{"id":"court_ctb_4230_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4230,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nDebtors.\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC.,\n\nDefendant.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span>Adv. Proc. No. 24-05117\n\n# **META PLATFORMS, INC. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PURSUE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, appellant Meta Platforms, Inc. (\"Meta\") moves for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's *Memorandum of Decision and Order (I) Denying Joint Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (II) Denying in Part Other Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; and (III) Overruling in Part Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.'s Objection to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings* (the \"Decision\") [BK Dkt. No. 4189], a copy of which is attached as **Exhibit 1**. [1](#page-0-0)\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span>[<sup>1</sup>](#page-0-1) Filings in the main bankruptcy case are cited as BK Dkt. No. \\_\\_. Filings in Meta's adversary proceeding are cited as AP Dkt. No. \\_\\_.\n\nLuc A. Despins is the bankruptcy trustee appointed in the chapter 11 bankruptcy case of individual debtor Ho Wan Kwok. Since February 2024, Mr. Despins has filed approximately 300 fraudulent transfer lawsuits in the Bankruptcy Court.\n\nMr. Despins has seemingly sued everyone—from large companies like Apple to local landscapers and movers—to recover ordinary course business payments made by non-debtor corporate customers under the theory that those non-debtors are alter egos of Mr. Kwok and that the payments they made were actually transfers of Mr. Kwok's property.\n\nMr. Despins' attempt to expand the reach of the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provisions is unprecedented. He has created a previously unthinkable potential for disrupting business by upending conventional commercial expectations and rendering every payment a potential fraudulent transfer of a third party unknown to the transferee. Typically, unsuspecting third parties acting in good faith are protected by the Bankruptcy Code as subsequent transferees. Under Mr. Despins' theory, however, those protections will be obliterated because bankruptcy trustees will now be able to reach payments made by any closely held company so long as there is a credible allegation that the company's owner engaged in pre-petition bad acts.\n\nIn September 2024, a group of defendants took steps to coordinate their response to Mr. Despins' novel and untested theories. Together with Mr. Despins, they jointly approached the Bankruptcy Court to suggest briefing certain threshold issues that they agreed were common to all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions. Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court allowed briefing on 4 stipulated issues.\n\nRecently, the Bankruptcy Court issued its Decision on the joint briefing and concluded that Mr. Despins can avoid transfers made by non-debtor affiliates because those entities were mere alter egos and instrumentalities of Mr. Kwok. In so concluding, the Bankruptcy Court sidelined arguments that the parties briefed extensively—at the Bankruptcy Court's direction—and instead relied on arguments that the Bankruptcy Court raised *sua sponte* after the close of briefing and oral argument.\n\nApple was not one of the participants in the joint briefing resulting in the Decision because it had previously filed its motion to dismiss and raised arguments beyond the scope of the 4 stipulated issues in the joint briefing. Apple's motion remains pending and the Decision has not been entered in Apple's adversary proceeding. Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Court has expressly stated in its Decision that it intends to bind Apple and others to its ruling. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court has already applied the law of the case doctrine to bind defendants in one adversary proceeding to rulings made in a separate adversary proceeding to which those defendants were not parties.\n\nThis interlocutory appeal concerns matters of first impression. No court in the Second Circuit has authorized a bankruptcy trustee to avoid transfers made by non-debtors using a state law alter ego theory of liability.\n\nNothing could be more inefficient than litigating hundreds of avoidance actions without obtaining an appellate ruling on the viability of Mr. Despins' underlying theory of liability. If the Bankruptcy Court's Decision is reversed, then all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions would be subject to dismissal. If the Decision is affirmed, then many of the avoidance actions would likely start to settle. Either way, an appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of that litigation.\n\nThe Court should grant this interlocutory appeal and address the threshold legal issues that affect the viability each of Mr. Despins' 300+ avoidance actions, including the one brought against Apple.\n\n3\n\n### **QUESTIONS PRESENTED**\n\n1. Whether the state law doctrine of alter ego liability can be used to avoid transfers made by non-debtor entities that are alleged to be affiliates of a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n2. Whether the Bankruptcy Court can use the law of the case doctrine to bind defendants in adversary proceedings to rulings made in the main bankruptcy case or different adversary proceedings in which those defendants were not parties.\n\n### **BACKGROUND**\n\nMr. Kwok filed for bankruptcy on February 15, 2022. BK Dkt. No. 1. Mr. Despins was appointed on July 8, 2022. BK Dkt. No. 523.\n\nBeginning in February 2024, Mr. Despins commenced hundreds of adversary proceedings to avoid and recover allegedly fraudulent transfers made by non-debtor entities affiliated with Mr. Kwok. Decision at 4-5.\n\nThe non-debtor entities are defendants in separate adversary proceedings filed by Mr. Despins to declare them to be alter egos of Mr. Kwok. *See*, *e.g.*, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005; *Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5018, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013; *Despins v. ACA Capital Group Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 24-05249; *Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5023; *Despins v. AA Global Ventures Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 05322.\n\nSome of these later ego adversary proceedings were filed long before Mr. Despins commenced his avoidance actions and final judgments have already been rendered declaring certain non-debtors to be alter egos of Mr. Kwok. *See*, *e.g.*, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 134; *Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5018, Dkt. No. 35; *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 297.\n\nMr. Despins filed his complaint against Meta on February 10, 2024. AP Dkt. No. 1. Meta appeared in the adversary proceeding and filed its motion to dismiss on June 28, 2024. AP Dkt. Nos. 14, 18.\n\nOn September 6, 2024, a group of defendants in separate avoidance actions (the \"Joint Defendants\") requested a status conference with the Bankruptcy Court to discuss briefing on legal issues common to all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions. Decision at 6-7. The Bankruptcy Court granted the request and later entered an order scheduling briefing on 4 issues:\n\n- i. Whether the Mr. Despins can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n- ii. Whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or alter ego determinations;\n- iii. The effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or alter ego determination; and\n- iv. Whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or alter ego may be applied retroactively.\n\n## *Id.* at 7.\n\nDefendants in other adversary proceedings were allowed to join in the briefing filed by the Joint Defendants, and some did. *Id.* at 8. Meta did not participate in the Joint Defendants briefing. No order was entered in Meta's adversary proceeding which could have made Meta a party who would be bound by the outcome of the joint briefing.\n\nThe Joint Defendants' brief raised some of the same arguments that Meta raised in its motion to dismiss. *Compare* BK Dkt. No. 3713 *with* AP Dkt. No. 18. However, because Meta was not limited to the 4 issues ordered by the Bankruptcy Court, it raised additional arguments. Nonetheless, Mr. Despins' opposition to Meta's motion to dismiss largely copied and pasted arguments from his opposition to the Joint Defendants' brief. *Compare* BK Dkt. No. 3803 *with* AP Dkt. No. 61. *Compare* BK Dkt. No. 3803 *with* AP Dkt. No. 36.\n\nOn November 27, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on the Joint Defendants' briefing for January 15, 2025. BK Dkt. No. 3857. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on Meta's motion to dismiss on the same day. AP Dkt. No. 38.\n\nOn January 5, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court held a status conference at Mr. Despins' request to discuss the format of the hearing on multiple motions to dismiss scheduled for January 15, 2025. Decision at 8. Because the Bankruptcy Court ruled that it would only hear oral argument on the 4 issues that are the subject of the Joint Defendants' briefing and not any of the other issues that Meta raised, Meta filed a motion to continue the hearing on its motion to dismiss, which the Bankruptcy Court granted. AP Dkt. Nos. 41, 42. The January 15, 2025 hearing proceeded without Meta's participation on the Joint Defendants' 4 issues. Decision at 9. Meta has never been one of the Joint Defendants, never consented to the 4 stipulated issues, and never agreed to limit its arguments for dismissal.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court issued its Decision on March 4, 2025. Meta's motion to dismiss remains pending and oral argument has not yet been scheduled.\n\nThe Decision side-steps issues that the Joint Defendants and Mr. Despins briefed extensively. *Compare* Decision *with* BK Dkt. Nos. 3713, 3803, 3848. Among those issues are whether the Bankruptcy Court's rulings determining certain non-debtor transferors are alter egos of Mr. Kwok is binding under the law of the case doctrine and Delaware law regarding alter ego liability.\n\nRather, the Bankruptcy Court *sua sponte* raised issues that were never briefed or argued but that the Bankruptcy Court found to be dispositive. Among those issues is the argumentwhich was never advanced by Mr. Despins himself—that Mr. Despins alleged a beneficial ownership theory of liability.\n\nAlthough the Bankruptcy Court noted in its Decision that Meta was not a party to briefing or oral argument that culminated in that Decision, and no order applying the Decision has been entered in Meta's adversary proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court has indicated that Meta and others are nonetheless bound by the Bankruptcy Court's rulings. In particular, footnote 12 of the Decision provides that \"[r]egardless of the usage of 'Joint Defendant' or 'Non-Joint Defendant', the determination in sections B and C of the Discussion apply to all defendants that raise or join in the arguments addressed. Decision at 11 n.12.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court has not hesitated to apply the law of the case doctrine in other adversary proceedings and has stated its view that the doctrine applies regardless of whether parties were involved in the prior litigation. *See Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133.\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n### **I. Legal Standard.**\n\nDistrict courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Whether to grant leave to appeal is within the district court's discretion. *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\nIn exercising their discretion, district courts look to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and grant leave where (1) the challenged order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. *In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp*., 333 B.R. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *see also Balintulo v. Daimler AG*, 727 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"When a ruling satisfies these criteria and involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, then the district court should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal.\") (internal quotations omitted).\n\nThe first prong of section 1292(b) is satisfied where reversal of the bankruptcy court's order could result in dismissal of the action, where reversal, although not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the conduct of the action, or where the issue has precedential value for a large number of cases. *Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc*., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 5405696, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).\n\nThe second prong is satisfied where there is a genuine doubt as to whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard. *Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada*, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), *aff'd*, 543 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). Such doubt may arise from conflicting authority on the issue or if the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit. *Id.*\n\nThe third prong is satisfied where the appeal could advance or shorten the time required for trial. *Id.* at \\*7.\n\n### **II. The Court Should Grant Leave to Appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Decision.**\n\nHere, the Court should grant Meta leave to appeal the Decision because all prongs of section 1292 are satisfied with respect to each of the questions presented.\n\n## **A. Whether Mr. Despins Can Avoid Transfers by Non-Debtor Entities is a Dispositive Legal Issue Across All of His Avoidance Actions.**\n\nEach of the more than 300 avoidance actions that Mr. Despins has commenced advances the novel legal theory that he can avoid transfers made by alleged non-debtor alter egos of Mr. Kwok. If this theory is fundamentally flawed, as Meta and others contend, then all of his actions are subject to dismissal. This issue is one of first impression in the Second Circuit and its resolution would be outcome-determinative.\n\nNeither the Bankruptcy Court nor Mr. Despins cites to a single decision by any court in the Second Circuit allowing a bankruptcy trustee to assert a claim under sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid a transfer made by a non-debtor entity. There is no binding precedent on the issue, and lower court decisions in the Second Circuit have rejected the Mr. Despins' liability theory. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Mina*, Adv. No. 21-0213-PRW, 2022 WL 2657481, at \\*1, \\*3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022) (trustee sought substantive consolidation of a debtor and nondebtor to acquire standing to challenge a transfer made by the non-debtor); *Pavers & Road Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC*, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"Just because two entities are alter egos does not make them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.\"). The only circuit-level decision on the issue also goes against his position. *See In re Howland*, 674 Fed. App'x 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of trustee's claims to avoid transfers made by alter egos of a debtor).\n\nMr. Despins attempts to use state law alter ego liability to achieve substantive consolidation of Mr. Kwok and non-debtor entities, but there is no binding precedent under Second Circuit or Delaware law allowing him to do so. Rather, the weight of precedent indicates that alter ego liability under Delaware law means vicarious liability only and does not result in a merger of the debtor and the alter ego. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re RS Air, LLC*, 651 B.R. 538, 545 n.5 (BAP 9th Cir. 2023) (applying Delaware law and holding that \"[a]lthough the alter ego doctrine requires a showing that the two entities 'operated as a single economic entity,' [] the result is not to deem the entities the same, but to hold one liable for the other's debts\") (internal citation omitted); *Blair v. Infineon Techs. AG*, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (D. Del. 2010) (\"The alter ego doctrine for piercing the corporate veil allows derivative liability to be placed upon a corporation's individuals.\").\n\nDespite ordering briefing on these very issues, the Bankruptcy Court punted on ruling on\n\nthe parties' arguments in its Decision. However, that does not preclude this Court from deciding those same issues because they were actually litigated. *See Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co.*, 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[W]e have discretion to considered issues that were raised, briefed, and argued in the District Court, but that were not reached there.\"); *see also Baker v. Dorfman*, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the court is more likely to exercise its discretion to review an issue not decided below where (1) consideration of the issue is necessary to avoid manifest injustice or (2) where the issue is purely legal and does not require additional fact-finding). A ruling on purely legal issues that were extensively briefed and but not addressed by the Bankruptcy Court is both appropriate and necessary to avoid manifest injustice.\n\nFurther, just as the Bankruptcy Court *sua sponte* decided issues it found to be controlling, so too can this Court. *See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp.*, 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"[W]e have discretion to consider and decide sua sponte a dispositive issue of law that, taking a plaintiff's allegations to be true, would prevent a plaintiff from recovering.\"). Indeed, given that this Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's legal conclusions under a *de novo* standard of review, *In re Hyman*, 502 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007), it makes no practical difference whether the Bankruptcy Court ruled on the issues presented by the parties, as this Court would be starting its own analysis from scratch anyways.\n\nAs for the legal issues the Bankruptcy Court did address, those issues were raised and decided in Mr. Despins' favor *sua sponte* without any notice or opportunity to be heard. *See Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp.*, 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (district court's ruling that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction was erroneous where it acted *sua sponte* without affording the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard). In fact, the Bankruptcy Court advanced arguments that Mr. Despins himself did not advocate and found those arguments to be dispositive in ruling in his favor. *See Akande v. U.S. Marshal Serv.*, No. 11-cv-1125 (VLB), 2018 WL 10667611, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2018) (\"[C]ourts are neutral arbiters and not advocates for parties. The role of the court is to decide which party is correct, not to research, analyze, and advance the claims of any party against that of another party.\").\n\nPutting aside the Bankruptcy Court's assisting Mr. Despins in reframing his actual allegations, the Bankruptcy Court's interpretations of Mr. Despins' pleadings are fundamentally flawed and require redress.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court's reading of the Mr. Despins' allegations as pleading Mr. Kwok himself—and not his non-debtor affiliates—made the transfers in question defies reality and common sense. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (\"[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw upon its experience and common sense.\"). If the challenged transfers were transfers made directly by Mr. Kwok to the defendants, then it would be wholly unnecessary for Mr. Despins to mention any of the non-debtor entities or resort to an alter ego theory of liability. But Mr. Despins expressly includes allegations regarding those entities' being alter egos precisely because the challenged transfers came from accounts belonging to those entities. No amount of liberal interpretation of the Mr. Despins' pleadings can alter the reality of how the funds flowed.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court also applied a novel but erroneous interpretation of *Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.*, 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018) to justify its reading of Mr. Despins' allegations. In *Merit*, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of evaluating the applicability of the statutory safe harbor contained in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer at issue is the overarching transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid, ignoring separate component parts. *Id.* at 370. But that decision applies to a *defense* based on section 546(e)—nowhere in *Merit* did the\n\nSupreme Court extend its holding to evaluating *claims* under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Nor did the Bankruptcy Court cite any other case applying *Merit* in the same way it did.\n\nAbsent an interlocutory appeal, Meta and other defendants would be stuck with the Decision and its erroneous legal conclusions on threshold issues of first impression. Both the (i) issues that were briefed and not decided by the Bankruptcy Court and (ii) issues that were never briefed but decided *sua sponte* by the Bankruptcy Code present controlling legal issues as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and this Court's addressing those issues would materially advance the hundreds of avoidance actions that Mr. Despins has commenced.\n\n## **B. The Law of the Case Doctrine Has Been Erroneously Applied to Facilitate a Shortcut Across Mr. Despins' Avoidance Actions.**\n\nInterlocutory review is also both necessary and appropriate to resolve the threshold legal issue of whether the law of the case doctrine applies to the Bankruptcy Court's rulings, including its alter ego rulings and the Decision. The Bankruptcy Court avoided answering this question in its Decision but the parties undoubtedly litigated the issue and it meets the requirements of section 1292(b) for consideration on appeal.\n\nThe law of the case doctrine is \"a discretionary rule of practice.\" *In re PHC Assocs.*, 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts decline to apply the doctrine where there is clear error or manifest injustice would result. *U.S. v. Quintieri*, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002); *Casey v. U.S.*, 161 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 2001).\n\nThe doctrine \"may apply to different adversary proceedings brought in the same bankruptcy case, provided that all the requirements of the doctrine – including identity of the parties – are met.\" *In re Brizinova*, 588 B.R. 311, 324 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also In re Schultz*, 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (doctrine applies only to the \"same litigation or to different lawsuits *between the parties*\") (emphasis in original); *In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.*, 310 B.R. 500, 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (district court's ruling in class action is not binding on trustee because she was not a party to that action).\n\nHere, however, Mr. Despins argues that the Bankruptcy Court's rulings that certain nondebtor affiliates are alter egos of Mr. Kwok—which rulings were entered in adversary proceedings to which Meta was not a party—are nonetheless binding on Meta. The Bankruptcy Court has indicated it agrees with that argument. *See Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133.\n\nMeta and numerous other defendants in Mr. Despins' avoidance actions were never parties or had any relationship to the parties in his alter ego actions, and thus Mr. Despins cannot use res judicata or collateral estoppel to bind those defendants. *Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon*, 310 F.3d 280, 286-88 (2d Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, he and the Bankruptcy Court will seek to bind them under the law of the case doctrine.\n\nTo Meta's knowledge, the Second Circuit has not addressed a situation where a trustee attempts to use a ruling in one adversary proceeding to bind hundreds of defendants in hundreds of different adversary proceedings of a different nature under the law of the case doctrine, and where res judicata and collateral estoppel would not otherwise bind those defendants.\n\nResolution of this issue would materially advance each of the avoidance actions by clarifying Mr. Despins' burden of proof. If this Court rules that the Bankruptcy Court's alter ego rulings are *not* law of the case, then Mr. Despins would need to plead and prove that each of the transferor non-debtors at issue in his complaints is an alter ego of Mr. Kwok before he can avoid any transfer made by any non-debtor.\n\nBy the same token, a ruling by this Court as to whether the law of the case doctrine binds Meta and other defendants who did not participate in the briefing culminating in the Decision would inform whether the Decision has any applicability in Meta's and other defendants' separate adversary proceedings. That too would save party and judicial resources in litigating the issue and help speed up the resolution of the avoidance actions.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor these reasons, the Court should grant Meta leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal addressing the questions identified above.\n\nDated: March 18, 2025 New York, New York */s/ George Angelich*\n\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: [george.angelich@afslaw.com](mailto:george.angelich@afslaw.com) [eric.roman@afslaw.com](mailto:eric.roman@afslaw.com) patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: [jin.yan@afslaw.com](mailto:jin.yan@afslaw.com)\n\n*Counsel for Meta Platforms, Inc.*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on March 18, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: New York, New York March 18, 2025\n\n> */s/ George Angelich*  George Angelich","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，\n\n债务人。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第 11 章破产受托人，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC.，\n\n被告。\n\n第 11 章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并审理）\n\n诉讼程序案号：24-05117\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC. 申请进行中间上诉许可的动议\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 及《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 8004 条（Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004），上诉人 Meta Platforms, Inc.（“Meta”）申请获得许可，就破产法院的《关于(I)驳回共同被告的驳回起诉动议或案头判决动议、(II)部分驳回其他被告的驳回起诉动议以及(III)部分否决 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 对受托人案头判决动议的异议的决定备忘录与命令》（Memorandum of Decision and Order (I) Denying Joint Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (II) Denying in Part Other Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; and (III) Overruling in Part Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.'s Objection to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings，以下简称“《决定》”）[BK 案卷号 4189] 提起中间上诉，该决定副本作为附件 1 附后。[1]\n\n[1] 主破产案件中的案卷材料引用为“BK 案卷号 __”。Meta 诉讼程序中的案卷材料引用为“AP 案卷号 __”。\n\nLuc A. Despins 是在个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok 的第 11 章破产案件中被任命的破产受托人。自 2024 年 2 月以来，Despins 先生已在破产法院提起了大约 300 起欺诈性转让诉讼。\n\nDespins 先生似乎起诉了所有人——从苹果（Apple）这样的大公司到当地的景观绿化商和搬家公司——以追回非债务人企业客户在正常业务过程中支付的款项，其依据的理论是这些非债务人是 Kwok 先生的人格混同体（alter ego），且他们所支付的款项实际上是 Kwok 先生财产的转让。\n\nDespins 先生试图扩大《破产法典》中欺诈性转让条款适用范围的做法是史无前例的。他造成了前所未有的扰乱商业运作的潜在风险，颠覆了传统的商业预期，并将每一笔付款都变成了受让人所不知晓的第三方的潜在欺诈性转让。通常情况下，善意行事且不知情的第三方作为后续受让人受《破产法典》的保护。然而，根据 Despins 先生的理论，这些保护将被彻底消除，因为只要有可靠的指控称公司的所有者在申请破产前从事了不良行为，破产受托人就将能够追索任何闭锁型公司所支付的款项。\n\n2024 年 9 月，一组被告采取措施协同应对 Despins 先生新颖且未经检验的理论。他们与 Despins 先生共同向破产法院提议，就他们一致认为属于 Despins 先生所有撤销之诉所共有的某些先决门槛问题提交书面辩论意见。最终，破产法院允许就 4 个约定的争议问题提交辩论意见。\n\n最近，破产法院就共同书面辩论作出了《决定》，并认定 Despins 先生可以撤销由非债务人关联方进行的转让，因为这些实体纯粹是 Kwok 先生的人格混同体和工具。在得出这一结论时，破产法院将各方在破产法院指示下进行充分辩论的论点搁置一旁，转而采纳了破产法院在书面辩论和口头辩论结束后依职权（sua sponte）主动提出的论点。\n\nApple 并非导致该《决定》出台的共同书面辩论的参与方之一，因为其此前已提交了驳回起诉动议，并提出了超出共同书面辩论中 4 个约定争议问题范围的论点。Apple 的动议仍在审理中，且该《决定》尚未在 Apple 的诉讼程序中下达。尽管如此，破产法院在其《决定》中明确表示，其意图使其裁定对 Apple 及其他方具有约束力。事实上，破产法院已经适用了法官判例效力原则（law of the case doctrine），将某一诉讼程序中的裁定约束至另一项独立的、且这些被告并非当事方的诉讼程序中的被告。\n\n本次中间上诉涉及属初审事项（matters of first impression）。第二巡回法院辖区内尚无任何法院曾批准破产受托人利用州法人格混同责任理论来撤销由非债务人进行的转让。\n\n没有什么比在尚未就 Despins 先生的基础责任理论的可行性获得上诉裁决的情况下，对数百起撤销之诉进行诉讼更缺乏效率的了。如果破产法院的《决定》被推翻，那么 Despins 先生的所有撤销之诉都将被驳回。如果该《决定》得到维持，那么许多撤销之诉很可能会开始达成和解。无论哪种结果，上诉都将实质性地推进该诉讼的最终终结。\n\n法院应当准许本次中间上诉，并审理影响 Despins 先生 300 多起撤销之诉（包括针对 Apple 提起的诉讼）中每一起诉讼可行性的先决法律问题。\n\n提请审理的问题\n\n1. 州法的法人格混同责任原则是否可用于撤销由《破产法典》下被指控为债务人关联方的非债务人实体所进行的转让。\n\n2. 破产法院是否可以利用法官判例效力原则，使诉讼程序中的被告受到主破产案件或该被告并非当事方的其他诉讼程序中所作裁定的约束。\n\n背景\n\nKwok 先生于 2022 年 2 月 15 日申请破产。BK 案卷号 1。Despins 先生于 2022 年 7 月 8 日被任命。BK 案卷号 523。\n\n自 2024 年 2 月开始，Despins 先生提起了数百起诉讼程序，以撤销并追回据称由 Kwok 先生关联的非债务人实体进行的欺诈性转让。《决定》第 4-5 页。\n\n这些非债务人实体是由 Despins 先生提起的旨在宣告其为 Kwok 先生人格混同体的独立诉讼程序中的被告。参见例如 Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC，诉讼程序案号：23-5005；Despins 诉 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. 等人，诉讼程序案号：23-5018；Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc. 等人，诉讼程序案号：23-5013；Despins 诉 ACA Capital Group Ltd. 等人，诉讼程序案号：24-05249；Despins 诉 Lamp Capital LLC 等人，诉讼程序案号：23-5023；Despins 诉 AA Global Ventures Ltd. 等人，诉讼程序案号：05322。\n\n其中一些人格混同诉讼程序早在 Despins 先生提起撤销之诉之前很久就已提起，并且法院已经作出了宣告某些非债务人为 Kwok 先生人格混同体的终局判决。参见例如 Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC，诉讼程序案号：23-5005，案卷号 134；Despins 诉 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. 等人，诉讼程序案号：23-5018，案卷号 35；Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc. 等人，诉讼程序案号：23-5013，案卷号 297。\n\nDespins 先生于 2024 年 2 月 10 日对 Meta 提起诉状。AP 案卷号 1。Meta 在该诉讼程序中出庭应诉，并于 2024 年 6 月 28 日提交了驳回起诉动议。AP 案卷号 14、18。\n\n2024 年 9 月 6 日，各独立撤销之诉中的一组被告（“共同被告”）请求与破产法院举行案件进展会议，以讨论就 Despins 先生所有撤销之诉共有的法律问题提交书面辩论意见。《决定》第 6-7 页。破产法院批准了该请求，随后下达了一项命令，安排就以下 4 个问题提交辩论意见：\n\n- i. Despins 先生是否可以撤销非债务人实体的初始转让；\n- ii. 适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或认定人格混同；\n- iii. 适用法律下反向揭开公司面纱或认定人格混同的效力；以及\n- iv. 反向揭开公司面纱或认定人格混同的决定是否可以追溯适用。\n同上，第 7 页。\n\n其他诉讼程序中的被告获准加入共同被告提交的辩论意见中，且部分被告也确实加入了。同上，第 8 页。Meta 未参与共同被告的辩论意见。Meta 的诉讼程序中未下达任何可能使 Meta 成为受共同辩论结果约束的当事方的命令。\n\n共同被告的辩论状提出了一些与 Meta 在其驳回起诉动议中提出的相同论点。对比 BK 案卷号 3713 与 AP 案卷号 18。然而，由于 Meta 未受破产法院所命 4 个问题的限制，它提出了额外的论点。尽管如此，Despins 先生对 Meta 驳回起诉动议的反对意见大部分直接复制粘贴了他对共同被告辩论状的反对意见。对比 BK 案卷号 3803 与 AP 案卷号 61。对比 BK 案卷号 3803 与 AP 案卷号 36。\n\n2024 年 11 月 27 日，破产法院安排于 2025 年 1 月 15 日就共同被告的书面辩论举行听证会。BK 案卷号 3857。破产法院安排在同一天就 Meta 的驳回起诉动议举行听证会。AP 案卷号 38。\n\n2025 年 1 月 5 日，破产法院应 Despins 先生的请求举行了案件进展会议，以讨论原定于 2025 年 1 月 15 日就多项驳回起诉动议举行听证会的形式。《决定》第 8 页。由于破产法院裁定其将仅就属于共同被告辩论主题的 4 个问题听取口头辩论，而不听取 Meta 提出的任何其他问题，Meta 提交了延期审理其驳回起诉动议听证会的动议，破产法院准许了该动议。AP 案卷号 41、42。2025 年 1 月 15 日的听证会在 Meta 未就共同被告的 4 个问题参与的情况下继续进行。《决定》第 9 页。Meta 从未属于共同被告之一，从未同意过这 4 个约定的争议问题，也从未同意限制其要求驳回起诉的论点。\n\n破产法院于 2025 年 3 月 4 日作出了《决定》。Meta 的驳回起诉动议仍在审理中，且尚未安排口头辩论。\n\n该《决定》回避了共同被告与 Despins 先生进行充分辩论的问题。对比《决定》与 BK 案卷号 3713、3803、3848。在这些问题中包括破产法院认定某些非债务人转让人为 Kwok 先生的人格混同体的裁定是否根据法官判例效力原则以及特拉华州关于法人格混同责任的法律具有约束力。\n\n相反，破产法院依职权主动提出了从未经辩论或主张、但破产法院认为具有决定性的问题。在这些问题中包括这一论点——该论点从未由 Despins 先生本人提出——即 Despins 先生主张了受益所有权责任理论。\n\n尽管破产法院在其《决定》中指出 Meta 并非最终促成该《决定》的书面辩论或口头辩论的当事方，且 Meta 的诉讼程序中未下达适用该《决定》的命令，但破产法院已表明 Meta 及其他方仍然受到破产法院裁定的约束。特别是，《决定》的脚注 12 规定，“无论是否使用‘共同被告’或‘非共同被告’的表述，本论述 B 和 C 节中的决定均适用于提出或加入所涉及论点的所有被告”。《决定》第 11 页脚注 12。\n\n破产法院在其他诉讼程序中毫不犹豫地适用了法官判例效力原则，并表明了其观点，即无论当事方是否参与了先前的诉讼，该原则均予适用。参见 Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC，诉讼程序案号：23-5005，案卷号 133。\n\n法律论辩\n\nI. 法律标准。\n\n地区法院具有管辖权审理针对破产法院中间命令提起的上诉。28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)。是否准许上诉属于地区法院的自由裁量权范围。Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n\n在行使其自由裁量权时，地区法院参考 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)，并在满足下列条件时准予上诉许可：(1) 被质疑的裁定涉及控制性法律问题；(2) 存在意见分歧的实质性理由；以及 (3) 立即上诉可能实质性地推进诉讼的最终终结。In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 333 B.R. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区破产法院/地区法院） 2005)；另见 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院） 2013)（“当一项裁决符合这些标准且涉及新的法律问题或具有特殊重要性时，地区法院应毫不犹豫地证明准予中间上诉。”）（内部引文省略）。\n\n第 1292(b) 条的第一项要素在以下情形下得以满足：推翻破产法院的裁定可能导致驳回诉讼；推翻裁定虽不导致驳回诉讼，但可能对诉讼的进行产生重大影响；或者该问题对大量案件具有先例价值。Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 5405696, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013)。\n\n第二项要素在破产法院是否适用了正确的法律标准存在真正疑问时得以满足。Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 543 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008)。此类疑问可能产生于该问题上存在冲突的权威判例，或者该问题特别困难且对第二巡回法院而言属于初次审理案件。同前引，第 309 页。\n\n第三项要素在上诉可以推进或缩短审判所需时间时得以满足。同前引，第 *7 页。\nII. 法院应当准予对破产法院裁决提起上诉的许可。\n\n在此，法院应当准予 Meta（元宇宙公司）就该裁决提起上诉的许可，因为就所提出的每一问题而言，第 1292 条的所有要素均已满足。\nA. Despins 先生能否撤销非债务人实体的转让，是贯穿其所有撤销权诉讼的决定性法律问题。\n\nDespins 先生提起的 300 多起撤销权诉讼中的每一起诉讼，均提出了一项新颖的法律理论，即他可以撤销据称是 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）的非债务人另我实体所作出的转让。如果正如 Meta 和其他人所主张的那样，该理论存在根本缺陷，那么他的所有诉讼均应予以驳回。该问题在第二巡回法院属于初次审理案件，且其解决将决定案件结果。\n\n破产法院和 Despins 先生均未引用第二巡回法院管辖区内任何法院允许破产受托人依据《破产法典》第 548 条和第 549 条提出主张以撤销非债务人实体所作转让的任何单一裁决。关于该问题不存在具有约束力的先例，且第二巡回法院管辖区内的下级法院裁决已驳回了 Despins 先生的责任理论。参见，例如，In re Mina, Adv. No. 21-0213-PRW, 2022 WL 2657481, at *1, *3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.（纽约西区破产法院） July 8, 2022)（受托人试图对债务人和非债务人进行实质性合并，以获得质疑非债务人所作转让的主体资格）；Pavers & Road Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区破产法院） 2015)（“仅仅因为两个实体互为另我，并不意味着它们依据《破产法典》都属于债务人。”）。关于该问题的唯一巡回法院级别裁决亦不利于其立场。参见 In re Howland, 674 Fed. App'x 482, 487 (6th Cir.（第六巡回上诉法院） 2017)（维持驳回受托人撤销债务人之另我所作转让的主张）。\n\nDespins 先生试图利用州法另我责任来实现 Kwok 先生与非债务人实体的实质性合并，但在第二巡回法院或 Delaware（特拉华州）法律下不存在允许其这样做的具有约束力的先例。相反，先例的分量表明，特拉华州法律下的另我责任仅指转承责任，并不导致债务人与另我实体的合并。参见，例如，In re RS Air, LLC, 651 B.R. 538, 545 n.5 (BAP 9th Cir.（第九巡回破产上诉审判庭） 2023)（适用特拉华州法律并认定“尽管另我原则要求证明两个实体‘作为单一经济实体运营’，但其结果并非将实体视为同一实体，而是令一方对另一方的债务承担责任”）（内部引文省略）；Blair v. Infineon Techs. AG, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (D. Del.（特拉华区地区法院） 2010)（“用于揭开公司面纱的另我原则允许将派生责任归于公司的个人。”）。\n\n尽管破产法院已下令就这些具体问题提交辩论状，但破产法院在其裁决中回避对各方当事人的主张作出裁定。\n\n然而，这并不妨碍本法院就这些相同问题作出决定，因为它们已经过了实际诉讼。参见 Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2001)（“我们有自由裁量权考虑在地区法院已提出、已提交辩论状并已进行辩论但未在该法院作出处理的问题”）；另见 Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000)（认定在以下情形下法院更有可能行使其自由裁量权来审查下级法院未决的问题：(1) 考虑该问题为避免明显不公所必需，或 (2) 该问题属于纯法律问题且不需要额外的事实认定）。对经过广泛提交辩论状但未被破产法院处理的纯法律问题作出裁定，既是适当的，也是避免明显不公所必需的。\n\n此外，正如破产法院得依职权决定其认定具有控制性的问题一样，本法院亦可如此行事。参见 Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993)（“我们有自由裁量权依职权考虑并决定一项具有决定性的法律问题，若将原告的主张视为真实，该问题将阻止原告获得救济。”）。事实上，鉴于本法院依据从头审查标准对破产法院的法律结论进行审查，In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007)，破产法院是否就各方当事人提出的问题作出了裁定，在实际中并无区别，因为本法院无论如何都将从头开始进行自己的分析。\n\n至于破产法院确实处理了的法律问题，这些问题是在没有任何通知或听取陈述的机会的情况下，由破产法院依职权提出并作出有利于 Despins 先生的决定的。参见 Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018)（地区法院在未向当事人提供通知和陈述机会的情况下依职权行事，其认定自身缺乏补充管辖权的裁定是错误的）。事实上，破产法院提出了 Despins 先生本人并未主张的论点，并在作出有利于他的裁决时认定这些论点具有决定性。参见 Akande v. U.S. Marshal Serv.（美国法警署）, No. 11-cv-1125 (VLB), 2018 WL 10667611, at *1 (D. Conn.（康涅狄格区地区法院） Aug. 21, 2018)（“法院是中立的裁判者，而非当事人的倡导者。法院的职责是判定哪一方是正确的，而不是研究、分析和推进任何一方反对另一方的主张。”）。\n\n暂且不论破产法院协助 Despins 先生重构其实际指控，破产法院对 Despins 先生诉状的解释存在根本缺陷，需要纠正。\n\n破产法院将 Despins 先生的指控解读为主张 Kwok 先生本人——而非其非债务人关联方——进行了涉案转让，这违背了现实和常识。参见 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（“确定一份起诉状是否阐述了合理的主张是视具体情况而定的，需要审查法院运用其经验和常识。”）。如果被质疑的转让是由 Kwok 先生直接向被告作出的转让，那么 Despins 先生提及任何非债务人实体或诉诸另我责任理论就完全没有必要。但是，Despins 先生明确包含了关于这些实体属于另我的指控，恰恰是因为被质疑的转让来自属于这些实体的账户。对 Despins 先生诉状的任何宽松解释都无法改变资金流向的现实。\n\n破产法院还适用了一种对 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018) 的新颖但错误的解释，以证明其对 Despins 先生指控的解读是正当的。在 Merit 案中，最高法院认定，为了评估《破产法典》第 546(e) 条所载法定安全港的适用性，涉案转让是指受托人试图撤销的总体转让，忽略单独的组成部分。同前引，第 370 页。但该判决适用于基于第 546(e) 条的抗辩——在 Merit 案中，最高法院绝未将其裁决延伸至评估依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 12 条提出的主张。破产法院也未引用以其相同方式适用 Merit 案的任何其他判例。\n\n若无中间上诉，Meta 和其他被告将不得不承受该裁决及其在初次审理的先决问题上作出的错误法律结论。(i) 破产法院已接收辩论状但未作出决定的问题，以及 (ii) 从未提交过辩论状但由破产法院依职权决定的问题，均构成了存在意见分歧实质性理由的控制性法律问题，且本法院对这些问题的处理将实质性推进 Despins 先生所提起的数百起撤销权诉讼。\nB. 已错误适用判决法理原则以促成跨越 Despins 先生撤销权诉讼的捷径。\n\n中间审查对于解决判决法理原则是否适用于破产法院裁决（包括其另我裁决和该裁决）这一先决法律问题而言，同样是必要且适当的。破产法院在其裁决中回避回答这一问题，但各方当事人无疑对该问题进行了诉讼，且其符合第 1292(b) 条关于在上诉中予以考虑的要求。\n\n判决法理原则是“一项自由裁量性的实践规则”。In re PHC Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991)。在存在明显错误或将导致明显不公的情况下，法院拒绝适用该原则。U.S. v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002); Casey v. U.S., 161 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 2001)。\n\n该原则“可适用于在同一破产案件中提起的不同对抗性程序，前提是满足该原则的所有要求——包括当事人同一性”。In re Brizinova, 588 B.R. 311, 324 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018)；另见 In re Schultz, 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000)（该原则仅适用于“当事人之间的同一诉讼或不同诉讼”）（原文强调）；In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 310 B.R. 500, 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)（地区法院在集体诉讼中的裁决对受托人不具约束力，因为她并非该诉讼的当事人）。\n\n然而在此，Despins 先生主张，破产法院认定某些非债务人关联方是 Kwok 先生之另我的裁决——该裁决是在 Meta 并非当事人的对抗性程序中作出的——对 Meta 仍具有约束力。破产法院已表明其同意该主张。参见 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133。\n\nMeta 以及 Despins 先生撤销权诉讼中的众多其他被告从未是其另我诉讼的当事人，亦与这些诉讼中的当事人无任何关系，因此 Despins 先生无法利用既判力或争点排除来约束这些被告。Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286-88 (2d Cir. 2002)。尽管如此，他与破产法院仍将寻求在判决法理原则下对他们进行约束。\n\n据 Meta（Meta Platforms, Inc.）所知，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）尚未处理过这样一种情况：即受托人试图根据判例法原则（law of the case doctrine），利用在单个对抗性程序中作出的一项裁定，来约束数百起不同性质的独立对抗性程序中的数百名被告，而在其他情况下既判力（res judicata）和争点排除（collateral estoppel）均无法对这些被告产生约束力。\n\n解决该问题将通过明确 Despins（德斯平斯）先生的举证责任，实质性地推进每一项撤销权诉讼。若本法院裁定破产法院关于「另我」（alter ego）的裁定不构成判例法原则，则德斯平斯先生在撤销任何非债务人作出的转让之前，需要主张并证明其起诉状中涉及的每个转让人非债务人均为 Kwok（郭文贵）先生的「另我」。\n\n同样，本法院关于判例法原则是否约束 Meta 以及未参与最终形成该《裁决》的书面陈词的其他被告的裁定，将指明该《裁决》在 Meta 及其他被告各自独立的对抗性程序中是否具有任何适用性。这也将节省当事人和司法资源以避免就该问题进行诉讼，并有助于加快撤销权诉讼的解决进程。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，法院应准予 Meta 提出针对上述确定问题的中间上诉许可。\n\n日期：March 18, 2025\nNew York, New York\n/s/ George Angelich\n\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542)\nEric Roman (admitted pro hac vice)\nPatrick Feeney (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\nT: 212.457.5423\nE: [george.angelich@afslaw.com]\n[eric.roman@afslaw.com]\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- 以及 -\n\nJin Yan (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\nT: 202.778.6442\nE: [jin.yan@afslaw.com]\n\nMeta Platforms, Inc. 之代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人证明，于 March 18, 2025，本人已促使上述文件的真实准确副本使用 CM/ECF 归档系统向法庭书记官完成归档，该系统将向所有记录在案的律师发送该归档通知。\n\n日期：New York, New York\nMarch 18, 2025\n\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich","key_entities":["Despins","Kwok","Je","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok","HCHK"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":18,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":35,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":36,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":38,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":61,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":134,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":297,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3857,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4189,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4144,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:55:22"}