{"id":"court_ctb_4042_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4042,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"NOTICE","filed_date":"2025-02-07","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors.\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **NOTICE OF FILING**\n\nMeta Platforms, Inc. (\"Meta\") files this notice of filing of its objection to the *Second*\n\n*Supplemental Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee to Extend February 15, 2025 Deadline for Trustee to*\n\n*File Avoidance Actions* in Adv. Proc. No. 24-05117. A true and correct copy of Meta's objection\n\nis attached.\n\nDated: February 7, 2025 New York, New York */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: [george.angelich@afslaw.com](mailto:george.angelich@afslaw.com) [eric.roman@afslaw.com](mailto:eric.roman@afslaw.com) patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: [jin.yan@afslaw.com](mailto:jin.yan@afslaw.com)\n\n*Counsel for Meta Platforms, Inc.*\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on February 7, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: New York, New York February 7, 2025\n\n> */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich\n\n### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nDebtors.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC.,\n\nDefendant.\n\nAdv. Proc. No. 24-05117\n\n## **META PLATFORMS, INC. OBJECTION TO SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO EXTEND FEBRUARY 15, 2025 DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS**\n\nMeta Platforms Inc. (\"Meta\") objects to the motion of Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") of debtor Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\") to further extend the deadline to commence avoidance actions to August 15, 2025 through his second supplemental motion dated January 29, 2025 (the \"Third Extension Motion\"). Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004; Adv. Dkt. No. 43.<sup>1</sup>\n\n<sup>1</sup> Bankr. Dkt. refers to filings in the Debtor's main bankruptcy case, No. 22-50073. Adv. Dkt. refers to filings in this adversary proceeding, No. 24-05117.\n\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Trustee's statutory deadline to commence avoidance actions against Meta terminated on February 15, 2024. However, this Court has twice approved requests to extend the Trustee's limitations period and, in so doing, afforded the Trustee an additional year to bring claims. Meta did not have notice of the Trustee's first extension request. His second extension request was granted over Meta's opposition. A consolidated appeal is pending.\n\n2. The Trustee comes before this Court a third time requesting an order to further extend his deadline to bring claims to August 15, 2025. In other words, the 2-year periods codified in 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code could be extended to an astonishing 3.5-year limitations period through off-menu relief via judicial fiat in derogation of the plain language of the statutes, and, in some instances, without notice to affected parties.\n\n3. Another extension order buys more time for the Trustee to get to judgment in his existing alter ego adversary proceedings. Once he obtains alter ego judgments, he will sue payees of those alleged alter ego entities and argue the payees are (a) barred from opposing alter ego rulings he obtained in unrelated actions through offensive use of the law of the case doctrine, and (b) barred from challenging the belatedness of those avoidance claims. If this strategy continues, target payees (some whom may have never heard the name Ho Wan Kwok before being sued by the Trustee) of alleged alter egos will continue to be hauled into this Court by the Trustee without regard for traditional notions of fairness and substantial justice.\n\n4. The Trustee's Third Extension Motion should be denied. At a minimum, Meta should be expressly carved out from any extension granted to the Trustee.\n\n#### **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**\n\n5. The Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition on February 15, 2022. Bankr. Dkt. No. 1.\n\nThe Trustee's deadline to commence litigation to avoid and recover pre-petition and post-petition transfers was February 15, 2024. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a), 549(d).\n\n6. On January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion for a six-month extension of the statute of limitations. Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509. At the time, the Trustee had not yet commenced this action, and Meta is not a scheduled creditor of the Debtor. Adv. Dkt. No. 1 (complaint filed on February 11, 2024). Meta was not served with this motion. *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509.\n\n7. On February 15, 2024, the Court entered an order (the \"First Extension Order\") extending the Trustee's statute of limitations to August 15, 2024. Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921. At that time, Meta had not been served with the Trustee's complaint in this case. *See* Adv. Dkt. No. 8 (indicating Meta was served with the complaint on February 23, 2024). Meta had no opportunity to contest the Trustee's motion even though the Trustee considered Meta a litigation target. Meta is not bound by the Court's First Extension Order under fundamental principles of due process.\n\n8. On July 19, 2024, the Trustee sought another six-month extension of the statute of limitations to February 15, 2025 . Bankr. Dkt. No. 3329. Unlike the first motion, the Trustee filed his second motion in this adversary proceeding in addition to the Debtor's main bankruptcy case. Adv. Dkt. No. 25.\n\n9. At the time of the Trustee's second extension motion, Meta had appeared through counsel and filed its motion to dismiss the Trustee's complaint. Adv. Dkt. Nos. 14, 18. Meta objected to the Trustee's second extension motion. Adv. Dkt. No. 28.\n\n10. On August 13, 2024, the Court held a hearing on the Trustee's second extension motion and Meta appeared and objected. The Trustee testified that he identified additional, but unpled, transfers:\n\nQ. Trustee Despins, you're aware that you've already sued Apple, correct?\n\nA. Correct.\n\n- Q. And you're also aware that you've already sued Meta, right?\n- A. Correct\n- Q. Have you identified any additional claims, other than the ones in your current lawsuit against Meta?\n- A. There are some smaller claims that we found, but not -- nothing material, you know, in the thousands of dollars, not in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. So, at this time, the answer would be no, nothing material.\n- Q. What about against Apple?\n- A. Same answer.\n- Q. And you said the additional claims that you found were not material, are those already asserted in the claims in the lawsuit that's been brought?\n- A. I don't think so. I think these would be added to that, but, again, not in -- it wouldn't move the dial in a material way.\n- Q. Do you intend to serve those claims against Apple or Meta?\n- A. I need to talk to counsel about that.\n\nTranscript of Proceedings dated August 13, 2024 at 31:10-32:7.\n\n11. Afterwards, on August 14, 2024, the Court overruled the objections raised by Meta\n\nand other adversary defendants and entered an order (the \"Second Extension Order\") granting the Trustee an extension to February 15, 2025 to file avoidance actions. Bankr. Dkt. No. 3417.\n\n12. Meta appealed the Court's Second Extension Order. Bankr. Dkt. No. 3464. Meta's\n\nappeal was consolidated with others appeals of the Second Extension Order as well as a pending appeal of the First Extension Order. The consolidated appeal, No. 24-284, is pending in the district court.<sup>2</sup>\n\n13. On January 24, 2025, the Trustee filed the Third Extension Motion, seeking until\n\nAugust 15, 2025 to commence avoidance actions. Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004. The Third Extension\n\nMotion raises the same issues in the consolidated appeal pending before the district court.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Appellate briefing has been suspended based on the Trustee's representation that the appeal may be moot if the Trustee does not seek to commence additional actions against Meta and the other appellants. The parties to that appeal have to submit a joint status report to the district court on or before March 17, 2025 advising as to whether that appeal will proceed.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n14. The Third Extension Motion should be denied for the reasons stated in Meta's prior objection, Adv. Dkt. No. 28, which Meta incorporates, and for the following reasons.\n\n#### **I. Prophylactic Extensions of Limitations Periods Are Inappropriate.**\n\n15. Bankruptcy courts are not empowered to extend statutes of limitations as a prophylactic measure. *See*, *e.g.*, *U.S. v. Ferrell*, No. 16-cv-230, 2020 WL 1164526, at \\*1 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2020) (\"[T]his Court cannot extend the applicable statute of limitations\"); *Rushing v. Unknown Party*, No. 10-2126, 2010 WL 4737698, at \\*2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2010) (\"A court cannot extend a statute of limitation. However, in some instances, the running of the statute of limitation may be subject to tolling.\"); *Redd v. Gilless*, 857 F. Supp. 601, 605 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (\"This court cannot extend the statute of limitations on a party's motion, although the statute may be tolled for various reasons.\").\n\n16. While the Court may allow equitable tolling, that is a matter to be addressed after an action has been commenced and the requisite papers justifying such relief have been submitted. None of that has happened yet. Thus, it is not appropriate for the Court to prospectively extend the statutes of limitations under sections 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n17. As the bankruptcy court in *In re Cramer* explained, proceeding otherwise intentionally deprives adversary defendants of basic due process:\n\n[T]he trustee seeks at this time an order applying equitable tolling in his favor with respect to any and all future defendants. If the court granted the motion then, when the trustee later files complaints after the statutory deadline, the trustee would inform defendants that they have no opportunity to contest the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling because the court resolved the matter months or years earlier without notice or any opportunity to object by the parties harmed by the court order. The trustee would seek to rely upon the court order as law of the case which is no longer subject to collateral attack This is the essential goal of such a motion and, as such, the court cannot approve such a course of action.\n\nThe trustee remains free to raise equitably tolling at a date after filing untimely complaints. At that point, the defendants will have notice to contest the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Granting the pending motion [for prospective application of equitable tolling] would deprive them of that opportunity and would be fundamentally unfair.\n\n*Id.*, 636 B.R. 830, 832-33 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022).\n\n18. While a bankruptcy court may allow equitable tolling, that is a matter to be addressed after an action has been commenced and the requisite papers justifying such relief have been submitted. None of that has happened yet. Equitable tolling is neither ripe for consideration nor pre-adjudicatory rulings. In effect, the Trustee seeks an impermissible advisory opinion. It is not appropriate for the Court to prospectively extend the statutes of limitations under sections 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n19. Prospectively extending statutes of limitations is no different in prejudicing potential defendants than prospectively applying equitable tolling. *See In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.*, No. 5-10-bk-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) (denying motion to prospectively toll section 546 and questioning whether a bankruptcy court could extend the statute to unnamed and unidentified defendants when there was no case or controversy before the court). The limitations periods under sections 546(a) and 549(d) cannot be extended. *Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 831 (\"The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure contain no rule to extend statutory deadlines such as the ones in sections 546 & 549\").\n\n20. The Trustee mainly relies on a 2005 Eleventh Circuit decision, *In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc.*, to support the relief he seeks, but that case is both factually distinguishable and legally unsound.<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005). However, in 2022, the Southern District of Florida\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Trustee also cites *In re Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Enters., LLC*, 658 B.R. 611, 621 (S.D. Fla. 2024), which follows *Int'l Admin. Servs*. That case is on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit and may well result in a reversal of *Int'l Admin. Servs*.\n\nBankruptcy Court in *In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC*, analyzed the Eleventh Circuit's *Int'l Admin. Servs*. decision and refused to apply its rationale. The facts of *Am. Purchasing Servs.* are nearly identical to the fact pattern of this case. The *Am. Purchasing Servs.* court refused to apply otherwise binding Eleventh Circuit precedent because of its flaws.\n\n21. First, the *Am. Purchasing Servs.* court explained that *Int'l Admin. Servs.* involved a situation \"where the litigation targets themselves are stymying the trustee's discovery efforts.\" *Id.*, No. 20-23495, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022). Here, unlike in *Int'l Admin. Servs.*, there is no allegation that Meta stymied the Trustee's investigation. The Trustee directly blames delay on the complexity of the bankruptcy case and obstructive behavior of Mr. Kwok, his family and associates. As a result, this Court should heed the sound rationale provided in *Am. Purchasing Servs.* for not extending the statute of limitations:\n\nWhen a party transacts with an entity that ends up in bankruptcy, that party has a commercial and legal expectation that if a trustee wants to challenge an pre-petition transaction, the trustee would have to do so within two years of the order for relief. A trustee's desire – however well intentioned – for more time to negotiate with a secured creditor in an attempt to maximize a recovery for unsecured creditors, must be balanced against the commercial and legal expectations of potential litigation targets. **And where there is no showing of wrongdoing by the litigation targets, their commercial and legal expectations must prevail over a trustee's desire to maximize a recovery for creditors**.\n\n*Id.*, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*4 (emphasis added).\n\n22. Second, the *Am. Purchasing Servs.* decision also explained that *Int'l Admin. Servs.* \"has been criticized by a leading bankruptcy law treatise as 'involving some convoluted reasoning'\" in reaching the conclusion that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) permits the court to extend statutes of limitations.<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at \\*3 n.27 (citing 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.04 (16th ed. 2022)).\n\n<sup>4</sup> The convoluted reasoning is as follows: because Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) brings in all of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, that would include Bankruptcy Rules 7001 and 7003, and therefore Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) allows for the extension of statutes of limitations. *Int'l Admin.*\n\n23. Third, and importantly, *Am. Purchasing Servs.* noted that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *Int'l Admin. Servs.* was permeated by the liberal interpretation of section 105(a) that applied before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Law v. Siegel*, 571 U.S. 415 (2014). The *Siegel*  opinion was issued a decade after the Eleventh Circuit's decision and is now a well-established mandate to bankruptcy courts requiring adherence to a restrictive interpretation of section 105(a) (as discussed further below). *Am. Purchasing Servs.*, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 n.28.\n\n#### **II. Section 105(a) Does Not Permit the Court to Extend Limitations Periods.**\n\n24. To overcome the absence of statutory authority in sections 546(a) and 549(d) for the Court to extend those limitations periods, the Trustee relies upon the Court's inherent powers under section 105(a). This reliance is misplaced.\n\n25. Section 105(a) is not a source of unlimited authority to rewrite the Bankruptcy Code or fill interstitial space in statutes with recontextualized interpretations of congressional intent. Rather, \"[s]ection 105(a) confers authority to 'carry out' the provisions of the Code, but it is quite impossible to do that by taking action that the Code prohibits.\" *Law*, 571 U.S. at 421; *In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.*, 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"The equitable power conferred on the bankruptcy court by section 105(a) is the power to exercise equity in carrying out the *provisions* of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than to further the purposes of the Code generally, or otherwise to do the right thing.\") (original emphasis). In other words, section 105(a) is supposed to be used to *enforce* the limitations periods in sections 546(a) and 549(d), not to *abrogate* those periods.\n\n*Servs.*, 408 F.3d 699. Not surprisingly, no other Circuit has adopted this reasoning and even lower courts in the Eleventh Circuit have criticized such flawed logic.\n\n#### **III. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Does Not Permit the Court to Extend Limitations Periods.**\n\n26. Nor does Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) empower courts to extend statutes of limitations because \"[n]owhere in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\"<sup>5</sup> *In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16- 20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*1 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018); *see also* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) (\"This paragraph (1) applies when these rules, a notice given under these rules, or a court order requires or allows an act to be performed at or within a specified period.\"); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001 (defining \"rules\" as the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure); *U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York*, 540 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"When interpreting a rule of procedure, we review the text for its 'plain meaning.'\") (citation omitted).\n\n27. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is patterned on Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), *Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship*, 507 U.S. 380, 381 (1993), and \"[e]very court to have considered this question has held that Rule 6(b) may be used only to extend time limits imposed by the court itself or by other Federal Rules, but not by statute.\" *Argentine Republic v. Nat'l Grid Plc*, 637 F.3d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing cases); *see also* 4B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 1165 (4th ed.) (\"Rule 6(b) does not apply to time periods set out in statutes\"); 1 James William Moore, et al., *Moore's Federal Practice* § 6.06(1)(a) (3d ed.) (\"Rule 6(b) does not provide any authority to extend time periods established by statutes.\"). As the D.C. Circuit reasoned,\n\nRule 6(b) gives district courts wide discretion to modify the time limits set forth in the rules. Statutory time limits are different. Whether a statute of limitations may be tolled requires the court to engage in statutory interpretation. This is not a matter\n\n<sup>5</sup> *Accord In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.,* No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022); *In re Kirk*, No. 7-13-13269, 2014 WL 1248040, at \\*7 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 25, 2014); *In re Southampton yen Restaurant Group, LLC*, No. 09-13874 (MG), 2009 WL 3925563, at \\*3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2009); *In re Tubular Techs., LLC*, 438 B.R. 699, 710-11 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); *In re U.S. Lines, Inc.*, 262 B.R. 223, 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); *In re Damach, Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999).\n\nof the court's discretion. The intent of the legislature is controlling.\n\n*Sherrod v. Breitbart*, 720 F.3d 932, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2013).\n\n28. Procedural rules cannot override or modify statutes is an axiom exemplified by the amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) that took effect on December 1, 2024. As the Committee Notes to that amendment explain, statutory deadlines supersede any deadlines imposed by the rules:\n\nRule 12 is amended to make it clear that a federal statute that specifies another time supersedes the times to serve a responsive pleading set by paragraphs (a)(2) and (3). Paragraph (a)(1) incorporates this provision, but the structure of subdivision (a) does not seem to extend it to paragraphs (2) and (3). There is no reason to supersede an inconsistent statute by any part of Rule 12(a). The amended structure recognizes the priority of any statute for all paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).\n\n29. Even if Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) allowed the Court to extend statutes of limitation (which it does not), as the Court previously recognized, fairness to defendants is an animating concern in evaluating the Trustee's requested extension. Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 13. The Trustee's complaint against Meta was filed before the original February 15, 2024 deadline to commence avoidance actions expired, and since getting two extensions, the Trustee has forced Meta to defend and oppose a legally deficient complaint. Meta has already committed substantial resources to defend the Trustee's existing claims. Meanwhile, the Trustee is provided extension after extension without condition or oversight. Meta in turn is forced to participate in this adversary proceeding without knowing the scope and magnitude of the Trustee's claims, or when the Trustee will conclude his investigation that already exceeds all codified limitations periods by 12 months. To the extent the Court is inclined to extend the Trustee's requested extension, the Court should carve out actions or claims against Meta from the scope of that extension. *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 21 (carving out certain parties from a previously granted extension).\n\n#### **IV. Section 108(a) Is Not a Limitations Period and Cannot Be Extended.**\n\n30. In seeking a further extension, the Trustee relies, in part, on section 108(a) which he describes as a statute of limitations. He is wrong. Section 108 is a limitation on the Trustee's ability to commence litigation. *See In re Chenault*, No. 04-91786, 2010 WL 797015, at \\*3 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2010) (\"Section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the outer limits of when a Trustee can commence any prepetition cause of action\"); *Seawinds Ltd. v. Nedlloyd Lines, B.V.*, 80 B.R. 181, 189 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (explaining that the purpose of section 108(a) \"is to give the trustee or debtor sufficient time to decide whether to start a lawsuit\").\n\n31. In fact, Section 108 is more characterized by most courts as a tolling statute. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Berjac of Oregon*, 538 B.R. 67, 78 (D. Or. 2015) (\"Bankruptcy Code section 108 tolls the statute of limitations for debtors bringing certain nonbankruptcy law claims.\"); *Seawinds Ltd.*, 80 B.R. at 187, 189 (explaining that \"section 108(a) provides a 'tolling period' of at least two years\" and its purpose is \"to give the trustee or debtor sufficient time to decide whether to start a lawsuit\"); *In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd*., 452 B.R. 52, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing section 108 as containing \"tolling provisions\"); *AJ Ruiz Consultoria Empresarial S.A. v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A*., No. AP 21-01213 (LGB), 2024 WL 460482, at \\*19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2024) (explaining that a trustee \"gets the benefit of section 108(a) tolling\"). The Trustee cannot toll a tolling statute.\n\n32. It is also inappropriate for the Court to prospectively extend statutes of limitations under non-bankruptcy laws which are tolled by section 108(a).<sup>6</sup> The text of section 108(a) gives\n\n<sup>6</sup> Since the Trustee seeks an extension to assert only avoidance actions, Meta contends that section 108(a) is inapplicable. To the extent the Trustee attempts to assert non-bankruptcy claims against Meta in the future, such claims would be outside the tolling period permitted by section 108(a) and therefore time-barred.\n\ndeference to applicable state law statutes of limitations, and nothing in the text of that tolling statute invites, permits, or enables a court to override the policy decisions of state legislators. *See* 11 U.S.C. 108(a); *In re Health Support Network, Inc.*, No. 15-bk-10966-MGW, 2018 WL 1621027, at \\*3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2018) (\"Unlike Rule 9006, § 108 only applies to time limitations fixed by nonbankruptcy law. It doesn't create or extend time limitations for bringing bankruptcy causes of action.\").\n\n33. Statutes of limitations exist for a reason—to provide finality. In the absence of an extension order, time-barred claims are useless to the Trustee. The Trustee's goal in obtaining yet another order for an extension of the statute of limitations is transparent—he wants more time to diligence additional non-debtor entities that will become the target of additional alter ego adversary proceedings, and then offensively use alter ego rulings into the bases for additional avoidance actions.\n\n34. As the *Am. Purchasing Servs.* court has made clear, regardless of how wellintentioned the Trustee's desire to pursue recoveries may be, the commercial and legal expectations of litigation targets must prevail over the Trustee's objectives. The Trustee's Third Extension Motion must be denied.\n\n#### **RESERVATION OF RIGHTS**\n\n35. Meta reserves all rights, arguments, defenses, and remedies. To the extent the Trustee may seek to bring additional actions or claims against Meta that would be time-barred, Meta objects to the requested extension. Meta also reserves the right to challenge any claim brought by the Trustee that would be untimely but for the extension of the original February 15, 2024 deadline.\n\nWHEREFORE, Meta respectfully requests that the Court deny the Trustee's motion to extend the February 15, 2025 deadline to file avoidance actions, at least as it applies to any actions or claims against Meta, and grant Meta such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.\n\nDated: February 7, 2025 New York, New York */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: george.angelich@afslaw.com eric.roman@afslaw.com patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\n*Counsel for Meta Platforms, Inc.*\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on February 7, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: February 7, 2025 New York, New York\n\n> */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n第11章\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n（合并管理）\n提交通知\n\nMeta Platforms, Inc.（Meta 平台公司，以下简称“Meta”）现提交本通知，就第11章受托人提出的第二份补充动议提出异议；该动议请求将受托人于 Adv. Proc. No. 24-05117 提起撤销诉讼的期限延长至 February 15, 2025。Meta 的异议之真实、准确副本随附于此。\n\n日期：February 7, 2025 纽约州纽约市 /s/ George Angelich  George Angelich（乔治·安杰利奇）(ct27542) Eric Roman（埃里克·罗曼）（获准 pro hac vice 出庭） Patrick Feeney（帕特里克·菲尼）（获准 pro hac vice 出庭） ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 电话：212.457.5423 电子邮件：[george.angelich@afslaw.com] [eric.roman@afslaw.com] patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n以及\n\nJin Yan（闫进）（获准 pro hac vice 出庭） ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 电话：202.778.6442 电子邮件：[jin.yan@afslaw.com]\n\nMeta Platforms, Inc. 的代理律师\n送达证明\n\n本人证明，于 February 7, 2025，本人已使用 CM/ECF 电子提交系统向法院书记官提交上述文件的真实、准确副本；该系统将向所有登记在案的律师发送该等提交的通知。\n\n日期：纽约州纽约市 February 7, 2025\n\n/s/ George Angelich  George Angelich（乔治·安杰利奇）\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯），第11章受托人，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC.（Meta 平台公司），\n\n被告。\n\nAdv. Proc. No. 24-05117\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC. 对第11章受托人提出的第二份补充动议的异议，该动议请求将受托人提起撤销诉讼的期限延长至 FEBRUARY 15, 2025\n\nMeta Platforms Inc.（“Meta”）反对 Luc A. Despins 以债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（“债务人”）第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份于 January 29, 2025 提出的第二份补充动议（“第三次延期动议”），该动议请求将提起撤销诉讼的期限进一步延长至 August 15, 2025。Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004；Adv. Dkt. No. 43.1\n\n1 Bankr. Dkt. 指债务人主破产案件 No. 22-50073 中的提交文件。Adv. Dkt. 指本对抗程序 No. 24-05117 中的提交文件。\n引言\n\n1. 受托人对 Meta 提起撤销诉讼的法定期限已于 February 15, 2024 终止。然而，本院已两次批准延长受托人诉讼时效期间的请求，从而给予受托人额外一年时间提起请求。Meta 未收到受托人第一次延期请求的通知。受托人的第二次延期请求在 Meta 反对的情况下获准。目前一项合并上诉正在审理中。\n\n2. 受托人第三次向本院提出请求，要求作出裁定，将其提起请求的期限进一步延长至 August 15, 2025。换言之，《破产法典》546(a) 和 549(d) 编纂的两年期限，可能通过司法命令授予的非常规救济而被延长至惊人的 3.5 年诉讼时效期间，此举有悖于法条的明确文字，并且在某些情况下未向受影响当事人发出通知。\n\n3. 另一项延期命令将为受托人在其现有的另我对抗程序中取得判决争取更多时间。一旦其取得另我判决，其将起诉该等被指称为另我实体的受款人，并主张受款人：(a) 因进攻性适用案件既判原则，而不得反对其在无关诉讼中取得的另我裁定；以及 (b) 不得质疑该等迟延提出的撤销请求。若该策略持续进行，被指称为另我实体的目标受款人（其中一些人在被受托人起诉前可能从未听说过 Ho Wan Kwok 之名）将继续被受托人带至本院，而不顾传统的公平和实质正义观念。\n\n4. 应驳回受托人的第三次延期动议。至少，应明确将 Meta 排除在向受托人授予的任何延期之外。\n程序经过\n\n5. 债务人于 February 15, 2022 提交其破产申请。Bankr. Dkt. No. 1。\n\n受托人提起诉讼以撤销并追回申请前及申请后转让的期限为 February 15, 2024。11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a), 549(d)。\n\n6. 于 January 18, 2024，受托人提交动议，请求将诉讼时效延长六个月。Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509。当时，受托人尚未提起本案，且 Meta 并非债务人列名的债权人。Adv. Dkt. No. 1（起诉状于 February 11, 2024 提交）。该动议未向 Meta 送达。见 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2509。\n\n7. 于 February 15, 2024，法院作出裁定（“第一次延期裁定”），将受托人的诉讼时效延长至 August 15, 2024。Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921。当时，Meta 尚未收到受托人在本案中起诉状的送达。见 Adv. Dkt. No. 8（表明 Meta 于 February 23, 2024 收到起诉状送达）。尽管受托人将 Meta 视为诉讼目标，Meta 仍无机会对受托人的动议提出异议。根据正当程序的基本原则，Meta 不受法院第一次延期裁定的约束。\n\n8. 于 July 19, 2024，受托人寻求将诉讼时效再延长六个月至 February 15, 2025。Bankr. Dkt. No. 3329。与第一份动议不同，受托人除在债务人的主破产案件中提交第二份动议外，还在本对抗程序中提交了该动议。Adv. Dkt. No. 25。\n\n9. 在受托人提出第二次延期动议时，Meta 已通过代理律师出庭，并提交了其驳回受托人起诉状的动议。Adv. Dkt. Nos. 14, 18。Meta 对受托人的第二次延期动议提出异议。Adv. Dkt. No. 28。\n\n10. 于 August 13, 2024，法院就受托人的第二次延期动议举行听证，Meta 出庭并提出异议。受托人作证称，其发现了额外但未主张的转让：\n\n问：Despins 受托人，您知道您已经起诉了 Apple，对吗？\n\n答：对。\n\n问：您也知道您已经起诉了 Meta，对吗？\n\n答：对。\n\n问：除您目前针对 Meta 的诉讼中的请求外，您是否已发现任何额外请求？\n\n答：我们发现了一些较小的请求，但没有——没有任何重大请求，您知道，金额为数千美元，而不是数十万美元。因此，目前答案是否定的，没有任何重大请求。\n\n问：针对 Apple 的情况呢？\n\n答：同样的答案。\n\n问：您说您发现的额外请求不重大，这些请求是否已经在已提起诉讼中的请求中主张？\n\n答：我认为没有。我认为会把这些加进去，但是，再说一次，不会——不会以重大方式改变情况。\n\n问：您是否打算向 Apple 或 Meta 送达这些请求？\n\n答：我需要与律师讨论此事。\n\nAugust 13, 2024 诉讼程序记录，第 31:10-32:7 页。\n\n11. 此后，于 August 14, 2024，法院驳回 Meta 及其他对抗程序被告提出的异议，并作出裁定（“第二次延期裁定”），准许受托人延期至 February 15, 2025 提起撤销诉讼。Bankr. Dkt. No. 3417。\n\n12. Meta 对法院的第二次延期裁定提起上诉。Bankr. Dkt. No. 3464。Meta 的上诉与对第二次延期裁定提出的其他上诉，以及对第一次延期裁定尚待审理的上诉合并。合并上诉 No. 24-284 目前正在地区法院审理。2\n\n13. 于 January 24, 2025，受托人提交第三次延期动议，请求将提起撤销诉讼的期限延长至 August 15, 2025。Bankr. Dkt. No. 4004。第三次延期动议提出了地区法院正在审理的合并上诉中相同的问题。\n\n2 根据受托人的陈述，如果受托人不寻求对 Meta 及其他上诉人提起额外诉讼，则该上诉可能失去争议，故上诉书面陈述程序已中止。该上诉的当事人须于 March 17, 2025 或之前向地区法院提交联合状态报告，说明该上诉是否将继续进行。\n论证\n\n14. 基于 Meta 先前异议 Adv. Dkt. No. 28 中所述理由（Meta 在此援引该异议），以及下述理由，应驳回第三次延期动议。\nI. 为预防目的延长诉讼时效期间并不适当。\n\n15. 破产法院无权以预防性措施延长诉讼时效。见，例如，U.S. v. Ferrell, No. 16-cv-230, 2020 WL 1164526, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2020)（“本院不能延长适用的诉讼时效”）；Rushing v. Unknown Party, No. 10-2126, 2010 WL 4737698, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2010)（“法院不能延长诉讼时效。但是，在某些情况下，诉讼时效的进行可能受到中止。”）；Redd v. Gilless, 857 F. Supp. 601, 605 (W.D. Tenn. 1994)（“本院不能应一方当事人的动议延长诉讼时效，尽管该时效可能因各种理由而中止。”）。\n\n16. 虽然法院可以允许衡平中止，但此事应在诉讼已经提起且已提交证明该等救济正当的必要文件之后处理。这些情况目前均尚未发生。因此，法院预先依据《破产法典》第 546(a) 和 549(d) 条延长诉讼时效并不适当。\n\n17. 正如 In re Cramer 一案中的破产法院所解释，以其他方式进行将故意剥夺对抗程序被告的基本正当程序：\n\n受托人目前寻求一项裁定，就任何及所有未来被告对其适用衡平中止。如果法院准许该动议，则当受托人随后在法定期限届满后提交起诉状时，受托人将告知被告，他们无机会对衡平中止原则的适用提出异议，因为法院已在数月或数年前，在未通知且未给予受法院裁定损害的当事人任何提出异议机会的情况下，解决了该事项。受托人将寻求依赖该法院裁定作为案件既判原则，该裁定不再受附带攻击。此乃该等动议的根本目的，因此，法院不能批准此种做法。\n\n受托人仍可在提交逾期起诉状后的某一日期提出衡平中止。届时，被告将收到通知，以对衡平中止原则的适用提出异议。准许待决动议［关于预先适用衡平中止的动议］将剥夺他们该等机会，并将构成根本性不公平。\n\n同上，636 B.R. 830, 832-33 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)。\n\n18. 虽然破产法院可以允许衡平中止，但此事应在诉讼已经提起且已提交证明该等救济正当的必要文件之后处理。这些情况目前均尚未发生。衡平中止既不适宜审理，也不适于作出审前裁定。实际上，受托人寻求一项不被允许的咨询意见。法院预先依据《破产法典》第 546(a) 和 549(d) 条延长诉讼时效并不适当。\n\n19. 前瞻性地延长时效期间，对潜在被告造成的损害，与前瞻性地适用衡平停止并无不同。参见 In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.（1号承包公司）, No. 5-10-bk-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012)（驳回前瞻性停止第546条适用的动议，并质疑在法院面前不存在实际案件或争议时，破产法院是否可以将该法条延长适用于未具名且身份不明的被告）。第546(a)条和第549(d)条规定的时效期间不得延长。Cramer（克雷默）, 636 B.R. at 831（“《联邦破产程序规则》并未包含延长第546条和第549条所规定期限等法定期限的规则”）。\n\n20. 受托人主要依赖第十一巡回法院于2005年作出的判决 In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc.（国际行政服务公司破产案），以支持其所请求的救济，但该案在事实和法律上均可予以区分，且于法无据。3 Id., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)。然而，2022年，Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court（佛罗里达南区破产法院）在 In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC（美国采购服务有限责任公司破产案）中分析了第十一巡回法院在 Int'l Admin. Servs. 一案中的判决，并拒绝适用其理由。Am. Purchasing Servs. 一案的事实与本案的事实情形几乎完全相同。Am. Purchasing Servs. 法院因其缺陷而拒绝适用原本具有约束力的第十一巡回法院先例。\n\n3 受托人还援引 In re Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Enters., LLC（Teras散杂货远洋航运企业有限责任公司破产案）, 658 B.R. 611, 621 (S.D. Fla. 2024)，该案遵循 Int'l Admin. Servs.。该案目前正在第十一巡回法院上诉审理中，很可能导致 Int'l Admin. Servs. 被推翻。\n\n21. 第一，Am. Purchasing Servs. 法院解释称，Int'l Admin. Servs. 涉及一种“诉讼对象本身正在阻挠受托人取证工作的情形”。Id., No. 20-23495, 2022 WL 17096649, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022)。本案与 Int'l Admin. Servs. 不同，并无任何指称认为 Meta（元宇宙平台）阻挠了受托人的调查。受托人直接将延误归咎于破产案件的复杂性，以及 Kwok先生（郭文贵）、其家人和关联人士的阻挠行为。因此，本院应当遵循 Am. Purchasing Servs. 所提出的、反对延长时效期间的合理理由：\n\n当一方与后来进入破产程序的实体进行交易时，该方具有商业和法律上的合理预期：如受托人希望质疑一项破产申请前交易，受托人必须在救济令作出后两年内提出。受托人为了尝试为无担保债权人最大化回收而希望获得更多时间与有担保债权人谈判的愿望——无论其用意多么良善——必须与潜在诉讼对象的商业和法律预期相平衡。在未证明诉讼对象存在不当行为的情况下，其商业和法律预期必须优先于受托人为债权人最大化回收的愿望。\n\nId., 2022 WL 17096649, at *4（着重号系原文所加）。\n\n22. 第二，Am. Purchasing Servs. 判决还解释称，Int'l Admin. Servs. 因得出《破产规则》9006(b)允许法院延长时效期间这一结论，而被一部权威破产法论著批评为“包含某些迂回复杂的推理”。4 Id. at *3 n.27（引自 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9006.04 (16th ed. 2022)）。\n\n4 该迂回复杂的推理如下：由于《破产规则》9006(b)纳入了全部《联邦破产程序规则》，其中将包括《破产规则》7001和7003，因此《破产规则》9006(b)允许延长时效期间。Int'l Admin. Servs., 408 F.3d 699。不足为奇的是，其他任何巡回法院均未采纳这一推理，甚至第十一巡回法院辖区内的下级法院也批评了这种有缺陷的逻辑。\n\n23. 第三，且尤为重要的是，Am. Purchasing Servs. 指出，第十一巡回法院在 Int'l Admin. Servs. 一案中的判决，受到 Law v. Siegel（劳诉西格尔案）, 571 U.S. 415 (2014) 中 U.S. Supreme Court（美国联邦最高法院）判决作出前适用的、对第105(a)条宽泛解释的全面影响。Siegel 判决是在第十一巡回法院判决作出十年后作出的，现已成为一项确立的指令，要求破产法院遵循对第105(a)条的限制性解释（如下文进一步讨论）。Am. Purchasing Servs., 2022 WL 17096649, at *3 n.28。\n\nII. 第105(a)条不允许法院延长时效期间。\n\n24. 为克服第546(a)条和第549(d)条中不存在授权本院延长该等时效期间的法定依据这一问题，受托人依赖本院根据第105(a)条所享有的固有权力。该依赖并无依据。\n\n25. 第105(a)条并非改写《破产法典》或以对国会意图重新置于语境中的解释填补法条间隙的无限权力来源。相反，“第105(a)条赋予执行《法典》规定的权力，但通过采取《法典》所禁止的行动，显然不可能做到这一点。”Law, 571 U.S. at 421；In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.（乳品市场便利店公司破产案）, 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003)（“第105(a)条赋予破产法院的衡平权力，是在执行《破产法典》规定时行使衡平权的权力，而非一般性地促进《法典》目的，或以其他方式做正确之事的权力。”）（原文着重）。换言之，第105(a)条应当用于执行第546(a)条和第549(d)条规定的时效期间，而非废止该等期间。\n\nIII. 《破产规则》9006(b)不允许法院延长时效期间。\n\n26. 《联邦破产程序规则》9006(b)亦未授权法院延长时效期间，因为“该规则中没有任何地方提到法定期限”。5 In re Walnut Hill（核桃山破产案）, No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at *1 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)；另见 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)（“本款第(1)项适用于本规则、根据本规则发出的通知或法院命令要求或允许在指定期限内或截至指定期限实施某项行为的情形。”）；Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001（将“规则”界定为《联邦破产程序规则》）；U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York（美利坚合众国依埃森斯坦之名诉纽约市案）, 540 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2008)（“在解释程序规则时，我们审查文本的‘通常含义’。”）（引文略）。\n\n27. 《破产规则》9006(b)以 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) 为范本，Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship（先锋投资服务公司诉不伦瑞克联合有限合伙企业案）, 507 U.S. 380, 381 (1993)，且“审议过这一问题的每一法院均认为，第6(b)条只能用于延长由法院本身或其他联邦规则规定的期限，而不能延长由法条规定的期限。”Argentine Republic v. Nat'l Grid Plc（阿根廷共和国诉国家电网有限公司案）, 637 F.3d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2011)（援引判例）；另见 4B Charles A. Wright（查尔斯·A·赖特）& Arthur R. Miller（阿瑟·R·米勒）, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1165 (4th ed.)（“第6(b)条不适用于法条规定的期间”）；1 James William Moore（詹姆斯·威廉·穆尔）, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 6.06(1)(a) (3d ed.)（“第6(b)条并未提供任何权力以延长法条规定的期间。”）。正如 D.C. Circuit（哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院）所推理：\n\n第6(b)条赋予地区法院广泛的裁量权，以修改规则规定的期限。法定期限则不同。时效法条是否可以停止适用，要求法院进行法条解释。这并非属于法院裁量权的问题。立法机关的意图具有决定性。\n\nSherrod v. Breitbart（谢罗德诉布赖特巴特案）, 720 F.3d 932, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2013)。\n\n5 同见 In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.（伦道夫医院公司破产案）, No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)；In re Kirk（柯克破产案）, No. 7-13-13269, 2014 WL 1248040, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 25, 2014)；In re Southampton yen Restaurant Group, LLC（南安普敦日元餐饮集团有限责任公司破产案）, No. 09-13874 (MG), 2009 WL 3925563, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2009)；In re Tubular Techs., LLC（管状技术有限责任公司破产案）, 438 B.R. 699, 710-11 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006)；In re U.S. Lines, Inc.（美国航运公司破产案）, 262 B.R. 223, 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)；In re Damach, Inc.（达马赫公司破产案）, 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999)。\n\n28. 程序规则不得凌驾于或修改法条，是一项公理；于2024年12月1日生效的对 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) 的修正即为例证。正如该修正案的委员会说明所解释，法定期限优先于规则规定的任何期限：\n\n对第12条作出修正，以明确规定，联邦法条规定其他期限时，该期限优先于第(a)(2)项和第(a)(3)项规定的送达答辩状期限。第(a)(1)项纳入了该规定，但(a)款的结构似乎并未将其延及第(2)项和第(3)项。没有理由以第12(a)条的任何部分凌驾于与之不一致的法条之上。经修正的结构确认，任何法条对于第(1)、(2)和(3)项均具有优先效力。\n\n29. 即使《破产规则》9006(b)允许本院延长时效期间（其并不允许），如本院此前所确认，在评估受托人请求延长时，对被告的公平性是一项核心考量。Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 13。受托人针对 Meta 的起诉状是在提起撤销诉讼的原定截止日期 February 15, 2024 届满前提交的，而在获得两次延期后，受托人已迫使 Meta 对一份法律上存在缺陷的起诉状进行抗辩并予以反对。Meta 已投入大量资源以抗辩受托人的现有请求。与此同时，受托人在不附加条件或监督的情况下，一再获得延期。反过来，Meta 被迫参与本对抗程序，却无法知悉受托人请求的范围和规模，亦无法知悉受托人何时会结束其已超出全部成文时效期间12个月的调查。如本院倾向于批准受托人所请求的延期，本院应将针对 Meta 的诉讼或请求排除在该延期的范围之外。参见 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2921 at 21（将某些当事人排除在此前获准的延期之外）。\n\nIV. 第108(a)条不是时效期间，且不得延长。\n\n30. 受托人在寻求进一步延期时，部分依赖第108(a)条，并将其描述为时效法条。他错了。第108条是对受托人提起诉讼能力的限制。参见 In re Chenault（舍诺破产案）, No. 04-91786, 2010 WL 797015, at *3 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2010)（“《破产法典》第108(a)条规定了受托人可以提起任何破产申请前诉因的最长期限”）；Seawinds Ltd. v. Nedlloyd Lines, B.V.（海风有限公司诉内德劳埃德航运公司案）, 80 B.R. 181, 189 (N.D. Cal. 1987)（解释第108(a)条的目的“是给予受托人或债务人足够时间，以决定是否提起诉讼”）。\n\n31. 实际上，大多数法院更将第108条定性为一项停止适用法条。参见，例如，In re Berjac of Oregon（俄勒冈州伯雅克公司破产案）, 538 B.R. 67, 78 (D. Or. 2015)（“《破产法典》第108条对债务人提起某些非破产法请求的时效法条予以停止适用。”）；Seawinds Ltd., 80 B.R. at 187, 189（解释“第108(a)条规定了至少两年的‘停止适用期间’”，其目的为“给予受托人或债务人足够时间，以决定是否提起诉讼”）；In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.（费尔菲尔德哨兵有限公司破产案）, 452 B.R. 52, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)（将第108条描述为包含“停止适用规定”）；AJ Ruiz Consultoria Empresarial S.A. v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.（AJ鲁伊斯企业咨询股份公司诉毕尔巴鄂比斯开阿根廷银行股份公司案）, No. AP 21-01213 (LGB), 2024 WL 460482, at *19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2024)（解释受托人“享有第108(a)条停止适用的利益”）。受托人不能对一项停止适用法条再次停止适用。\n\n32. 对于根据第108(a)条停止适用的非破产法下的时效法条，本院前瞻性地予以延长同样不适当。6 第108(a)条的文本赋予\n\n6 鉴于受托人仅寻求延长提起撤销诉讼的期限，Meta（元公司）主张第 108(a) 条不适用。如果受托人日后试图针对 Meta 提出非破产法请求，此类请求将超出第 108(a) 条所允许的中止期间，因而受到时效限制。\n\n尊重适用州法中的诉讼时效法规，且该中止期间法规的文本中没有任何内容要求、允许或使法院能够推翻州立法机关的政策决定。见 11 U.S.C. 108(a); In re Health Support Network, Inc., No. 15-bk-10966-MGW, 2018 WL 1621027, at \\*3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2018)（“与规则 9006 不同，§ 108 仅适用于非破产法所规定的期限限制。它并不创设或延长提起破产法诉因的期限限制。”）。\n\n33. 诉讼时效存在自有其理由——提供终局性。在没有延期命令的情况下，受时效限制的请求对受托人毫无用处。受托人取得又一项诉讼时效延期命令的目标显而易见——其希望有更多时间对将成为额外揭开公司面纱对抗诉讼目标的其他非债务人实体进行尽职调查，然后将揭开公司面纱的裁决主动用作提出额外撤销诉讼的依据。\n\n34. 如 Am. Purchasing Servs. 案法院已明确指出，无论受托人追求追偿的愿望多么善意，诉讼目标的商业和法律预期必须优先于受托人的目标。受托人的第三次延期动议必须被驳回。\n\n权利保留\n\n35. Meta 保留一切权利、论点、抗辩和救济。若受托人可能寻求针对 Meta 提起任何将受到时效限制的额外诉讼或请求，Meta 对所请求的延期提出异议。Meta 还保留对受托人提出的任何请求提出质疑的权利；若非延长原定 February 15, 2024 截止日期，该等请求将不及时。\n\n据此，Meta 谨请法院驳回受托人要求将提交撤销诉讼的 February 15, 2025 截止日期延长的动议，至少就针对 Meta 的任何诉讼或请求而言，并给予 Meta 法院认为适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：February 7, 2025\nNew York, New York\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich（乔治·安杰利希）(ct27542)\nEric Roman（埃里克·罗曼）(admitted pro hac vice)\nPatrick Feeney（帕特里克·费尼）(admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\nT: 212.457.5423\nE: george.angelich@afslaw.com\neric.roman@afslaw.com\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- 及 -\n\nJin Yan（燕津）(admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\nT: 202.778.6442\nE: jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\nMeta Platforms, Inc.（元平台公司）的代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人证明，于 February 7, 2025，本人促使使用 CM/ECF 电子提交系统向法院书记官提交上述文件的真实且正确副本，该系统将向所有登记在案的律师发送该等提交的通知。\n\n日期：February 7, 2025\nNew York, New York\n\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":8,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":28,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3329,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3417,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3464,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4004,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4290,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-02-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-02-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:24:23"}