{"id":"court_ctb_4189_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4189,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2025-03-04","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT | In re:
HO WAN KWOK, et al.,","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re:
HO WAN KWOK, et al., | )
)
Chapter 11
)
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)
)
(Jointly Administered) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Debtors. | )
)
Re: ECF Nos. 3577, 3713 |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 24
)
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| AGORA LAB, INC., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM)
) |\n| Plaintiff, | )
Re: ECF No. 21
)
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM)
) |\n| Plaintiff, | )
Re: ECF No. 26
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| DIRECT PERSUASION LLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| ARRI AMERICAS, INC., | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20 |\n| Plaintiff, | )
) |\n| v. | ) |\n| TERIS-PHOENIX, LLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| PHILLIPS NIZER LLP, | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
) |\n| v. | ) |\n| MARK GUNDERSON, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17 |\n| Plaintiff, | )
) |\n| v. | ) |\n| 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
) |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| v. | )
) |\n| FFP (BVI) LIMITED, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 42
) |\n| v. | )
)
) |\n| AMAZON.COM, INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX
HADJICHARALAMBOUS, CHUNGUANG HAN, and
MEI GUO, | )
)
) |\n| Defendants. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC., | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| | |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20
)
) |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| v. | ) |\n| FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, | )
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
) |\n| v. | )
)
) |\n| DJD CREATIVE LLC, | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| B&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP., HING CHI
NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, and
CHUNGUANG HAN, | )
)
)
) |\n| Defendants. | )
)
) |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| OHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| ZETA GLOBAL CORP., | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| GROCYBER, LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
) |\n| CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
) |\n| v.
AARON MITCHELL,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| v.
ANTHEM HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
f/k/a EMPIRE HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
d/b/a EMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
) |\n| v.
MODSQUAD INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
) |\n| CLOUDFLARE, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| INDIUM SOFTWARE, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
) |\n| v.
MILLER MOTORCARS INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 10 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 102 | | |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| ON THE SPOT HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC., | )
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 16
)
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| V.X. CERDA & ASSOCIATES P.A., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19 |\n| Plaintiff, | ) |\n| v. | )
)
) |\n| LIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT CORP., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 11 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 102 | | |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| TARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC, | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| FLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n| | ) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19 |\n| Plaintiff, | ) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| JAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, LLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 12 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| 102 | | | | |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| NARDELLO & CO., LLC, | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 15
)
) |\n| v. | ) |\n| THE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| BERKELEY ROWE LIMITED, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| | |\n\n*Continued on next page*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 13 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| 102 | | | | |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 11
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | ) |\n| WEDDLE LAW PLLC, | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| MORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND IASON &
ANELLO P.C., | )
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC, and
AARON MITCHELL, | )
)
) |\n| Defendants. | )
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 14 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 102 | | |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 28
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| CLAYMAN ROSENBERG KIRSHNER & LINDER LLP, )
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| G4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
) |\n| v.
ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C., | )
)
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
Doc 4189
Filed 03/04/25
102 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18
Page 15 of |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n| PUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING LLC, | )
) |\n| | ) |\n| Defendant. | ) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| JASON MILLER, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18 |\n| Plaintiff, | )
) |\n| v. | ) |\n| SEDGWICK REALTY CORP., | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 16 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| 102 | | | | |\n\n| Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM)
Re: ECF No. 21 |\n|----------------------------------------------|\n| |\n| Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM)
Re: ECF No. 26 |\n| |\n| Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM)
Re: ECF No. 25 |\n| |\n| |\n\n### **APPEARANCES**\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\nDouglas S. Skalka James C. Graham Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Plaintiff*\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert Lindsay C. Stone Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10112\n\nand\n\nAlan H. Martin Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP 650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626\n\n*Counsel for Movant Agora Lab, Inc., Defendant*\n\nLindsay Sampson Bishop K&L Gates LLP One Congress Street, Suite 2900 Boston, MA 02114\n\nand\n\nBrian T. Peterson (argued) Ruby A. Nagamine K&L Gates LLP 925 4th Ave, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104\n\n*Counsel for Movants Amazon Web Services, Inc., and Amazon.com, Inc., Defendants*\n\nBenjamin Mintz Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019\n\nand\n\nand\n\nRyan M. Trombley Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n## *Counsel for Movant Direct Persuasion LLC, Defendant*\n\nSteven G. Mintz Barry M. Kazan Philip Ian Tafet Mintz & Gold LLP 600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Fox News Network, LLC, and Marcum LLP, Defendants*\n\nMichael T. Conway Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Ave., 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Movant Arri Americas Inc., Defendant*\n\nAndrea Chase Spencer Fane 1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400 Kansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Teris-Phoenix, LLC, Defendant*\n\nJared R. Clark Phillips Nizer LLP 485 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n## *Counsel for Movant Phillips Nizer LLP, Defendant*\n\nJeffrey Hellman Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC 195 Church Street, 10th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movants Mr. Mark Gundersen, Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, and Mr. Jason Miller, Defendants*\n\nRobert N. Sensale Bershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC 900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movant 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n# *Counsel for Movants FFP (BVI) Limited, Aaron A. Mitchell, V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A., The Francis Firm PLLC, Lawall & Mitchell, LLC, and G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., Defendants*\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Anthem Health Plans, Inc., Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., f/k/a Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., d/b/a Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, and Sedgwick Realty Corp., Defendants*\n\nMichael A. Siedband Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building 2, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Nicole Lapenta Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Federal Express Corporation, Defendant*\n\nBret Strong Zachary W. Doninger 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 The Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III Martocchio & Oliveira, LLC 191 Main Street Southington, CT 06489\n\n### *Counsel for Movant DJD Creative LLC, Defendant*\n\nScott M. Kessler Akerman LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas 37th Floor New York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., Defendant*\n\nDarryl S. Laddin Frank N. White Arnall Golden Gregory LLP 171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100 Atlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches Law Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC 82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203 Wethersfield, CT 06109\n\n### *Counsel for Movant American Express Company, Defendant*\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr. DLA Piper LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020\n\nand\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe DLA Piper LLP (US) 650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeta Global Corp., Defendant*\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante Cohn Birnbaum & Shea CityPlace II, 15th Floor 185 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant GroCyber, LLC, Defendant*\n\nIlan Markus Barclay Damon LLP 545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant Conservative Campaign Technology LLC, Defendant*\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n*Counsel for Movants ModSquad, Inc., and 3 Columbus Circle, LLC, Defendants*\n\nSabrina L. Streusand Streusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP Spyglass Point 1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold Stokesbury, Shipman & Fingold 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 Farmington, CT 06032\n\n## *Counsel for Movant Cloudflare, Inc., Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Reding ASK LLP 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 St. Paul, MN 55121\n\nand\n\nEdward E. Neiger ASK LLP 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor New York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow Eric R. Wilson Benjamin D. Feder Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Indium Software, Inc., Defendant*\n\nEric Seltzer Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC 30 Brewster Lane Bellport, NY 11713\n\n### *Counsel for Movant Miller Motorcars Inc., Defendant*\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner Becker LLC 354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500 Livingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., Defendant*\n\nGerard R. Luckman Elbert F. Nasis Forchelli Deegan Terrana LLP 333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010 Uniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz Fazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall 96 Oak Street Harford, CT 06106\n\n### *Counsel for Movant Liberty Jet Management Corp., Defendant*\n\nJohn F. Carberry Kara Anne Zarchin Cummings & Lockwood LLC Six Landmark Square Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Target Enterprises, LLC, and Jamestown Associates, LLC, Defendants*\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr. Norris McLaughlin PA 400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor Bridgewater, NJ 08807\n\n#### *Counsel for Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., Defendant*\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Nardello & Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen Armstrong Teasdale LLP 100 North Riverside Plaza Chicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\nand\n\nJohn G. Willard Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105\n\n### *Counsel for Movant Berkeley Rowe Limited, Defendant*\n\nRichard Corbi The Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC 104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor New York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n## *Counsel for Movant Weddle Law PLLC, Defendant*\n\nRowena A. Moffett Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP 271 Whitney Avenue New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., Defendant*\n\nBrian David Linder Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650 New York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker 1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP, Defendant*\n\nStephen M. Kindseth (argued) James M. Moriarty Daniel A. Byrd Zeisler& Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., Defendant*\n\nScott M. Charmoy Charmoy & Charmoy 1465 Post Road East, Suite 100 Westport, CT 06880\n\n*Counsel for Movant Putnam's Landscaping, Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Bernard Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036\n\nand\n\nJosh Peterson Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 2200 Wells Fargo Center 90 S. 7th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402\n\nand\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801\n\n*Counsel for Movant Cirrus Design Corporation, Defendant*\n\nRahman Connelly Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant ACASS Canada LTD., Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 26 of 102\n\n## **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER (I) DENYING JOINT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; (II) DENYING IN PART OTHER DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AND (III) OVERRULING IN PART ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.'S OBJECTION TO THE TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS**\n\n#### Julie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\nThis case involves an individual Chapter 11 debtor who is alleged to have been involved in an extensive shell game involving hundreds of corporate *alter egos.* The Chapter 11 trustee has filed more than 260 actions seeking to avoid transfers nominally made by these *alter egos*. Forty-eight avoidance action defendants, including many who are participating in mandatory mediation with the Chapter 11 trustee, have asked this Court to decide four common issues relating to the interaction of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer law. The sheer number of defendants, complaints, and alleged *alter egos* complicates the analysis. However, when analyzing the issues in light of the facts alleged in the complaints, which the Court must take as true, the result is clear. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that none of the four common issues raised by the avoidance action defendants merit dismissal of the avoidance actions.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are several motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings filed by avoidance action defendants. The avoidance actions were commenced by Mr. Luc A. Despins, the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). The Trustee seeks to avoid and recover alleged fraudulent transfers and unauthorized post-petition transfers pursuant to sections 544, 548, 549, and 550 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") and sections 273, 274, and 276 of New York's\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 27 of 102\n\nDebtor and Creditor Law, codifying New York's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"NYUVTA\").\n\nThirty-seven motions (the \"Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants (the \"Joint Defendants\")1 pursuant to the Order Further Amending Avoidance Action Procedures Order and Scheduling Joint Briefing of Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (the \"Joint Briefing Order\"). (Main Case ECF No. 3577.)2 The Joint Defendants requested and proposed this omnibus process and prepared and submitted common legal issues they requested the Court address. (*See* Main Case ECF No. 3511.) The Trustee did not object to the Joint Defendants' request. In issuing the Joint Briefing Order, the Court adopted the Joint Defendants' process.\n\nAdditional motions (the \"Non-Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants3 who, although they did not participate in the joint briefing, raised some or all the issues raised by the Joint Defendants and requested to have their motions be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions. Because it raised some of the issues in the Joint Briefing Order, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (\"Z&Z\", and, together with the filers of the Non-Joint Motions, the \"Non-Joint Defendants\") also requested its objection to a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Trustee (the \"Z&Z Objection\")4 be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions.\n\n1 Due to the complexities of this omnibus proceeding, certain information that might appear in footnotes is contained in Appendices. The .pdf file of this decision contains bookmarks to facilitate access to the Appendices. A list of the Joint Motions, with a notation of the Joint Defendant that filed each Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix A**. 2\n\nReferences to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), will be styled \"Main Case ECF No. \\_\\_.\"\n\n3 A list of the Non-Joint Motions, with a notation of the defendant(s) that filed each Non-Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix B**. 4\n\nThe citation for Z&Z's objection appears in **Appendix C**.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 28 of 102\n\nThis memorandum of decision sets forth the Court's conclusions of law on the four issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Because (i) the issues of law raised are not dispositive of the sufficiency of the pleadings; (ii) the defendants do not prevail on the issues of law; and (iii) many of the issues raised are issues of fact, not law, the Joint Motions are **DENIED**. For these same reasons, the Non-Joint Motions are **DENIED IN PART** as to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order and the Z&Z Objection is **OVERRULED IN PART** to the same extent.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court. (Main Case ECF No. 1.) On June 15, 2022, presented with allegations related to the Individual Debtor's financial mismanagement and alleged shell game, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee to administer the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate. (Main Case ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 523.)\n\n#### *The Avoidance Action Procedures Order*\n\nOn January 29, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion to prospectively establish procedures for avoidance actions he intended to commence and in which he would bring claims only under sections 544, 547, 548, 549, and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Main Case ECF No. 2532.) The Trustee anticipated filing hundreds of avoidance actions in advance of the second anniversary of the petition date and also anticipated these filings would pose case management issues. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549. After a hearing held on February 5, 2024, the Court entered an order granting the motion (as amended and supplemented, the \"Avoidance Action Procedures Order\").\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 29 of 102\n\n(Main Case ECF No. 2578.) Between February 9, 2024, and February 15, 2024, the Trustee filed\n\n268 avoidance actions, including the actions that are the subject of this decision. (Main Case\n\nECF Nos. 2594–925.) The complaints each assert at least one or more among the following six\n\ncauses of action (as asserted, collectively the \"Avoidance Claims\")5 :\n\n> (i) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 550(a), avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(ii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 2766 , avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a), avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iv) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276, avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(v) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a), avoidance of an unauthorized postpetition transfer by the Individual Debtor of property of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and recovery from the initial transferee; and\n\n(vi) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) and in connection with one of the above causes of action, recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee.\n\n(*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nEach complaint alleges at least (a) an actual fraudulent transfer under both federal and\n\nstate law; or (b) an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Agora*\n\n5 A schedule setting forth the causes of action in each complaint at issue appears in **Appendix D**. The text of the statutory provisions pursuant to which the Avoidance Claims appears in **Appendix E** alongside certain relevant statutory definitions.\n\n6 In the relevant complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor conducted business in New York, including in relation to the alleged fraudulent transfers.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 30 of 102\n\n*Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) In addition to alleging an actual fraudulent transfer, some complaints allege a constructive fraudulent transfer under both federal and state law. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Finally, one of the complaints seeks recovery from a Non-Joint Defendant as a subsequent transferee of a fraudulent transfer or an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (Complaint, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nAll the complaints allege the Individual Debtor, through various *alter egos*, transferred property and those transfers were either fraudulent transfers or unauthorized post-petition transfers. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24- 05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Additional allegations regarding the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the *alter egos* are made through incorporation of complaints filed against alleged *alter egos* seeking declaratory judgment of *alter ego* and/or beneficial ownership and turnover of assets and control.7\n\n7 The Avoidance Claims are stayed as to allegations involving certain alleged *alter egos*. (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i), (ii), Main Case ECF No. 3163.) Accordingly, the Court has not considered any Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims (used herein as defined by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i) and (ii)), to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed. **Appendix D**, *infra*, includes notations indicating whether an Avoidance\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 31 of 102\n\nOn February 27, 2024, a Status Conference was held to address the management of the myriad avoidance actions. During the Status Conference, the Trustee requested the implementation of mandatory mediation procedures. On May 2, 2024, after several pleadings were filed and hearings were held, an order entered amending the Avoidance Action Procedures Order to include mandatory mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3163.)\n\n#### *The Joint Briefing Order*\n\nTwo features of the mediation procedures are particularly relevant to the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. First, certain defendants are automatically excluded from mandatory mediation (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(j)(vi), Main Case ECF No. 3163) and defendants subject to mediation may move to be excluded from mediation (*Id.* ¶ 2(m)). Second, the mediation procedures include a litigation stay. (*Id.* ¶ 2(j)(iii).) Together, these features create the procedural context for the Joint Briefing Order.\n\nAs early as April 22, 2024, avoidance action defendants *not subject to the mediation stay* began filing motions to dismiss. (*See, e.g.*, Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11.) As these motions were being set for hearing, on September 6, 2024, certain avoidance action defendants *subject to the mediation stay* – the original Joint Defendants8 – requested the Court establish a process for the Joint Defendants to\n\nClaim is a Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claim. Litigation is not stayed as to the seven alleged *alter egos* who are discussed below. A schedule of these *alter egos*, listing the incorporated complaint, the allegation regarding state of formation, and causes of action, appears in **Appendix F**. 8\n\nAll these defendants remain Joint Defendants other than Bering Yachts, LLC (*compare* Main Case ECF No. 3511 *with* Main Case ECF No. 3713) and McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC (*see* Letter, *Despins v. McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05194 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2025), ECF No. 22 (announcing settlement with the Trustee)).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 32 of 102\n\nargue issues raised by the other avoidance action defendants' motions rather than requiring them to seek to be excluded from mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3511.)\n\nOn September 24, 2024, a Status Conference was held. During the Status Conference, the Joint Defendants circulated their proposal for an amendment to the Avoidance Action Procedures Order and a joint briefing process. The Trustee did not oppose the Joint Defendants' proposal. Certain defendants not subject to the mediation stay did not oppose the hearings on their motions to dismiss being continued until a hearing on the prospective Joint Motions was held, but raised due process concerns should their motions be heard after the Joint Motions. At the end of the Status Conference, the Court took the matter under consideration.\n\nOn September 25, 2024, for the reasons set forth therein, the Court entered the Joint Briefing Order. (Main Case ECF No. 3577.) In pertinent part, the Joint Briefing Order provides the Joint Defendants shall collectively file a brief addressing only four issues the Joint Defendants argued were common legal issues. Those four issues, which were adopted almost verbatim from the Joint Defendants' proposal, are:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\n(Joint Briefing Order ¶ 2(b)(i)–(iv), Main Case ECF No. 3577.) Under the Joint Briefing Order, (1) to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed, the Joint Motions shall not address Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order; and (2) the Joint Defendants reserve for future\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 33 of 102\n\npleadings all bases for a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings other than the four issues. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 5.)\n\nThe Joint Briefing Order also provided time for other avoidance action defendants to join the Joint Defendants. Several did, including some not subject to the mediation stay. (Main Case ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629.) On October 18, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed their joint memorandum of law (the \"Joint Brief\") and the Joint Motions. (Main Case ECF No. 3713.) On November 8, 2024, the Trustee filed an opposition to the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3803.) On November 22, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed a reply in support of the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3848.) The Joint Motions are fully briefed. The Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z are also fully briefed.9\n\nOn January 8, 2025, a Status Conference was held regarding the format of the hearing on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. During the Status Conference, the Court, in consultation with the parties, established the format for the hearing. The Court also noted certain defendants did not raise any of the Joint Brief issues in their motions to dismiss. The parties agreed that the hearing on those defendants' motions should not be held at the same time. Accordingly, the Court adjourned without date the hearings on those motions.10 (*Despins v. Harcus Parker Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05163 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 32; *Despins v. Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 29.)\n\n9 A schedule of the briefing of the Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z appears in **Appendix G**.\n\n10 Although Mr. Jason Miller joined the Joint Brief, by a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on October 18, 2024, *see* **Appendix A**, *infra*, and was heard with respect to that motion, he was not heard on his previous, non-joint motion to dismiss filed on June 26, 2024.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 34 of 102\n\nDespite raising some or all the common issues, other defendants were unsure whether they wanted to be heard at the same time as the Joint Defendants. After the Status Conference, these defendants indicated they did not wish their motions to be heard at the same time. Accordingly, the Court also adjourned without date the hearings on their motions. (*Despins v. Apple Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 67; *Despins v. Meta Platforms Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 42.)\n\nOn January 15, 2025, a hearing was held on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. This matter is ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O). The Court concludes its exercise of jurisdiction is not precluded by Article III of the Constitution. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n#### **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\n#### **A. Legal Standard**\n\nThe Joint Motions, Non-Joint Motions, and Z&Z Objection assert the Trustee has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b); *see also Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc.*, 6\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 35 of 102\n\nF.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021) (motions for judgment on the pleadings are subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss). In determining whether the Avoidance Claims state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must take the well-pled allegations, including those in documents attached to the complaint, as true. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); *Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't*, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012); *Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.*, 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002); *Tatum v. Oberg*, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in the Trustee's favor. *Warren v. Colvin*, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014).\n\nTo be well-pled, the Avoidance Claims must contain \"a short and plain statement showing the pleader is entitled to relief\". Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008. They must contain \"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'\". *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The \"plausibility standard\", while not a \"probability requirement\", requires more than a \"sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). Determining the plausibility of a claim is \"a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Nevertheless, \"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.\" *Id.* at 678.\n\nIn determining the sufficiency of the Avoidance Claims, the Court must also consider documents incorporated into the complaints by reference and matters of which it may take judicial notice. *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Here, as noted above, the Trustee has incorporated by reference his complaints against (1) Golden Spring\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 36 of 102\n\n(New York) Limited (\"Golden Spring\"); (2) Lamp Capital LLC (\"Lamp Capital\"); (3) HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Tech\"); (4) HCHK Property Management, Inc (\"HCHK Property\"); (5) Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (\"Lexington\", and, together with HCHK Tech and HCHK Property, each, an \"HCHK Entity\" and, collectively, the \"HCHK Entities\"); (6) Greenwich Land, LLC (\"Greenwich Land\"); and (7) Leading Shine NY Ltd. (\"Leading Shine\"). These complaints allege, under Delaware law, (i) the foregoing entities are the *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor; and (ii) they and/or their assets are beneficially owned by the Individual Debtor.11 None of the elements of these claims need to be pled with particularity. *See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.*, 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Delaware law and holding there is no requirement to show fraud to establish *alter ego*).\n\n#### **B. Joint Motions**\n\nThe Court will first consider the Joint Defendants'12 arguments on the four issues:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n11 Each of the seven *alter egos* at issue were allegedly formed in Delaware. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. Taking these allegations as true, Delaware law applies to the Trustee's *alter ego* and beneficial ownership claims. *Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)*, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013) (forum state choice of law applies); *see Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc.*, 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007) (applying local law of state of formation to *alter ego* action and other internal affairs regarding an LLC); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304. To be clear, \"Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.\" *Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.*, 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018).\n\n12 Regardless of usage of \"Joint Defendant\" or \"Non-Joint Defendant\", the determinations in sections B and C of the Discussion apply to all defendants that raise or join in the arguments addressed.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 37 of 102\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\nDuring the hearing, the Joint Defendants divided the four issues into two arguments. Regarding issues (i) and (iii), the Joint Defendants argue even if the Court were to hold certain entities are the Individual Debtor's *alter egos*, the Court must dismiss the complaints because an *alter ego* finding does not give the Trustee standing to sue on the *alter ego's* transfers of its property. As to issues (ii) and (iv), the Joint Defendants raise a series of arguments that *alter ego* determinations are improper under applicable state law or must be circumscribed in the bankruptcy context because of prejudice to the *alter egos'* transferees. The Court will address these arguments in turn.\n\n### **1. Issues (i) and (iii): The effect of an** *alter ego* **determination in avoidable transfer actions**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law would result only in the *alter egos* being vicariously liable for debts of the Individual Debtor. Such a determination, they argue, would *not* (i) accomplish the transfer of the *alter egos'* assets into the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and allow the Trustee to assert an unauthorized post-petition transfer claim; or (ii) collapse the identity of the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allow the Trustee to assert that an *alter ego's* transfer of its property is a fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of his property. On these bases, the Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring the Avoidance Claims even assuming he prevails on his *alter ego* claims. Ultimately, the Joint Defendants assert the Trustee's only recovery is from the *alter egos* themselves.\n\nIn response, the Trustee makes two arguments. First, the Trustee argues that while an *alter ego* determination is made under applicable state law, the effect of an *alter ego*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 38 of 102\n\ndetermination is a matter of federal law. In particular, the Trustee asserts section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code controls whether an interest that exists at state law is property of the estate. Second, the Trustee argues even if state law controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination, Delaware law follows an identity theory of *alter ego.* Therefore, the Trustee argues an *alter ego* determination provides him with a basis to assert fraudulent transfer and unauthorized postpetition transfer claims. The Trustee contends that if the Court agrees with the Joint Defendants, the result will be to ignore the Individual Debtor's misconduct and inequitable dealings by cutting off the estate's recovery.\n\nAs discussed in greater detail below, the Court agrees with the Trustee. As a threshold matter, the Joint Defendants' argument focuses solely on the Avoidance Claims' *alter ego* allegations and fails to address the overlapping and alternative beneficial ownership allegations. The Avoidance Claims assert the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* and their assets as a basis for the relief requested. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv.*, 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990); *Orr v. Kinderhill Corp.*, 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993). Moreover, the substantive avoidable transfer law upon which the Avoidance Claims are pled controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination. Avoidable transfer law values substance over form and is, hence, amenable to piercing the corporate veil where applicable law would disregard the corporate form. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *United States v. Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983); *Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979); *Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht)*, 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024); *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *McNellis v. Raymond*, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970); *ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp.*, 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007).\n\n### **i. Issues (i) and (iii): Beneficial ownership alleged in connection with the transfers**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee improperly uses Delaware *alter ego* law to satisfy two elements of the Avoidance Claims by collapsing the distinctions between (a) the alleged *alter ego* transferor and the Individual Debtor13; and (b) the *alter ego* transferor's *property* and the Individual Debtor's *property*14 and/or the estate's *property*15. However, as noted, the Trustee also alleges the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos* and/or their assets. The Court cannot ignore the Trustee's allegations.\n\n### **a. Beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to issue (i): whether Trustee alleges an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity or by the Individual Debtor**\n\nRegarding the first element, to plead actual fraudulent transfer or one sort of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee must plead the Individual Debtor made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(ii)(IV). Likewise, with respect to his NYUVTA claims, the Trustee must plead that the Individual Debtor or some other party liable on his debt made the transfer. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). However, an unauthorized postpetition transfer and the other types of constructive fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code do not require the Individual Debtor to have made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III) (no requirement that the debtor made the transfer), 549(a) (same).\n\nUnder the Bankruptcy Code, \"transfers\" include, in pertinent part, \"each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.\" 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). Similarly, transfers under\n\n13 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n14 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n15 *See* 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 40 of 102\n\nNYUVTA include, in pertinent part, \"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset\". N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p).\n\nIn keeping with the inclusion of \"indirect\" conveyances in the definition of transfer in both the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA, courts look to the substance, not the form, of a transfer. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35 (\"In equity, 'substance will not give way to form, [and] technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done.' Thus, an allegedly fraudulent conveyance must be evaluated in context; '[w]here a transfer is only a step in a general plan, the plan \"must be viewed as a whole with all its composite implications.\"'\") (internal citations omitted; other alterations in original); *see* 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.03[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2025) (collecting cases). Courts must look at the \"economic reality\" of the transaction. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 36 (citing *Salomon Inc. v. United States*, 976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)). Courts may, on appropriate facts, disregard corporate separateness in analyzing the economic reality of a transaction. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53 (in an action under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, affirming district court ruling insofar as it pierced the corporate veil to determine that principal received consideration – the loan to his company – for his personal payments to the lender and, hence, ruled the transaction was not a fraudulent conveyance); *see Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding law under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, is not displaced unless there is a clear indication Congress intended to do so).\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims as alleging the following *series* of transfers:16\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\nAccepting the Joint Defendants' interpretation, the Trustee is wholly relying on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allege the Individual Debtor made the transfers. The Joint Defendants dispute this identity and argue the Trustee does not have standing to avoid the remaining transfer, **BC**.\n\nHowever, the Court must assess the transfers as they are alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.,*\n\n*LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.*, 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018). Contrary to the Joint Defendants' interpretation of the complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers \"using\" the *alter egos*:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is not relying solely on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos*\n\n– he is alleging the *alter egos* are an *instrument* of the transfers.\n\nFor example, in the complaint against, among others, Amazon.com, Inc. (\"Amazon\"), a\n\nJoint Defendant, the Trustee alleges:\n\n44. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies Greenwich Land, G Club17, Lexington, HCHK Technologies, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to Amazon (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n16 The diagrams below are reproduced in **Appendix H**. 17 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club Operations LLC. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 42 of 102\n\n45. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through his shell companies, Greenwich Land, G Club, Lexington, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to Amazon (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 44–45, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The Trustee alleges the transfers were part of the Individual Debtor's \"shell game\" involving \"(i) [Individual] Debtor-controlled shell companies held by close family members and/or subordinates, (ii) assets purchased with cash from other [Individual] Debtor-controlled entities and/or transferred to and among shell entities for no consideration, and (iii) the [Individual] Debtor benefitting from and having control and dominion over such assets\", (*id*. ¶ 22), with the purpose of the shell game being \"to conceal and dissipate millions of dollars in assets while falsely pleading poverty to his many creditors\", (*id.* ¶ 37). (*See id.* ¶¶ 20–43.) All the other complaints make the same allegations about the Individual Debtor's financial affairs.\n\nIn support of these arguments, the complaint against Amazon incorporates the *alter ego* complaints against Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land. (*Id.* ¶ 20 n. 4.) The *alter ego* complaints seek declaratory judgments of *alter ego* and beneficial ownership and, on the bases of these declaratory judgments, turnover of property of the estate. For example, the complaint against Golden Spring alleges\n\nGolden Spring is the alter ego of the [Individual] Debtor and the [Individual] Debtor is the equitable owner of Golden Spring and/or its assets.\n\n(Complaint ¶ 2, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 43 of 102\n\nThe complaint against Golden Spring alleges numerous facts about, *inter alia*, the Individual Debtor's control over Golden Spring's formation, funding, management, and operations as well as his use of Golden Spring as a shell company to hide assets, pay expenses, and, generally, serve his interests. (*Id.* ¶¶ 13–38.) Extensive exhibits are attached to the complaint in support of these allegations. The other *alter ego* complaints make similar allegations relating to the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the alleged *alter egos*, his benefit from and use of their assets and/or services, and his use of their corporate form to shield assets from his creditors.\n\nThe Trustee's allegations connect the Individual Debtor to the nominal transferors through two overlapping legal theories: (i) *alter ego*, the focus of the Joint Defendants' argument; and (ii) beneficial ownership, which the Joint Defendants do not address. However, the Trustee's beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Assuming the Trustee has plausibly alleged the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos*18, he has plausibly pled the *alter egos* are affiliates of the Individual Debtor, through which the Individual Debtor could indirectly transfer assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a). In fact, courts have collapsed transactions involving affiliates. *See, e.g.*, *Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp.*, 919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming district court where fraudulent transfer involved owners laundering the assets of one company they owned to another as part of an overall scheme to make assets unavailable to creditors); *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D) (transfers include *indirect* transfers); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p) (same).\n\n18 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* because that is not among the four issues.\n\nTherefore, the Court finds the parties' argument regarding the effect of *alter ego* is not dispositive of the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n### **b. Beneficial ownership allegations may render inconsequential issue (iii): the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination**\n\nTurning to the second element at issue, Bankruptcy Code section 548 actual or constructive fraudulent transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Trustee standing to bring avoidance actions an actual creditor could bring under other applicable state or federal law to avoid transfers of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). The Trustee's New York law actual and constructive fraudulent transfer claims must additionally plead a transfer of \"property of the debtor\", where \"debtor\" is the Individual Debtor or another party liable on his debt. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b). Finally, unauthorized post-petition transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"property of the estate\". 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\nAn interest of the debtor in property is anything that would have been property of the estate but for the transfer to be avoided. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (\"Because the purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate—the property available for distribution to creditors—'property of the debtor' subject to the preferential transfer provision is best understood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.\"). Therefore, the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"an interest of the debtor in property\", 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1), and the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"property of the estate\", 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), both center on section 541, which defines property of the estate. Property of\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 45 of 102\n\nthe estate includes, in pertinent part, \"wherever located and by whomever held[,] . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Indeed, the Avoidance Claims must plead the Individual Debtor has an *equitable* interest in property, as opposed to mere legal title. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 58; *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (excepting from property of the estate property to which the debtor has only a legal interest insofar as the debtor does not have an equitable interest).\n\nAs to whether a transfer is of property of a debtor under NYUVTA, New York law recognizes beneficial ownership in actions to collect on a debt. *See, e.g.*, *In re Gliklad v. Chernoi*, 12 N.Y.S.3d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (affirming order requiring judgment debtor to turn over beneficial ownership of a business); *Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp.*, 651 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (remanding case to determine whether individual defendants equitably owned a corporate defendant and whether the plaintiff could pierce the corporate veil between the corporate defendant and its potential equitable owners); *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) (determining judgment debtor beneficially owned yacht in action to collect on judgment). Therefore, an \"interest of the debtor in property\", \"property of the estate\", and \"property of the debtor\" all include the Individual Debtor's equitable interests in property.\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee seeks to avoid a transfer of the *alter egos'* property:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 46 of 102\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the complaints to be alleging an *alter ego* determination would *create* an interest of the Individual Debtor in the *alter egos'* property.19 The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee is mistaken – an *alter ego* determination cannot create an interest in property that did not previously exist – and, therefore, the Trustee does not have standing to assert the remaining **BC** transfer of **B**'s property.\n\nOnce again, however, the Court must assess the transfers as alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. In the complaints, the Trustee alleges the transfers are transfers of the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate – *not* the *alter egos'* property:\n\n# *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is alleging the Individual Debtor *always* had an interest in the *alter egos'* property – the interest is not created by an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThis can be seen in the paragraphs from the complaint against Amazon cited above. But\n\nto use another example, in the complaint against, among others, Joint Defendant B&H Foto &\n\nElectronics Corp. (\"B&H Foto\"), the Trustee makes the following allegations:\n\n43. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies including Greenwich Land, Golden Spring, HCHK Technologies, G Club Operations, Rule of Law20 and Lexington Property, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to B&H (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n44. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through shell companies including Greenwich Land, Lexington, Golden Spring, G Club Operations,\n\n19 Effectively, as the Joint Defendants see it, *alter ego* determinations are involuntary transfers,\n\n*see* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), and **A=BC** can also be written **ABC**. 20 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club Operations and Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 47 of 102\n\nand HCHK Technologies, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to B&H (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\n### See **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 43–44, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The complaint alleges the Individual Debtor was involved in a \"shell game\", whereby he hid *his* assets in *alter egos* – and after the petition date, the assets of the estate – to frustrate collection of those assets to pay his debts and avoid his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. (*Id.* ¶¶ 19–42.) These allegations are identical in form to those in all the other complaints.\n\nThe complaints against the alleged *alter egos* involved in the transfers at issue are incorporated by reference. (*Id.* ¶ 19 n. 4.) All the *alter ego* complaints contain extensive allegations that the Individual Debtor used, controlled, and benefitted from the assets of the *alter egos*. 21 One of those, the *alter ego* complaint against Golden Spring is discussed above. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 10–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) As another example, the complaint against the HCHK Entities makes similar allegations. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 16–40, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23- 05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.)\n\nA review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints makes clear the Trustee is not solely relying on *alter ego* to assert the Individual Debtor or the estate has an equitable interest in the transferred property. As with the first element, to the extent the Trustee\n\n21 All the *alter ego* complaints except the complaint against Greenwich Land allege beneficial ownership of both the *alter ego* and its assets. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. The complaint against Greenwich Land nevertheless contains allegations about the Individual Debtor's use and control of and benefit from Greenwich Land's assets.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 48 of 102\n\nhas plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of an *alter ego's* assets22, he has plausibly pled a transfer of his property and/or property that is or, but for the transfer, would have been property of the estate. Hence, the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is also not dispositive of this element.\n\n## **ii. Avoidable transfer law controls issue (i): whether the Individual Debtor is the transferor; and issue (iii): whether the** *alter egos'* **property is the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate**\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, the Court will discuss the parties' arguments regarding the effect of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer actions in bankruptcy proceedings. In *McNellis*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court both in piercing the corporate veil with respect to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action and in refusing to pierce the same corporate veil with respect to the trustee's usury action. 420 F.2d at 53–54. The Second Circuit concluded, while fraudulent conveyance law allowed courts to pierce form in favor of substance, New York's usury law had developed to allow individuals to use a corporate *alter ego* to take out an otherwise usurious loan. *Id.* That is, the Second Circuit looked to the substantive law governing the trustee's causes of actions to determine whether the corporate veil could be pierced to establish an element or defense. *Id.*\n\nAccordingly, the Trustee is correct that the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is not dispositive. The relevant avoidable transfer statutes – here, the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA – determine whether and to what effect corporate veils may be pierced for the purposes of fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54. The standard governing veil piercing is determined by applicable choice of law rules –\n\n22 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos'* assets because that is not among the four issues.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 49 of 102\n\nwhich may or may not be different than the law governing the overall cause of action. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (denying motion to dismiss because debtor had sufficiently alleged standing to allege fraudulent transfer, under Delaware law, standing in shoes of its subsidiary through reverse veil-piercing, under Delaware law); *accord Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC*, C.A. No. 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) (acknowledging that under Delaware fraudulent transfer law, where reverse veil piercing is available under applicable law, a creditor of a parent may argue *alter ego* for the purposes of pursuing the fraudulent transfer of a subsidiary's assets).\n\nThe Joint Defendants assert the relief the Trustee seeks is novel. It is not. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (applying Delaware *alter ego* law); *see Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at \\*4–6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020) (applying Nevada *alter ego* law); *Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery)*, 402 B.R. 728, 743–48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) (same); *Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner)*, 335 B.R. 140, 145–47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005) (applying California *alter ego* law), *upheld in pertinent part on reconsideration* 345 B.R. 674, 676–77 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (upholding *alter ego* determination).\n\n### **a. Issues (i) and (iii): State law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nFurthermore, the relief the Trustee is seeking is certainly not novel under state law. Under NYUVTA, actual and constructive fraudulent transfers can be established by an *alter ego's* transfer of its property. \"'Debtor' means a person that is liable on a claim.\" N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). Therefore, even assuming *alter ego* only creates vicarious *liability*, an *alter ego* is a \"debtor\" even if it is not a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Because it is a debtor, an *alter ego* can make an avoidable transfer. *See* N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274. Moreover, property\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 50 of 102\n\nof an *alter ego* is property of a debtor. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p). Therefore, in a state law action, *alter ego* can be used in conjunction with NYUVTA. *See Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp.*, No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK), 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (applying NYUVTA and Delaware *alter ego* law) (citing *JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc.*, 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (\"UFTA\"), predecessor of Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"UVTA\")).\n\nThis is not only the law in New York; it is the law of most if not all jurisdictions within the United States. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6) (Connecticut has adopted UFTA which has same definition of \"debtor\" as UVTA); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2] (forty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFTA or UVTA); *see, e.g.*, *Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc.*, 450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at \\*4–5 (Nev. 2019) (table disposition); *Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc.*, 839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002); *Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3; *Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C.*, 75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); *U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc.*, 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015). Avoidable transfer and *alter ego* law both seek to thwart judgment evasion and can, unsurprisingly, be used together in collection actions outside of bankruptcy.\n\nIf the Trustee has standing under section 544(b) to bring his NYUVTA claims and has plausibly pled *alter ego*23, he has plausibly pled a debtor transferred its property.\n\n23 The Court will discuss the plausibility of the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations in section D below, after discussing the defendants' arguments regarding the sufficiency of his pleading.\n\n### **b. Issues (i) and (iii): Bankruptcy law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nThe Court must determine whether the normal rule applicable outside of bankruptcy also applies in bankruptcy. As in the beneficial ownership discussion above, two elements are at issue. First, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor. The Bankruptcy Code only controls this element with respect to actual fraudulent transfer and one of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV). Section 544(b) does not apply this element to the Trustee's NYUVTA claims and it is not an element of three of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a).\n\nSecond, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the *alter ego's* property is or would have been, but for the transfer, property of the estate. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59. This is an element of all the Avoidance Claims, including the Trustee's NYUVTA claims. As discussed above, the Trustee only has standing to bring claims under NYUVTA if he alleges a transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).\n\n#### *Issue (i): Does the Trustee allege an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?*\n\nWith respect to the first element, the Court concludes *alter ego* can be used to establish the Individual Debtor was the transferor because the definition of \"transfer\" includes indirect conveyances. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). Indeed, in *McNellis*, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to pierce the corporate veil and to hold the individual rather than his corporation took out the loan he later repaid. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54; *see Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *Voest-*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 52 of 102\n\n*Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 212–13. Therefore, *alter ego* allegations may support allegations that the Individual Debtor – not a non-debtor entity – is the transferor.\n\n### *Issue (iii): What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or alter ego determination?*\n\nAs to the second element, where the Bankruptcy Code is silent, state law determines what interests parties have in property. *Butner*, 440 U.S. at 54–57. However, *Butner* also holds Congress has authority under Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution to define property interests contrary to state law for the purposes of bankruptcy. *Id.* at 54–57 (holding it is a matter of state law whether, when, and how a mortgagee obtains a security interest in rents because the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, did not include a provision providing or denying mortgagees such a security interest).\n\nCongress defined property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. \"Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in the estate\", including \"property in which the debtor did not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy proceedings commenced.\" *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–05 (affirming Second Circuit determination that property of the estate included property seized by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a tax lien prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition). Therefore, consistent with *Butner* and *Whiting Pools*, courts have generally held that while state law determines what interests a debtor has in property, federal law determines whether those interests in property are included in property of the estate. *Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.)*, 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019); *Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.)*, 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007); *In re Nejberger*, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991); *N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons)*, 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985).\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 53 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* claim is property of the estate. *Nordlicht*,115 F.4th at 104–06 (holding *alter ego* claim under New York law is property of the estate), because such claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\", *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (alteration in original); *see In re Emoral, Inc.*, 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that successor liability claims are property of the estate because, like *alter ego* claims, they are general claims of creditors). This is true even if at state law *alter ego* is a claim for the imposition of vicarious liability, not an independent cause of action. *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 109–111. *Nordlicht* determined that\n\nalter-ego theories of liability neatly fall[] within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of 'claim':\n\n(A) *right to payment*, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or\n\n(B) *right to an equitable remedy* for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.\"\n\n115 F.4th at 110 (emphasis in original).\n\nUnder *Nordlicht*, a trustee's right to payment or an equitable remedy (such as turnover) from an *alter ego* is property of the estate. 115 F.4th at 105. A trustee may seek recovery from the *alter ego* to the full extent of claims asserted against the estate. *See Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.)*, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931) (holding, with respect to predecessors of section 544(b) claims, the trustee could recover on an avoided transfer for the estate's creditors at large). Property recoverable by a trustee is property of the estate. *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–07. Moreover, under *Begier*, the Individual Debtor had an interest in any such property prepetition. 496 U.S. at 59. Hence, if the Trustee prevails on his *alter ego* claims, the *alter egos'*\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 54 of 102\n\nproperty is property of the estate and the Individual Debtor had an interest in that property prepetition. *See Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (*alter ego* claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\"); *718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein)*, 192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding court had jurisdiction to determine appeal of a ruling on, among other things, creditor's claim that certain corporations were *alter egos* of the debtor because a determination that they were his *alter egos* \"would result in the inclusion in his bankruptcy estate of substantial assets which then would be available to satisfy, at least in part, his creditors' claims.\"); *Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.)*, 97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding trustee had standing to bring *alter ego* claim because it was \"an attempt to collect property of the estate for the benefit of *all* creditors and is not personal to any particular creditor\") (emphasis in original).\n\n#### *Contrary authority is unpersuasive*\n\nIn coming to this conclusion, the Court respectfully disagrees with the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in *In re Howland*. 674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017); *accord Lippe v. Bairnco Corp.*, 230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); *Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle)*, BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006); *Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle)*, Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21- 04041-lsg, \\_\\_\\_ B.R. \\_\\_\\_, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023) (applying *Howland*); *Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver)*, 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022) (same). In *Howland*, the Sixth Circuit held property of an *alter ego* is not property of the estate and cannot be recovered where, at state law, *alter ego* merely imposes vicarious liability. 674 F.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 55 of 102\n\nApp'x at 487. *Lippe* and *Wardle* held the same. *DuMouchelle* and *Silver*, decisions from courts within the sixth circuit, applied *Howland*.\n\nIn addition to the statutory analysis above, the Court respectfully disagrees with *Howland* for several reasons. First, courts \"do not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\". *Cohen*, 523 U.S. at 221. In interpreting the Code, courts presume Congress's \"familiarity with the prevailing understanding\" of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898. *Johnson v. Home State Bank*, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991). There is no clear indication that Congress intended to overrule *McNellis*. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 541(a), 544(b), 548(a), 549(a) *with* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 1) (repealed 1978), 107(d) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 67) (repealed 1978), 110(a), (d), (e) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 70) (repealed 1978). *McNellis* – which upheld the use of *alter ego* to prove a defense to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action brought under federal bankruptcy law and New York law – is binding on this Court. 420 F.2d at 53–54.\n\nSecond, the Sixth Circuit's approach to *alter ego* claims in avoidance actions is contrary to the Second Circuit's directive that courts must consider the substance, rather than the form, of a fraudulent transfer. *See Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *see also Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc.*, 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); *Voest-Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 211–12. There is capacity in fraudulent transfer law to look past the nominal parties to a transaction where state law allows the corporate form to be disregarded. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68. This capacity to recognize the economic reality is reflected in the expansive definitions of transfer and property of the estate in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 541.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 56 of 102\n\nThird, *Howland* is contrary to how *alter ego* and avoidance claims interact under state law. As outlined above, *alter ego* can be used in NYUVTA claims outside of bankruptcy to target transactions where the *alter ego* is both the nominal transferor and the nominal owner of the transferred property. *Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\nThe result should be no different in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is, among other things, a collective collection proceeding. *Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 370–71. That is *why* the Trustee has standing to assert (i) general claims for the benefit of creditors at large, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); *see Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105; and (ii) particular avoidance claims of actual creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), to the full extent of the transfer – even if the actual creditors' debt is less than the transferred amount, *Moore*, 284 U.S. at 5. Bankruptcy \"shields creditors from one another by replacing 'race' and other preferential systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of assets.\" *In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.*, 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (discussing purpose of the automatic stay) (citing *Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc.*, 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (case under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended)). It would undermine the collective nature of bankruptcy to send creditors on a race to the courthouse to pursue *alter ego* and fraudulent transfer remedies – remedies they may have no standing to pursue during the pendency of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy. *See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989).\n\nEven if creditors *could* bring these actions outside of bankruptcy, the costs to do so would be high: the Trustee's investigation into the Individual Debtor's financial affairs has been highly litigated and time consuming. Forcing creditors to pursue these avoidance actions outside of bankruptcy or forego their prosecution would promote an inequitable and uneven recovery for\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 57 of 102\n\nthe Individual Debtor's creditors, many of whom likely could not pay the fees and costs associated with such an effort. *See Union Bank v. Wolas*, 502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991) (section 547 is designed to balance related goals of preventing a race to the courthouse and providing for an equitable distribution to all creditors); *Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.)*, 78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). The Trustee is the person to pool the creditors' interests in the estate and bring the avoidance actions for their collective benefit. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50*.*\n\nFinally, *Howland* also runs contrary to Delaware *alter ego* law. It is an accident of our legal system that, generally, *alter ego* results in vicarious liability – the *alter ego* doctrine is about disregarding the corporate form where it is abused and causes fraud or injustice. *See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968) (\"There is, of course, no doubt that upon a proper showing corporate entities as between parent and subsidiary may be disregarded and the ultimate party in interest, the parent, be regarded in law and fact as the sole party in a particular transaction.\"). As the Delaware Court of Chancery observed \"[a]t its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners\", *Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.*, 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021) (action to collect on appraisal judgment), *because* \"where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent\", *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (alteration in the original).\n\nMost relief in the common law takes the form of money damages. The primary use of an *alter ego* claim is to spread liability from a defendant liable at law for money damages on, *e.g.*, tort or contract to a defendant with deeper pockets. *See NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC*, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances,\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 58 of 102\n\nthe distinction between the entity and its owner 'may be disregarded' to require an owner to answer for the entity's debts.\") (action on contract); *Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC*, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"A plaintiff seeking to hold the owners of a corporation liable for the corporation's debts 'faces a difficult task.'\") (action on fraud); *Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.)*, 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"Under Delaware law, veil piercing is a doctrine of equity. . . . Veil piercing is thus not a purely independent cause of action. Instead, piercing the corporate veil *effectively* amounts to the imposition of joint and several liability between a direct actor and its corporate affiliate for some underlying wrong committed by the direct actor.\") (action on tort) (emphasis added).\n\nHowever, the avoidance of a transfer is not money damages. \"[T]he purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate\". *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (discussing section 547 and the avoidance of preferential transfers); *see In re PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002) (\"Fraudulent conveyance law aims 'to make available to creditors those assets of the debtor that are rightfully a part of the bankruptcy estate, even if they have been transferred away.'\"); *Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.)*, 881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that allowing an administrative claim holder to keep unauthorized post-petition transfers would be inequitable to other creditors who have similar claims). To this end, the relief provided by sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code and section 273 and 274 of NYUVTA is *avoidance* of the subject transfer – not money damages. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274.\n\nUpon avoidance of the transfer, section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 276(b) of NYUVTA allow recovery of the *specific property* transferred, the value thereof, or the proceeds thereof. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b). It is, therefore, entirely\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 59 of 102\n\nunsurprising that disregarding the corporate form and treating the assets of the *alter ego* as the assets of the debtor operates differently with regard to avoidance actions than it does with regard to other actions. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (\"In the parent/subsidiary context, 'where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent.'\").\n\n\"Delaware will not countenance the use of the corporate form as a means to facilitate fraud or injustice.\" *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714. Fraudulent and unauthorized postpetition transfer law align with this purpose. They exist to prevent inequitable results arising from the dissipation of assets. *See Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d at 313; *Photo Promotion Assocs.*, 881 F.2d at 9–10. It would be fundamentally absurd and contrary to the purpose of the doctrine, if *alter ego* could not be used to prevent fraud or injustice resulting from a fraudulent or unauthorized post-petition transfer. These two bodies of law can be used together. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68; *see Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see also Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes a debtor may make a transfer through an *alter ego* and an *alter ego's* property is property of the debtor's estate. To the extent the Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*, the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor transferred property that is, or would have been but for the transfers, property of the estate. To this same extent, the Trustee therefore has standing to bring his NYUVTA claims and, for the reasons stated above, has plausibly pled those claims. *Alter ego* can be used to support an avoidable transfer claim under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA.\n\n### **2. Issues (ii) and (iv): Prejudice to** *alter egos'* **trade creditors and substantive consolidation**\n\nThe Court turns to the Joint Defendants' remaining arguments. The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee has failed to plead a cognizable reverse veil piercing claim under Delaware law because (a) the Trustee has failed to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*; and (b) the Joint Defendants would, as a matter of law, be prejudiced by reverse veil-piercing. The Joint Defendants also argue (c) the Trustee is seeking impermissible *nunc pro tunc* relief; and (d) even if the relief were otherwise permissible under state law, the relief sought could also be achieved by substantive consolidation and therefore it is inequitable to allow the Trustee that relief without meeting the test required for *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation. Woven throughout the Joint Defendants' arguments is the contention that the relief the Trustee seeks is deeply inequitable to them as innocent trade creditors of the alleged *alter egos*.\n\nThe Trustee argues (a) the caselaw is clear a plaintiff is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of an alleged *alter ego*; (b) prejudice is a fact intensive inquiry not resolvable on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and, in any event, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Joint Defendants protections unavailable outside of bankruptcy; (c) he is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief with his *alter ego* claims but rather seeking to conform legal reality to factual reality; and (d) while the relief *alter ego* provides in bankruptcy proceedings may be similar to substantive consolidation, the factual and legal predicates for the two remedies differ and the Trustee has pled *alter ego*. The Trustee also disputes the contention that the Joint Defendants are all innocent trade creditors and that the relief he seeks is fundamentally unfair.\n\n### **i. Issue (ii): Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nAs stated above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to allege transfers:\n\n$$\\begin{array}{c} \\mathbf{A} \\text{ (Indidual Debtor)} = \\mathbf{B} \\text{ (Alter ego)} \\xrightarrow[\\text{(Transfer elimination)}]{} \\mathbf{C} \\text{ (Joint Defendant)} \\text{ } \\mathbf{A} \\text{ (Joint Defendant)} \\\\ \\text{ (Alter ego determination)} \\end{array}$$\n\nWith respect to issue (ii), the Joint Defendants argue that even if an *alter ego* determination would create an identity between the Individual Debtor and the alleged *alter egos*, avoiding the **BC** transfer is prejudicial because the Joint Defendants did not know **A=B**, and, hence, the Court cannot *as a matter of law* make an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThe Court disagrees. First, the Trustee is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the *alter egos'* creditors. In adopting reverse veil-piercing, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that courts must consider the traditional *alter ego* factors and additionally consider a series of other factors that, essentially, relate to prejudice to the alleged *alter ego's* creditors, owners, and other stakeholders. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery rejected a defendant's argument the complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead a lack of prejudice to certain creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at 718. Instead, the Court of Chancery held \"[t]here is no basis in the Complaint to infer that reverse veil-piercing will cause harm to innocent third-party creditors. . . . To be clear, factual allegations related to . . . third-party creditors are not in the Complaint, and for now at least, my analysis is confined to the 'four corners' of that pleading.\" *Id.* The Court has been provided no reason to believe the Delaware Supreme Court would disagree with the Court of Chancery on this issue. Prejudice is an issue that requires factual development.\n\nSecond, the Trustee may plead the Joint Defendants are the initial transferees; it does not matter that subsequent transferees have different defenses. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 62 of 102\n\n382–86 (holding plaintiff could plead transfer in a way that a safe harbor defense was inapplicable); *cf. Covey v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth)*, Bankruptcy No. 10- 83603, Adversary No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*8 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) (holding trustee's use of *alter ego* was impermissible in part because it would deprive defendant of subsequent transferee defenses it would have if trustee pled a different fraudulent transfer). The Joint Defendants can argue the Trustee has not pled a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. Indeed, the Joint Defendants have done so, as discussed above. They can continue to do so as these proceedings move beyond the pleading stage.\n\nIn support of their argument, the Joint Defendants urge the Court to adopt the holding of *Duckworth*, but their reliance is misplaced. The court in *Duckworth* was not faced with motions to dismiss – it was faced with motions for summary judgment. *Duckworth*, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*2. The *Duckworth* court determined on the undisputed facts that it would be inequitable and contrary to applicable state law to allow the trustee to recover from a trade creditor of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at \\*7. Here, the Joint Motions are motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. At this stage, the standard is whether the Trustee's well-pled allegations, taken as true, support a determination of impermissible prejudice. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718. A review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints does not support such a determination.\n\nThe Joint Defendants do not have a right to the Trustee pleading that they are subsequent transferees. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. The Trustee pleads transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 63 of 102\n\nHe is not required to plead an **ABC** transfer, treating the *alter ego* determination as a transfer, such that he alleges the Individual Debtor transferred his property to the *alter egos* as the initial transferees and the Joint Defendants are subsequent transferees of the *alter egos*.\n\n### **ii. Issue (iv): May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nTurning to issue (iv), the Court concludes the Trustee is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief. Adjudging an entity to be and have been an *alter ego* of another entity is not affording *nunc pro tunc* relief – it is adjudging that the corporate form is and has been a façade. Under the Joint Defendants' theory of *alter ego*, there would be no remedy available for a prevailing party. The Joint Defendants argue under Delaware law an *alter ego* determination merely imposes vicarious liability for a companion claim reducible to money damages. If an *alter ego* determination could only *prospectively* spread liability as the Joint Defendants assert, the *alter ego* would not be liable on the prevailing party's companion claim based on *already existing* facts. This is not how Delaware law operates. *Alter ego* may be brought *alongside* the companion claim, *see Tronox*, 549 B.R. at 27 (personal injury plaintiffs seek to impose vicarious liability through various theories, including *alter ego*, where original defendant is not amendable to suit), or even *after* judgment is entered on the companion claim, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 699–701 (*alter ego* claim was brought *after* appraisal judgment), without any analysis as to whether *nunc pro tunc* relief is appropriate. This is because *nunc pro tunc* relief is not being sought. *See Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf)*, 644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (rejecting \"confusing\" argument that an *alter ego* determination would be impermissibly retroactive in a bankruptcy case). *Alter ego* seeks a remedy based on existing facts, just as a breach of contract claim seeks a remedy on existing facts.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 64 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* determination is *not* a transfer – it does not *create* an interest in property, but rather *recognizes* an interest in property. This is a fundamental flaw in the Joint Defendants' interpretation of the Avoidance Claims. As depicted above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to be alleging transfers:\n\n$$\\begin{array}{c} \\mathbf{A} \\text{ (Indidual Debtor)} = \\mathbf{B} \\text{ (Alter ego)} \\xrightarrow[\\text{(Transfer elimination)}]{} \\mathbf{C} \\text{ (Joint Defendant)} \\text{ } \\mathbf{A} \\text{ (Joint Defendant)} \\\\ \\text{ (Alter ego determinant)} \\text{ } \\mathbf{C} \\text{ (Alter edge of \\\"B's property)} \\end{array}$$\n\nAssuming *arguendo* that an *alter ego* determination creates an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter ego*, the Joint Defendants argue an *alter ego* determination would change the nature of the **BC** transfer *after the fact*. Therefore, the Joint Defendants argue the Court cannot treat the *alter ego* determination – **A=B**, which could be stated **AB** – as having occurred at the time of the **BC** transfer.\n\nThe Trustee is not, however, alleging the **A=B** transfer, but rather alleging the *alter egos* have always been a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor. He alleges transfers:\n\n$$\\begin{array}{c} \\textbf{A} \\text{(Indidual Debtor)} \\xrightarrow[\\text{(Transfer of A's property through alter ego } \\mathsf{B} \\text{)} ]} $$\n\nand asserts such transfers through the *alter egos* are the Individual Debtor's *modus operandi* to obtain goods and services for himself, his family, his associates, and his businesses and to move assets.\n\nThe Court declines to adopt a prudential limitation on the use of *alter ego* in bankruptcy\n\ncases. The Delaware Court of Chancery held in *Manichaean Capital* that\n\nThe risks that reverse veil-piercing may be used as a blunt instrument to harm innocent parties, and to disrupt the expectations of arms-length bargaining, while real, do not, in my view, justify the rejection of reverse veil-piercing outright. Rather, the recognition of the risks creates an opportunity to manage them, and to do so in a manner that serves the interests of equity.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 65 of 102\n\n251 A.3d at 712. The Court sees no reason why courts sitting in bankruptcy are unable or illequipped to take up the \"opportunity to manage [the risks of reverse veil-piercing]\" in the interests of equity as the Court of Chancery directs. Indeed, one of the overriding purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a single forum for the adjustment and final, equitable resolution of claims, including by collective collection proceedings. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 *et seq*. The balancing of the traditional *alter ego* factors and prejudice to the *alter ego's* creditors and other stakeholders, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15, is within the purview of a bankruptcy court.\n\nThe Joint Defendants urge the Court to view the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations as *sub rosa* substantive consolidation allegations and to, hence, apply restrictions on the retroactive effect of any *alter ego* determination – regardless of whether such restrictions apply at state law. Substantive consolidation \"results in, *inter alia*¸ pooling the assets of, and claims against, the two entities; satisfying liabilities from the resultant common fund; eliminating inter-company claims; and combining the creditors of the two companies for purposes of voting on reorganization plans.\" *Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.)*, 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). \"The sole purpose of substantive consolidation is to ensure the equitable treatment of all creditors.\" *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. Substantive consolidation requires (i) creditors to have \"dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and 'did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit'\"; and (ii) the debtors' affairs to be \"so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.\" *Id.* In *Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.)*, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantive consolidation orders should be issued *nunc pro tunc* where the proponent can show its benefits outweigh the harms to potential avoidance defendants. 810 F.2d 270, 277\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 66 of 102\n\n(D.C. Cir. 1987). The Joint Defendants urge the Court to apply *Auto-Train* to any *alter ego* determination.\n\nAs the Trustee acknowledges, the effect of an *alter ego* determination in bankruptcy is similar to the effect of substantive consolidation – assets and liabilities of the *alter egos* are merged. However, the availability of substantive consolidation – which the Joint Defendants appear to doubt – does not mean *alter ego* cannot be pled in bankruptcy cases. *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005) (\"Prior to substantive consolidation, other remedies for corporate disregard were (and remain) in place. For example, where a subsidiary is so dominated by its corporate parent as to be the parent's 'alter ego,' the 'corporate veil' of the subsidiary can be ignored (or 'pierced') under state law.\").\n\nMoreover, the elements and the purposes of the doctrines differ. Under Delaware law, traditional *alter ego* or piercing the corporate veil has two elements: (i) the corporate entity whose form is to be disregarded is so dominated and controlled by its alleged *alter ego* that the corporate entity and its *alter ego* are, in fact, a single economic unit; and (ii) the corporate form to be disregarded causes fraud or some similar injustice. *Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633; *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706; *Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood*, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999); *Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co.*, 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992). Reverse veil-piercing requires a court additionally consider prejudice to creditors, owners, and other stakeholders of the alleged *alter ego*. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. *Alter ego* provides a remedy for abuse of the corporate form. In contrast, provided there is no outweighing harm, substantive consolidation provides a remedy for overly complicated financial affairs that could be treated much more simply.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 67 of 102\n\nThis is a distinction with a difference. \"Substantive consolidation is better thought of as an economic remedy, the primary goal being the equitable treatment of all creditors. Conversely, a state law alter ego claim is an equitable remedy focused on preventing 'fraud or injustice.'\" *Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594- DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175, at \\*8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022). Substantive consolidation does not seek to remedy any fraud or injustice. *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. The corporate form need not have been abused, the entities need not have been shams, and no creditor needs to have been harmed by the corporate form. *Id.* All that is necessary is that creditors would benefit from substantive consolidation. *Id.* In substantively consolidating estates, a court is solving a practical problem – the management of highly intertwined estates with the prospect of high administrative costs spent untangling the estates – by prospectively simplifying the facts before it, where doing so does more good than harm. *See id.* In piercing the corporate veil, a court is recognizing an existing reality of abuse of the corporate form to the detriment of creditors and, as a matter of equity, not allowing that abuse to persist. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. Substantive consolidation may involve a transfer; an *alter ego* determination does not.\n\nBankruptcy is about, among other things, the equitable spreading of loss. In seeking to have the Court apply *Auto-Train* to *alter ego* claims, the Joint Defendants try to shift the focus of the analysis to the **BC** transfer and away from **A**. In so doing, the Joint Defendants ignore the shell game alleged in the complaints involving numerous *alter egos* perpetrated by and for the benefit of the Individual Debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors – which allegations are central to an *alter ego* analysis. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 68 of 102\n\n05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) These allegations, taken as true, are relevant to the balancing of the reverse veil-piercing factors. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 715–16 (stating courts will balance \"the social value of upholding the legitimate expectations of the affected corporate creditors or debtors, applying a rebuttable presumption in favor of assuring such expectations, against the importance of the policies served by allowing a reverse pierce under the particular circumstances involved.\") (citing Gregory S. Crespi, *The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards*, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)).\n\nAlthough the Joint Defendants ask the Court to apply the *Auto-Train nunc pro tunc* analysis to the *alter ego* claims, the Court concludes there is no reason or basis to depart from Delaware *alter ego* law. It remains available to trustees notwithstanding the advent of substantive consolidation. *Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d at 205–06.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Joint Defendants' arguments on issues (ii) and (iv) are not persuasive. The Court will not balance prejudice to the Joint Defendants and the factors supporting *alter ego* on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, the Court will not impose prudential limits on the use of *alter ego* beyond the elements of the doctrine.\n\n## **C. Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**24\n\nThe Court will address only the distinct arguments made by the Non-Joint Defendants on the four issues. The following Non-Joint Defendants: (1) FFP (BVI) Limited; (2) Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell; (3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.; (4) The Francis Firm PLLC; (5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.; (6) Weddle Law PLLC; (7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC; (8) G4S Security Systems (Hong\n\n24 *See* n. 12, *supra*.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 69 of 102\n\nKong) Ltd.; and (9) ACASS Canada LTD, (collectively, the \"Assorted Non-Joint Defendants\") are represented by the same counsel who argued their Non-Joint Motions as a single argument.\n\nThere are two other Non-Joint Defendants: (10) Liberty Jet Management Corp. (\"Liberty Jet\") and (11) Z&Z. Liberty Jet and Z&Z raise no distinct arguments that are not also raised by the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. Moreover, neither Liberty Jet nor Z&Z advanced independent arguments during the hearing. The Court will, therefore, only discuss the arguments of the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. To the extent Liberty Jet or Z&Z raised or joined in the arguments discussed below, this discussion also applies to Liberty Jet and Z&Z.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise two distinct arguments. First, with respect to issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring an *alter ego* claim because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor who, accepting the Trustee's allegations as true, is *in pari delicto* with the alleged *alter egos*. Second, with respect to issues (i), whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity, and (iii), the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue that the Trustee is improperly asserting claims of the *alter egos'* bankruptcy estates without the *alter egos* having filed for bankruptcy and without the substantive consolidation of the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case and the not-filed *alter ego* bankruptcy cases. In doing so, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert the Trustee is bypassing disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\nIn response, the Trustee argues he has standing under either section 541 or section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor's creditors and, even if he did not, the insider exception to *in pari delicto* would apply. The Trustee argues he\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 70 of 102\n\nhas properly asserted claims of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate, has properly asserted *alter ego* claims, and that, in any event, he will be seeking a new claims bar date to allow creditors of the *alter egos* to assert claims against the estate.\n\n#### **1. Issue (ii): Standing**\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code provides a bankruptcy trustee standing to bring certain claims on behalf of creditors. *PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d at 700. Absent such statutory authority, \"a bankruptcy trustee has no standing generally to sue third parties on behalf of the estate's creditors, but may only assert claims held by the bankrupt corporation itself.\" *Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner*, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991); *see Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.*, 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995); *Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.)*, 17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994).\n\nWhere a trustee is not asserting a claim on behalf of creditors, *Wagoner* directs courts to determine (i) whether the debtor could have brought the claim and (ii) if so, whether the trustee is *in pari delicto* by imputation of the debtor's conduct. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 119–20. Although an assertion of *in pari delicto* is typically considered an affirmative equitable defense, the *Wagoner* doctrine, including its consideration of *in pari delicto*, \"functions as a prudential standing limitation.\" *Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd.*, 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015).\n\nThe Second Circuit has held trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* claims on behalf of creditors at large. In *PepsiCo*, the Second Circuit adopted the approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in *Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc.*, 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987). *PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05. In *Koch Refining*, the Seventh Circuit held that, pursuant to section 544(a), a bankruptcy trustee is \"the\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 71 of 102\n\nrepresentative of the general creditors\" and could pursue *alter ego* claims because they address generalized rather than particularized harm to creditors. 831 F.2d at 1351–54; *see Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan)*, 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009). This accords with the statutory text of section 544(a): any judgment creditor could bring an *alter ego* claim to collect on their debt; it does not depend on its particular claim. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).\n\nWhile the Second Circuit distinguished *PepsiCo* in *Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC)*, 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013), it did so on facts where the Securities Investor Protection Act trustee sought to bring particularized claims of defrauded creditors – even if such claims were very commonly held on the particular facts of the Madoff Ponzi scheme25, *JPMorgan*¸721 F.3d at 58–59. The claims in *JPMorgan* closely resemble those in *Wagoner*. *Compare JPMorgan*, 721 F.3d at 58–59 *with Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 116–17. Moreover, consistent with *PespiCo*, the Second Circuit has recently reiterated that trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* on behalf of creditors at large and that *alter ego* claims are property of the estate. *Compare Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 *with PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 701.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue *Nordlicht* follows a line of cases starting with *Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.)*, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), which, unlike *Koch*, held that section 544(a) does not provide the trustee standing to bring general claims of creditors at large. *See PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 698–99. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert\n\n25 Indeed, section 544(a) avoids this sort of accidentally general claim because it does not give a trustee standing to bring claims of particular creditors but rather the standing to bring claims a hypothetical judgment creditor – without a particular underlying claim – could bring, that is, section 544(a) introduces a creditor external to the particular facts surrounding the debtor and its debts.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 72 of 102\n\nthis means the Trustee's *alter ego* claims are subject to *Wagoner*. While *Nordlicht* itself is silent on section 544(a), it is completely consistent with holding a trustee has the rights and powers of certain hypothetical creditors to hold his claims derived from those rights and powers are property of the estate. Moreover, even if it is only pursuant to section 541 that a trustee has standing to bring an *alter ego* claim, such standing is derived from the general claims of creditors at large.\n\nHence, the *Wagoner* doctrine is not applicable. It does not apply where a trustee brings an action standing in the shoes of a creditor. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 118 (\"The trustee insists he is not asserting the claims of the noteholders, so it is unnecessary for us to delve deeply into when, if ever, a trustee may sue a third party on behalf of the bankrupt's creditors.\"); *see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander)*, 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"neither the *Wagoner* rule nor the *in pari delicto* doctrine apply to a trustee's statutory standing under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.\"); *Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.)*, 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017). The Court does not reach the parties' arguments regarding exceptions to *in pari delicto*. The Trustee has standing to bring the *alter ego* claims.\n\n#### **2. Issue (i) and (iii):** *Alter ego***, substantive consolidation, and disclosure**\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise largely the same argument as the Joint Defendants, which argument the Court has rejected above, as to why the Trustee cannot use *alter ego* to plead that the Individual Debtor is the transferor or that property of the debtor and/or property that is or would be, but for the transfer, property of the estate was transferred. The Court will not discuss that argument again. The distinction arises from what the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have instead done. While the Joint Defendants argue\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 73 of 102\n\nthe Trustee can only recover from the alleged *alter egos* themselves and that is the extent of his potential recovery, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have seized control over the Individual Debtor's businesses, placed them into bankruptcy, and then sought *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation.\n\nThe Court has also already ruled above that, notwithstanding the existence of substantive consolidation, trustees may assert *alter ego* claims. As to the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants' notice concerns, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants do not represent the creditors of the alleged *alter egos* at large. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants themselves have notice of the Trustee's *alter ego* claims. The Trustee has stated multiple times that he will seek a new bar date for the creditors of adjudged *alter egos*. The Court will consider proper notice and service of such a bar date should such a request be made.\n\n#### **D. Issue (ii): plausibility of** *Alter Ego* **allegations**\n\nThe Court has addressed the Joint Defendants' and Non-Joint Defendants' arguments as to why the Trustee has not plausibly pled *alter ego*. The Court has found the Trustee has standing to bring his reverse veil-piercing claims, he is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the alleged *alter egos'* creditors, and prejudice does not exist as a matter of law. This discussion, however, leaves issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – less than completely resolved.\n\nOn the basis of the allegations in the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints, the Court concludes the Trustee has plausibly alleged (1) Golden Spring; (2) Lamp Capital; (3) HCHK Tech; (4) HCHK Property; (5) Lexington; (6) Greenwich Land; and (7) Leading Shine are *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor and their corporate veils should be pierced in reverse. The Trustee has plausibly pled (i) the Individual Debtor dominated and controlled the\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 74 of 102\n\n*alter egos* such that they have no independent economic existence and serve only as a façade for the Individual Debtor; and (ii) the corporate form of the *alter egos* serves to hinder, delay, or defraud the Individual Debtor's creditors as part of a large shell game designed to effectively judgment proof the Individual Debtor. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 13–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) Furthermore, the allegations in the complaints and the *alter ego* complaints, taken as true, do not establish prejudice to the creditors of the *alter egos*. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nCertain issues before the Court are legal issues – but they are narrowly drawn and, in essence, ask the Court to look past or recharacterize the allegations in the complaints. The Court will not do so in ruling on motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants present the Trustee's transfer allegations as a series, **A=BC**: an *alter ego* determination creating an identity between **A**, the Individual Debtor, and **B**, an alleged *alter ego*, and then a transfer of **B's** property to **C**, a Joint Defendant. The Trustee, however, alleges **AC** transfers, transfers of **A**'s property to **C** *using* **B**. Other issues before the Court are drawn in an attempt to make them amenable to adjudication on a motion to dismiss. In doing so, the defendants focus on the unalleged **BC** transfer and argue adding another transfer, **A=B**, to this transfer prejudices **C**. The defendants ask the Court to go beyond the pleadings and rule on the facts, which the Court will not do.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes as follows regarding the four issues:\n\n#### **(i) Can the Trustee avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?**\n\nThe Trustee does not seek to avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity. The Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Transfer is defined to include indirect transfers. Hence, the nominal transferor is not controlling. The Trustee advances *alter ego* and beneficial ownership allegations to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n### **(ii) Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nReverse veil-piercing is recognized by Delaware law. The Court has considered the parties' arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading of *alter ego*. The Trustee has standing to bring a reverse veil-piercing claim. The Trustee is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. The Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*.\n\n## **(iii) What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination?**\n\nThe Trustee does not solely rely on *alter ego* allegations – he also pleads beneficial ownership. Nevertheless, the effect of reverse veil-piercing under Delaware law is that the corporate form is disregarded. Disregard of the corporate form has different results depending on the substantive law of the companion cause of action. Typically, it results in the imposition of vicarious liability. It may also be asserted to prove some claim or defense. Under the Bankruptcy Code, an *alter ego* determination can be used to establish a debtor made an indirect transfer and renders the property of the debtor's *alter ego* property of the estate. Under NYUVTA, an *alter ego* determination can be used to avoid transfers by the *alter ego* of the *alter ego's* property.\n\n### **(iv) May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nThe Trustee is not seeking retroactive relief. *Alter ego* is a remedy for past and present abuse of the corporate form. It brings legal reality in line with factual reality. *Alter ego* survives the advent of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy proceedings. There is no basis to reinterpret the complaints as seeking substantive consolidation rather than *alter ego*.\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED:**\n\n1. The Joint Motions, listed on Appendix A, are **DENIED**.\n\n2. The Non-Joint Motions, listed on Appendix B, are **DENIED IN PART** with\n\nrespect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n\n3. The Z&Z Objection, listed on Appendix C to this Order, is **OVERRULED IN**\n\n**PART** with respect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n\n4. On or before March 28, 2025, each Non-Joint Defendant shall file a joint statement with the Trustee in their respective avoidance actions stating the issues that remain to\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 77 of 102\n\nbe determined with respect to their Non-Joint Motions or the motion for judgment on the pleadings to which Z&Z objected. The statements must delineate with specificity where in the pleadings the issues are raised. Upon review of the statements, the Court will determine with respect to each matter whether a hearing is necessary or the matter may be decided on the submissions of the parties.\n\n> **IT IS SO ORDERED** at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 4th day of March, 2025.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 78 of 102\n\n## **APPENDIX A Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 24 (filed by Agora Lab, Inc., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Amazon Web Services, Inc., defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by Direct Persuasion LLC, defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Fox News Network, LLC, defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 27, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Arri Americas Inc., defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Teris-Phoenix, LLC, defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Phillips Nizer LLP, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Mr. Mark Gundersen, defendant).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 42 (filed by Amazon.com, Inc., defendant).\n- 11. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Anthem Health Plans, Inc., defendant).\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 79 of 102\n\n- 12. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Federal Express Corporation, defendant).\n- 13. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by DJD Creative, LLC, defendant).\n- 14. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., defendant).\n- 15. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by American Express Company, defendant).\n- 16. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, defendant).\n- 17. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeta Global Corp., defendant).\n- 18. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by GroCyber LLC, defendant).\n- 19. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC, defendant).\n- 20. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc., defendant).\n- 21. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by ModSquad Inc., defendant).\n- 22. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Cloudfare, Inc., defendant).\n- 23. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 3 Columbus Circle LLC, defendant).\n- 24. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Indium Software Inc., defendant).\n- 25. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Miller Motorcars Inc., defendant).\n- 26. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., defendant).\n- 27. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Target Enterprises, LLC, defendant).\n- 28. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., defendant).\n- 29. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Jamestown Associates, LLC, defendant).\n- 30. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Nardello & Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 31. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., defendant).\n- 32. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 28 (filed by Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP, defendant).\n- 33. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Putnam's Landscaping LLC, defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 81 of 102\n\n- 34. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Mr. Jason Miller, defendant).\n- 35. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Sedgwick Realty Corp., defendant).\n- 36. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Cirrus Design Corp., defendant).\n- 37. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 25 (filed by Marcum LLP, defendant).\n\n## **APPENDIX B Non-Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by FFP (BVI) Ltd., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2024), ECF No. 16 (filed by V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A., defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Liberty Jet Management Corp., defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 29, 2024), ECF No. 15 (filed by The Francis Firm PLLC, defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by Berkeley Rowe Ltd., defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11 (filed by Weddle Law PLLC, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Lawall & Mitchell, LLC and Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendants).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by ACASS Canada LTD., defendant).\n\n## **APPENDIX C Z&Z Objection**\n\n1. Memorandum of Law in Opposition, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., defendant, in opposition to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2024), ECF No. 17).\n\n## **APPENDIX D Complaints Against Joint and Non-Joint Defendants**\n\n### Legend\n\n## **Complaints against Non-Joint Defendant are bolded**\n\nAvoidance Claims\n\nAFT (BC) – Actual Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code)\n\nAvoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and550(a).\n\n- AFT (NY) Actual Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n- CFT (BC) Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a).\n- CFT (NY) Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n- UPT Unauthorized Post-petition Transfer Avoidance and recovery of an unauthorized post-petition transfer of property of the estate from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a).\n- ST Recovery from Subsequent Transferee Recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).\n- \\* Partially Stayed Claim\n\n\\*\\* Stayed Claim\n\n(Claims against neither Joint Defendant nor Non-Joint Defendant appear in parentheses)\n\n*Alter Egos*\n\nGSNY – Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. LC – Lamp Capital LLC HCHKT – HCHK Technologies, Inc. HCHKP – HCHK Property Management, Inc. LPS – Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. GL – Greenwich Land, LLC LSNY – Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n[*Alter egos* involved in Avoidance Claim insofar as it is not stayed by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(e) appear in brackets]\n\n1. Complaint, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n2. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 4.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n3. Complaint, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n4. Complaint, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n5. Complaint, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. Complaint, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n7. Complaint, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LPS] |\n\n8. Complaint, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n9. Complaint, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LPS]\n\n10. **Complaint,** *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT** | |\n\n11. Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n\n12. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKP]\n\n13. Complaint, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n14. Complaint, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n15. Complaint, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKT, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n\n16. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2025), ECF No. 30.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. Complaint, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. Complaint, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n19. Complaint, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n20. Complaint, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n### 21. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n\n22. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. Complaint, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n\n24. Complaint, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT* | [LPS] |\n\n25. Complaint, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. Complaint, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n27. Complaint, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n\n28. Complaint, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n29. **Complaint,** *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL] |\n\n30. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 2.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n31. Complaint, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: AFT (BC) [HCHKT] Second Claim: AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. Complaint, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. Complaint, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n34. Complaint, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LPS] |\n\n### 35. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT | [LC, LPS] |\n\n### 36. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2024), ECF No. 23.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n\n37. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n38. Complaint, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n|---------------|-----------|-----------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | ST* | |\n\n40. Complaint, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\n41. **Complaint,** *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\n42. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. Complaint, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, GL] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC, HCHKP, GL] |\n\n44. Complaint, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| | | |\n\n45. Complaint, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC]\n\n46. Complaint, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | (ST) | |\n\n47. **Second Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2024), ECF No. 22.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n|---------------|-----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n48. Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|----------|--------------|\n| AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| UPT | [HCHKP, LPS] |\n| | |\n\n# **APPENDIX E Selected Statutory Provisions**\n\n## **Bankruptcy Code Provisions**\n\n## Definitions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(54) The term \"transfer\" means—\n\n- (A) the creation of a lien;\n- (B) the retention of title as a security interest;\n- (C) the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption; or\n\n(D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—\n\n- (i) property; or\n- (ii) an interest in property.\n\n## 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:\n\n(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.\n\n## Avoidance Provisions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—\n\n(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or\n\n(B) (i) received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and\n\n(ii) (I) was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;\n\n (II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;\n\n (III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured; or\n\n (IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate—\n\n- (1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and\n- (2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or\n- (B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, If the court so orders, the value of such property, from—\n\n(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or\n\n(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.\n\n# **NYUVTA Provisions**\n\n# Definitions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) \"Asset\" means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:\n\n- (1) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;\n- (2) property to the extent it is generally exempt under non-bankruptcy law; or\n\n(3) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entirety to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.\n\n. . .\n\n(f) \"Debtor\" means a person that is liable on a claim.\n\n. . .\n\n(p) \"Transfer\" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and the creation of a lien or other encumbrance.\n\n## Avoidance Provisions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:\n\n(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or\n\n(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:\n\n(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or\n\n(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due.\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.\n\n(b) A transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 97 of 102\n\n## N.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this article, a creditor, subject to the limitations in section two hundred seventy-seven of this article, may obtain:\n\n(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;\n\n(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee if available under applicable law; and\n\n(3) subject to principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:\n\n(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;\n\n(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or\n\n(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.\n\n## **APPENDIX F Incorporated Complaints Against** *Alter Egos*\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"Golden Spring\")\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claims: Avoidance and recovery of actual fraudulent transfer.\n\nDisposition: Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2023), ECF No. 35.\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC). Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Default Judgment, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2024), ECF No. 66.\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity\n\nDisposition: Summary Judgment, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2024), ECF No. 134.\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC) Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Pending.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 101 of 102\n\n| Adv. P. | Mot. ECF | Filed | Obj. ECF | Filed | Rep. ECF | Filed |\n|-------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|\n| 24-05056 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. FFP (BVI) | 17 | 8/12/24 | 20 | 10/11/24 | 22 | 11/11/24 |\n| Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05110 | 19 | 5/24/24 | 23 | 7/23/24 | 24 | 8/22/24 |\n| Despins v. Mitchell | | | | | | |\n| 24-05134 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. V.X. Cerda | 16 | 6/5/24 | 20 | 8/5/24 | 21 | 9/3/24 |\n| & Assocs. P.A. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05135 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Liberty Jet | 19 | 6/20/24 | 24 | 9/16/24 | 27 | 10/16/24 |\n| Mgmt. Corp. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05168 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Francis Firm | 15 | 5/29/24 | 19 | 7/29/24 | 20 | 8/28/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05186 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Berkeley | 35 | 10/12/24 | 42 | 12/11/24 | 51 | 1/10/25 |\n| Rowe Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05188 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Weddle Law | 11 | 4/22/24 | 17 | 6/21/24 | 27 | 8/2/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05199 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Lawall & | 21 | 5/24/24 | 26 | 7/23/24 | 27 | 8/22/24 |\n| Mitchell, LLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05204 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. G4S Sec. | 19 | 8/22/24 | 23 | 10/21/24 | 25 | 11/20/24 |\n| Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05208 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Zeisler & | 17 | 8/2/24 | 21 | 9/6/24 | 22 | 9/20/24 |\n| Zeisler, P.C. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05226 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. ACASS | 26 | 9/12/24 | 33 | 11/12/24 | 41 | 12/20/24 |\n| Canada LTD. | | | | | | |\n\n**APPENDIX G Briefing of Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**\n\n### **APPENDIX H Transfer Diagrams**\n\nAlleged Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nJoint Defendants' Interpretation of Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，）\n）\n第11章\n）\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n）\n（合并管理）\n\n债务人。）\n）\n事由：ECF Nos. 3577, 3713\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯），作为 HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05005 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 24\n）\n）\n诉\n）\nAGORA LAB, INC.（Agora Lab公司），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05006 (JAM)\n）\n原告，）\n事由：ECF No. 21\n）\n）\n诉\n）\nAMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.（亚马逊网络服务公司），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05010 (JAM)\n）\n原告，）\n事由：ECF No. 26\n）\n诉\n）\nDIRECT PERSUASION LLC（Direct Persuasion有限责任公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05015 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 23\n）\n）\n）\n\nFOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05031 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 17\n）\n）\n）\nARRI AMERICAS, INC.（ARRI美洲公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05044 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 20\n原告，）\n）\n诉）\nTERIS-PHOENIX, LLC（Teris-Phoenix有限责任公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05047 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 23\n）\n）\n）\n）\n\nPHILLIPS NIZER LLP（Phillips Nizer律师事务所），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05048 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 21\n）\n）\n诉）\nMARK GUNDERSON（马克·冈德森），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05055 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 17\n原告，）\n）\n诉）\n270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西39街270号公司有限责任公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05056 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 17\n）\n）\n诉）\n）\nFFP (BVI) LIMITED（FFP〔英属维尔京群岛〕有限公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05057 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 42\n）\n诉）\n）\n）\nAMAZON.COM, INC.（亚马逊公司）、HING CHI NGOK（吴庆之）、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS（亚历克斯·哈吉查拉兰布斯）、CHUNGUANG HAN（韩春光）及\nMEI GUO（郭梅），）\n）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05058 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 21\n）\n诉）\n）\nANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC.（Anthem健康计划公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05059 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 20\n）\n）\n诉）\nFEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION（联邦快递公司），）\n）\n）\n被告。）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05063 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 22\n）\n诉）\n）\n）\nDJD CREATIVE LLC（DJD Creative有限责任公司），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05069 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 35\n）\n诉）\n）\nB&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP.（B&H Foto & Electronics公司）、HING CHI\nNGOK、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS及\nCHUNGUANG HAN，）\n）\n）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05077 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 18\n）\n）\n）\n\nAMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY（美国运通公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05082 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 17\n）\n）\n）\nOHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE LLC（Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure有限责任公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05092 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 21\n）\n诉）\n）\nZETA GLOBAL CORP.（Zeta Global公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05100 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 17\n）\n）\n）\n\nGROCYBER, LLC（Grocyber有限责任公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05108 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 22\n）\n）\n）\nCONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY, LLC（Conservative Campaign Technology有限责任公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05110 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n）\n）\n诉。\nAARON MITCHELL（亚伦·米切尔），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05112 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 23\n）\n）\n诉。\nANTHEM HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.（Anthem Healthchoice Assurance公司），\n原名为 EMPIRE HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.（Empire Healthchoice Assurance公司），\n以 EMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD（Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield）名义经营，\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05114 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 21\n）\n）\n诉。\nMODSQUAD INC.（ModSquad公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05115 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 22\n）\n）\n）\nCLOUDFLARE, INC.（Cloudflare公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05120 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 17\n）\n）\n）\n\n3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05122 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n）\n）\n）\nINDIUM SOFTWARE, INC.（Indium Software公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05128 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 18\n）\n）\n诉。\nMILLER MOTORCARS INC.（Miller Motorcars公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n）\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 登记日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第10页，共102页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05130 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 21\n）\n）\n）\n\nON THE SPOT HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC.（On the Spot Home Improvement公司），）\n）\n）\n被告。）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05134 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 16\n）\n）\n诉）\n）\nV.X. CERDA & ASSOCIATES P.A.（V.X. Cerda & Associates专业协会），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05135 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n原告，）\n诉）\n）\n）\nLIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT CORP.（Liberty Jet Management公司），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 登记日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第11页，共102页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05138 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n）\n）\n）\n）\n\nTARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC（Target Enterprises有限责任公司），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05141 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n）\n诉）\n）\nFLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD.（Flat Rate Movers有限公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05147 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n原告，）\n诉）\n）\nJAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, LLC（Jamestown Associates有限责任公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 登记日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第12页，共102页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05162 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n）\n）\n）\n）\n\nNARDELLO & CO., LLC（Nardello & Co.有限责任公司），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05168 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 15\n）\n）\n诉）\nTHE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC（The Francis Firm专业有限责任公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05186 (JAM)\n）\n事由：ECF No. 35\n）\n诉）\n）\nBERKELEY ROWE LIMITED（Berkeley Rowe有限公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\n续下页\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 登记日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第13页，共102页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05188 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 11\n）\n）\n）\n\n）\nWEDDLE LAW PLLC（Weddle Law专业有限责任公司），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05196 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 18\n）\n诉）\n）\nMORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND IASON &\nANELLO P.C.（Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello专业公司），）\n）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05199 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 21\n）\n诉）\n）\nLAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC（Lawall & Mitchell有限责任公司）及\nAARON MITCHELL，）\n）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 登记日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第14页，共102页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05202 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 28\n）\n）\n）\n\nCLAYMAN ROSENBERG KIRSHNER & LINDER LLP（Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder律师事务所），）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05204 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 19\n）\n）\n）\nG4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.（G4S安保系统〔香港〕有限公司），\n被告。）\n）\n）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05208 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 17\n）\n）\n诉。\nZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.（Zeisler & Zeisler专业公司），）\n）\n）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n登记日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第15页，共102页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05211 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 18\n）\n）\n）\nPUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING LLC（Putnam's Landscaping有限责任公司），）\n）\n）\n被告。）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，\n原告，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05219 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 23\n）\n诉）\n）\nJASON MILLER（贾森·米勒），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第11章受托人，）\n）\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05222 (JAM)\n）\n）\n事由：ECF No. 18\n原告，）\n）\n诉）\nSEDGWICK REALTY CORP.（Sedgwick Realty公司），）\n）\n被告。）\n）\n）\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 登记日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第16页，共102页\n\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05225 (JAM)\n事由：ECF No. 21\n\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05226 (JAM)\n事由：ECF No. 26\n\n对抗诉讼案号 24-05229 (JAM)\n事由：ECF No. 25\n\n出庭律师\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz\nDouglass Barron\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（出庭陈述）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n\nDouglas S. Skalka\nJames C. Graham\nPatrick R. Linsey\nNeubert, Pepe & Montieth（Neubert、Pepe & Montieth律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议方及答辩方 Luc A. Despins 先生、作为 Ho Wan Kwok 先生遗产第11章受托人及原告的代理律师\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert\nLindsay C. Stone\nSheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP（Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton律师事务所）\n30 Rockefeller Plaza\nNew York, NY 10112\n\n及\n\nAlan H. Martin\nSheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP\n650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor\nCosta Mesa, CA 92626\n\n动议方 Agora Lab, Inc.、被告的代理律师\n\nLindsay Sampson Bishop\nK&L Gates LLP（K&L Gates律师事务所）\nOne Congress Street, Suite 2900\nBoston, MA 02114\n\n及\n\nBrian T. Peterson（出庭陈述）\nRuby A. Nagamine\nK&L Gates LLP\n925 4th Ave, Suite 2900\nSeattle, WA 98104\n\n动议方 Amazon Web Services, Inc.及 Amazon.com, Inc.、被告的代理律师\n\nBenjamin Mintz\nArnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP（Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer律师事务所）\n250 West 55th Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\n及\n\n及\n\nRyan M. Trombley\nArnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP\n70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200\nChicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor\nShipman & Goodwin LLP（Shipman & Goodwin律师事务所）\n300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor\nStamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein（出庭陈述）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n动议方 Direct Persuasion LLC、被告的代理律师\n\nSteven G. Mintz\nBarry M. Kazan\nPhilip Ian Tafet\nMintz & Gold LLP（Mintz & Gold律师事务所）\n600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor\nNew York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer\nEilis A. Meagher\nFinn Dixon & Herling LLP（Finn Dixon & Herling律师事务所）\nSix Landmark Square, Suite 600\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议方 Fox News Network, LLC及 Marcum LLP、被告的代理律师\n\nMichael T. Conway\nLazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP（Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle律师事务所）\n747 Third Ave., 16th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n动议方 Arri Americas Inc.、被告的代理律师\n\nAndrea Chase\nSpencer Fane（Spencer Fane律师事务所）\n1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400\nKansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer\nEilis A. Meagher\nFinn Dixon & Herling LLP\nSix Landmark Square, Suite 600\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议方 Teris-Phoenix, LLC、被告的代理律师\n\nJared R. Clark\nPhillips Nizer LLP\n485 Lexington Avenue\nNew York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin\nHarris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC（Harris Beach Murtha Cullina专业有限责任公司）\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n及\n\nMatthew Pesce\nHarris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC\n1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06106\n动议方 Phillips Nizer LLP、被告的代理律师\n\nJeffrey Hellman\nLaw Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC（Jeffrey Hellman律师事务所有限责任公司）\n195 Church Street, 10th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议方 Mark Gundersen先生、Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC及 Jason Miller先生、被告的代理律师\n\nRobert N. Sensale（罗伯特·N·森萨莱） Bershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC（伯施泰因、沃尔普及麦基翁专业公司） 900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议人270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西39街270号公司有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨）（出庭辩论） Kellianne Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基） Michelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安陶） Green & Sklarz LLC（格林及斯克拉茨有限责任公司） One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n动议人FFP (BVI) Limited、Aaron A. Mitchell（亚伦·A·米切尔）、V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.（V.X. 塞尔达及合伙人专业协会）、The Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所专业有限责任公司）、Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔及米切尔有限责任公司）及G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.（G4S安保系统〔香港〕有限公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nEric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈尔茨坦）（出庭辩论） Shipman & Goodwin LLP（希普曼及古德温律师事务所） One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n及\n\nJessica Signor（杰西卡·西格诺） Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安森健康计划公司）、Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（安森健康优选保险公司）、f/k/a Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（前称帝国健康优选保险公司）、d/b/a Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield（以帝国蓝十字蓝盾名义营业）及Sedgwick Realty Corp.（塞奇威克房地产公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nMichael A. Siedband（迈克尔·A·西德班德） Federal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司） 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building 2, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈尔茨坦）（出庭辩论） Nicole Lapenta（妮科尔·拉彭塔） Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n及\n\nJessica Signor（杰西卡·西格诺） Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人Federal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nBret Strong（布雷特·斯特朗） Zachary W. Doninger（扎卡里·W·多宁格） 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 The Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III（路易斯·约瑟夫·马托基奥三世） Martocchio & Oliveira, LLC（马托基奥及奥利维拉有限责任公司） 191 Main Street Southington, CT 06489\n动议人DJD Creative LLC（DJD创意有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nScott M. Kessler（斯科特·M·凯斯勒） Akerman LLP（阿克曼律师事务所） 1251 Avenue of the Americas 37th Floor New York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams（特蕾西·埃利斯·威廉姆斯） Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（B&H摄影及电子公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nDarryl S. Laddin（达里尔·S·拉丁） Frank N. White（弗兰克·N·怀特） Arnall Golden Gregory LLP（阿诺尔·戈尔登·格雷戈里律师事务所） 171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100 Atlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches（罗纳德·I·乔切斯） Law Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC（罗纳德·I·乔切斯律师事务所有限责任公司） 82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203 Wethersfield, CT 06109\n动议人American Express Company（美国运通公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr.（小约翰·J·克拉克） DLA Piper LLP (US)（德杰律师事务所〔美国〕） 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020\n\n及\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe（C·凯文·科比） DLA Piper LLP (US) 650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n动议人Zeta Global Corp.（泽塔全球公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante（尼古拉斯·P·韦利安特） Cohn Birnbaum & Shea（科恩、伯恩鲍姆及谢伊律师事务所） CityPlace II, 15th Floor 185 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人GroCyber, LLC（格罗赛博有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nIlan Markus（伊兰·马库斯） Barclay Damon LLP（巴克莱·达蒙律师事务所） 545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人Conservative Campaign Technology LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nRobert E. Kaelin（罗伯特·E·凯林） Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC（哈里斯·比奇·默萨·库利纳专业有限责任公司） 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n及\n\nMatthew Pesce（马修·佩谢） Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n动议人ModSquad, Inc.（莫德小队公司）及3 Columbus Circle, LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nSabrina L. Streusand（萨布丽娜·L·斯特罗桑德） Streusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP（斯特罗桑德、兰登、奥兹本及莱蒙律师事务所） Spyglass Point 1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold（罗斯·G·芬戈尔德） Stokesbury, Shipman & Fingold（斯托克斯伯里、希普曼及芬戈尔德律师事务所） 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 Farmington, CT 06032\n动议人Cloudflare, Inc.（云耀公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nRichard J. Reding（理查德·J·雷丁） ASK LLP（ASK律师事务所） 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 St. Paul, MN 55121\n\n及\n\nEdward E. Neiger（爱德华·E·奈格） ASK LLP 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor New York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow（伊丽莎白·N·克拉斯诺） Eric R. Wilson（埃里克·R·威尔逊） Benjamin D. Feder（本杰明·D·费德） Kelley Drye & Warren LLP（凯利·德莱及沃伦律师事务所） Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人Indium Software, Inc.（铟软件公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nEric Seltzer（埃里克·塞尔策） Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC（吉尔布赖德、图萨、拉斯特及斯佩兰有限责任公司） 30 Brewster Lane Bellport, NY 11713\n动议人Miller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner（贾斯汀·S·鲍姆加特纳） Becker LLC（贝克尔有限责任公司） 354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500 Livingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈尔茨坦）（出庭辩论） Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（即时家居改善公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nGerard R. Luckman（杰拉德·R·拉克曼） Elbert F. Nasis（埃尔伯特·F·纳西斯） Forchelli Deegan Terrana LLP（福切利、迪根及特拉纳律师事务所） 333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010 Uniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz（帕特里克·托马谢维奇） Fazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall（法扎诺、托马谢维奇及巴拉尔律师事务所） 96 Oak Street Harford, CT 06106\n动议人Liberty Jet Management Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJohn F. Carberry（约翰·F·卡伯里） Kara Anne Zarchin（卡拉·安妮·扎钦） Cummings & Lockwood LLC（卡明斯及洛克伍德有限责任公司） Six Landmark Square Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人Target Enterprises, LLC（塔吉特企业有限责任公司）及Jamestown Associates, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr.（小詹姆斯·J·科斯特洛） Norris McLaughlin PA（诺里斯·麦克劳克林专业协会） 400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor Bridgewater, NJ 08807\nFlat Rate Movers, Ltd.（统一费率搬家公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nHenry P. Baer（亨利·P·贝尔） Eilis A. Meagher（艾莉丝·A·米格） Finn Dixon & Herling LLP（芬恩、迪克森及赫林律师事务所） Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人Nardello & Co., LLC（纳尔代洛公司有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen（朱莉·约翰斯顿-阿伦） Armstrong Teasdale LLP（阿姆斯特朗·蒂斯代尔律师事务所） 100 North Riverside Plaza Chicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨）（出庭辩论） Kellianne Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基） Michelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安陶） Green & Sklarz LLC（格林及斯克拉茨有限责任公司） One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n及\n\nJohn G. Willard（约翰·G·威拉德） Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105\n动议人Berkeley Rowe Limited（伯克利·罗有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nRichard Corbi（理查德·科比） The Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC（理查德·J·科比律师事务所专业有限责任公司） 104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor New York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨）（出庭辩论） Kellianne Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基） Michelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安陶） Green & Sklarz LLC（格林及斯克拉茨有限责任公司） One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n动议人Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所专业有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nRowena A. Moffett（罗威娜·A·莫菲特） Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP（布伦纳、萨尔茨曼及沃尔曼律师事务所） 271 Whitney Avenue New Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（莫维洛、阿布拉莫维茨、格兰德、伊亚松及阿内洛专业公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nBrian David Linder（布赖恩·大卫·林德） Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼、罗森伯格、基什纳及林德律师事务所） 305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650 New York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri（马修·D·瓦劳里） Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker（威尔逊·埃尔瑟、莫斯科维茨、埃德尔曼及迪克律师事务所） 1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP（克莱曼、罗森伯格、基尔施纳及林德律师事务所）、被告的代理律师\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）（出庭辩论） James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂） Daniel A. Byrd（丹尼尔·A·伯德） Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒及泽斯勒专业公司） 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n动议人Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒及泽斯勒专业公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nScott M. Charmoy（斯科特·M·查莫伊） Charmoy & Charmoy（查莫伊及查莫伊律师事务所） 1465 Post Road East, Suite 100 Westport, CT 06880\n\n动议人Putnam's Landscaping（普特南园林公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nRichard J. Bernard（理查德·J·伯纳德） Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP（费格雷·德林克·比德尔及里思律师事务所） 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036\n\n及\n\nJosh Peterson（乔希·彼得森） Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 2200 Wells Fargo Center 90 S. 7th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402\n\n及\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco（杰奎琳·C·马拉斯科） Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801\n\n动议人Cirrus Design Corporation（西锐设计公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nRahman Connelly（拉赫曼·康奈利） Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP（博盛律师事务所） 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨）（出庭辩论） Kellianne Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基） Michelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安陶） Green & Sklarz LLC（格林及斯克拉茨有限责任公司） One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS加拿大有限公司）、被告的代理律师\n\n案件22-50073 文书4189 提交日期03/04/25 录入日期03/04/25 14:45:18 第26页，共102页\n\n裁判备忘录及命令：（一）驳回共同被告提出的驳回动议或就诉状作出判决的动议；（二）部分驳回其他被告提出的驳回动议；以及（三）部分驳回Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.对受托人就诉状作出判决动议提出的异议\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国破产法院法官\n\n本案涉及一名个人第11章债务人，据称其参与了一项涉及数百个公司替身实体的大规模骗局。第11章受托人已提起260余项诉讼，寻求撤销由这些替身实体名义上作出的转让。包括许多正在与第11章受托人参加强制调解的被告在内，48名撤销转让诉讼被告请求本院裁决有关替身实体法与可撤销转让法相互作用的四项共同问题。被告、起诉状及据称的替身实体数量之多，使分析变得复杂。然而，根据起诉状中所主张的事实分析这些问题——本院必须将该等事实视为真实——结论是明确的。基于下述理由，本院认定，撤销转让诉讼被告提出的四项共同问题均不足以支持驳回撤销转让诉讼。\n\n一、导言\n\n本院现审理的是撤销转让诉讼被告提出的若干驳回动议或就诉状作出判决的动议。该等撤销转让诉讼由Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生，即Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（“个人债务人”）破产财产的第11章受托人（“受托人”）提起。受托人依据《美国法典》第11编（“破产法”）第544、548、549及550条以及纽约州《债务人与债权人法》第273、274及276条，寻求撤销并追回据称的欺诈性转让及未经授权的申请后转让；该纽约州法律编纂了纽约州《统一可撤销交易法》（“NYUVTA”）。\n\n案件22-50073 文书4189 提交日期03/04/25 录入日期03/04/25 14:45:18 第27页，共102页\n\n被告（“共同被告”）已根据《关于进一步修订撤销转让诉讼程序命令及安排驳回动议和就诉状作出判决动议联合书面陈述的命令》（“联合书面陈述命令”）提出37项动议（“共同动议”）。(主案ECF编号3577。)2 共同被告请求并提议采用这一综合程序，并准备及提交了其请求本院审理的共同法律问题。(参见主案ECF编号3511。)受托人未反对共同被告的请求。在发布联合书面陈述命令时，本院采纳了共同被告的程序。\n\n其他被告3亦提出了附加动议（“非共同动议”）；尽管其未参与联合书面陈述，但其提出了共同被告提出的部分或全部问题，并请求其动议与共同动议同时审理。由于Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（“Z&Z”，并与非共同动议提交人合称“非共同被告”）提出了联合书面陈述命令中的部分问题，故其还请求将其对受托人提出的就诉状作出判决动议所提交的异议（“Z&Z异议”）4与共同动议同时审理。\n\n1 鉴于本综合程序的复杂性，某些原本可能载于脚注中的信息载于附录。本裁判备忘录的.pdf文件包含书签，以便查阅附录。附录A列有共同动议清单，并注明提交各共同动议的共同被告。2\n\n对主案In re Kwok（郭文贵案），案件编号22-50073 (JAM)的案卷引用，将表述为“主案ECF编号__”。\n\n3 附录B列有非共同动议清单，并注明提交各非共同动议的被告。4\n\nZ&Z异议的引注载于附录C。\n\n案件22-50073 文书4189 提交日期03/04/25 录入日期03/04/25 14:45:18 第28页，共102页\n\n本裁判备忘录阐述本院对联合书面陈述命令所列四项问题的法律结论。联邦破产程序规则7052。由于：(i) 所提出的法律问题并非决定诉状是否充分；(ii) 被告未能在该等法律问题上胜诉；且(iii) 所提出的许多问题属于事实问题，而非法律问题，故共同动议予以驳回。基于同样理由，对于联合书面陈述命令所列问题，非共同动议予以部分驳回，Z&Z异议亦在同等范围内予以部分驳回。\n\n二、背景\n\n2022年2月15日，个人债务人在本院提交自愿第11章破产申请。(主案ECF编号1。)2022年6月15日，鉴于有关个人债务人财务管理不善及据称骗局的指控，本院作出裁判备忘录及命令，指定一名第11章受托人管理个人债务人的破产财产。(主案ECF编号465。)In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022年7月8日，Despins先生被指定为受托人。(主案ECF编号523。)\n\n撤销转让诉讼程序命令\n\n2024年1月29日，受托人提交动议，请求预先确立其拟提起的撤销诉讼程序；在该等诉讼中，其仅会根据《破产法典》第544、547、548、549及550条提出请求。（主案 ECF No. 2532。）受托人预计将在申请日两周年届满前提起数百宗撤销诉讼，并预计该等提交将引发案件管理问题。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549。在2024年2月5日举行听证后，本院作出命令准许该动议（经修订及补充后，称为“撤销诉讼程序令”）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 29 页，共 102 页\n\n（主案 ECF No. 2578。）2024年2月9日至2024年2月15日期间，受托人提起了268宗撤销诉讼，其中包括本裁决所涉诉讼。（主案 ECF Nos. 2594–925。）各项起诉状均主张以下六项诉因中的至少一项或多项（合称“撤销请求”）5：\n\n（i）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 550(a)，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益作出的实际欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追偿；\n\n（ii）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 2766，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益作出的实际欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追偿；\n\n（iii）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a)，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益作出的推定欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追偿；\n\n（iv）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益作出的推定欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追偿；\n\n（v）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对其破产财产作出的未经授权的申请后转让，并向初始受让人追偿；以及\n\n（vi）根据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)，并结合上述诉因之一，向后续受让人追偿已被撤销的转让。\n\n（见，例如，起诉状，Despins（德斯潘）诉 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格联邦破产法院） Feb. 10, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n各项起诉状均至少主张：（a）依据联邦法及州法的实际欺诈性转让；或（b）未经授权的申请后转让。（见，例如，起诉状，Despins 诉 Agora Lab, Inc.（阿戈拉实验室公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）除主张实际欺诈性转让外，部分起诉状还依据联邦法及州法主张推定欺诈性转让。（见，例如，起诉状，Despins 诉 Mitchell（米切尔）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）最后，其中一项起诉状请求向一名非共同被告作为欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请后转让的后续受让人进行追偿。（起诉状，Despins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n5 列明各涉案起诉状中诉因的附表见附录 D。撤销请求所依据的法定条文文本，与若干相关法定定义一并载于附录 E。\n\n6 在相关起诉状中，受托人主张个人债务人在纽约开展业务，包括与被指称的欺诈性转让有关的业务。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 30 页，共 102 页\n\n所有起诉状均主张，个人债务人通过各种另我实体转让财产，且该等转让属于欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请后转让。（见，例如，起诉状，Despins 诉 Marcum LLP（马库姆有限责任合伙企业）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024)，ECF No. 1；起诉状，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒专业公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1；起诉状，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（FFP〈英属维尔京群岛〉有限公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）关于个人债务人对该等另我实体的支配及控制的补充主张，是通过援引针对被指称的另我实体所提起的起诉状而作出的；该等起诉状请求就另我和／或受益所有权作出确认判决，并要求移交资产及控制权。7\n\n7 对于涉及某些被指称的另我实体的主张，撤销请求已被中止。（撤销诉讼程序令 ¶¶ 2(e)(i), (ii)，主案 ECF No. 3163。）因此，对于被中止的范围内，本院未审议任何被中止或部分中止的撤销请求（本文所用含义见撤销诉讼程序令 ¶¶ 2(e)(i) and (ii)）。下文附录 D 包含标注，说明某项撤销请求是否属于被中止或部分中止的撤销请求。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 31 页，共 102 页\n\n就下文讨论的七个被指称的另我实体而言，诉讼并未中止。列明该等另我实体、所援引的起诉状、关于设立地州的主张及诉因的附表见附录 F。8\n\n2024年2月27日，就管理大量撤销诉讼举行了状态会议。在状态会议期间，受托人请求实施强制调解程序。2024年5月2日，在提交若干书状并举行听证后，作出命令，修订撤销诉讼程序令以纳入强制调解。（主案 ECF No. 3163。）\n\n共同书状命令\n\n调解程序的两项特征与共同动议、非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议尤为相关。第一，某些被告被自动排除在强制调解之外（撤销诉讼程序令 ¶ 2(j)(vi)，主案 ECF No. 3163），而受调解约束的被告可提出动议，请求被排除在调解之外（Id. ¶ 2(m)）。第二，调解程序包括诉讼中止。（Id. ¶ 2(j)(iii)。）这些特征共同构成共同书状命令的程序背景。\n\n早在2024年4月22日，不受调解中止约束的撤销诉讼被告即开始提交驳回动议。（见，例如，驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所专业有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024)，ECF No. 11。）在该等动议被安排听证期间，2024年9月6日，受调解中止约束的某些撤销诉讼被告——原共同被告8——请求本院确立程序，使共同被告得以就其他撤销诉讼被告的动议所提出的问题进行辩论，而无须请求被排除在调解之外。（主案 ECF No. 3511。）\n\n8 除 Bering Yachts, LLC（白令游艇有限责任公司）（比较主案 ECF No. 3511 与主案 ECF No. 3713）及 McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC（麦克马尼蒙、斯科特兰与鲍曼有限责任公司）（见函件，Despins 诉 McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05194 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2025)，ECF No. 22〔宣布与受托人达成和解〕）外，所有该等被告仍为共同被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 32 页，共 102 页\n\n2024年9月24日，举行了状态会议。在状态会议期间，共同被告分发了其关于修订撤销诉讼程序令及共同书状程序的提案。受托人未反对共同被告的提案。某些不受调解中止约束的被告不反对将其驳回动议的听证延期至就拟议共同动议举行听证之后，但表示如其动议在共同动议之后审理，将引发正当程序方面的关切。状态会议结束时，本院将该事项留待审议。\n\n2024年9月25日，基于其中所述理由，本院作出共同书状命令。（主案 ECF No. 3577。）共同书状命令的相关部分规定，共同被告应共同提交一份书状，仅处理共同被告主张为共同法律问题的四项问题。该四项问题几乎逐字采纳自共同被告的提案，具体为：\n\n（i）受托人是否可以撤销非债务实体作出的初始转让；\n\n（ii）适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或作出另我认定；\n\n（iii）反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力；以及\n\n（iv）反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定是否可以追溯适用。\n\n（共同书状命令 ¶ 2(b)(i)–(iv)，主案 ECF No. 3577。）根据共同书状命令，（1）在该等撤销请求被中止的范围内，共同动议不得处理被中止或部分中止的撤销请求，其含义见撤销诉讼程序令第2(e)(i)及(ii)段；以及（2）共同被告保留在日后书状中就该四项问题以外的所有驳回动议或依书状判决动议理由提出主张的权利。（Id. ¶¶ 4, 5。）\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 33 页，共 102 页\n\n共同书状命令还规定了其他撤销诉讼被告加入共同被告的期限。数名被告加入，包括一些不受调解中止约束的被告。（主案 ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629。）2024年10月18日，共同被告提交了其共同法律备忘录（“共同书状”）及共同动议。（主案 ECF No. 3713。）2024年11月8日，受托人提交了对共同书状的反对书。（主案 ECF No. 3803。）2024年11月22日，共同被告提交了支持共同书状的答复书。（主案 ECF No. 3848。）共同动议的书状程序已完成。非共同动议及受托人针对 Z&Z 提出的依书状判决动议也已完成书状程序。9\n\n2025年1月8日，就共同动议、非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议听证的形式举行了状态会议。在状态会议期间，本院与各方协商后确定了听证形式。本院还指出，某些被告未在其驳回动议中提出任何共同书状问题。各方同意，不应同时举行该等被告动议的听证。因此，本院无限期延期审理该等动议。10（Despins 诉 Harcus Parker Ltd.（哈克斯·帕克有限公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05163 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025)，ECF No. 32；Despins 诉 Miller（米勒）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073，Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025)，ECF No. 29。）\n\n9 列明非共同动议及受托人针对 Z&Z 提出的依书状判决动议的书状程序的附表见附录 G。\n\n10 尽管 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒）先生通过于 October 18, 2024 提交的对诉状作出判决动议加入了共同书状，见下文附录 A，并就该动议接受了听审，但其此前于 June 26, 2024 提交的非共同驳回动议未获听审。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 34 页，共 102 页\n\n尽管提出了部分或全部共同争点，其他被告不确定其是否希望与共同被告同时接受听审。在状态会议后，这些被告表示不希望其动议与共同被告的动议同时接受听审。因此，本院亦将对其动议的听审无限期延期。(Despins v. Apple Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 67; Despins v. Meta Platforms Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 42.)\n\n于 January 15, 2025，就共同动议、非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议举行了听审。本案已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本案享有管辖权。本院依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）于 September 21, 1984 作出的移交令，有权审理并裁决本案。本程序属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O)。本院认定，其行使管辖权不受《宪法》第三条的禁止。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适格审判地。\n\nIV. 讨论\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n共同动议、非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议主张，受托人未能提出可获救济的请求。见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c)，经 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b) 适用；另见 Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 35 页，共 102 页\n\nF.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021)（对诉状作出判决的动议适用与驳回动议相同的标准）。在确定撤销请求是否提出可获救济的请求时，本院必须将妥为主张的指控，包括附于诉状的文件中的指控，视为真实。见 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002); Tatum v. Oberg, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009)。本院必须作出一切有利于受托人的合理推论。Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014)。\n\n为构成妥为主张，撤销请求必须包含“一项简短且明晰的陈述，表明主张人有权获得救济”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)，经 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008 适用。其必须包含“足够的事实内容，在被视为真实的情况下，‘提出表面上具有合理性的救济请求’”。Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))。“合理性标准”虽非“概率要求”，但要求的不仅仅是“被告曾实施违法行为的纯粹可能性”。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)。确定一项请求是否具有合理性，是“一项因具体情境而异的任务，要求审查法院运用其司法经验和常识”。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679。尽管如此，“对诉因要件的公式化罗列，如仅有结论性陈述支持，并不足够”。Id. at 678。\n\n在确定撤销请求是否充分时，本院还必须考虑通过引用纳入诉状的文件以及本院可予司法认知的事项。Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)。如上所述，受托人已通过引用纳入其针对以下主体的诉状：(1) Golden Spring (New York) Limited（高登斯普林〔纽约〕有限公司）（“Golden Spring”）；(2) Lamp Capital LLC（兰普资本有限责任公司）（“Lamp Capital”）；(3) HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK 技术公司）（“HCHK Tech”）；(4) HCHK Property Management, Inc（HCHK 物业管理公司）（“HCHK Property”）；(5) Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人力配置公司）（“Lexington”，并与 HCHK Tech 和 HCHK Property 合称时，各自称为“HCHK Entity”，统称为“HCHK Entities”）；(6) Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）（“Greenwich Land”）；以及 (7) Leading Shine NY Ltd.（领先之光纽约有限公司）（“Leading Shine”）。这些诉状根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律主张，(i) 前述实体为个人债务人的另我；及 (ii) 个人债务人对该等实体及/或其资产享有受益所有权。11 这些请求的任何要件均无需特别具体地陈述。见 Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995)（适用 Delaware law，并认定为确立另我无需证明欺诈）。\n\nB. 共同动议\n\n本院将首先审议共同被告12 就以下四项争点提出的论点：\n\n(i) 受托人是否可以撤销非债务人实体作出的初始转让；\n\n(ii) 适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或作出另我认定；\n\n(iii) 反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力；以及\n\n11 所涉七个另我实体均被指称在 Delaware（特拉华州）设立。见下文附录 F。将这些指控视为真实，Delaware law（特拉华州法律）适用于受托人的另我及受益所有权请求。Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013)（适用法院地州的法律选择规则）；见 Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007)（对有限责任公司的另我诉讼及其他内部事务适用设立州的当地法律）；RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304。为免疑义，“Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.” Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018)。\n\n12 无论使用“共同被告”还是“非共同被告”一语，讨论部分 B 节和 C 节中的裁断均适用于提出或加入所处理论点的所有被告。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 37 页，共 102 页\n\n(iv) 反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定是否可以追溯适用。\n\n在听审期间，共同被告将这四项争点分为两组论点。关于争点 (i) 和 (iii)，共同被告主张，即使本院认定某些实体是个人债务人的另我，本院亦必须驳回诉状，因为另我认定并未赋予受托人就该另我对其财产作出的转让提起诉讼的资格。关于争点 (ii) 和 (iv)，共同被告提出一系列论点，主张依适用州法作出另我认定不当，或者鉴于对该等另我的受让人造成的损害，在破产语境中必须对该等认定加以限制。本院将依次处理这些论点。\n\n1. 争点 (i) 和 (iii)：另我认定在可撤销转让诉讼中的效力\n\n共同被告主张，根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法律），另我认定的效力仅会导致该等另我就个人债务人的债务承担替代责任。其主张，该认定不会 (i) 将该等另我的资产转入个人债务人的破产财产，并允许受托人主张未经授权的申请提交后转让请求；或 (ii) 消除个人债务人与该等另人之间的身份区别，以允许受托人主张该另我对其财产的转让，是个人债务人对其财产作出的欺诈性转让。基于此，共同被告主张，即使受托人的另我请求获得支持，受托人也不具有提起撤销请求的诉讼资格。归根结底，共同被告主张，受托人只能向该等另我本身追偿。\n\n作为回应，受托人提出两项论点。第一，受托人主张，尽管另我认定是根据适用州法作出的，但另我认定的效力属于联邦法问题。具体而言，受托人主张，《破产法》第 541 条决定依州法存在的权益是否属于破产财产。第二，受托人主张，即使州法决定另我认定的效力，Delaware law（特拉华州法律）也遵循另我的同一性理论。因此，受托人主张，另我认定为其提出欺诈性转让及未经授权的申请提交后转让请求提供依据。受托人认为，如本院同意共同被告的意见，结果将是通过切断破产财产的追偿而忽视个人债务人的不当行为和不公平交易。\n\n如下文将作更详细说明，本院同意受托人的意见。首先，共同被告的论点仅聚焦于撤销请求中关于另我的指控，而未处理相互重叠且作为替代依据的受益所有权指控。撤销请求将个人债务人对该等另我及其资产的受益所有权作为请求救济的依据。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990); Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993)。此外，撤销请求所依据的实体性可撤销转让法决定另我认定的效力。可撤销转让法重实质而轻形式，因此，在适用法律会否认公司形式时，该法允许刺破公司面纱。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; Begier, 496 U.S. at 59; United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979); Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht), 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024); Orr, 991 F.2d at 35; McNellis v. Raymond, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970); ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007)。\n\ni. 争点 (i) 和 (iii)：与转让有关的受益所有权指控\n\n共同被告主张，受托人不当地利用 Delaware alter ego law（特拉华州另我法），通过消除以下二者之间的区别来满足撤销请求的两个要件：(a) 被指称为另我的转让人和个人债务人13；及 (b) 该另我转让人的财产与个人债务人的财产14 及/或破产财产的财产15。然而，如前所述，受托人还主张个人债务人对该等另我及/或其资产享有受益所有权。本院不能忽视受托人的指控。\n\na. 受益所有权指控与争点 (i) 相关：受托人是否主张初始转让由非债务人实体或由个人债务人作出\n\n关于第一项要件，为就《破产法典》项下实际欺诈性转让或其中一种推定欺诈性转让提出充分主张，受托人必须主张个人债务人作出了该转让。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(ii)(IV)。同样，就其 NYUVTA（纽约统一可撤销交易法）请求而言，受托人必须主张个人债务人或对其债务承担责任的其他当事人作出了该转让。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。然而，《破产法典》项下未经授权的破产申请后转让以及其他类型的推定欺诈性转让，并不要求该转让由个人债务人作出。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III)（不要求债务人作出该转让）, 549(a)（同）。\n\n根据《破产法典》，“转让”包括，相关部分，“处分或放弃——(i) 财产；或 (ii) 财产权益的每一种方式，无论直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿。”11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)。同样，NYUVTA 项下的转让包括，相关部分，“处分或放弃资产或资产权益的每一种方式，无论直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿”。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)。\n\n13 参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n14 参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n15 参见 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 40 页，共 102 页\n\n鉴于《破产法典》和 NYUVTA 对转让的定义均包括“间接”让与，法院审查转让时着眼于实质，而非形式。Orr, 991 F.2d at 35（“在衡平法中，‘实质不会让位于形式，[且]技术性考量不会阻碍实质正义的实现。’因此，所谓欺诈性让与必须在具体情境中予以评估；‘[当]一项转让仅为总体计划中的一个步骤时，该计划“必须作为整体，连同其所有构成性影响一并审视。”’”）（省略内部引文；原文中的其他改动）；参见 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.03[6]（Alan N. Resnick（艾伦·N·雷斯尼克）和 Henry J. Sommer（亨利·J·索默）编，第 16 版 2025）（汇集判例）。法院必须审视交易的“经济现实”。Orr, 991 F.2d at 36（引用 Salomon Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)）。在适当事实情况下，法院可在分析交易的经济现实时不顾及公司的独立人格。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53（在一项根据经修订的 1898 年《破产法》提起的诉讼中，维持地区法院裁定中刺破公司面纱的部分，以认定主事人因其向贷款人作出的个人付款而获得对价——即向其公司提供的贷款——并因而裁定该交易不构成欺诈性让与）；参见 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（裁定除非有明确迹象表明国会意图如此，否则经修订的 1898 年《破产法》项下的法律不被取代）。\n\n联合被告将撤销请求理解为主张下列一系列转让：16\n\nA（个人债务人）＝B（替身实体） C（联合被告）（替身实体认定）（转让 B 的财产）\n\n采纳联合被告的理解，受托人完全依赖个人债务人与替身实体之间的同一性，以主张个人债务人作出了这些转让。联合被告对该同一性提出异议，并主张受托人无资格撤销其余的转让，即 BC。\n\n然而，法院必须按照所主张的方式评估这些转让。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018)。与联合被告对各项起诉状的理解相反，受托人主张个人债务人“使用”替身实体作出了这些转让：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（联合被告）（通过替身实体 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n受托人并非仅依赖个人债务人与替身实体之间的同一性——其主张替身实体是实施转让的工具。\n\n例如，在针对 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（“Amazon”）等人提起的起诉状中，Amazon 是一名联合被告，受托人主张：\n\n44. 在申请日之前，[个人]债务人使用其替身空壳公司 Greenwich Land（格林威治土地）、G Club17、Lexington（列克星敦）、HCHK Technologies（HCHK 科技）和 Golden Spring（黄金之泉），或以其他方式，将[个人]债务人的财产转让给 Amazon（统称“申请前转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n\n参见随附并构成本文件一部分的附件 A。\n\n16 下列图示载于附录 H。\n\n17 就涉及 G Club Operations LLC 的转让而言，本起诉状中的撤销请求已中止。因此，法院在此仅讨论 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 42 页，共 102 页\n\n45. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过其空壳公司 Greenwich Land、G Club、Lexington 和 Golden Spring，或以其他方式，将破产财产转让给 Amazon（统称“申请后转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n\n参见随附并构成本文件一部分的附件 B。\n\n（起诉状 ¶¶ 44–45, Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。）受托人主张，这些转让是个人债务人的“空壳把戏”的一部分，该把戏涉及“(i) 由近亲和／或下属持有的、受[个人]债务人控制的空壳公司，(ii) 以来自其他受[个人]债务人控制实体的现金购买，和／或在空壳实体之间无偿转让的资产，以及 (iii) [个人]债务人从该等资产中受益，并对该等资产拥有控制权和支配权”，（同上 ¶ 22），该空壳把戏的目的在于“在向其众多债权人虚假宣称贫困的同时，隐匿和耗散数百万美元资产”，（同上 ¶ 37）。（参见同上 ¶¶ 20–43。）所有其他起诉状均就个人债务人的财务事务作出了相同主张。\n\n为支持这些论点，针对 Amazon 的起诉状纳入了针对 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land 的替身实体起诉状。（同上 ¶ 20 n. 4。）这些替身实体起诉状请求作出关于替身实体和受益所有权的确认判决，并以这些确认判决为依据，命令返还破产财产。例如，针对 Golden Spring 的起诉状主张：\n\nGolden Spring 是[个人]债务人的替身实体，且[个人]债务人是 Golden Spring 及／或其资产的衡平法所有人。\n\n（起诉状 ¶ 2, Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 43 页，共 102 页\n\n针对 Golden Spring 的起诉状主张了大量事实，其中包括个人债务人对 Golden Spring 的设立、注资、管理和运营的控制，以及其将 Golden Spring 用作空壳公司以隐匿资产、支付开支并总体上服务于其利益。（同上 ¶¶ 13–38。）该起诉状附有大量证据材料，以支持这些主张。其他替身实体起诉状亦作出类似主张，涉及个人债务人对所称替身实体的支配和控制、其从该等实体的资产和／或服务中获益并加以使用，以及其利用其公司形式使资产免受债权人追索。\n\n受托人的主张通过两项相互重叠的法律理论，将个人债务人与名义转让人联系起来：(i) 替身实体，即联合被告论点的重点；以及 (ii) 受益所有权，联合被告对此未予论述。然而，受托人关于受益所有权的主张，与受托人是否合理主张个人债务人作出了这些转让相关。假定受托人已合理主张个人债务人对替身实体18享有受益所有权，则其已合理主张这些替身实体是个人债务人的关联方，个人债务人可通过其间接转让资产。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a)。事实上，法院已将涉及关联方的交易合并审查。参见，例如，Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990)（维持地区法院判决；该欺诈性转让涉及所有人作为总体计划的一部分，将其拥有的一家公司资产经由洗钱转移至其拥有的另一家公司，以使资产无法供债权人追索）；参见 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)（转让包括间接转让）；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)（同）。\n\n18 法院未处理受托人是否已合理主张个人债务人对替身实体享有受益所有权的问题，因为该问题不属于四项争点之列。\n\n因此，法院认定，当事人关于替身实体效力的论点，并不能决定受托人关于个人债务人为转让人的主张是否充分。\n\nb. 受益所有权主张可能使争点 (iii)——反向刺破公司面纱或替身实体认定在适用法律下的效力——变得无关紧要\n\n转向第二项争议要件，《破产法典》第 548 条项下的实际或推定欺诈性转让请求必须主张转让了“债务人在财产中的权益”。11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)。同样，《破产法典》赋予受托人资格，使其可提起实际债权人根据其他适用州法或联邦法本可提起的撤销诉讼，以撤销“债务人在财产中的权益”的转让。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。受托人依据纽约州法律提出的实际及推定欺诈性转让请求，还必须主张转让了“债务人的财产”，其中“债务人”是指个人债务人或对其债务承担责任的其他当事人。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。最后，未经授权的破产申请后转让请求必须主张转让了“破产财产”。11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\n\n债务人在财产中的权益，是指若非为避免被撤销的该项转让，本应构成破产财产的任何权益。Begier, 496 U.S. at 59（“由于撤销条款的目的在于保存可计入破产财团的财产——可供向债权人分配的财产——因此，受优先转让条款规制的‘债务人的财产’，最好理解为：若在破产程序开始前未被转让，本应构成破产财产的财产。”）。因此，对于转让是否属于“债务人在财产中的权益”的分析，11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)，以及对于转让是否属于“破产财产”的分析，11 U.S.C. § 549(a)，均以界定破产财产的第 541 条为中心。破产财产包括，相关部分，“无论位于何处或由谁持有[,] . . . 债务人在财产中的所有法定或衡平法权益”。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。实际上，撤销请求必须主张个人债务人对财产享有衡平法权益，而非仅享有法定所有权。Begier, 496 U.S. at 58；参见 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)（将债务人仅享有法定权益、且债务人不享有衡平法权益的财产排除在破产财产之外）。\n\n就 NYUVTA 下某项转让是否属于债务人的财产转让而言，纽约州法律承认在追收债务的诉讼中存在受益所有权。参见，例如，In re Gliklad v. Chernoi, 12 N.Y.S.3d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)（维持一项要求判决债务人交付企业受益所有权的命令）；Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp., 651 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)（将案件发回，以确定个人被告是否衡平地拥有公司被告，以及原告是否可以刺破公司被告与其潜在衡平所有人之间的公司面纱）；Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan, Index No. 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022)（在追收判决款的诉讼中认定判决债务人对游艇享有受益所有权）。因此，“债务人对财产的权益”、“破产财团财产”及“债务人的财产”均包括个人债务人对财产享有的衡平权益。\n\n联合被告主张，受托人寻求撤销的是另我实体的财产转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另我实体）C（联合被告）（另我认定）（B 的财产转让）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 46 of 102\n\n联合被告将诉状理解为主张，另我认定将使个人债务人对另我实体的财产产生权益。19 联合被告主张，受托人存在错误——另我认定不能创设此前并不存在的财产权益——因此，受托人无诉讼资格主张其余的 B 向 C 转让 B 财产。\n\n然而，再次强调，法院必须按照所主张的情形评估该等转让。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at 382。在诉状中，受托人主张该等转让属于个人债务人的财产和/或破产财团财产的转让——而非另我实体财产的转让：\nA（个人债务人）C（联合被告）（经由另我实体 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n受托人主张，个人债务人始终对另我实体的财产享有权益——该权益并非由另我认定所创设。\n\n这一点可见于上文引用的针对 Amazon 的诉状段落。但\n\n再举一例，在针对包括联合被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（B&H Foto 图片与电子公司，以下简称“B&H Foto”）在内的主体提起的诉状中，受托人作出如下主张：\n\n43. 在申请日之前，[个人]债务人通过包括 Greenwich Land、Golden Spring、HCHK Technologies、G Club Operations、Rule of Law20 和 Lexington Property 在内的其另我空壳公司，或以其他方式，将[个人]债务人的财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请前转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n\n见随附并构成本文件一部分的附表 A。\n\n44. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过包括 Greenwich Land、Lexington、Golden Spring、G Club Operations、\n\n19 实际上，依联合被告之见，另我认定属于非自愿转让，\n\n参见 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)，且 A=BC 亦可写为 ABC。20 本诉状中的撤销请求，就涉及 G Club Operations 和 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. 的转让而言，处于中止状态。因此，法院在此仅讨论 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 47 of 102\n\n以及 HCHK Technologies 在内的空壳公司，或以其他方式，将破产财团财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请后转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n见随附并构成本文件一部分的附表 B。\n\n（Complaint ¶¶ 43–44, Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.）该诉状主张，个人债务人参与了一场“空壳把戏”，即其将资产隐藏于另我实体之中——并在申请日之后隐藏破产财团资产——以阻挠追收该等资产用于清偿其债务，并规避其在《破产法》下的义务。（Id. ¶¶ 19–42.）这些主张在形式上与所有其他诉状中的主张相同。\n\n针对涉及争议转让的被主张为另我实体的诉状，均通过引用纳入。（Id. ¶ 19 n. 4.）所有另我诉状均包含大量主张，称个人债务人使用、控制并受益于另我实体的资产。21 其中之一，即针对 Golden Spring 的另我诉状，已于上文讨论。（See Complaint ¶¶ 10–38, Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.）再举一例，针对 HCHK Entities 的诉状作出类似主张。（See Complaint ¶¶ 16–40, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23- 05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.）\n\n审阅各诉状及通过引用纳入的另我诉状可清楚表明，受托人并非仅依赖另我主张个人债务人或破产财团对被转让财产享有衡平权益。与第一个要件相同，在受托人\n\n21 除针对 Greenwich Land 的诉状外，所有另我诉状均主张对另我实体及其资产均享有受益所有权。见下文附录 F。针对 Greenwich Land 的诉状仍包含关于个人债务人使用、控制及受益于 Greenwich Land 资产的主张。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 48 of 102\n\n已可信地主张个人债务人对某一另我实体资产享有受益所有权的范围内22，其已可信地主张其财产和/或属于或若非因该转让本将属于破产财团财产的转让。因此，特拉华州法律下另我认定的效力，对该要件亦不具有决定性意义。\nii. 可撤销转让法控制问题（i）：个人债务人是否为转让人；以及问题（iii）：另我实体的财产是否属于个人债务人的财产和/或破产财团财产\n\n尽管有上述论述，法院仍将讨论当事人关于另我及可撤销转让诉讼在破产程序中效力的主张。在 McNellis 一案中，美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit）既维持地区法院就受托人欺诈性转让诉讼刺破公司面纱的裁决，也维持其就受托人高利贷诉讼拒绝刺破同一公司面纱的裁决。420 F.2d at 53–54。第二巡回上诉法院认定，尽管欺诈性转让法允许法院重实质而轻形式，但纽约州高利贷法已发展至允许个人利用公司另我取得原本属于高利贷的贷款。Id. 即，第二巡回上诉法院审查适用于受托人诉因的实体法，以确定是否可以刺破公司面纱来确立某项要件或抗辩。Id.\n\n因此，受托人正确地指出，特拉华州法律下另我认定的效力并不具有决定性意义。相关的可撤销转让法规——此处为《破产法》和 NYUVTA——决定为欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请后转让之目的，是否可以以及在何种效力范围内刺破公司面纱。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53–54。适用于刺破公司面纱的标准由适用的法律选择规则决定——\n\n22 法院未审理受托人是否已可信地主张个人债务人对另我实体资产享有受益所有权的问题，因为该问题不属于四个争议问题之一。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 49 of 102\n\n该规则可能不同于，也可能不不同于适用于整体诉因的法律。ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 66–68（驳回撤诉动议，因债务人已充分主张其有资格依据特拉华州法律，通过反向刺破公司面纱、以其子公司的地位提出欺诈性转让主张）；accord Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016)（承认在特拉华州欺诈性转让法下，如适用法律允许反向刺破公司面纱，母公司的债权人可为追究子公司资产的欺诈性转让而主张另我）。\n\n联合被告主张受托人寻求的救济具有新颖性。并非如此。ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 66–68（适用特拉华州另我法）；see Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.), Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at \\*4–6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020)（适用内华达州另我法）；Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery), 402 B.R. 728, 743–48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008)（同）；Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner), 335 B.R. 140, 145–47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005)（适用加利福尼亚州另我法），在复议中于相关部分获维持，345 B.R. 674, 676–77 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006)（维持另我认定）。\na. 问题（i）和（iii）：州法允许撤销另我实体对其财产的转让\n\n此外，受托人寻求的救济在州法下当然也并不新颖。根据 NYUVTA，另我实体对其财产的转让可以构成实际和推定欺诈性转让。“债务人”系指对某项请求权负有责任的人。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。因此，即使假定另我仅产生替代责任，另我实体亦属于“债务人”，即使其并非《破产法》下的债务人。由于其为债务人，另我实体可以作出可撤销转让。参见 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274。此外，另我实体的财产\n\n属于债务人的财产。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p)。因此，在州法诉讼中，可将另我与 NYUVTA 一并适用。参见 Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp., No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK), 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025)（适用 NYUVTA 和特拉华州另我法）（援引 JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)（适用《统一欺诈性转让法》（“UFTA”），即《统一可撤销交易法》（“UVTA”）的前身））。\n\n这不仅是纽约州的法律，也是美国大多数（如非全部）辖区的法律。参见 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6)（康涅狄格州已采纳 UFTA，其对“债务人”的定义与 UVTA 相同）；5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2]（四十六个州及哥伦比亚特区已采纳 UFTA 或 UVTA）；see, e.g., Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc., 450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at \\*4–5 (Nev. 2019)（列表裁决）；Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc., 839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002)；Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3；Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C., 75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)；U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015)。可撤销转让法和另我法均旨在挫败规避判决的行为，且不出所料，二者可在破产程序外的追收诉讼中一并适用。\n\n如果受托人根据 section 544(b) 有诉讼资格提出其 NYUVTA 请求，并且已可信地主张另我关系23，则其已可信地主张一名债务人转让了其财产。\n\n23 本院将在下文 D 节讨论受托人关于另我（alter ego）的指称是否具有合理性，此前先讨论被告人就其诉状充分性提出的论点。\n\nb. 争点 (i) 和 (iii)：破产法允许撤销另我对其财产的转让\n\n本院必须确定，通常适用于破产程序之外的规则是否同样适用于破产程序。如上文关于受益所有权的讨论，涉及两个要件。第一，必须确定是否可以利用另我指称来主张自然人债务人是转让人。《破产法典》仅就实际欺诈性转让以及《破产法典》规定的四类推定欺诈性转让中的一种控制该要件。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV)。第 544(b) 条并未将该要件适用于受托人依据 NYUVTA 提出的请求，且该要件并非《破产法典》规定的四类推定欺诈性转让中的三类或未经授权的破产申请后转让的要件。11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a)。\n\n第二，必须确定是否可以利用另我指称来主张另我的财产是，或者若非因该转让本会是，破产财产。Begier, 496 U.S. at 59。这是所有撤销请求的要件，包括受托人依据 NYUVTA 提出的请求。如上文所述，受托人仅在其主张自然人债务人对财产权益进行了转让时，才有资格依据 NYUVTA 提起请求。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。\n\n争点 (i)：受托人是否主张由非债务人实体作出的最初转让？\n\n就第一个要件而言，本院认为，可以利用另我来确立自然人债务人是转让人，因为“转让”的定义包括间接让与。11 U.S.C. § 101(54)。事实上，在 McNellis 一案中，Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）维持了地区法院揭开公司面纱并认定后来偿还贷款的是个人而非其公司、即由该个人取得该贷款的裁决。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53–54; see Orr, 991 F.2d at 35; Voest-Alpine, 919 F.2d at 212–13。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 52 of 102\n\n因此，另我指称可以支持如下主张：转让人是自然人债务人，而非非债务人实体。\n\n争点 (iii)：反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下具有什么效力？\n\n就第二个要件而言，在《破产法典》未作规定之处，州法决定当事人对财产享有何种权益。Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–57。然而，Butner 还认定，国会有权依据《宪法》第一条第八节第四款，为破产目的作出与州法相反的财产权益界定。Id. at 54–57（认定抵押权人是否、何时以及如何取得对租金的担保权益，属于州法问题，因为经修订的原《1898 年破产法》并未载有授予或否认抵押权人该等担保权益的规定）。\n\n国会界定了破产财产。11 U.S.C. § 541。“国会意图将广泛范围的财产纳入破产财产”，包括“在破产程序开始时债务人并未享有占有权益的财产”。Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204–05（维持 Second Circuit 的认定，即在提交破产申请之前由 Internal Revenue Service（美国国内税务局）为执行税收留置权而扣押的财产属于破产财产）。因此，与 Butner 和 Whiting Pools 一致，法院通常认定，尽管州法决定债务人对财产享有何种权益，但联邦法决定该等财产权益是否被纳入破产财产。Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.), 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019); Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.), 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007); In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991); N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons), 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985)。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 53 of 102\n\n另我请求属于破产财产。Nordlicht,115 F.4th at 104–06（认定纽约州法下的另我请求属于破产财产），因为该等请求通过扩大破产财产而“使全体债权人受益”，Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105（原文改动）；see In re Emoral, Inc., 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014)（认定继受人责任请求属于破产财产，因为其与另我请求一样，属于债权人的一般性请求）。即使在州法下，另我是要求施加替代责任的请求，而非独立诉因，亦是如此。Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 109–111。Nordlicht 认定：\n\n另我责任理论完全属于《破产法典》对“请求权”的定义范围：\n\n(A) 获得给付的权利，不论该权利是否已化为判决、已清算、未清算、确定、附条件、已到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、法定、衡平、有担保或无担保；或\n\n(B) 因不履行而获得衡平法救济的权利，如该不履行产生获得给付的权利，不论该获得衡平法救济的权利是否已化为判决、确定、附条件、已到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、有担保或无担保。”\n\n115 F.4th at 110（原文强调）。\n\n根据 Nordlicht，受托人向另我请求给付或衡平法救济（如交付）的权利属于破产财产。115 F.4th at 105。受托人可以就针对破产财产提出的请求的全部范围，向另我寻求追偿。See Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.), 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931)（就第 544(b) 条请求的前身条款认定，受托人可为破产财产全体债权人就已撤销的转让进行追偿）。受托人可追偿的财产属于破产财产。Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204–07。此外，根据 Begier，自然人债务人在破产申请前对任何该等财产享有权益。496 U.S. at 59。因此，如受托人在其另我请求中胜诉，另我的\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 54 of 102\n\n财产即属于破产财产，且自然人债务人在破产申请前对该财产享有权益。See Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105（另我请求通过扩大破产财产而“使全体债权人受益”）；718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein), 192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999)（认定法院有管辖权裁决针对一项裁定的上诉，该裁定涉及等事项包括债权人的主张，即某些公司是债务人的另我，因为认定其为债务人的另我“将导致大量资产被纳入其破产财产，从而至少可部分用于清偿其债权人的请求。”）；Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.), 97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（认定受托人有资格提出另我请求，因为该请求“旨在为全体债权人的利益收取破产财产，且并非任何特定债权人专属”）（原文强调）。\n\n相反的权威意见缺乏说服力\n\n作出该结论时，本院谨不同意 United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit（美国联邦第六巡回上诉法院）在 In re Howland 一案中的裁决。674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017); accord Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle), BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006); Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle), Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21- 04041-lsg, ___ B.R. ___, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023)（适用 Howland）；Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver), 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)（同）。在 Howland 一案中，第六巡回法院认定，如在州法下另我仅施加替代责任，则另我的财产不属于破产财产，亦不得追偿。674 F.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 55 of 102\n\nApp'x at 487。Lippe 和 Wardle 作出了相同认定。DuMouchelle 和 Silver 为第六巡回法院辖区内法院作出的裁决，适用了 Howland。\n\n除上述法条分析外，本院基于数项理由谨不同意 Howland。第一，除非有明确迹象表明国会意图作出该等背离，否则法院“不会将《破产法典》解读为削弱既往破产实践”。Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221。在解释《破产法典》时，法院推定国会“熟悉”原《1898 年破产法》的“通行理解”。Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991)。并无明确迹象表明国会意图推翻 McNellis。Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 541(a), 544(b), 548(a), 549(a) with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 1) (repealed 1978), 107(d) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 67) (repealed 1978), 110(a), (d), (e) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 70) (repealed 1978)。McNellis 维持了在依据联邦破产法和纽约州法提起的受托人欺诈性转让诉讼中，使用另我证明抗辩的做法，对本院具有约束力。420 F.2d at 53–54。\n\n第二，第六巡回法院在撤销诉讼中处理另我请求的方式，违反了 Second Circuit 的指示，即法院必须考察欺诈性转让的实质而非形式。See Orr, 991 F.2d at 35; see also Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); Voest-Alpine, 919 F.2d at 211–12。如州法允许否认公司形式，欺诈性转让法可以透过交易的名义当事人进行审视。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53; ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 65–68。这种承认经济现实的能力，体现在《破产法典》对转让和破产财产作出的宽泛定义中。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 541。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 56 of 102\n\n第三，Howland 与州法下另我请求和撤销请求之间的相互作用相悖。如上所述，在破产程序之外，另我可用于 NYUVTA 请求，以针对另我既是名义转让人又是所转让财产名义所有人的交易。Bravia Cap., 2025 WL 552046, at 9; Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; see Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at 3。\n\n结果在破产程序中亦不应有所不同。破产程序除其他性质外，乃一种集体追偿程序。Merit Mgmt. Grp.（优点管理集团）, 583 U.S. at 370–71。这正是受托人有资格提出以下请求的原因：(i) 为全体债权人利益提出的一般性请求，11 U.S.C. § 544(a)；参见 Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105；以及 (ii) 实际债权人的特定撤销请求，11 U.S.C. § 544(b)，其范围涵盖全部转让——即使实际债权人的债务少于被转让金额，Moore, 284 U.S. at 5。破产程序“通过以更公平且有序的资产分配取代债务追收中的‘竞速’及其他优先制度，使债权人彼此免受侵害。”In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)（讨论自动中止的目的）（援引 Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976)（经修订的原1898年《破产法》项下的案件））。若让债权人竞相向法院提起诉讼以寻求另我及欺诈性转让救济——而在个人债务人破产程序未决期间，他们可能无资格寻求该等救济——将损害破产程序的集体性质。参见 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989)。\n\n即使债权人能够在破产程序之外提起这些诉讼，其成本也将很高：受托人对个人债务人财务事务的调查已引发大量诉讼并耗费大量时间。迫使债权人在破产程序之外追究这些撤销请求，或者放弃追究，将导致个人债务人的债权人获得不公平且不均衡的受偿，\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 57 页，共 102 页\n\n其中许多人很可能无力支付与此类努力相关的费用和成本。参见 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991)（第547条旨在平衡防止竞相向法院提起诉讼和向所有债权人进行公平分配这两个相关目标）；Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996)（同上）。受托人是应当汇集债权人对破产财产的利益，并为其集体利益提起撤销诉讼之人。11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50*.*\n\n最后，Howland 亦与 Delaware（特拉华州）的另我法相抵触。一般而言，另我导致替代责任，乃我国法律制度中的一种偶然现象——另我原则旨在于公司形式被滥用并导致欺诈或不公时，无视该公司形式。参见 Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968)（“当然，毫无疑问，在适当证明下，母公司与子公司之间的公司实体可以被忽略，最终利益相关方即母公司，可以在法律和事实上被视为特定交易中的唯一当事方。”）。正如 Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）所指出，“在最基本的层面上，反向刺破公司面纱涉及就企业组织所有者的债务，对该企业组织施加责任”，Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc., 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021)（为执行评估判决而提起的诉讼），因为“如果子公司仅为母公司的另我……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产”，Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 710（原文改动）。\n\n普通法中的大多数救济采取金钱损害赔偿的形式。另我请求的主要用途，是将因例如侵权或合同而依法承担金钱损害赔偿责任的被告的责任，扩展至财力更雄厚的被告。参见 NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)（“尽管如此，在适当情形下，可以‘忽略’实体与其所有者之间的区别，以要求所有者对实体的债务负责。”）（合同诉讼）；Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（“试图使公司所有者对公司债务承担责任的原告‘面临艰巨任务。’”）（欺诈诉讼）；Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“根据 Delaware 法，刺破公司面纱是一项衡平法原则。……因此，刺破公司面纱并非纯粹独立的诉因。相反，刺破公司面纱实际上意味着，就直接行为人实施的某项基础性不法行为，在直接行为人及其公司关联方之间施加连带责任。”）（侵权诉讼）（着重号为后加）。\n\n然而，撤销一项转让并非金钱损害赔偿。“[撤销规定的目的在于保全可纳入破产财产的财产。”Begier, 496 U.S. at 59（讨论第547条及对优先转让的撤销）；参见 In re PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002)（“欺诈性让与法旨在‘使债权人能够获得那些正当地属于破产财产、即使已被转让出去的债务人资产。’”）；Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.), 881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989)（认定允许行政请求权持有人保留未经授权的申请后转让，将对拥有类似请求权的其他债权人不公平）。为此，《破产法》第548和549条以及 NYUVTA 第273和274条所提供的救济，是撤销涉案转让——而非金钱损害赔偿。11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274.\n\n在撤销该转让后，《破产法》第550(a)条及 NYUVTA 第276(b)条允许追回被转让的特定财产、其价值或其收益。11 U.S.C. § 550(a); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b)。因此，\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 58 页，共 102 页\n\n无视公司形式并将另我的资产视为债务人资产，就撤销诉讼而言，与就其他诉讼而言产生不同效果，完全不足为奇。参见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 710（“在母公司/子公司情形中，‘如果子公司仅为母公司的另我……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。’”）。\n\n“Delaware 不会容忍将公司形式用作促成欺诈或不公的手段。”Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714。欺诈性及未经授权的申请后转让法与此目的相一致。它们旨在防止因资产耗散而产生的不公平结果。参见 Begier, 496 U.S. at 59; PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d at 313; Photo Promotion Assocs., 881 F.2d at 9–10。若另我不能用于防止因欺诈性或未经授权的申请后转让所导致的欺诈或不公，这将根本上荒谬且违背该原则的目的。这两类法律可以结合适用。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53; ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 65–68; 参见 Bravia Cap., 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; 另参见 Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\n基于上述所有理由，法院认定，债务人可以通过另我进行转让，且另我的财产属于债务人的破产财产。在受托人已合理主张另我的范围内，受托人已合理主张个人债务人转让了属于破产财产的财产，或者若非该等转让本应属于破产财产的财产。在同一范围内，受托人因此有资格提出其 NYUVTA 请求，并且如上所述，已合理主张该等请求。另我可用于支持根据《破产法》或 NYUVTA 提出的可撤销转让请求。\n\n2. 问题 (ii) 和 (iv)：对另我的商业债权人的损害及实质合并\n\n法院现转向联合被告的其余论点。联合被告主张，受托人未能根据 Delaware 法提出可识别的反向刺破公司面纱请求，理由是：(a) 受托人未能主张不存在对被指称另我的债权人的损害；以及 (b) 作为法律问题，反向刺破公司面纱将损害联合被告。联合被告还主张：(c) 受托人正在寻求不被允许的 nunc pro tunc（追溯）救济；以及 (d) 即使所求救济在州法下本可被允许，该救济亦可通过实质合并实现，因此，若受托人未满足追溯性实质合并所要求的检验标准，允许其获得该救济将不公平。贯穿联合被告论点的是如下主张：受托人所寻求的救济对作为被指称另我的无辜商业债权人的联合被告极不公平。\n\n受托人主张：(a) 判例法明确表明，原告无需主张不存在对被指称另我的债权人的损害；(b) 损害是一项事实密集型问题，不能在驳回动议或依诉状判决动议中解决，而且无论如何，《破产法》向联合被告提供了在破产程序之外无法获得的保护；(c) 其并非通过另我请求寻求 nunc pro tunc 救济，而是寻求使法律现实符合事实现实；以及 (d) 尽管另我在破产程序中提供的救济可能类似于实质合并，但两种救济的事实及法律前提不同，且受托人已主张另我。受托人亦对联合被告均为无辜商业债权人，以及其所寻求救济根本不公平的主张提出异议。\n\ni. 问题 (ii)：适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定？\n\n如上所述，联合被告将撤销请求理解为主张以下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另我）→ C（联合被告） A（联合被告）\n（转让消除）\n（另我认定）\n\n就问题 (ii) 而言，联合被告主张，即使另我认定会在个人债务人与被指称另我之间形成同一性，撤销 BC 转让仍具有损害性，因为联合被告并不知道 A=B，因此，法院不得作为法律问题作出另我认定。\n\n法院不同意。首先，受托人无需主张不存在对另我债权人的损害。在采纳反向刺破公司面纱时，Delaware Court of Chancery 认为，法院必须考量传统另我因素，并额外考量一系列其他因素；这些因素实质上涉及对被指称另我的债权人、所有者及其他利益相关者的损害。Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714–15。然而，衡平法院驳回了被告关于应因未主张不存在对被指称另我的某些债权人的损害而驳回起诉状的论点。Id. at 718。相反，衡平法院认为：“起诉状中没有任何依据可推断反向刺破公司面纱将对无辜的第三方债权人造成损害。……为明确起见，起诉状中并无与……第三方债权人有关的事实主张，而且至少就目前而言，我的分析仅限于该诉状的‘四角’之内。”Id.。法院未获提供任何理由相信 Delaware Supreme Court（特拉华州最高法院）会在此问题上不同意衡平法院。损害是一个需要进行事实发展的议题。\n\n第二，受托人可以主张共同被告为初始受让人；后续受让人具有不同的抗辩理由并不重要。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 62 页，共 102 页\n\n382–86（认定原告可以以使安全港抗辩不适用的方式主张转让）；比较 Covey v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth), Bankruptcy No. 10-83603, Adversary No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681, at *8 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012)（认定受托人使用另一个自我理论不被允许，部分原因在于该做法将剥夺被告在受托人以不同方式主张欺诈性转让时本可享有的后续受让人抗辩）。共同被告可以主张受托人并未依据《破产法典》或 NYUVTA 主张一项转让。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at 382。事实上，如上所述，共同被告已经作出了该项主张。随着本程序越过诉答阶段，其仍可继续作出该项主张。\n\n为支持其论点，共同被告敦促本院采纳 Duckworth 的裁判结论，但其援引并不恰当。Duckworth 一案的法院所面对的并非驳回动议，而是简易判决动议。Duckworth, 2012 WL 4434681, at *2。Duckworth 一案法院根据无争议的事实认定，允许受托人向被指称的另一个自我的贸易债权人追偿，将不公平且违反适用的州法。Id. at *7。本案中，共同动议为驳回动议或依诉答作出判决的动议。在此阶段，适用的标准是：将受托人充分主张的事实视为真实后，该等事实是否支持作出存在不允许的不利影响的认定。Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 718。审查起诉状及其中通过援引纳入的另一个自我起诉状，并不支持作出该项认定。\n\n共同被告无权要求受托人主张其为后续受让人。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at 382。受托人主张的转让为：\n\nA（个人债务人）→ C（共同被告）（A 的财产经由另一个自我 B 转让）\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 63 页，共 102 页\n\n其无须主张 ABC 转让，即将另一个自我的认定视为一项转让，从而主张个人债务人将其财产转让给作为初始受让人的另一个自我，而共同被告则为该等另一个自我的后续受让人。\nii. 争点（iv）：反向刺破公司面纱或另一个自我的认定能否追溯适用？\n\n转向争点（iv），本院认定受托人并未寻求 nunc pro tunc（追溯既往）救济。裁定某一实体是且一直是另一实体的另一个自我，并非给予 nunc pro tunc 救济，而是裁定公司形式是且一直是表象。按照共同被告关于另一个自我的理论，胜诉方将没有任何可获得的救济。共同被告主张，根据特拉华州法，另一个自我的认定仅就一项可折算为金钱损害赔偿的关联请求施加替代责任。若另一个自我的认定只能如共同被告所主张般前瞻性地扩展责任，则另一个自我将不对胜诉方基于既有事实提出的关联请求承担责任。这并非特拉华州法的运作方式。另一个自我请求可以与关联请求一并提出，参见 Tronox, 549 B.R. at 27（在人身伤害原始被告无法被起诉的情形下，原告寻求通过包括另一个自我在内的各种理论施加替代责任），甚至可以在关联请求的判决作出后提出，参见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 699–701（另一个自我请求于评估判决后提出），且均未分析 nunc pro tunc 救济是否适当。这是因为并未寻求 nunc pro tunc 救济。参见 Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf), 644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022)（驳回在破产案件中另一个自我的认定会构成不允许的追溯适用这一“令人困惑”的论点）。另一个自我寻求基于既有事实的救济，正如违约请求寻求基于既有事实的救济一样。\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 64 页，共 102 页\n\n另一个自我的认定并非一项转让——其并不创设财产权益，而是确认财产权益。这是共同被告对撤销请求之解释的根本缺陷。如上图所示，共同被告将撤销请求理解为主张如下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另一个自我）→ C（共同被告）\n另一个自我的认定 “B 的财产”的转让\n\n即使假定另一个自我的认定在个人债务人与另一个自我之间创设同一性，共同被告仍主张，另一个自我的认定会在事后改变 BC 转让的性质。因此，共同被告主张，本院不能将另一个自我的认定——A=B，亦可表述为 AB——视为在 BC 转让发生时即已作出。\n\n然而，受托人并未主张 A=B 转让，而是主张另一个自我一直以来均只是个人债务人的工具。其主张如下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）→ C（共同被告）（A 的财产经由另一个自我 B 转让）\n\n并主张，该等经由另一个自我进行的转让，是个人债务人为其本人、其家人、其关联人士及其企业取得货物和服务并转移资产的一贯做法。\n\n本院拒绝在破产案件中对另一个自我的使用采取审慎性限制。Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）在 Manichaean Capital 一案中认定：\n\n反向刺破公司面纱可能被作为损害无辜当事人的钝器使用，并扰乱独立交易的预期；尽管这些风险确实存在，但在我看来，并不足以证明应当完全否定反向刺破公司面纱。相反，对这些风险的认识创造了管理这些风险的机会，并可通过服务于衡平利益的方式加以管理。\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 65 页，共 102 页\n\n251 A.3d at 712。本院看不出任何理由，说明依特拉华州衡平法院所指示的、为衡平利益而“管理[反向刺破公司面纱风险]的机会”，在破产案件中审理案件的法院无法或不具备适当能力把握。事实上，《破产法典》的首要目的之一，是为请求权的调整及最终、公平解决提供单一法院，包括通过集体追偿程序。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 et seq.。对传统另一个自我因素以及对另一个自我的债权人和其他利益相关者的不利影响进行衡量，参见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714–15，属于破产法院的职权范围。\n\n共同被告敦促本院将受托人的另一个自我主张视为暗中的实质合并主张，并因此对任何另一个自我认定的追溯效力施加限制——无论该等限制是否适用于州法。实质合并“尤其导致汇集两个实体的资产及针对该等实体的债权；从由此形成的共同基金中清偿债务；消除公司间请求权；以及为就重组计划投票之目的合并两家公司的债权人。”Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988)。“实质合并的唯一目的，是确保所有债权人获得公平待遇。”Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518。实质合并要求：（i）债权人曾“将各实体作为一个单一经济单位进行交易，并且‘在提供信贷时未依赖其独立身份’”；及（ii）债务人的事务“如此错综复杂，以致合并将使所有债权人受益”。Id.。在 Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.) 一案中，United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit（美国哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院）认定，在申请方能够证明其实质合并的利益超过对潜在撤销诉讼被告造成的损害时，应当 nunc pro tunc 作出实质合并命令。810 F.2d 270, 277\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 66 页，共 102 页\n\n(D.C. Cir. 1987)。共同被告敦促本院将 Auto-Train 适用于任何另一个自我的认定。\n\n如受托人所承认，另一个自我认定在破产中的效果与实质合并的效果相似——另一个自我的资产和负债被合并。然而，实质合并可以适用——对此共同被告似乎表示怀疑——并不意味着不能在破产案件中主张另一个自我。In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005)（“在实质合并之前，公司人格否认的其他救济已经存在（且仍然存在）。例如，若一家子公司受到其公司母公司的支配程度如此之深，以致成为母公司的‘另一个自我’，则根据州法可以忽略（或‘刺破’）该子公司的‘公司面纱’。”）。\n\n此外，两项原则的要件和目的不同。根据特拉华州法，传统的另一个自我或刺破公司面纱有两个要件：（i）其形式将被否认的公司实体受到其被指称的另一个自我的支配和控制程度如此之深，以致该公司实体及其另一个自我事实上构成单一经济单位；及（ii）将被否认的公司形式导致欺诈或某种类似的不公正。Pauley Petroleum, 239 A.2d at 633; Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 706; Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)。反向刺破公司面纱还要求法院考虑对被指称的另一个自我的债权人、所有人及其他利益相关者造成的不利影响。Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714–15。另一个自我为滥用公司形式提供救济。相比之下，在不存在超过其利益的损害时，实质合并为可被更简单处理的过度复杂财务事务提供救济。\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 67 页，共 102 页\n\n这是一项具有实质差异的区分。“实质合并最好被视为一种经济救济，其主要目标是对所有债权人实行公平对待。相反，州法上的另我主张是一种衡平法救济，侧重于防止‘欺诈或不公正’。”Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.), Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022)。实质合并并不旨在救济任何欺诈或不公正。Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518。公司形式无须曾被滥用，各实体无须是幌子，也无须有任何债权人因公司形式而受到损害。Id. 所必需的只是债权人将从实质合并中受益。Id. 在对财产进行实质合并时，法院是在解决一个实际问题——对高度交织的财产进行管理，而梳理这些财产可能产生高额行政成本——即在这样做利大于弊的情况下，通过前瞻性地简化其面前的事实来解决该问题。See id. 在刺破公司面纱时，法院是在确认一种既存现实，即公司形式被滥用并损害债权人利益；作为衡平法事项，法院不允许该等滥用持续存在。See Pauley Petroleum, 239 A.2d at 633。实质合并可能涉及一项转让；另我认定则不会。\n\n破产所涉事项之一，是对损失的公平分摊。共同被告试图促使法院将 Auto-Train 适用于另我主张，从而将分析重点转移至 BC 转让，而非 A。共同被告如此做时，忽视了起诉书中所指称的、由个人债务人为阻碍、拖延或欺诈其债权人而实施并使其受益的、涉及众多另我的障眼法——而该等指称是另我分析的核心。See Pauley Petroleum, 239 A.2d at 633。（See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1。）在视为真实的前提下，这些指称与权衡反向刺破公司面纱因素相关。Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 715–16（说明法院将权衡“维护受影响公司债权人或债务人的合法预期之社会价值，并适用有利于确保该等预期的可反驳推定，与在所涉特定情形下允许反向刺破公司面纱所服务政策的重要性之间的关系。”）（引自 Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)）。\n\n尽管共同被告请求法院将 Auto-Train 的 nunc pro tunc 分析适用于另我主张，法院认定不存在理由或依据偏离 Delaware（特拉华州）另我法。尽管实质合并已经出现，该法仍可供受托人援用。Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 205–06。\n\n* * *\n\n基于上述所有理由，共同被告就争议事项 (ii) 和 (iv) 提出的论点不具有说服力。法院不会在驳回动议或就诉状作出判决的动议中，权衡对共同被告的不利影响与支持另我的因素。同样，法院不会在该理论构成要件之外，对另我的使用施加审慎性限制。\n\nC. 非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议24\n\n法院仅处理非共同被告就四项争议所提出的不同论点。下列非共同被告：(1) FFP (BVI) Limited；(2) Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell；(3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.；(4) The Francis Firm PLLC；(5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.；(6) Weddle Law PLLC；(7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC；(8) G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.；以及 (9) ACASS Canada LTD（统称“其他非共同被告”），均由同一律师代理，该律师将其非共同动议作为一项统一论证提出。\n\n24 See n. 12, supra.\n\n另有两名非共同被告：(10) Liberty Jet Management Corp.（“Liberty Jet”）及 (11) Z&Z。Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 未提出任何亦未由其他非共同被告提出的不同论点。此外，Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 均未在听证会上提出独立论点。因此，法院仅讨论其他非共同被告的论点。在 Liberty Jet 或 Z&Z 提出或加入下文所讨论论点的范围内，本讨论同样适用于 Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z。\n\n其他非共同被告提出两项不同论点。第一，就争议事项 (ii)——适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定——其他非共同被告主张，受托人无权提起另我主张，因为他代表个人债务人的地位，而在将受托人的指称视为真实的前提下，个人债务人与所称另我处于 in pari delicto 状态。第二，就争议事项 (i)，即受托人能否撤销非债务人实体作出的初始转让，以及 (iii)，即反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力，其他非共同被告主张，受托人在所称另我尚未申请破产、且个人债务人的 Chapter 11 案件与未申请的另我破产案件尚未实质合并的情况下，不当地提出了所称另我破产财产的主张。其他非共同被告据此主张，受托人正在规避 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法》）的披露要求。\n\n作为回应，受托人主张，根据 Bankruptcy Code 的 section 541 或 section 544(a)，他具有诉讼资格，因为他代表个人债务人债权人的地位；即使并非如此，in pari delicto 的内部人例外也应适用。受托人主张，他已适当提出个人债务人破产财产的主张，已适当提出另我主张，并且无论如何，他将寻求一个新的债权申报截止日期，以使另我的债权人能够向该财产提出债权。\n\n1. 争议事项 (ii)：诉讼资格\n\nBankruptcy Code 赋予破产受托人代表债权人提出某些主张的诉讼资格。PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d at 700。在缺乏该等法定授权的情况下，“破产受托人通常无权代表财产债权人起诉第三方，而只能主张破产公司自身享有的主张。”Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991)；see Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995)；Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994)。\n\n在受托人并非代表债权人提出主张的情形下，Wagoner 指示法院确定：(i) 债务人本可否提出该主张；及 (ii) 若可以，是否因归责于债务人的行为而使受托人与他人处于 in pari delicto 状态。Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 119–20。尽管 in pari delicto 的主张通常被视为积极的衡平法抗辩，但 Wagoner 理论（包括其对 in pari delicto 的考量）“发挥审慎性诉讼资格限制的作用”。Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd., 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015)。\n\nSecond Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）裁定，受托人有资格代表全体债权人提出另我主张。在 PepsiCo 一案中，第二巡回上诉法院采纳了 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit（美国第七巡回上诉法院）在 Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987) 中所采取的方法。PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05。在 Koch Refining 一案中，第七巡回上诉法院裁定，根据 section 544(a)，破产受托人是“普通债权人的代表”，并可追究另我主张，因为该等主张针对的是对债权人的普遍性损害，而非特定化损害。831 F.2d at 1351–54；see Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan), 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009)。这与 section 544(a) 的法定文本一致：任何判决债权人均可为收取其债务而提出另我主张；这并不取决于其特定主张。11 U.S.C. § 544(a)。\n\n尽管第二巡回上诉法院在 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC), 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013) 中区分了 PepsiCo，但其依据的事实是，Securities Investor Protection Act（《证券投资者保护法》）受托人寻求提出被欺诈债权人的特定化主张——即使该等主张在 Madoff 庞氏骗局的特定事实下极为普遍地被持有25，JPMorgan, 721 F.3d at 58–59。JPMorgan 中的主张与 Wagoner 中的主张高度相似。Compare JPMorgan, 721 F.3d at 58–59 with Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 116–17。此外，与 PepsiCo 一致，第二巡回上诉法院最近重申，受托人有资格代表全体债权人提出另我主张，且另我主张属于破产财产。Compare Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 with PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 701。\n\n其他非共同被告主张，Nordlicht 沿袭了一系列始于 Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987) 的案件；该案与 Koch 不同，裁定 section 544(a) 未赋予受托人代表全体债权人提出一般性主张的诉讼资格。See PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 698–99。其他非共同被告主张，这意味着受托人的另我主张受 Wagoner 约束。尽管 Nordlicht 本身未提及 section 544(a)，但其与如下裁定完全一致：受托人拥有某些假设债权人的权利和权力，并且其源自该等权利和权力的主张属于破产财产。此外，即使受托人仅依据 section 541 才有资格提出另我主张，该诉讼资格亦源自全体债权人的一般性主张。\n\n因此，Wagoner 理论不适用。在受托人代表债权人地位提起诉讼时，该理论不适用。Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118（“受托人坚持其并非主张票据持有人的主张，因此我们无须深入探究受托人何时——如果曾经——可以代表破产人的债权人起诉第三方。”）；see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander), 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)（“Wagoner 规则和 in pari delicto 理论均不适用于受托人根据 Bankruptcy Code Section 544 所享有的法定诉讼资格。”）；Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.), 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017)。法院不处理各方就 in pari delicto 例外所提出的论点。受托人有资格提出另我主张。\n\n2. 争议事项 (i) 和 (iii)：另我、实质合并与披露\n\n其他非共同被告提出的论点与共同被告提出的论点大体相同，即关于为何受托人不能援引另我理论主张个人债务人为转让人，或者主张债务人的财产及/或若非因该转让即为或将为破产财产的财产已被转让；本院已在上文驳回该论点。本院不再讨论该论点。区别在于其他非共同被告主张受托人本应采取的措施。共同被告主张\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 73 页，共 102 页\n\n受托人只能向被指称的另我实体本身追偿，且这就是其潜在追偿的范围；而其他非共同被告则主张，受托人本应取得对个人债务人企业的控制权，将其置于破产程序中，继而寻求追溯性实质合并。\n\n本院亦已在上文裁定，尽管存在实质合并，受托人仍可提出另我主张。关于其他非共同被告的通知顾虑，其他非共同被告并不代表被指称的另我实体全体债权人。其他非共同被告自身已获悉受托人的另我主张。受托人已多次表示，其将为经裁定为另我实体的债权人寻求新的申报截止日期。如提出该等请求，本院将审议该申报截止日期的适当通知及送达问题。\n\nD. 问题（二）：另我指控的合理可信性\n\n本院已处理共同被告和非共同被告关于受托人为何未能以合理可信的方式主张另我的论点。本院认定，受托人有资格提出其反向刺破公司面纱主张；其无须主张不存在对被指称的另我实体债权人的损害；且依法不存在该等损害。然而，该讨论并未完全解决问题（二）——适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或作出另我认定。\n\n基于起诉状及其纳入的另我起诉状中的指控，本院认定，受托人已以合理可信的方式主张：（1）Golden Spring（金泉）；（2）Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）；（3）HCHK Tech（HCHK科技）；（4）HCHK Property（HCHK房地产）；（5）Lexington（列克星敦）；（6）Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地）；及（7）Leading Shine（领耀）均为个人债务人的另我实体，且应对其公司面纱进行反向刺破。受托人已以合理可信的方式主张：（i）个人债务人支配并控制该等另我实体，以致其不存在独立的经济实体，仅作为个人债务人的表面幌子；及（ii）该等另我实体的公司形式被用于阻碍、拖延或欺诈个人债务人的债权人，作为一场旨在使个人债务人事实上免于判决执行的大型空壳游戏的一部分。见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 706。（例如，Complaint ¶¶ 13–38, Despins（德斯平斯） v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd.（Golden Spring（纽约）有限公司） (In re Kwok（郭文贵案）), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格联邦地区破产法院） July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1。）此外，将起诉状和另我起诉状中的指控视为真实，并不能证明对另我实体债权人造成损害。见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 718。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 74 页，共 102 页\n\nV. 结论及命令\n\n本院审理的某些问题属于法律问题——但其范围界定狭窄，实质上要求本院无视或重新定性起诉状中的指控。本院在裁决驳回动议或依诉状判决动议时不会如此处理。被告将受托人的转让指控表述为一连串关系，即 A=BC：一项另我认定，使 A（个人债务人）与 B（被指称的另我实体）形成同一性，然后将 B 的财产转让给 C（共同被告）。然而，受托人主张的是 AC 转让，即利用 B 将 A 的财产转让给 C。本院审理的其他问题被界定为可通过驳回动议裁决。为此，被告聚焦于未被主张的 BC 转让，并主张在该转让之外增加另一项转让 A=B，会损害 C。被告要求本院超越诉状并就事实作出裁决，本院不会如此处理。\n\n基于上述理由，本院就以下四项问题得出结论：\n\n（一）受托人能否撤销非债务实体作出的初始转让？\n\n受托人并未寻求撤销非债务实体作出的初始转让。受托人主张由个人债务人作出该等转让。转让的定义包括间接转让。因此，名义转让人并非决定性因素。受托人提出另我及受益所有权指控，以主张个人债务人为转让人。\n\n（二）适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或作出另我认定？\n\n特拉华州法律承认反向刺破公司面纱。本院已审议各方就受托人另我主张是否充分提出的论点。受托人有资格提出反向刺破公司面纱主张。受托人无须主张不存在对被指称的另我实体债权人的损害。受托人已以合理可信的方式主张另我。\n\n（三）根据适用法律，反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定具有什么效力？\n\n受托人并非仅依赖另我指控——其亦主张受益所有权。尽管如此，根据特拉华州法律，反向刺破公司面纱的效力在于不予理会公司形式。不予理会公司形式会因附随诉因的实体法不同而产生不同结果。通常，这会导致承担替代责任。其亦可被用以证明某项请求权或抗辩。根据《破产法》，另我认定可用于证明债务人作出了间接转让，并使债务人另我实体的财产成为破产财产。根据 NYUVTA，另我认定可用于撤销另我实体对其自身财产作出的转让。\n\n（四）反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定是否可以追溯适用？\n\n受托人并未寻求追溯性救济。另我是对过去及现在滥用公司形式的救济。其使法律现实与事实现实保持一致。另我在破产程序中实质合并出现后仍然存在。没有依据将起诉状重新解释为寻求实质合并而非另我。\n\n据此，现命令如下：\n\n1. 附录 A 所列共同动议予以驳回。\n\n2. 附录 B 所列非共同动议，就其中提出的与《联合书面陈述命令》所列问题有关的任何及全部论点，予以部分驳回。尽管有前述规定，本裁决不适用于《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i) 及 (ii) 段所定义的已中止或部分中止的撤销请求，但仅限于该等撤销请求被中止的范围。附于本命令的附录 D 中标注了哪些撤销请求属于已中止或部分中止的撤销请求。\n\n3. 附录 C 所列 Z&Z（Z&Z公司）异议，就其中提出的与《联合书面陈述命令》所列问题有关的任何及全部论点，予以部分驳回。尽管有前述规定，本裁决不适用于《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i) 及 (ii) 段所定义的已中止或部分中止的撤销请求，但仅限于该等撤销请求被中止的范围。附于本命令的附录 D 中标注了哪些撤销请求属于已中止或部分中止的撤销请求。\n\n4. 不迟于 March 28, 2025，各非共同被告应与受托人在各自的撤销诉讼中提交联合陈述，说明其非共同动议或 Z&Z 提出异议的依诉状判决动议中尚待裁定的问题。该等陈述必须具体列明该等问题在诉状中的提出位置。本院审阅该等陈述后，将就每一事项确定是否有必要举行听证，或可根据各方提交的材料作出裁决。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 77 页，共 102 页\n\n特此于 2025 年 3 月 4 日在康涅狄格州布里奇波特下令。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 78 页，共 102 页\n\n附录 A 共同动议\n\n1. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc.（Agora Lab, Inc.公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 24（由被告 Agora Lab, Inc. 提交）。\n\n2. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc.（Amazon Web Services, Inc.公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21（由被告 Amazon Web Services, Inc. 提交）。\n\n3. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC（Direct Persuasion有限责任公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 26（由被告 Direct Persuasion LLC 提交）。\n\n4. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23（由被告 Fox News Network, LLC 提交）。\n\n5. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Arri Americas Inc.（阿莱美洲公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 27, 2024), ECF No. 17（由被告 Arri Americas Inc. 提交）。\n\n6. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC（Teris-Phoenix有限责任公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20（由被告 Teris-Phoenix, LLC 提交）。\n\n7. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23（由被告 Phillips Nizer LLP 提交）。\n\n8. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Gunderson（冈德森） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21（由被告 Mark Gundersen（马克·冈德森）先生提交）。\n\n9. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西39街270号公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17（由被告 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC 提交）。\n\n10. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 42（由被告 Amazon.com, Inc. 提交）。\n\n11. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安森健康计划公司） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21（由被告 Anthem Health Plans, Inc. 提交）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 79 页，共 102 页\n\n12. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins（德斯平斯）诉 Fed. Express Corp.（联邦快递公司）（关于 Kwok（郭文贵）），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格联邦破产法院）Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 20（由被告 Federal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司）提交）。\n\n13. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 DJD Creative LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2024），ECF No. 22（由被告 DJD Creative, LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n14. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（B&H 摄影与电子公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 35（由被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（B&H 摄影与电子公司）提交）。\n\n15. 基于诉状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Am. Express Co.（美国运通公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 American Express Company（美国运通公司）提交）。\n\n16. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（奥特扎尔·什洛莫·所罗门宝藏有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC 提交）。\n\n17. 基于诉状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Zeta Glob. Corp.（泽塔全球公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Zeta Global Corp.（泽塔全球公司）提交）。\n\n18. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 GroCyber LLC（格罗网络安全有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 GroCyber LLC 提交）。\n\n19. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 22（由被告 Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n20. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（安森健康选择保险公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 23（由被告 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc.（安森健康选择保险公司）提交）。\n\n21. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 ModSquad Inc.（莫德小队公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 ModSquad Inc. 提交）。\n\n22. 基于诉状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Cloudflare, Inc.（云火公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 22（由被告 Cloudfare, Inc.（云火公司）提交）。\n\n23. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 3 Columbus Circle LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 3 Columbus Circle LLC 提交）。\n\n24. 基于诉状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Indium Software Inc.（铟软件公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Indium Software Inc. 提交）。\n\n25. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Miller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 Miller Motorcars Inc. 提交）。\n\n26. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（即时家居装修公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. 提交）。\n\n27. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Target Enters., LLC（目标企业有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Target Enterprises, LLC（目标企业有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n28. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd.（统一费率搬家公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. 提交）。\n\n29. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Jamestown Assocs., LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Jamestown Associates, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n30. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Nardello & Co., LLC（纳德洛公司有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Nardello & Co., LLC 提交）。\n\n31. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·伊亚松与阿内洛专业公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. 提交）。\n\n32. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·柯什纳与林德有限责任合伙企业）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 28（由被告 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 提交）。\n\n33. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Putnam's Landscaping LLC（普特南园林绿化有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 Putnam's Landscaping LLC 提交）。\n\n案件 22-50073，文件 4189，已提交 03/04/25，已录入 03/04/25 14:45:18，第 81 页，共 102 页\n\n34. 基于诉状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 23（由被告 Jason Miller 先生提交）。\n\n35. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（塞奇威克房地产公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 Sedgwick Realty Corp. 提交）。\n\n36. 基于诉状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Cirrus Design Corp.（西锐设计公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Cirrus Design Corp. 提交）。\n\n37. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Marcum LLP（马库姆有限责任合伙企业）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 25（由被告 Marcum LLP 提交）。\n\n附录 B 非共同动议\n\n1. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（FFP（英属维尔京群岛）有限公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 FFP (BVI) Ltd. 提交）。\n\n2. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Mitchell（米切尔）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Aaron A. Mitchell（亚伦·A·米切尔）先生提交）。\n\n3. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A.（V.X. 塞尔达联合专业协会）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2024），ECF No. 16（由被告 V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A.（V.X. 塞尔达联合专业协会）提交）。\n\n4. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 20, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Liberty Jet Management Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司）提交）。\n\n5. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所专业有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. May 29, 2024），ECF No. 15（由被告 The Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所专业有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n6. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（伯克利·罗有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2024），ECF No. 35（由被告 Berkeley Rowe Ltd. 提交）。\n\n7. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所专业有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024），ECF No. 11（由被告 Weddle Law PLLC 提交）。\n\n8. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 及 Aaron A. Mitchell 先生提交）。\n\n9. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（G4S 安保系统（香港）有限公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.（G4S 安保系统（香港）有限公司）提交）。\n\n10. 对抗程序驳回动议，Despins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS 加拿大有限公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2024），ECF No. 26（由被告 ACASS Canada LTD. 提交）。\n\n附录 C Z&Z 异议\n\n1. 反对法律备忘录，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 提交，反对受托人基于诉状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2024），ECF No. 17）。\n\n附录 D 针对共同被告及非共同被告的起诉状\n\n图例\n\n针对非共同被告的起诉状以粗体标示\n\n撤销请求\n\nAFT (BC)－实际欺诈性转让（《破产法》）\n\n根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追回个人债务人在财产中所享权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nAFT (NY) 实际欺诈性转让（纽约州法）根据 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追回个人债务人在财产中所享权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nCFT (BC) 推定欺诈性转让（《破产法》）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追回个人债务人在财产中所享权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n\nCFT (NY) 推定欺诈性转让（纽约州法）根据 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追回个人债务人在财产中所享权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n\nUPT 未经授权的申请后转让：根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追回未经授权的破产财产申请后转让。\n\nST 向后手受让人追回：根据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)，向后手受让人追回已被撤销的转让。\n\n＊部分中止的请求\n\n中止的请求\n\n（针对共同被告和非共同被告均未提出的请求以括号标示）\n\n替身实体\n\nGSNY－Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司） LC－Lamp Capital LLC（兰普资本有限责任公司） HCHKT－HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK 技术公司） HCHKP－HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK 物业管理公司） LPS－Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事公司） GL－Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司） LSNY－Leading Shine NY Ltd.（领耀纽约有限公司）\n\n［在撤销请求中涉及的替身实体，如该请求未因《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e) 段而中止，则以方括号标示］\n\n1. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Agora Lab, Inc.（阿戈拉实验室公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第三项请求：UPT [HCHKT]\n\n2. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Amazon Web Servs., Inc.（亚马逊云服务公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024），ECF No. 4。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n\n第三项请求：UPT [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n3. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Direct Persuasion LLC（直接说服有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n4. 起诉状，Despins（德斯潘斯）诉 Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司）（In re Kwok（郭文贵）），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格地区联邦破产法院） Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n5. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Arri Americas Inc.（阿莱美洲公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（泰瑞斯-菲尼克斯有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n7. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Phillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽有限责任合伙企业）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC]\n第三项请求：UPT [LPS]\n\n8. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Gunderson（冈德森）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n9. 起诉状，Despins 诉 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西39街270号公司有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [LPS]\n\n10. 起诉状，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（FFP〈英属维尔京群岛〉有限公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LSNY]\n第三项请求：UPT**\n\n11. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项请求：UPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\n第六项请求：(ST*)\n\n12. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安森健康计划公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [HCHKP]\n\n13. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Fed. Express Corp.（联邦快递公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n14. 起诉状，Despins 诉 DJD Creative LLC（DJD创意有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n15. 起诉状，Despins 诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（B&H摄影与电子产品公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项请求：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKT, GL]\n第六项请求：(ST*)\n\n16. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Am. Express Co.（美国运通公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2025), ECF No. 30。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（奥察尔·什洛莫·所罗门珍宝有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Zeta Glob. Corp.（泽塔全球公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n19. 起诉状，Despins 诉 GroCyber LLC（格罗网络安全有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n20. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n21. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Mitchell（米切尔）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LPS]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC) [LPS]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY) [LPS]\n\n22. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（安森健康选择保险公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. 起诉状，Despins 诉 ModSquad Inc.（莫德小队公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n24. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Cloudflare, Inc.（云闪公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项请求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n25. 起诉状，Despins 诉 3 Columbus Circle LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Indium Software Inc.（铟软件公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项请求：UPT [HCHKT]\n\n27. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Miller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC]\n\n28. 起诉状，Despins 诉 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（即时家居改造公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n29. 起诉状，Despins 诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A.（V.X.塞尔达及联合律师事务所）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [GSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [GSNY]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC) [GSNY]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY) [GSNY]\n第五项请求：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL]\n\n30. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 2。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC]\n\n31. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Target Enters., LLC（塔吉特企业有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT] 第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd.（统一费率搬家公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Jamestown Assocs., LLC（詹姆斯敦联合公司有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n34. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Nardello & Co., LLC（纳德洛及公司有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC, LPS]\n\n35. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所专业有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC) [LC]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY) [LC]\n第五项请求：UPT [LC, LPS]\n\n36. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（伯克利·罗有限公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2024), ECF No. 23。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n37. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所专业有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n38. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·亚森与阿内洛专业公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n第五项请求：UPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\n第六项请求：ST*\n\n40. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·基什纳与林德有限责任合伙企业）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LC]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC]\n第三项请求：UPT [LC]\n\n41. 起诉状，Despins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（G4S安保系统〈香港〉有限公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC, LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC, LSNY]\n第三项请求：UPT [LC]\n\n42. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Putnam's Landscaping LLC（普特南园林绿化有限责任公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC, GL]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC, GL]\n第三项请求：UPT [LC, HCHKP, GL]\n\n44. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n45. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（塞奇威克房地产公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [LC]\n\n46. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Cirrus Design Corp.（赛勒斯设计公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第五项请求：(ST)\n\n47. 第二次修正起诉状，Despins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS加拿大有限公司）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2024), ECF No. 22。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n第三项请求：UPT [GSNY, LC]\n\n48. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Marcum LLP（马库姆有限责任合伙企业）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\nAFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\nAFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\nCFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\nCFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\nUPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n附录E 选定法定条款\n《破产法典》条款\n定义\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(54) “转让”一词是指—\n\n(A) 设立留置权；\n(B) 将所有权保留为担保权益；\n(C) 丧失债务人的赎回权；或\n\n(D) 以任何直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的方式处分或放弃—\n\n(i) 财产；或\n(ii) 财产中的权益。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n(a) 根据本编第301、302或303条启动案件，即设立遗产。该遗产由下列所有财产组成，无论位于何处或由何人持有：\n\n(1) 除本条第(b)款和第(c)(2)款另有规定外，债务人在案件启动时对财产享有的所有法定或衡平权益。\n\n撤销条款\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) 除第（2）项另有规定外，受托人可以撤销债务人对财产享有的权益的任何转让，或者债务人所承担的任何义务，只要该转让或义务依适用法律可由持有本法典第502条项下可获准的无担保债权请求的债权人撤销，或者仅因本法典第502(e)条而不可获准的债权人撤销。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) 如债务人自愿或非自愿地作出或承担下列转让或义务，受托人可以撤销债务人在提交申请书之日前2年内作出或承担的任何对财产享有的权益的转让（包括根据雇佣合同向内幕人士作出或为其利益作出的任何转让），或者债务人承担的任何义务（包括根据雇佣合同向内幕人士承担或为其利益承担的任何义务）：\n\n(A) 债务人作出该等转让或承担该等义务时，具有妨碍、拖延或欺诈任何实体的实际意图；该实体在作出该等转让或承担该等义务之日或之后，曾经或成为债务人的债权人；或者\n\n(B) (i) 债务人就该等转让或义务获得的对价少于合理等值；并且\n\n(ii) (I) 债务人在作出该等转让或承担该等义务之日已无力偿债，或因该等转让或义务而无力偿债；\n\n(II) 债务人正在从事或即将从事某项业务或交易，而债务人保留的任何财产对于该业务或交易而言构成不合理地过少的资本；\n\n(III) 债务人意图承担，或相信债务人将承担，在该等债务到期时超出债务人偿付能力的债务；或者\n\n(IV) 债务人根据雇佣合同向内幕人士作出或为其利益作出该等转让，或向内幕人士承担或为其利益承担该等义务，且并非在正常营业过程中作出或承担。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) 除本条(b)款或(c)款另有规定外，受托人可以撤销破产财团财产的转让：\n\n(1) 该转让发生于案件启动之后；并且\n\n(2) (A) 该转让仅根据本法典第303(f)条或第542(c)条获得授权；或者\n\n(B) 该转让未经本法典或法院授权。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) 除本条另有规定外，在根据本法典第544、545、547、548、549、553(b)或724(a)条撤销某项转让的范围内，受托人可为破产财团的利益，向下列主体追偿被转让的财产，或者，如法院作出命令，则追偿该等财产的价值：\n\n(1) 该项转让的初始受让人，或者为该项转让利益所及的实体；或者\n\n(2) 该初始受让人的任何直接或间接受让人。\n\nNYUVTA（纽约统一可撤销交易法）条款\n\n定义\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) “资产”是指债务人的财产，但该术语不包括：\n\n(1) 在由有效留置权负担的范围内的财产；\n\n(2) 在非破产法下通常可获豁免的范围内的财产；或者\n\n(3) 以夫妻整体共有形式持有的财产权益，在该权益不受仅对其中一名共有人享有债权请求的债权人执行程序约束的范围内。\n\n. . .\n\n(f) “债务人”是指对债权请求负有责任的人。\n\n. . .\n\n(p) “转让”是指直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿地处分或放弃资产或资产权益的任何方式，包括支付金钱、解除、租赁、许可，以及设定留置权或其他权利负担。\n\n撤销条款\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) 如债务人作出转让或承担义务时存在下列情形，则无论债权人的债权请求是在作出转让或承担义务之前或之后产生，该转让或义务均可由该债权人撤销：\n\n(1) 债务人具有妨碍、拖延或欺诈任何债权人的实际意图；或者\n\n(2) 债务人未就该转让或义务获得合理等值的对价，并且债务人：\n\n(i) 正在从事或即将从事某项业务或交易，而债务人的剩余资产相对于该业务或交易而言不合理地过少；或者\n\n(ii) 意图承担，或者相信或合理地应当相信债务人将承担，在债务到期时超出债务人偿付能力的债务。\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) 如债务人未就转让或义务获得合理等值的对价，且债务人在当时无力偿债，或因该转让或义务而无力偿债，则债务人作出的转让或承担的义务，可由其债权请求在作出转让或作出或承担义务之前产生的债权人撤销。\n\n(b) 债务人向内幕人士为既存债务作出的转让，如债务人在当时无力偿债，且该内幕人士有合理理由相信债务人无力偿债，则该转让可由其债权请求在作出转让之前产生的债权人撤销。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 97 页，共 102 页\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) 在依本编对转让或义务提起救济诉讼时，债权人在遵守本编第277条限制的前提下，可以获得：\n\n(1) 在满足债权人债权请求所必需的范围内撤销该转让或义务；\n\n(2) 如适用法律允许，对已转让资产或受让人的其他财产采取扣押或其他临时救济；以及\n\n(3) 在遵循衡平原则并依照适用民事诉讼规则的前提下：\n\n(i) 禁止债务人、受让人或二者进一步处分已转让资产或其他财产的禁令；\n\n(ii) 指定接管人管理已转让资产或受让人的其他财产；或者\n\n(iii) 情势可能要求的任何其他救济。\n\n附录 F 通过引用纳入的针对另我实体的起诉状\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（纽约金泉有限公司）（“Golden Spring”）\n\n经援引并入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins（德斯平）诉 Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd.（纽约金泉有限公司）（In re Kwok（郭文贵）），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05018 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格联邦地区破产法院）July 25, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n主张的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我。第二项请求：实体及/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项请求：撤销及追偿实际欺诈性转让。\n\n处理结果：准许缺席判决动议的命令，Despins 诉 Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05018 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2023），ECF No. 35。\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC（灯资本有限责任公司）\n\n经援引并入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05023 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n主张的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项请求：Lamp Capital LLC及/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项请求：另我（Hudson Diamond NY LLC（哈德逊钻石纽约有限责任公司））。第四项请求：Hudson Diamond NY LLC及/或其资产的实益所有权。第五项请求：另我（Leading Shine NY Ltd.（领耀纽约有限公司））。第六项请求：Leading Shine NY Ltd.及/或其资产的实益所有权。\n\n处理结果：缺席判决，Despins 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05023 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2024），ECF No. 66。\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）\n\n经援引并入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n主张的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我。第二项请求：实体及/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：修正后的缺席判决及永久禁令，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024），ECF No. 297。\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）\n\n经援引并入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n主张的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我。第二项请求：实体及/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：修正后的缺席判决及永久禁令，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024），ECF No. 297。\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事公司）\n\n经援引并入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n主张的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我。第二项请求：实体及/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：修正后的缺席判决及永久禁令，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024），ECF No. 297。\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）\n\n经援引并入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05005 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n主张的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我。第二项请求：实体的实益所有权。\n\n处理结果：简易判决，Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05005 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2024），ECF No. 134。\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.（领耀纽约有限公司）\n\n经援引并入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05023 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n主张的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项请求：Lamp Capital LLC及/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项请求：另我（Hudson Diamond NY LLC）。第四项请求：Hudson Diamond NY LLC及/或其资产的实益所有权。第五项请求：另我（Leading Shine NY Ltd.）。第六项请求：Leading Shine NY Ltd.及/或其资产的实益所有权。\n\n处理结果：待决。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 101 页，共 102 页\n\n对抗程序 动议 ECF 提交 异议 ECF 提交 答复 ECF 提交\n\n24-05056\nDespins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（FFP（英属维尔京群岛）有限公司） 17 8/12/24 20 10/11/24 22 11/11/24\n\n24-05110\nDespins 诉 Mitchell（米切尔） 19 5/24/24 23 7/23/24 24 8/22/24\n\n24-05134\nDespins 诉 V.X. Cerda（V.X. 塞尔达） & Assocs. P.A.（联合律师事务所） 16 6/5/24 20 8/5/24 21 9/3/24\n\n24-05135\nDespins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司） 19 6/20/24 24 9/16/24 27 10/16/24\n\n24-05168\nDespins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所） 15 5/29/24 19 7/29/24 20 8/28/24\n\n24-05186\nDespins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（伯克利罗有限公司） 35 10/12/24 42 12/11/24 51 1/10/25\n\n24-05188\nDespins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所） 11 4/22/24 17 6/21/24 27 8/2/24\n\n24-05199\nDespins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司） 21 5/24/24 26 7/23/24 27 8/22/24\n\n24-05204\nDespins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（G4S安保系统（香港）有限公司） 19 8/22/24 23 10/21/24 25 11/20/24\n\n24-05208\nDespins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒专业公司） 17 8/2/24 21 9/6/24 22 9/20/24\n\n24-05226\nDespins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS加拿大有限公司） 26 9/12/24 33 11/12/24 41 12/20/24\n\n附录 G 非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议的书面陈述\n\n附录 H 转让示意图\n\n主张的转让形式：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（共同被告） （通过另我 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n共同被告对转让形式的解释：\n\n*A（个人债务人）= B（另我） C（共同被告） （*另我认定） （转让 B 的财产）","key_entities":["Despins","Kwok","HCHK","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Paul Hastings","Guo","Geyer"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":11,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":15,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":16,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":17,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":18,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":20,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":21,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":22,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":23,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":24,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":28,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":30,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":32,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":35,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":66,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":67,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":134,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":297,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2532,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2578,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3163,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3511,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3577,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3848,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":27857,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-03-04 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-03-04","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:34:28"}