached.\n\nDated: February 7, 2025 New York, New York */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: [george.angelich@afslaw.com](mailto:george.angelich@afslaw.com) [eric.roman@afslaw.com](mailto:eric.roman@afslaw.com) patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: [jin.yan@afslaw.com](mailto:jin.yan@afslaw.com)\n\n*Counsel for Apple Inc.*\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on February 7, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: New York, New York February 7, 2025\n\n> */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich\n\n### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nDebtors.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nAdv. Proc. No. 24-05060\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nAPPLE INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, BERNARDO ENRIQUEZ, CHUNGUANG HAN, and MEI GUO,\n\nDefendants.\n\n## **APPLE INC. OBJECTION TO SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO EXTEND FEBRUARY 15, 2025 DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS**\n\nApple Inc. (\"Apple\") objects to the motion of Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter\n\n11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") of debtor Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\") to further extend the deadline\n\nto commence avoidance actions to August 15, 2025 through his second supplemental motion dated\n\nJanuary 29, 2025 (the \"Third Extension Motion\"). Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004; Adv. Dkt. No. 68.<sup>1</sup>\n\n<sup>1</sup> Bankr. Dkt. refers to filings in the Debtor's main bankruptcy case, No. 22-50073. Adv. Dkt. refers to filings in this adversary proceeding, No. 24-05060.\n\n### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Trustee's statutory deadline to commence avoidance actions against Apple terminated on February 15, 2024. However, this Court has twice approved requests to extend the Trustee's limitations period and, in so doing, afforded the Trustee an additional year to bring claims. Apple did not have notice of the Trustee's first extension request. His second extension request was granted over Apple's opposition. A consolidated appeal is pending.\n\n2. The Trustee comes before this Court a third time requesting an order to further extend his deadline to bring claims to August 15, 2025. In other words, the 2-year periods codified in 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code could be extended to an astonishing 3.5-year limitations period through off-menu relief via judicial fiat in derogation of the plain language of the statutes, and, in some instances, without notice to affected parties.\n\n3. Another extension order buys more time for the Trustee to get to judgment in his existing alter ego adversary proceedings. Once he obtains alter ego judgments, he will sue payees of those alleged alter ego entities and argue the payees are (a) barred from opposing alter ego rulings he obtained in unrelated actions through offensive use of the law of the case doctrine, and (b) barred from challenging the belatedness of those avoidance claims. If this strategy continues, target payees (some whom may have never heard the name Ho Wan Kwok before being sued by the Trustee) of alleged alter egos will continue to be hauled into this Court by the Trustee without regard for traditional notions of fairness and substantial justice.\n\n4. The Trustee's Third Extension Motion should be denied. At a minimum, Apple should be expressly carved out from any extension granted to the Trustee.\n\n### **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**\n\n5. The Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition on February 15, 2022. Bankr. Dkt. No. 1.\n\nThe Trustee's deadline to commence litigation to avoid and recover pre-petition and post-petition transfers was February 15, 2024. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a), 549(d).\n\n6. On January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion for a six-month extension of the statute of limitations. Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509. At the time, the Trustee had not yet commenced this action, and Apple is not a scheduled creditor of the Debtor. Adv. Dkt. No. 1 (complaint filed on February 10, 2024). Apple was not served with this motion, *see* Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509, even though, according to time records of the Trustee's professionals, in December 2023 it was considered a litigation target. *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 2936.\n\n7. On February 15, 2024, the Court entered an order (the \"First Extension Order\") extending the Trustee's statute of limitations to August 15, 2024. Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921. At that time, Apple had not been served with the Trustee's complaint in this case. *See* Adv. Dkt. No. 8 (indicating Apple was served with the complaint on February 21, 2024). Apple had no opportunity to contest the Trustee's motion even though the Trustee considered Apple a litigation target. Apple is not bound by the Court's First Extension Order under fundamental principles of due process.\n\n8. On July 19, 2024, the Trustee sought another six-month extension of the statute of limitations to February 15, 2025. Bankr. Dkt. No. 3329. Unlike the first motion, the Trustee filed his second motion in this adversary proceeding in addition to the Debtor's main bankruptcy case. Adv. Dkt. No. 42.\n\n9. At the time of the Trustee's second extension motion, Apple had appeared through counsel and filed its motion to dismiss the Trustee's complaint. Adv. Dkt. Nos. 28, 32. Apple objected to the Trustee's second extension motion. Adv. Dkt. No. 45.\n\n10. On August 13, 2024, the Court held a hearing on the Trustee's second extension motion and Apple appeared and objected. The Trustee testified that he identified additional, but\n\nunpled, transfers:\n\n- Q. Trustee Despins, you're aware that you've already sued Apple, correct?\n- A. Correct.\n- Q. And you're also aware that you've already sued Meta, right?\n- A. Correct\n- Q. Have you identified any additional claims, other than the ones in your current lawsuit against Meta?\n- A. There are some smaller claims that we found, but not -- nothing material, you know, in the thousands of dollars, not in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. So, at this time, the answer would be no, nothing material.\n- Q. What about against Apple?\n- A. Same answer.\n- Q. And you said the additional claims that you found were not material, are those already asserted in the claims in the lawsuit that's been brought?\n- A. I don't think so. I think these would be added to that, but, again, not in -- it wouldn't move the dial in a material way.\n- Q. Do you intend to serve those claims against Apple or Meta?\n- A. I need to talk to counsel about that.\n\nTranscript of Proceedings dated August 13, 2024 at 31:10-32:7.\n\n11. Afterwards, on August 14, 2024, the Court overruled the objections raised by Apple\n\nand other adversary defendants and entered an order (the \"Second Extension Order\") granting the\n\nTrustee an extension to February 15, 2025 to file avoidance actions. Bankr. Dkt. No. 3417.\n\n12. Apple appealed the Court's Second Extension Order. Bankr. Dkt. No. 3463.\n\nApple's appeal was consolidated with others appeals of the Second Extension Order as well as a pending appeal of the First Extension Order. The consolidated appeal, No. 24-284, is pending in the district court.<sup>2</sup>\n\n13. On January 24, 2025, the Trustee filed the Third Extension Motion, seeking until\n\nAugust 15, 2025 to commence avoidance actions. Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004. The Third Extension\n\n<sup>2</sup> Appellate briefing has been suspended based on the Trustee's representation that the appeal may be moot if the Trustee does not seek to commence additional actions against Apple and the other appellants. The parties to that appeal have to submit a joint status report to the district court on or before March 17, 2025 advising as to whether that appeal will proceed.\n\nMotion raises the same issues in the consolidated appeal pending before the district court.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n14. The Third Extension Motion should be denied for the reasons stated in Apple's prior objection, Adv. Dkt. No. 45, which Apple incorporates, and for the following reasons.\n\n#### **I. Prophylactic Extensions of Limitations Periods Are Inappropriate.**\n\n15. Bankruptcy courts are not empowered to extend statutes of limitations as a prophylactic measure. *See*, *e.g.*, *U.S. v. Ferrell*, No. 16-cv-230, 2020 WL 1164526, at \\*1 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2020) (\"[T]his Court cannot extend the applicable statute of limitations\"); *Rushing v. Unknown Party*, No. 10-2126, 2010 WL 4737698, at \\*2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2010) (\"A court cannot extend a statute of limitation. However, in some instances, the running of the statute of limitation may be subject to tolling.\"); *Redd v. Gilless*, 857 F. Supp. 601, 605 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (\"This court cannot extend the statute of limitations on a party's motion, although the statute may be tolled for various reasons.\").\n\n16. While the Court may allow equitable tolling, that is a matter to be addressed after an action has been commenced and the requisite papers justifying such relief have been submitted. None of that has happened yet. Thus, it is not appropriate for the Court to prospectively extend the statutes of limitations under sections 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n17. As the bankruptcy court in *In re Cramer* explained, proceeding otherwise intentionally deprives adversary defendants of basic due process:\n\n[T]he trustee seeks at this time an order applying equitable tolling in his favor with respect to any and all future defendants. If the court granted the motion then, when the trustee later files complaints after the statutory deadline, the trustee would inform defendants that they have no opportunity to contest the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling because the court resolved the matter months or years earlier without notice or any opportunity to object by the parties harmed by the court order. The trustee would seek to rely upon the court order as law of the case which is no longer subject to collateral attack. This is the essential goal of such a\n\nmotion and, as such, the court cannot approve such a course of action.\n\nThe trustee remains free to raise equitably tolling at a date after filing untimely complaints. At that point, the defendants will have notice to contest the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Granting the pending motion [for prospective application of equitable tolling] would deprive them of that opportunity and would be fundamentally unfair.\n\n*Id.*, 636 B.R. 830, 832-33 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022).\n\n18. While a bankruptcy court may allow equitable tolling, that is a matter to be addressed after an action has been commenced and the requisite papers justifying such relief have been submitted. None of that has happened yet. Equitable tolling is neither ripe for consideration nor pre-adjudicatory rulings. In effect, the Trustee seeks an impermissible advisory opinion. It is not appropriate for the Court to prospectively extend the statutes of limitations under sections 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n19. Prospectively extending statutes of limitations is no different in prejudicing potential defendants than prospectively applying equitable tolling. *See In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.*, No. 5-10-bk-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) (denying motion to prospectively toll section 546 and questioning whether a bankruptcy court could extend the statute to unnamed and unidentified defendants when there was no case or controversy before the court). The limitations periods under sections 546(a) and 549(d) cannot be extended. *Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 831 (\"The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure contain no rule to extend statutory deadlines such as the ones in sections 546 & 549\").\n\n20. The Trustee mainly relies on a 2005 Eleventh Circuit decision, *In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc.*, to support the relief he seeks, but that case is both factually distinguishable and legally\n\nunsound.<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005). However, in 2022, the Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court in *In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC*, analyzed the Eleventh Circuit's *Int'l Admin. Servs.* decision and refused to apply its rationale. The facts of *Am. Purchasing Servs.* are nearly identical to the fact pattern of this case. The *Am. Purchasing Servs.* court refused to apply otherwise binding Eleventh Circuit precedent because of its flaws.\n\n21. First, the *Am. Purchasing Servs.* court explained that *Int'l Admin. Servs.* was a situation \"where the litigation targets themselves are stymying the trustee's discovery efforts.\" *Id.*, No. 20-23495, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022). Here, unlike in *Int'l Admin. Servs.*, there is no allegation that Apple stymied the Trustee's investigation. The Trustee directly blames delay on the complexity of the bankruptcy case and obstructive behavior of Mr. Kwok, his family and associates. As a result, this Court should heed the sound rationale provided in *Am. Purchasing Servs.* for not extending the statute of limitations:\n\nWhen a party transacts with an entity that ends up in bankruptcy, that party has a commercial and legal expectation that if a trustee wants to challenge an pre-petition transaction, the trustee would have to do so within two years of the order for relief. A trustee's desire – however well intentioned – for more time to negotiate with a secured creditor in an attempt to maximize a recovery for unsecured creditors, must be balanced against the commercial and legal expectations of potential litigation targets. **And where there is no showing of wrongdoing by the litigation targets, their commercial and legal expectations must prevail over a trustee's desire to maximize a recovery for creditors**.\n\n*Id.*, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*4 (emphasis added).\n\n22. Second, the *Am. Purchasing Servs.* decision also explained that *Int'l Admin. Servs.* \"has been criticized by a leading bankruptcy law treatise as 'involving some convoluted reasoning'\" in reaching the conclusion that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) permits the court to extend\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Trustee cites *In re Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Enters., LLC*, 658 B.R. 611, 621 (S.D. Fla. 2024), which follows *Int'l Admin. Servs*. That case is on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit and may well result in a reversal of *Int'l Admin. Servs*.\n\nstatutes of limitations.<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at \\*3 n.27 (citing 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.04 (16th ed. 2022)).\n\n23. Third, and importantly, *Am. Purchasing Servs.* noted that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *Int'l Admin. Servs.* was permeated by the liberal interpretation of section 105(a) that applied before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Law v. Siegel*, 571 U.S. 415 (2014). The *Siegel*  opinion was issued a decade after the Eleventh Circuit's decision and is now a well-established mandate to bankruptcy courts requiring adherence to a restrictive interpretation of section 105(a) (as discussed further below). *Am. Purchasing Servs.*, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 n.28.\n\n#### **II. Section 105(a) Does Not Permit the Court to Extend Limitations Periods.**\n\n24. To overcome the absence of statutory authority in sections 546(a) and 549(d) for the Court to extend those limitations periods, the Trustee relies upon the Court's inherent powers under section 105(a). This reliance is misplaced.\n\n25. Section 105(a) is not a source of unlimited authority to rewrite the Bankruptcy Code or fill interstitial space in statutes with recontextualized interpretations of congressional intent. Rather, \"[s]ection 105(a) confers authority to 'carry out' the provisions of the Code, but it is quite impossible to do that by taking action that the Code prohibits.\" *Law*, 571 U.S. at 421; *In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.*, 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"The equitable power conferred on the bankruptcy court by section 105(a) is the power to exercise equity in carrying out the *provisions* of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than to further the purposes of the Code generally, or otherwise to do the right thing.\") (original emphasis). In other words, section 105(a) is supposed to be used to *enforce* the limitations periods in sections 546(a) and 549(d), not to *abrogate* those\n\n<sup>4</sup> The convoluted reasoning is as follows: because Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) brings in all of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, that would include Bankruptcy Rules 7001 and 7003, and therefore Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) allows for the extension of statutes of limitations. *Int'l Admin. Servs.*, 408 F.3d 699. Not surprisingly, no other Circuit has adopted this reasoning and even lower courts in the Eleventh Circuit have criticized such flawed logic.\n\nperiods.\n\n#### **III. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Does Not Permit the Court to Extend Limitations Periods.**\n\n26. Nor does Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) empower courts to extend statutes of limitations because \"[n]owhere in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\"<sup>5</sup> *In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16- 20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*1 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018); *see also* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) (\"This paragraph (1) applies when these rules, a notice given under these rules, or a court order requires or allows an act to be performed at or within a specified period.\"); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001 (defining \"rules\" as the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure); *U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York*, 540 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"When interpreting a rule of procedure, we review the text for its 'plain meaning.'\") (citation omitted).\n\n27. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is patterned on Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), *Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship*, 507 U.S. 380, 381 (1993), and \"[e]very court to have considered this question has held that Rule 6(b) may be used only to extend time limits imposed by the court itself or by other Federal Rules, but not by statute.\" *Argentine Republic v. Nat'l Grid Plc*, 637 F.3d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing cases); *see also* 4B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 1165 (4th ed.) (\"Rule 6(b) does not apply to time periods set out in statutes\"); 1 James William Moore, et al., *Moore's Federal Practice* § 6.06(1)(a) (3d ed.) (\"Rule 6(b) does not provide any authority to extend time periods established by statutes.\"). As the D.C. Circuit reasoned,\n\nRule 6(b) gives district courts wide discretion to modify the time limits set forth in\n\n<sup>5</sup> *Accord In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.,* No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022); *In re Kirk*, No. 7-13-13269, 2014 WL 1248040, at \\*7 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 25, 2014); *In re Southampton yen Restaurant Group, LLC*, No. 09-13874 (MG), 2009 WL 3925563, at \\*3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2009); *In re Tubular Techs., LLC*, 438 B.R. 699, 710-11 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); *In re U.S. Lines, Inc.*, 262 B.R. 223, 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); *In re Damach, Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999).\n\nthe rules. Statutory time limits are different. Whether a statute of limitations may be tolled requires the court to engage in statutory interpretation. This is not a matter of the court's discretion. The intent of the legislature is controlling.\n\n*Sherrod v. Breitbart*, 720 F.3d 932, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2013).\n\n28. Procedural rules cannot override or modify statutes is an axiom exemplified by the amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) that took effect on December 1, 2024. As the Committee Notes to that amendment explain, statutory deadlines supersede any deadlines imposed by the rules:\n\nRule 12 is amended to make it clear that a federal statute that specifies another time supersedes the times to serve a responsive pleading set by paragraphs (a)(2) and (3). Paragraph (a)(1) incorporates this provision, but the structure of subdivision (a) does not seem to extend it to paragraphs (2) and (3). There is no reason to supersede an inconsistent statute by any part of Rule 12(a). The amended structure recognizes the priority of any statute for all paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).\n\n29. Even if Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) allowed the Court to extend statutes of limitation\n\n(which it does not), as the Court previously recognized, fairness to defendants is an animating concern in evaluating the Trustee's requested extension. Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 13. The Trustee's complaint against Apple was filed before the original February 15, 2024 deadline to commence avoidance actions expired, and since getting two extensions, the Trustee has forced Apple to defend and oppose a legally deficient complaint. Apple has already committed substantial resources to defend the Trustee's existing claims. Meanwhile, the Trustee is provided extension after extension without condition or oversight. Apple in turn is forced to participate in this adversary proceeding without knowing the scope and magnitude of the Trustee's claims, or when the Trustee will conclude his investigation that already exceeds all codified limitations periods by 12 months. To the extent the Court is inclined to extend the Trustee's requested extension, the Court should carve out actions or claims against Apple from the scope of that extension. *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 21 (carving out certain parties from a previously granted\n\nextension).\n\n#### **IV. Section 108(a) Is Not a Limitations Period and Cannot Be Extended.**\n\n30. In seeking a further extension, the Trustee relies, in part, on section 108(a) which he describes as a statute of limitations. He is wrong. Section 108 is a limitation on the Trustee's ability to commence litigation. *See In re Chenault*, No. 04-91786, 2010 WL 797015, at \\*3 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2010) (\"Section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the outer limits of when a Trustee can commence any prepetition cause of action\"); *Seawinds Ltd. v. Nedlloyd Lines, B.V.*, 80 B.R. 181, 189 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (explaining that the purpose of section 108(a) \"is to give the trustee or debtor sufficient time to decide whether to start a lawsuit\").\n\n31. Section 108 is characterized by most courts as a tolling statute. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Berjac of Oregon*, 538 B.R. 67, 78 (D. Or. 2015) (\"Bankruptcy Code section 108 tolls the statute of limitations for debtors bringing certain nonbankruptcy law claims.\"); *Seawinds Ltd.*, 80 B.R. at 187, 189 (explaining that \"section 108(a) provides a 'tolling period' of at least two years\" and its purpose is \"to give the trustee or debtor sufficient time to decide whether to start a lawsuit\"); *In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd*., 452 B.R. 52, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing section 108 as containing \"tolling provisions\"); *AJ Ruiz Consultoria Empresarial S.A. v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A*., No. AP 21-01213 (LGB), 2024 WL 460482, at \\*19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2024) (explaining that a trustee \"gets the benefit of section 108(a) tolling\"). The Trustee cannot toll a tolling statute.\n\n32. It is also inappropriate for the Court to prospectively extend statutes of limitations under non-bankruptcy laws which are tolled by section 108(a).<sup>6</sup> The text of section 108(a) gives\n\n<sup>6</sup> Since the Trustee seeks an extension to assert only avoidance actions, Apple contends that section 108(a) is inapplicable. To the extent the Trustee attempts to assert non-bankruptcy claims against Apple in the future, such claims would be outside the tolling period permitted by section 108(a)\n\ndeference to applicable state law statutes of limitations, and nothing in the text of that tolling statute invites, permits or enables a federal court to override the policy decisions of state legislators. *See* 11 U.S.C. 108(a); *In re Health Support Network, Inc.*, No. 15-bk-10966-MGW, 2018 WL 1621027, at \\*3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2018) (\"Unlike Rule 9006, § 108 only applies to time limitations fixed by nonbankruptcy law. It doesn't create or extend time limitations for bringing bankruptcy causes of action.\").\n\n33. Statutes of limitations exist for a reason—to provide finality. In the absence of an extension order, time-barred claims are useless to the Trustee. The Trustee's goal in obtaining yet another order for an extension of the statute of limitations is transparent—he wants more time to diligence additional non-debtor entities that will become the target of additional alter ego adversary proceedings, and then offensively use alter ego rulings into the bases for additional avoidance actions.\n\n34. As the *Am. Purchasing Servs.* court has made clear, regardless of how wellintentioned the Trustee's desire to pursue recoveries may be, the commercial and legal expectations of litigation targets must prevail over the Trustee's objectives. The Trustee's Third Extension Motion must be denied.\n\n#### **RESERVATION OF RIGHTS**\n\n35. Apple reserves all rights, arguments, defenses, and remedies. To the extent the Trustee may seek to bring additional actions or claims against Apple that would be time-barred, Apple objects to the requested extension. Apple also reserves the right to challenge any claim brought by the Trustee that would be untimely but for the extension of the original February 15, 2024 deadline.\n\nand therefore time-barred.\n\nWHEREFORE, Apple respectfully requests that the Court deny the Trustee's motion to extend the February 15, 2025 deadline to file avoidance actions, at least as it applies to any actions or claims against Apple, and grant Apple such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.\n\nDated: February 7, 2025 New York, New York */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: george.angelich@afslaw.com eric.roman@afslaw.com patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\n*Counsel for Apple Inc.*\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on February 7, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: February 7, 2025 New York, New York\n\n> */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n第11章\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n（合并管理）\n提交通知\n\nApple Inc.（苹果公司，“Apple”）特此提交其对第11章受托人延长受托人于 February 15, 2025 前在对抗程序案号 24-05060 中提起撤销诉讼期限的第二份补充动议之异议提交通知。Apple 异议的真实、准确副本随附于后。\n\n日期：February 7, 2025\nNew York, New York\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich（乔治·安杰利奇）(ct27542)\nEric Roman（埃里克·罗曼）（获准以特别许可出庭）\nPatrick Feeney（帕特里克·菲尼）（获准以特别许可出庭）\nArentFox Schiff LLP（ArentFox Schiff 律师事务所）\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212.457.5423\n电子邮箱：[george.angelich@afslaw.com]\n[eric.roman@afslaw.com]\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n及\n\nJin Yan（严进）（获准以特别许可出庭）\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\n电话：202.778.6442\n电子邮箱：[jin.yan@afslaw.com]\n\nApple Inc. 代理律师\n送达证明\n\n本人证明，于 February 7, 2025，本人已通过 CM/ECF 电子提交系统向法院书记官提交上述文件的真实、准确副本，该系统将向所有登记在案的律师发送该提交的通知。\n\n日期：New York, New York\nFebruary 7, 2025\n\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich（乔治·安杰利奇）\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\n对抗程序案号 24-05060\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章受托人，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nAPPLE INC.（苹果公司）、HING CHI NGOK（欣·奇·诺克）、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS（亚历克斯·哈吉查拉兰布斯）、BERNARDO ENRIQUEZ（贝尔纳多·恩里克斯）、CHUNGUANG HAN（韩春光）及 MEI GUO（郭梅），\n\n被告。\nAPPLE INC. 对第11章受托人延长受托人于 FEBRUARY 15, 2025 前提起撤销诉讼期限的第二份补充动议之异议\n\nApple Inc.（“Apple”）反对 Luc A. Despins 以债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（“债务人”）的第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份提出的动议，该动议通过其日期为 January 29, 2025 的第二份补充动议（“第三次延期动议”），请求将提起撤销诉讼的期限进一步延长至 August 15, 2025。Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004；Adv. Dkt. No. 68.1\n\n1 Bankr. Dkt. 指债务人主破产案件 No. 22-50073 中的提交文件。Adv. Dkt. 指本对抗程序 No. 24-05060 中的提交文件。\n\n引言\n\n1. 受托人针对 Apple 提起撤销诉讼的法定期限于 February 15, 2024 届满。然而，本院已两次批准延长受托人时效期间的请求，从而给予受托人额外一年时间提出请求。Apple 未收到受托人第一次延期请求的通知。其第二次延期请求是在 Apple 反对的情况下获准的。一项合并上诉正在审理中。\n\n2. 受托人第三次向本院提出请求，要求作出裁定，将其提出请求的期限进一步延长至 August 15, 2025。换言之，《破产法典》第 546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的 2 年期间，可能通过有违法律条文明确文义、以司法裁断方式给予法定规定之外的救济，而被延长为惊人的 3.5 年时效期间，并且在某些情况下未向受影响当事人发出通知。\n\n3. 又一项延期命令将给予受托人更多时间，使其在现有的另我对抗程序中取得判决。一旦其取得另我判决，其将起诉这些被指称另我实体的受款人，并主张该等受款人：(a) 因进攻性适用案件法则原则，而不得反对其在无关诉讼中取得的另我裁定；以及 (b) 不得质疑该等撤销请求提出过晚。如果该策略继续，受托人将继续把被指称另我的目标受款人（其中一些人在被受托人起诉前可能从未听说过 Ho Wan Kwok 之名）带至本院，而不顾传统的公平观念和实质正义。\n\n4. 应驳回受托人的第三次延期动议。至少，应明确将 Apple 排除在授予受托人的任何延期之外。\n\n程序经过\n\n5. 债务人于 February 15, 2022 提交破产申请。Bankr. Dkt. No. 1。受托人提起诉讼以撤销并追回申请前及申请后转让的期限为 February 15, 2024。11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a), 549(d)。\n\n6. 于 January 18, 2024，受托人提交动议，请求将诉讼时效延长六个月。Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509。当时，受托人尚未提起本案，且 Apple 并非债务人的列名债权人。Adv. Dkt. No. 1（起诉状于 February 10, 2024 提交）。Apple 未获送达该动议，见 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509，尽管根据受托人专业人员的工时记录，Apple 在 December 2023 已被视为诉讼目标。见 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2936。\n\n7. 于 February 15, 2024，法院作出命令（“第一次延期命令”），将受托人的诉讼时效延长至 August 15, 2024。Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921。当时，Apple 尚未获送达受托人在本案中的起诉状。见 Adv. Dkt. No. 8（表明 Apple 于 February 21, 2024 获送达起诉状）。尽管受托人将 Apple 视为诉讼目标，Apple 仍无机会对受托人的动议提出异议。根据正当程序的基本原则，Apple 不受法院第一次延期命令的约束。\n\n8. 于 July 19, 2024，受托人请求将诉讼时效再延长六个月至 February 15, 2025。Bankr. Dkt. No. 3329。与第一次动议不同，受托人除在债务人的主破产案件中提交第二次动议外，还在本对抗程序中提交了该动议。Adv. Dkt. No. 42。\n\n9. 在受托人第二次延期动议提出时，Apple 已通过代理律师出庭，并提交了其驳回受托人起诉状的动议。Adv. Dkt. Nos. 28, 32。Apple 对受托人的第二次延期动议提出异议。Adv. Dkt. No. 45。\n\n10. 于 August 13, 2024，法院就受托人的第二次延期动议举行听证，Apple 出庭并提出异议。受托人证称，其识别出额外但未在诉状中陈述的转让：\n\n问：Despins 受托人，您知道您已经起诉 Apple，对吗？\n答：对。\n问：您也知道您已经起诉 Meta，对吗？\n答：对。\n问：除您目前针对 Meta 的诉讼中的请求外，您是否识别出任何额外请求？\n答：我们发现了一些较小的请求，但没有任何重大请求，您知道，是数千美元，不是数十万美元。因此，目前答案是否定的，没有任何重大请求。\n问：针对 Apple 的请求呢？\n答：同样的答案。\n问：您说您发现的额外请求并不重大，这些请求是否已经在已提起诉讼中的请求中主张？\n答：我认为没有。我认为这些会加入其中，但再次强调，不会以实质方式改变结果。\n问：您是否打算向 Apple 或 Meta 送达这些请求？\n答：我需要与律师讨论此事。\n\n日期为 August 13, 2024 的庭审记录，第 31:10-32:7 页。\n\n11. 此后，于 August 14, 2024，法院驳回 Apple 和其他对抗程序被告提出的异议，并作出命令（“第二次延期命令”），准许受托人将提起撤销诉讼的期限延长至 February 15, 2025。Bankr. Dkt. No. 3417。\n\n12. Apple 对法院的第二次延期命令提出上诉。Bankr. Dkt. No. 3463。Apple 的上诉与其他对第二次延期命令的上诉以及对第一次延期命令的一项待决上诉合并。合并上诉 No. 24-284 正在地区法院审理中。2\n\n13. 于 January 24, 2025，受托人提交第三次延期动议，请求获准于 August 15, 2025 前提起撤销诉讼。Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004。第三次延期动议提出了地区法院待决合并上诉中相同的问题。\n\n2 上诉书面陈述程序已被暂停，原因是受托人表示，若受托人不寻求对 Apple 及其他上诉人提起额外诉讼，则该上诉可能已无实际意义。该上诉的当事人必须于 March 17, 2025 或之前向地区法院提交联合状态报告，说明该上诉是否将继续进行。\n\n论证\n\n14. 基于 Apple 先前异议 Adv. Dkt. No. 45 中所述理由（Apple 在此援引该异议）以及下述理由，应驳回第三次延期动议。\n\nI. 预防性延长时效期间并不适当。\n\n15. 破产法院无权作为预防性措施延长诉讼时效。见，例如，U.S. v. Ferrell, No. 16-cv-230, 2020 WL 1164526, at \\*1 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2020)（“本院不能延长适用的诉讼时效”）；Rushing v. Unknown Party, No. 10-2126, 2010 WL 4737698, at \\*2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2010)（“法院不能延长诉讼时效。但是，在某些情况下，诉讼时效的进行可能中止。”）；Redd v. Gilless, 857 F. Supp. 601, 605 (W.D. Tenn. 1994)（“本院不能依当事人的动议延长诉讼时效，尽管该时效可能因各种原因中止。”）。\n\n16. 虽然法院可准许衡平中止，但该事项应在诉讼已经提起且已提交证明此类救济正当的必要文件后处理。上述情形目前均未发生。因此，法院不宜前瞻性地延长《破产法典》第 546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的诉讼时效。\n\n17. 如 In re Cramer 一案中的破产法院所解释，采取其他做法将故意剥夺对抗程序被告的基本正当程序：\n\n“受托人目前寻求一项命令，对其有利地将衡平中止适用于任何及所有未来被告。如果法院准许该动议，则当受托人在法定期限后提起起诉状时，受托人将告知被告，他们没有机会对衡平中止原则的适用提出异议，因为法院在数月或数年前，未向受法院命令损害的当事人发出通知或给予其任何提出异议机会的情况下，已解决该事项。受托人将寻求将该法院命令作为案件法则加以依赖，而该命令不再受附带攻击。此即此类动议的根本目的，因此，法院不能批准该等做法。\n\n受托人仍可在提交逾期起诉状后的日期提出衡平中止问题。届时，被告将收到通知，以对衡平中止原则的适用提出异议。准许待决动议［关于前瞻性适用衡平中止的动议］将剥夺他们该机会，且将构成根本性不公平。”\n\nId., 636 B.R. 830, 832-33 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)。\n\n18. 虽然破产法院可准许衡平中止，但该事项应在诉讼已经提起且已提交证明此类救济正当的必要文件后处理。上述情形目前均未发生。衡平中止既尚未具备审理条件，也不应在裁判前作出裁定。实际上，受托人寻求一项不被允许的咨询意见。法院不宜前瞻性地延长《破产法典》第 546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的诉讼时效。\n\n19. 前瞻性地延长诉讼时效，与前瞻性地适用衡平法上的时效中止相比，对潜在被告造成的不利影响并无不同。参见 In re No. 1 Contracting Corp., No. 5-10-bk-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012)（驳回前瞻性中止第546条时效的动议，并质疑在法院面前不存在案件或争议时，破产法院是否能够将该法定期限延长至未具名且身份不明的被告）。根据第546(a)条和第549(d)条规定的期限不得延长。Cramer, 636 B.R. at 831（“《联邦破产程序规则》并无任何规则允许延长第546条和第549条所规定的此类法定期限”）。\n\n20. 受托人主要依赖第十一巡回上诉法院于2005年作出的裁决 In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc. 来支持其所请求的救济，但该案在事实方面可予区分，且在法律上站不住脚。3 Id., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)。然而，2022年，Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court（佛罗里达南区破产法院）在 In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC 一案中分析了第十一巡回上诉法院在 Int'l Admin. Servs. 一案中的裁决，并拒绝适用其推理。Am. Purchasing Servs. 一案的事实与本案的事实模式几乎完全相同。Am. Purchasing Servs. 法院因其缺陷而拒绝适用本应具有约束力的第十一巡回上诉法院先例。\n\n21. 首先，Am. Purchasing Servs. 法院解释称，Int'l Admin. Servs. 属于“诉讼对象本身正在阻挠受托人调查取证努力”的情形。Id., No. 20-23495, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022)。在本案中，与 Int'l Admin. Servs. 不同，并无任何指称称 Apple（苹果公司）阻挠了受托人的调查。受托人直接将延误归咎于破产案件的复杂性以及 Kwok先生（郭文贵）、其家人和关联人士的阻挠行为。因此，本院应当遵循 Am. Purchasing Servs. 为不延长诉讼时效所提供的合理理由：\n\n当一方与后来进入破产程序的实体进行交易时，该方具有商业和法律上的合理预期，即如果受托人希望对一项破产申请前交易提出异议，受托人必须在救济令作出后两年内提出。受托人希望获得更多时间与有担保债权人协商、以尽力最大化无担保债权人回收额的愿望——无论其用意多么良善——必须与潜在诉讼对象的商业和法律预期相平衡。在未显示诉讼对象存在不当行为的情况下，其商业和法律预期必须优先于受托人为债权人最大化回收额的愿望。\n\nId., 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*4（强调系后加）。\n\n22. 其次，Am. Purchasing Servs. 裁决还解释称，Int'l Admin. Servs. 因得出《破产程序规则》第9006(b)条允许法院延长诉讼时效这一结论，而被一部权威破产法论著批评为“包含某些曲折复杂的推理”。4 Id. at \\*3 n.27 (citing 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.04 (16th ed. 2022))。\n\n3 受托人援引 In re Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Enters., LLC, 658 B.R. 611, 621 (S.D. Fla. 2024)，该案遵循 Int'l Admin. Servs.。该案目前正在第十一巡回上诉法院审理上诉，并且很可能导致 Int'l Admin. Servs. 被推翻。\n\n23. 第三，也是重要的一点，Am. Purchasing Servs. 指出，第十一巡回上诉法院在 Int'l Admin. Servs. 一案中的裁决，受到 Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415 (2014) 一案中 U.S. Supreme Court（美国联邦最高法院）裁决作出之前适用的对第105(a)条宽泛解释的全面影响。Siegel 意见书在第十一巡回上诉法院作出裁决十年后才发布，现在已成为要求破产法院遵循对第105(a)条限制性解释的既定指令（如下文进一步讨论）。Am. Purchasing Servs., 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 n.28。\n\nII. 第105(a)条不允许法院延长时效期间。\n\n24. 为克服第546(a)条和第549(d)条中缺乏授权本院延长该等时效期间的法定依据，受托人依赖本院根据第105(a)条享有的固有权力。此种依赖并不恰当。\n\n25. 第105(a)条并非赋予无限权力以改写《破产法典》或以重新语境化的国会意图解释填补法规间隙的来源。相反，“第105(a)条赋予实施《法典》条款的权力，但通过采取《法典》禁止的行动来实施这些条款显然是不可能的。”Law, 571 U.S. at 421；In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003)（“第105(a)条赋予破产法院的衡平权力，是在实施《破产法典》条款时行使衡平权的权力，而不是一般性地推进《法典》的目的，或以其他方式做正确之事的权力。”）（原文强调）。换言之，第105(a)条应当用于执行第546(a)条和第549(d)条规定的时效期间，而不是废止该等期间。\n\nIII. 《破产程序规则》第9006(b)条不允许法院延长时效期间。\n\n26. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) 也未授权法院延长诉讼时效，因为“该规则中没有任何地方提及法定期限。”5 In re Walnut Hill, No. 16- 20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*1 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)；另见 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)（“当本规则、根据本规则发出的通知或法院命令要求或允许在指定期间内或于该期间届满时完成某项行为时，本款第(1)项适用。”）；Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001（将“规则”界定为《联邦破产程序规则》）；U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 540 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2008)（“在解释程序规则时，我们审阅文本以确定其‘通常含义’。”）（引文略）。\n\n27. 《破产程序规则》第9006(b)条以 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) 为范本，Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 381 (1993)，且“审议过该问题的每一家法院均认为，第6(b)条只能用于延长由法院自身或其他《联邦规则》规定的期限，而不能延长法定期限。”Argentine Republic v. Nat'l Grid Plc, 637 F.3d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2011)（援引案例）；另见 4B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1165 (4th ed.)（“第6(b)条不适用于法规规定的期间”）；1 James William Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 6.06(1)(a) (3d ed.)（“第6(b)条并未赋予延长法规设定期间的任何权力。”）。正如 D.C. Circuit（哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院）所推理：\n\n第6(b)条赋予地区法院广泛裁量权，以修改规则规定的期限。法定期限则不同。诉讼时效是否可以中止，要求法院进行法定解释。这不是法院裁量的问题。立法机关的意图具有决定性作用。\n\nSherrod v. Breitbart, 720 F.3d 932, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2013)。\n\n28. 程序规则不得凌驾或修改法规，是一项公理，该公理由于 December 1, 2024 生效的对 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) 的修正而得到例证。正如该项修正的委员会说明所解释，法定期限优先于规则设定的任何期限：\n\n对第12条作出修正，以明确规定：如果联邦法规规定了另一期限，该期限优先于第(a)(2)项和第(a)(3)项规定的送达答辩状期限。第(a)(1)项纳入了该规定，但第(a)款的结构似乎并未将其延伸至第(2)项和第(3)项。没有理由以第12(a)条的任何部分取代不一致的法规。修正后的结构确认，对于第(1)、(2)和(3)项中的所有规定，任何法规均具有优先地位。\n\n29. 即使《破产程序规则》第9006(b)条允许本院延长诉讼时效（事实并非如此），如本院先前所承认，被告的公平性是评估受托人所请求延长时的一个核心关切。Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 13。受托人针对 Apple 的起诉状在启动撤销诉讼的原定 February 15, 2024 截止日期届满之前提交；并且在获得两次延期后，受托人迫使 Apple 对一份法律上存在缺陷的起诉状进行抗辩和反对。Apple 已经投入大量资源对受托人现有的请求进行抗辩。与此同时，受托人在没有条件或监督的情况下获得一次又一次延期。反过来，Apple 被迫参与该对抗程序，却不知道受托人请求的范围和规模，也不知道受托人何时将完成其调查；该调查已超出所有法典化时效期间12个月。倘若本院倾向于准许受托人请求的延期，本院应将针对 Apple 的诉讼或请求排除在该延期范围之外。参见 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 21（将某些当事人排除在此前获准的延期之外）。\n\nIV. 第108(a)条不是时效期间，且不得延长。\n\n30. 在寻求进一步延期时，受托人部分依赖第108(a)条，并将其描述为诉讼时效。他错了。第108条是对受托人提起诉讼能力的限制。参见 In re Chenault, No. 04-91786, 2010 WL 797015, at \\*3 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2010)（“《破产法典》第108(a)条规定了受托人可以提起任何破产申请前诉因的最长期限”）；Seawinds Ltd. v. Nedlloyd Lines, B.V., 80 B.R. 181, 189 (N.D. Cal. 1987)（解释第108(a)条的目的“是给予受托人或债务人充分时间，以决定是否提起诉讼”）。\n\n31. 大多数法院将第108条定性为时效中止法规。参见，例如，In re Berjac of Oregon, 538 B.R. 67, 78 (D. Or. 2015)（“《破产法典》第108条中止债务人提出某些非破产法请求的诉讼时效。”）；Seawinds Ltd., 80 B.R. at 187, 189（解释“第108(a)条规定至少两年的‘中止期间’”，其目的“是给予受托人或债务人充分时间，以决定是否提起诉讼”）；In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 452 B.R. 52, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)（将第108条描述为包含“时效中止规定”）；AJ Ruiz Consultoria Empresarial S.A. v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., No. AP 21-01213 (LGB), 2024 WL 460482, at \\*19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2024)（解释受托人“享有第108(a)条时效中止的利益”）。受托人不能中止一项时效中止法规。\n\n32. 对于由第108(a)条中止的非破产法下诉讼时效，由本院前瞻性地延长亦不恰当。6 第108(a)条的文本赋予\n\n6 鉴于受托人仅寻求延期提起撤销权诉讼，Apple Inc.（苹果公司）主张第 108(a) 条不适用。在受托人日后试图对苹果公司主张非破产法请求权的范围内，该等请求权将不在第 108(a) 条允许的中止期间内\n\n对适用州法时效法规的尊重，且该中止时效法规的文本中没有任何内容邀请、允许或使联邦法院能够推翻州立法者作出的政策决定。见 11 U.S.C. 108(a); In re Health Support Network, Inc., No. 15-bk-10966-MGW, 2018 WL 1621027, at \\*3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2018)（“不同于规则 9006，第 108 条仅适用于非破产法规定的时限。它并不创设或延长提起破产法诉因的时限。”）。\n\n33. 时效法规的存在事出有因——即提供终局性。在不存在延期命令的情况下，已过时效的请求权对受托人毫无用处。受托人取得又一项时效延期命令的目标显而易见——他希望获得更多时间，对将成为更多另我对抗程序目标的其他非债务人实体进行尽职调查，随后进攻性地将另我裁定作为更多撤销权诉讼的依据。\n\n34. 如 Am. Purchasing Servs. 法院已明确指出，无论受托人追求追偿的愿望多么善意，诉讼对象在商业和法律上的预期均必须优先于受托人的目标。受托人的第三次延期动议必须被驳回。\n\n权利保留\n\n35. 苹果公司保留一切权利、论点、抗辩和救济。在受托人可能寻求对苹果公司提起其他本会因时效届满而被禁止的诉讼或请求权的范围内，苹果公司反对所请求的延期。苹果公司还保留对受托人提出的任何请求权提出异议的权利；若非原定 February 15, 2024 截止日期被延期，该等请求权本将不及时。\n\n并因此受到时效限制。\n\n因此，苹果公司谨请求法院驳回受托人关于将提交撤销权诉讼的 February 15, 2025 截止日期延期的动议，至少就针对苹果公司的任何诉讼或请求权而言，并给予苹果公司法院认为适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：February 7, 2025\nNew York, New York\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542)\nEric Roman (admitted pro hac vice)\nPatrick Feeney (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212.457.5423\n电子邮件：george.angelich@afslaw.com\neric.roman@afslaw.com\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- 以及 -\n\nJin Yan (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\n电话：202.778.6442\n电子邮件：jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\nApple Inc.（苹果公司）的代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人证明，于 February 7, 2025，本人已通过 CM/ECF 电子提交系统向法院书记员提交上述文件的一份真实、正确副本；该系统将向所有登记在案的律师发送该等提交的通知。\n\n日期：February 7, 2025\nNew York, New York\n\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":8,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":45,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":68,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2936,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3329,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3417,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3463,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4004,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4318,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-02-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-02-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:24:26"}