{"id":"court_ctb_4228_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4228,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nDebtors.\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nAPPLE INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, BERNARDO ENRIQUEZ, CHUNGUANG HAN, and MEI GUO,\n\nDefendants.\n\n## **APPLE INC. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PURSUE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, appellant Apple Inc. (\"Apple\") moves for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's *Memorandum of Decision and Order (I) Denying Joint Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (II) Denying in Part Other Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; and (III) Overruling in Part Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.'s Objection to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings* (the \"Decision\") [BK Dkt. No. 4189], a copy of which is attached as **Exhibit 1**. [1](#page-0-0)\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span>Adv. Proc. No. 24-05060\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span>[<sup>1</sup>](#page-0-1) Filings in the main bankruptcy case are cited as BK Dkt. No. \\_\\_. Filings in Apple's adversary proceeding are cited as AP Dkt. No. \\_\\_.\n\nLuc A. Despins is the bankruptcy trustee appointed in the chapter 11 bankruptcy case of individual debtor Ho Wan Kwok. Since February 2024, Mr. Despins has filed approximately 300 fraudulent transfer lawsuits in the Bankruptcy Court.\n\nMr. Despins has seemingly sued everyone—from large companies like Apple to local landscapers and movers—to recover ordinary course business payments made by non-debtor corporate customers under the theory that those non-debtors are alter egos of Mr. Kwok and that the payments they made were actually transfers of Mr. Kwok's property.\n\nMr. Despins' attempt to expand the reach of the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provisions is unprecedented. He has created a previously unthinkable potential for disrupting business by upending conventional commercial expectations and rendering every payment a potential fraudulent transfer of a third party unknown to the transferee. Typically, unsuspecting third parties acting in good faith are protected by the Bankruptcy Code as subsequent transferees. Under Mr. Despins' theory, however, those protections will be obliterated because bankruptcy trustees will now be able to reach payments made by any closely held company so long as there is a credible allegation that the company's owner engaged in pre-petition bad acts.\n\nIn September 2024, a group of defendants took steps to coordinate their response to Mr. Despins' novel and untested theories. Together with Mr. Despins, they jointly approached the Bankruptcy Court to suggest briefing certain threshold issues that they agreed were common to all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions. Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court allowed briefing on 4 stipulated issues.\n\nRecently, the Bankruptcy Court issued its Decision on the joint briefing and concluded that Mr. Despins can avoid transfers made by non-debtor affiliates because those entities were mere alter egos and instrumentalities of Mr. Kwok. In so concluding, the Bankruptcy Court sidelined arguments that the parties briefed extensively—at the Bankruptcy Court's direction—and instead relied on arguments that the Bankruptcy Court raised *sua sponte* after the close of briefing and oral argument.\n\nApple was not one of the participants in the joint briefing resulting in the Decision because it had previously filed its motion to dismiss and raised arguments beyond the scope of the 4 stipulated issues in the joint briefing. Apple's motion remains pending and the Decision has not been entered in Apple's adversary proceeding. Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Court has expressly stated in its Decision that it intends to bind Apple and others to its ruling. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court has already applied the law of the case doctrine to bind defendants in one adversary proceeding to rulings made in a separate adversary proceeding to which those defendants were not parties.\n\nThis interlocutory appeal concerns matters of first impression. No court in the Second Circuit has authorized a bankruptcy trustee to avoid transfers made by non-debtors using a state law alter ego theory of liability.\n\nNothing could be more inefficient than litigating hundreds of avoidance actions without obtaining an appellate ruling on the viability of Mr. Despins' underlying theory of liability. If the Bankruptcy Court's Decision is reversed, then all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions would be subject to dismissal. If the Decision is affirmed, then many of the avoidance actions would likely start to settle. Either way, an appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of that litigation.\n\nThe Court should grant this interlocutory appeal and address the threshold legal issues that affect the viability each of Mr. Despins' 300+ avoidance actions, including the one brought against Apple.\n\n3\n\n### **QUESTIONS PRESENTED**\n\n1. Whether the state law doctrine of alter ego liability can be used to avoid transfers made by non-debtor entities that are alleged to be affiliates of a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n2. Whether the Bankruptcy Court can use the law of the case doctrine to bind defendants in adversary proceedings to rulings made in the main bankruptcy case or different adversary proceedings in which those defendants were not parties.\n\n### **BACKGROUND**\n\nMr. Kwok filed for bankruptcy on February 15, 2022. BK Dkt. No. 1. Mr. Despins was appointed on July 8, 2022. BK Dkt. No. 523.\n\nBeginning in February 2024, Mr. Despins commenced hundreds of adversary proceedings to avoid and recover allegedly fraudulent transfers made by non-debtor entities affiliated with Mr. Kwok. Decision at 4-5.\n\nThe non-debtor entities are defendants in separate adversary proceedings filed by Mr. Despins to declare them to be alter egos of Mr. Kwok. *See*, *e.g.*, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005; *Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5018, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013; *Despins v. ACA Capital Group Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 24-05249; *Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5023; *Despins v. AA Global Ventures Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 05322.\n\nSome of these later ego adversary proceedings were filed long before Mr. Despins commenced his avoidance actions and final judgments have already been rendered declaring certain non-debtors to be alter egos of Mr. Kwok. *See*, *e.g.*, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 134; *Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5018, Dkt. No. 35; *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 297.\n\nMr. Despins filed his complaint against Apple on February 10, 2024. AP Dkt. No. 1. Apple appeared in the adversary proceeding and filed its motion to dismiss on June 28, 2024. AP Dkt. Nos. 28, 32.\n\nOn September 6, 2024, a group of defendants in separate avoidance actions (the \"Joint Defendants\") requested a status conference with the Bankruptcy Court to discuss briefing on legal issues common to all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions. Decision at 6-7. The Bankruptcy Court granted the request and later entered an order scheduling briefing on 4 issues:\n\n- i. Whether the Mr. Despins can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n- ii. Whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or alter ego determinations;\n- iii. The effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or alter ego determination; and\n- iv. Whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or alter ego may be applied retroactively.\n\n## *Id.* at 7.\n\nDefendants in other adversary proceedings were allowed to join in the briefing filed by the Joint Defendants, and some did. *Id.* at 8. Apple did not participate in the Joint Defendants' briefing. No order was entered in Apple's adversary proceeding which could have made Apple a party who would be bound by the outcome of the joint briefing.\n\nThe Joint Defendants' brief raised some of the same arguments that Apple raised in its motion to dismiss. *Compare* BK Dkt. No. 3713 *with* AP Dkt. No. 32. However, because Apple was not limited to the 4 issues ordered by the Bankruptcy Court, it raised additional arguments. Nonetheless, Mr. Despins' opposition to Apple's motion to dismiss largely copied and pasted arguments from his opposition to the Joint Defendants' brief. *Compare* BK Dkt. No. 3803 *with* AP Dkt. No. 61.\n\nOn November 27, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on the Joint Defendants' briefing for January 15, 2025. BK Dkt. No. 3857. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on Apple's motion to dismiss on the same day. AP Dkt. No. 63.\n\nOn January 5, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court held a status conference at Mr. Despins' request to discuss the format of the hearing on multiple motions to dismiss scheduled for January 15, 2025. Decision at 8. Because the Bankruptcy Court ruled that it would only hear oral argument on the 4 issues that are the subject of the Joint Defendants' briefing and not any of the other issues that Apple raised, Apple filed a motion to continue the hearing on its motion to dismiss, which the Bankruptcy Court granted. AP Dkt. Nos. 66, 67. The January 15, 2025 hearing proceeded without Apple's participation on the Joint Defendants' 4 issues. Decision at 9. Apple has never been one of the Joint Defendants, never consented to the 4 stipulated issues, and never agreed to limit its arguments for dismissal.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court issued its Decision on March 4, 2025. Apple's motion to dismiss remains pending and oral argument has not yet been scheduled.\n\nThe Decision side-steps issues that the Joint Defendants and Mr. Despins briefed extensively. *Compare* Decision *with* BK Dkt. Nos. 3713, 3803, 3848. Among those issues are whether the Bankruptcy Court's rulings determining certain non-debtor transferors are alter egos of Mr. Kwok is binding under the law of the case doctrine and Delaware law regarding alter ego liability.\n\nRather, the Bankruptcy Court *sua sponte* raised issues that were never briefed or argued but that the Bankruptcy Court found to be dispositive. Among those issues is the argumentwhich was never advanced by Mr. Despins himself—that Mr. Despins alleged a beneficial ownership theory of liability.\n\nAlthough the Bankruptcy Court noted in its Decision that Apple was not a party to briefing or oral argument that culminated in that Decision, and no order applying the Decision has been entered in Apple's adversary proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court has indicated that Apple and others are nonetheless bound by the Bankruptcy Court's rulings. In particular, footnote 12 of the Decision provides that \"[r]egardless of the usage of 'Joint Defendant' or 'Non-Joint Defendant', the determination in sections B and C of the Discussion apply to all defendants that raise or join in the arguments addressed. Decision at 11 n.12.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court has not hesitated to apply the law of the case doctrine in other adversary proceedings and has stated its view that the doctrine applies regardless of whether parties were involved in the prior litigation. *See Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133.\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n### **I. Legal Standard.**\n\nDistrict courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Whether to grant leave to appeal is within the district court's discretion. *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\nIn exercising their discretion, district courts look to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and grant leave where (1) the challenged order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. *In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp*., 333 B.R. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *see also Balintulo v. Daimler AG*, 727 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"When a ruling satisfies these criteria and involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, then the district court should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal.\") (internal quotations omitted).\n\nThe first prong of section 1292(b) is satisfied where reversal of the bankruptcy court's order could result in dismissal of the action, where reversal, although not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the conduct of the action, or where the issue has precedential value for a large number of cases. *Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc*., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 5405696, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).\n\nThe second prong is satisfied where there is a genuine doubt as to whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard. *Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada*, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), *aff'd*, 543 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). Such doubt may arise from conflicting authority on the issue or if the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit. *Id.*\n\nThe third prong is satisfied where the appeal could advance or shorten the time required for trial. *Id.* at \\*7.\n\n### **II. The Court Should Grant Leave to Appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Decision.**\n\nHere, the Court should grant Apple leave to appeal the Decision because all prongs of section 1292 are satisfied with respect to each of the questions presented.\n\n## **A. Whether Mr. Despins Can Avoid Transfers by Non-Debtor Entities is a Dispositive Legal Issue Across All of His Avoidance Actions.**\n\nEach of the more than 300 avoidance actions that Mr. Despins has commenced advances the novel legal theory that he can avoid transfers made by alleged non-debtor alter egos of Mr. Kwok. If this theory is fundamentally flawed, as Apple and others contend, then all of his actions are subject to dismissal. This issue is one of first impression in the Second Circuit and its resolution would be outcome-determinative.\n\nNeither the Bankruptcy Court nor Mr. Despins cites to a single decision by any court in the Second Circuit allowing a bankruptcy trustee to assert a claim under sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid a transfer made by a non-debtor entity. There is no binding precedent on the issue, and lower court decisions in the Second Circuit have rejected the Mr. Despins' liability theory. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Mina*, Adv. No. 21-0213-PRW, 2022 WL 2657481, at \\*1, \\*3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022) (trustee sought substantive consolidation of a debtor and nondebtor to acquire standing to challenge a transfer made by the non-debtor); *Pavers & Road Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC*, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"Just because two entities are alter egos does not make them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.\"). The only circuit-level decision on the issue also goes against his position. *See In re Howland*, 674 Fed. App'x 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of trustee's claims to avoid transfers made by alter egos of a debtor).\n\nMr. Despins attempts to use state law alter ego liability to achieve substantive consolidation of Mr. Kwok and non-debtor entities, but there is no binding precedent under Second Circuit or Delaware law allowing him to do so. Rather, the weight of precedent indicates that alter ego liability under Delaware law means vicarious liability only and does not result in a merger of the debtor and the alter ego. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re RS Air, LLC*, 651 B.R. 538, 545 n.5 (BAP 9th Cir. 2023) (applying Delaware law and holding that \"[a]lthough the alter ego doctrine requires a showing that the two entities 'operated as a single economic entity,' [] the result is not to deem the entities the same, but to hold one liable for the other's debts\") (internal citation omitted); *Blair v. Infineon Techs. AG*, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (D. Del. 2010) (\"The alter ego doctrine for piercing the corporate veil allows derivative liability to be placed upon a corporation's individuals.\").\n\nDespite ordering briefing on these very issues, the Bankruptcy Court punted on ruling on the parties' arguments in its Decision. However, that does not preclude this Court from deciding those same issues because they were actually litigated. *See Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co.*, 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[W]e have discretion to considered issues that were raised, briefed, and argued in the District Court, but that were not reached there.\"); *see also Baker v. Dorfman*, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the court is more likely to exercise its discretion to review an issue not decided below where (1) consideration of the issue is necessary to avoid manifest injustice or (2) where the issue is purely legal and does not require additional fact-finding). A ruling on purely legal issues that were extensively briefed and but not addressed by the Bankruptcy Court is both appropriate and necessary to avoid manifest injustice.\n\nFurther, just as the Bankruptcy Court *sua sponte* decided issues it found to be controlling, so too can this Court. *See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp.*, 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"[W]e have discretion to consider and decide sua sponte a dispositive issue of law that, taking a plaintiff's allegations to be true, would prevent a plaintiff from recovering.\"). Indeed, given that this Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's legal conclusions under a *de novo* standard of review, *In re Hyman*, 502 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007), it makes no practical difference whether the Bankruptcy Court ruled on the issues presented by the parties, as this Court would be starting its own analysis from scratch anyways.\n\nAs for the legal issues the Bankruptcy Court did address, those issues were raised and decided in Mr. Despins' favor *sua sponte* without any notice or opportunity to be heard. *See Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp.*, 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (district court's ruling that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction was erroneous where it acted *sua sponte* without affording the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard). In fact, the Bankruptcy Court advanced arguments that Mr. Despins himself did not advocate and found those arguments to be dispositive in ruling in his favor. *See Akande v. U.S. Marshal Serv.*, No. 11-cv-1125 (VLB), 2018 WL 10667611, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2018) (\"[C]ourts are neutral arbiters and not advocates for parties. The role of the court is to decide which party is correct, not to research, analyze, and advance the claims of any party against that of another party.\").\n\nPutting aside the Bankruptcy Court's assisting Mr. Despins in reframing his actual allegations, the Bankruptcy Court's interpretations of Mr. Despins' pleadings are fundamentally flawed and require redress.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court's reading of the Mr. Despins' allegations as pleading Mr. Kwok himself—and not his non-debtor affiliates—made the transfers in question defies reality and common sense. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (\"[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw upon its experience and common sense.\"). If the challenged transfers were transfers made directly by Mr. Kwok to the defendants, then it would be wholly unnecessary for Mr. Despins to mention any of the non-debtor entities or resort to an alter ego theory of liability. But Mr. Despins expressly includes allegations regarding those entities' being alter egos precisely because the challenged transfers came from accounts belonging to the Non-Debtor Entities. No amount of liberal interpretation of Mr. Despins' pleadings can alter the reality of how the funds flowed.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court also applied a novel but erroneous interpretation of *Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.*, 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018) to justify its reading of Mr. Despins' allegations. In *Merit*, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of evaluating the applicability of the statutory safe harbor contained in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer at issue is the overarching transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid, ignoring separate component parts. *Id.*\n\nat 370. But that decision applies to a *defense* based on section 546(e)—nowhere in *Merit* did the Supreme Court extend its holding to evaluating *claims* under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Nor did the Bankruptcy Court cite any other case applying *Merit* in the same way it did.\n\nAbsent an interlocutory appeal, Apple and other defendants would be stuck with the Decision and its erroneous legal conclusions on threshold issues of first impression. Both the (i) issues that were briefed and not decided by the Bankruptcy Court and (ii) issues that were never briefed but decided *sua sponte* by the Bankruptcy Code present controlling legal issues as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and this Court's addressing those issues would materially advance the hundreds of avoidance actions that Mr. Despins has commenced.\n\n## **B. The Law of the Case Doctrine Has Been Erroneously Applied to Facilitate a Shortcut Across Mr. Despins' Avoidance Actions.**\n\nInterlocutory review is also both necessary and appropriate to resolve the threshold legal issue of whether the law of the case doctrine applies to the Bankruptcy Court's rulings, including its alter ego rulings and the Decision. The Bankruptcy Court avoided answering this question in its Decision but the parties undoubtedly litigated the issue and it meets the requirements of section 1292(b) for consideration on appeal.\n\nThe law of the case doctrine is \"a discretionary rule of practice.\" *In re PHC Assocs.*, 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts decline to apply the doctrine where there is clear error or manifest injustice would result. *U.S. v. Quintieri*, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002); *Casey v. U.S.*, 161 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 2001).\n\nThe doctrine \"may apply to different adversary proceedings brought in the same bankruptcy case, provided that all the requirements of the doctrine – including identity of the parties – are met.\" *In re Brizinova*, 588 B.R. 311, 324 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also In re Schultz*, 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (doctrine applies only to the \"same litigation or to different lawsuits *between the parties*\") (emphasis in original); *In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.*, 310 B.R. 500, 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (district court's ruling in class action is not binding on trustee because she was not a party to that action).\n\nHere, however, Mr. Despins argues that the Bankruptcy Court's rulings that certain nondebtor affiliates are alter egos of Mr. Kwok—which rulings were entered in adversary proceedings to which Apple was not a party—are nonetheless binding on Apple. The Bankruptcy Court has indicated it agrees with that argument. *See Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133.\n\nApple and numerous other defendants in Mr. Despins' avoidance actions were never parties or had any relationship to the parties in his alter ego actions, and thus Mr. Despins cannot use res judicata or collateral estoppel to bind those defendants. *Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon*, 310 F.3d 280, 286-88 (2d Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, he and the Bankruptcy Court will seek to bind them under the law of the case doctrine.\n\nTo Apple's knowledge, the Second Circuit has not addressed a situation where a trustee attempts to use a ruling in one adversary proceeding to bind hundreds of defendants in hundreds of different adversary proceedings of a different nature under the law of the case doctrine, and where res judicata and collateral estoppel would not otherwise bind those defendants.\n\nResolution of this issue would materially advance each of the avoidance actions by clarifying Mr. Despins' burden of proof. If this Court rules that the Bankruptcy Court's alter ego rulings are *not* law of the case, then Mr. Despins would need to plead and prove that each of the transferor non-debtors at issue in his complaints is an alter ego of Mr. Kwok before he can avoid any transfer made by any non-debtor.\n\nBy the same token, a ruling by this Court as to whether the law of the case doctrine binds Apple and other defendants who did not participate in the briefing culminating in the Decision would inform whether the Decision has any applicability in Apple's and other defendants' separate adversary proceedings. That too would save party and judicial resources in litigating the issue and help speed up the resolution of the avoidance actions.\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor these reasons, the Court should grant Apple leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal addressing the questions identified above.\n\nDated: March 18, 2025 New York, New York */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: [george.angelich@afslaw.com](mailto:george.angelich@afslaw.com) [eric.roman@afslaw.com](mailto:eric.roman@afslaw.com) patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: [jin.yan@afslaw.com](mailto:jin.yan@afslaw.com)\n\n*Counsel for Apple Inc.*\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on March 18, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: New York, New York March 18, 2025\n\n> */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院）\n\nIn re:（关于：）\n\nHO WAN KWOK, et al.,（Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等人，）\n\nDebtors.（债务人。）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,（Luc A. Despins（第11章破产受托人），）\n\nPlaintiff,（原告，）\n\nv.（诉）\n\nAPPLE INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, BERNARDO ENRIQUEZ, CHUNGUANG HAN, and MEI GUO,（Apple Inc.（苹果公司）、Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）、Alex Hadjicharalambous、Bernardo Enriquez、Chunguang Han（韩春光）以及 Mei Guo（郭美），）\n\nDefendants.（被告。）\n\nAPPLE INC. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PURSUE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL（苹果公司寻求提起中间上诉之许可的动议）\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, appellant Apple Inc. (\"Apple\") moves for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's Memorandum of Decision and Order (I) Denying Joint Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (II) Denying in Part Other Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; and (III) Overruling in Part Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.'s Objection to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the \"Decision\") [BK Dkt. No. 4189], a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1. [1]（依据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 及《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》（Fed. R. Bankr. P.）第 8004 条，上诉人 Apple Inc.（「苹果」）提出动议，请求准许其就破产法院的《关于 (I) 驳回联合被告的撤案动议或根据答辩状作出判决的动议；(II) 部分驳回其他被告的撤案动议；以及 (III) 部分驳回 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 对受托人根据答辩状作出判决的动议的异议的决定与裁定备忘录》（下称「《裁决》」）[BK Dkt. No. 4189] 提起中间上诉，该文件的副本作为附件 1 附于本动议之后。[1]）\n\nChapter 11（第11章）\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)（案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)）\n\n(Jointly Administered)（（合并审理））\n\nAdv. Proc. No. 24-05060（附带诉讼编号：24-05060）\n\n[1] Filings in the main bankruptcy case are cited as BK Dkt. No. __. Filings in Apple's adversary proceeding are cited as AP Dkt. No. __.（[1] 主破产案中的案卷文件引述为 BK Dkt. No. __。苹果附带诉讼中的案卷文件引述为 AP Dkt. No. __。）\n\nLuc A. Despins 是在个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok 的第11章破产案中指定的破产受托人。自 2024年2月 以来，Despins 先生已在破产法院提起了大约 300 起欺诈性转让诉讼。\n\nDespins 先生似乎起诉了所有人——从像苹果这样的大型公司到当地的园艺绿化商和搬家公司——以追回非债务人企业客户在常规商业过程中支付的款项，其依据的理论是：这些非债务人是 Kwok 先生的替身（alter egos），且它们所支付的款项实际上是对 Kwok 先生财产的转让。\n\nDespins 先生试图扩大《破产法典》欺诈性转让条款适用范围的做法是史无前例的。他颠覆了传统的商业预期，使得每一笔付款都可能成为受让人所不知晓的第三方的潜在欺诈性转让，从而对商业运作造成了以往难以想象的潜在破坏。通常情况下，善意行事且毫不知情的第三方作为后手受让人受到《破产法典》的保护。然而，根据 Despins 先生的理论，这些保护将被彻底抹杀，因为只要存在关于公司所有人在破产申请前存在不当行为的合理指控，破产受托人现在就能够追索任何闭锁型公司（closely held company）所作出的付款。\n\n2024年9月，一组被告采取措施，协调应对 Despins 先生新颖且未经检验的理论。他们与 Despins 先生共同向破产法院提出建议，就他们一致认为属于 Despins 先生所有撤销之诉所共有的某些先决性问题提交书面意见。最终，破产法院准许就 4 项约定的争议焦点提交书面意见。\n\n近期，破产法院就联合书面意见作出了《裁决》，并认定 Despins 先生可以撤销由非债务人关联实体所作出的转让，理由是这些实体仅仅是 Kwok 先生的替身和工具。在得出这一结论时，破产法院将各方按照破产法院指示广泛论述的主张搁置一旁，转而采信了破产法院自己在书面意见提交和口头辩论结束后依职权（sua sponte）提出的主张。\n\n苹果并非促成该《裁决》的联合书面意见的参与方之一，因为苹果此前已提交了撤案动议，并提出了超出联合书面意见中 4 项约定争议焦点范围的主张。苹果的动议仍处于待决状态，且该《裁决》尚未在苹果的附带诉讼中录入。尽管如此，破产法院在其《裁决》中明确表示，其意图使苹果及其他人受其裁定的约束。事实上，破产法院已经适用了案件事由规则（law of the case doctrine），使某一附带诉讼中的被告受到在这些被告并非当事人的另一独立附带诉讼中所作裁定的约束。\n\n本中间上诉涉及初次审理的事项（matters of first impression）。Second Circuit（第二巡回区）内没有任何法院曾授权破产受托人利用州法关于替身责任的理论来撤销由非债务人所作出的转让。\n\n没有什么比在尚未就 Despins 先生所依据的基础责任理论的可行性获得上诉法院裁定的情况下，对数百起撤销之诉进行诉讼更加低效的了。如果破产法院的《裁决》被推翻，那么 Despins 先生的所有撤销之诉都将面临驳回。如果该《裁决》得到维持，那么许多撤销之诉很可能会开始走向和解。无论哪种结果，上诉都将实质性地推进该诉讼的最终终结。\n\n法院应当准许本中间上诉，并解决影响 Despins 先生 300 多起撤销之诉（包括针对苹果提起的撤销之诉）每一件诉讼可行性的先决性法律问题。\n\nQUESTIONS PRESENTED（提出的争议焦点）\n\n1. Whether the state law doctrine of alter ego liability can be used to avoid transfers made by non-debtor entities that are alleged to be affiliates of a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.（1. 州法关于替身责任的原则是否可用于撤销据称属于《破产法典》下债务人关联方的非债务人实体所作出的转让。）\n\n2. Whether the Bankruptcy Court can use the law of the case doctrine to bind defendants in adversary proceedings to rulings made in the main bankruptcy case or different adversary proceedings in which those defendants were not parties.（2. 破产法院是否可以利用案件事由规则，使附带诉讼中的被告受到主破产案或这些被告并非当事人的其他附带诉讼中所作裁定的约束。）\n\nBACKGROUND（背景）\n\nKwok 先生于 2022年2月15日 申请破产。BK Dkt. No. 1。Despins 先生于 2022年7月8日 被指定。BK Dkt. No. 523。\n\n自 2024年2月 开始，Despins 先生提起了数百起附带诉讼，以撤销并追回据称由 Kwok 先生关联的非债务人实体所作出的欺诈性转让。见《裁决》第 4-5 页。\n\n这些非债务人实体是 Despins 先生为了宣告它们是 Kwok 先生的替身而提起的独立附带诉讼中的被告。参见例如：Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005；Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5018；Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013；Despins v. ACA Capital Group Ltd., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 24-05249；Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5023；Despins v. AA Global Ventures Ltd., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 05322。\n\n其中一些替身附带诉讼在 Despins 先生提起其撤销之诉之前很久就已经提起，且已有终审判决宣告某些非债务人是 Kwok 先生的替身。参见例如：Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 134；Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5018, Dkt. No. 35；Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 297。\n\nDespins 先生于 2024年2月10日 对苹果提起了起诉状。AP Dkt. No. 1。苹果在该附带诉讼中出庭，并于 2024年6月28日 提交了撤案动议。AP Dkt. Nos. 28, 32。\n\n2024年9月6日，在各独立撤销之诉中的一组被告（下称「联合被告」）请求与破产法院举行案件进展会议，以讨论就 Despins 先生所有撤销之诉所共有的法律问题提交书面意见事宜。见《裁决》第 6-7 页。破产法院准许了该请求，随后作出一项命令，安排就 4 项争议焦点提交书面意见：\n\n- i. Despins 先生是否可以撤销非债务人实体的初始转让；\n- ii. 适用法律是否允许进行反向揭开公司面纱或替身认定；\n- iii. 适用法律下反向揭开公司面纱或替身认定的法律效力；以及\n- iv. 反向揭开公司面纱或替身的认定是否可以溯及适用。\n同上，第 7 页。\n\n其他附带诉讼中的被告获准加入联合被告提交的书面意见中，且部分被告确实加入了。同上，第 8 页。苹果并未参与联合被告的书面意见。在苹果的附带诉讼中，未作出任何可能使苹果成为受联合书面意见结果约束的当事人的裁定。\n\n联合被告的书面意见提出了苹果在其撤案动议中提出的部分相同主张。对比 BK Dkt. No. 3713 与 AP Dkt. No. 32。然而，由于苹果不受破产法院命令限定的 4 项争议焦点的限制，苹果提出了额外的主张。尽管如此，Despins 先生对苹果撤案动议的反对意见大部分直接复制粘贴了他对联合被告书面意见的反对意见中的主张。对比 BK Dkt. No. 3803 与 AP Dkt. No. 61。\n\n2024年11月27日，破产法院将联合被告书面意见的听证会排期在 2025年1月15日。BK Dkt. No. 3857。破产法院将苹果撤案动议的听证会安排在同一天。AP Dkt. No. 63。\n\n2025年1月5日，破产法院应 Despins 先生的请求举行了案件进展会议，以讨论定于 2025年1月15日 举行的多起撤案动议听证会的形式。见《裁决》第 8 页。由于破产法院裁定其仅听取关于作为联合被告书面意见标的的 4 项争议焦点的口头辩论，而不听取苹果提出的任何其他争议焦点，苹果提交了延期审理其撤案动议听证会的动议，并获得了破产法院的准许。AP Dkt. Nos. 66, 67。2025年1月15日 的听证会在苹果没有就联合被告的 4 项争议焦点参与的情况下继续进行。见《裁决》第 9 页。苹果从未属于联合被告之一，从未同意过这 4 项约定的争议焦点，也从未同意限制其请求撤案的主张。\n\n破产法院于 2025年3月4日 作出了其《裁决》。苹果的撤案动议仍处于待决状态，口头辩论尚未排期。\n\n该《裁决》回避了联合被告与 Despins 先生广泛论述的争议焦点。对比《裁决》与 BK Dkt. Nos. 3713, 3803, 3848。在这些争议焦点中，包括破产法院认定某些非债务人转让人是 Kwok 先生替身的裁定是否根据案件事由规则具有约束力，以及特拉华州关于替身责任的法律。\n\n相反，破产法院依职权提出了从未经由各方提交书面意见或辩论、但破产法院认为具有决定性的争议焦点。在这些争议焦点中，包括了 Despins 先生主张了实际所有权（beneficial ownership）责任理论这一主张——而这一主张实际上从未由 Despins 先生本人提出过。\n\n尽管破产法院在其《裁决》中指出，苹果并非最终达成该《裁决》的书面意见或口头辩论的当事人，且在苹果的附带诉讼中尚未录入适用该《裁决》的裁定，但破产法院已表明，苹果及其他人仍受破产法院裁定的约束。特别是，《裁决》的脚注 12 规定：「无论使用『联合被告』还是『非联合被告』，『讨论』部分 B 节和 C 节中的认定均适用于提出或加入所涉及主张的所有被告。」见《裁决》第 11 页脚注 12。\n\n破产法院在其他附带诉讼中毫不犹豫地适用了案件事由规则，并表达了其观点，即无论当事人此前是否参与了先前的诉讼，该规则均予以适用。参见 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 133。\n\nARGUMENT（论辩）\n\nI. Legal Standard.（I. 法律标准。）\n\nDistrict courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Whether to grant leave to appeal is within the district court's discretion. Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).（联邦地区法院拥有管辖权审理针对破产法院中间裁定的上诉。28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)。是否准许上诉属于地区法院的自由裁量权范围。Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (Eastern District of New York（纽约东区）, 2018）。）\n\n在行使自由裁量权时，地区法院参考 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)，并在满足下列条件时准予上诉许可：(1) 受质疑的裁定涉及支配性法律问题；(2) 存在重大意见分歧的合理根据；以及 (3) 立即上诉可能会实质性推进诉讼的最终终结。In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 333 B.R. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院） 2005)；并参见 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院） 2013)（“当一项裁决符合这些标准，且涉及新的法律问题或具有特殊重大意义时，地区法院应毫不犹豫地核准中间上诉。”）（内部引文省略）。\n\n第 1292(b) 条的第一项要件在以下情形下得以满足：破产法院裁定的被改判可能导致驳回起诉；被改判虽未导致驳回起诉，但可能对诉讼的进行产生重大影响；或者该问题对大量案件具有先例价值。Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 5405696, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013)。\n\n第二项要件在破产法院是否适用了正确的法律标准存在真正存疑时得以满足。Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 543 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008)。此类疑问可能源于该问题上存在相互冲突的权威先例，或者该问题对第二巡回法院而言极为棘手且属于首例案件（first impression）。同上。\n\n第三项要件在上诉可能推进或缩短审判所需时间时得以满足。同上，第 *7 页。\n\nII. 本院应当准予对破产法院裁决提起上诉的许可。\n\n在此，本院应当准许 Apple（苹果公司）对该 Decision（裁决）提起上诉，因为就所提出的每一项问题而言，均已满足第 1292 条的所有要件。\n\nA. Despins 先生能否撤销非债务人实体的转让行为，是其所有撤销之诉中的决定性法律问题。\n\nMr. Despins（德斯平斯先生）提起的 300 多起撤销之诉中的每一起，都提出了一项新颖的法律理论，即他可以撤销据称是 Mr. Kwok（郭文贵先生）的非债务人另我主体（alter egos）所作出的转让。正如苹果公司及其他方所主张的那样，如果该理论存在根本性缺陷，那么他的所有诉讼均应被驳回。该问题在第二巡回法院属于首例问题，且其解决将对案件结果起决定性作用。\n\n破产法院和德斯平斯先生均未引用第二巡回法院辖区内任何法院允许破产受托人根据《Bankruptcy Code（破产法典）》第 548 条和第 549 条提出主张以撤销非债务人实体所作转让的任何判例。在该问题上不存在具有约束力的先例，且第二巡回法院辖区内的下级法院判决均已否定了德斯平斯先生的责任理论。参见，例如，In re Mina, Adv. No. 21-0213-PRW, 2022 WL 2657481, at *1, *3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.（纽约西区联邦破产法院） July 8, 2022)（受托人寻求债务人与非债务人的实质合并，以获得质疑非债务人所作转让的起诉资格）；Pavers & Road Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦破产法院） 2015)（“仅仅因为两个实体互为另我主体，并不会使它们都成为《破产法典》项下的债务人。”）。关于该问题的唯一巡回法院层级判决亦与其立场相悖。参见 In re Howland, 674 Fed. App'x 482, 487 (6th Cir.（第六巡回上诉法院） 2017)（维持驳回受托人关于撤销债务人另我主体所作转让的主张）。\n\n德斯平斯先生企图利用州法的另我责任来实现郭先生与非债务人实体的实质合并，但第二巡回法院或 Delaware（特拉华州）法律项下均无任何具有约束力的先例允许其这样做。相反，大量先例表明，特拉华州法律项下的另我责任仅指代位责任（vicarious liability），并不导致债务人与另我主体的合并。参见，例如，In re RS Air, LLC, 651 B.R. 538, 545 n.5 (BAP 9th Cir.（第九巡回破产上诉审判庭） 2023)（适用特拉华州法并认定“尽管另我原则要求证明这两个实体‘作为单一经济实体运作’，但其结果并非将各实体视为同一主体，而是令一方对另一方的债务承担责任”）（内部引文省略）；Blair v. Infineon Techs. AG, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (D. Del.（特拉华区联邦地区法院） 2010)（“用于揭开公司面纱的另我原则允许将派生责任归于公司的个人。”）。\n\n尽管破产法院责令就正是这些问题提交书面辩论意见，但其在裁决中却回避了对各方当事人主张的裁决。然而，这并不妨碍本院对这些相同问题作出判定，因为这些问题已被实际争讼。参见 Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2001)（“我们有权酌情审理在地区法院已提出、已提交辩论书并已辩论、但未在该院得到处理的问题。”）；并参见 Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000)（认定在以下情况下法院更倾向于行使自由裁量权来审查下级法院未判定的问题：(1) 为避免显失公正而有必要考虑该问题，或 (2) 该问题纯属法律问题且无需额外的案件事实调查）。就已被广泛提交书面辩论但未被破产法院处理的纯法律问题作出裁定，不仅恰当，而且是避免显失公正所必需的。\n\n此外，正如破产法院依职权（sua sponte）裁定了其认为具有支配性的问题一样，本院同样可以这样做。参见 Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993)（“我们有权酌情依职权审理并裁定某一决定性的法律问题，该问题在假设原告的主张属实的情况下，将阻碍原告获得救济。”）。事实上，鉴于本院按照全面审查标准（de novo standard of review）审查破产法院的法律结论，In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007)，破产法院是否对各方当事人提出的问题作出了裁定，在实际中并无区别，因为本院无论如何都将从头重新开始分析。\n\n至于破产法院确实处理了的法律问题，那些问题是在没有任何通知或听取陈述意见机会的情况下，被依职权提出并作出了有利于德斯平斯先生的裁定。参见 Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018)（地区法院在未向当事人提供通知及陈述意见机会的情况下依职权行事，其认定自身缺乏补充管辖权的裁定是错误的）。事实上，破产法院提出了德斯平斯先生本人并未主张的论点，并认定这些论点具有决定性，从而作出了有利于他的裁决。参见 Akande v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 11-cv-1125 (VLB), 2018 WL 10667611, at *1 (D. Conn.（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院） Aug. 21, 2018)（“法院是中立的裁判者，而非当事人的倡导者。法院的职责是判定哪一方是正确的，而不是去研究、分析和替任何一方推进针对另一方的主张。”）。\n\n且不论破产法院协助德斯平斯先生重构其真实诉称主张这一问题，破产法院对德斯平斯先生诉状的解读存在根本性缺陷，亟待纠正。\n\n破产法院将德斯平斯先生的诉称解读为是郭先生本人——而非其非债务人关联方——进行了涉案转让，这违背了现实和常理。参见 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（“判定一份诉状是否阐明了具有合理可信度的主张取决于具体语境，需要审查法院借鉴其经验和常识。”）。如果受质疑的转让是由郭先生直接向各被告作出的转让，那么德斯平斯先生就完全没有必要提及任何非债务人实体或求助于另我责任理论。然而，德斯平斯先生之所以明确包含关于这些实体属于另我主体的诉称，恰恰是因为受质疑的转让款项来自属于非债务人实体的账户。对德斯平斯先生诉状的任何宽松解释，都无法改变资金流向的客观事实。\n\n破产法院还适用了一种关于 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018) 的新颖但错误的解释，以支持其对德斯平斯先生诉称的解读。在 Merit 案中，Supreme Court（联邦最高法院）认定，为了评估《破产法典》第 546(e) 条所载法定安全港的适用性，涉案转让是指受托人寻求撤销的整体转让，而忽略单独的组成部分。同上，\n\n第 370 页。但该裁决适用于基于第 546(e) 条的抗辩——最高法院在 Merit 案中绝未将其判决要旨扩展到评估 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第12条）项下的诉讼请求。破产法院也未引用任何其他以相同方式适用 Merit 案的判例。\n\n若无中间上诉，苹果公司和其他被告将被迫受制于该裁决及其在首例先决问题上的错误法律结论。无论是 (i) 经书面辩论但未由破产法院判定的问题，还是 (ii) 从未进行书面辩论而由破产法院依职权判定的问题，都构成了存在重大意见分歧的合理根据的支配性法律问题，且本院处理这些问题将对德斯平斯先生提起的数百起撤销之诉产生实质性推进。\n\nB. 案件既定法则原则被错误适用，以便在德斯平斯先生的撤销之诉中走捷径。\n\n为了解决案件既定法则原则（law of the case doctrine）是否适用于破产法院裁决（包括其另我主体裁决及本裁决）这一先决法律问题，进行中间审查同样是必要且恰当的。破产法院在其裁决中回避了回答这一问题，但各方当事人无疑对该问题进行了充分争辩，且该问题符合第 1292(b) 条关于上诉审理的各项要求。\n\n案件既定法则原则是一项“具有自由裁量性质的诉讼实践规则”。In re PHC Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991)。在存在明显错误或将导致显失公正的情况下，法院拒绝适用该原则。U.S. v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002)；Casey v. U.S., 161 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 2001)。\n\n该原则“可适用于在同一破产案件中提起的不同对抗性诉讼程序（adversary proceedings），前提是满足该原则的所有要件——包括当事人同一性”。In re Brizinova, 588 B.R. 311, 324 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018)；并参见 In re Schultz, 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000)（该原则仅适用于“同一诉讼或当事人之间的不同诉讼”）（原文强调）；In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 310 B.R. 500, 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)（地区法院在集体诉讼中的裁定对受托人不具有约束力，因为其并非该诉讼的当事人）。\n\n然而在本案中，德斯平斯先生主张，破产法院关于某些非债务人关联方为郭先生的另我主体的裁决——这些裁决是在苹果公司并非当事人的对抗性诉讼程序中作出的——仍然对苹果公司具有约束力。破产法院已表示同意该主张。参见 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 133。\n\n苹果公司以及德斯平斯先生撤销之诉中的众多其他被告，从未成为其另我主体诉讼中的当事人，也与这些诉讼中的当事人没有任何关系，因此德斯平斯先生无法利用既判力（res judicata）或争点排除（collateral estoppel）来约束这些被告。Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286-88 (2d Cir. 2002)。尽管如此，他与破产法院仍企图根据案件既定法则原则对他们进行约束。\n\n据Apple（苹果公司）所知，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）尚未处理过受托人试图根据案件法理原则（law of the case doctrine），利用一项对抗性程序中的裁定来约束数百起不同性质的对抗性程序中的数百名被告，且在其他情况下既判力（res judicata）和争点排除（collateral estoppel）不会约束这些被告的情形。\n\n解决这一问题将通过明确Despins先生的举证责任，实质性推进每起撤销之诉。如果本法院裁定破产法院关于另我（alter ego）的裁定不构成案件法理，那么Despins先生在其起诉书中主张的每个作为转让方的非债务人，在能够撤销任何非债务人进行的任何转让之前，都需要主张并证明其为Kwok（郭文贵）先生的另我。\n\n出于同样的原因，本法院关于案件法理原则是否约束苹果公司以及未参与形成该裁定的简报程序之其他被告的裁定，将明确该裁定在苹果公司及其他被告各自独立的对抗性程序中是否具有任何适用性。这同样将在该问题的诉讼中节约当事人及司法资源，并有助于加快撤销之诉的解决。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，法院应准予苹果公司就上述确定的问题提起中间上诉。\n\n日期：March 18, 2025\n纽约州纽约市\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542)\nEric Roman（特许出庭）\nPatrick Feeney（特许出庭）\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212.457.5423\n电子邮箱：george.angelich@afslaw.com\neric.roman@afslaw.com\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n及\n\nJin Yan（特许出庭）\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\n电话：202.778.6442\n电子邮箱：jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\nApple Inc.（苹果公司）代理律师\n\n送达证书\n\n本人证明，于 March 18, 2025，本人已使用 CM/ECF 归档系统向法庭书记官提交了上述文件的真实正确副本，该系统将向所有记录在案的律师发送该归档通知。\n\n日期：纽约州纽约市\nMarch 18, 2025\n\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich","key_entities":["Despins","Kwok","Je","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok","HCHK","Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":32,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":35,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":61,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":63,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":134,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":297,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3857,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4189,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4142,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:55:48"}