{"id":"court_ctb_421_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":421,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK<sup>1</sup>\n\nChapter 11 Case No.\n\n22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor.\n\nMay 20, 2022\n\n# **PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.'S SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASE**\n\nPAX<sup>2</sup> respectfully submits this supplemental statement in support of its Dismissal Motion.\n\n## **SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT**\n\n1. This case has been a sham from the outset, designed to prejudice PAX and PAX alone. PAX has consistently demonstrated the Debtor's abuse of the bankruptcy process, and that abuse should stop now. Accordingly, this Court should exercise its discretion and grant dismissal, rather than convert it to a chapter 7 case, for four reasons. *First*, dismissal is the only feasible option. *Second*, neither conversion nor appointment of a trustee will result in better recoveries for creditors. *Third*, dismissal is the preferred remedy of creditors given the size of PAX's judgment compared to other liquidated claims against the Debtor. *Fourth*, where the cause to dismiss is the Debtor's bad faith or misconduct, dismissal is the proper remedy.\n\n## **I. DISMISSAL IS THE ONLY FEASIBLE OPTION**\n\n2. The Committee supported keeping Kwok as the debtor-in-possession while Kwok dangled DIP funding before it. Now, in the absence of funding to pursue the chapter 11 case, it seeks conversion to chapter 7. But there is no money available to fund a chapter 7. Continuing\n\n<sup>1</sup> The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meaning set forth in PAX's prior related pleadings.\n\nthe case without liquid assets to pay the U.S. Trustee and professional fees (and substantial contribution fees) already incurred and to be incurred loads up the estate with administrative claims and delays all creditors from independently pursuing satisfaction of their debts. In bankruptcy, Kwok maintains the benefit of the automatic stay and may obtain a discharge. The Court will potentially need to oversee innumerable non-discharge claims, with each individual creditor bearing the burden for each complaint and the trustee for defending them, in each case at great expense. Some claims may be discharged, while others may not. A dismissal avoids all of the foregoing costs and results in all claims being treated equally, with every creditor free to pursue Kwok.\n\n3. Also, claims litigation against Kwok has no common nucleus of fact lending itself to centralization. And, to the extent the many unliquidated claims are personal injury tort claims (such as the defamation claims), there could be extensive and expensive additional litigation over whether a District Court would need to oversee the ultimate liquidation of disputed claims, resulting in no centralized forum for claim resolution.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, in bankruptcy, PAX will have no choice but to carefully review all of the other claims and assert any objections to them (creating yet additional layers of costly litigation and potential discovery disputes) because there would not be a funded mechanism to effectively screen the claims. All of this promises an unending morass leaving creditors no closer to getting paid while fees mushroom.\n\n### **II. DISMISSAL WOULD MAXIMIZE RECOVERIES FOR CREDITORS**\n\n4. A chapter 7 trustee will face immediate funding issues that would require hiring\n\n<sup>3</sup> Multiple courts have construed \"personal injury tort\" claims under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) to include claims for defamation. *See, e.g.*, *In re Von Volkmar*, 217 B.R. 561, 566–67 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (defamation claims fall within \"personal injury\" tort definition, which \"encompasses 'any injury which is an invasion of personal rights'\"); *see also In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.*, 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002) (adopting the \"broader\" view of \"personal injury tort claim\" that includes \"*any injury which is an invasion of personal rights*,\" except where the claim \"has earmarks of a financial, business, or property tort claim\"). *But see In re Gawker Media,* 571 B.R. 612, 620–21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2017) (adopting narrower view).\n\ncontingency counsel and/or borrowing money from litigation funders (for which there is no current prospect). Such fees would likely amount to tens of millions of dollars,<sup>4</sup> which may outweigh the entirety of allowed claims held by creditors other than PAX.\n\n5. The cost of such contingency or financing fees would fall largely on PAX, a patently unfair result. And considering creditors as a whole, more will be recovered without a trustee because PAX and other creditors retain their right to pursue the Debtor (and any third parties who hold Debtor assets) on their own terms without financing or contingency costs. Also, as the Debtor now states, \"After dismissal, the Debtor intends to satisfy his legitimate debts.\"<sup>5</sup>\n\n6. Although PAX believes (and the Committee disputes) that other unsecured creditors can obtain full payment from the Debtor or related third parties (any of whom could be pursued by creditors outside of bankruptcy), there is no guarantee of an equity cushion in Kwok's estate sufficient to cover large contingency fees, litigation funding fees, and administrative claims before paying any allowed unsecured claims. The Committee cannot have it both ways. If there is not enough to pay creditors, then the Committee seeks to impose tens of millions of dollars in unwarranted expenses on PAX. If there are sufficient assets, there is no risk that non-PAX creditors will be left \"holding the bag.\" But it cannot be true (as the Committee suggests) that there is *both* enough excess value to cover the substantial additional fees in bankruptcy *and* not enough value to pay creditors outside of bankruptcy without expending the fees.\n\n#### **III. PAX'S DESIRE FOR DISMISSAL MUST CARRY SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT**\n\n7. The touchstone of what is best for the estate in considering dismissal as opposed to conversion is the preference of creditors. The best interest of creditors here must reflect PAX's\n\n<sup>4</sup> A 20-30% contingency applied to the proceeds necessary to pay PAX's claims would result in fees of roughly \\$50 to \\$75 million dollars.\n\n<sup>5</sup> *Debtor's Consent to Dismissal of Case* at 4, ECF No. 344.\n\nview. Multiple courts have held that the interest of even a single creditor favoring dismissal should prevail where, like here, that creditor has the financially dominant claim. *See, e.g.*, *In re Acme Cake Co., Inc.*, 495 B.R. 212, 222 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"[i]t is not necessary that the interest of every creditor actually favor conversion. There is no specific numerosity requirement inherent in section 1112(b)'s best interest test. *The interest of a single creditor with a large enough claim will suffice.*\") (emphasis added) (quoting *In re Staff Inv. Co.*, 146 B.R. 256, 261 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992)); *Goodrich v. Lines*, 284 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1960) (preference of single largest creditor was basis for dismissal, even where all other creditors disagreed, given largest claim was far in excess of that owed to any other). Here, *PAX has more than \\$260 million in judgments* against Kwok. No other non-insider has a liquidated claim that is remotely comparable to PAX's claim— PAX's claim is over 1,300 times larger than the next largest judgment claim.<sup>6</sup> And the Court should disregard the \"claims\" of insiders (*e.g.*, Golden Spring). Other claims in this case are almost exclusively unliquidated, contingent, already dismissed, or otherwise speculative.<sup>7</sup> In the UCC Objection, the Committee speculates that ultimately PAX may be in the minority after more creditors file proofs of claim, but there is no evidence to support this, and the Committee surely knows it; in fact, where there is no operating business and no bar date, the notion that many other creditors are waiting in the wings to participate in the case seems far-fetched.\n\n8. Although the Committee may contend conversion is needed to protect against PAX recovering first from Kwok, given the size of PAX's already adjudicated judgments, PAX is entitled to recover first. *See Acme Cake.*, 495 B.R. at 222 (holding \"that dismissal is in the best interests of creditors and the estate is not affected by the *probable result that [largest creditor]*\n\n<sup>6</sup> This is calculated by taking PAX's claim of approximately \\$261 million and dividing by the next largest applicable claim of approximately \\$200,000.\n\n<sup>7</sup> *See* Reply at 5, n. 5.\n\n*will execute its judgment and reach the Debtor's assets before other unsecured creditors*\"); *In re OptInRealBig.com, LLC*, 345 B.R. 277, 290 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (holding that \"a creditor should not be permitted to prolong or sustain a case merely to take advantage of benefits bankruptcy offers to creditors\" and that a case could never be dismissed under section 1112 if guaranteeing the bankruptcy code's priority scheme was a precondition of dismissal).\n\n9. Additionally, dismissal should not be denied (keeping PAX from pursuing its claims, which Kwok has frustrated for years), for the benefit of entities that are not actual creditors today. This case is not a mass tort bankruptcy where current plaintiffs know they will become actual creditors based on the debtor's pre-bankruptcy litigation history. Who knows when and if the contingent claims here will result in allowed claims against the Debtor. Further, permitting some creditors to increase their chances of payment is not enough to sustain a chapter 11 case filed in bad faith. *See In re Briarpatch Film Corp*., 281 B.R. 820, 826 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing case for bad faith where debtor corporation—with no business or employees—and its principals were subject to extensive litigation and contempt proceedings and filed to avoid an adverse ruling, rejecting argument that bankruptcy could help creditors get paid)*.*\n\n# **IV. THE CAUSE SUGGESTS THE REMEDY: DEBTOR BAD FAITH AND MISCONDUCT STRONGLY FAVOR DISMISSAL**\n\n10. Courts routinely dismiss cases where the debtor has filed in bad faith. Every one of the roughly 20 cases cited by PAX in the Dismissal Motion or Reply where the court found cause in the form of bad faith resulted in dismissal,<sup>8</sup> and countless additional cases follow the same pattern.<sup>9</sup> This demonstrates that where a debtor's filing was rotten from the get-go, dismissal is\n\n<sup>8</sup> *See* Dismissal Motion ¶¶ 52, 54, 56–57, 59–60; Reply ¶¶ 9, 15 n.17 & 21, 30.\n\n<sup>9</sup> *Collier's* has collected dozens of bankruptcy cases finding cause for bad faith, none of which resulted in conversion to chapter 7 except for four. *See* 7 Collier on Bankruptcy P 1112.07 (16th 2022). In each of these four cases, the creditors were, unlike here where PAX opposes it, *uniformly in favor of conversion*. *Finney v. Smith*, 141 B.R. 94, 103 (E.D. Va. 1992), *aff'd and modified*, 992 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1993); *See In re Winslow,* 123 B.R. 641,\n\nthe right remedy. *Sapphire Dev., LLC v. McKay*, 549 B.R. 556, 575 (D. Conn. 2016) (affirming decision to dismiss rather than convert case where conversion would continue bad faith filing to moving party's detriment).\n\n11. This is consistent with the fundamental precept that bankruptcy is for the \"honest but unfortunate debtor\" and not those engaged in malfeasance, especially when targeted at specific creditors. While remaining in bankruptcy, the Debtor will persist as a party in interest able to hinder, delay, and defraud PAX's efforts to collect on its judgments, and otherwise protect the Debtor's family and shell companies that hold his assets, through continued obfuscation and \"shell games\".<sup>10</sup>\n\n12. In contrast, where courts have converted a case for cause, it frequently has involved repetitive bankruptcy petitions, the debtor's non-compliance with court filing requirements, failure to file a plan, or the diminishing of the estate in a way that a chapter 7 trustee can remedy, such as by pursuing avoidance actions set to expire.<sup>11</sup> Here, the issues with Kwok's filings result from his bad faith, not failure to meet deadlines. If and to the extent that Kwok's estate is diminishing, that is a primarily result of the ballooning administrative expenses, which cannot be remedied by a trustee. The Committee may point to *SWJ Mgmt., LLC v. Coan*, 551 B.R. 93, 94 (D. Conn. 2015) (cause found for failure to take steps as chapter 11 debtor and file operating reports and proper\n\n<sup>11</sup> *See, e.g.*, *In re Sakon*, 617 B.R. 7, 16–18 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020) (converting where cause was continuing losses); *In re Fuschi-Aibel*, No. 18-50052 (JAM), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 180, at \\*9 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2020) (failure to comply with court orders to file a plan and DS); *Hamilton Rd. Realty, LLC v. United States*, No. 20-CV-1746 (LDH), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44486, at \\*11–13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2021) (definition monthly operating reports, administrative insolvency, and failure to file a plan); *Lynch v. Barnard*, 590 B.R. 30, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (cause for diminution of estate and failure to comply with court requirements, where trustee could jump start case); *In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC*, 439 B.R. 342, 346–47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (cause for failure to file disclosure statement timely and where certain avoidance actions were set to expire).\n\n<sup>643–47 (</sup>D. Colo. 1991); *In re Bowman*, 181 B.R. 836, 846 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); *In re Wright Air Lines, Inc.*, 51 B.R. 96, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).\n\n<sup>10</sup> *See Sapphire Dev., LLC v. McKay*, 549 B.R. 556, 575 (D. Conn. 2016) (affirming decision to dismiss rather than convert case where conversion would continue bad faith filing to moving party's detriment).\n\ndisclosures and failure to retain unconflicted counsel), as a case from this District supporting conversion of a chapter 11 case. In *SWJ*, though the bankruptcy court did not find cause for bad faith dismissal, the debtor had displayed some misconduct. But *SWJ* is distinguishable from Kwok's case because the debtor sought dismissal and creditors overwhelmingly sought conversion, and the court was concerned the debtor would shortly refile a new bankruptcy case. Importantly, the *SWJ* case involved serial abusive filings and the court feared more filings in other jurisdictions would follow dismissal. Here, PAX—by far the largest creditor—favors dismissal and submits that dismissal *will not* harm collection efforts (and PAX has shown that Kwok can successfully be pursued in state court), while conversion *will*. The only aspect of the *SWJ* decision that is relevant to this case is that it upholds this Court's broad discretion in deciding whether to dismiss or covert the case.\n\n13. Some courts, including a few lower courts within the Second Circuit, have taken special notice of factors for deciding between dismissal and conversion set forth in *Collier's*. 12 These factors favor dismissal. For example, PAX has explained at length why equality of distribution is not harmed by dismissal<sup>13</sup> (Factor 1), there are no apparent avoidance actions that would be lost upon dismissal (Factors 1 and 2), the debtor is unlikely to file another case (Factor 3), creditors are perfectly capable of reaching assets outside of bankruptcy, as shown by PAX's New York Action (Factor 4), conversion would only dissipate potential recoveries compared to dismissal as noted above (Factor 5), other issues such as the outstanding cases against Kwok and the contempt matters are all best pursued in state court (Factor 6), and the debtor has engaged in\n\n<sup>12</sup> *In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC*, 439 at 346–47 (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6]); *see also In re Babayoff*, 445 B.R. 64, 81 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (reciting same factors and observing that there is no \"bright-line test to determine whether conversion or dismissal is in the best interests of creditors and the estate\"). <sup>13</sup> *See* Reply at 5–9.\n\nsignificant misconduct, including using bankruptcy as a delay and litigation tactic, which would\n\nnot be remedied by a chapter 7 trustee(Factor 8).<sup>14</sup>\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons set forth above, PAX respectfully requests dismissal of the chapter 11 case.\n\nDated: May 20, 2022 New York, New York\n\n### **Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.**\n\n*By: /s/ Patrick M. Birney* Patrick M. Birney (CT No. 19875) Annecca H. Smith (CT No. 31148) **ROBINSON & COLE LLP**  280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: (860) 275-8275 Facsimile: (860) 275-8299 E-mail: pbirney@rc.com asmith@rc.com\n\n-and-\n\nPeter Friedman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Stuart M. Sarnoff (admitted *pro hac vice*) **O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP**  Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 326-2000 Facsimile: (212) 326-2061 Email: pfriedman@omm.com ssarnoff@omm.com\n\n<sup>14</sup> Factors 7 (single asset), 9 (whether plan already confirmed), 10 (environmental concerns) are generally inapplicable to the Debtor's case; they provide no basis for conversion.\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on May 20, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically through the Court's CM/ECF System. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties receiving notice by operation of the court's electronic filing system. Parties in interest may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n /s/ *Patrick M. Birney*  Patrick M. Birney","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）1\n\n第 11 章案件编号：\n\n22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n2022年5月20日\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙，简称PAX）支持驳回第 11 章案件动议之补充陈述\n\nPAX2 谨此提交本补充陈述，以支持其驳回动议。\n补充陈述\n\n1. 本案自始至终是一场骗局，旨在损害 PAX 以及仅损害 PAX 的利益。PAX 一贯证明债务人滥用破产程序，而这种滥用现在应当停止。因此，基于四个理由，本法院应行使其自由裁量权准予驳回，而非将其转为第 7 章案件。第一，驳回是唯一可行的方案。第二，无论是转为第 7 章还是指定破产管理人，都不会为债权人带来更好的受偿。第三，鉴于 PAX 的判决金额与针对债务人的其他已确定金额债权相比规模巨大，驳回是债权人首选的救济途径。第四，当驳回的起因是债务人的恶意或不当行为时，驳回是正当的救济途径。\n一、驳回是唯一可行的方案\n\n2. 委员会在郭文贵向其抛出破产重整债务人融资（DIP funding）的诱饵时，支持保留郭文贵作为占有债务人。如今，在缺乏资金继续推进第 11 章案件的情况下，委员会寻求转为第 7 章。但目前根本没有可用资金来资助第 7 章程序。继续\n\n1 债务人纳税人识别号的后四位数字为 9595。\n\n2 本文中使用但未作定义的大写术语具有 PAX 先前相关诉状中所载明的含义。\n\n审理本案，而在缺乏流动资产用于支付已经产生及将要产生的美国联邦破产受托人费用与专业人员费用（以及实质性贡献费用）的情况下，会使破产财产堆满行政优先受偿债权，并阻碍所有债权人独立寻求清偿其债务。在破产程序中，郭文贵仍享有自动中止的益处并可能获得免责。法院可能需要监督无数的不可免责债权，每位单独的债权人需为每起申诉承担举证责任，而破产管理人需为抗辩承担责任，在每起诉讼中都会耗费巨额费用。有些债权可能被免责，而其他债权可能不会。驳回诉讼可避免所有上述费用，并使所有债权得到平等对待，让每一位债权人均可自由向郭文贵追讨。\n\n3. 此外，针对郭文贵提出的债权诉讼并无利于集中管辖的共同事实核心。而且，在许多未确定金额的债权属于人身伤害侵权债权（例如诽谤债权）的范围内，关于地区法院是否需要监督争议债权的最终金额清算，可能会引发广泛且昂贵的额外诉讼，从而导致没有一个集中的法庭来进行债权解决。3 此外，在破产程序中，PAX 将别无选择，只能仔细审查所有其他债权并对其提出任何异议（这将造成额外层次的昂贵诉讼以及潜在的证据开示争议），因为届时将不存在一个获得资金支持的机制来有效筛选债权。这一切预示着一个无休止的泥潭，在费用如雨后春笋般激增的同时，债权人却丝毫无法接近获得清偿的目标。\n二、驳回将最大化债权人的受偿\n\n4. 第 7 章破产管理人将面临紧迫的资金问题，这将需要聘请\n\n3 多家法院已将 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) 项下的“人身伤害侵权”债权解释为包括诽谤债权。参见例如 In re Von Volkmar, 217 B.R. 561, 566–67 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998)（诽谤债权属于“人身伤害”侵权定义，该定义“包含‘任何侵犯人身权利的损害’”）；亦见 In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc., 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002)（采纳对“人身伤害侵权债权”的“较宽泛”观点，即包括“任何侵犯人身权利的损害”，除非该债权“具有金融、商业或财产侵权债权的特征”）。但参见 In re Gawker Media, 571 B.R. 612, 620–21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2017)（采纳较狭义观点）。\n\n风险代理律师和/或向诉讼资助方借款（对此目前毫无前景）。此类费用可能高达数千万美元，4 这可能会超过除 PAX 以外的债权人所持有的全部获准债权。\n\n5. 此类风险代理或融资费用的成本将主要落在 PAX 身上，这是极其不公平的结果。而且就债权人整体而言，在没有破产管理人的情况下将获得更多清偿，因为 PAX 和其他债权人保留了按照自己的方式追讨债务人（以及持有债务人资产的任何第三方）的权利，而无需承担融资或风险代理成本。此外，正如债务人现在所称，“在驳回之后，债务人打算清偿其合法债务。”5\n\n6. 尽管 PAX 认为（而委员会存有争议）其他无担保债权人可以从债务人或相关第三方处获得全额清偿（债权人均可在破产程序之外向其中任何人追讨），但无法保证郭文贵的破产财产中拥有足够的净资产缓冲，可以在支付任何获准无担保债权之前覆盖巨额的风险代理费、诉讼资助费和行政管理债权。委员会不能兼得二者。如果没有足够的资产清偿债权人，那么委员会就是试图将数千万美元的不合理开支强加给 PAX。如果有足够的资产，就不存在非 PAX 债权人将“自咽苦果”的风险。但（正如委员会所暗示的）既有足够的超额价值来支付破产程序中的巨额额外费用，又没有足够的价值在不支出这些费用的情况下在破产程序之外向债权人清偿，这绝不可能成立。\n三、PAX 谋求驳回的意愿必须具有实质分量\n\n7. 在考虑驳回还是转为第 7 章时，衡量何者最有利于破产财产的试金石是债权人的偏好。此处债权人的最大利益必须体现 PAX 的\n\n4 适用于清偿 PAX 债权所需收益的 20-30% 风险代理比例，将产生大约 5000 万至 7500 万美元的费用。\n\n5 债务人同意驳回案件之书面意见第 4 页，ECF 编号 344。\n\n观点。多家法院均已裁定，在赞成驳回的债权人（如本案中的情况）拥有在财务上占主导地位的债权时，即便只有单一债权人赞成驳回，其利益也应占据上风。参见例如 In re Acme Cake Co., Inc., 495 B.R. 212, 222 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010)（“[并不]要求每一位债权人的利益实际上都赞成转换程序。第 1112(b) 条的最大利益测试中并没有固有的具体人数要求。单一拥有足够大债权的债权人利益即已足够。”）（强调为后加）（引自 In re Staff Inv. Co., 146 B.R. 256, 261 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992)）；Goodrich v. Lines, 284 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1960)（鉴于最大债权远超欠付任何其他债权人的金额，即使所有其他债权人都不同意，单一最大债权人的偏好也是驳回的依据）。在此案中，PAX 对郭文贵拥有超过 2.6 亿美元的判决。没有其他非内部人拥有可与 PAX 债权相提并论的已确定金额债权——PAX 的债权是次大判决债权的 1300 多倍。6 且法院应忽视内部人（例如 Golden Spring）的“债权”。本案中的其他债权几乎全部是未确定金额的、附条件的、已被驳回的或在其他方面具有投机性的。7 在 UCC（无担保债权人委员会）异议中，委员会推测在更多债权人提交债权证明后，PAX 最终可能沦为少数派，但没有任何证据支持这一点，且委员会必定心知肚明；事实上，在既无营运业务又未设定申报截止日期的情况下，认为许多其他债权人正在伺机参与本案的想法似乎是脱离实际的。\n\n8. 尽管委员会可能主张需要转为第 7 章以防止 PAX 先于他人从郭文贵处获得受偿，但鉴于 PAX 已经判决确认的债权规模，PAX 有权优先受偿。参见 Acme Cake., 495 B.R. at 222（裁定“驳回符合债权人和破产财产的最大利益这一结论，并不受[最大债权人]可能先于其他无担保债权人执行其判决并获取债务人资产这一结果的影响”）；In re OptInRealBig.com, LLC, 345 B.R. 277, 290 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006)（裁定“不应允许债权人仅为了利用破产程序为债权人提供的好处而拖延或维持案件”，并且如果将保证破产法典的优先受偿顺位体系作为驳回的前提条件，则案件将永远无法根据第 1112 条被驳回）。\n\n9. 此外，不应为了目前并非实际债权人的实体的利益而拒绝驳回（从而阻碍 PAX 追讨其债权，而郭文贵多年来一直在阻挠该债权的追讨）。本案并非大规模侵权破产案件，在那种案件中现有原告根据债务人在破产前的诉讼历史明确知晓自己将成为实际债权人。谁也不知道此处的附条件债权何时以及是否会转化为针对债务人的获准债权。此外，允许部分债权人增加其获得受偿的机会，不足以维持一个恶意提起的第 11 章案件。参见 In re Briarpatch Film Corp., 281 B.R. 820, 826 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（对债务人公司——无业务且无雇员——及其负责人面临广泛诉讼和藐视法庭程序并为避免不利裁决而申请破产的案件，以恶意为由予以驳回，拒绝了破产有助于债权人获得清偿的抗辩理由）。\n四、起因昭示了救济途径：债务人的恶意和不当行为极力支持驳回\n\n10. 法院常规性地驳回债务人出于恶意提起的案件。PAX 在驳回动议或答辩书中引用的约 20 起法院以恶意为由认定构成起因的案件中，每一起案件的最终结果都是驳回，8 且无数其他案件均遵循相同的模式。9 这表明，如果债务人的申请自始就是腐败的，那么驳回就是\n\n8 参见驳回动议第 52、54、56–57、59–60 段；答辩书第 9 段、第 15 段注 17 及 21、第 30 段。\n\n9 《科利尔破产论》（Collier on Bankruptcy）收集了数十起以恶意为由认定起因的破产案件，除四起外，无一导致转为第 7 章。参见 7 Collier on Bankruptcy P 1112.07 (16th 2022)。在这四起案件中的每一起中，债权人都一致赞成转换，而不像本案中 PAX 予以反对。Finney v. Smith, 141 B.R. 94, 103 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd and modified, 992 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1993); 参见 In re Winslow, 123 B.R. 641,\n\n正确的救济途径。Sapphire Dev., LLC v. McKay, 549 B.R. 556, 575 (D. Conn. 2016)（确认驳回而非转换案件的裁定，因为转换程序将使恶意的破产申请继续存在并损害动议方的利益）。\n\n11. 这符合破产程序是为“诚实但不幸的债务人”而非从事不法行为的人设立的基本准则，尤其是当不法行为针对特定债权人时更是如此。在继续处于破产程序期间，债务人将继续作为利害关系方存在，能够通过持续的混淆视听和“皮包套壳把戏”来阻碍、拖延和欺诈 PAX 执行判决的努力，并以其他方式保护持有其资产的债务人家属和空壳公司。10\n\n12. 相比之下，在法院因法定事由（for cause）转换案件的情形中，通常涉及重复提交破产申请、债务人不遵守法院的材料提交要求、未能提交重整计划，或者破产财产的减损属于第 7 章受托人能够予以救济的情形（例如提起即将过期的撤销权诉讼）11。在本案中，Kwok（郭文贵）在材料提交方面存在的问题源于其恶意，而非未能赶上截止日期。若郭文贵的破产财产正在发生减损，且在其发生减损的限度内，这主要是行政管理费用急剧膨胀的结果，而受托人无法对此予以救济。官方无担保债权人委员会（The Committee）可能会指出 SWJ Mgmt., LLC v. Coan, 551 B.R. 93, 94 (D. Conn. 2015) 案（认定因未能履行作为第 11 章债务人的职责、未能提交经营报告以及适当的\n\n11 参见，例如，In re Sakon, 617 B.R. 7, 16–18 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)（在持续亏损构成法定事由的情况下予以转换）；In re Fuschi-Aibel, No. 18-50052 (JAM), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 180, at *9 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2020)（未能遵守法院关于提交重整计划和披露声明的命令）；Hamilton Rd. Realty, LLC v. United States, No. 20-CV-1746 (LDH), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44486, at *11–13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2021)（界定月度经营报告、行政性无力偿债以及未能提交重整计划）；Lynch v. Barnard, 590 B.R. 30, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)（在受托人可重启案件推进的情况下，破产财产减损及未能遵守法院要求构成法定事由）；In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. 342, 346–47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)（未能及时提交披露声明且某些撤销权诉讼即将过期的情形构成法定事由）。\n\n643–47 (D. Colo. 1991); In re Bowman, 181 B.R. 836, 846 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); In re Wright Air Lines, Inc., 51 B.R. 96, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).\n\n10 参见 Sapphire Dev., LLC v. McKay, 549 B.R. 556, 575 (D. Conn. 2016)（维持驳回而非转换案件的裁定，因为若予转换将使恶意申请持续存在并损害动议方的利益）。\n\n披露，以及未能聘请无利益冲突的法律顾问而存在法定事由），作为本司法管辖区（District of Connecticut，康涅狄格区）支持转换第 11 章案件的判例。在 SWJ 案中，尽管破产法院并未认定存在基于恶意而应驳回的法定事由，但债务人确实表现出了一定的不当行为。然而，SWJ 案与郭文贵案存在明显区别，因为在该案中债务人请求驳回，而债权人绝大多数请求转换，且法院担忧债务人很快会重新提起新的破产案件。重要的是，SWJ 案涉及连续滥用破产申请，法院担心驳回后会在其他管辖区引发更多申请。而在本案中，迄今为止最大的债权人 PAX（Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.，太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金）主张驳回，并陈明驳回不会损害追索工作（且 PAX 已证明在州法院可以成功对郭文贵进行追索），而转换则会造成损害。SWJ 案裁决中唯一与本案相关的方面在于，它确认了本法院在决定驳回还是转换案件方面拥有广泛的自由裁量权。\n\n13. 包括 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）辖区内少数下级法院在内的部分法院，对 Collier's（《科利尔论破产》）中列出的用于在驳回与转换之间作出决定的各项考量因素予以了特别关注12。这些因素均支持驳回。例如，PAX 已详细阐明为何驳回不会损害分配的平等性13（因素 1）；不存在因驳回而丧失的显见撤销权诉讼（因素 1 和 2）；债务人不太可能另行提起案件（因素 3）；正如 PAX 的纽约州诉讼所示，债权人完全有能力在破产程序之外触及资产（因素 4）；如前所述，与驳回相比，转换只会削减潜在的受偿金额（因素 5）；其他问题（例如针对郭文贵的未结诉讼和藐视法庭事项）均最适合在州法院推进（因素 6）；以及债务人存在\n\n12 In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 卷第 346–47 页（援引 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6]）；另见 In re Babayoff, 445 B.R. 64, 81 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011)（重述相同因素并指出不存在“用于确定转换还是驳回最符合债权人和破产财产最佳利益的明确界线测试”）。13 参见回复意见书第 5–9 页。\n\n重大不当行为，包括将破产作为拖延和诉讼策略，而此类行为\n\n无法由第 7 章受托人予以纠正（因素 8）14。\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，PAX 谨请求驳回本第 11 章案件。\n\n日期：2022年5月20日 纽约州纽约市\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限公司）\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick M. Birney\nPatrick M. Birney (CT 执照号 19875)\nAnnecca H. Smith (CT 执照号 31148)\nROBINSON & COLE LLP（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n电话：(860) 275-8275\n传真：(860) 275-8299\n电子邮件：pbirney@rc.com, asmith@rc.com\n\n-及-\n\nPeter Friedman (特别准许出庭代理)\nStuart M. Sarnoff (特别准许出庭代理)\nO'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（美迈斯律师事务所）\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n电话：(212) 326-2000\n传真：(212) 326-2061\n电子邮件：pfriedman@omm.com, ssarnoff@omm.com\n\n14 因素 7（单一资产）、因素 9（重整计划是否已获确认）、因素 10（环境问题）通常不适用于债务人的案件；它们不构成转换案件的依据。\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2022年5月20日，本文件的副本已通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统进行电子提交。本提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统的运行，通过电子邮件发送给所有接收通知的各方当事人。利害关系方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本提交文件。\n\n /s/ Patrick M. Birney  Patrick M. Birney","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":344,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2758,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:22:57"}