{"id":"court_ctb_4205_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4205,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-03-11","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT | IN RE: KWOK,<br>Debtors                        | )<br>)","summary_zh":"判决备忘录 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #4205（2025-03-11立案）。美国联邦地区法院作出判决，维持破产法院要求 G Club Operations, LLC 依据受托人与 HCHK 公司的和解协议向受托人移交文件的裁定，认定 G-Club 依据《主服务协议》未能证明该批文件享有律师-委托人特权或未被弃权。","summary_en":"Memorandum of Decision — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB Case No. 22-50073, ECF #4205 (Filed 2025-03-11). The U.S. District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's order requiring G Club Operations, LLC to turn over documents to the Chapter 11 Trustee pursuant to a settlement with HCHK Technologies, Inc.'s assignee, holding that G-Club failed to establish attorney-client privilege or overcome waiver under the parties' Master Services Agreement.","body_en":"### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| IN RE: KWOK,<br>Debtors                        | )<br>)           |\n|------------------------------------------------|------------------|\n|                                                | )<br>)           |\n| G CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC,<br>Appellant,          | )<br>)<br>)<br>) |\n| v.                                             | )<br>)           |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>Ch. 11<br>Trustee-Appellee. | )<br>)<br>)      |\n|                                                | )                |\n\nBANKR. NO. 22-50073 (JAM) *Chapter 11*\n\nADV. PRO. NO. 23-5013\n\nCIVIL NO. 3:23-CV-1514 (KAD)\n\nMARCH 11, 2025\n\n### **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION**\n\nKari A. Dooley, United States District Judge:\n\nG-Club Operations (\"Appellant\" or \"G-Club\") challenges the order of the Bankruptcy Court finding that G-Club did not meet its burden of establishing that G-Club's documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege insofar as any such privilege was waived, and ordering the turnover of such documents pursuant to the Trustee's settlement agreement with the Assignee of HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK\") in the underlying adversary proceeding (hereinafter, the \"G-Club Documents Order\").<sup>1</sup> *See Luc A. Despins, Ch. 11 Trustee v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.*, No. 23-ap-5013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2023), ECF No. 179. For the reasons set forth below, G-Club's appeal is subject to **DISMISSAL** because the G-Club Documents Order is a non-final, interlocutory order for which leave to appeal was neither sought nor granted.\n\n<sup>1</sup> G-Club filed a Notice of Appeal in both the underlying Adversary Proceeding, as well as the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding of Debtor Ho Wan Kwok, *In re Kwok*, No. 22-bk-50073 (the \"Main Case\"). On January 2, 2024, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Court consolidated the two appeals under Case No. 3:23-cv-1514. *See* ECF No. 17.\n\nNevertheless, the appeal of the G-Club Documents Order, having been considered on the merits,\n\n### is **AFFIRMED**.\n\n### **Facts and Procedural History**\n\n The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and repeats only those necessary for deciding the instant appeal.\n\n### HCHK, G-Club, and the Master Services Agreement\n\nG-Club is an alleged shell company of the Debtor, and one of the various \"G-Series\" entities functionally owned and controlled by the Debtor. HCHK is a technology and consulting firm providing strategic solutions and a wide range of \"a la carte\" consulting services across numerous business sectors.<sup>2</sup> On July 30, 2021, G-Club entered into a Master Services Agreement (the \"MSA\") with HCHK. Under the terms of the MSA, HCHK provided the following services to G-Club: (a) accounting, audit, and tax services; (b) treasury, finance, and risk management services; (c) human resources and payroll services; (d) legal services; (e) information technology support services; and (f) engineering, design, and software development services.\n\nAs a general matter, the MSA contemplates that HCHK may use G-Club's documents in the course of providing the foregoing services.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the MSA specifically states that G-Club \"will make available in a timely manner for [HCHK's] use, at no charge to [HCHK], all personnel, technical data, computer files, programs, files, documentation, test data, sample output, or other information, and resources required by [HCHK] as set forth in the applicable document for the\n\n<sup>2</sup> G-Club disputes the Bankruptcy Court's characterization of HCHK's services as \"a la carte.\" But as observed by the Trustee, HCHK itself, as well as its Assignee, have described the firm's wide-ranging services as \"a la carte.\" *See* Appellant Br., ECF No. 26, at 13 n.13.\n\n<sup>3</sup> G-Club argues that it provided documents to HCHK on a strictly confidential basis purely for cloud-based storage purposes, and not for HCHK to access/use the documents to perform its services to G-Club as set forth in the MSA. As set forth below, the Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument, and correctly so, insofar as the argument conflicts with the plain language of the MSA and was not supported by any evidence.\n\nperformance of Services.\" The MSA further provides, *inter alia*, that HCHK (as the \"Receiving Party\") may access and use G-Club's documents/information (as the \"Disclosing Party\") \"for the purposes of performing its obligations and exercising its rights under the [MSA],\" and may disclose G-Club documents \"if . . . required by law to make any disclosure,\" as long as HCHK first provides an opportunity to G-Club to seek a protective order or other appropriate relief.\n\n#### The Adversary Proceeding\n\nOn December 6, 2022, in the Main Case, the Trustee served a Rule 2004 subpoena on G-Club seeking the production of documents in its possession regarding the Debtor (the \"G-Club Subpoena\").<sup>4</sup> On December 7, 2022, the Trustee served a Rule 2004 subpoena on HCHK (the \"HCHK Subpoena\"). On April 20, 2023, HCHK executed a Deed of Assignment purporting to assign all of its assets to Brian W. Hofmeister as Assignee (the \"Assignee\") for the benefit of HCHK's creditors. On April 25, 2023, the Deed of Assignment was filed in New York state court (the \"Assignment Proceedings\").\n\nOn June 8, 2023, the Trustee filed the underlying adversary proceeding against, *inter alia*, HCHK<sup>5</sup> (the \"Adversary Proceeding\"), principally alleging that HCHK is the Debtor's alter ego. Through the Adversary Proceeding, the Trustee also sought to enjoin the commencement or continuation of the Assignment Proceedings, as well as the transfer or use of HCHK's assets and/or ownership interests. To that end, the Trustee filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (\"TRO\") against the continuation of the Assignment Proceedings. On June 12,\n\n<sup>4</sup> Thereafter, a dispute arose in the Main Case concerning G-Club's compliance with the Rule 2004 subpoena. That dispute is separate and distinct from the instant appeal, and is not addressed herein.\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Adversary Proceeding was commenced against HCHK, HCHK Property Management, Inc., Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc., Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD., Anthony DiBattista, and Yvette Wang (collectively, the \"HCHK Entities\"), as well as the Assignee.\n\n2023, the Bankruptcy Court granted the TRO in part and, *inter alia*, restrained the Assignment Proceedings. G-Club is not, and has never been, a defendant in the Adversary Proceeding.\n\n### The Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement\n\nFollowing entry of the TRO in the Adversary Proceeding, the Trustee and the Assignee reached a settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement\"). Pursuant to the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement, the Assignee agreed, *inter alia*, to turn over corporate documents from HCHK that would otherwise have been sought by the Trustee through discovery in the Adversary Proceeding. On June 23, 2023, the Trustee filed a motion seeking the entry of a proposed order approving the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement (the \"Settlement Motion\").\n\n#### G-Club's Challenge to the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement\n\nOn July 5, 2023, G-Club filed objections to the Settlement Motion and the initial proposed order. Specifically, G-Club asserted that, by virtue of the MSA, HCHK was in possession of confidential G-Club documents which should be returned to G-Club before being turned over to the Trustee as part of the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement, so that G-Club could evaluate the documents for their responsiveness to the G-Club Subpoena issued in the Main Case. Following a hearing, the Trustee submitted a revised proposed order related to the Settlement Motion (the \"Revised Proposed Order\"), which would have resolved the confidentiality issues raised by G-Club in its objection. Notwithstanding, G-Club objected to the Revised Proposed Order, asserting the same argument regarding their review of the records for responsiveness and, for the first time, asserted that G-Club should also be permitted to review the documents for attorney-client privilege. In response, the Trustee argued, *inter alia,* that by providing documents to HCHK, G-\n\nClub had waived all privilege as to those documents which had by then been turned over to the Assignee and were to be turned over to the Trustee as part of the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement.\n\nOn July 28, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting the Settlement Motion and approving the settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee (the \"Order Approving Settlement\"). Paragraph 6 of the Order Approving Settlement, *inter alia*, addressed G-Club's remaining objections to the Settlement Motion and set a briefing schedule whereby the Trustee and G-Club would contest whether, prior to the documents being produced to the Trustee, G-Club had the right to review G-Club documents in the possession of the Assignee for responsiveness to the G-Club Subpoena and for privilege.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, on August 11, 2023, the Trustee filed a memorandum arguing that G-Club did not have any right to review the documents for either responsiveness or privilege. On September 29, 2023, G-Club filed a response to the Trustee's memorandum, and on October 24, 2023, a hearing was held in the Bankruptcy Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court took the matter under advisement.\n\n#### The G-Club Documents Order\n\nOn November 13, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued the G-Club Documents Order, which overruled G-Club's remaining objections to the Settlement Motion and instructed that on or before November 17, 2023: (1) \"G-Club shall make available to the Trustee all documents provided to G-Club by the Assignee in accordance with paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement\"; and (2) \"the Assignee shall make available to the Trustee all copies retained by the Assignee of documents provided to G-Club by the Assignee in accordance with paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement.\" The Bankruptcy Court concluded that G-Club was not entitled to review\n\n<sup>6</sup> The G-Club Documents Order makes clear that paragraph 6 of the Order Approving Settlement did not decide the issues in G-Club's favor, but rather, \"reserved the [privilege waiver] issues while providing a mechanism for discovery to continue pending a determination of the issues presently before the [Bankruptcy] Court.\" To the extent G-Club argues to the contrary, such arguments were specious when raised in the Bankruptcy Court, and are specious on appeal.\n\nthe G-Club documents for their responsiveness to the G-Club Subpoena before their disclosure to the Trustee, and concluded that G-Club had not met its burden of establishing that the attorneyclient privilege applied to any of the documents. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court determined that G-Club waived all privilege in its documents when it entered the MSA, through which its records and documents were made available to HCHK. The Court also rejected G-Club's argument that the Trustee had the burden of proving that HCHK actually accessed G-Club's documents, as opposed to merely having the ability to do so by hosting the documents on a cloudbased server, in demonstrating waiver of the privilege.\n\nThe G-Club Documents Order further ordered that \"all documents produced to the Trustee pursuant to [the G-Club Documents Order] shall be considered documents designated as 'confidential' and subject to the protective order entered as ECF No. 923 in the [Main Case].\"\n\nOn November 15, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court denied G-Club's Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. That same day, G-Club filed the instant Notice of Appeal as to the G-Club Documents Order.<sup>7</sup>\n\n### **Standard of Review**\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), which provides in relevant part that \"[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals . . . from final judgment, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges.\" *Salim v. VW Credit, Inc.*, 577 B.R. 615, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). \"A district court may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, or decree or remand\n\n<sup>7</sup> Although the Bankruptcy Court concluded that \"the Assignee may produce G-Club's documents without such documents being subject to G-Club's review for responsiveness to the G-Club Subpoena,\" this aspect of the Order was not appealed. Only the Bankruptcy Court's determination that G-Club waived its privilege in the documents provided to HCHK is appealed herein. The Court does not therefore further address the Bankruptcy Court's determination regarding G-Club's responsiveness argument.\n\nwith instructions for further proceedings.\" *Margulies v. Hough (In re Margulies)*, 566 B.R. 318, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted).\n\n\"Matters left to the [bankruptcy] court's discretion are reviewed for abuse of discretion.\" *In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.*, 342 B.R. 122, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its ruling \"on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or render[s] a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.\" *In re Sims*, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); *see also Stasko v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.)*, No. 10-CV-4322 (JGK), 2011 WL 2462773, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2011) (\"[a] ruling is an abuse of discretion only if the bankruptcy court bases its ruling on a mistaken application of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.\") (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). \"The bankruptcy court's discovery rulings 'are reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.'\" *In re MF Glob. Inc.*, 505 B.R. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting *DG Creditor Corp. v. Dabah (In re DG Acquisition Corp.)*, 151 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998)).\n\n#### **Discussion**\n\nG-Club now appeals, in part, the G-Club Documents Order. Specifically, G-Club argues that: (1) the G-Club Documents Order was a final, appealable order, and not a \"discovery order\"; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that G-Club had waived its attorney-client privilege. In response, the Trustee asserts that (a) the G-Club Documents Order is an interlocutory discovery order not appealable as of right; and (b) to the extent this Court considers the merits of G-Club's appeal, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that G-Club had not met its burden of establishing privilege with respect to the G-Club documents. The Court\n\nagrees with the Trustee, and concludes that the G-Club Documents Order is not a final, appealable order, but even if construed as such, *see infra* at 10, it must be affirmed because the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in entering the G-Club Documents Order.\n\n### Final Order\n\nAs a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether the G-Club Documents Order is a final, appealable order. G-Club argues that the G-Club Documents Order—which it characterizes as a \"contractual interpretation impacting G-Club's rights\"—is not a discovery order and thus, is final. As to the merits, G-Club rehashes the arguments rejected by the Bankruptcy Court, and asserts, *inter alia*, that the Bankruptcy Court erroneously \"endorsed\" the Trustee's improper effort to satisfy the HCHK Subpoena \"through a settlement of the Adversary [Proceeding] by ignoring G Club's rights.\" Neither of these arguments addresses the actual legal issues raised and decided in the Bankruptcy Court. As such, this Court is not persuaded.\n\nBankruptcy court orders are considered final and therefore appealable as of right only when they \"finally dispose of *discrete disputes within the larger case*.\" *Shimer v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.)*, 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original). A discrete dispute \"means at least an entire claim on which relief may be granted.\" *Id.* at 775–76. \"Courts have routinely found that bankruptcy court orders granting or denying discovery . . . are not final for the purposes of an appeal to a district court.\" *Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Brandt for CFG Peru Invs. Pte. Ltd. (Singapore)*, No. 17-CV-6672 (VEC), 2017 WL 6729191, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2017). Indeed, such discovery orders \"do not finally dispose of an entire claim on which relief may be granted, and therefore are generally treated as interlocutory and not appealable as of right.\" *In re Towers Fin. Corp.*, 164 B.R. 719, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); *see also In re Celsius Network LLC*, No. 23-CV-523 (JPO), 2023 WL 2648169, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023).\n\nHere, though the G-Club Documents Order does not invoke Rule 26 or otherwise raise common discovery issues involving, *e.g.*, requests for production or interrogatories, it nevertheless resolves a dispute over a document review for responsiveness, the assertion of attorney-client privilege in an effort to withhold production, and the timing and process for the production of documents as contemplated under the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement. It is therefore very much a \"discovery order\" for purposes of evaluating its appealability. Moreover—and crucially—the G-Club Documents Order does not finally dispose of any claim upon which relief might be granted. *See In re Towers*, 164 B.R. at 720. It resolves only these various issues associated with the production of documents to the Trustee, in connection with the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement. G-Club emphasizes however, that the G-Club Documents Order \"resolved all open issues between the Trustee and HCHK in the HCHK Adversary Proceeding,\" and brought an end to that litigation. As a factual matter, G-Club is incorrect. Following entry of the Order Approving Settlement and the ensuing G-Club Documents Order, the Adversary Proceeding was, at most, only finally resolved as between the Trustee and the Assignee. The litigation continued as to the remaining HCHK Entities, *see supra* n.5, and eventually resolved via a default judgment against those additional Defendants.<sup>8</sup>\n\nG-Club appears to conflate the G-Club Documents Order with the Order Approving Settlement, which did resolve the Adversary Proceeding as between the Trustee and the Assignee and would have been a final appealable order.<sup>9</sup> *See In re Purdue Pharma L.P.*, 724 F. Supp. 3d 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (\"a bankruptcy court order approving a settlement is a final order.\")\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Bankruptcy Court's denial of the HCHK Entities' Motion to Vacate Entry of Default, as well as its subsequent Default Judgment against the HCHK Entities, were the subject of a different appeal to this Court. *See In re Kwok*, No. 3:24-cv-335. That appeal was dismissed on October 24, 2024 pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, due to the HCHK Entities' failure to prosecute. *See id.* at ECF No. 25.\n\n<sup>9</sup> The Court observes that the Order Approving Settlement was appealed, but not by G-Club. *See In re Kwok*, No. 3:23-cv-1067. Such appeal was dismissed via stipulation on August 29, 2024. *See id.* at ECF No. 50.\n\n(citing *In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.*, 439 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2006) (approval of Rule 9019 settlement \"that brings to an end litigation between parties is a final order\")). And as G-Club itself recognizes, the G-Club Documents Order did no more than \"finally determine[] the Assignee's right to transfer G Club's corporate records to the Trustee\" pursuant to the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement, by concluding that G-Club had waived its privilege over those records. This is the sort of ancillary discovery issue that courts routinely find to be interlocutory. *See In re Towers*, 164 B.R. at 720 (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court finds that the G-Club Documents Order is a non-final, interlocutory order that is not appealable absent leave of the Court.10 As such, this appeal is subject to dismissal.\n\n#### The G-Club Documents Order\n\nDespite this Court's determination that G-Club Documents Order is not appealable as of right, under the circumstances, the Court will address the merits of the appeal. As G-Club correctly observes, the G-Club Documents Order did serve as a final determination of all issues impacting G-Club in the Adversary Proceeding. G-Club was not named as a party or otherwise involved in the remaining issues being litigated. And although G-Club appealed only the Bankruptcy Court's decision on the issue of privilege waiver, the Court acknowledges the unique procedural circumstances presented here. The G-Club Documents Order, although coming subsequent in time, directly impacts the scope and execution of the Order Approving Settlement, which, as discussed above, is a final appealable order. Thus, given the inter-related nature of, and the close nexus between, the G-Club Documents Order and the Order Approving Settlement, the Court\n\n<sup>10</sup> G-Club has not argued, in the alternative, that this Court should grant leave to file an interlocutory appeal under the standards applicable to such requests. *See Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (leave to appeal interlocutory order may be granted where \"the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation\").\n\nelects to review the merits of G-Club's appeal in the alternative. Having done so, the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion, and that therefore, the G-Club Documents Order must be affirmed.\n\n### *Standard of Review*\n\n G-Club first asserts that the appropriate standard of review is *de novo*. The Court disagrees. To be sure, a mixed question of law and fact is reviewed *de novo*. *In re Vebeliunas*, 332 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). But a court's finding of waiver of the attorney-client privilege generally presents no such mixed question, and indeed, such findings are consistently reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *See Schaeffler v. United States*, 806 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2015) (\"We review the district court's finding of waiver of the attorney-client privilege for abuse of discretion.\") (citing *In re Grand Jury Proceedings*, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000)). The Court finds *United States v. Mejia* instructive. 655 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011). There, the Second Circuit acknowledged the well-settled principle that rulings on claims of attorney-client privilege are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but further observed that \"[t]here are, however, occasions where the attorney-client privilege raises a question of law, which [is] review[ed] *de novo*.\" *See id.* at 131. But in *Mejia*, as here, the issue was simply whether the privilege applied to the subject communications. *Id.* In other words, \"the question involve[d] the application of the attorneyclient privilege as our case law has already developed it to the novel set of facts before us; it d[id] not require us to address the scope of the privilege itself in a novel way.\" *Id.*\n\nIn seeking *de novo* review, G-Club exaggerates the nature and scope of the G-Club Documents Order, which merely concluded that G-Club had not met its burden to establish that the attorney-client privilege applied to the documents in question, and that therefore, those documents could be turned over to the Trustee in accordance with the Rule 9019 Settlement\n\nAgreement reached in the Adversary Proceeding.11 Indeed, the narrow question on appeal involves a straightforward application of the attorney-client privilege to the novel set of facts presented; it does not compel an evaluation as to \"the scope of the privilege itself in a novel way.\" *Mejia*, 655 F.3d at 131.\n\nAdditionally, G-Club relies heavily on the Bankruptcy Court's citation to the terms of the MSA, arguing that \"the Bankruptcy Court's finding of a waiver here was premised on its legal interpretation of the effect of the [MSA].\" Appellee Reply Br., ECF No. 29 at 15. But once again, G-Club mischaracterizes the G-Club Documents Order. The Bankruptcy Court's conclusion was an evidence-based assessment, not a matter of contract interpretation. In concluding only that G-Club had not met its burden of establishing that the attorney-client privilege applied, the Bankruptcy Court primarily: (a) emphasized G-Club's failure to provide *any evidence* supporting its assertion that HCHK was merely hosting the G-Club documents on a cloud-based server; and (b) cited the plain language of the MSA—which made clear that HCHK would have access to and could use G-Club's documents—as evidence contradicting and defeating G-Club's otherwise unsupported assertion.\n\nAccordingly, the G-Club Documents Order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.\n\n### *Waiver of Privilege*\n\nTurning to the merits, G-Club argues that the G-Club Documents Order is erroneous, because there is no evidence that HCHK accessed the contents of G-Club's documents, and \"G-Club did not waive any privilege in its documents by providing HCHK administrative rights as part of providing cloud-based email services.\" In response, the Trustee argues that G-Club has\n\n<sup>11</sup> In support of its argument, G-Club relies on *Krys v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP (In re China Med. Techs., Inc.)*, 539 B.R. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). But as argued by the Trustee, that case is inapposite. Here, this Court is reviewing the Bankruptcy Court's affirmative finding that G-Club's privilege was in fact waived, as opposed to a determination of who owned the privilege in the first instance. *See, e.g.*, *id.*\n\nshirked its burden as the party claiming privilege and that, in fact, G-Club waived its privilege by permitting HCHK to indiscriminately access G-Club documents under the MSA.12 The Court agrees with the Trustee.\n\nThe party asserting the attorney-client privilege bears the burden of establishing that the communications to be protected are \"communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.\" *Mejia*, 655 F.3d at 132; *Harnage v. Kenny*, No. 3:19-CV-938 (SDV), 2022 WL 2046140, at \\*3 (D. Conn. June 7, 2022) (\"The party asserting the privilege bears the burden of establishing its elements.\") (citing *In re County of Erie*, 473 F.3d 413, 418 (2d Cir. 2007)). It is well-settled that the attorney-client privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of the communication to a third party or stranger to the attorney-client relationship. *Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp*, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).\n\nHere, there was no dispute in the Bankruptcy Court or on appeal as to whether the G-Club documents had been provided to HCHK by G-Club and were in the possession of HCHK as a result. Indeed, G-Club sought to challenge the Settlement Motion because it contemplated further disclosure by HCHK of G-Club's documents. It was G-Club's burden to prove that its documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege. *See Mejia*, 655 F.3d at 132. Yet, G-Club failed to even acknowledge this burden, much less satisfy it. Instead, G-Club has consistently maintained\n\n<sup>12</sup> G-Club further asserts that HCHK lacked authority under the MSA to assign G-Club's data to the Assignee. Because the Court is affirming the Bankruptcy Court's privilege waiver determination on the basis of G-Club's disclosure of its data to HCHK pursuant to the MSA, it need not address the parties' alternative arguments regarding G-Club's purported failure to timely object to the subsequent Assignment Proceedings and/or the related proposed sale of HCHK to G-News Operations. Nevertheless, HCHK's assignment of G-Club's data is immaterial to the Bankruptcy Court's privilege waiver finding, which was principally premised on G-Club's disclosure of documents to HCHK in the first instance. And as observed *supra*, G-Club does not herein challenge the Order Approving Settlement.\n\nthat its contractual relationship with HCHK under the MSA is analogous to the relationship between Microsoft or Google and their consumers' use of cloud-based document hosting services. To that tend, G-Club urges that the MSA contemplated HCHK's mere \"administrative\" access to G-Club documents \"as part of providing cloud-based email services,\" and further asserts that there is no evidence of HCHK accessing the contents of any G-Club documents. But G-Club—the party asserting privilege and thus, bearing the burden of proof—has wholly failed to provide any support for such a narrow reading of the MSA. Nor has G-Club provided any evidence that its normal course of dealing with HCHK under the MSA was for HCHK to simply \"provide[] and maintain[] G Club's cloud-based email system.\" In fact, as accurately observed by the Trustee, \"nowhere does the MSA mention cloud-based services or otherwise define the scope of the information technology services provided by HCHK to G Club.\" As properly observed by the Bankruptcy Court, G-Club's naked assertions as to the services contemplated and provided under the MSA are completely belied by the plain language of the MSA. For substantially those reasons, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that G-Club had not met its burden of establishing that the attorneyclient privilege applied to the documents that G-Club had itself turned over to HCHK, a third party to any purported privileged communications contained in the documents. In support of this determination, the Bankruptcy Court emphasized the plain language of the MSA, which states that HCHK will provide a wide range of services to G-Club, and that HCHK will have access to and may use G-Club's documents in the course of providing those services.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court's well-reasoned and factually supported finding was not an abuse of its discretion. G-Club clearly failed to meet its burden of establishing that the attorney-client privilege applied, *i.e.*, was not waived, particularly when considered within the context of the plain\n\nmeaning of MSA, and the complete absence of evidence supporting G-Club's tortured argument.\n\nAccordingly, the G-Club Documents Order is **AFFIRMED**. 13\n\n### **Conclusion**\n\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor\n\nof the Trustee and close this case.\n\n**SO ORDERED** at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 11th day of March 2025.\n\n */s/ Kari A. Dooley*  KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE\n\n<sup>13</sup> G-Club further challenges the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that any harm resulting from the disclosure of the G-Club documents to the Trustee could be remedied by clawing back privileged documents pursuant to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable in the Adversary Proceeding by Rule 7026 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy. Specifically, G-Club argues that because the \"wholesale turnover\" of G-Club's data was not limited in scope or proportionality, reviewing the entire universe of G-Club data would be \"unduly burdensome, costly, and simply unnecessary.\" Ironically, it is this very \"unduly burdensome, costly, and simply unnecessary\" review of the documents that G-Club appears to have advocated for in the Bankruptcy Court—not only for responsiveness, but also privilege. In any event, this determination by the Bankruptcy Court was made in the Court's denial of G-Club's Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, which is not the subject of the instant appeal and is not further addressed herein.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院\n\n关于：KWOK（郭文贵）\n债务人\n)\n)\n\n)\n)\nG CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC（G Club运营有限责任公司），\n上诉人，\n)\n)\n)\n)\n诉\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），\n第11章\n受托人—被上诉人。\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n破产案号 22-50073 (JAM) 第11章\n\n对抗程序案号 23-5013\n\n民事案号 3:23-CV-1514 (KAD)\n\n2025年3月11日\n裁决备忘录\n\n美国联邦地区法官 Kari A. Dooley（卡丽·A·杜利）：\n\nG-Club Operations（以下简称“上诉人”或“G-Club”）对破产法院作出的命令提出异议。该命令认定，G-Club未能履行其举证责任，证明G-Club的文件受律师—当事人保密特权保护，因为任何该等特权均已被放弃；并命令根据受托人与HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司，以下简称“HCHK”）的受让人在基础对抗程序中达成的和解协议，移交该等文件（以下简称“G-Club文件命令”）。1 见 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章受托人诉 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）等，No. 23-ap-5013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2023), ECF No. 179。基于下述理由，G-Club的上诉应予驳回，因为G-Club文件命令属于非终局性的中间命令，既未申请也未获准对其提起上诉。\n\n1 G-Club既在基础对抗程序中，也在债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）的第11章破产程序 In re Kwok, No. 22-bk-50073（以下简称“主案”）中提交了上诉通知。2024年1月2日，根据各方当事人的约定，本院将两项上诉合并至案号 3:23-cv-1514。见 ECF No. 17。\n\n然而，经就实体问题审理，G-Club文件命令的上诉予以维持。\n\n事实与程序经过\n\n本院推定各方当事人熟悉基础事实，仅重述裁决本次上诉所必需的事实。\n\nHCHK、G-Club及主服务协议\n\nG-Club是被指称为债务人的空壳公司，也是由债务人在实质上拥有和控制的各种“G系列”实体之一。HCHK是一家技术与咨询公司，在众多商业领域提供战略解决方案及广泛的“单点式”咨询服务。2 2021年7月30日，G-Club与HCHK签订了一份主服务协议（以下简称“MSA”）。根据MSA条款，HCHK向G-Club提供如下服务：(a) 会计、审计和税务服务；(b) 资金管理、财务和风险管理服务；(c) 人力资源和薪酬服务；(d) 法律服务；(e) 信息技术支持服务；以及 (f) 工程、设计和软件开发服务。\n\n一般而言，MSA设想HCHK可在提供前述服务过程中使用G-Club的文件。3 事实上，MSA明确规定，G-Club“将及时向[HCHK]提供，供其使用，且不向[HCHK]收费，[HCHK]为履行服务所需的全部人员、技术数据、计算机文件、程序、文件、文档、测试数据、样本输出或其他信息及资源，具体如适用服务文件所规定。”\n\n2 G-Club对破产法院将HCHK的服务描述为“单点式”提出异议。但正如受托人所指出，HCHK本身及其受让人均将该公司广泛的服务描述为“单点式”。见上诉人陈述，ECF No. 26，第13页脚注13。\n\n3 G-Club主张，其仅为基于云端的存储目的，且严格保密地向HCHK提供文件，并非供HCHK访问或使用该等文件以履行MSA所规定的向G-Club提供的服务。如后文所述，破产法院驳回了该主张，且驳回正确，因为该主张与MSA的明确文字相冲突，也没有任何证据支持。\n\nMSA还规定，除其他事项外，HCHK作为“接收方”，可为“履行其在[MSA]项下的义务及行使其权利”之目的，访问和使用G-Club作为“披露方”的文件／信息；且只要HCHK先给予G-Club寻求保护令或其他适当救济的机会，HCHK即可在“……法律要求作出任何披露”时披露G-Club文件。\n\n对抗程序\n\n2022年12月6日，在主案中，受托人向G-Club送达了根据规则2004发出的传票，要求其提交其占有的有关债务人的文件（以下简称“G-Club传票”）。4 2022年12月7日，受托人向HCHK送达了根据规则2004发出的传票（以下简称“HCHK传票”）。2023年4月20日，HCHK签署了一份转让契约，声称为HCHK债权人的利益，将其全部资产转让给作为受让人的 Brian W. Hofmeister（布赖恩·W·霍夫迈斯特，以下简称“受让人”）。2023年4月25日，该转让契约在纽约州法院提交备案（以下简称“转让程序”）。\n\n2023年6月8日，受托人对包括HCHK在内的主体提起了基础对抗程序5（以下简称“对抗程序”），主要主张HCHK是债务人的另一个自我。受托人还通过对抗程序寻求禁止启动或继续进行转让程序，以及禁止转让或使用HCHK的资产和／或所有权权益。为此，受托人就继续进行转让程序提出紧急临时限制令动议（以下简称“TRO”）。2023年6月12日，\n\n4 此后，主案中就G-Club遵守规则2004传票的问题产生争议。该争议与本次上诉相互独立且有别，本裁决不予处理。\n\n5 对抗程序系针对HCHK、HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）、Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人力资源公司）、Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD.（圣城香港创投有限公司）、Anthony DiBattista（安东尼·迪巴蒂斯塔）和Yvette Wang（王月芳）（合称“HCHK实体”），以及受让人提起。\n\n破产法院部分准许了临时限制令，并且除其他事项外，限制转让程序。G-Club不是且从未是对抗程序中的被告。\n\n规则9019和解协议\n\n在对抗程序中作出临时限制令后，受托人与受让人根据《联邦破产程序规则》规则9019达成和解协议（以下简称“规则9019和解协议”）。根据规则9019和解协议，受让人同意，除其他事项外，移交HCHK的公司文件；若非如此，受托人将通过对抗程序中的证据开示寻求取得该等文件。2023年6月23日，受托人提出动议，请求作出拟议命令以批准规则9019和解协议（以下简称“和解动议”）。\n\nG-Club对规则9019和解协议的异议\n\n2023年7月5日，G-Club对和解动议及最初的拟议命令提出异议。具体而言，G-Club主张，根据MSA，HCHK占有G-Club的保密文件；在作为规则9019和解协议的一部分移交给受托人之前，该等文件应返还给G-Club，以便G-Club可评估该等文件是否回应主案中发出的G-Club传票。经听证后，受托人提交了与和解动议有关的修订拟议命令（以下简称“修订拟议命令”），该命令本可解决G-Club在其异议中提出的保密问题。尽管如此，G-Club仍对修订拟议命令提出异议，再次主张其有权审查记录是否具有回应性，并首次主张G-Club还应获准审查文件是否受律师—当事人保密特权保护。作为回应，受托人主张，除其他事项外，G-Club向HCHK提供文件，即已放弃对该等文件的一切特权；该等文件当时已移交受让人，并将作为规则9019和解协议的一部分移交给受托人。\n\n2023年7月28日，破产法院作出命令，准许和解动议并批准受托人与受让人之间的和解（以下简称“批准和解命令”）。批准和解命令第6段除其他事项外，处理了G-Club对和解动议的其余异议，并制定了书面陈述时间表，受托人与G-Club将据此争议：在文件提交给受托人之前，G-Club是否有权审查受让人占有的G-Club文件，以确定其是否回应G-Club传票以及是否受特权保护。6 因此，2023年8月11日，受托人提交了一份备忘录，主张G-Club无权基于回应性或特权审查文件。2023年9月29日，G-Club对受托人的备忘录提交了答复；2023年10月24日，破产法院举行听证。听证结束时，破产法院将该事项留待裁定。\n\nG-Club文件命令\n\n2023年11月13日，破产法院作出G-Club文件命令，驳回G-Club对和解动议的其余异议，并指示最迟于2023年11月17日：(1) “G-Club应向受托人提供受让人依照批准和解命令第6(a)段向G-Club提供的所有文件”；以及 (2) “受让人应向受托人提供其保留的所有副本，该等副本系受让人依照批准和解命令第6(a)段向G-Club提供的文件。”破产法院认定，在向受托人披露G-Club文件前，G-Club无权审查该等文件是否回应G-Club传票；并认定G-Club未能履行其举证责任，证明任何文件适用律师—当事人保密特权。具体而言，破产法院认定，G-Club在签订MSA时放弃了其文件中的一切特权，因为其记录和文件藉由该协议可供HCHK使用。本院还驳回G-Club的主张，即受托人负有举证责任，证明HCHK实际上访问过G-Club的文件，而非仅证明HCHK通过在云端服务器托管文件而有能力访问该等文件，以证明特权已被放弃。\n\n6 G-Club文件命令明确表明，批准和解命令第6段并未作出有利于G-Club的裁定，而是“保留了[特权放弃]问题，同时提供一种机制，使证据开示可在等待对目前提交至[破产]法院的问题作出裁定期间继续进行。”即使G-Club提出相反主张，该等主张在破产法院提出时即属站不住脚，在上诉中亦属站不住脚。\n\nG-Club文件命令还命令：“根据[G-Club文件命令]向受托人提交的所有文件，均应视为被指定为‘保密’的文件，并受主案中以 ECF No. 923 作出的保护令约束。”\n\n2023年11月15日，破产法院驳回G-Club的待上诉期间中止执行动议。同日，G-Club就G-Club文件命令提交本次上诉通知。7\n\n审查标准\n\n本院根据28 U.S.C. § 158(a)对破产法院裁决的上诉享有管辖权。该条相关部分规定：“美国地区法院有管辖权审理……对破产法官作出的终局判决书、命令和裁定……提起的上诉。”Salim v. VW Credit, Inc., 577 B.R. 615, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)。“地区法院可以维持、修改或撤销破产法官的判决书、命令或裁定，或者发回重审\n\n7 尽管破产法院认定，“受让人可以提交 G-Club 的文件，而该等文件无需由 G-Club 审查其是否对 G-Club 传票具有响应性”，但该《裁定》的这一方面未被上诉。本案仅上诉破产法院关于 G-Club 就提供给 HCHK 的文件放弃其特权的认定。因此，本院不再进一步处理破产法院关于 G-Club 响应性主张的认定。\n\n“并附有进一步程序的指示。”Margulies v. Hough (In re Margulies), 566 B.R. 318, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)（引文略）。\n\n“留待[破产]法院酌情决定的事项，应按酌处权滥用标准审查。”In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 342 B.R. 122, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)（内部引号略）。地区法院如基于“对法律的错误理解，或对证据的明显错误评估，或者作出无法归入可允许决定范围内的决定”，即构成酌处权滥用。In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)（引文及内部引号略）；另见 Stasko v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), No. 10-CV-4322 (JGK), 2011 WL 2462773, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2011)（“仅当破产法院基于对法律的错误适用或明显错误的事实认定作出裁定时，该裁定才构成酌处权滥用。”）（引文及内部引号略）。“破产法院关于证据开示的裁定‘仅在明确显示存在酌处权滥用时才予以撤销。’”In re MF Glob. Inc., 505 B.R. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（引自 DG Creditor Corp. v. Dabah (In re DG Acquisition Corp.), 151 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998)）。\n\n讨论\n\nG-Club 现对《G-Club 文件裁定》部分提出上诉。具体而言，G-Club 主张：(1)《G-Club 文件裁定》是终局且可上诉的裁定，而非“证据开示裁定”；以及 (2) 破产法院错误认定 G-Club 已放弃其律师—当事人特权。作为回应，受托人主张：(a)《G-Club 文件裁定》是一项中间证据开示裁定，依法不可上诉；以及 (b) 即使本院审查 G-Club 上诉的实体问题，破产法院认定 G-Club 未就 G-Club 文件履行其确立特权的举证责任，也未构成酌处权滥用。本院同意受托人的意见，并认定《G-Club 文件裁定》并非终局且可上诉的裁定；但即使将其如此解释，见下文第 10 页，亦必须予以维持，因为破产法院作出《G-Club 文件裁定》并未滥用其酌处权。\n\n终局裁定\n\n作为门槛问题，本院必须确定《G-Club 文件裁定》是否为终局且可上诉的裁定。G-Club 主张，其所称的“影响 G-Club 权利的合同解释”《G-Club 文件裁定》并非证据开示裁定，因此是终局裁定。就实体问题而言，G-Club 重述了破产法院已经驳回的论点，并主张，其中包括，破产法院错误地“认可”了受托人通过“在无视 G Club 权利的情况下和解对抗性[程序]”来满足 HCHK 传票的不当努力。这两项论点均未涉及在破产法院中提出并裁决的实际法律问题。因此，本院不予采信。\n\n仅当破产法院裁定“最终处置了较大案件中的独立争议”时，该裁定才被视为终局裁定，因而可依法上诉。Shimer v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1992)（原文强调）。独立争议“至少是指一项可以获得救济的完整请求权。”Id. at 775–76。“法院一贯认定，破产法院准许或驳回证据开示的裁定……就向地区法院上诉而言并非终局裁定。”Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Brandt for CFG Peru Invs. Pte. Ltd. (Singapore), No. 17-CV-6672 (VEC), 2017 WL 6729191, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2017)。事实上，此类证据开示裁定“并未最终处置任何可获救济的完整请求权，因此通常被视为中间裁定，且不能依法上诉。”In re Towers Fin. Corp., 164 B.R. 719, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)；另见 In re Celsius Network LLC, No. 23-CV-523 (JPO), 2023 WL 2648169, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023)。\n\n本案中，尽管《G-Club 文件裁定》未援引 Rule 26，亦未以其他方式提出诸如文件提交请求或书面质询等常见证据开示问题，但其仍裁决了关于文件审查是否具有响应性的争议、为拒绝提交而主张律师—当事人特权的问题，以及 Rule 9019 和解协议所设想的文件提交时间和程序。因此，就评估其可上诉性而言，该裁定确属“证据开示裁定”。此外——且至关重要的是——《G-Club 文件裁定》并未最终处置任何可能获得救济的请求权。见 In re Towers, 164 B.R. at 720。其仅解决了与根据 Rule 9019 和解协议向受托人提交文件有关的上述各项问题。然而，G-Club 强调，《G-Club 文件裁定》“解决了 HCHK 对抗性程序中受托人与 HCHK 之间所有未决问题”，并终结了该诉讼。作为事实问题，G-Club 的说法不正确。在作出《批准和解裁定》及随后作出《G-Club 文件裁定》后，该对抗性程序至多仅在受托人与受让人之间得到了最终解决。针对其余 HCHK 实体的诉讼仍在继续，见上文注 5，并最终通过对该等额外被告作出的缺席判决得到解决。8\n\nG-Club 似乎混淆了《G-Club 文件裁定》与《批准和解裁定》；后者确实解决了受托人与受让人之间的对抗性程序，并本应是一项终局且可上诉的裁定。9 见 In re Purdue Pharma L.P., 724 F. Supp. 3d 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)（“破产法院批准和解的裁定是一项终局裁定。”）\n\n8 破产法院驳回 HCHK 实体撤销记入缺席的动议，以及其后对 HCHK 实体作出的缺席判决，均是向本院提出的另一上诉的标的。见 In re Kwok, No. 3:24-cv-335。该上诉因 HCHK 实体未推进诉讼，于 October 24, 2024 根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》Rule 41(b) 被驳回。见 id. at ECF No. 25。\n\n9 本院注意到，《批准和解裁定》曾被上诉，但并非由 G-Club 提起。见 In re Kwok, No. 3:23-cv-1067。该上诉于 August 29, 2024 经约定被驳回。见 id. at ECF No. 50。\n\n（引自 In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2006)（终结当事人之间诉讼的 Rule 9019 和解之批准“是一项终局裁定”））。而且，正如 G-Club 自己所承认，《G-Club 文件裁定》仅通过认定 G-Club 已放弃对该等记录的特权，“最终确定了受让人根据 Rule 9019 和解协议将 G Club 的公司记录移交给受托人的权利”。这正是法院一贯认定为中间事项的附带证据开示问题。见 In re Towers, 164 B.R. at 720（汇集案例）。因此，本院认定，《G-Club 文件裁定》是一项非终局中间裁定，未经本院许可不得上诉。10 因此，该上诉应予驳回。\n\n《G-Club 文件裁定》\n\n尽管本院认定《G-Club 文件裁定》不可依法上诉，但鉴于本案情形，本院将审查该上诉的实体问题。正如 G-Club 正确指出，《G-Club 文件裁定》确实最终确定了对抗性程序中影响 G-Club 的所有问题。G-Club 未被列为当事人，也未以其他方式参与仍在诉讼中的其余问题。尽管 G-Club 仅对破产法院关于特权放弃问题的决定提出上诉，本院承认本案呈现出独特的程序情形。《G-Club 文件裁定》虽在时间上后作出，但直接影响《批准和解裁定》的范围和执行，而如上所述，后者是一项终局且可上诉的裁定。因此，鉴于《G-Club 文件裁定》与《批准和解裁定》之间相互关联的性质及紧密联系，本院选择备选地审查 G-Club 上诉的实体问题。经审查，本院认定破产法院未滥用其酌处权，因此必须维持《G-Club 文件裁定》。\n\n10 G-Club 未备选地主张本院应依照适用于此类请求的标准，准许其提出中间上诉。见 Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)（如“该裁定 (1) 涉及控制性法律问题，(2) 对该问题存在实质性意见分歧理由，且 (3) 对该裁定的即时上诉可能实质性推进诉讼的最终终结”，则可准许对中间裁定提出上诉）。\n\n审查标准\n\nG-Club 首先主张，适当的审查标准是重新审查。本院不同意。诚然，法律与事实的混合问题应按重新审查标准审查。In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2003)。但法院关于放弃律师—当事人特权的认定通常并不构成此类混合问题；事实上，该等认定一贯按酌处权滥用标准审查。见 Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2015)（“我们按酌处权滥用标准审查地区法院关于放弃律师—当事人特权的认定。”）（引自 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000)）。本院认为 United States v. Mejia 具有指导意义。655 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011)。在该案中，第二巡回上诉法院承认，对律师—当事人特权主张的裁定按酌处权滥用标准审查这一确立已久的原则，但进一步指出，“然而，在某些情况下，律师—当事人特权会引发法律问题，该等问题[应]按重新审查标准审查。”见 id. at 131。但在 Mejia 案中，如同本案，问题仅在于该特权是否适用于涉案通信。Id. 换言之，“该问题涉及将我们的判例法已形成的律师—当事人特权适用于本案面前的新事实集合；其不要求我们以新方式处理特权本身的范围。”Id.\n\n在寻求重新审查时，G-Club 夸大了《G-Club 文件裁定》的性质和范围；该裁定仅认定 G-Club 未履行其证明律师—当事人特权适用于涉案文件的举证责任，因此，该等文件可依照对抗性程序中达成的 Rule 9019 和解协议移交给受托人。11 实际上，上诉中的狭窄问题涉及将律师—当事人特权直接适用于所呈现的新事实集合；其并不要求评估“以新方式处理特权本身的范围”。Mejia, 655 F.3d at 131。\n\n此外，G-Club严重依赖破产法院对MSA条款的援引，主张“破产法院在此认定存在放弃，是以其对[MSA]效力的法律解释为前提。”被上诉人答辩状，ECF No. 29，第15页。然而，G-Club再一次歪曲了G-Club文件命令。破产法院的结论是基于证据的评估，而非合同解释问题。破产法院仅得出G-Club未能履行其证明律师—客户特权适用之举证责任的结论时，主要：(a) 强调G-Club未能提供任何证据支持其关于HCHK仅在基于云的服务器上托管G-Club文件的主张；以及(b) 援引MSA的明确文字——其清楚表明HCHK将能够访问并可使用G-Club的文件——作为与G-Club原本毫无支持的主张相矛盾并足以推翻该主张的证据。\n\n因此，G-Club文件命令应按滥用裁量权标准进行审查。\n\n特权的放弃\n\n转向实体问题，G-Club主张G-Club文件命令存在错误，因为没有证据表明HCHK访问了G-Club文件的内容，并且“G-Club并未因作为提供基于云的电子邮件服务的一部分而向HCHK授予管理权限，就放弃其文件中的任何特权。”作为回应，受托人主张G-Club已\n\n11 为支持其主张，G-Club援引Krys v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP (In re China Med. Techs., Inc.), 539 B.R. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)。但是，如受托人所主张，该案并不适用。在此，本院审查的是破产法院关于G-Club的特权事实上已被放弃的肯定性认定，而不是首先确定该特权归谁所有。参见，例如，id.\n\n未履行其作为主张特权一方的举证责任，并且事实上，G-Club通过允许HCHK根据MSA不加区分地访问G-Club文件而放弃了其特权。12 本院同意受托人的意见。\n\n主张律师—客户特权的一方负有举证责任，证明拟受保护的通信属于“为取得或提供法律意见之目的而进行的、(1) 客户与其律师之间的、(2) 旨在保密且事实上确已保密的通信。”Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132；Harnage v. Kenny, No. 3:19-CV-938 (SDV), 2022 WL 2046140, at \\*3 (D. Conn. June 7, 2022)（“主张特权的一方负有证明其构成要件的举证责任。”）（援引In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 418 (2d Cir. 2007)）。法律已明确确立：如特权持有人自愿向第三方或律师—客户关系之外的人披露该通信，或同意披露该通信，则律师—客户特权即被放弃。Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)。\n\n在此，对于G-Club是否已向HCHK提供G-Club文件，以及HCHK是否因此持有该等文件，在破产法院或上诉中均不存在争议。事实上，G-Club寻求质疑和解动议，因为该动议设想HCHK将进一步披露G-Club的文件。G-Club负有证明其文件受律师—客户特权保护的举证责任。参见Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132。然而，G-Club甚至未承认该项举证责任，更遑论履行该责任。相反，G-Club始终坚持\n\n12 G-Club进一步主张，HCHK根据MSA无权将G-Club的数据转让给受让人。由于本院基于G-Club依照MSA向HCHK披露其数据，确认破产法院关于特权放弃的认定，因此无需处理双方关于G-Club据称未及时对后续转让程序和/或将HCHK出售给G-News Operations的相关拟议交易提出异议的替代性主张。尽管如此，HCHK对G-Club数据的转让与破产法院关于特权放弃的认定无关，该认定主要以前述G-Club首先向HCHK披露文件为依据。如上所述，G-Club在此并未质疑批准和解命令。\n\n其与HCHK在MSA项下的合同关系类似于Microsoft或Google与其消费者使用基于云的文件托管服务之间的关系。为此，G-Club坚持认为，MSA设想HCHK作为“提供基于云的电子邮件服务的一部分”仅对G-Club文件具有“管理性”访问权限，并进一步主张没有证据表明HCHK访问了任何G-Club文件的内容。但是，G-Club——主张特权并因此负有举证责任的一方——完全未能为这种对MSA的狭义解读提供任何支持。G-Club也未提供任何证据表明，其在MSA项下与HCHK的通常交易过程是由HCHK仅“提供[]并维护[] G Club的基于云的电子邮件系统。”事实上，正如受托人准确指出的，“MSA中没有任何地方提及基于云的服务，或以其他方式界定HCHK向G Club提供的信息技术服务范围。”正如破产法院适当指出的，G-Club关于MSA项下所设想及提供的服务的空泛主张，完全被MSA的明确文字所否定。基于实质上相同的理由，破产法院得出结论：G-Club未能履行其证明律师—客户特权适用于其自身交给HCHK的文件之举证责任；HCHK是该等文件中任何所谓特权通信的第三方。为支持该认定，破产法院强调MSA的明确文字，其中规定HCHK将向G-Club提供广泛服务，且HCHK在提供该等服务过程中将能够访问并可使用G-Club的文件。\n\n破产法院理由充分且有事实支持的认定并未构成滥用其裁量权。G-Club显然未能履行其证明律师—客户特权适用，即未被放弃的举证责任，尤其是在结合MSA的通常含义以及完全不存在支持G-Club牵强主张的证据予以考量时，更是如此。\n\n因此，G-Club文件命令予以确认。13\n\n结论\n\n基于上述全部理由，法院书记员被指示作出有利于受托人的判决，并结案。\n\n特此命令，于2025年3月11日，在康涅狄格州布里奇波特作出。\n\n/s/ Kari A. Dooley  KARI A. DOOLEY 美国联邦地区法院法官\n\n13 G-Club进一步质疑破产法院的结论，即根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》Rule 26(b)(5)(B)对享有特权的文件进行追回，可以补救因向受托人披露G-Club文件所造成的任何损害；该规则通过《联邦破产规则》Rule 7026适用于对抗程序。具体而言，G-Club主张，由于对G-Club数据的“整体移交”在范围或比例性上均未受到限制，审查全部G-Club数据将会“过度繁重、成本高昂且完全没有必要。”具有讽刺意味的是，G-Club在破产法院似乎正是主张应对文件进行这种“过度繁重、成本高昂且完全没有必要”的审查——不仅审查相关性，也审查特权。无论如何，破产法院是在驳回G-Club待上诉期间暂停执行动议时作出该认定；该认定并非本次上诉的标的，故本院不再于此进一步处理。","key_entities":["HCHK","Je","Kwok","Despins","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":17,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":30,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":179,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":923,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4935,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-03-11 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-03-11","updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:45:49"}