{"id":"court_ctb_4235_3","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4235,"sub_number":3,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-03-18","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":"中间上诉许可动议 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #4235（2025-03-18立案）。在对抗性诉讼（Adv. Proc. No. 24-05060）中，苹果公司（Apple Inc.）请求法院许可其就破产法院关于受托人基于「人格混同/替身」（alter ego）理论追索欺诈性转让的裁定（BK Dkt. No. 4189）提起中间上诉。","summary_en":"Motion for Leave to Pursue Interlocutory Appeal — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB No. 22-50073, ECF No. 4235 (filed 2025-03-18). In Adv. Proc. No. 24-05060, Apple Inc. moved for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's decision (BK Dkt. No. 4189) regarding the Trustee's use of state-law alter ego theories in fraudulent transfer avoidance actions.","body_en":"Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 1 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 1 of 118\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nDebtors.\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nAPPLE INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, BERNARDO ENRIQUEZ, CHUNGUANG HAN, and MEI GUO,\n\nDefendants.\n\n# **APPLE INC. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PURSUE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, appellant Apple Inc. (\"Apple\") moves for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's *Memorandum of Decision and Order (I) Denying Joint Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (II) Denying in Part Other Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; and (III) Overruling in Part Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.'s Objection to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings* (the \"Decision\") [BK Dkt. No. 4189], a copy of which is attached as **Exhibit 1**. 1\n\n# Chapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nAdv. Proc. No. 24-05060\n\n1 Filings in the main bankruptcy case are cited as BK Dkt. No. \\_\\_. Filings in Apple's adversary proceeding are cited as AP Dkt. No. \\_\\_.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 2 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 2 of 118\n\nLuc A. Despins is the bankruptcy trustee appointed in the chapter 11 bankruptcy case of individual debtor Ho Wan Kwok. Since February 2024, Mr. Despins has filed approximately 300 fraudulent transfer lawsuits in the Bankruptcy Court.\n\nMr. Despins has seemingly sued everyone—from large companies like Apple to local landscapers and movers—to recover ordinary course business payments made by non-debtor corporate customers under the theory that those non-debtors are alter egos of Mr. Kwok and that the payments they made were actually transfers of Mr. Kwok's property.\n\nMr. Despins' attempt to expand the reach of the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provisions is unprecedented. He has created a previously unthinkable potential for disrupting business by upending conventional commercial expectations and rendering every payment a potential fraudulent transfer of a third party unknown to the transferee. Typically, unsuspecting third parties acting in good faith are protected by the Bankruptcy Code as subsequent transferees. Under Mr. Despins' theory, however, those protections will be obliterated because bankruptcy trustees will now be able to reach payments made by any closely held company so long as there is a credible allegation that the company's owner engaged in pre-petition bad acts.\n\nIn September 2024, a group of defendants took steps to coordinate their response to Mr. Despins' novel and untested theories. Together with Mr. Despins, they jointly approached the Bankruptcy Court to suggest briefing certain threshold issues that they agreed were common to all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions. Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court allowed briefing on 4 stipulated issues.\n\nRecently, the Bankruptcy Court issued its Decision on the joint briefing and concluded that Mr. Despins can avoid transfers made by non-debtor affiliates because those entities were mere alter egos and instrumentalities of Mr. Kwok. In so concluding, the Bankruptcy Court sidelined\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 3 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 3 of 118\n\narguments that the parties briefed extensively—at the Bankruptcy Court's direction—and instead relied on arguments that the Bankruptcy Court raised *sua sponte* after the close of briefing and oral argument.\n\nApple was not one of the participants in the joint briefing resulting in the Decision because it had previously filed its motion to dismiss and raised arguments beyond the scope of the 4 stipulated issues in the joint briefing. Apple's motion remains pending and the Decision has not been entered in Apple's adversary proceeding. Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Court has expressly stated in its Decision that it intends to bind Apple and others to its ruling. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court has already applied the law of the case doctrine to bind defendants in one adversary proceeding to rulings made in a separate adversary proceeding to which those defendants were not parties.\n\nThis interlocutory appeal concerns matters of first impression. No court in the Second Circuit has authorized a bankruptcy trustee to avoid transfers made by non-debtors using a state law alter ego theory of liability.\n\nNothing could be more inefficient than litigating hundreds of avoidance actions without obtaining an appellate ruling on the viability of Mr. Despins' underlying theory of liability. If the Bankruptcy Court's Decision is reversed, then all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions would be subject to dismissal. If the Decision is affirmed, then many of the avoidance actions would likely start to settle. Either way, an appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of that litigation.\n\nThe Court should grant this interlocutory appeal and address the threshold legal issues that affect the viability each of Mr. Despins' 300+ avoidance actions, including the one brought against Apple.\n\n# **QUESTIONS PRESENTED**\n\n1. Whether the state law doctrine of alter ego liability can be used to avoid transfers made by non-debtor entities that are alleged to be affiliates of a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n2. Whether the Bankruptcy Court can use the law of the case doctrine to bind defendants in adversary proceedings to rulings made in the main bankruptcy case or different adversary proceedings in which those defendants were not parties.\n\n# **BACKGROUND**\n\nMr. Kwok filed for bankruptcy on February 15, 2022. BK Dkt. No. 1. Mr. Despins was appointed on July 8, 2022. BK Dkt. No. 523.\n\nBeginning in February 2024, Mr. Despins commenced hundreds of adversary proceedings to avoid and recover allegedly fraudulent transfers made by non-debtor entities affiliated with Mr. Kwok. Decision at 4-5.\n\nThe non-debtor entities are defendants in separate adversary proceedings filed by Mr. Despins to declare them to be alter egos of Mr. Kwok. *See*, *e.g.*, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005; *Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5018, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013; *Despins v. ACA Capital Group Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 24-05249; *Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5023; *Despins v. AA Global Ventures Ltd., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 05322.\n\nSome of these later ego adversary proceedings were filed long before Mr. Despins commenced his avoidance actions and final judgments have already been rendered declaring certain non-debtors to be alter egos of Mr. Kwok. *See*, *e.g.*, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 134; *Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al.*, Adv.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 5 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 5 of 118\n\nProc. No. 23-5018, Dkt. No. 35; *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 297.\n\nMr. Despins filed his complaint against Apple on February 10, 2024. AP Dkt. No. 1. Apple appeared in the adversary proceeding and filed its motion to dismiss on June 28, 2024. AP Dkt. Nos. 28, 32.\n\nOn September 6, 2024, a group of defendants in separate avoidance actions (the \"Joint Defendants\") requested a status conference with the Bankruptcy Court to discuss briefing on legal issues common to all of Mr. Despins' avoidance actions. Decision at 6-7. The Bankruptcy Court granted the request and later entered an order scheduling briefing on 4 issues:\n\n- i. Whether the Mr. Despins can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n- ii. Whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or alter ego determinations;\n- iii. The effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or alter ego determination; and\n- iv. Whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or alter ego may be applied retroactively.\n\n*Id.* at 7.\n\nDefendants in other adversary proceedings were allowed to join in the briefing filed by the Joint Defendants, and some did. *Id.* at 8. Apple did not participate in the Joint Defendants' briefing. No order was entered in Apple's adversary proceeding which could have made Apple a party who would be bound by the outcome of the joint briefing.\n\nThe Joint Defendants' brief raised some of the same arguments that Apple raised in its motion to dismiss. *Compare* BK Dkt. No. 3713 *with* AP Dkt. No. 32. However, because Apple was not limited to the 4 issues ordered by the Bankruptcy Court, it raised additional arguments. Nonetheless, Mr. Despins' opposition to Apple's motion to dismiss largely copied and pasted\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 6 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 6 of 118\n\narguments from his opposition to the Joint Defendants' brief. *Compare* BK Dkt. No. 3803 *with* AP Dkt. No. 61.\n\nOn November 27, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on the Joint Defendants' briefing for January 15, 2025. BK Dkt. No. 3857. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on Apple's motion to dismiss on the same day. AP Dkt. No. 63.\n\nOn January 5, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court held a status conference at Mr. Despins' request to discuss the format of the hearing on multiple motions to dismiss scheduled for January 15, 2025. Decision at 8. Because the Bankruptcy Court ruled that it would only hear oral argument on the 4 issues that are the subject of the Joint Defendants' briefing and not any of the other issues that Apple raised, Apple filed a motion to continue the hearing on its motion to dismiss, which the Bankruptcy Court granted. AP Dkt. Nos. 66, 67. The January 15, 2025 hearing proceeded without Apple's participation on the Joint Defendants' 4 issues. Decision at 9. Apple has never been one of the Joint Defendants, never consented to the 4 stipulated issues, and never agreed to limit its arguments for dismissal.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court issued its Decision on March 4, 2025. Apple's motion to dismiss remains pending and oral argument has not yet been scheduled.\n\nThe Decision side-steps issues that the Joint Defendants and Mr. Despins briefed extensively. *Compare* Decision *with* BK Dkt. Nos. 3713, 3803, 3848. Among those issues are whether the Bankruptcy Court's rulings determining certain non-debtor transferors are alter egos of Mr. Kwok is binding under the law of the case doctrine and Delaware law regarding alter ego liability.\n\nRather, the Bankruptcy Court *sua sponte* raised issues that were never briefed or argued but that the Bankruptcy Court found to be dispositive. Among those issues is the argument—\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 7 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 7 of 118\n\nwhich was never advanced by Mr. Despins himself—that Mr. Despins alleged a beneficial ownership theory of liability.\n\nAlthough the Bankruptcy Court noted in its Decision that Apple was not a party to briefing or oral argument that culminated in that Decision, and no order applying the Decision has been entered in Apple's adversary proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court has indicated that Apple and others are nonetheless bound by the Bankruptcy Court's rulings. In particular, footnote 12 of the Decision provides that \"[r]egardless of the usage of 'Joint Defendant' or 'Non-Joint Defendant', the determination in sections B and C of the Discussion apply to all defendants that raise or join in the arguments addressed. Decision at 11 n.12.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court has not hesitated to apply the law of the case doctrine in other adversary proceedings and has stated its view that the doctrine applies regardless of whether parties were involved in the prior litigation. *See Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133.\n\n# **ARGUMENT**\n\n# **I. Legal Standard.**\n\nDistrict courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Whether to grant leave to appeal is within the district court's discretion. *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\nIn exercising their discretion, district courts look to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and grant leave where (1) the challenged order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. *In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp*., 333 B.R. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *see also Balintulo v. Daimler AG*, 727 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"When a ruling satisfies these\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 8 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 8 of 118\n\ncriteria and involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, then the district court should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal.\") (internal quotations omitted).\n\nThe first prong of section 1292(b) is satisfied where reversal of the bankruptcy court's order could result in dismissal of the action, where reversal, although not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the conduct of the action, or where the issue has precedential value for a large number of cases. *Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc*., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 5405696, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).\n\nThe second prong is satisfied where there is a genuine doubt as to whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard. *Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada*, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), *aff'd*, 543 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). Such doubt may arise from conflicting authority on the issue or if the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit. *Id.*\n\nThe third prong is satisfied where the appeal could advance or shorten the time required for trial. *Id.* at \\*7.\n\n# **II. The Court Should Grant Leave to Appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Decision.**\n\nHere, the Court should grant Apple leave to appeal the Decision because all prongs of section 1292 are satisfied with respect to each of the questions presented.\n\n# **A. Whether Mr. Despins Can Avoid Transfers by Non-Debtor Entities is a Dispositive Legal Issue Across All of His Avoidance Actions.**\n\nEach of the more than 300 avoidance actions that Mr. Despins has commenced advances the novel legal theory that he can avoid transfers made by alleged non-debtor alter egos of Mr. Kwok. If this theory is fundamentally flawed, as Apple and others contend, then all of his actions are subject to dismissal. This issue is one of first impression in the Second Circuit and its resolution would be outcome-determinative.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 9 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 9 of 118\n\nNeither the Bankruptcy Court nor Mr. Despins cites to a single decision by any court in the Second Circuit allowing a bankruptcy trustee to assert a claim under sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid a transfer made by a non-debtor entity. There is no binding precedent on the issue, and lower court decisions in the Second Circuit have rejected the Mr. Despins' liability theory. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Mina*, Adv. No. 21-0213-PRW, 2022 WL 2657481, at \\*1, \\*3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022) (trustee sought substantive consolidation of a debtor and nondebtor to acquire standing to challenge a transfer made by the non-debtor); *Pavers & Road Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC*, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"Just because two entities are alter egos does not make them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.\"). The only circuit-level decision on the issue also goes against his position. *See In re Howland*, 674 Fed. App'x 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of trustee's claims to avoid transfers made by alter egos of a debtor).\n\nMr. Despins attempts to use state law alter ego liability to achieve substantive consolidation of Mr. Kwok and non-debtor entities, but there is no binding precedent under Second Circuit or Delaware law allowing him to do so. Rather, the weight of precedent indicates that alter ego liability under Delaware law means vicarious liability only and does not result in a merger of the debtor and the alter ego. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re RS Air, LLC*, 651 B.R. 538, 545 n.5 (BAP 9th Cir. 2023) (applying Delaware law and holding that \"[a]lthough the alter ego doctrine requires a showing that the two entities 'operated as a single economic entity,' [] the result is not to deem the entities the same, but to hold one liable for the other's debts\") (internal citation omitted); *Blair v. Infineon Techs. AG*, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (D. Del. 2010) (\"The alter ego doctrine for piercing the corporate veil allows derivative liability to be placed upon a corporation's individuals.\").\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 10 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 10 of 118\n\nDespite ordering briefing on these very issues, the Bankruptcy Court punted on ruling on the parties' arguments in its Decision. However, that does not preclude this Court from deciding those same issues because they were actually litigated. *See Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co.*, 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[W]e have discretion to considered issues that were raised, briefed, and argued in the District Court, but that were not reached there.\"); *see also Baker v. Dorfman*, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the court is more likely to exercise its discretion to review an issue not decided below where (1) consideration of the issue is necessary to avoid manifest injustice or (2) where the issue is purely legal and does not require additional fact-finding). A ruling on purely legal issues that were extensively briefed and but not addressed by the Bankruptcy Court is both appropriate and necessary to avoid manifest injustice.\n\nFurther, just as the Bankruptcy Court *sua sponte* decided issues it found to be controlling, so too can this Court. *See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp.*, 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"[W]e have discretion to consider and decide sua sponte a dispositive issue of law that, taking a plaintiff's allegations to be true, would prevent a plaintiff from recovering.\"). Indeed, given that this Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's legal conclusions under a *de novo* standard of review, *In re Hyman*, 502 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007), it makes no practical difference whether the Bankruptcy Court ruled on the issues presented by the parties, as this Court would be starting its own analysis from scratch anyways.\n\nAs for the legal issues the Bankruptcy Court did address, those issues were raised and decided in Mr. Despins' favor *sua sponte* without any notice or opportunity to be heard. *See Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp.*, 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (district court's ruling that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction was erroneous where it acted *sua sponte* without affording the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard). In fact, the Bankruptcy Court advanced arguments\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 11 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 11 of 118\n\nthat Mr. Despins himself did not advocate and found those arguments to be dispositive in ruling in his favor. *See Akande v. U.S. Marshal Serv.*, No. 11-cv-1125 (VLB), 2018 WL 10667611, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2018) (\"[C]ourts are neutral arbiters and not advocates for parties. The role of the court is to decide which party is correct, not to research, analyze, and advance the claims of any party against that of another party.\").\n\nPutting aside the Bankruptcy Court's assisting Mr. Despins in reframing his actual allegations, the Bankruptcy Court's interpretations of Mr. Despins' pleadings are fundamentally flawed and require redress.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court's reading of the Mr. Despins' allegations as pleading Mr. Kwok himself—and not his non-debtor affiliates—made the transfers in question defies reality and common sense. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (\"[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw upon its experience and common sense.\"). If the challenged transfers were transfers made directly by Mr. Kwok to the defendants, then it would be wholly unnecessary for Mr. Despins to mention any of the non-debtor entities or resort to an alter ego theory of liability. But Mr. Despins expressly includes allegations regarding those entities' being alter egos precisely because the challenged transfers came from accounts belonging to the Non-Debtor Entities. No amount of liberal interpretation of Mr. Despins' pleadings can alter the reality of how the funds flowed.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court also applied a novel but erroneous interpretation of *Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.*, 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018) to justify its reading of Mr. Despins' allegations. In *Merit*, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of evaluating the applicability of the statutory safe harbor contained in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer at issue is the overarching transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid, ignoring separate component parts. *Id.*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 12 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 12 of 118\n\nat 370. But that decision applies to a *defense* based on section 546(e)—nowhere in *Merit* did the Supreme Court extend its holding to evaluating *claims* under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Nor did the Bankruptcy Court cite any other case applying *Merit* in the same way it did.\n\nAbsent an interlocutory appeal, Apple and other defendants would be stuck with the Decision and its erroneous legal conclusions on threshold issues of first impression. Both the (i) issues that were briefed and not decided by the Bankruptcy Court and (ii) issues that were never briefed but decided *sua sponte* by the Bankruptcy Code present controlling legal issues as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and this Court's addressing those issues would materially advance the hundreds of avoidance actions that Mr. Despins has commenced.\n\n# **B. The Law of the Case Doctrine Has Been Erroneously Applied to Facilitate a Shortcut Across Mr. Despins' Avoidance Actions.**\n\nInterlocutory review is also both necessary and appropriate to resolve the threshold legal issue of whether the law of the case doctrine applies to the Bankruptcy Court's rulings, including its alter ego rulings and the Decision. The Bankruptcy Court avoided answering this question in its Decision but the parties undoubtedly litigated the issue and it meets the requirements of section 1292(b) for consideration on appeal.\n\nThe law of the case doctrine is \"a discretionary rule of practice.\" *In re PHC Assocs.*, 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts decline to apply the doctrine where there is clear error or manifest injustice would result. *U.S. v. Quintieri*, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002); *Casey v. U.S.*, 161 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 2001).\n\nThe doctrine \"may apply to different adversary proceedings brought in the same bankruptcy case, provided that all the requirements of the doctrine – including identity of the parties – are met.\" *In re Brizinova*, 588 B.R. 311, 324 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also In re Schultz*, 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (doctrine applies only to the \"same litigation or\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 13 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 13 of 118\n\nto different lawsuits *between the parties*\") (emphasis in original); *In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.*, 310 B.R. 500, 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (district court's ruling in class action is not binding on trustee because she was not a party to that action).\n\nHere, however, Mr. Despins argues that the Bankruptcy Court's rulings that certain nondebtor affiliates are alter egos of Mr. Kwok—which rulings were entered in adversary proceedings to which Apple was not a party—are nonetheless binding on Apple. The Bankruptcy Court has indicated it agrees with that argument. *See Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133.\n\nApple and numerous other defendants in Mr. Despins' avoidance actions were never parties or had any relationship to the parties in his alter ego actions, and thus Mr. Despins cannot use res judicata or collateral estoppel to bind those defendants. *Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon*, 310 F.3d 280, 286-88 (2d Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, he and the Bankruptcy Court will seek to bind them under the law of the case doctrine.\n\nTo Apple's knowledge, the Second Circuit has not addressed a situation where a trustee attempts to use a ruling in one adversary proceeding to bind hundreds of defendants in hundreds of different adversary proceedings of a different nature under the law of the case doctrine, and where res judicata and collateral estoppel would not otherwise bind those defendants.\n\nResolution of this issue would materially advance each of the avoidance actions by clarifying Mr. Despins' burden of proof. If this Court rules that the Bankruptcy Court's alter ego rulings are *not* law of the case, then Mr. Despins would need to plead and prove that each of the transferor non-debtors at issue in his complaints is an alter ego of Mr. Kwok before he can avoid any transfer made by any non-debtor.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 14 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 14 of 118\n\nBy the same token, a ruling by this Court as to whether the law of the case doctrine binds Apple and other defendants who did not participate in the briefing culminating in the Decision would inform whether the Decision has any applicability in Apple's and other defendants' separate adversary proceedings. That too would save party and judicial resources in litigating the issue and help speed up the resolution of the avoidance actions.\n\n# **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor these reasons, the Court should grant Apple leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal addressing the questions identified above.\n\nDated: March 18, 2025 New York, New York */s/ George Angelich* George Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: george.angelich@afslaw.com eric.roman@afslaw.com patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\n*Counsel for Apple Inc.*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 15 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 15 of 118\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on March 18, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: New York, New York March 18, 2025\n\n*/s/ George Angelich*\n\nGeorge Angelich\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 1 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 16 of 118\n\n# **EXHIBIT 1**\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-3 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 17 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4228-1 | 118
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HO WAN KWOK, et al., | )
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Chapter 11
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Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)
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(Jointly Administered) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Debtors. | )
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Re: ECF Nos. 3577, 3713
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 24
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) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| AGORA LAB, INC., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
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) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 21 |\n| Plaintiff, | ) |\n| v. | )
)
) |\n| AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 26 |\n| Plaintiff, | ) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| DIRECT PERSUASION LLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 2 of 102 |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
) |\n| FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| ARRI AMERICAS, INC.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20
)
)
) |\n| TERIS-PHOENIX, LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 3 of 102 |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
)
) |\n| PHILLIPS NIZER LLP,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| MARK GUNDERSON,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
) |\n| v.
270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Filed 03/19/25
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Page 4 of 102 |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| FFP (BVI) LIMITED,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 42
)
)
)
) |\n| AMAZON.COM, INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX
HADJICHARALAMBOUS, CHUNGUANG HAN, and
MEI GUO,
Defendants.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC., | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
)
)
) |\n\nDefendant. )\n\n)\n\n)\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-3 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 21 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 6 of 118\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 5 of 102\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20
)
)
) |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
) |\n| DJD CREATIVE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
)
)
) |\n| B&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP., HING CHI
NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, and
CHUNGUANG HAN,
Defendants. | )
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-3 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 22 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 118 | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 7 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 6 of 102\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| OHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| ZETA GLOBAL CORP.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 7 of 102 |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
)
) |\n| GROCYBER, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
) |\n| CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
) |\n| v.
AARON MITCHELL,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Filed 03/18/25
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Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 8 of 102 |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHEM HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
f/k/a EMPIRE HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
d/b/a EMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, | | )
)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
)
)
)
)
) | Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
) | Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) |\n| v.
MODSQUAD INC.,
Defendant. | | )
)
)
)
)
) | |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | | )
)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
) | Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) |\n| v.
CLOUDFLARE, INC., | | )
)
)
) | |\n| Defendant. | | ) | |\n\n*Continued on next page*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-3 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 25 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4228-1 | 118
Filed 03/18/25
103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 | Page 10 of |\n| | | | | |\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 9 of 102 |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| INDIUM SOFTWARE, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n| MILLER MOTORCARS INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 10 of |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ON THE SPOT HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC., | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 16
)
)
) |\n| V.X. CERDA & ASSOCIATES P.A.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) |\n| LIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT CORP.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 11 of |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| TARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
) |\n| v.
FLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
) |\n| v.
JAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 12 of |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) |\n| NARDELLO & CO., LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 15
)
)
) |\n| THE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
)
)
) |\n| BERKELEY ROWE LIMITED,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 13 of |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
WEDDLE LAW PLLC, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 11
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n| MORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND IASON &
ANELLO P.C.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
) |\n| v.
LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC, and
AARON MITCHELL,
Defendants. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 14 of |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 28
)
)
) |\n| CLAYMAN ROSENBERG KIRSHNER & LINDER LLP, )
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
) |\n| v.
G4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 15 of |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
)
) |\n| PUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
) |\n| JASON MILLER,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
) |\n| v.
SEDGWICK REALTY CORP.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Page 16 of |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
)
) |\n| CIRRUS DESIGN CORPORATION, and QIANG GUO,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 26
)
)
) |\n| ACASS CANADA LTD.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 25
)
)
)
) |\n| MARCUM LLP,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 33 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 18 of\n\n103\n\n118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 17 of 102\n\n#### **APPEARANCES**\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglas S. Skalka James C. Graham Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Plaintiff*\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert Lindsay C. Stone Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10112\n\nand\n\nAlan H. Martin Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP 650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626\n\n*Counsel for Movant Agora Lab, Inc., Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-3 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 34 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4228-1 | 118
Filed 03/18/25
103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 | Page 19 of |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 18 of\n\n102\n\nLindsay Sampson Bishop K&L Gates LLP One Congress Street, Suite 2900 Boston, MA 02114\n\nand\n\nBrian T. Peterson (argued) Ruby A. Nagamine K&L Gates LLP 925 4th Ave, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104\n\n*Counsel for Movants Amazon Web Services, Inc., and Amazon.com, Inc., Defendants*\n\nBenjamin Mintz Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019\n\nand\n\nand\n\nRyan M. Trombley Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Direct Persuasion LLC, Defendant*\n\nSteven G. Mintz Barry M. Kazan Philip Ian Tafet Mintz & Gold LLP 600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Fox News Network, LLC, and Marcum LLP, Defendants*\n\nMichael T. Conway Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Ave., 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Movant Arri Americas Inc., Defendant*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 35 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 20 of\n\n103\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 19 of\n\nAndrea Chase Spencer Fane 1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400 Kansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Teris-Phoenix, LLC, Defendant*\n\nJared R. Clark Phillips Nizer LLP 485 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Phillips Nizer LLP, Defendant*\n\nJeffrey Hellman Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC 195 Church Street, 10th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movants Mr. Mark Gundersen, Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, and Mr. Jason Miller, Defendants*\n\nRobert N. Sensale Bershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC 900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movant 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 20 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 21 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 36 of 118\n\n102\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movants FFP (BVI) Limited, Aaron A. Mitchell, V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A., The Francis Firm PLLC, Lawall & Mitchell, LLC, and G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., Defendants*\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Anthem Health Plans, Inc., Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., f/k/a Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., d/b/a Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, and Sedgwick Realty Corp., Defendants*\n\nMichael A. Siedband Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building 2, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Nicole Lapenta Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Federal Express Corporation, Defendant*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 37 of 118\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 22 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 21 of\n\n102\n\nBret Strong Zachary W. Doninger 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 The Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III Martocchio & Oliveira, LLC 191 Main Street Southington, CT 06489\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant DJD Creative LLC, Defendant*\n\nScott M. Kessler Akerman LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas 37th Floor New York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., Defendant*\n\nDarryl S. Laddin Frank N. White Arnall Golden Gregory LLP 171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100 Atlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches Law Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC 82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203 Wethersfield, CT 06109\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant American Express Company, Defendant*\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr. DLA Piper LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020\n\nand\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe DLA Piper LLP (US) 650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeta Global Corp., Defendant*\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante Cohn Birnbaum & Shea CityPlace II, 15th Floor 185 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant GroCyber, LLC, Defendant*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 23 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 38 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 22 of 102\n\nIlan Markus Barclay Damon LLP 545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant Conservative Campaign Technology LLC, Defendant*\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n*Counsel for Movants ModSquad, Inc., and 3 Columbus Circle, LLC, Defendants*\n\nSabrina L. Streusand Streusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP Spyglass Point 1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold Stokesbury, Shipman & Fingold 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 Farmington, CT 06032\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Cloudflare, Inc., Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Reding ASK LLP 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 St. Paul, MN 55121\n\nand\n\nEdward E. Neiger ASK LLP 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor New York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow Eric R. Wilson Benjamin D. Feder Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Indium Software, Inc., Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 39 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 24 of\n\n103 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 23 of 102\n\nEric Seltzer Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC 30 Brewster Lane Bellport, NY 11713\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Miller Motorcars Inc., Defendant*\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner Becker LLC 354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500 Livingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., Defendant*\n\nGerard R. Luckman Elbert F. Nasis Forchelli Deegan Terrana LLP 333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010 Uniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz Fazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall 96 Oak Street Harford, CT 06106\n\n*Counsel for Movant Liberty Jet Management Corp., Defendant*\n\nJohn F. Carberry Kara Anne Zarchin Cummings & Lockwood LLC Six Landmark Square Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Target Enterprises, LLC, and Jamestown Associates, LLC, Defendants*\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr. Norris McLaughlin PA 400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor Bridgewater, NJ 08807\n\n*Counsel for Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., Defendant*\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Nardello & Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-3 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 40 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 118 | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 25 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 24 of\n\n102\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen Armstrong Teasdale LLP 100 North Riverside Plaza Chicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\nand\n\nJohn G. Willard Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105\n\n*Counsel for Movant Berkeley Rowe Limited, Defendant*\n\nRichard Corbi The Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC 104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor New York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Weddle Law PLLC, Defendant*\n\nRowena A. Moffett Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP 271 Whitney Avenue New Haven, CT 06511\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., Defendant*\n\nBrian David Linder Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650 New York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker 1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP, Defendant*\n\nStephen M. Kindseth (argued) James M. Moriarty Daniel A. Byrd Zeisler& Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., Defendant*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 26 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 41 of 118\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 25 of\n\n102\n\nScott M. Charmoy Charmoy & Charmoy 1465 Post Road East, Suite 100 Westport, CT 06880\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Putnam's Landscaping, Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Bernard Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036\n\nand\n\nJosh Peterson Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 2200 Wells Fargo Center 90 S. 7th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402\n\nand\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801\n\n*Counsel for Movant Cirrus Design Corporation, Defendant*\n\nRahman Connelly Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant ACASS Canada LTD., Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 27 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 42 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 26 of 102\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER (I) DENYING JOINT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; (II) DENYING IN PART OTHER DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AND (III) OVERRULING IN PART ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.'S OBJECTION TO THE TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\nThis case involves an individual Chapter 11 debtor who is alleged to have been involved in an extensive shell game involving hundreds of corporate *alter egos.* The Chapter 11 trustee has filed more than 260 actions seeking to avoid transfers nominally made by these *alter egos*. Forty-eight avoidance action defendants, including many who are participating in mandatory mediation with the Chapter 11 trustee, have asked this Court to decide four common issues relating to the interaction of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer law. The sheer number of defendants, complaints, and alleged *alter egos* complicates the analysis. However, when analyzing the issues in light of the facts alleged in the complaints, which the Court must take as true, the result is clear. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that none of the four common issues raised by the avoidance action defendants merit dismissal of the avoidance actions.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are several motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings filed by avoidance action defendants. The avoidance actions were commenced by Mr. Luc A. Despins, the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). The Trustee seeks to avoid and recover alleged fraudulent transfers and unauthorized post-petition transfers pursuant to sections 544, 548, 549, and 550 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") and sections 273, 274, and 276 of New York's\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 28 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 43 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 27 of 102\n\nDebtor and Creditor Law, codifying New York's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"NYUVTA\").\n\nThirty-seven motions (the \"Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants (the \"Joint Defendants\")1 pursuant to the Order Further Amending Avoidance Action Procedures Order and Scheduling Joint Briefing of Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (the \"Joint Briefing Order\"). (Main Case ECF No. 3577.)2 The Joint Defendants requested and proposed this omnibus process and prepared and submitted common legal issues they requested the Court address. (*See* Main Case ECF No. 3511.) The Trustee did not object to the Joint Defendants' request. In issuing the Joint Briefing Order, the Court adopted the Joint Defendants' process.\n\nAdditional motions (the \"Non-Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants3 who, although they did not participate in the joint briefing, raised some or all the issues raised by the Joint Defendants and requested to have their motions be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions. Because it raised some of the issues in the Joint Briefing Order, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (\"Z&Z\", and, together with the filers of the Non-Joint Motions, the \"Non-Joint Defendants\") also requested its objection to a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Trustee (the \"Z&Z Objection\")4 be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions.\n\n1 Due to the complexities of this omnibus proceeding, certain information that might appear in footnotes is contained in Appendices. The .pdf file of this decision contains bookmarks to facilitate access to the Appendices. A list of the Joint Motions, with a notation of the Joint Defendant that filed each Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix A**. 2\n\nReferences to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), will be styled \"Main Case ECF No. \\_\\_.\"\n\n3 A list of the Non-Joint Motions, with a notation of the defendant(s) that filed each Non-Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix B**. 4\n\nThe citation for Z&Z's objection appears in **Appendix C**.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 29 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 44 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 28 of 102\n\nThis memorandum of decision sets forth the Court's conclusions of law on the four issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Because (i) the issues of law raised are not dispositive of the sufficiency of the pleadings; (ii) the defendants do not prevail on the issues of law; and (iii) many of the issues raised are issues of fact, not law, the Joint Motions are **DENIED**. For these same reasons, the Non-Joint Motions are **DENIED IN PART** as to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order and the Z&Z Objection is **OVERRULED IN PART** to the same extent.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court. (Main Case ECF No. 1.) On June 15, 2022, presented with allegations related to the Individual Debtor's financial mismanagement and alleged shell game, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee to administer the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate. (Main Case ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 523.)\n\n#### *The Avoidance Action Procedures Order*\n\nOn January 29, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion to prospectively establish procedures for avoidance actions he intended to commence and in which he would bring claims only under sections 544, 547, 548, 549, and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Main Case ECF No. 2532.) The Trustee anticipated filing hundreds of avoidance actions in advance of the second anniversary of the petition date and also anticipated these filings would pose case management issues. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549. After a hearing held on February 5, 2024, the Court entered an order granting the motion (as amended and supplemented, the \"Avoidance Action Procedures Order\").\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 30 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 45 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 29 of 102\n\n(Main Case ECF No. 2578.) Between February 9, 2024, and February 15, 2024, the Trustee filed\n\n268 avoidance actions, including the actions that are the subject of this decision. (Main Case\n\nECF Nos. 2594–925.) The complaints each assert at least one or more among the following six\n\ncauses of action (as asserted, collectively the \"Avoidance Claims\")5 :\n\n> (i) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 550(a), avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(ii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 2766 , avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a), avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iv) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276, avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(v) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a), avoidance of an unauthorized postpetition transfer by the Individual Debtor of property of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and recovery from the initial transferee; and\n\n(vi) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) and in connection with one of the above causes of action, recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee.\n\n(*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nEach complaint alleges at least (a) an actual fraudulent transfer under both federal and\n\nstate law; or (b) an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Agora*\n\n5 A schedule setting forth the causes of action in each complaint at issue appears in **Appendix D**. The text of the statutory provisions pursuant to which the Avoidance Claims appears in **Appendix E** alongside certain relevant statutory definitions.\n\n6 In the relevant complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor conducted business in New York, including in relation to the alleged fraudulent transfers.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 31 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 46 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 30 of 102\n\n*Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) In addition to alleging an actual fraudulent transfer, some complaints allege a constructive fraudulent transfer under both federal and state law. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Finally, one of the complaints seeks recovery from a Non-Joint Defendant as a subsequent transferee of a fraudulent transfer or an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (Complaint, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nAll the complaints allege the Individual Debtor, through various *alter egos*, transferred property and those transfers were either fraudulent transfers or unauthorized post-petition transfers. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24- 05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Additional allegations regarding the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the *alter egos* are made through incorporation of complaints filed against alleged *alter egos* seeking declaratory judgment of *alter ego* and/or beneficial ownership and turnover of assets and control.7\n\n7 The Avoidance Claims are stayed as to allegations involving certain alleged *alter egos*. (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i), (ii), Main Case ECF No. 3163.) Accordingly, the Court has not considered any Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims (used herein as defined by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i) and (ii)), to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed. **Appendix D**, *infra*, includes notations indicating whether an Avoidance\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 32 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 47 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 31 of 102\n\nOn February 27, 2024, a Status Conference was held to address the management of the myriad avoidance actions. During the Status Conference, the Trustee requested the implementation of mandatory mediation procedures. On May 2, 2024, after several pleadings were filed and hearings were held, an order entered amending the Avoidance Action Procedures Order to include mandatory mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3163.)\n\n#### *The Joint Briefing Order*\n\nTwo features of the mediation procedures are particularly relevant to the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. First, certain defendants are automatically excluded from mandatory mediation (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(j)(vi), Main Case ECF No. 3163) and defendants subject to mediation may move to be excluded from mediation (*Id.* ¶ 2(m)). Second, the mediation procedures include a litigation stay. (*Id.* ¶ 2(j)(iii).) Together, these features create the procedural context for the Joint Briefing Order.\n\nAs early as April 22, 2024, avoidance action defendants *not subject to the mediation stay* began filing motions to dismiss. (*See, e.g.*, Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11.) As these motions were being set for hearing, on September 6, 2024, certain avoidance action defendants *subject to the mediation stay* – the original Joint Defendants8 – requested the Court establish a process for the Joint Defendants to\n\nClaim is a Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claim. Litigation is not stayed as to the seven alleged *alter egos* who are discussed below. A schedule of these *alter egos*, listing the incorporated complaint, the allegation regarding state of formation, and causes of action, appears in **Appendix F**. 8\n\nAll these defendants remain Joint Defendants other than Bering Yachts, LLC (*compare* Main Case ECF No. 3511 *with* Main Case ECF No. 3713) and McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC (*see* Letter, *Despins v. McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05194 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2025), ECF No. 22 (announcing settlement with the Trustee)).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 33 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 48 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 32 of 102\n\nargue issues raised by the other avoidance action defendants' motions rather than requiring them to seek to be excluded from mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3511.)\n\nOn September 24, 2024, a Status Conference was held. During the Status Conference, the Joint Defendants circulated their proposal for an amendment to the Avoidance Action Procedures Order and a joint briefing process. The Trustee did not oppose the Joint Defendants' proposal. Certain defendants not subject to the mediation stay did not oppose the hearings on their motions to dismiss being continued until a hearing on the prospective Joint Motions was held, but raised due process concerns should their motions be heard after the Joint Motions. At the end of the Status Conference, the Court took the matter under consideration.\n\nOn September 25, 2024, for the reasons set forth therein, the Court entered the Joint Briefing Order. (Main Case ECF No. 3577.) In pertinent part, the Joint Briefing Order provides the Joint Defendants shall collectively file a brief addressing only four issues the Joint Defendants argued were common legal issues. Those four issues, which were adopted almost verbatim from the Joint Defendants' proposal, are:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\n(Joint Briefing Order ¶ 2(b)(i)–(iv), Main Case ECF No. 3577.) Under the Joint Briefing Order, (1) to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed, the Joint Motions shall not address Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order; and (2) the Joint Defendants reserve for future\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 34 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 49 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 33 of 102\n\npleadings all bases for a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings other than the four issues. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 5.)\n\nThe Joint Briefing Order also provided time for other avoidance action defendants to join the Joint Defendants. Several did, including some not subject to the mediation stay. (Main Case ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629.) On October 18, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed their joint memorandum of law (the \"Joint Brief\") and the Joint Motions. (Main Case ECF No. 3713.) On November 8, 2024, the Trustee filed an opposition to the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3803.) On November 22, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed a reply in support of the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3848.) The Joint Motions are fully briefed. The Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z are also fully briefed.9\n\nOn January 8, 2025, a Status Conference was held regarding the format of the hearing on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. During the Status Conference, the Court, in consultation with the parties, established the format for the hearing. The Court also noted certain defendants did not raise any of the Joint Brief issues in their motions to dismiss. The parties agreed that the hearing on those defendants' motions should not be held at the same time. Accordingly, the Court adjourned without date the hearings on those motions.10 (*Despins v. Harcus Parker Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05163 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 32; *Despins v. Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 29.)\n\n9 A schedule of the briefing of the Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z appears in **Appendix G**.\n\n10 Although Mr. Jason Miller joined the Joint Brief, by a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on October 18, 2024, *see* **Appendix A**, *infra*, and was heard with respect to that motion, he was not heard on his previous, non-joint motion to dismiss filed on June 26, 2024.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 35 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 50 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 34 of 102\n\nDespite raising some or all the common issues, other defendants were unsure whether they wanted to be heard at the same time as the Joint Defendants. After the Status Conference, these defendants indicated they did not wish their motions to be heard at the same time. Accordingly, the Court also adjourned without date the hearings on their motions. (*Despins v. Apple Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 67; *Despins v. Meta Platforms Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 42.)\n\nOn January 15, 2025, a hearing was held on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. This matter is ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O). The Court concludes its exercise of jurisdiction is not precluded by Article III of the Constitution. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\n#### **A. Legal Standard**\n\nThe Joint Motions, Non-Joint Motions, and Z&Z Objection assert the Trustee has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b); *see also Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc.*, 6\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 36 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 51 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 35 of 102\n\nF.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021) (motions for judgment on the pleadings are subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss). In determining whether the Avoidance Claims state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must take the well-pled allegations, including those in documents attached to the complaint, as true. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); *Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't*, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012); *Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.*, 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002); *Tatum v. Oberg*, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in the Trustee's favor. *Warren v. Colvin*, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014).\n\nTo be well-pled, the Avoidance Claims must contain \"a short and plain statement showing the pleader is entitled to relief\". Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008. They must contain \"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'\". *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The \"plausibility standard\", while not a \"probability requirement\", requires more than a \"sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). Determining the plausibility of a claim is \"a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Nevertheless, \"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.\" *Id.* at 678.\n\nIn determining the sufficiency of the Avoidance Claims, the Court must also consider documents incorporated into the complaints by reference and matters of which it may take judicial notice. *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Here, as noted above, the Trustee has incorporated by reference his complaints against (1) Golden Spring\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 37 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 52 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 36 of 102\n\n(New York) Limited (\"Golden Spring\"); (2) Lamp Capital LLC (\"Lamp Capital\"); (3) HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Tech\"); (4) HCHK Property Management, Inc (\"HCHK Property\"); (5) Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (\"Lexington\", and, together with HCHK Tech and HCHK Property, each, an \"HCHK Entity\" and, collectively, the \"HCHK Entities\"); (6) Greenwich Land, LLC (\"Greenwich Land\"); and (7) Leading Shine NY Ltd. (\"Leading Shine\"). These complaints allege, under Delaware law, (i) the foregoing entities are the *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor; and (ii) they and/or their assets are beneficially owned by the Individual Debtor.11 None of the elements of these claims need to be pled with particularity. *See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.*, 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Delaware law and holding there is no requirement to show fraud to establish *alter ego*).\n\n#### **B. Joint Motions**\n\nThe Court will first consider the Joint Defendants'12 arguments on the four issues:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n11 Each of the seven *alter egos* at issue were allegedly formed in Delaware. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. Taking these allegations as true, Delaware law applies to the Trustee's *alter ego* and beneficial ownership claims. *Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)*, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013) (forum state choice of law applies); *see Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc.*, 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007) (applying local law of state of formation to *alter ego* action and other internal affairs regarding an LLC); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304. To be clear, \"Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.\" *Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.*, 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018).\n\n12 Regardless of usage of \"Joint Defendant\" or \"Non-Joint Defendant\", the determinations in sections B and C of the Discussion apply to all defendants that raise or join in the arguments addressed.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 38 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 53 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 37 of 102\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\nDuring the hearing, the Joint Defendants divided the four issues into two arguments. Regarding issues (i) and (iii), the Joint Defendants argue even if the Court were to hold certain entities are the Individual Debtor's *alter egos*, the Court must dismiss the complaints because an *alter ego* finding does not give the Trustee standing to sue on the *alter ego's* transfers of its property. As to issues (ii) and (iv), the Joint Defendants raise a series of arguments that *alter ego* determinations are improper under applicable state law or must be circumscribed in the bankruptcy context because of prejudice to the *alter egos'* transferees. The Court will address these arguments in turn.\n\n# **1. Issues (i) and (iii): The effect of an** *alter ego* **determination in avoidable transfer actions**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law would result only in the *alter egos* being vicariously liable for debts of the Individual Debtor. Such a determination, they argue, would *not* (i) accomplish the transfer of the *alter egos'* assets into the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and allow the Trustee to assert an unauthorized post-petition transfer claim; or (ii) collapse the identity of the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allow the Trustee to assert that an *alter ego's* transfer of its property is a fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of his property. On these bases, the Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring the Avoidance Claims even assuming he prevails on his *alter ego* claims. Ultimately, the Joint Defendants assert the Trustee's only recovery is from the *alter egos* themselves.\n\nIn response, the Trustee makes two arguments. First, the Trustee argues that while an *alter ego* determination is made under applicable state law, the effect of an *alter ego*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 39 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 54 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 38 of 102\n\ndetermination is a matter of federal law. In particular, the Trustee asserts section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code controls whether an interest that exists at state law is property of the estate. Second, the Trustee argues even if state law controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination, Delaware law follows an identity theory of *alter ego.* Therefore, the Trustee argues an *alter ego* determination provides him with a basis to assert fraudulent transfer and unauthorized postpetition transfer claims. The Trustee contends that if the Court agrees with the Joint Defendants, the result will be to ignore the Individual Debtor's misconduct and inequitable dealings by cutting off the estate's recovery.\n\nAs discussed in greater detail below, the Court agrees with the Trustee. As a threshold matter, the Joint Defendants' argument focuses solely on the Avoidance Claims' *alter ego* allegations and fails to address the overlapping and alternative beneficial ownership allegations. The Avoidance Claims assert the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* and their assets as a basis for the relief requested. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv.*, 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990); *Orr v. Kinderhill Corp.*, 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993). Moreover, the substantive avoidable transfer law upon which the Avoidance Claims are pled controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination. Avoidable transfer law values substance over form and is, hence, amenable to piercing the corporate veil where applicable law would disregard the corporate form. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *United States v. Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983); *Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979); *Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht)*, 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024); *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *McNellis v. Raymond*, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970); *ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp.*, 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 40 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 55 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 39 of 102\n\n# **i. Issues (i) and (iii): Beneficial ownership alleged in connection with the transfers**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee improperly uses Delaware *alter ego* law to satisfy two elements of the Avoidance Claims by collapsing the distinctions between (a) the alleged *alter ego* transferor and the Individual Debtor13; and (b) the *alter ego* transferor's *property* and the Individual Debtor's *property*14 and/or the estate's *property*15. However, as noted, the Trustee also alleges the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos* and/or their assets. The Court cannot ignore the Trustee's allegations.\n\n# **a. Beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to issue (i): whether Trustee alleges an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity or by the Individual Debtor**\n\nRegarding the first element, to plead actual fraudulent transfer or one sort of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee must plead the Individual Debtor made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(ii)(IV). Likewise, with respect to his NYUVTA claims, the Trustee must plead that the Individual Debtor or some other party liable on his debt made the transfer. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). However, an unauthorized postpetition transfer and the other types of constructive fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code do not require the Individual Debtor to have made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III) (no requirement that the debtor made the transfer), 549(a) (same).\n\nUnder the Bankruptcy Code, \"transfers\" include, in pertinent part, \"each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.\" 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). Similarly, transfers under\n\n13 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n14 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n15 *See* 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 41 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 56 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 40 of 102\n\nNYUVTA include, in pertinent part, \"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset\". N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p).\n\nIn keeping with the inclusion of \"indirect\" conveyances in the definition of transfer in both the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA, courts look to the substance, not the form, of a transfer. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35 (\"In equity, 'substance will not give way to form, [and] technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done.' Thus, an allegedly fraudulent conveyance must be evaluated in context; '[w]here a transfer is only a step in a general plan, the plan \"must be viewed as a whole with all its composite implications.\"'\") (internal citations omitted; other alterations in original); *see* 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.03[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2025) (collecting cases). Courts must look at the \"economic reality\" of the transaction. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 36 (citing *Salomon Inc. v. United States*, 976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)). Courts may, on appropriate facts, disregard corporate separateness in analyzing the economic reality of a transaction. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53 (in an action under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, affirming district court ruling insofar as it pierced the corporate veil to determine that principal received consideration – the loan to his company – for his personal payments to the lender and, hence, ruled the transaction was not a fraudulent conveyance); *see Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding law under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, is not displaced unless there is a clear indication Congress intended to do so).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 42 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 57 of 118\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 41 of\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims as alleging the following *series* of transfers:16\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\nAccepting the Joint Defendants' interpretation, the Trustee is wholly relying on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allege the Individual Debtor made the transfers. The Joint Defendants dispute this identity and argue the Trustee does not have standing to avoid the remaining transfer, **B**Æ**C**.\n\nHowever, the Court must assess the transfers as they are alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.,*\n\n*LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.*, 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018). Contrary to the Joint Defendants'\n\ninterpretation of the complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers\n\n\"using\" the *alter egos*:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is not relying solely on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos*\n\n– he is alleging the *alter egos* are an *instrument* of the transfers.\n\nFor example, in the complaint against, among others, Amazon.com, Inc. (\"Amazon\"), a\n\nJoint Defendant, the Trustee alleges:\n\n44. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies Greenwich Land, G Club17, Lexington, HCHK Technologies, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to Amazon (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n16 The diagrams below are reproduced in **Appendix H**. 17 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club Operations LLC. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 43 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 58 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 42 of 102\n\n> 45. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through his shell companies, Greenwich Land, G Club, Lexington, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to Amazon (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 44–45, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The Trustee alleges the transfers were part of the Individual Debtor's \"shell game\" involving \"(i) [Individual] Debtor-controlled shell companies held by close family members and/or subordinates, (ii) assets purchased with cash from other [Individual] Debtor-controlled entities and/or transferred to and among shell entities for no consideration, and (iii) the [Individual] Debtor benefitting from and having control and dominion over such assets\", (*id*. ¶ 22), with the purpose of the shell game being \"to conceal and dissipate millions of dollars in assets while falsely pleading poverty to his many creditors\", (*id.* ¶ 37). (*See id.* ¶¶ 20–43.) All the other complaints make the same allegations about the Individual Debtor's financial affairs.\n\nIn support of these arguments, the complaint against Amazon incorporates the *alter ego* complaints against Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land. (*Id.* ¶ 20 n. 4.) The *alter ego* complaints seek declaratory judgments of *alter ego* and beneficial ownership and, on the bases of these declaratory judgments, turnover of property of the estate. For example, the complaint against Golden Spring alleges\n\nGolden Spring is the alter ego of the [Individual] Debtor and the [Individual] Debtor is the equitable owner of Golden Spring and/or its assets.\n\n(Complaint ¶ 2, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 44 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 59 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 43 of 102\n\nThe complaint against Golden Spring alleges numerous facts about, *inter alia*, the Individual Debtor's control over Golden Spring's formation, funding, management, and operations as well as his use of Golden Spring as a shell company to hide assets, pay expenses, and, generally, serve his interests. (*Id.* ¶¶ 13–38.) Extensive exhibits are attached to the complaint in support of these allegations. The other *alter ego* complaints make similar allegations relating to the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the alleged *alter egos*, his benefit from and use of their assets and/or services, and his use of their corporate form to shield assets from his creditors.\n\nThe Trustee's allegations connect the Individual Debtor to the nominal transferors through two overlapping legal theories: (i) *alter ego*, the focus of the Joint Defendants' argument; and (ii) beneficial ownership, which the Joint Defendants do not address. However, the Trustee's beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Assuming the Trustee has plausibly alleged the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos*18, he has plausibly pled the *alter egos* are affiliates of the Individual Debtor, through which the Individual Debtor could indirectly transfer assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a). In fact, courts have collapsed transactions involving affiliates. *See, e.g.*, *Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp.*, 919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming district court where fraudulent transfer involved owners laundering the assets of one company they owned to another as part of an overall scheme to make assets unavailable to creditors); *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D) (transfers include *indirect* transfers); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p) (same).\n\n18 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* because that is not among the four issues.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 45 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 60 of 118\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 44 of\n\nTherefore, the Court finds the parties' argument regarding the effect of *alter ego* is not dispositive of the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n# **b. Beneficial ownership allegations may render inconsequential issue (iii): the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination**\n\nTurning to the second element at issue, Bankruptcy Code section 548 actual or constructive fraudulent transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Trustee standing to bring avoidance actions an actual creditor could bring under other applicable state or federal law to avoid transfers of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). The Trustee's New York law actual and constructive fraudulent transfer claims must additionally plead a transfer of \"property of the debtor\", where \"debtor\" is the Individual Debtor or another party liable on his debt. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b). Finally, unauthorized post-petition transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"property of the estate\". 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\nAn interest of the debtor in property is anything that would have been property of the estate but for the transfer to be avoided. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (\"Because the purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate—the property available for distribution to creditors—'property of the debtor' subject to the preferential transfer provision is best understood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.\"). Therefore, the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"an interest of the debtor in property\", 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1), and the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"property of the estate\", 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), both center on section 541, which defines property of the estate. Property of\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 46 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 61 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 45 of 102\n\nthe estate includes, in pertinent part, \"wherever located and by whomever held[,] . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Indeed, the Avoidance Claims must plead the Individual Debtor has an *equitable* interest in property, as opposed to mere legal title. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 58; *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (excepting from property of the estate property to which the debtor has only a legal interest insofar as the debtor does not have an equitable interest).\n\nAs to whether a transfer is of property of a debtor under NYUVTA, New York law recognizes beneficial ownership in actions to collect on a debt. *See, e.g.*, *In re Gliklad v. Chernoi*, 12 N.Y.S.3d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (affirming order requiring judgment debtor to turn over beneficial ownership of a business); *Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp.*, 651 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (remanding case to determine whether individual defendants equitably owned a corporate defendant and whether the plaintiff could pierce the corporate veil between the corporate defendant and its potential equitable owners); *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) (determining judgment debtor beneficially owned yacht in action to collect on judgment). Therefore, an \"interest of the debtor in property\", \"property of the estate\", and \"property of the debtor\" all include the Individual Debtor's equitable interests in property.\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee seeks to avoid a transfer of the *alter egos'* property:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 47 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 62 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 46 of 102\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the complaints to be alleging an *alter ego* determination would *create* an interest of the Individual Debtor in the *alter egos'* property.19 The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee is mistaken – an *alter ego* determination cannot create an interest in property that did not previously exist – and, therefore, the Trustee does not have standing to assert the remaining **B**Æ**C** transfer of **B**'s property.\n\nOnce again, however, the Court must assess the transfers as alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. In the complaints, the Trustee alleges the transfers are transfers of the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate – *not* the *alter egos'* property:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is alleging the Individual Debtor *always* had an interest in the *alter egos'* property – the interest is not created by an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThis can be seen in the paragraphs from the complaint against Amazon cited above. But to use another example, in the complaint against, among others, Joint Defendant B&H Foto & Electronics Corp. (\"B&H Foto\"), the Trustee makes the following allegations:\n\n43. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies including Greenwich Land, Golden Spring, HCHK Technologies, G Club Operations, Rule of Law20 and Lexington Property, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to B&H (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n44. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through shell companies including Greenwich Land, Lexington, Golden Spring, G Club Operations,\n\n19 Effectively, as the Joint Defendants see it, *alter ego* determinations are involuntary transfers, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), and **A=B**Æ**C** can also be written **A**Å**B**Æ**C**. 20 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club\n\nOperations and Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 48 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 63 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 47 of 102\n\nand HCHK Technologies, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to B&H (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 43–44, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The complaint alleges the Individual Debtor was involved in a \"shell game\", whereby he hid *his* assets in *alter egos* – and after the petition date, the assets of the estate – to frustrate collection of those assets to pay his debts and avoid his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. (*Id.* ¶¶ 19–42.) These allegations are identical in form to those in all the other complaints.\n\nThe complaints against the alleged *alter egos* involved in the transfers at issue are incorporated by reference. (*Id.* ¶ 19 n. 4.) All the *alter ego* complaints contain extensive allegations that the Individual Debtor used, controlled, and benefitted from the assets of the *alter egos*. 21 One of those, the *alter ego* complaint against Golden Spring is discussed above. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 10–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) As another example, the complaint against the HCHK Entities makes similar allegations. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 16–40, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23- 05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.)\n\nA review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints makes clear the Trustee is not solely relying on *alter ego* to assert the Individual Debtor or the estate has an equitable interest in the transferred property. As with the first element, to the extent the Trustee\n\n21 All the *alter ego* complaints except the complaint against Greenwich Land allege beneficial ownership of both the *alter ego* and its assets. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. The complaint against Greenwich Land nevertheless contains allegations about the Individual Debtor's use and control of and benefit from Greenwich Land's assets.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 49 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 64 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 48 of 102\n\nhas plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of an *alter ego's* assets22, he has plausibly pled a transfer of his property and/or property that is or, but for the transfer, would have been property of the estate. Hence, the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is also not dispositive of this element.\n\n# **ii. Avoidable transfer law controls issue (i): whether the Individual Debtor is the transferor; and issue (iii): whether the** *alter egos'* **property is the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate**\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, the Court will discuss the parties' arguments regarding the effect of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer actions in bankruptcy proceedings. In *McNellis*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court both in piercing the corporate veil with respect to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action and in refusing to pierce the same corporate veil with respect to the trustee's usury action. 420 F.2d at 53–54. The Second Circuit concluded, while fraudulent conveyance law allowed courts to pierce form in favor of substance, New York's usury law had developed to allow individuals to use a corporate *alter ego* to take out an otherwise usurious loan. *Id.* That is, the Second Circuit looked to the substantive law governing the trustee's causes of actions to determine whether the corporate veil could be pierced to establish an element or defense. *Id.*\n\nAccordingly, the Trustee is correct that the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is not dispositive. The relevant avoidable transfer statutes – here, the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA – determine whether and to what effect corporate veils may be pierced for the purposes of fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54. The standard governing veil piercing is determined by applicable choice of law rules –\n\n22 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos'* assets because that is not among the four issues.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 50 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 65 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 49 of 102\n\nwhich may or may not be different than the law governing the overall cause of action. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (denying motion to dismiss because debtor had sufficiently alleged standing to allege fraudulent transfer, under Delaware law, standing in shoes of its subsidiary through reverse veil-piercing, under Delaware law); *accord Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC*, C.A. No. 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) (acknowledging that under Delaware fraudulent transfer law, where reverse veil piercing is available under applicable law, a creditor of a parent may argue *alter ego* for the purposes of pursuing the fraudulent transfer of a subsidiary's assets).\n\nThe Joint Defendants assert the relief the Trustee seeks is novel. It is not. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (applying Delaware *alter ego* law); *see Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at \\*4–6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020) (applying Nevada *alter ego* law); *Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery)*, 402 B.R. 728, 743–48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) (same); *Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner)*, 335 B.R. 140, 145–47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005) (applying California *alter ego* law), *upheld in pertinent part on reconsideration* 345 B.R. 674, 676–77 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (upholding *alter ego* determination).\n\n# **a. Issues (i) and (iii): State law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nFurthermore, the relief the Trustee is seeking is certainly not novel under state law. Under NYUVTA, actual and constructive fraudulent transfers can be established by an *alter ego's* transfer of its property. \"'Debtor' means a person that is liable on a claim.\" N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). Therefore, even assuming *alter ego* only creates vicarious *liability*, an *alter ego* is a \"debtor\" even if it is not a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Because it is a debtor, an *alter ego* can make an avoidable transfer. *See* N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274. Moreover, property\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 51 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 66 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 50 of 102\n\nof an *alter ego* is property of a debtor. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p). Therefore, in a state law action, *alter ego* can be used in conjunction with NYUVTA. *See Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp.*, No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK), 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (applying NYUVTA and Delaware *alter ego* law) (citing *JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc.*, 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (\"UFTA\"), predecessor of Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"UVTA\")).\n\nThis is not only the law in New York; it is the law of most if not all jurisdictions within the United States. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6) (Connecticut has adopted UFTA which has same definition of \"debtor\" as UVTA); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2] (forty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFTA or UVTA); *see, e.g.*, *Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc.*, 450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at \\*4–5 (Nev. 2019) (table disposition); *Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc.*, 839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002); *Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3; *Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C.*, 75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); *U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc.*, 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015). Avoidable transfer and *alter ego* law both seek to thwart judgment evasion and can, unsurprisingly, be used together in collection actions outside of bankruptcy.\n\nIf the Trustee has standing under section 544(b) to bring his NYUVTA claims and has plausibly pled *alter ego*23, he has plausibly pled a debtor transferred its property.\n\n23 The Court will discuss the plausibility of the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations in section D below, after discussing the defendants' arguments regarding the sufficiency of his pleading.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 52 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 67 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 51 of 102\n\n### **b. Issues (i) and (iii): Bankruptcy law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nThe Court must determine whether the normal rule applicable outside of bankruptcy also applies in bankruptcy. As in the beneficial ownership discussion above, two elements are at issue. First, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor. The Bankruptcy Code only controls this element with respect to actual fraudulent transfer and one of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV). Section 544(b) does not apply this element to the Trustee's NYUVTA claims and it is not an element of three of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a).\n\nSecond, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the *alter ego's* property is or would have been, but for the transfer, property of the estate. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59. This is an element of all the Avoidance Claims, including the Trustee's NYUVTA claims. As discussed above, the Trustee only has standing to bring claims under NYUVTA if he alleges a transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).\n\n### *Issue (i): Does the Trustee allege an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?*\n\nWith respect to the first element, the Court concludes *alter ego* can be used to establish the Individual Debtor was the transferor because the definition of \"transfer\" includes indirect conveyances. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). Indeed, in *McNellis*, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to pierce the corporate veil and to hold the individual rather than his corporation took out the loan he later repaid. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54; *see Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *Voest-*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 53 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 68 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 52 of 102\n\n*Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 212–13. Therefore, *alter ego* allegations may support allegations that the Individual Debtor – not a non-debtor entity – is the transferor.\n\n# *Issue (iii): What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or alter ego determination?*\n\nAs to the second element, where the Bankruptcy Code is silent, state law determines what interests parties have in property. *Butner*, 440 U.S. at 54–57. However, *Butner* also holds Congress has authority under Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution to define property interests contrary to state law for the purposes of bankruptcy. *Id.* at 54–57 (holding it is a matter of state law whether, when, and how a mortgagee obtains a security interest in rents because the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, did not include a provision providing or denying mortgagees such a security interest).\n\nCongress defined property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. \"Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in the estate\", including \"property in which the debtor did not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy proceedings commenced.\" *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–05 (affirming Second Circuit determination that property of the estate included property seized by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a tax lien prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition). Therefore, consistent with *Butner* and *Whiting Pools*, courts have generally held that while state law determines what interests a debtor has in property, federal law determines whether those interests in property are included in property of the estate. *Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.)*, 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019); *Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.)*, 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007); *In re Nejberger*, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991); *N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons)*, 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 54 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 69 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 53 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* claim is property of the estate. *Nordlicht*,115 F.4th at 104–06 (holding *alter ego* claim under New York law is property of the estate), because such claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\", *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (alteration in original); *see In re Emoral, Inc.*, 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that successor liability claims are property of the estate because, like *alter ego* claims, they are general claims of creditors). This is true even if at state law *alter ego* is a claim for the imposition of vicarious liability, not an independent cause of action. *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 109–111. *Nordlicht* determined that\n\nalter-ego theories of liability neatly fall[] within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of 'claim':\n\n(A) *right to payment*, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or\n\n(B) *right to an equitable remedy* for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.\"\n\n115 F.4th at 110 (emphasis in original).\n\nUnder *Nordlicht*, a trustee's right to payment or an equitable remedy (such as turnover) from an *alter ego* is property of the estate. 115 F.4th at 105. A trustee may seek recovery from the *alter ego* to the full extent of claims asserted against the estate. *See Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.)*, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931) (holding, with respect to predecessors of section 544(b) claims, the trustee could recover on an avoided transfer for the estate's creditors at large). Property recoverable by a trustee is property of the estate. *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–07. Moreover, under *Begier*, the Individual Debtor had an interest in any such property prepetition. 496 U.S. at 59. Hence, if the Trustee prevails on his *alter ego* claims, the *alter egos'*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 55 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 70 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 54 of 102\n\nproperty is property of the estate and the Individual Debtor had an interest in that property prepetition. *See Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (*alter ego* claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\"); *718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein)*, 192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding court had jurisdiction to determine appeal of a ruling on, among other things, creditor's claim that certain corporations were *alter egos* of the debtor because a determination that they were his *alter egos* \"would result in the inclusion in his bankruptcy estate of substantial assets which then would be available to satisfy, at least in part, his creditors' claims.\"); *Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.)*, 97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding trustee had standing to bring *alter ego* claim because it was \"an attempt to collect property of the estate for the benefit of *all* creditors and is not personal to any particular creditor\") (emphasis in original).\n\n#### *Contrary authority is unpersuasive*\n\nIn coming to this conclusion, the Court respectfully disagrees with the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in *In re Howland*. 674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017); *accord Lippe v. Bairnco Corp.*, 230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); *Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle)*, BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006); *Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle)*, Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21- 04041-lsg, \\_\\_\\_ B.R. \\_\\_\\_, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023) (applying *Howland*); *Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver)*, 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022) (same). In *Howland*, the Sixth Circuit held property of an *alter ego* is not property of the estate and cannot be recovered where, at state law, *alter ego* merely imposes vicarious liability. 674 F.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 56 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 71 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 55 of 102\n\nApp'x at 487. *Lippe* and *Wardle* held the same. *DuMouchelle* and *Silver*, decisions from courts within the sixth circuit, applied *Howland*.\n\nIn addition to the statutory analysis above, the Court respectfully disagrees with *Howland* for several reasons. First, courts \"do not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\". *Cohen*, 523 U.S. at 221. In interpreting the Code, courts presume Congress's \"familiarity with the prevailing understanding\" of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898. *Johnson v. Home State Bank*, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991). There is no clear indication that Congress intended to overrule *McNellis*. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 541(a), 544(b), 548(a), 549(a) *with* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 1) (repealed 1978), 107(d) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 67) (repealed 1978), 110(a), (d), (e) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 70) (repealed 1978). *McNellis* – which upheld the use of *alter ego* to prove a defense to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action brought under federal bankruptcy law and New York law – is binding on this Court. 420 F.2d at 53–54.\n\nSecond, the Sixth Circuit's approach to *alter ego* claims in avoidance actions is contrary to the Second Circuit's directive that courts must consider the substance, rather than the form, of a fraudulent transfer. *See Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *see also Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc.*, 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); *Voest-Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 211–12. There is capacity in fraudulent transfer law to look past the nominal parties to a transaction where state law allows the corporate form to be disregarded. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68. This capacity to recognize the economic reality is reflected in the expansive definitions of transfer and property of the estate in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 541.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 57 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 72 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 56 of 102\n\nThird, *Howland* is contrary to how *alter ego* and avoidance claims interact under state law. As outlined above, *alter ego* can be used in NYUVTA claims outside of bankruptcy to target transactions where the *alter ego* is both the nominal transferor and the nominal owner of the transferred property. *Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\nThe result should be no different in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is, among other things, a collective collection proceeding. *Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 370–71. That is *why* the Trustee has standing to assert (i) general claims for the benefit of creditors at large, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); *see Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105; and (ii) particular avoidance claims of actual creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), to the full extent of the transfer – even if the actual creditors' debt is less than the transferred amount, *Moore*, 284 U.S. at 5. Bankruptcy \"shields creditors from one another by replacing 'race' and other preferential systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of assets.\" *In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.*, 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (discussing purpose of the automatic stay) (citing *Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc.*, 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (case under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended)). It would undermine the collective nature of bankruptcy to send creditors on a race to the courthouse to pursue *alter ego* and fraudulent transfer remedies – remedies they may have no standing to pursue during the pendency of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy. *See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989).\n\nEven if creditors *could* bring these actions outside of bankruptcy, the costs to do so would be high: the Trustee's investigation into the Individual Debtor's financial affairs has been highly litigated and time consuming. Forcing creditors to pursue these avoidance actions outside of bankruptcy or forego their prosecution would promote an inequitable and uneven recovery for\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 58 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 73 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 57 of 102\n\nthe Individual Debtor's creditors, many of whom likely could not pay the fees and costs associated with such an effort. *See Union Bank v. Wolas*, 502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991) (section 547 is designed to balance related goals of preventing a race to the courthouse and providing for an equitable distribution to all creditors); *Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.)*, 78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). The Trustee is the person to pool the creditors' interests in the estate and bring the avoidance actions for their collective benefit. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50*.*\n\nFinally, *Howland* also runs contrary to Delaware *alter ego* law. It is an accident of our legal system that, generally, *alter ego* results in vicarious liability – the *alter ego* doctrine is about disregarding the corporate form where it is abused and causes fraud or injustice. *See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968) (\"There is, of course, no doubt that upon a proper showing corporate entities as between parent and subsidiary may be disregarded and the ultimate party in interest, the parent, be regarded in law and fact as the sole party in a particular transaction.\"). As the Delaware Court of Chancery observed \"[a]t its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners\", *Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.*, 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021) (action to collect on appraisal judgment), *because* \"where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent\", *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (alteration in the original).\n\nMost relief in the common law takes the form of money damages. The primary use of an *alter ego* claim is to spread liability from a defendant liable at law for money damages on, *e.g.*, tort or contract to a defendant with deeper pockets. *See NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC*, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances,\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 59 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 74 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 58 of 102\n\nthe distinction between the entity and its owner 'may be disregarded' to require an owner to answer for the entity's debts.\") (action on contract); *Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC*, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"A plaintiff seeking to hold the owners of a corporation liable for the corporation's debts 'faces a difficult task.'\") (action on fraud); *Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.)*, 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"Under Delaware law, veil piercing is a doctrine of equity. . . . Veil piercing is thus not a purely independent cause of action. Instead, piercing the corporate veil *effectively* amounts to the imposition of joint and several liability between a direct actor and its corporate affiliate for some underlying wrong committed by the direct actor.\") (action on tort) (emphasis added).\n\nHowever, the avoidance of a transfer is not money damages. \"[T]he purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate\". *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (discussing section 547 and the avoidance of preferential transfers); *see In re PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002) (\"Fraudulent conveyance law aims 'to make available to creditors those assets of the debtor that are rightfully a part of the bankruptcy estate, even if they have been transferred away.'\"); *Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.)*, 881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that allowing an administrative claim holder to keep unauthorized post-petition transfers would be inequitable to other creditors who have similar claims). To this end, the relief provided by sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code and section 273 and 274 of NYUVTA is *avoidance* of the subject transfer – not money damages. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274.\n\nUpon avoidance of the transfer, section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 276(b) of NYUVTA allow recovery of the *specific property* transferred, the value thereof, or the proceeds thereof. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b). It is, therefore, entirely\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 60 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 75 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 59 of 102\n\nunsurprising that disregarding the corporate form and treating the assets of the *alter ego* as the assets of the debtor operates differently with regard to avoidance actions than it does with regard to other actions. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (\"In the parent/subsidiary context, 'where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent.'\").\n\n\"Delaware will not countenance the use of the corporate form as a means to facilitate fraud or injustice.\" *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714. Fraudulent and unauthorized postpetition transfer law align with this purpose. They exist to prevent inequitable results arising from the dissipation of assets. *See Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d at 313; *Photo Promotion Assocs.*, 881 F.2d at 9–10. It would be fundamentally absurd and contrary to the purpose of the doctrine, if *alter ego* could not be used to prevent fraud or injustice resulting from a fraudulent or unauthorized post-petition transfer. These two bodies of law can be used together. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68; *see Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see also Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes a debtor may make a transfer through an *alter ego* and an *alter ego's* property is property of the debtor's estate. To the extent the Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*, the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor transferred property that is, or would have been but for the transfers, property of the estate. To this same extent, the Trustee therefore has standing to bring his NYUVTA claims and, for the reasons stated above, has plausibly pled those claims. *Alter ego* can be used to support an avoidable transfer claim under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 60 of 102\n\n# **2. Issues (ii) and (iv): Prejudice to** *alter egos'* **trade creditors and substantive consolidation**\n\nThe Court turns to the Joint Defendants' remaining arguments. The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee has failed to plead a cognizable reverse veil piercing claim under Delaware law because (a) the Trustee has failed to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*; and (b) the Joint Defendants would, as a matter of law, be prejudiced by reverse veil-piercing. The Joint Defendants also argue (c) the Trustee is seeking impermissible *nunc pro tunc* relief; and (d) even if the relief were otherwise permissible under state law, the relief sought could also be achieved by substantive consolidation and therefore it is inequitable to allow the Trustee that relief without meeting the test required for *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation. Woven throughout the Joint Defendants' arguments is the contention that the relief the Trustee seeks is deeply inequitable to them as innocent trade creditors of the alleged *alter egos*.\n\nThe Trustee argues (a) the caselaw is clear a plaintiff is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of an alleged *alter ego*; (b) prejudice is a fact intensive inquiry not resolvable on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and, in any event, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Joint Defendants protections unavailable outside of bankruptcy; (c) he is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief with his *alter ego* claims but rather seeking to conform legal reality to factual reality; and (d) while the relief *alter ego* provides in bankruptcy proceedings may be similar to substantive consolidation, the factual and legal predicates for the two remedies differ and the Trustee has pled *alter ego*. The Trustee also disputes the contention that the Joint Defendants are all innocent trade creditors and that the relief he seeks is fundamentally unfair.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 62 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 77 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 61 of 102\n\n### **i. Issue (ii): Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nAs stated above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to allege transfers:\n\n$$\\begin{array}{c} \\mathbf{A}\\_{\\text{(Indidual Deftor)}} = \\mathbf{B}\\_{\\text{(Alter ergo)}} \\xrightarrow[\\text{(Transfer elimination)}]{} \\mathbf{C}\\_{\\text{(Join Defretadant)}} \\\\ \\text{(Alter ergo determination)} \\end{array}$$\n\nWith respect to issue (ii), the Joint Defendants argue that even if an *alter ego* determination would create an identity between the Individual Debtor and the alleged *alter egos*, avoiding the **B**Æ**C** transfer is prejudicial because the Joint Defendants did not know **A=B**, and, hence, the Court cannot *as a matter of law* make an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThe Court disagrees. First, the Trustee is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the *alter egos'* creditors. In adopting reverse veil-piercing, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that courts must consider the traditional *alter ego* factors and additionally consider a series of other factors that, essentially, relate to prejudice to the alleged *alter ego's* creditors, owners, and other stakeholders. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery rejected a defendant's argument the complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead a lack of prejudice to certain creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at 718. Instead, the Court of Chancery held \"[t]here is no basis in the Complaint to infer that reverse veil-piercing will cause harm to innocent third-party creditors. . . . To be clear, factual allegations related to . . . third-party creditors are not in the Complaint, and for now at least, my analysis is confined to the 'four corners' of that pleading.\" *Id.* The Court has been provided no reason to believe the Delaware Supreme Court would disagree with the Court of Chancery on this issue. Prejudice is an issue that requires factual development.\n\nSecond, the Trustee may plead the Joint Defendants are the initial transferees; it does not matter that subsequent transferees have different defenses. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 63 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 78 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 62 of 102\n\n382–86 (holding plaintiff could plead transfer in a way that a safe harbor defense was inapplicable); *cf. Covey v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth)*, Bankruptcy No. 10- 83603, Adversary No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*8 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) (holding trustee's use of *alter ego* was impermissible in part because it would deprive defendant of subsequent transferee defenses it would have if trustee pled a different fraudulent transfer). The Joint Defendants can argue the Trustee has not pled a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. Indeed, the Joint Defendants have done so, as discussed above. They can continue to do so as these proceedings move beyond the pleading stage.\n\nIn support of their argument, the Joint Defendants urge the Court to adopt the holding of *Duckworth*, but their reliance is misplaced. The court in *Duckworth* was not faced with motions to dismiss – it was faced with motions for summary judgment. *Duckworth*, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*2. The *Duckworth* court determined on the undisputed facts that it would be inequitable and contrary to applicable state law to allow the trustee to recover from a trade creditor of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at \\*7. Here, the Joint Motions are motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. At this stage, the standard is whether the Trustee's well-pled allegations, taken as true, support a determination of impermissible prejudice. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718. A review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints does not support such a determination.\n\nThe Joint Defendants do not have a right to the Trustee pleading that they are subsequent transferees. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. The Trustee pleads transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 64 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 79 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 63 of 102\n\nHe is not required to plead an **A**Æ**B**Æ**C** transfer, treating the *alter ego* determination as a transfer, such that he alleges the Individual Debtor transferred his property to the *alter egos* as the initial transferees and the Joint Defendants are subsequent transferees of the *alter egos*.\n\n### **ii. Issue (iv): May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nTurning to issue (iv), the Court concludes the Trustee is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief. Adjudging an entity to be and have been an *alter ego* of another entity is not affording *nunc pro tunc* relief – it is adjudging that the corporate form is and has been a façade. Under the Joint Defendants' theory of *alter ego*, there would be no remedy available for a prevailing party. The Joint Defendants argue under Delaware law an *alter ego* determination merely imposes vicarious liability for a companion claim reducible to money damages. If an *alter ego* determination could only *prospectively* spread liability as the Joint Defendants assert, the *alter ego* would not be liable on the prevailing party's companion claim based on *already existing* facts. This is not how Delaware law operates. *Alter ego* may be brought *alongside* the companion claim, *see Tronox*, 549 B.R. at 27 (personal injury plaintiffs seek to impose vicarious liability through various theories, including *alter ego*, where original defendant is not amendable to suit), or even *after* judgment is entered on the companion claim, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 699–701 (*alter ego* claim was brought *after* appraisal judgment), without any analysis as to whether *nunc pro tunc* relief is appropriate. This is because *nunc pro tunc* relief is not being sought. *See Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf)*, 644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (rejecting \"confusing\" argument that an *alter ego* determination would be impermissibly retroactive in a bankruptcy case). *Alter ego* seeks a remedy based on existing facts, just as a breach of contract claim seeks a remedy on existing facts.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 65 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 80 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 64 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* determination is *not* a transfer – it does not *create* an interest in property, but rather *recognizes* an interest in property. This is a fundamental flaw in the Joint Defendants' interpretation of the Avoidance Claims. As depicted above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to be alleging transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\nAssuming *arguendo* that an *alter ego* determination creates an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter ego*, the Joint Defendants argue an *alter ego* determination would change the nature of the **B**Æ**C** transfer *after the fact*. Therefore, the Joint Defendants argue the Court cannot treat the *alter ego* determination – **A=B**, which could be stated **A**Å**B** – as having occurred at the time of the **B**Æ**C** transfer.\n\nThe Trustee is not, however, alleging the **A=B** transfer, but rather alleging the *alter egos* have always been a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor. He alleges transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nand asserts such transfers through the *alter egos* are the Individual Debtor's *modus operandi* to obtain goods and services for himself, his family, his associates, and his businesses and to move assets.\n\nThe Court declines to adopt a prudential limitation on the use of *alter ego* in bankruptcy\n\ncases. The Delaware Court of Chancery held in *Manichaean Capital* that\n\nThe risks that reverse veil-piercing may be used as a blunt instrument to harm innocent parties, and to disrupt the expectations of arms-length bargaining, while real, do not, in my view, justify the rejection of reverse veil-piercing outright. Rather, the recognition of the risks creates an opportunity to manage them, and to do so in a manner that serves the interests of equity.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 66 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 81 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 65 of 102\n\n251 A.3d at 712. The Court sees no reason why courts sitting in bankruptcy are unable or illequipped to take up the \"opportunity to manage [the risks of reverse veil-piercing]\" in the interests of equity as the Court of Chancery directs. Indeed, one of the overriding purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a single forum for the adjustment and final, equitable resolution of claims, including by collective collection proceedings. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 *et seq*. The balancing of the traditional *alter ego* factors and prejudice to the *alter ego's* creditors and other stakeholders, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15, is within the purview of a bankruptcy court.\n\nThe Joint Defendants urge the Court to view the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations as *sub rosa* substantive consolidation allegations and to, hence, apply restrictions on the retroactive effect of any *alter ego* determination – regardless of whether such restrictions apply at state law. Substantive consolidation \"results in, *inter alia*¸ pooling the assets of, and claims against, the two entities; satisfying liabilities from the resultant common fund; eliminating inter-company claims; and combining the creditors of the two companies for purposes of voting on reorganization plans.\" *Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.)*, 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). \"The sole purpose of substantive consolidation is to ensure the equitable treatment of all creditors.\" *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. Substantive consolidation requires (i) creditors to have \"dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and 'did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit'\"; and (ii) the debtors' affairs to be \"so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.\" *Id.* In *Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.)*, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantive consolidation orders should be issued *nunc pro tunc* where the proponent can show its benefits outweigh the harms to potential avoidance defendants. 810 F.2d 270, 277\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 67 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 82 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 66 of 102\n\n(D.C. Cir. 1987). The Joint Defendants urge the Court to apply *Auto-Train* to any *alter ego* determination.\n\nAs the Trustee acknowledges, the effect of an *alter ego* determination in bankruptcy is similar to the effect of substantive consolidation – assets and liabilities of the *alter egos* are merged. However, the availability of substantive consolidation – which the Joint Defendants appear to doubt – does not mean *alter ego* cannot be pled in bankruptcy cases. *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005) (\"Prior to substantive consolidation, other remedies for corporate disregard were (and remain) in place. For example, where a subsidiary is so dominated by its corporate parent as to be the parent's 'alter ego,' the 'corporate veil' of the subsidiary can be ignored (or 'pierced') under state law.\").\n\nMoreover, the elements and the purposes of the doctrines differ. Under Delaware law, traditional *alter ego* or piercing the corporate veil has two elements: (i) the corporate entity whose form is to be disregarded is so dominated and controlled by its alleged *alter ego* that the corporate entity and its *alter ego* are, in fact, a single economic unit; and (ii) the corporate form to be disregarded causes fraud or some similar injustice. *Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633; *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706; *Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood*, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999); *Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co.*, 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992). Reverse veil-piercing requires a court additionally consider prejudice to creditors, owners, and other stakeholders of the alleged *alter ego*. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. *Alter ego* provides a remedy for abuse of the corporate form. In contrast, provided there is no outweighing harm, substantive consolidation provides a remedy for overly complicated financial affairs that could be treated much more simply.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 68 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 83 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 67 of 102\n\nThis is a distinction with a difference. \"Substantive consolidation is better thought of as an economic remedy, the primary goal being the equitable treatment of all creditors. Conversely, a state law alter ego claim is an equitable remedy focused on preventing 'fraud or injustice.'\" *Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594- DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175, at \\*8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022). Substantive consolidation does not seek to remedy any fraud or injustice. *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. The corporate form need not have been abused, the entities need not have been shams, and no creditor needs to have been harmed by the corporate form. *Id.* All that is necessary is that creditors would benefit from substantive consolidation. *Id.* In substantively consolidating estates, a court is solving a practical problem – the management of highly intertwined estates with the prospect of high administrative costs spent untangling the estates – by prospectively simplifying the facts before it, where doing so does more good than harm. *See id.* In piercing the corporate veil, a court is recognizing an existing reality of abuse of the corporate form to the detriment of creditors and, as a matter of equity, not allowing that abuse to persist. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. Substantive consolidation may involve a transfer; an *alter ego* determination does not.\n\nBankruptcy is about, among other things, the equitable spreading of loss. In seeking to have the Court apply *Auto-Train* to *alter ego* claims, the Joint Defendants try to shift the focus of the analysis to the **B**Æ**C** transfer and away from **A**. In so doing, the Joint Defendants ignore the shell game alleged in the complaints involving numerous *alter egos* perpetrated by and for the benefit of the Individual Debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors – which allegations are central to an *alter ego* analysis. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 69 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 84 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 68 of 102\n\n05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) These allegations, taken as true, are relevant to the balancing of the reverse veil-piercing factors. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 715–16 (stating courts will balance \"the social value of upholding the legitimate expectations of the affected corporate creditors or debtors, applying a rebuttable presumption in favor of assuring such expectations, against the importance of the policies served by allowing a reverse pierce under the particular circumstances involved.\") (citing Gregory S. Crespi, *The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards*, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)).\n\nAlthough the Joint Defendants ask the Court to apply the *Auto-Train nunc pro tunc* analysis to the *alter ego* claims, the Court concludes there is no reason or basis to depart from Delaware *alter ego* law. It remains available to trustees notwithstanding the advent of substantive consolidation. *Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d at 205–06.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Joint Defendants' arguments on issues (ii) and (iv) are not persuasive. The Court will not balance prejudice to the Joint Defendants and the factors supporting *alter ego* on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, the Court will not impose prudential limits on the use of *alter ego* beyond the elements of the doctrine.\n\n# **C. Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**24\n\nThe Court will address only the distinct arguments made by the Non-Joint Defendants on the four issues. The following Non-Joint Defendants: (1) FFP (BVI) Limited; (2) Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell; (3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.; (4) The Francis Firm PLLC; (5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.; (6) Weddle Law PLLC; (7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC; (8) G4S Security Systems (Hong\n\n24 *See* n. 12, *supra*.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 70 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 85 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 69 of 102\n\nKong) Ltd.; and (9) ACASS Canada LTD, (collectively, the \"Assorted Non-Joint Defendants\") are represented by the same counsel who argued their Non-Joint Motions as a single argument.\n\nThere are two other Non-Joint Defendants: (10) Liberty Jet Management Corp. (\"Liberty Jet\") and (11) Z&Z. Liberty Jet and Z&Z raise no distinct arguments that are not also raised by the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. Moreover, neither Liberty Jet nor Z&Z advanced independent arguments during the hearing. The Court will, therefore, only discuss the arguments of the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. To the extent Liberty Jet or Z&Z raised or joined in the arguments discussed below, this discussion also applies to Liberty Jet and Z&Z.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise two distinct arguments. First, with respect to issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring an *alter ego* claim because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor who, accepting the Trustee's allegations as true, is *in pari delicto* with the alleged *alter egos*. Second, with respect to issues (i), whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity, and (iii), the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue that the Trustee is improperly asserting claims of the *alter egos'* bankruptcy estates without the *alter egos* having filed for bankruptcy and without the substantive consolidation of the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case and the not-filed *alter ego* bankruptcy cases. In doing so, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert the Trustee is bypassing disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\nIn response, the Trustee argues he has standing under either section 541 or section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor's creditors and, even if he did not, the insider exception to *in pari delicto* would apply. The Trustee argues he\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 71 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 86 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 70 of 102\n\nhas properly asserted claims of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate, has properly asserted *alter ego* claims, and that, in any event, he will be seeking a new claims bar date to allow creditors of the *alter egos* to assert claims against the estate.\n\n#### **1. Issue (ii): Standing**\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code provides a bankruptcy trustee standing to bring certain claims on behalf of creditors. *PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d at 700. Absent such statutory authority, \"a bankruptcy trustee has no standing generally to sue third parties on behalf of the estate's creditors, but may only assert claims held by the bankrupt corporation itself.\" *Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner*, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991); *see Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.*, 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995); *Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.)*, 17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994).\n\nWhere a trustee is not asserting a claim on behalf of creditors, *Wagoner* directs courts to determine (i) whether the debtor could have brought the claim and (ii) if so, whether the trustee is *in pari delicto* by imputation of the debtor's conduct. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 119–20. Although an assertion of *in pari delicto* is typically considered an affirmative equitable defense, the *Wagoner* doctrine, including its consideration of *in pari delicto*, \"functions as a prudential standing limitation.\" *Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd.*, 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015).\n\nThe Second Circuit has held trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* claims on behalf of creditors at large. In *PepsiCo*, the Second Circuit adopted the approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in *Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc.*, 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987). *PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05. In *Koch Refining*, the Seventh Circuit held that, pursuant to section 544(a), a bankruptcy trustee is \"the\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 72 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 87 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 71 of 102\n\nrepresentative of the general creditors\" and could pursue *alter ego* claims because they address generalized rather than particularized harm to creditors. 831 F.2d at 1351–54; *see Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan)*, 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009). This accords with the statutory text of section 544(a): any judgment creditor could bring an *alter ego* claim to collect on their debt; it does not depend on its particular claim. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).\n\nWhile the Second Circuit distinguished *PepsiCo* in *Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC)*, 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013), it did so on facts where the Securities Investor Protection Act trustee sought to bring particularized claims of defrauded creditors – even if such claims were very commonly held on the particular facts of the Madoff Ponzi scheme25, *JPMorgan*¸721 F.3d at 58–59. The claims in *JPMorgan* closely resemble those in *Wagoner*. *Compare JPMorgan*, 721 F.3d at 58–59 *with Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 116–17. Moreover, consistent with *PespiCo*, the Second Circuit has recently reiterated that trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* on behalf of creditors at large and that *alter ego* claims are property of the estate. *Compare Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 *with PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 701.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue *Nordlicht* follows a line of cases starting with *Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.)*, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), which, unlike *Koch*, held that section 544(a) does not provide the trustee standing to bring general claims of creditors at large. *See PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 698–99. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert\n\n25 Indeed, section 544(a) avoids this sort of accidentally general claim because it does not give a trustee standing to bring claims of particular creditors but rather the standing to bring claims a hypothetical judgment creditor – without a particular underlying claim – could bring, that is, section 544(a) introduces a creditor external to the particular facts surrounding the debtor and its debts.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 73 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 88 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 72 of 102\n\nthis means the Trustee's *alter ego* claims are subject to *Wagoner*. While *Nordlicht* itself is silent on section 544(a), it is completely consistent with holding a trustee has the rights and powers of certain hypothetical creditors to hold his claims derived from those rights and powers are property of the estate. Moreover, even if it is only pursuant to section 541 that a trustee has standing to bring an *alter ego* claim, such standing is derived from the general claims of creditors at large.\n\nHence, the *Wagoner* doctrine is not applicable. It does not apply where a trustee brings an action standing in the shoes of a creditor. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 118 (\"The trustee insists he is not asserting the claims of the noteholders, so it is unnecessary for us to delve deeply into when, if ever, a trustee may sue a third party on behalf of the bankrupt's creditors.\"); *see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander)*, 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"neither the *Wagoner* rule nor the *in pari delicto* doctrine apply to a trustee's statutory standing under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.\"); *Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.)*, 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017). The Court does not reach the parties' arguments regarding exceptions to *in pari delicto*. The Trustee has standing to bring the *alter ego* claims.\n\n#### **2. Issue (i) and (iii):** *Alter ego***, substantive consolidation, and disclosure**\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise largely the same argument as the Joint Defendants, which argument the Court has rejected above, as to why the Trustee cannot use *alter ego* to plead that the Individual Debtor is the transferor or that property of the debtor and/or property that is or would be, but for the transfer, property of the estate was transferred. The Court will not discuss that argument again. The distinction arises from what the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have instead done. While the Joint Defendants argue\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 74 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 89 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 73 of 102\n\nthe Trustee can only recover from the alleged *alter egos* themselves and that is the extent of his potential recovery, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have seized control over the Individual Debtor's businesses, placed them into bankruptcy, and then sought *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation.\n\nThe Court has also already ruled above that, notwithstanding the existence of substantive consolidation, trustees may assert *alter ego* claims. As to the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants' notice concerns, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants do not represent the creditors of the alleged *alter egos* at large. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants themselves have notice of the Trustee's *alter ego* claims. The Trustee has stated multiple times that he will seek a new bar date for the creditors of adjudged *alter egos*. The Court will consider proper notice and service of such a bar date should such a request be made.\n\n### **D. Issue (ii): plausibility of** *Alter Ego* **allegations**\n\nThe Court has addressed the Joint Defendants' and Non-Joint Defendants' arguments as to why the Trustee has not plausibly pled *alter ego*. The Court has found the Trustee has standing to bring his reverse veil-piercing claims, he is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the alleged *alter egos'* creditors, and prejudice does not exist as a matter of law. This discussion, however, leaves issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – less than completely resolved.\n\nOn the basis of the allegations in the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints, the Court concludes the Trustee has plausibly alleged (1) Golden Spring; (2) Lamp Capital; (3) HCHK Tech; (4) HCHK Property; (5) Lexington; (6) Greenwich Land; and (7) Leading Shine are *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor and their corporate veils should be pierced in reverse. The Trustee has plausibly pled (i) the Individual Debtor dominated and controlled the\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 75 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 90 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 74 of 102\n\n*alter egos* such that they have no independent economic existence and serve only as a façade for the Individual Debtor; and (ii) the corporate form of the *alter egos* serves to hinder, delay, or defraud the Individual Debtor's creditors as part of a large shell game designed to effectively judgment proof the Individual Debtor. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 13–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) Furthermore, the allegations in the complaints and the *alter ego* complaints, taken as true, do not establish prejudice to the creditors of the *alter egos*. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nCertain issues before the Court are legal issues – but they are narrowly drawn and, in essence, ask the Court to look past or recharacterize the allegations in the complaints. The Court will not do so in ruling on motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants present the Trustee's transfer allegations as a series, **A=B**Æ**C**: an *alter ego* determination creating an identity between **A**, the Individual Debtor, and **B**, an alleged *alter ego*, and then a transfer of **B's** property to **C**, a Joint Defendant. The Trustee, however, alleges **A**Æ**C** transfers, transfers of **A**'s property to **C** *using* **B**. Other issues before the Court are drawn in an attempt to make them amenable to adjudication on a motion to dismiss. In doing so, the defendants focus on the unalleged **B**Æ**C** transfer and argue adding another transfer, **A=B**, to this transfer prejudices **C**. The defendants ask the Court to go beyond the pleadings and rule on the facts, which the Court will not do.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 76 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 91 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 75 of 102\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes as follows regarding the four issues:\n\n#### **(i) Can the Trustee avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?**\n\nThe Trustee does not seek to avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity. The Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Transfer is defined to include indirect transfers. Hence, the nominal transferor is not controlling. The Trustee advances *alter ego* and beneficial ownership allegations to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n# **(ii) Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nReverse veil-piercing is recognized by Delaware law. The Court has considered the parties' arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading of *alter ego*. The Trustee has standing to bring a reverse veil-piercing claim. The Trustee is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. The Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*.\n\n# **(iii) What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination?**\n\nThe Trustee does not solely rely on *alter ego* allegations – he also pleads beneficial ownership. Nevertheless, the effect of reverse veil-piercing under Delaware law is that the corporate form is disregarded. Disregard of the corporate form has different results depending on the substantive law of the companion cause of action. Typically, it results in the imposition of vicarious liability. It may also be asserted to prove some claim or defense. Under the Bankruptcy Code, an *alter ego* determination can be used to establish a debtor made an indirect transfer and renders the property of the debtor's *alter ego* property of the estate. Under NYUVTA, an *alter ego* determination can be used to avoid transfers by the *alter ego* of the *alter ego's* property.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 77 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 92 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 76 of 102\n\n# **(iv) May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nThe Trustee is not seeking retroactive relief. *Alter ego* is a remedy for past and present abuse of the corporate form. It brings legal reality in line with factual reality. *Alter ego* survives the advent of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy proceedings. There is no basis to reinterpret the complaints as seeking substantive consolidation rather than *alter ego*.\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED:**\n\n- 1. The Joint Motions, listed on Appendix A, are **DENIED**.\n- 2. The Non-Joint Motions, listed on Appendix B, are **DENIED IN PART** with respect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n- 3. The Z&Z Objection, listed on Appendix C to this Order, is **OVERRULED IN PART** with respect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n- 4. On or before March 28, 2025, each Non-Joint Defendant shall file a joint statement with the Trustee in their respective avoidance actions stating the issues that remain to\n\n\n\n102\n\nbe determined with respect to their Non-Joint Motions or the motion for judgment on the pleadings to which Z&Z objected. The statements must delineate with specificity where in the pleadings the issues are raised. Upon review of the statements, the Court will determine with respect to each matter whether a hearing is necessary or the matter may be decided on the submissions of the parties.\n\n**\\*5\\*44003%&3&%**BU#SJEHFQPSU\n\\$POOFDUJDVUUIJT4th day of March, 2025.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 94 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 79 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 78 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX A Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 24 (filed by Agora Lab, Inc., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Amazon Web Services, Inc., defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by Direct Persuasion LLC, defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Fox News Network, LLC, defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 27, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Arri Americas Inc., defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Teris-Phoenix, LLC, defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Phillips Nizer LLP, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Mr. Mark Gundersen, defendant).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 42 (filed by Amazon.com, Inc., defendant).\n- 11. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Anthem Health Plans, Inc., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 80 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 95 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 79 of 102\n\n- 12. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Federal Express Corporation, defendant).\n- 13. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by DJD Creative, LLC, defendant).\n- 14. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., defendant).\n- 15. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by American Express Company, defendant).\n- 16. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, defendant).\n- 17. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeta Global Corp., defendant).\n- 18. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by GroCyber LLC, defendant).\n- 19. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC, defendant).\n- 20. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc., defendant).\n- 21. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by ModSquad Inc., defendant).\n- 22. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Cloudfare, Inc., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 81 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 96 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 80 of 102\n\n- 23. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 3 Columbus Circle LLC, defendant).\n- 24. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Indium Software Inc., defendant).\n- 25. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Miller Motorcars Inc., defendant).\n- 26. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., defendant).\n- 27. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Target Enterprises, LLC, defendant).\n- 28. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., defendant).\n- 29. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Jamestown Associates, LLC, defendant).\n- 30. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Nardello & Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 31. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., defendant).\n- 32. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 28 (filed by Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP, defendant).\n- 33. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Putnam's Landscaping LLC, defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 82 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 97 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 81 of 102\n\n- 34. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Mr. Jason Miller, defendant).\n- 35. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Sedgwick Realty Corp., defendant).\n- 36. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Cirrus Design Corp., defendant).\n- 37. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 25 (filed by Marcum LLP, defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 83 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 98 of 118\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 82 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX B Non-Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by FFP (BVI) Ltd., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2024), ECF No. 16 (filed by V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A., defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Liberty Jet Management Corp., defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 29, 2024), ECF No. 15 (filed by The Francis Firm PLLC, defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by Berkeley Rowe Ltd., defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11 (filed by Weddle Law PLLC, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Lawall & Mitchell, LLC and Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendants).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by ACASS Canada LTD., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 84 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 99 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 83 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX C Z&Z Objection**\n\n1. Memorandum of Law in Opposition, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., defendant, in opposition to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2024), ECF No. 17).\n\n\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 84 of 102\n\n## **APPENDIX D Complaints Against Joint and Non-Joint Defendants**\n\nLegend\n\n#### **Complaints against Non-Joint Defendant are bolded**\n\nAvoidance Claims\n\nAFT (BC) – Actual Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code)\n\nAvoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and550(a).\n\nAFT (NY) – Actual Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n\nCFT (BC) – Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a).\n\n- CFT (NY) Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n- UPT Unauthorized Post-petition Transfer Avoidance and recovery of an unauthorized post-petition transfer of property of the estate from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a).\n- ST Recovery from Subsequent Transferee Recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).\n\n\\* Partially Stayed Claim\n\n\\*\\* Stayed Claim\n\n(Claims against neither Joint Defendant nor Non-Joint Defendant appear in parentheses)\n\n#### *Alter Egos*\n\nGSNY – Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. LC – Lamp Capital LLC HCHKT – HCHK Technologies, Inc. HCHKP – HCHK Property Management, Inc. LPS – Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. GL – Greenwich Land, LLC LSNY – Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n[*Alter egos* involved in Avoidance Claim insofar as it is not stayed by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(e) appear in brackets]\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 86 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 101 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 85 of 102\n\n1. Complaint, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n2. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 4.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n3. Complaint, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n4. Complaint, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n5. Complaint, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. Complaint, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n7. Complaint, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LPS] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 87 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 102 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 86 of 102\n\n8. Complaint, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n9. Complaint, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LPS]\n\n10. **Complaint,** *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT** | |\n\n11. Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n| | | |\n\n12. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKP]\n\n13. Complaint, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n14. Complaint, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 88 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 103 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 87 of 102\n\n15. Complaint, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKT, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n\n16. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2025), ECF No. 30.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. Complaint, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. Complaint, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n19. Complaint, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n20. Complaint, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n21. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 89 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 104 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 88 of 102\n\n22. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. Complaint, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n\n24. Complaint, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT* | [LPS] |\n\n25. Complaint, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. Complaint, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n27. Complaint, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n\n28. Complaint, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 89 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 90 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 105 of 118\n\n102\n\n29. **Complaint,** *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL] |\n\n30. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 2.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n31. Complaint, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: AFT (BC) [HCHKT] Second Claim: AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. Complaint, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. Complaint, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n34. Complaint, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LPS] |\n\n- Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 90 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 91 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 106 of 118\n\t- 35. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT | [LC, LPS] |\n\n36. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2024), ECF No. 23.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n\n37. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | UPT* | [HCHKT, HCHKP] |\n|--------------|------|----------------|\n| | | |\n\n38. Complaint, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n|-----------|-----------------------|\n| AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| ST* | |\n| | |\n\n40. Complaint, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 92 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 107 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 91 of 102\n\n41. **Complaint,** *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\n42. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. Complaint, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, GL] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC, HCHKP, GL] |\n\n44. Complaint, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n45. Complaint, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC]\n\n46. Complaint, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | (ST) | |\n\n- Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 92 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 93 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 108 of 118\n\t- 102\n\t- 47. **Second Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2024), ECF No. 22.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n|---------------|-----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n48. Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT | [HCHKP, LPS] |\n\n\n\n102\n\n# **APPENDIX E Selected Statutory Provisions**\n\n# **Bankruptcy Code Provisions**\n\nDefinitions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(54) The term \"transfer\" means—\n\n(A) the creation of a lien;\n\n(B) the retention of title as a security interest;\n\n(C) the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption; or\n\n(D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—\n\n(i) property; or\n\n(ii) an interest in property.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:\n\n(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.\n\nAvoidance Provisions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 94 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 95 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 110 of 118\n\n102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—\n\n(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or\n\n(B) (i) received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and\n\n(ii) (I) was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;\n\n (II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;\n\n (III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured; or\n\n (IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate—\n\n- (1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and\n- (2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or\n- (B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 96 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 111 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 95 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, If the court so orders, the value of such property, from—\n\n(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or\n\n(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.\n\n#### **NYUVTA Provisions**\n\nDefinitions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) \"Asset\" means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:\n\n- (1) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;\n- (2) property to the extent it is generally exempt under non-bankruptcy law; or\n\n(3) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entirety to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.\n\n. . .\n\n(f) \"Debtor\" means a person that is liable on a claim.\n\n. . .\n\n(p) \"Transfer\" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and the creation of a lien or other encumbrance.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 97 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 112 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 96 of 102\n\nAvoidance Provisions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:\n\n(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or\n\n(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:\n\n(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or\n\n(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due.\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.\n\n(b) A transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 97 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 98 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 113 of 118\n\n102\n\n### N.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this article, a creditor, subject to the limitations in section two hundred seventy-seven of this article, may obtain:\n\n(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;\n\n(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee if available under applicable law; and\n\n(3) subject to principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:\n\n(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;\n\n(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or\n\n(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 99 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 114 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 98 of 102\n\n### **APPENDIX F Incorporated Complaints Against** *Alter Egos*\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"Golden Spring\")\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claims: Avoidance and recovery of actual fraudulent transfer.\n\nDisposition: Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2023), ECF No. 35.\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC). Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Default Judgment, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2024), ECF No. 66.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 100 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 115 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 99 of 102\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 101 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 116 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 100 of 102\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity\n\nDisposition: Summary Judgment, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2024), ECF No. 134.\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC) Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Pending.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 102 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 117 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 101 of 102\n\n| Adv. P. | Mot. ECF | Filed | Obj. ECF | Filed | Rep. ECF | Filed |\n|-------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|\n| 24-05056 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. FFP (BVI) | 17 | 8/12/24 | 20 | 10/11/24 | 22 | 11/11/24 |\n| Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05110 | 19 | 5/24/24 | 23 | 7/23/24 | 24 | 8/22/24 |\n| Despins v. Mitchell | | | | | | |\n| 24-05134 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. V.X. Cerda | 16 | 6/5/24 | 20 | 8/5/24 | 21 | 9/3/24 |\n| & Assocs. P.A. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05135 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Liberty Jet | 19 | 6/20/24 | 24 | 9/16/24 | 27 | 10/16/24 |\n| Mgmt. Corp. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05168 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Francis Firm | 15 | 5/29/24 | 19 | 7/29/24 | 20 | 8/28/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05186 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Berkeley | 35 | 10/12/24 | 42 | 12/11/24 | 51 | 1/10/25 |\n| Rowe Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05188 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Weddle Law | 11 | 4/22/24 | 17 | 6/21/24 | 27 | 8/2/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05199 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Lawall & | 21 | 5/24/24 | 26 | 7/23/24 | 27 | 8/22/24 |\n| Mitchell, LLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05204 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. G4S Sec. | 19 | 8/22/24 | 23 | 10/21/24 | 25 | 11/20/24 |\n| Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05208 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Zeisler & | 17 | 8/2/24 | 21 | 9/6/24 | 22 | 9/20/24 |\n| Zeisler, P.C. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05226 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. ACASS | 26 | 9/12/24 | 33 | 11/12/24 | 41 | 12/20/24 |\n| Canada LTD. | | | | | | |\n\n# **APPENDIX G Briefing of Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 103 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 118 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 102 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX H Transfer Diagrams**\n\nAlleged Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nJoint Defendants' Interpretation of Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*","body_zh":"案号 22-50073 文书 4228 提交 03/18/25 录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 1 页，共 15 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交 03/19/25 录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 1 页，共 118 页\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院）\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章受托人，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nAPPLE INC.（苹果公司）、HING CHI NGOK（欣奇·诺克）、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS（亚历克斯·哈吉查拉兰布斯）、BERNARDO ENRIQUEZ（贝尔纳多·恩里克斯）、CHUNGUANG HAN（韩春光）及 MEI GUO（郭梅），\n\n被告。\n\nAPPLE INC.（苹果公司）请求准许提起中间上诉的动议\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 及 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004，上诉人 Apple Inc.（“Apple”）申请准许就破产法院作出的《裁决备忘录及命令：（一）驳回共同被告的撤诉动议或依诉状判决动议；（二）部分驳回其他被告的撤诉动议；及（三）部分驳回 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所）对受托人依诉状判决动议提出的异议》（以下简称“裁决”）[BK Dkt. No. 4189]提起中间上诉，该裁决副本作为附件1附后。1\n\n第11章\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\n对抗程序案号 24-05060\n\n1 主破产案件中的提交文件引用为 BK Dkt. No. ___。Apple 对抗程序中的提交文件引用为 AP Dkt. No. ___。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228 提交 03/18/25 录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 2 页，共 15 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交 03/19/25 录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 2 页，共 118 页\n\nLuc A. Despins 是在个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok 的第11章破产案件中获任命的破产受托人。自 February 2024 起，Despins 先生已在破产法院提起约 300 起欺诈性转让诉讼。\n\nDespins 先生似乎起诉了所有人——从 Apple 等大型公司到当地园艺工人和搬家公司——以追索非债务人公司客户在正常经营过程中支付的款项；其理论为，该等非债务人是 Kwok 先生的另我，且其所作支付实际上是对 Kwok 先生财产的转让。\n\nDespins 先生试图扩大《破产法典》欺诈性转让条款的适用范围，此举史无前例。他通过颠覆传统商业预期，并使每一笔付款都有可能成为受让人所不知情的第三方作出的欺诈性转让，创造了此前不可想象的扰乱商业活动的可能性。通常，善意行事且毫不知情的第三方作为后续受让人，受《破产法典》保护。然而，根据 Despins 先生的理论，该等保护将被彻底消除，因为只要存在可信指控称某公司的所有者实施了破产申请前的不当行为，破产受托人现在便能够追及任何非上市公司所作的付款。\n\n于 September 2024，一组被告采取措施，就回应 Despins 先生新颖且未经检验的理论进行协调。他们与 Despins 先生一道，共同向破产法院提出，建议就若干门槛问题提交书面陈述；双方一致认为，该等问题为 Despins 先生所有撤销诉讼所共有。最终，破产法院准许就 4 项约定争点提交书面陈述。\n\n近日，破产法院就共同书面陈述作出裁决，并认定 Despins 先生可以撤销非债务人关联实体作出的转让，因为该等实体仅为 Kwok 先生的另我及工具实体。作出该认定时，破产法院搁置了\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228 提交 03/18/25 录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 3 页，共 15 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交 03/19/25 录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 3 页，共 118 页\n\n各方在破产法院指示下已广泛提交书面陈述的论点，转而依赖破产法院在书面陈述及口头辩论结束后依职权提出的论点。\n\nApple 并非促成该裁决的共同书面陈述参与者之一，因为其此前已提交撤诉动议，并提出了超出共同书面陈述中 4 项约定争点范围的论点。Apple 的动议仍在待决，且该裁决尚未录入 Apple 的对抗程序。尽管如此，破产法院已在其裁决中明确表示，其意图使 Apple 及其他方受其裁定约束。事实上，破产法院已适用同案法则，使一宗对抗程序中的被告受另一宗该等被告并非当事人的对抗程序中所作裁定的约束。\n\n本中间上诉涉及首例问题。第二巡回区内没有法院准许破产受托人运用州法上的另我责任理论，撤销非债务人作出的转让。\n\n没有什么比在未就 Despins 先生基础责任理论的可行性取得上诉裁定的情况下，对数百起撤销诉讼进行诉讼更为低效。若破产法院的裁决被撤销，则 Despins 先生的所有撤销诉讼均可能被驳回。若该裁决被维持，则许多撤销诉讼很可能开始和解。无论何种情形，上诉均将实质性推进该等诉讼的最终终结。\n\n法院应准许本中间上诉，并处理影响 Despins 先生 300 多起撤销诉讼中每一起（包括针对 Apple 提起的该起诉讼）可行性的门槛法律问题。\n\n提出的问题\n\n1．州法上的另我责任法则是否可用于根据《破产法典》撤销据称为债务人关联方的非债务人实体所作转让。\n\n2．破产法院是否可以运用同案法则，使对抗程序中的被告受主破产案件或其他对抗程序中所作裁定的约束，而该等被告并非该等案件或程序的当事人。\n\n背景\n\nKwok 先生于 February 15, 2022 申请破产。BK Dkt. No. 1。Despins 先生于 July 8, 2022 获任命。BK Dkt. No. 523。\n\n自 February 2024 起，Despins 先生提起数百宗对抗程序，以撤销及追索据称由与 Kwok 先生关联的非债务人实体作出的欺诈性转让。裁决第 4-5 页。\n\n该等非债务人实体是在 Despins 先生提起的单独对抗程序中的被告，该等程序旨在宣告其为 Kwok 先生的另我。参见，例如，Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005；Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5018, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013；Despins v. ACA Capital Group Ltd., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 24-05249；Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5023；Despins v. AA Global Ventures Ltd., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 05322。\n\n其中一些另我对抗程序早在 Despins 先生提起其撤销诉讼之前即已提起，且已作出终局判决，宣告若干非债务人为 Kwok 先生的另我。参见，例如，Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 134；Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., et al., Adv.\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228 提交 03/18/25 录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 5 页，共 15 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交 03/19/25 录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 5 页，共 118 页\n\nProc. No. 23-5018, Dkt. No. 35；Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 297。\n\nDespins 先生于 February 10, 2024 对 Apple 提交起诉状。AP Dkt. No. 1。Apple 在该对抗程序中出庭，并于 June 28, 2024 提交撤诉动议。AP Dkt. Nos. 28, 32。\n\n于 September 6, 2024，单独撤销诉讼中的一组被告（以下简称“共同被告”）请求与破产法院举行状态会议，以讨论就 Despins 先生所有撤销诉讼共同的法律问题提交书面陈述。裁决第 6-7 页。破产法院准许该请求，后作出命令，安排就 4 项问题提交书面陈述：\n\ni．Despins 先生是否可以撤销非债务人实体作出的初始转让；\n\nii．适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或作出另我认定；\n\niii．反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力；以及\n\niv．反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定是否可追溯适用。\n\n同上，第 7 页。\n\n其他对抗程序中的被告获准加入共同被告提交的书面陈述，部分被告确已加入。同上，第 8 页。Apple 未参与共同被告的书面陈述。Apple 的对抗程序中未录入任何可使 Apple 成为受共同书面陈述结果约束之当事人的命令。\n\n共同被告的书面陈述提出了 Apple 在其撤诉动议中提出的部分相同论点。比较 BK Dkt. No. 3713 与 AP Dkt. No. 32。然而，由于 Apple 不受破产法院命令所列 4 项问题的限制，其提出了额外论点。尽管如此，Despins 先生对 Apple 撤诉动议的反对意见，在很大程度上复制并粘贴了\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228 提交 03/18/25 录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 6 页，共 15 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交 03/19/25 录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 6 页，共 118 页\n\n其对共同被告书面陈述的反对意见中的论点。比较 BK Dkt. No. 3803 与 AP Dkt. No. 61。\n\n于 November 27, 2024，破产法院安排于 January 15, 2025 就共同被告的书面陈述举行听证会。BK Dkt. No. 3857。破产法院安排于同日就 Apple 的撤诉动议举行听证会。AP Dkt. No. 63。\n\n于 January 5, 2025，破产法院应 Despins 先生请求举行状态会议，讨论定于 January 15, 2025 就多项撤诉动议举行听证会的形式。裁决第 8 页。由于破产法院裁定，其仅就共同被告书面陈述所涉的 4 项问题听取口头辩论，而不就 Apple 提出的任何其他问题听取口头辩论，Apple 遂提交动议请求延期审理其撤诉动议，破产法院准许了该动议。AP Dkt. Nos. 66, 67。January 15, 2025 的听证会在 Apple 未参与的情况下，就共同被告的 4 项问题继续进行。裁决第 9 页。Apple 从未是共同被告之一，从未同意该 4 项约定争点，亦从未同意限制其要求驳回的论点。\n\n破产法院于 March 4, 2025 作出其裁决。Apple 的撤诉动议仍在待决，且尚未安排口头辩论。\n\n该裁决回避了共同被告及 Despins 先生已广泛提交书面陈述的问题。比较裁决与 BK Dkt. Nos. 3713, 3803, 3848。该等问题包括：根据同案法则及特拉华州关于另我责任的法律，破产法院认定若干非债务人转让人为 Kwok 先生另我的裁定是否具有约束力。\n\n相反，破产法院依职权提出了从未提交书面陈述或进行辩论、但破产法院认定具有决定性的问题。该等问题包括如下论点——\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228 提交 03/18/25 录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 7 页，共 15 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交 03/19/25 录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 7 页，共 118 页\n\n即 Despins 先生本人从未提出的论点——即 Despins 先生主张了一项受益所有权责任理论。\n\n尽管破产法院在其裁决中指出，Apple 并非促成该裁决的书面陈述或口头辩论的当事人，且 Apple 的对抗程序中尚未录入适用该裁决的命令，但破产法院表示 Apple 及其他方仍受破产法院裁定的约束。具体而言，裁决脚注 12 规定：“无论使用‘共同被告’还是‘非共同被告’，论述部分 B 节及 C 节中的认定均适用于提出或加入所处理论点的所有被告。”裁决第 11 页，脚注 12。\n\n破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）在其他对抗程序中毫不犹豫地适用了案件既判原则，并表明其观点认为，无论当事人是否参与了先前的诉讼，该原则均适用。参见 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治地产有限责任公司）, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133。\n\n论证\n\nI. 法律标准。\n\n地区法院对破产法院作出的中间命令具有上诉管辖权。28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)。是否准许上诉由地区法院酌情决定。Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n\n在行使其酌处权时，地区法院参照 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)，并在以下情形准许上诉：(1) 被质疑的命令涉及一个具有决定性的法律问题；(2) 对此存在重大意见分歧的依据；以及 (3) 即时上诉可能实质性推进诉讼的最终终结。In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 333 B.R. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 另见 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2013)（“当一项裁决满足这些标准，并且涉及一个新的法律问题或具有特别重要性时，地区法院不应犹豫认证中间上诉。”）（省略内部引文）。\n\n第 1292(b) 条的第一项要件，在撤销破产法院的命令可能导致诉讼被驳回、虽不导致驳回但可能显著影响诉讼进行，或该问题对大量案件具有先例价值时，即获满足。Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 5405696, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013)。\n\n当对于破产法院是否适用了正确的法律标准存在真实疑问时，第二项要件即获满足。Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 543 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008)。此类疑问可能源于该问题上相互冲突的权威，或该问题对于第二巡回区而言特别困难且属首次审理。Id.\n\n当上诉可能推进或缩短审判所需时间时，第三项要件即获满足。Id. at \\*7。\n\nII. 本院应准许对破产法院裁决提出上诉。\n\n在本案中，本院应准许 Apple（苹果公司）就该裁决提出上诉，因为就所提出的每一问题而言，第 1292 条的所有要件均已满足。\n\nA. Despins 先生能否撤销非债务人实体作出的转让，是其所有撤销之诉中具有决定性的法律问题。\n\nDespins 先生提起的 300 多起撤销之诉中的每一起，均提出了一项新颖的法律理论，即他可以撤销 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）被指称的非债务人另我实体所作出的转让。如果该理论如 Apple 及其他方所主张的那样存在根本性缺陷，则其所有诉讼均应被驳回。该问题在第二巡回区属首次审理，其解决将决定案件结果。\n\n破产法院和 Despins 先生均未援引第二巡回区内任何法院作出的任何一项裁决，该裁决允许破产受托人依据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第 548 条和第 549 条提出请求，以撤销非债务人实体作出的转让。该问题不存在具有约束力的先例，且第二巡回区内下级法院的裁决已否定 Despins 先生的责任理论。参见，例如，In re Mina, Adv. No. 21-0213-PRW, 2022 WL 2657481, at \\*1, \\*3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022)（受托人寻求将债务人与非债务人进行实质合并，以取得对非债务人作出的转让提出异议的诉讼资格）；Pavers & Road Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015)（“仅因两个实体互为另我，并不意味着二者均为《破产法典》下的债务人。”）。唯一就该问题作出的巡回法院级别裁决也不支持其立场。参见 In re Howland, 674 Fed. App'x 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2017)（维持驳回受托人提出的、旨在撤销债务人另我实体所作转让的请求）。\n\nDespins 先生试图利用州法下的另我责任，使 Kwok 先生与非债务人实体实现实质合并，但第二巡回区法律或 Delaware（特拉华州）法律下均不存在允许其如此行事的具有约束力先例。相反，先例的主流表明，Delaware 法下的另我责任仅意味着替代责任，并不导致债务人与另我实体合并。参见，例如，In re RS Air, LLC, 651 B.R. 538, 545 n.5 (BAP 9th Cir. 2023)（适用 Delaware 法，并认定“[a]lthough the alter ego doctrine requires a showing that the two entities ‘operated as a single economic entity,’ [] the result is not to deem the entities the same, but to hold one liable for the other's debts”）（省略内部引文）；Blair v. Infineon Techs. AG, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (D. Del. 2010)（“用于刺破公司面纱的另我理论允许将派生责任加诸公司个人。”）。\n\n尽管破产法院就这些问题下令提交书面陈述，但其在该裁决中回避了对各方论点作出裁决。然而，这并不妨碍本院裁决同样的问题，因为这些问题已被实际诉讼。参见 Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2001)（“[W]e have discretion to considered issues that were raised, briefed, and argued in the District Court, but that were not reached there.”）；另见 Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 2000)（认定在下列情形下，法院更可能行使其酌处权审查下级法院未作裁决的问题：(1) 审议该问题对于避免明显不公正是必要的，或 (2) 该问题纯属法律问题且不需要额外事实认定）。对已经充分书面陈述、但破产法院未予处理的纯法律问题作出裁决，既属适当，也为避免明显不公正所必需。\n\n此外，正如破产法院依职权裁决了其认为具有决定性的问题，本院亦可如此。参见 Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993)（“[W]e have discretion to consider and decide sua sponte a dispositive issue of law that, taking a plaintiff's allegations to be true, would prevent a plaintiff from recovering.”）。事实上，鉴于本院依重新审查标准审查破产法院的法律结论，In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007)，破产法院是否对各方提出的问题作出裁决，在实践中并无差别，因为本院无论如何都将从头开始进行自己的分析。\n\n至于破产法院确实处理的法律问题，这些问题是在未给予通知或陈述意见机会的情况下，依职权提出并裁决为有利于 Despins 先生。参见 Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018)（地区法院在未给予各方通知和陈述意见机会的情况下依职权行动并裁定其缺乏补充管辖权，属错误）。事实上，破产法院提出了 Despins 先生本人未主张的论点，并认定这些论点对于作出有利于其的裁决具有决定性。参见 Akande v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 11-cv-1125 (VLB), 2018 WL 10667611, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2018)（“[C]ourts are neutral arbiters and not advocates for parties. The role of the court is to decide which party is correct, not to research, analyze, and advance the claims of any party against that of another party.”）。\n\n即使不论破产法院协助 Despins 先生重新构建其实际主张，破产法院对 Despins 先生诉状的解释亦存在根本性错误，需要纠正。\n\n破产法院将 Despins 先生的指称解读为主张由 Kwok 先生本人——而非其非债务人关联方——作出所涉转让，这有悖于事实和常理。参见 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（“[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw upon its experience and common sense.”）。如果被质疑的转让是 Kwok 先生直接向被告作出的转让，则 Despins 先生完全没有必要提及任何非债务人实体，或诉诸另我责任理论。但 Despins 先生明确纳入关于这些实体属于另我的指称，恰恰是因为被质疑的转让来自属于非债务人实体（Non-Debtor Entities）的账户。无论对 Despins 先生的诉状作出何种宽松解释，都无法改变资金流转方式这一事实。\n\n破产法院还对 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018) 作出了新颖但错误的解释，以证明其对 Despins 先生指称的解读。在 Merit 一案中，最高法院裁定，为评估《破产法典》第 546(e) 条所载法定安全港的适用性，所涉转让是受托人寻求撤销的整体转让，而不考虑单独的组成部分。Id. at 370。但该裁决适用于基于第 546(e) 条的抗辩——最高法院在 Merit 一案中从未将其裁定扩展至对 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 项下请求的评估。破产法院也未援引任何其他以其所采用方式适用 Merit 的案件。\n\n若无中间上诉，Apple 及其他被告将受该裁决及其就首次审理的门槛问题作出的错误法律结论所约束。(i) 已提交书面陈述但未由破产法院裁决的问题，以及 (ii) 从未提交书面陈述但由破产法院依职权裁决的问题，均提出了具有决定性的法律问题；对此存在重大意见分歧的依据，并且本院处理这些问题将实质性推进 Despins 先生已提起的数百起撤销之诉。\n\nB. 案件既判原则被错误适用，以便为 Despins 先生的撤销之诉开辟捷径。\n\n中间审查同样既有必要又属适当，以解决案件既判原则是否适用于破产法院裁决这一门槛法律问题，包括其关于另我的裁决及该裁决。破产法院在其裁决中回避回答该问题，但各方无疑已就该问题进行了诉讼，并且该问题符合第 1292(b) 条关于上诉审查的要求。\n\n案件既判原则是一项“酌情适用的实践规则”。In re PHC Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991)。在存在明显错误或将导致明显不公正时，法院拒绝适用该原则。U.S. v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002); Casey v. U.S., 161 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 2001)。\n\n该法理“可适用于在同一破产案件中提起的不同对抗程序，前提是该法理的所有要件——包括当事人同一性——均得到满足。”In re Brizinova, 588 B.R. 311, 324 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018)；另见 In re Schultz, 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000)（该法理仅适用于“同一诉讼或当事人之间的不同诉讼”）（原文强调）；In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 310 B.R. 500, 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)（地区法院在集体诉讼中的裁决对受托人不具有约束力，因为她并非该诉讼的当事人）。\n\n然而，在此，Despins 先生主张，破产法院关于某些非债务人关联方为 Kwok 先生另一个自我的裁决——该等裁决系在 Apple（苹果公司）并非当事人的对抗程序中作出——仍对 Apple 具有约束力。破产法院已表示其同意该主张。见 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23- 5005, Dkt. No. 133。\n\nApple 及 Despins 先生撤销诉讼中的众多其他被告，从未成为其另一个自我诉讼中当事人的一方，亦未与该等当事人存在任何关系，因此 Despins 先生不能利用既判力或争点排除来约束该等被告。Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286-88 (2d Cir. 2002)。尽管如此，他和破产法院将试图根据案件法理来约束他们。\n\n据 Apple 所知，第二巡回法院尚未处理过如下情形：一名受托人试图依据案件法理，使用一项对抗程序中的裁决，约束数百项性质不同的对抗程序中的数百名被告，而既判力和争点排除在其他方面本不会约束该等被告。\n\n解决该问题将通过明确 Despins 先生的举证责任，实质性推进每一项撤销诉讼。如果本法院裁定破产法院关于另一个自我的裁决不构成案件法理，则 Despins 先生须在其能够撤销任何非债务人作出的任何转让之前，主张并证明其诉状所涉的每一名转让人非债务人均为 Kwok 先生的另一个自我。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 13 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 13 of 118\n\n同样，本法院关于案件法理是否约束 Apple 及其他未参与形成该《裁决》的书面辩论的被告的裁定，将有助于确定该《裁决》是否适用于 Apple 及其他被告各自独立的对抗程序。这同样将节省当事人和司法资源用于审理该问题，并有助于加快撤销诉讼的解决。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，法院应准许 Apple 就上述确定的问题提起中间上诉。\n\n日期：March 18, 2025 New York, New York /s/ George Angelich\n\nGeorge Angelich（乔治·安杰利奇） (ct27542)\n\nEric Roman（埃里克·罗曼） (admitted pro hac vice)\n\nPatrick Feeney（帕特里克·菲尼） (admitted pro hac vice)\n\nArentFox Schiff LLP（阿伦特福克斯·希夫律师事务所）\n\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\n\nNew York, NY 10019\n\nT: 212.457.5423\n\nE: george.angelich@afslaw.com\n\neric.roman@afslaw.com\n\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- 以及 -\n\nJin Yan（严进） (admitted pro hac vice)\n\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n\n1717 K St. NW\n\nWashington, DC 20006\n\nT: 202.778.6442\n\nE: jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\nApple Inc.（苹果公司）的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 15 of 15 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 15 of 118\n\n送达证明\n\n本人证明，于 March 18, 2025，本人已使用 CM/ECF 电子提交系统向法院书记官提交前述文件的一份真实、准确副本；该系统将向所有登记在案的律师发送该等提交的通知。\n\n日期：New York, New York March 18, 2025\n\n/s/ George Angelich\n\nGeorge Angelich\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 1 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 16 of 118\n\n附件 1\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 17 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 118\nFiled 03/18/25\n103 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 2 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 1 of 102\n\n事项：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， )\n)\n第 11 章\n)\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n)\n（合并管理）\n\n债务人。 )\n)\n关于：ECF Nos. 3577, 3713\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A.·德斯平斯），作为\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 24\n)\n)\n诉 )\n)\nAGORA LAB, INC.（阿戈拉实验室公司）， )\n被告。 )\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人， )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n原告， )\n诉 )\n)\n)\nAMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.（亚马逊网络服务公司）， )\n被告。 )\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人， )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 26\n原告， )\n诉 )\n)\nDIRECT PERSUASION LLC（直接说服有限责任公司）， )\n)\n被告。 )\n)\n)\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院）\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4235-3\nFiled 03/19/25\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4228-1\nFiled 03/18/25\n103 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16\nPage 18 of\nEntered 03/18/25 23:53:23\nPage 3 of\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4189\nFiled 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 23\n)\n)\n)\nFOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 17\n)\n)\n)\nARRI AMERICAS, INC.（阿莱美洲公司），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 20\n)\n)\n)\nTERIS-PHOENIX, LLC（特里斯-菲尼克斯有限责任公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4235-3\nFiled 03/19/25\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4228-1\nFiled 03/18/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16\nPage 19 of\nEntered 03/18/25 23:53:23\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4189\nFiled 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 23\n)\n)\n)\n)\nPHILLIPS NIZER LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n)\n)\n)\nMARK GUNDERSON（马克·冈德森），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 17\n)\n诉。\n270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西 39 街 270 号公司有限责任公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4235-3\nFiled 03/19/25\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4228-1\nFiled 03/18/25\n103 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16\nPage 20 of\nEntered 03/18/25 23:53:23\nPage 5 of\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4189\nFiled 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 17\n)\n)\n)\nFFP (BVI) LIMITED（FFP〔英属维尔京群岛〕有限公司），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 42\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAMAZON.COM, INC.（亚马逊公司）、HING CHI NGOK（鄂兴志）、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS（亚历克斯·哈吉查拉兰布斯）、CHUNGUANG HAN（韩春光）及 MEI GUO（郭梅），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉。\nANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC.（安塞姆健康计划公司）， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n被告。 )\n\n)\n\n)\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 21 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 6 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 5 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 20\n)\n)\n)\n\nFEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION（联邦快递公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 22\n)\n)\n)\nDJD CREATIVE LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 35\n)\n)\n)\nB&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP.（B&H 摄影及电子产品公司）、HING CHI NGOK、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS 及 CHUNGUANG HAN，\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 22 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 7 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 6 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 18\n)\n)\n)\n\nAMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY（美国运通公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 17\n)\n)\n)\nOHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE LLC（奥察尔·所罗门·所罗门珍宝有限责任公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n)\n)\n)\nZETA GLOBAL CORP.（泽塔全球公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4235-3\nFiled 03/19/25\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4228-1\nFiled 03/18/25\n103 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16\nPage 23 of\nEntered 03/18/25 23:53:23\nPage 8 of\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4189\nFiled 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 17\n)\n)\n)\n)\nGROCYBER, LLC（格罗赛博有限责任公司），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 22\n)\n)\n)\nCONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY, LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司），\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n诉。\nAARON MITCHELL（亚伦·米切尔），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 24 of\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4228-1 118\nFiled 03/18/25\n103 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 9 of\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 8 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉。\nANTHEM HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.（安塞姆健康优选保险公司），\nf/k/a EMPIRE HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.（原名帝国健康优选保险公司），\nd/b/a EMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD（以帝国蓝十字蓝盾名义营业）， )\n)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 23\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n) Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM)\n被告。\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n)\n) Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM)\n诉。\nMODSQUAD INC.（模块小队公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 22\n)\n) Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM)\n诉。\nCLOUDFLARE, INC.（云盾公司）， )\n)\n)\n)\n被告。 )\n\n下页续\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 25 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 118\nFiled 03/18/25\n103 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 10 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 9 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 17\n)\n)\n)\n\n3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE LLC（哥伦布圆环 3 号有限责任公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n)\n)\nINDIUM SOFTWARE, INC.（铟软件公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为\nHO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\nAdv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 18\n)\n)\n)\nMILLER MOTORCARS INC.（米勒汽车公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4235-3\nFiled 03/19/25\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4228-1\nFiled 03/18/25\n103 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16\nPage 26 of\nEntered 03/18/25 23:53:23\nPage 11 of\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4189\nFiled 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n102 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 10 页，共\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），作为 HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nON THE SPOT HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC.（On the Spot 房屋改造公司）， )\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05130 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05134 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 16\n)\n)\n)\nV.X. CERDA & ASSOCIATES P.A.（V.X. Cerda 律师事务所），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n对抗程序案号 24-05135 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT CORP.（自由喷气机管理公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4235-3\n提交日期 03/19/25\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4228-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n103 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16\n第 27 页，共\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23\n第 12 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n102 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 11 页，共\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05138 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n)\n)\nTARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC（目标企业有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05141 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n)\n诉\nFLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD.（统一费率搬家公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05147 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n诉\nJAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4235-3\n提交日期 03/19/25\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4228-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n103 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16\n第 28 页，共\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23\n第 13 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n102 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 12 页，共\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05162 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n)\n)\n)\nNARDELLO & CO., LLC（纳德洛公司有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05168 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 15\n)\n)\n)\nTHE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05186 (JAM)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 35\n)\n)\n)\nBERKELEY ROWE LIMITED（伯克利·罗有限公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4235-3\n提交日期 03/19/25\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4228-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n103 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16\n第 29 页，共\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23\n第 14 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n102 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 13 页，共\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nWEDDLE LAW PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所）， )\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05188 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 11\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05196 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 18\n)\n)\n)\nMORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND IASON & ANELLO P.C.（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·亚森及阿内洛律师事务所），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05199 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n)\n诉\nLAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司），及\nAARON MITCHELL（亚伦·米切尔），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4235-3\n提交日期 03/19/25\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4228-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n103 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16\n第 30 页，共\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23\n第 15 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n102 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 14 页，共\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05202 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 28\n)\n)\n)\nCLAYMAN ROSENBERG KIRSHNER & LINDER LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·科什纳与林德律师事务所）， )\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05204 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 19\n)\n)\n诉\nG4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.（G4S 安保系统〈香港〉有限公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05208 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 17\n)\n)\n)\nZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4235-3\n提交日期 03/19/25\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4228-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n103 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16\n第 31 页，共\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23\n第 16 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n102 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 15 页，共\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05211 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 18\n)\n)\n)\n)\nPUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING LLC（普特南园林绿化有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05219 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 23\n)\n)\n)\nJASON MILLER（杰森·米勒），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05222 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 18\n)\n诉\nSEDGWICK REALTY CORP.（塞奇威克房地产公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4235-3\n提交日期 03/19/25\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4228-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n103 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16\n第 32 页，共\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23\n第 17 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n102 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 16 页，共\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05225 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 21\n)\n)\n)\n)\nCIRRUS DESIGN CORPORATION（卷云设计公司），及 QIANG GUO（郭强），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n对抗程序案号 24-05226 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 26\n)\n)\n)\nACASS CANADA LTD.（ACASS 加拿大有限公司），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 遗产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n诉 )\n对抗程序案号 24-05229 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 25\n)\n)\n)\n)\nMARCUM LLP（马库姆律师事务所），\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n)\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 33 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 18 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 17 页，共 102\n\n出庭人员\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G. 亚历山大·邦加茨）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）\nJames C. Graham（詹姆斯·C·格雷厄姆）\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）\nNeubert, Pepe & Montieth（诺伊伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂思律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（出庭陈述）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议人及被申请人 Luc A. Despins 先生、作为原告 Ho Wan Kwok 先生遗产第 11 章受托人的代理律师\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert（本杰明·O·吉尔伯特）\nLindsay C. Stone（林赛·C·斯通）\nSheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP（谢泼德·马林·里希特与汉普顿律师事务所）\n30 Rockefeller Plaza\nNew York, NY 10112\n\n及\n\nAlan H. Martin（艾伦·H·马丁）\nSheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP\n650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor\nCosta Mesa, CA 92626\n\n动议人 Agora Lab, Inc.（阿戈拉实验室公司）、被告的代理律师\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 34 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 118\n提交日期 03/18/25\n103 录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 19 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 18 页，共\n\nLindsay Sampson（林赛·桑普森）\nBishop K&L Gates LLP（毕晓普 K&L Gates 律师事务所）\nOne Congress Street, Suite 2900\nBoston, MA 02114\n\n及\n\nBrian T. Peterson（布赖恩·T·彼得森）（出庭陈述）\nRuby A. Nagamine（鲁比·A·长峰）\nK&L Gates LLP\n925 4th Ave, Suite 2900\nSeattle, WA 98104\n\n动议人 Amazon Web Services, Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司）及 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nBenjamin Mintz（本杰明·明茨）\nArnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP（阿诺德与波特·凯伊·斯科勒律师事务所）\n250 West 55th Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\n及\n\n及\n\nRyan M. Trombley（瑞安·M·特朗布利）\nArnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP\n70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200\nChicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor（杰西卡·西格诺尔）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP（希普曼与古德温律师事务所）\n300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor\nStamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈尔茨坦）（出庭陈述）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n动议人 Direct Persuasion LLC（直接说服有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nSteven G. Mintz（史蒂文·G·明茨）\nBarry M. Kazan（巴里·M·卡赞）\nPhilip Ian Tafet（菲利普·伊恩·塔费特）\nMintz & Gold LLP（明茨与戈尔德律师事务所）\n600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor\nNew York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer（亨利·P·贝尔）\nEilis A. Meagher（艾利斯·A·米格尔）\nFinn Dixon & Herling LLP（芬恩·迪克森与赫林律师事务所）\nSix Landmark Square, Suite 600\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司）及 Marcum LLP、被告的代理律师\n\nMichael T. Conway（迈克尔·T·康韦）\nLazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP（拉扎尔·波特·贾科瓦斯与莫伊尔律师事务所）\n747 Third Ave., 16th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n动议人 Arri Americas Inc.（阿莱美洲公司）、被告的代理律师\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 35 页，共 118\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 20 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 19 页，共\n\nAndrea Chase（安德烈娅·蔡斯）\nSpencer Fane（斯宾塞·费恩律师事务所）\n1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400\nKansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer\nEilis A. Meagher\nFinn Dixon & Herling LLP\nSix Landmark Square, Suite 600\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（特里斯-菲尼克斯有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJared R. Clark（贾里德·R·克拉克）\nPhillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所）\n485 Lexington Avenue\nNew York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin（罗伯特·E·凯林）\nHarris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC（哈里斯·比奇·默萨·库利纳律师事务所）\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n及\n\nMatthew Pesce（马修·佩西）\nHarris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC\n1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06106\n动议人 Phillips Nizer LLP、被告的代理律师\n\nJeffrey Hellman（杰弗里·赫尔曼）\nLaw Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC（杰弗里·赫尔曼律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 10th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议人 Mark Gundersen 先生、Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（奥扎尔·什洛莫·所罗门珍宝有限责任公司）及 Jason Miller 先生、被告的代理律师\n\nRobert N. Sensale（罗伯特·N·森萨莱）\nBershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC（伯什泰因、沃尔佩与麦基翁律师事务所）\n900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议人 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西 39 街 270 号公司有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 20 页，共 案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 21 页，共 103 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 36 页，共 118\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）（出庭陈述）\nKellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nMichelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安唐）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林与斯克拉兹有限责任公司）\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\nFFP (BVI) Limited、Aaron A. Mitchell（亚伦·A·米切尔）、V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.、The Francis Firm PLLC、Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 及 G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.（G4S 安保系统〈香港〉有限公司）、被告等动议人的代理律师\n\nEric S. Goldstein（出庭陈述）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n及\n\nJessica Signor\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\n300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安森健康计划公司）、Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（安森健康选择保险公司，原名 Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.，以 Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield 名义营业）及 Sedgwick Realty Corp.、被告等的代理律师\n\nMichael A. Siedband（迈克尔·A·西德班德）\nFederal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司）\n3620 Hacks Cross Road\nBuilding 2, 3rd Floor\nMemphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein（出庭陈述）\nNicole Lapenta（妮可·拉彭塔）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n及\n\nJessica Signor\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\n300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Federal Express Corporation、被告的代理律师\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 37 页，共 118\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 22 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 21 页，共\n\nBret Strong（布雷特·斯特朗）\nZachary W. Doninger（扎卡里·W·多宁格）\n1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200\nThe Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III（路易斯·约瑟夫·马尔托基奥三世）\nMartocchio & Oliveira, LLC（马尔托基奥与奥利韦拉有限责任公司）\n191 Main Street\nSouthington, CT 06489\n动议人 DJD Creative LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nScott M. Kessler（斯科特·M·凯斯勒）\nAkerman LLP（阿克曼律师事务所）\n1251 Avenue of the Americas\n37th Floor\nNew York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams（特蕾西·埃利斯·威廉斯）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\n300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor\nStamford, CT 06901\n动议人 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（B&H 摄影与电子产品公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nDarryl S. Laddin（达里尔·S·拉丁）\nFrank N. White（弗兰克·N·怀特）\nArnall Golden Gregory LLP（阿诺尔·戈尔登·格雷戈里律师事务所）\n171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100\nAtlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches（罗纳德·I·乔奇斯）\nLaw Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC（罗纳德·I·乔奇斯律师事务所）\n82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203\nWethersfield, CT 06109\n动议人 American Express Company（美国运通公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr.（小约翰·J·克拉克）\nDLA Piper LLP (US)（德杰律师事务所〈美国〉）\n1251 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10020\n\n及\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe（C·凯文·科比）\nDLA Piper LLP (US)\n650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100\nBaltimore, MD 21202\n\n动议人 Zeta Global Corp.（泽塔全球公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante（尼古拉斯·P·维格利安特）\nCohn Birnbaum & Shea（科恩·伯恩鲍姆与谢伊律师事务所）\nCityPlace II, 15th Floor\n185 Asylum Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人 GroCyber, LLC（格罗赛伯有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 23 页，共 103 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 38 页，共 118\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 22 页，共 102\n\nIlan Markus（伊兰·马库斯）\nBarclay Damon LLP（巴克莱·达蒙律师事务所）\n545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人 Conservative Campaign Technology LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）、被告的代理律师\n\nRobert E. Kaelin（罗伯特·E·凯林）\nHarris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC（哈里斯·比奇·默萨·库利纳律师事务所）\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nMatthew Pesce（马修·佩斯）\nHarris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC（哈里斯·比奇·默萨·库利纳律师事务所）\n1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06106\n\n动议申请人 ModSquad, Inc.（ModSquad公司）及 3 Columbus Circle, LLC（3 Columbus Circle有限责任公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nSabrina L. Streusand（萨布丽娜·L·斯特鲁桑德）\nStreusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP（斯特鲁桑德、兰登、奥兹伯恩及莱蒙律师事务所）\nSpyglass Point\n1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320\nAustin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold（罗斯·G·芬戈尔德）\nStokesbury, Shipman & Fingold（斯托克斯伯里、希普曼及芬戈尔德律师事务所）\n10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204\nFarmington, CT 06032\n动议申请人 Cloudflare, Inc.（Cloudflare公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nRichard J. Reding（理查德·J·雷丁）\nASK LLP（ASK律师事务所）\n2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400\nSt. Paul, MN 55121\n\n以及\n\nEdward E. Neiger（爱德华·E·奈格）\nASK LLP（ASK律师事务所）\n60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor\nNew York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow（伊丽莎白·N·克拉斯诺）\nEric R. Wilson（埃里克·R·威尔逊）\nBenjamin D. Feder（本杰明·D·费德）\nKelley Drye & Warren LLP（凯利·德赖及沃伦律师事务所）\nCanterbury Green\n201 Broad Street\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议申请人 Indium Software, Inc.（Indium Software公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 第39页，共118页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 第24页，共103页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 第23页，共102页\n\nEric Seltzer（埃里克·塞尔策）\nGilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC（吉尔布赖德、图萨、拉斯特及斯佩莱恩有限责任公司）\n30 Brewster Lane\nBellport, NY 11713\n动议申请人 Miller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner（贾斯汀·S·鲍姆加特纳）\nBecker LLC（贝克有限责任公司）\n354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500\nLivingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈尔茨坦）（出庭辩论）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP（希普曼及古德温律师事务所）\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n动议申请人 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（On the Spot Home Improvement公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nGerard R. Luckman（杰拉德·R·拉克曼）\nElbert F. Nasis（埃尔伯特·F·纳西斯）\nForchelli Deegan Terrana LLP（福切利、迪根及特拉纳律师事务所）\n333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010\nUniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz（帕特里克·托马谢维奇）\nFazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall（法扎诺、托马谢维奇及巴拉尔律师事务所）\n96 Oak Street\nHarford, CT 06106\n\n动议申请人 Liberty Jet Management Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nJohn F. Carberry（约翰·F·卡伯里）\nKara Anne Zarchin（卡拉·安妮·扎钦）\nCummings & Lockwood LLC（卡明斯及洛克伍德有限责任公司）\nSix Landmark Square\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议申请人 Target Enterprises, LLC（塔吉特企业有限责任公司）及 Jamestown Associates, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr.（小詹姆斯·J·科斯特洛）\nNorris McLaughlin PA（诺里斯·麦克劳克林律师事务所）\n400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor\nBridgewater, NJ 08807\n\nFlat Rate Movers, Ltd.（固定费率搬家公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nHenry P. Baer（亨利·P·贝尔）\nEilis A. Meagher（艾莉丝·A·米格尔）\nFinn Dixon & Herling LLP（芬恩、迪克森及赫林律师事务所）\nSix Landmark Square, Suite 600\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议申请人 Nardello & Co., LLC（纳德洛及公司有限责任公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 第40页，共118页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 第25页，共103页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 第24页，共102页\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen（朱莉·约翰斯顿-阿伦）\nArmstrong Teasdale LLP（阿姆斯特朗·蒂斯代尔律师事务所）\n100 North Riverside Plaza\nChicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）（出庭辩论）\nKellianne Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nMichelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安唐）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林及斯克拉兹有限责任公司）\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n以及\n\nJohn G. Willard（约翰·G·威拉德）\nArmstrong Teasdale LLP（阿姆斯特朗·蒂斯代尔律师事务所）\n7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800\nSt. Louis, MO 63105\n\n动议申请人 Berkeley Rowe Limited（伯克利·罗有限责任公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nRichard Corbi（理查德·科尔比）\nThe Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC（理查德·J·科尔比律师事务所）\n104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）（出庭辩论）\nKellianne Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nMichelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安唐）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林及斯克拉兹有限责任公司）\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n动议申请人 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所）（被告）的代理律师\n\nRowena A. Moffett（罗维娜·A·莫菲特）\nBrenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP（布伦纳、萨尔茨曼及沃尔曼律师事务所）\n271 Whitney Avenue\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n动议申请人 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（莫维洛、阿布拉莫维茨、格兰德、亚森及阿内洛律师事务所）（被告）的代理律师\n\nBrian David Linder（布赖恩·戴维·林德）\nClayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼、罗森伯格、基什纳及林德律师事务所）\n305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650\nNew York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri（马修·D·瓦劳里）\nWilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker（威尔逊·埃尔瑟、莫斯科维茨、埃德尔曼及迪克律师事务所）\n1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议申请人 Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP（克莱曼、罗森伯格、基什纳及林德律师事务所）（被告）的代理律师\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金塞思）（出庭辩论）\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）\nDaniel A. Byrd（丹尼尔·A·伯德）\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\n动议申请人 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒专业公司）（被告）的代理律师\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 第26页，共103页 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 第41页，共118页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 第25页，共102页\n\nScott M. Charmoy（斯科特·M·沙莫伊）\nCharmoy & Charmoy（沙莫伊及沙莫伊律师事务所）\n1465 Post Road East, Suite 100\nWestport, CT 06880\n动议申请人 Putnam's Landscaping（普特南园林公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nRichard J. Bernard（理查德·J·伯纳德）\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP（费格雷·德林克·比德尔及里思律师事务所）\n1177 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n以及\n\nJosh Peterson（乔希·彼得森）\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP（费格雷·德林克·比德尔及里思律师事务所）\n2200 Wells Fargo Center\n90 S. 7th Street\nMinneapolis, MN 55402\n\n以及\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco（杰克琳·C·马拉斯科）\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP（费格雷·德林克·比德尔及里思律师事务所）\n222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400\nWilmington, DE 19801\n\n动议申请人 Cirrus Design Corporation（西锐设计公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nRahman Connelly（拉赫曼·康奈利）\nPillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP（皮尔斯伯里·温思罗普·肖·皮特曼律师事务所）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）（出庭辩论）\nKellianne Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nMichelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安唐）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林及斯克拉兹有限责任公司）\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议申请人 ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS加拿大有限公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 第27页，共103页 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 第42页，共118页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 第26页，共102页\n\n裁决备忘录及命令：（一）驳回联名被告提出的驳回动议或就诉状作出判决的动议；（二）部分驳回其他被告提出的驳回动议；以及（三）部分驳回 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒专业公司）对受托人提出的就诉状作出判决动议所提异议\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国破产法院法官\n\n本案涉及一名个人第11章债务人，据称该债务人参与了一项涉及数百个公司替身的广泛障眼法。第11章受托人已提起260余项诉讼，寻求撤销名义上由这些替身作出的转让。四十八名撤销诉讼被告，其中包括许多正与第11章受托人参加强制调解的被告，请求本院裁决有关替身法与可撤销转让法相互作用的四个共同问题。被告、起诉书及所称替身的数量之多使分析变得复杂。然而，在根据各起诉书中所主张的事实分析这些问题时——本院必须将该等事实视为真实——结论是明确的。基于下述理由，本院认定，撤销诉讼被告提出的四个共同问题均不足以支持驳回撤销诉讼。\n\n一、引言\n\n本院现审理撤销诉讼被告提出的若干驳回动议或就诉状作出判决的动议。该等撤销诉讼由 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生，即 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（以下简称“个人债务人”）破产财产的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）提起。受托人根据 United States Code（美国法典）第11编（以下简称“破产法”）第544、548、549及550条，以及 New York（纽约州）的\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 第28页，共103页 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 第43页，共118页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 第27页，共102页\n\n债务人和债权人法第273、274及276条，该法将纽约州《统一可撤销交易法》（“NYUVTA”）编纂入法，寻求撤销并追回所称欺诈性转让及未经授权的申请后转让。\n\n被告（以下简称“联名被告”）已根据《进一步修订撤销诉讼程序命令及安排驳回动议和就诉状作出判决动议联合陈述的命令》（以下简称“联合陈述命令”）提出三十七项动议（以下简称“联名动议”）。(主案 ECF No. 3577.)2 联名被告请求并提议采用该综合程序，并编制及提交了其请求本院审理的共同法律问题。(见主案 ECF No. 3511.) 受托人未对联名被告的请求提出异议。本院在发布联合陈述命令时，采纳了联名被告的程序。\n\n其他被告3亦提出了额外动议（以下简称“非联名动议”）；该等被告虽未参与联合陈述，但提出了联名被告提出的部分或全部问题，并请求其动议与联名动议同时审理。因其提出了联合陈述命令中的部分问题，Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（“Z&Z”，并与非联名动议的提出人合称“非联名被告”）亦请求其针对受托人提出的就诉状作出判决动议所提异议（以下简称“Z&Z异议”）4与联名动议同时审理。\n\n1 鉴于该综合程序的复杂性，某些原可载于脚注中的信息载于附录。本裁决的.pdf文件包含书签，以便利查阅附录。联名动议清单以及提出各项联名动议的联名被告标注，载于附录A。2\n\n对主案 In re Kwok, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) 中案卷的引用，格式为“主案 ECF No. __。”\n\n3 非联名动议清单以及提出各项非联名动议的被告标注，载于附录B。4\n\nZ&Z异议的引注载于附录C。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 第29页，共103页 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 第44页，共118页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 第28页，共102页\n\n本裁决备忘录阐述本院就联合陈述命令所列四个问题作出的法律结论。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. 由于：（一）所提出的法律问题并非决定诉状是否充分的问题；（二）被告在该等法律问题上未能胜诉；且（三）所提出的许多问题属于事实问题而非法律问题，故联名动议予以驳回。基于同样理由，对于联合陈述命令所列问题，非联名动议予以部分驳回；Z&Z异议亦在同等范围内予以部分驳回。\n\n二、背景\n\n2022年2月15日，个人债务人在本院提出自愿第11章申请。(主案 ECF No. 1.) 2022年6月15日，鉴于有关个人债务人财务管理不当及所称障眼法的指控，本院作出裁决备忘录及命令，指定一名第11章受托人管理个人债务人的破产财产。(主案 ECF No. 465.) In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). 2022年7月8日，Despins先生被指定为受托人。(主案 ECF No. 523.)\n\n撤销诉讼程序命令\n\n2024年1月29日，受托人提出一项动议，寻求前瞻性地制定其拟提起的撤销诉讼程序；在该等诉讼中，其仅将依据破产法第544、547、548、549及550条提出权利主张。(主案 ECF No. 2532.) 受托人预计将在申请日二周年之前提起数百项撤销诉讼，并预计该等提交将造成案件管理问题。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549. 在2024年2月5日举行听证会后，本院作出命令，准许该动议（经修订及补充后，以下简称“撤销诉讼程序命令”）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 第30页，共103页 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 第45页，共118页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 第29页，共102页\n\n(主案 ECF No. 2578.) 2024年2月9日至2024年2月15日期间，受托人提起了268项撤销诉讼，包括本裁决所涉诉讼。(主案 ECF Nos. 2594–2925.) 各起诉书均主张以下六项诉因中的至少一项（所主张的该等诉因合称“撤销请求”）5：\n\n(i) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) 和 550(a)，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益所作出的实际欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(ii) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 和 550(a) 以及 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)、274 和 276，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益所作出的实际欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(iii) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) 和 550(a)，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益所作出的推定欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(iv) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 和 550(a) 以及 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2)、274 和 276，撤销个人债务人就其财产权益所作出的推定欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(v) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 和 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对个人债务人破产财产所作出的未经授权的破产申请后转让，并向初始受让人追回；以及\n\n(vi) 依据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)，并结合上述诉因之一，向后手受让人追回已被撤销的转让。\n\n（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（In re Kwok（郭文贵案）），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格联邦破产法院）Feb. 10, 2024），ECF No. 1。）\n\n每份起诉书均主张至少存在：(a) 依据联邦法和州法的实际欺诈性转让；或 (b) 未经授权的破产申请后转让。（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc.（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024），ECF No. 1。）除主张实际欺诈性转让外，部分起诉书还主张依据联邦法和州法的推定欺诈性转让。（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Mitchell（米切尔）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024），ECF No. 1。）最后，其中一份起诉书请求以一名非共同被告作为欺诈性转让或未经授权的破产申请后转让的后手受让人，向其追回。（起诉书，Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024），ECF No. 1。）\n\n5 列明每份涉案起诉书中各项诉因的附表见附录 D。提出撤销请求所依据的法定条文文本，以及某些相关法定定义，载于附录 E。\n\n6 在相关起诉书中，受托人主张个人债务人在纽约开展业务，包括与被指称的欺诈性转让有关的业务。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入，第 31 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入，第 46 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入，第 30 页，共 102 页\n\n所有起诉书均主张个人债务人通过各种另一自我实体转让财产，且该等转让要么是欺诈性转让，要么是未经授权的破产申请后转让。（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Marcum LLP（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024），ECF No. 1；起诉书，Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024），ECF No. 1；起诉书，Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd.（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024），ECF No. 1。）关于个人债务人对该等另一自我实体的支配和控制的其他主张，是通过援引针对被指称的另一自我实体提出的起诉书作出的；该等起诉书寻求就另一自我和／或受益所有权作出确认判决，并要求移交资产和控制权。7\n\n7 就涉及某些被指称的另一自我实体的主张而言，撤销请求已被中止。（Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i), (ii), Main Case ECF No. 3163。）因此，对于被中止的撤销请求，法院未予考虑任何被中止或部分被中止的撤销请求（本文所用定义见 Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i) 和 (ii)）。下文附录 D 标明某项撤销请求是否为被中止或部分被中止的撤销请求。对于下文讨论的七个被指称的另一自我实体，诉讼并未中止。列明该等另一自我实体、所援引的起诉书、关于成立地州的主张以及诉因的附表见附录 F。8\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入，第 32 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入，第 47 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入，第 31 页，共 102 页\n\n2024 年 2 月 27 日，为处理大量撤销诉讼的管理事宜，举行了一次状态会议。在状态会议期间，受托人请求实施强制调解程序。2024 年 5 月 2 日，在提交数份诉状并举行听证后，法院作出命令，修订 Avoidance Action Procedures Order，将强制调解纳入其中。（Main Case ECF No. 3163。）\n\n共同书面陈述命令\n\n调解程序的两个特点与共同动议、非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议尤为相关。第一，某些被告被自动排除在强制调解之外（Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(j)(vi), Main Case ECF No. 3163），而须接受调解的被告可以申请被排除于调解之外（同上 ¶ 2(m)）。第二，调解程序包括诉讼中止。（同上 ¶ 2(j)(iii)。）这些特点共同构成了共同书面陈述命令的程序背景。\n\n早在 2024 年 4 月 22 日，不受调解中止约束的撤销诉讼被告便开始提交驳回动议。（参见，例如，驳回对抗程序动议，Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024），ECF No. 11。）在安排对这些动议进行听证期间，2024 年 9 月 6 日，某些受调解中止约束的撤销诉讼被告——原共同被告8——请求法院建立一项程序，使共同被告能够就其他撤销诉讼被告动议中提出的问题进行辩论，而非要求其申请被排除于调解之外。（Main Case ECF No. 3511。）\n\n所有这些被告仍为共同被告，但 Bering Yachts, LLC 除外（比较 Main Case ECF No. 3511 与 Main Case ECF No. 3713），McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC 亦除外（参见信函，Despins v. McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05194 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2025），ECF No. 22〔宣布与受托人达成和解〕）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入，第 33 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入，第 48 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入，第 32 页，共 102 页\n\n2024 年 9 月 24 日，举行了一次状态会议。在状态会议期间，共同被告分发了其关于修订 Avoidance Action Procedures Order 和共同书面陈述程序的提案。受托人未反对共同被告的提案。某些不受调解中止约束的被告并未反对将其驳回动议的听证延至就拟议共同动议举行听证之后，但提出了正当程序方面的担忧，即如其动议在共同动议之后审理。状态会议结束时，法院将该事项留待审议。\n\n2024 年 9 月 25 日，基于其中所述理由，法院作出共同书面陈述命令。（Main Case ECF No. 3577。）共同书面陈述命令的相关部分规定，共同被告应共同提交一份书面陈述，仅就共同被告主张为共同法律问题的四个问题进行论述。该四个问题几乎逐字采纳自共同被告的提案，具体为：\n\n(i) 受托人能否撤销非债务人实体作出的初始转让；\n\n(ii) 适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或作出另一自我认定；\n\n(iii) 反向揭开公司面纱或另一自我认定在适用法律下的效力；以及\n\n(iv) 对反向揭开公司面纱或另一自我的认定是否可以追溯适用。\n\n（Joint Briefing Order ¶ 2(b)(i)–(iv), Main Case ECF No. 3577。）根据共同书面陈述命令，(1) 在该等撤销请求被中止的范围内，共同动议不得涉及被中止或部分被中止的撤销请求，此等术语的定义见 Avoidance Action Procedures Order 第 2(e)(i) 和 (ii) 段；以及 (2) 除该四个问题外，共同被告保留在今后诉状中提出驳回动议或依诉状判决动议的一切依据。（同上 ¶¶ 4, 5。）\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入，第 34 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入，第 49 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入，第 33 页，共 102 页\n\n共同书面陈述命令还规定了其他撤销诉讼被告加入共同被告的期限。数名被告进行了加入，其中包括一些不受调解中止约束的被告。（Main Case ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629。）2024 年 10 月 18 日，共同被告提交了其共同法律备忘录（“共同书面陈述”）及共同动议。（Main Case ECF No. 3713。）2024 年 11 月 8 日，受托人提交了对共同书面陈述的反对意见。（Main Case ECF No. 3803。）2024 年 11 月 22 日，共同被告提交了支持共同书面陈述的答复。（Main Case ECF No. 3848。）共同动议的书面陈述程序已经完结。非共同动议以及受托人针对 Z&Z 提出的依诉状判决动议的书面陈述程序亦已完结。9\n\n2025 年 1 月 8 日，就共同动议、非共同动议和 Z&Z 异议的听证形式举行了一次状态会议。在状态会议期间，法院与各方协商后确定了听证形式。法院还指出，某些被告在其驳回动议中并未提出任何共同书面陈述问题。各方同意，不应与其他动议同时就这些被告的动议举行听证。因此，法院无限期延后了对该等动议的听证。10（Despins v. Harcus Parker Ltd.（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05163 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025），ECF No. 32；Despins v. Miller（米勒）（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073，Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025），ECF No. 29。）\n\n9 关于非共同动议以及受托人针对 Z&Z 提出的依诉状判决动议的书面陈述情况的附表见附录 G。\n\n10 尽管 Jason Miller（贾森·米勒）通过于 2024 年 10 月 18 日提交的依诉状判决动议加入共同书面陈述，参见下文附录 A，且法院已就该动议听取了其陈述，但法院并未就其先前于 2024 年 6 月 26 日提交的非共同驳回动议听取其陈述。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入，第 35 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入，第 50 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入，第 34 页，共 102 页\n\n尽管提出了部分或全部共同争议，其他被告不确定其是否希望与共同被告同时进行审理。在状态会议后，这些被告表示不希望其动议同时审理。因此，法院亦将其动议的听证会无限期延期。（Despins（德斯平斯）诉 Apple Inc.（苹果公司）（In re Kwok（郭文贵）），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 67；Despins（德斯平斯）诉 Meta Platforms Inc.（元平台公司）（In re Kwok（郭文贵）），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 42。）\n\n2025年1月15日，法院就共同动议、非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议举行了听证会。本事项现已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）于 September 21, 1984 作出的移送命令，有权审理并裁决本事项。本程序依法属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O)。法院认为，其行使管辖权不受《宪法》第 III 条禁止。Cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本区为适格审理地。\n\nIV. 讨论\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n共同动议、非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议主张，受托人未能提出可获救济的请求。见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c)，经 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b) 适用；另见 Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021)（依诉状作出判决的动议适用与驳回动议相同的标准）。在确定撤销请求是否提出可获救济的请求时，法院必须将妥善陈述的主张，包括附于起诉书的文件中的主张，视为真实。见 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980)；Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012)；Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002)；Tatum v. Oberg, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009)。法院必须作出一切有利于受托人的合理推论。Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014)。\n\n为构成妥善陈述，撤销请求必须包含“一项简明的陈述，表明主张者有权获得救济”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)，经 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008 适用。其必须包含“足够的事实内容，在被视为真实的前提下，‘提出表面上可信的救济请求’”。Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（援引 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)）。“可信性标准”虽非“概率要求”，但要求超过“被告存在违法行为的纯粹可能性”。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678（援引 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556）。确定一项请求是否可信，是“一项取决于具体情境的任务，要求审查法院运用其司法经验和常识。”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679。然而，“仅罗列诉因要件并以纯粹结论性陈述支持，并不足够。”Id. at 678。\n\n在确定撤销请求是否充分时，法院还必须考虑通过援引并入起诉书的文件，以及可对其采取司法认知的事项。Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)。如上所述，受托人已通过援引并入其针对以下各方的起诉书：（1）Golden Spring (New York) Limited（“Golden Spring”）；（2）Lamp Capital LLC（“Lamp Capital”）；（3）HCHK Technologies, Inc.（“HCHK Tech”）；（4）HCHK Property Management, Inc（“HCHK Property”）；（5）Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（“Lexington”，并与 HCHK Tech 和 HCHK Property 合称“各 HCHK 实体”，统称“HCHK 实体”）；（6）Greenwich Land, LLC（“Greenwich Land”）；以及（7）Leading Shine NY Ltd.（“Leading Shine”）。这些起诉书依据特拉华州法主张：（i）前述实体均为个人债务人的另我；以及（ii）个人债务人对其及/或其资产享有实益所有权。11 这些请求的任何要件均无需以特别具体的方式陈述。见 Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995)（适用特拉华州法并认定，确立另我无需证明欺诈）。\n\nB. 共同动议\n\n法院将首先审议共同被告12就以下四项争议提出的论点：\n\n（i）受托人是否可撤销非债务人实体作出的初始转让；\n\n（ii）适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或作出另我认定；\n\n（iii）反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力；以及\n\n11 涉案的七个另我均被主张在特拉华州设立。见下文附件 F。将这些主张视为真实，特拉华州法适用于受托人关于另我和实益所有权的请求。Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013)（适用法院所在地州的法律选择规则）；见 Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007)（将设立地州的当地法适用于针对 LLC 的另我诉讼及其他内部事务）；RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304。为明确起见，“特拉华州法院将‘揭开公司面纱’和‘另我’理论两个术语互换使用。”Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018)。\n\n12 无论使用“共同被告”还是“非共同被告”一词，讨论部分 B 节和 C 节中的认定均适用于提出或加入所涉论点的所有被告。\n\n（iv）反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定是否可追溯适用。\n\n在听证期间，共同被告将这四项争议分为两项论点。关于争议（i）和（iii），共同被告主张，即使法院认定某些实体属于个人债务人的另我，法院仍必须驳回起诉书，因为另我认定并未赋予受托人对另我转让其财产提起诉讼的诉讼资格。至于争议（ii）和（iv），共同被告提出一系列论点，认为根据适用州法，另我认定并不适当，或者因对另我的受让人造成不利影响，在破产情境下必须受到限制。法院将依次处理这些论点。\n\n1. 争议（i）和（iii）：另我认定在可撤销转让诉讼中的效力\n\n共同被告主张，特拉华州法下另我认定的效力，仅会使另我对个人债务人的债务承担替代责任。他们主张，该等认定不会：（i）将另我的资产转入个人债务人的破产财产，并允许受托人主张未经授权的破产申请后转让请求；或（ii）消除个人债务人与另我之间的身份区别，从而允许受托人主张，另我对其财产的转让是个人债务人对其财产作出的欺诈性转让。基于这些理由，共同被告主张，即使受托人在其另我请求中胜诉，受托人亦无诉讼资格提出撤销请求。最终，共同被告主张，受托人只能向另我本身追偿。\n\n作为回应，受托人提出两项论点。第一，受托人主张，尽管另我认定是根据适用州法作出的，但另我认定的效力属于联邦法问题。具体而言，受托人主张，《破产法》第 541 条决定根据州法存在的权益是否构成破产财产。第二，受托人主张，即使州法控制另我认定的效力，特拉华州法亦遵循另我的身份同一理论。因此，受托人主张，另我认定为其提出欺诈性转让及未经授权的破产申请后转让请求提供了依据。受托人认为，如法院同意共同被告的主张，结果将是通过切断破产财产的追偿而无视个人债务人的不当行为和不公平交易。\n\n如下文更详细讨论，法院同意受托人的意见。作为初步事项，共同被告的论点仅聚焦于撤销请求中有关另我的主张，且未处理重叠及替代性的实益所有权主张。撤销请求将个人债务人对另我及其资产的实益所有权作为所请求救济的依据。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541；Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990)；Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993)。此外，作为撤销请求依据的实体性可撤销转让法控制另我认定的效力。可撤销转让法重实质而轻形式，因此，在适用法律会否认公司形式的情况下，该法可适用于揭开公司面纱。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541；Begier, 496 U.S. at 59；United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983)；Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979)；Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht), 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024)；Orr, 991 F.2d at 35；McNellis v. Raymond, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970)；ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007)。\n\ni. 争议（i）和（iii）：就有关转让所主张的实益所有权\n\n共同被告主张，受托人不当地利用特拉华州另我法，通过消除以下两者之间的区别来满足撤销请求的两项要件：（a）被主张为另我的转让人与个人债务人13；以及（b）另我转让人的财产与个人债务人的财产14及/或破产财产的财产15。然而，如前所述，受托人还主张个人债务人对另我及/或其资产享有实益所有权。法院不能忽视受托人的主张。\n\na. 实益所有权主张与争议（i）相关：受托人是否主张由非债务人实体或由个人债务人作出的初始转让\n\n就第一要件而言，为根据《破产法》主张实际欺诈性转让或一种构成性欺诈性转让，受托人必须主张个人债务人作出了该转让。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(ii)(IV)。同样，就其依据《纽约统一可撤销交易法》（NYUVTA）提出的请求而言，受托人必须主张个人债务人或对其债务负有责任的其他当事人作出了该转让。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。然而，根据《破产法》，未经授权的破产申请后转让及其他类型的构成性欺诈性转让，并不要求由个人债务人作出该转让。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III)（不要求债务人作出该转让）, 549(a)（同）。\n\n根据《破产法》，“转让”尤其包括“以直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的每一种方式，处分或放弃——(i) 财产；或 (ii) 财产权益。”11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)。同样，根据\n\n13 见 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n14 见 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n15 见 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 41 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 56 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 40 页，共 102 页\n\nNYUVTA 下的转让尤其包括“以直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的每一种方式，处分或放弃某项资产或某项资产权益”。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)。\n\n鉴于《破产法》和 NYUVTA 对转让的定义均包括“间接”让与，法院审查的是转让的实质，而非形式。Orr, 991 F.2d at 35（“在衡平法上，‘实质不会让位于形式，[且]技术性考量不会阻碍实质正义的实现。’因此，所称欺诈性让与必须在其背景下予以评估；‘[当]某项转让仅为总体计划中的一个步骤时，该计划“必须作为一个整体，连同其所有组成部分的含义一并审视。”’”）（省略内部引注；原文中另有修改）；见 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.03[6]（Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 编，第 16 版，2025）（汇集案例）。法院必须审视交易的“经济现实”。Orr, 991 F.2d at 36（引述 Salomon Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)）。在适当事实情形下，法院在分析交易的经济现实时可以不顾公司独立性。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53（在依据经修订的原 1898 年《破产法》提起的诉讼中，维持地区法院裁定，即该法院刺破公司面纱，以认定本人就其向贷款人支付的个人款项获得了对价——即向其公司发放的贷款——因而裁定该交易不构成欺诈性让与）；见 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（裁定除非有明确迹象表明国会意图如此，否则经修订的原 1898 年《破产法》下的法律不受排除）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 42 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 57 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 41 页，共\n\n共同被告将撤销请求解释为主张下列一系列转让：16\n\nA（个人债务人） = B（另我） C（共同被告）（另我认定）（转让 B 的财产）\n\n即使接受共同被告的解释，受托人完全依赖个人债务人与另我之间的同一性，来主张个人债务人作出了转让。共同被告对该同一性提出异议，并主张受托人无资格撤销其余转让，即 B→C。\n\n然而，法院必须按照所主张的方式评估转让。见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018)。与共同被告对起诉书的解释相反，受托人主张个人债务人“使用”另我作出了转让：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（共同被告）（通过另我 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n受托人并非仅依赖个人债务人与另我之间的同一性——其主张另我是实施转让的工具。\n\n例如，在针对共同被告 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）等被告的起诉书中，受托人主张：\n\n44. 在申请日之前，[个人]债务人使用其另我空壳公司 Greenwich Land、G Club17、Lexington、HCHK Technologies 和 Golden Spring，或以其他方式，向 Amazon 转让了[个人]债务人的财产（统称“申请前转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n\n见随附并构成本文件一部分的附表 A。\n\n16 下列图示载于附录 H。17 就涉及 G Club Operations LLC 的转让而言，本起诉书中的撤销请求已中止。因此，法院在此仅讨论 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 43 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 58 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 42 页，共 102 页\n\n45. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过其空壳公司 Greenwich Land、G Club、Lexington 和 Golden Spring，或以其他方式，向 Amazon 转让了破产财团的财产（统称“申请后转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n\n见随附并构成本文件一部分的附表 B。\n\n（起诉书 ¶¶ 44–45, Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok（郭文贵）), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。）受托人主张，该等转让是个人债务人的“空壳游戏”的一部分，该游戏涉及“(i) 由近亲属和/或下属持有的、受[个人]债务人控制的空壳公司，(ii) 使用来自其他受[个人]债务人控制实体的现金购买的资产和/或无对价转让给空壳实体及在空壳实体之间转让的资产，以及 (iii) [个人]债务人从该等资产中获益并对其享有控制和支配权”，（同 ¶ 22），该空壳游戏的目的在于“在向其众多债权人虚假声称贫困的同时，隐匿和耗散数百万美元资产”，（同 ¶ 37）。（见同 ¶¶ 20–43。）所有其他起诉书均就个人债务人的财务事务作出相同主张。\n\n为支持这些论点，针对 Amazon 的起诉书援引了针对 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land 的另我起诉书。（同 ¶ 20 n. 4。）另我起诉书请求作出关于另我及受益所有权的宣告性判决，并基于该等宣告性判决，要求移交破产财团财产。例如，针对 Golden Spring 的起诉书主张\n\nGolden Spring 是[个人]债务人的另我，[个人]债务人是 Golden Spring 和/或其资产的衡平所有人。\n\n（起诉书 ¶ 2, Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok（郭文贵）), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 44 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 59 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 43 页，共 102 页\n\n针对 Golden Spring 的起诉书主张了众多事实，包括个人债务人对 Golden Spring 的设立、注资、管理和运营的控制，以及其将 Golden Spring 用作空壳公司以隐匿资产、支付费用并总体上服务于其利益。（同 ¶¶ 13–38。）起诉书附有大量证据材料以支持这些主张。其他另我起诉书亦就个人债务人对所称另我的支配和控制、其从该等实体的资产和/或服务中获益并加以使用，以及其利用该等实体的公司形式使资产免受其债权人追索，作出类似主张。\n\n受托人的主张通过两项相互重叠的法律理论，将个人债务人与名义转让人联系起来：(i) 另我，即共同被告论点的重点；以及 (ii) 受益所有权，共同被告并未加以论述。然而，受托人关于受益所有权的主张，与受托人是否合理主张个人债务人作出了该等转让有关。假定受托人已合理主张个人债务人受益所有该等另我18，则其已合理主张该等另我是个人债务人的关联方，个人债务人可通过其间接转让资产。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a)。事实上，法院曾合并审查涉及关联方的交易。见，例如，Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990)（维持地区法院判决；该欺诈性转让涉及所有人作为总体计划的一部分，将其拥有的一家公司资产转移至其拥有的另一家公司，以使资产无法供债权人追索）；参见 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)（转让包括间接转让）；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)（同）。\n\n18 法院不审理受托人是否已合理主张个人债务人对另我的受益所有权这一问题，因为该问题不属于四项争点之一。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 45 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文书 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 60 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 44 页，共\n\n因此，法院认定，当事人关于另我效力的论点并非决定受托人关于个人债务人为转让人的主张是否充分的决定性因素。\n\nb. 受益所有权主张可能使争点 (iii)——反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力——变得无关紧要\n\n转向第二项争议要件，《破产法》第 548 条下的实际或构成性欺诈性转让请求必须主张转让了“债务人在财产中的权益”。11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)。同样，《破产法》赋予受托人资格，使其可提起实际债权人可依据其他适用的州法或联邦法提起的撤销诉讼，以撤销对“债务人在财产中的权益”的转让。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。受托人依据纽约法提出的实际及构成性欺诈性转让请求，还必须主张转让了“债务人的财产”，其中“债务人”系指个人债务人或对其债务负有责任的另一方。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。最后，未经授权的破产申请后转让请求必须主张转让了“破产财团财产”。11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\n\n债务人在财产中的权益，是指若非为拟被撤销的转让，本应属于破产财产的任何财产。Begier（贝吉尔）, 496 U.S. at 59（“由于撤销规定的目的在于保全可纳入破产财产的财产——即可供向债权人分配的财产——因此，受优先转让规定约束的‘债务人在财产中的权益’，最好理解为：若该财产未在破产程序开始前被转让，其本将构成破产财产的一部分。”）。因此，关于一项转让是否属于“债务人在财产中的权益”的分析（11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)），以及关于一项转让是否属于“破产财产”的分析（11 U.S.C. § 549(a)），均以界定破产财产的第 541 条为中心。破产财产包括相关部分的“无论位于何处且由何人持有的……债务人在财产中享有的一切法定或衡平权益”。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。事实上，撤销权请求必须主张个人债务人在财产中享有衡平权益，而非仅享有法定所有权。Begier（贝吉尔）, 496 U.S. at 58；参见 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)（将债务人仅享有法定权益、而不享有衡平权益的财产，在该范围内排除在破产财产之外）。\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 46 页，共 103 页；案 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 61 页，共 118 页\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 45 页，共 102 页\n\n至于根据 NYUVTA，一项转让是否属于债务人的财产，新 York law recognizes beneficial ownership in actions to collect on a debt. 例如，In re Gliklad v. Chernoi（格利克拉德诉切尔诺伊）, 12 N.Y.S.3d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)（维持一项命令，该命令要求判决债务人交付一家企业的实益所有权）；Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp.（吉尔德诉科林斯建筑公司）, 651 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)（将案件发回，以确定个人被告是否衡平地拥有公司被告，以及原告是否可以揭开公司被告与其潜在衡平所有人之间的公司面纱）；Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan（太平洋全亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业诉郭文贵）, Index No. 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022)（在追收判决的诉讼中认定判决债务人实益拥有游艇）。因此，“债务人在财产中的权益”、“破产财产”及“债务人的财产”均包括个人债务人在财产中的衡平权益。\n\n共同被告主张，受托人寻求撤销的是另一自我实体的财产转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另一自我实体）→ C（共同被告）（另一自我认定）（转让 B 的财产）\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 47 页，共 103 页；案 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 62 页，共 118 页\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 46 页，共 102 页\n\n共同被告将各起诉状理解为主张，另一自我认定将使个人债务人在另一自我实体的财产中产生权益。19 共同被告主张，受托人有误——另一自我认定不能在此前并不存在的财产中创设权益——因此，受托人无诉讼资格主张余下的 B→C，即 B 的财产转让。\n\n然而，法院仍须根据所主张的内容评估这些转让。见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.（梅里特管理集团）, 583 U.S. at 382。各起诉状中，受托人主张相关转让是个人债务人的财产和/或破产财产的转让，而非另一自我实体的财产转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）→ C（共同被告）（通过另一自我实体 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n受托人主张，个人债务人一直在另一自我实体的财产中享有权益——该权益并非由另一自我认定所创设。\n\n这一点可见于上文引用的针对 Amazon（亚马逊）的起诉状段落。但再举一例，在针对共同被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.，简称“B&H Foto”）等主体的起诉状中，受托人作出如下主张：\n\n43. 在申请日之前，[个人]债务人通过包括 Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地）、Golden Spring（黄金之春）、HCHK Technologies（HCHK 技术公司）、G Club Operations（G 俱乐部运营公司）、Rule of Law20（法治）及 Lexington Property（列克星敦地产）在内的其另一自我空壳公司，或以其他方式，将[个人]债务人的财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请日前转让”），包括但不限于如下各项：\n\n见随附于此并构成本文件一部分的附表 A。\n\n44. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过包括 Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地）、Lexington（列克星敦）、Golden Spring（黄金之春）、G Club Operations（G 俱乐部运营公司）及 HCHK Technologies（HCHK 技术公司）在内的空壳公司，或以其他方式，将破产财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请日后转让”），包括但不限于如下各项：\n\n见随附于此并构成本文件一部分的附表 B。\n\n（起诉状第 43–44 段，Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（德斯平斯诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.）(In re Kwok（郭案）), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。）起诉状主张，个人债务人参与了一场“空壳公司障眼法”，借此将其资产——以及在申请日后将破产财产——隐藏于另一自我实体之中，以妨碍对该等资产的追收，用于偿还其债务并规避其在《破产法》下的义务。（同上，第 19–42 段。）这些主张在形式上与其他所有起诉状中的主张相同。\n\n涉及争议转让的被主张为另一自我实体的各起诉状，均以引用方式并入。（同上，第 19 段，注 4。）所有另一自我起诉状均提出广泛主张，称个人债务人使用、控制并受益于另一自我实体的资产。21 其中之一，即针对 Golden Spring（黄金之春）的另一自我起诉状，已于上文讨论。（见起诉状第 10–38 段，Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd.（德斯平斯诉 Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd.）(In re Kwok（郭案）), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1。）再如，针对 HCHK Entities（HCHK 实体）的起诉状提出了类似主张。（见起诉状第 16–40 段，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc.（德斯平斯诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.）(In re Kwok（郭案）), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1。）\n\n审阅各起诉状及以引用方式并入的另一自我起诉状可清楚表明，受托人并非仅依赖另一自我主张个人债务人或破产财产在被转让财产中享有衡平权益。如同第一项要件，只要受托人已合理主张个人债务人对另一自我实体资产享有实益所有权22，其即已合理主张其财产和/或已属或若非该转让本将属于破产财产的财产发生了转让。因此，根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法律），另一自我认定的效力对该要件亦不具有决定性。\n\n21 除针对 Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地）的起诉状外，所有另一自我起诉状均主张个人债务人对另一自我实体及其资产均享有实益所有权。见下文附录 F。尽管如此，针对 Greenwich Land 的起诉状仍载有关于个人债务人使用、控制及受益于 Greenwich Land 资产的主张。\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 49 页，共 103 页；案 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 64 页，共 118 页\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 48 页，共 102 页\n\nii. 可撤销转让法控制问题（i）：个人债务人是否为转让人；以及问题（iii）：另一自我实体的财产是否为个人债务人的财产和/或破产财产\n\n尽管有上述内容，法院仍将讨论当事人关于另一自我及可撤销转让诉讼在破产程序中效力的论点。在 McNellis（麦克内利斯）案中，United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国第二巡回上诉法院）维持地区法院的裁判：就受托人的欺诈性转让诉讼而言揭开公司面纱，同时就受托人的高利贷诉讼而言拒绝揭开同一公司面纱。420 F.2d at 53–54。第二巡回法院认定，尽管欺诈性转让法允许法院重实质而轻形式，但纽约州高利贷法的发展允许个人利用公司另一自我取得原本构成高利贷的贷款。同上。也就是说，第二巡回法院考察适用于受托人各项诉因的实体法，以确定是否可以揭开公司面纱，从而确立某一要件或抗辩。同上。\n\n因此，受托人正确地认为，根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法律），另一自我认定的效力并不具有决定性。相关的可撤销转让法规——本案中为《破产法》和 NYUVTA——决定为欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请日后转让之目的，是否以及在何种范围内可以揭开公司面纱。McNellis（麦克内利斯）, 420 F.2d at 53–54。支配揭开公司面纱的标准，由适用的法律选择规则确定——\n\n22 法院不处理受托人是否已合理主张个人债务人对另一自我实体资产享有实益所有权的问题，因为该问题不在四个问题之列。\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 50 页，共 103 页；案 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 65 页，共 118 页\n\n案 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 49 页，共 102 页\n\n该法律可能与支配整体诉因的法律相同，也可能不同。ASARCO（美国冶炼与精炼公司）, 382 B.R. at 66–68（驳回撤诉动议，理由是债务人已充分主张其有资格根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法律），通过反向揭开公司面纱以其子公司的地位主张欺诈性转让）；参见 Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC（斯普林房地产有限责任公司诉 Echo/RT Holdings, LLC）, C.A. No. 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016)（确认根据 Delaware law（特拉华州欺诈性转让法），在适用法律允许反向揭开公司面纱的情况下，母公司的债权人可以为追究子公司资产的欺诈性转让而主张另一自我）。\n\n共同被告主张，受托人寻求的救济具有新颖性。并非如此。ASARCO（美国冶炼与精炼公司）, 382 B.R. at 66–68（适用 Delaware law（特拉华州另一自我法））；见 Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp.（帕克诉泰坦矿业（美国）公司）(In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.（斯塔尔山资源公司案）), Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at \\*4–6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020)（适用 Nevada law（内华达州另一自我法））；Searcy v. Knight（瑟西诉奈特）(In re Am. Int'l Refinery（美国国际炼油厂案）), 402 B.R. 728, 743–48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008)（同上）；Kendall v. Turner（肯德尔诉特纳）(In re Turner（特纳案）), 335 B.R. 140, 145–47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005)（适用 California law（加利福尼亚州另一自我法）），经重新审议后在相关部分予以维持，345 B.R. 674, 676–77 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006)（维持另一自我认定）。\n\na. 问题（i）和（iii）：州法允许撤销另一自我实体对其财产所作的转让\n\n此外，受托人正在寻求的救济在州法下当然并非新颖。根据 NYUVTA（纽约《统一可撤销交易法》），可通过另我的财产转让证明实际欺诈性转让和推定欺诈性转让。“债务人”是指对某项请求承担责任的人。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。因此，即使假定另我仅产生替代责任，另我也是“债务人”，即使其并非《破产法》规定的债务人亦然。由于其是债务人，另我可以作出可撤销的转让。见 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274。此外，另我的财产属于债务人的财产。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p)。因此，在州法诉讼中，另我可以与 NYUVTA 结合适用。见 Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp., No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK), 2025 WL 552046, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025)（适用 NYUVTA 及 Delaware（特拉华州）另我法）（援引 JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)（适用《统一欺诈性转让法》（“UFTA”），即《统一可撤销交易法》（“UVTA”）的前身））。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 已提交 03/18/25 已录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 51 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 已提交 03/19/25 已录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 66 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 已提交 03/04/25 已录入 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 50 页，共 102 页\n\n这不仅是纽约州的法律；它也是美国境内绝大多数（即使不是全部）司法辖区的法律。见 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6)（Connecticut（康涅狄格州）已采纳 UFTA，而 UFTA 对“债务人”的定义与 UVTA 相同）；5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2]（四十六个州和 District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区）已采纳 UFTA 或 UVTA）；另见，例如，Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc., 450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at *4–5 (Nev. 2019)（表格处置）；Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc., 839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002)；Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at *3；Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C., 75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)；U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015)。可撤销转让法和另我法均旨在阻止规避判决，并且不出所料，可以在破产程序之外的追收诉讼中结合适用。\n\n如果受托人根据第 544(b) 条有资格提出其 NYUVTA 请求，并且已合理地陈述另我主张23，则其已合理地陈述一名债务人转让了其财产。\n\n23 法院将在下文 D 节中，在讨论被告关于其诉状充分性的论点之后，讨论受托人关于另我的指控是否具有合理可信性。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 已提交 03/18/25 已录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 52 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 已提交 03/19/25 已录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 67 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 已提交 03/04/25 已录入 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 51 页，共 102 页\n\nb. 问题 (i) 和 (iii)：破产法允许撤销另我对其财产作出的转让\n\n法院必须确定，通常适用于破产程序之外的规则是否也适用于破产程序。如同上文关于受益所有权的讨论，存在两个争议要件。第一，必须确定是否可以利用另我主张来主张个人债务人是转让人。《破产法》仅就实际欺诈性转让以及《破产法》下四类推定欺诈性转让中的一类规制这一要件。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV)。第 544(b) 条并未将这一要件适用于受托人的 NYUVTA 请求，而且该要件并非《破产法》下四类推定欺诈性转让中的三类或未经授权的破产申请后转让的要件。11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a)。\n\n第二，必须确定是否可以利用另我主张来主张另我的财产是破产财产，或者若非发生该转让，本应成为破产财产。Begier, 496 U.S. at 59。这是所有撤销请求的要件，包括受托人的 NYUVTA 请求。如上所述，只有当受托人主张个人债务人对财产权益作出了转让时，其才有资格依据 NYUVTA 提出请求。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。\n\n问题 (i)：受托人是否主张由非债务人实体作出的初始转让？\n\n就第一个要件而言，法院认为可以利用另我来确定个人债务人是转让人，因为“转让”的定义包括间接让与。11 U.S.C. § 101(54)。事实上，在 McNellis 一案中，Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）维持了地区法院刺破公司面纱的裁决，并认定是个人而非其公司取得了其后偿还的贷款。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53–54；见 Orr, 991 F.2d at 35；Voest-Alpine, 919 F.2d at 212–13。因此，另我主张可以支持如下主张：个人债务人——而非非债务人实体——是转让人。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 已提交 03/18/25 已录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 53 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 已提交 03/19/25 已录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 68 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 已提交 03/04/25 已录入 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 52 页，共 102 页\n\n问题 (iii)：反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下具有什么效力？\n\n就第二个要件而言，在《破产法》未作规定之处，州法决定各方对财产享有何种权益。Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–57。然而，Butner 还认为，根据《宪法》第一条第 8 节第 4 款，国会有权为破产目的界定有别于州法的财产权益。Id. at 54–57（认定抵押权人是否、何时以及如何取得租金担保权益属于州法问题，因为经修订的 1898 年旧《破产法》未包含赋予或否认抵押权人此种担保权益的规定）。\n\n国会界定了破产财产。11 U.S.C. § 541。“国会意图将广泛范围的财产纳入破产财产”，包括“在破产程序开始时债务人并不享有占有权益的财产”。Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204–05（维持 Second Circuit 的认定，即破产财产包括 Internal Revenue Service（美国国税局）在提交破产申请前为执行税收留置权而扣押的财产）。因此，与 Butner 和 Whiting Pools 一致，法院通常认为，尽管州法决定债务人对财产享有何种权益，联邦法决定该等财产权益是否被纳入破产财产。Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.), 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019)；Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.), 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007)；In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991)；N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons), 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985)。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 已提交 03/18/25 已录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 54 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 已提交 03/19/25 已录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 69 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 已提交 03/04/25 已录入 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 53 页，共 102 页\n\n另我请求属于破产财产。Nordlicht,115 F.4th at 104–06（认定纽约法下的另我请求属于破产财产），因为此类请求通过扩大破产财产而“使所有债权人受益”，Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105（原文改动）；见 In re Emoral, Inc., 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014)（认定继受责任请求属于破产财产，因为该等请求与另我请求一样，属于债权人的一般性请求）。即使在州法下另我是一项施加替代责任的请求，而非独立诉因，亦是如此。Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 109–111。Nordlicht 认定：\n\n另我责任理论完全落入《破产法》对“请求”的定义之内：\n\n(A) 获得付款的权利，无论该权利是否已化为判决、已清算、未清算、确定、或有、已到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、法定、衡平、有担保或无担保；或者\n\n(B) 因不履行义务而获得衡平救济的权利，如该不履行产生获得付款的权利，无论该衡平救济权利是否已化为判决、确定、或有、已到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、有担保或无担保。”\n\n115 F.4th at 110（原文强调）。\n\n根据 Nordlicht，受托人从另我处获得付款或衡平救济（如交还）的权利属于破产财产。115 F.4th at 105。受托人可以在针对破产财产提出的请求范围内，向另我寻求全额追偿。见 Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.), 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931)（就第 544(b) 条请求的前身规定认定，受托人可以就已撤销的转让为破产财产全体债权人追偿）。受托人可以追偿的财产属于破产财产。Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204–07。此外，根据 Begier，个人债务人在破产申请前对任何此类财产享有权益。496 U.S. at 59。因此，如果受托人的另我请求获得支持，另我的财产即属于破产财产，且个人债务人在破产申请前对该财产享有权益。见 Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105（另我请求通过扩大破产财产而“使所有债权人受益”）；718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein), 192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999)（认定法院有管辖权审理对一项裁决的上诉，该裁决涉及债权人关于某些公司系债务人另我的主张等事项，因为认定该等公司为其另我“将导致大量资产被纳入其破产财产，进而可用于至少部分清偿其债权人的请求。”）；Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.), 97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（认定受托人有资格提出另我请求，因为该请求“旨在为全体债权人的利益收回破产财产，而非任何特定债权人专有”）（原文强调）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 已提交 03/18/25 已录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 55 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 已提交 03/19/25 已录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 70 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 已提交 03/04/25 已录入 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 54 页，共 102 页\n\n相反判例缺乏说服力\n\n在得出这一结论时，法院谨不同意 United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit（美国联邦第六巡回上诉法院）在 In re Howland 一案中的裁决。674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017)；同见 Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)；Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle), BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006)；Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle), Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21- 04041-lsg, ___ B.R. ___, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023)（适用 Howland）；Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver), 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)（同上）。在 Howland 一案中，第六巡回上诉法院认为，在州法下另我仅施加替代责任时，另我的财产不属于破产财产，亦不得追偿。674 F. App'x at 487。Lippe 和 Wardle 作出了同样认定。DuMouchelle 和 Silver，即第六巡回辖区内法院作出的裁决，适用了 Howland。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 已提交 03/18/25 已录入 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 56 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 已提交 03/19/25 已录入 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 71 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 已提交 03/04/25 已录入 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 55 页，共 102 页\n\n除上述法条分析外，本院亦基于若干理由谨此不同意 Howland。首先，除非有明确迹象表明国会意图作出此种背离，法院“不会将《破产法典》解读为削弱既往的破产惯例”。Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221。在解释《法典》时，法院推定国会“熟悉”原《1898年破产法》当时的通行理解。Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991)。没有明确迹象表明国会意图推翻 McNellis。Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 541(a), 544(b), 548(a), 549(a) with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 1) (repealed 1978), 107(d) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 67) (repealed 1978), 110(a), (d), (e) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 70) (repealed 1978)。McNellis——该案维持了在依据联邦破产法和纽约州法提起的受托人欺诈转让诉讼中，使用另我理论证明抗辩的做法——对本院具有约束力。420 F.2d at 53–54.\n\n第二，第六巡回上诉法院对撤销诉讼中另我请求的处理方法，有悖于第二巡回上诉法院的指示，即法院必须考量欺诈转让的实质，而非形式。See Orr, 991 F.2d at 35; see also Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); Voest-Alpine, 919 F.2d at 211–12。在州法允许否认公司形式的情况下，欺诈转让法能够穿透交易的名义当事人。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53; ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 65–68。这种承认经济现实的能力，体现在《破产法典》对转让和破产财产所作的宽泛定义中。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 541.\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交 于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入 第 57 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交 于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入 第 72 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交 于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入 第 56 页，共 102 页\n\n第三，Howland 有悖于州法下另我请求与撤销请求的相互作用方式。如上所述，在破产程序之外，另我理论可用于 NYUVTA 请求，以针对另我既是名义转让人又是被转让财产名义所有人的交易。Bravia Cap., 2025 WL 552046, at *9; Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; see Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at *3.\n\n在破产程序中，结论不应有所不同。破产程序尤其是一项集体追偿程序。Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at 370–71。这正是受托人有资格主张以下请求的原因：(i) 为全体债权人利益提出的一般性请求，11 U.S.C. § 544(a); see Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105；以及 (ii) 特定实际债权人的撤销请求，11 U.S.C. § 544(b)，其范围及于全部转让——即使实际债权人的债务低于被转让金额，Moore, 284 U.S. at 5。破产程序“以更公平、更有序的资产分配，取代债务追偿中的‘竞速’及其他优先制度，从而保护债权人彼此免受侵害。”In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)（讨论自动中止的目的）（引用 Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976)（经修订的原《1898年破产法》项下案件））。若令债权人为寻求另我和欺诈转让救济而竞相向法院起诉——而在个人债务人破产程序存续期间，他们可能并无资格寻求该等救济——将损害破产程序的集体性质。See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989).\n\n即使债权人能够在破产程序之外提起这些诉讼，其成本亦将十分高昂：受托人对个人债务人财务事务的调查已引发大量诉讼且耗时甚久。强迫债权人在破产程序之外追究这些撤销诉讼，或放弃追究，将导致对个人债务人债权人的不公平且不均衡的受偿；其中许多人很可能无力支付此类努力所涉的律师费和成本。See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991)（第 547 条旨在平衡防止竞相向法院起诉及确保向所有债权人公平分配这两个相关目标）；Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996)（同上）。受托人是应当汇集债权人在破产财产中的利益，并为其集体利益提起撤销诉讼的人。11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50*.*\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交 于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入 第 58 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交 于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入 第 73 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交 于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入 第 57 页，共 102 页\n\n最后，Howland 亦有悖于 Delaware（特拉华州）的另我法。一般而言，另我理论导致替代责任，这只是我们法律体系中的一种偶然现象——另我理论所关涉的是：在公司形式被滥用并造成欺诈或不公时，否认该公司形式。See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968)（“当然，毫无疑问，在适当证明的情况下，可忽略母公司与子公司之间的公司实体，并在法律和事实层面将最终利益方，即母公司，视为特定交易中的唯一当事人。”）。正如 Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）所指出，“在最基本的层面上，反向揭开公司面纱涉及使商业组织为其所有者的债务承担责任”，Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc., 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021)（执行评估判决之诉），因为“在子公司仅为母公司的另我之处……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产”，Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 710（原文改动）。\n\n普通法中的大多数救济采取金钱损害赔偿的形式。另我请求的主要用途，是将因例如侵权或合同而依法承担金钱损害赔偿责任的被告之责任，扩展至资金更雄厚的被告。See NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)（“尽管如此，在适当情形下，可以‘忽略’实体与其所有者之间的区别，以要求所有者对实体的债务负责。”）（合同之诉）；Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（“试图使公司所有者对公司债务承担责任的原告‘面临艰巨任务。’”）（欺诈之诉）；Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“根据 Delaware 法，揭开公司面纱是一项衡平法原则。……因此，揭开公司面纱并非纯粹独立的诉因。相反，揭开公司面纱实际上等同于，就直接行为人实施的某项基础不法行为，使直接行为人与其公司关联方承担连带责任。”）（侵权之诉）（强调系后加）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交 于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入 第 59 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交 于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入 第 74 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交 于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入 第 58 页，共 102 页\n\n然而，撤销转让并非金钱损害赔偿。“撤销条款的目的在于保全可纳入破产财产的财产。”Begier, 496 U.S. at 59（讨论第 547 条及对优先转让的撤销）；see In re PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002)（“欺诈转让法旨在‘使债权人能够获得本应正当地构成破产财产一部分的债务人资产，即使该等资产已被转让。’”）；Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.), 881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989)（裁定允许行政请求权持有人保留未经授权的破产申请后转让，对持有类似请求权的其他债权人不公平）。为此，《破产法典》第 548 条和第 549 条以及 NYUVTA 第 273 条和第 274 条所提供的救济，是撤销涉案转让，而非金钱损害赔偿。11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274.\n\n在撤销转让后，《破产法典》第 550(a) 条和 NYUVTA 第 276(b) 条允许追回已转让的特定财产、其价值或其收益。11 U.S.C. § 550(a); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b)。因此，否认公司形式并将另我的资产视为债务人资产，就撤销诉讼而言，其运作方式不同于就其他诉讼而言的运作方式，完全不足为奇。See Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 710（“在母公司/子公司语境中，‘在子公司仅为母公司的另我之处……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。’”）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交 于 03/18/25 23:53:23 录入 第 60 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文书 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交 于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入 第 75 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交 于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入 第 59 页，共 102 页\n\n“Delaware 不会容忍将公司形式作为促成欺诈或不公的手段。”Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714。欺诈性及未经授权的破产申请后转让法与该目的相一致。其存在是为了防止因资产耗散而产生的不公平结果。See Begier, 496 U.S. at 59; PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d at 313; Photo Promotion Assocs., 881 F.2d at 9–10。若另我理论不能用于防止因欺诈性或未经授权的破产申请后转让而产生的欺诈或不公，这将从根本上荒谬，并有悖于该理论的目的。这两套法律可以结合适用。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53; ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 65–68; see Bravia Cap., 2025 WL 552046, at *9; Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; see also Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at *3.\n\n* * *\n\n基于上述所有理由，本院认定，债务人可以通过另我作出转让，且另我的财产属于债务人的破产财产。在受托人已合理主张另我理论的范围内，受托人已合理主张个人债务人转让了属于破产财产的财产，或者若非因该等转让本将属于破产财产的财产。在同一范围内，受托人因此有资格提起其 NYUVTA 请求，并且基于上述理由，已合理主张该等请求。另我理论可用于支持根据《破产法典》或 NYUVTA 提出的可撤销转让请求。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 4189 于 03/04/25 提交 于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入 第 60 页，共 102 页\n\n2. 争点 (ii) 和 (iv)：对另我的贸易债权人的不利影响及实质合并\n\n法院继而审理共同被告的其余论点。共同被告主张，受托人未能根据特拉华州法律充分主张一项可成立的反向刺破公司面纱请求，因为：(a) 受托人未能主张不存在对被指称另我的债权人的不利影响；以及 (b) 反向刺破公司面纱将依法对共同被告造成不利影响。共同被告还主张：(c) 受托人正在寻求不被允许的追溯生效救济；以及 (d) 即使该救济在州法下本可被允许，所寻求的救济亦可通过实质合并实现，因此，在未满足追溯生效实质合并所要求的检验标准前，允许受托人获得该救济是不公平的。共同被告的论点始终贯穿着这样一种主张：受托人所寻求的救济对于作为被指称另我的无辜商业债权人的共同被告而言，极不公平。\n\n受托人主张：(a) 判例法明确规定，原告无需主张不存在对被指称另我的债权人的不利影响；(b) 不利影响是一项需要大量事实审查的问题，不能通过驳回动议或依诉状判决动议予以解决，而且无论如何，《破产法典》向共同被告提供了在破产程序外无法获得的保护；(c) 他并非通过其另我请求寻求追溯生效救济，而是寻求使法律现实符合事实现实；以及 (d) 尽管另我在破产程序中提供的救济可能与实质合并相似，但这两种救济的事实及法律前提不同，且受托人已主张另我。受托人还对共同被告均为无辜商业债权人，以及其所寻求的救济在根本上不公平的主张提出异议。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 62 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文档 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 77 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 61 页，共 102 页\n\ni. 争点 (ii)：适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定？\n\n如上所述，共同被告将撤销请求解释为主张以下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另我）→ C（共同被告）（消除转让）\n（另我认定）\n\n就争点 (ii) 而言，共同被告主张，即使另我认定会使个人债务人与被指称的另我之间形成同一性，撤销 B→C 转让仍具有不利影响，因为共同被告并不知道 A=B，因此，法院无法依法作出另我认定。\n\n法院不同意。首先，受托人无需主张不存在对另我的债权人的不利影响。在采纳反向刺破公司面纱时，Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）认定，法院必须考量传统的另我因素，并额外考量一系列其他因素，而这些因素实质上涉及对被指称另我的债权人、所有人及其他利益相关方的不利影响。Manichaean Cap.（摩尼教资本）, 251 A.3d at 714–15。然而，衡平法院驳回了被告提出的、因未能主张不存在对被指称另我的某些债权人的不利影响而应驳回起诉书的论点。Id. at 718。相反，衡平法院认定：“起诉书中没有任何依据可推断反向刺破公司面纱将对无辜第三方债权人造成损害。……为明确起见，起诉书中并无与……第三方债权人有关的事实主张，而且至少就目前而言，我的分析仅限于该诉状的‘四角之内’。”Id.。法院未获提供任何理由相信 Delaware Supreme Court（特拉华州最高法院）会在此问题上不同意衡平法院。不利影响是一个需要事实发展的争点。\n\n其次，受托人可以主张共同被告为初始受让人；后续受让人具有不同抗辩并不重要。见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.（优点管理集团）, 583 U.S. at\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 63 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文档 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 78 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 62 页，共 102 页\n\n382–86（认定原告可以一种使安全港抗辩不适用的方式主张转让）；参见 Covey（科维） v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc.（凯西综合商店公司） (In re Duckworth（达克沃思案）), Bankruptcy No. 10-83603, Adversary No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681, at *8 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012)（认定受托人使用另我理论不被允许，部分原因在于，如受托人主张不同的欺诈性转让，该做法将剥夺被告本可享有的后续受让人抗辩）。共同被告可以主张受托人未根据《破产法典》或 NYUVTA 充分主张一项转让。见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at 382。事实上，如上所述，共同被告已作出该主张。随着本程序进入诉状阶段之后，他们可以继续作出该主张。\n\n为支持其论点，共同被告敦促法院采纳 Duckworth 的裁决，但其援引并不恰当。Duckworth 法院面对的不是驳回动议，而是简易判决动议。Duckworth, 2012 WL 4434681, at *2。Duckworth 法院根据无争议事实认定，允许受托人向被指称另我的商业债权人追偿将不公平且违反适用州法。Id. at *7。在本案中，共同动议为驳回动议或依诉状判决动议。在这一阶段，标准是将受托人充分主张的事实视为真实时，该等主张是否支持作出存在不被允许的不利影响的认定。Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 718。审查起诉书及通过援引并入的另我起诉书，并不支持作出该认定。\n\n共同被告无权要求受托人主张其为后续受让人。见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at 382。受托人主张如下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）→ C（共同被告）（通过另我 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n他无需主张 A→B→C 转让，将另我认定视为一项转让，从而主张个人债务人将其财产转让给作为初始受让人的另我，而共同被告则为该等另我的后续受让人。\n\nii. 争点 (iv)：反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定是否可以追溯适用？\n\n转向争点 (iv)，法院认定受托人并未寻求追溯生效救济。裁定某实体为且一直为另一实体的另我，并非给予追溯生效救济——而是裁定公司形式现在及过去均为一种假象。根据共同被告的另我理论，胜诉方将无法获得任何救济。共同被告主张，根据特拉华州法律，另我认定仅就一项可折算为金钱损害赔偿的附随请求施加替代责任。如果如共同被告所主张，另我认定只能前瞻性地扩展责任，则另我不会就基于已经存在事实的胜诉方附随请求承担责任。这并非特拉华州法律的运作方式。另我请求可以与附随请求一并提出，见 Tronox（特罗诺克斯）, 549 B.R. at 27（在人身伤害原告无法对原被告提起诉讼的情况下，其寻求通过包括另我在内的多种理论施加替代责任），甚至可以在附随请求的判决作出后提出，见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 699–701（另我请求在评估判决作出后提出），且均未分析追溯生效救济是否适当。这是因为并未寻求追溯生效救济。见 Reid（里德） v. Wolf（沃尔夫） (In re Wolf), 644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022)（驳回如下“令人困惑”的论点：在破产案件中，另我认定将构成不被允许的追溯适用）。另我寻求基于既存事实的救济，正如违约请求寻求基于既存事实的救济一样。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 65 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文档 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 80 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 64 页，共 102 页\n\n另我认定不是一项转让——它并不创设财产权益，而是确认财产权益。这是共同被告对撤销请求之解释的根本缺陷。如上图所示，共同被告将撤销请求解释为主张以下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另我）→ C（共同被告）（另我认定）（转让 B 的财产）\n\n即使为论证起见假定另我认定在个人债务人与另我之间创设同一性，共同被告仍主张，另我认定将事后改变 B→C 转让的性质。因此，共同被告主张，法院不能将另我认定——A=B，也可表述为 A→B——视为在 B→C 转让发生时已经作出。\n\n然而，受托人并未主张 A=B 转让，而是主张另我一直只是个人债务人的工具。他主张如下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）→ C（共同被告）（通过另我 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n并主张此类通过另我进行的转让，是个人债务人为其本人、其家人、其关联人及其企业获取货物和服务并转移资产的惯常做法。\n\n法院拒绝在破产案件中对使用另我理论施加审慎性限制。Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）在 Manichaean Capital（摩尼教资本）中认定：\n\n反向刺破公司面纱可能被用作损害无辜当事人并扰乱公平交易预期的钝器，这种风险虽确实存在，但在我看来，并不足以证明应彻底拒绝反向刺破公司面纱。相反，对这些风险的认识创造了一个管理它们的机会，并以服务于衡平利益的方式加以管理。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4228-1 于 03/18/25 提交，于 03/18/25 23:53:23 登记，第 66 页，共 103 页；案件 22-50073 文档 4235-3 于 03/19/25 提交，于 03/19/25 15:59:16 登记，第 81 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 4189 于 03/04/25 提交，于 03/04/25 14:45:18 登记，第 65 页，共 102 页\n\n251 A.3d at 712。法院认为，没有理由认为审理破产案件的法院无法或不具备条件，依照衡平法院的指示，为衡平利益把握“管理［反向刺破公司面纱风险］的机会”。事实上，《破产法典》的首要目的之一，是通过包括集体追收程序在内的方式，为请求的调整及最终、公平解决提供一个统一法院。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 et seq.。对传统另我因素与对另我债权人及其他利益相关方不利影响的权衡，见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714–15，属于破产法院的职权范围。\n\n联合被告敦促本院将受托人关于另我（alter ego）的主张视为秘密的实质合并主张，并因此对任何另我认定的追溯效力适用限制——无论州法是否适用此类限制。实质合并“尤其导致将两个实体的资产及其债权请求汇集在一起；从由此形成的共同资金中清偿债务；消除公司间债权请求；以及为就重组计划进行表决之目的，将两家公司的债权人合并。”Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.（In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.），860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988)。“实质合并的唯一目的，是确保所有债权人获得公平对待。”Augie/Restivo，860 F.2d at 518。实质合并要求：(i) 债权人“将该等实体作为单一经济单位与之交易，且‘在提供信贷时并未依赖其独立身份’”；以及 (ii) 债务人的事务“纠缠至如此程度，以致合并将使所有债权人受益”。Id.。在 Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp.（In re Auto-Train Corp.）一案中，United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit（美国哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院）裁定，如主张方能够证明其益处超过对潜在撤销被告的损害，则应追溯生效地作出实质合并命令。810 F.2d 270, 277\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4228-1，提交于 03/18/25，登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23，第 67 页，共 103 页；案号 22-50073，文件 4235-3，提交于 03/19/25，登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16，第 82 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4189，提交于 03/04/25，登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18，第 66 页，共 102 页\n\n(D.C. Cir. 1987)。联合被告敦促本院将 Auto-Train 适用于任何另我认定。\n\n如受托人所承认，破产程序中另我认定的效果与实质合并的效果相似——另我的资产和负债被合并。然而，实质合并可获适用——联合被告似乎对此存疑——并不意味着不能在破产案件中主张另我。In re Owens Corning，419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005)（“在实质合并之前，对无视公司独立人格的其他救济已经存在（并且仍然存在）。例如，如果一家子公司被其母公司如此支配，以致成为母公司的‘另我’，则该子公司的‘公司面纱’可根据州法被忽略（或被‘揭开’）。”）。\n\n此外，这些法理的要件和目的不同。根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律，传统的另我或揭开公司面纱有两个要件：(i) 其形式将被无视的公司实体受到其被主张的另我如此支配和控制，以致该公司实体及其另我实际上构成单一经济单位；以及 (ii) 将被无视的公司形式造成欺诈或某种类似的不公正。Pauley Petroleum，239 A.2d at 633；Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 706；Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood，752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999)；Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co.，621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)。反向揭开公司面纱要求法院额外考量对被主张的另我的债权人、所有人及其他利益相关方造成的损害。Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 714–15。另我为滥用公司形式提供救济。相反，在不存在超过其益处的损害的情况下，实质合并为本可得到更为简单处理的过度复杂财务事务提供救济。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4228-1，提交于 03/18/25，登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23，第 68 页，共 103 页；案号 22-50073，文件 4235-3，提交于 03/19/25，登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16，第 83 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4189，提交于 03/04/25，登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18，第 67 页，共 102 页\n\n这是具有实质意义的区别。“实质合并最好被理解为一种经济救济，其主要目标是公平对待所有债权人。相反，州法上的另我请求是一种衡平法救济，侧重于防止‘欺诈或不公正’。”Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp.（In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.），Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC，Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC，2022 WL 2294175, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022)。实质合并并不旨在补救任何欺诈或不公正。Augie/Restivo，860 F.2d at 518。公司形式无需曾被滥用，实体无需为虚假实体，且无需有任何债权人因公司形式而受损。Id.。所必需的只是债权人将从实质合并中受益。Id.。在对破产财产进行实质合并时，法院是在通过前瞻性地简化其面前的事实，来解决一个实际问题——管理高度交织的破产财产，以及为厘清该等破产财产而可能产生高额管理成本——前提是如此作为利大于弊。See id.。在揭开公司面纱时，法院是在承认一种既存现实，即公司形式被滥用而损害债权人，并且基于衡平原则不允许该等滥用持续存在。See Pauley Petroleum，239 A.2d at 633。实质合并可能涉及一项转让；另我认定则不涉及。\n\n破产程序尤其关乎公平分摊损失。联合被告试图让本院将 Auto-Train 适用于另我请求，从而将分析重点转向 BÆC 转让并离开 A。联合被告借此忽视了起诉状所指称的、由个人债务人为阻碍、拖延或欺诈其债权人而实施并为其利益所实施的、涉及众多另我的障眼法——而该等主张对于另我分析至关重要。See Pauley Petroleum，239 A.2d at 633。（See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc.（In re Kwok），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4228-1，提交于 03/18/25，登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23，第 69 页，共 103 页；案号 22-50073，文件 4235-3，提交于 03/19/25，登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16，第 84 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4189，提交于 03/04/25，登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18，第 68 页，共 102 页\n\n05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) 在假定该等主张为真的前提下，其与反向揭开公司面纱因素的权衡相关。Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 715–16（说明法院将权衡“维持受影响公司债权人或债务人合法期待的社会价值，对确保该等期待适用有利的可反驳推定，与在所涉具体情形下允许反向揭开公司面纱所实现政策的重要性。”）（引 Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)）。\n\n尽管联合被告请求本院将 Auto-Train 的追溯生效分析适用于另我请求，本院认定，没有理由或依据背离 Delaware（特拉华州）的另我法。尽管实质合并已经出现，另我法仍可由受托人援用。Owens Corning，419 F.3d at 205–06。\n\n* * *\n\n基于所有这些理由，联合被告就问题 (ii) 和 (iv) 提出的论点没有说服力。本院不会在驳回动议或依诉状作出判决的动议中，权衡对联合被告的损害与支持另我的因素。同样，本院不会在该法理要件之外，对另我的适用施加审慎限制。\n\nC. 非联合动议和 Z&Z 异议24\n\n本院将仅处理非联合被告就四个问题提出的不同论点。下列非联合被告：(1) FFP (BVI) Limited；(2) Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell（Aaron A. Mitchell 先生）；(3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.；(4) The Francis Firm PLLC；(5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.；(6) Weddle Law PLLC；(7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC；(8) G4S Security Systems (Hong\n\n24 见上文注 12。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4228-1，提交于 03/18/25，登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23，第 70 页，共 103 页；案号 22-50073，文件 4235-3，提交于 03/19/25，登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16，第 85 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4189，提交于 03/04/25，登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18，第 69 页，共 102 页\n\nKong) Ltd.；以及 (9) ACASS Canada LTD，（统称“杂项非联合被告”）由同一律师代理，该律师将其非联合动议作为一项统一论点进行陈述。\n\n另有两名非联合被告：(10) Liberty Jet Management Corp.（“Liberty Jet”）和 (11) Z&Z。Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 未提出任何亦未由杂项非联合被告提出的不同论点。此外，Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 均未在听证中提出独立论点。因此，本院将仅讨论杂项非联合被告的论点。凡 Liberty Jet 或 Z&Z 提出或加入下文所讨论的论点之处，本讨论亦适用于 Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z。\n\n杂项非联合被告提出两项不同论点。第一，就问题 (ii)——适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定——杂项非联合被告主张，受托人无资格提出另我请求，因为受托人代位于个人债务人，而在将受托人的主张视为真实的情况下，个人债务人与被主张的另我具有同等过错。第二，就问题 (i)，即受托人能否撤销非债务实体作出的初始转让，及问题 (iii)，即反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力，杂项非联合被告主张，受托人在另我尚未申请破产、且个人债务人的 Chapter 11 案件与未申请的另我破产案件尚未实质合并的情况下，不当地在主张另我破产财产的请求。杂项非联合被告由此主张，受托人正在规避 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法》）的披露要求。\n\n作为回应，受托人主张，根据 Bankruptcy Code 的 section 541 或 section 544(a)，其具有原告资格，因为其代位于个人债务人的债权人；即使其并非如此，in pari delicto 的内部人例外也将适用。受托人主张其\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4228-1，提交于 03/18/25，登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23，第 71 页，共 103 页；案号 22-50073，文件 4235-3，提交于 03/19/25，登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16，第 86 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 4189，提交于 03/04/25，登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18，第 70 页，共 102 页\n\n已适当地提出个人债务人破产财产的请求，已适当地提出另我请求，并且无论如何，其将寻求新的债权申报截止日期，以使另我的债权人能够向该破产财产主张债权。\n\n1. 问题 (ii)：原告资格\n\nBankruptcy Code 赋予破产受托人原告资格，以代表债权人提出某些请求。PepsiCo, Inc.，884 F.2d at 700。若无该等法定授权，“破产受托人通常无权代表破产财产的债权人起诉第三方，而仅可主张破产公司自身持有的请求。”Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner，944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991)；see Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.，72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995)；Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.（In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.），17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994)。\n\n在受托人并非代表债权人主张请求权的情况下，Wagoner 指示法院确定：(i) 债务人是否本可提出该请求权；以及 (ii) 如是，是否因归责于债务人行为而使受托人构成同等过错。Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 119–20。尽管同等过错主张通常被视为一项积极衡平抗辩，但 Wagoner 原则（包括其对同等过错的考量）“作为一项审慎性诉讼资格限制而发挥作用”。Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd., 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015)。\n\n美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）已认定，受托人有资格代表全体债权人提出另我（alter ego）请求权。在 PepsiCo（百事公司）一案中，第二巡回上诉法院采纳了美国联邦第七巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit）在 Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987) 一案中的做法。PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05。在 Koch Refining 一案中，第七巡回上诉法院认定，依据第 544(a) 条，破产受托人是“全体债权人的代表”，并且可以追究另我请求权，因为该等请求权针对的是对债权人的一般性损害，而非个别化损害。831 F.2d at 1351–54; see Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan), 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009)。这与第 544(a) 条的法定文本相一致：任何判决债权人均可为收取其债务而提出另我请求权；该权利不取决于其特定请求权。11 U.S.C. § 544(a)。\n\n尽管第二巡回上诉法院在 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC), 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013) 一案中区分了 PepsiCo，但其所依据的事实是，《证券投资者保护法》受托人试图提出受欺诈债权人的个别化请求权——即使在马多夫庞氏骗局的特定事实上，该等请求权极为普遍地由多人持有25，JPMorgan, 721 F.3d at 58–59。JPMorgan 中的请求权与 Wagoner 中的请求权极为相似。比较 JPMorgan, 721 F.3d at 58–59 与 Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 116–17。此外，与 PepsiCo 一致，第二巡回上诉法院最近重申，受托人有资格代表全体债权人提出另我请求权，且另我请求权属于破产财产。比较 Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 与 PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 701。\n\n各项非共同被告（Assorted Non-Joint Defendants）主张，Nordlicht 遵循始于 Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987) 的一系列判例；该系列判例与 Koch 不同，认定第 544(a) 条并未赋予受托人代表全体债权人提出一般性请求权的诉讼资格。参见 PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 698–99。各项非共同被告主张，这意味着受托人的另我请求权受 Wagoner 原则约束。尽管 Nordlicht 本身未提及第 544(a) 条，但其与以下认定完全一致：受托人享有某些假设债权人的权利和权力，且其基于该等权利和权力提出的请求权属于破产财产。此外，即使受托人仅依据第 541 条才有资格提出另我请求权，该诉讼资格仍源自全体债权人的一般性请求权。\n\n因此，Wagoner 原则不适用。受托人以债权人地位提出诉讼时，该原则不适用。Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118（“受托人坚持其并非主张票据持有人的请求权，因此，我们无须深入探讨受托人何时（如有）可代表破产人债权人起诉第三方。”）；参见 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander), 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)（“Wagoner 规则和同等过错原则均不适用于受托人根据《破产法》第 544 条享有的法定诉讼资格。”）；Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.), 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017)。法院不审理当事人关于同等过错例外情形的论点。受托人有资格提出另我请求权。\n\n2. 争点 (i) 和 (iii)：另我、实质合并及通知\n\n各项非共同被告提出的论点，在很大程度上与共同被告（Joint Defendants）提出的论点相同；法院已在上文驳回该论点，即该论点认为受托人不得通过另我理论主张个人债务人是转让人，或者主张债务人财产及／或若非因该转让本将成为破产财产的财产已被转让。法院不会再次讨论该论点。区别在于各项非共同被告主张受托人本应采取何种做法。共同被告主张，受托人只能向被指称的另我主体本身追偿，且这就是其可能追偿的范围；而各项非共同被告则主张，受托人本应接管个人债务人的企业，将其置于破产程序中，然后寻求追溯性实质合并。\n\n法院还已在上文裁定，尽管存在实质合并，受托人仍可提出另我请求权。就各项非共同被告的通知关切而言，各项非共同被告并不代表被指称另我主体的全体债权人。各项非共同被告本身已获知受托人的另我请求权。受托人已多次表示，其将为被裁定为另我主体者的债权人寻求新的债权申报截止日。如提出该项请求，法院将审议该债权申报截止日的适当通知和送达问题。\n\nD. 争点 (ii)：另我主张的合理可信性\n\n法院已处理共同被告和非共同被告关于受托人未能以具有合理可信性的方式陈述另我主张的论点。法院认定，受托人有资格提出其反向刺破公司面纱请求权；其无须陈述未对被指称另我主体的债权人造成损害；且该等损害在法律上并不存在。然而，该讨论使争点 (ii)——适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定——尚未得到完全解决。\n\n基于起诉状中的指控以及通过引用纳入的另我起诉状，法院认定，受托人已以具有合理可信性的方式主张：(1) Golden Spring；(2) Lamp Capital；(3) HCHK Tech；(4) HCHK Property；(5) Lexington；(6) Greenwich Land；以及 (7) Leading Shine 均为个人债务人的另我主体，且应对其公司面纱进行反向刺破。受托人已以具有合理可信性的方式陈述：(i) 个人债务人支配并控制该等另我主体，以致其不具有独立的经济实质，仅作为个人债务人的幌子；以及 (ii) 该等另我主体的公司形式被用于阻碍、拖延或欺诈个人债务人的债权人，作为旨在事实上使个人债务人免于判决执行的大型空壳运作的一部分。参见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 706。（参见，例如，Complaint ¶¶ 13–38, Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1。）此外，将起诉状和另我起诉状中的指控视为真实，也不能证明对另我主体债权人造成了损害。参见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 718。\n\nV. 结论及命令\n\n法院面前的某些争点属于法律问题——但其范围狭窄，且实质上要求法院无视或重新定性起诉状中的指控。法院不会在裁定驳回动议或依诉状判决动议时这样做。被告将受托人关于转让的指控表述为一连串关系，即 A=B→C：先是作出另我认定，使 A（个人债务人）与 B（被指称的另我主体）形成同一关系，继而将 B 的财产转让给 C（共同被告）。然而，受托人主张的是 A→C 转让，即利用 B 将 A 的财产转让给 C。法院面前的其他争点，其提出方式意在使其适合在驳回动议中作出裁判。为此，被告聚焦于未被主张的 B→C 转让，并主张在该转让中加入另一项转让 A=B 会损害 C。被告要求法院超越诉状并就事实作出裁判，而法院不会这样做。\n\n基于上述理由，法院就四项争点作出如下结论：\n\n(i) 受托人能否撤销非债务人实体作出的初始转让？\n\n受托人并不寻求撤销非债务人实体作出的初始转让。受托人主张，个人债务人作出了该等转让。转让的定义包括间接转让。因此，名义转让人并非决定性因素。受托人提出另我和受益所有权指控，以主张个人债务人为转让人。\n\n(ii) 适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定？\n\n特拉华州（Delaware）法律承认反向刺破公司面纱。法院已审议当事人关于受托人对另我主张陈述是否充分的论点。受托人有资格提出反向刺破公司面纱请求权。受托人无须陈述未对被指称另我主体的债权人造成损害。受托人已以具有合理可信性的方式陈述另我主张。\n\n(iii) 反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下具有什么效力？\n\n受托人并非仅依赖于另我主张——其亦主张受益所有权。然而，根据特拉华州法，反向刺破公司面纱的效力在于否认公司的独立法人形式。否认公司形式的结果因相伴诉因所适用的实体法而异。通常，这将导致课以替代责任。该主张亦可用于证明某项请求权或抗辩。根据《破产法典》，另我认定可用于确立债务人作出了间接转让，并使债务人另我的财产成为破产财产。根据 NYUVTA，另我认定可用于撤销另我对其自身财产所作的转让。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 77 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 92 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 76 of 102\n\n(iv) 反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定能否追溯适用？\n\n受托人并未寻求追溯性救济。另我是对过去及现在滥用公司形式的一种救济。其使法律上的现实与事实上的现实相一致。另我在破产程序中实体合并制度出现后仍然适用。没有依据将起诉状重新解释为寻求实体合并而非另我认定。\n\n因此，现命令如下：\n\n1．附件 A 所列共同动议，予以驳回。\n\n2．附件 B 所列非共同动议，就其中提出的与共同书面陈述命令所列问题有关的一切论点，予以部分驳回。尽管有前述规定，本裁定不适用于《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i) 和 (ii) 段所界定的、在其被中止范围内的已中止或部分中止撤销请求。随附于本命令的附件 D 中标注了哪些撤销请求属于已中止或部分中止撤销请求。\n\n3．本命令附件 C 所列 Z&Z 异议，就其中提出的与共同书面陈述命令所列问题有关的一切论点，予以部分驳回。尽管有前述规定，本裁定不适用于《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i) 和 (ii) 段所界定的、在其被中止范围内的已中止或部分中止撤销请求。随附于本命令的附件 D 中标注了哪些撤销请求属于已中止或部分中止撤销请求。\n\n4．不迟于 March 28, 2025，各非共同被告应在各自的撤销诉讼中与受托人共同提交一份陈述，说明就其非共同动议或 Z&Z 提出异议的依诉状判决动议而言，仍有待裁定的问题。该等陈述必须具体说明该等问题在诉状中的提出位置。审查该等陈述后，法院将就每一事项确定是否有必要举行听证，或可依据当事人提交的材料作出裁定。\n\n于2025年3月4日，康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 94 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 79 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 78 of 102\n\n附件 A 共同动议\n\n1．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins（德斯平斯）诉 Agora Lab, Inc.（阿戈拉实验室公司）（关于 Kwok（郭文贵）案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 24（由被告 Agora Lab, Inc. 提交）。\n\n2．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Amazon Web Servs., Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Amazon Web Services, Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司）提交）。\n\n3．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Direct Persuasion LLC（直接劝说有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 26（由被告 Direct Persuasion LLC 提交）。\n\n4．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 23（由被告 Fox News Network, LLC 提交）。\n\n5．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Arri Americas Inc.（阿莱美洲公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 27, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 Arri Americas Inc. 提交）。\n\n6．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（特里斯—菲尼克斯有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 20（由被告 Teris-Phoenix, LLC 提交）。\n\n7．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Phillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽有限责任合伙企业）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 23（由被告 Phillips Nizer LLP 提交）。\n\n8．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Gunderson（冈德森）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Mr. Mark Gundersen（马克·冈德森）提交）。\n\n9．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西39街270号公司有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC 提交）。\n\n10．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 42（由被告 Amazon.com, Inc. 提交）。\n\n11．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安森健康计划公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Anthem Health Plans, Inc. 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 80 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 95 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 79 of 102\n\n12．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Fed. Express Corp.（联邦快递公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 20（由被告 Federal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司）提交）。\n\n13．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 DJD Creative LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2024），ECF No. 22（由被告 DJD Creative, LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n14．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（B&H 摄影与电子公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 35（由被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（B&H 摄影与电子公司）提交）。\n\n15．依诉状判决动议，Despins 诉 Am. Express Co.（美国运通公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 American Express Company（美国运通公司）提交）。\n\n16．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（奥扎尔·什洛莫·所罗门珍宝有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC 提交）。\n\n17．依诉状判决动议，Despins 诉 Zeta Glob. Corp.（泽塔环球公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 Zeta Global Corp.（泽塔环球公司）提交）。\n\n18．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 GroCyber LLC（格罗赛博有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 GroCyber LLC 提交）。\n\n19．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 22（由被告 Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n20．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（安森健康选择保险公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 23（由被告 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc.（安森健康选择保险公司）提交）。\n\n21．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 ModSquad Inc.（摩德小队公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 ModSquad Inc. 提交）。\n\n22．依诉状判决动议，Despins 诉 Cloudflare, Inc.（云耀公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 22（由被告 Cloudfare, Inc.（云耀公司）提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 81 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 96 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 80 of 102\n\n23．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 3 Columbus Circle LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 17（由被告 3 Columbus Circle LLC 提交）。\n\n24．依诉状判决动议，Despins 诉 Indium Software Inc.（铟软件公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Indium Software Inc. 提交）。\n\n25．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Miller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 Miller Motorcars Inc. 提交）。\n\n26．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（即刻家居改造公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 21（由被告 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. 提交）。\n\n27．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Target Enters., LLC（目标企业有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Target Enterprises, LLC（目标企业有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n28．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd.（统一费率搬家公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. 提交）。\n\n29．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Jamestown Assocs., LLC（詹姆斯敦联合公司有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Jamestown Associates, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合公司有限责任公司）提交）。\n\n30．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Nardello & Co., LLC（纳尔德洛公司有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 19（由被告 Nardello & Co., LLC 提交）。\n\n31．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·伊亚松与阿内洛专业公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. 提交）。\n\n32．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·基什纳与林德有限责任合伙企业）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 28（由被告 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 提交）。\n\n33．驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Putnam's Landscaping LLC（普特南园林绿化有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024），ECF No. 18（由被告 Putnam's Landscaping LLC 提交）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 82 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文档 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 97 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 81 页，共 102 页\n\n- 34. 诉状判决动议，Despins（德斯平斯）诉 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒）（关于 Kwok（郭文贵）案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院） Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23（由被告 Jason Miller 提交）。\n- 35. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（塞奇威克房地产公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18（由被告 Sedgwick Realty Corp. 提交）。\n- 36. 诉状判决动议，Despins 诉 Cirrus Design Corp.（赛勒斯设计公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21（由被告 Cirrus Design Corp. 提交）。\n- 37. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Marcum LLP（马库姆有限责任合伙企业）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 25（由被告 Marcum LLP 提交）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 83 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文档 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 98 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 82 页，共 102 页\n附录 B 非共同动议\n\n- 1. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（FFP（英属维尔京群岛）有限公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2024), ECF No. 17（由被告 FFP (BVI) Ltd. 提交）。\n- 2. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Mitchell（米切尔）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 19（由被告 Aaron A. Mitchell（阿伦·A.·米切尔）先生提交）。\n- 3. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A.（V.X. Cerda 律师事务所）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2024), ECF No. 16（由被告 V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A. 提交）。\n- 4. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 19（由被告 Liberty Jet Management Corp. 提交）。\n- 5. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所专业有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 29, 2024), ECF No. 15（由被告 The Francis Firm PLLC 提交）。\n- 6. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（伯克利·罗有限公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2024), ECF No. 35（由被告 Berkeley Rowe Ltd. 提交）。\n- 7. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所专业有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11（由被告 Weddle Law PLLC 提交）。\n- 8. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 21（由被告 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 及 Aaron A. Mitchell 先生提交）。\n- 9. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（G4S 安全系统（香港）有限公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2024), ECF No. 19（由被告 G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd. 提交）。\n- 10. 驳回对抗程序动议，Despins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS 加拿大有限公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2024), ECF No. 26（由被告 ACASS Canada LTD. 提交）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 84 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文档 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 99 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 83 页，共 102 页\n附录 C Z&Z 异议\n\n1. 反对意见法律备忘录，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2024), ECF No. 21（由被告 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 提交，以反对受托人的诉状判决动议，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2024), ECF No. 17）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 84 页，共 102 页\n附录 D 对共同被告及非共同被告提起的诉状\n\n图例\n针对非共同被告的诉状以粗体标示\n\n撤销请求\n\nAFT (BC) – 实际欺诈性转让（《破产法典》）\n\n根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追偿个人债务人在财产中权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nAFT (NY) – 实际欺诈性转让（纽约州法） 根据 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追偿个人债务人在财产中权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nCFT (BC) – 推定欺诈性转让（《破产法典》） 根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追偿个人债务人在财产中权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n\n- CFT (NY) 推定欺诈性转让（纽约州法）根据 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追偿个人债务人在财产中权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n- UPT 未经授权的申请破产后转让 根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a)，撤销并向初始受让人追偿未经授权的破产财团财产的申请破产后转让。\n- ST 向后续受让人追偿 根据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)，向后续受让人追偿已撤销的转让。\n\n* 部分中止的请求\n\n\\ 已中止的请求\n\n（不针对共同被告或非共同被告的请求以圆括号标示）\n替身实体\n\nGSNY – Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司） LC – Lamp Capital LLC（灯资本有限责任公司） HCHKT – HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK 技术公司） HCHKP – HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK 物业管理公司） LPS – Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事公司） GL – Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司） LSNY – Leading Shine NY Ltd.（领盛纽约有限公司）\n\n[在其未因 Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(e) 而被中止的范围内，涉及撤销请求的替身实体以方括号标示]\n案号 22-50073 文档 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 86 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文档 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 101 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 85 页，共 102 页\n\n1. 诉状，Despins 诉 Agora Lab, Inc.（阿戈拉实验室公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项请求：UPT [HCHKT]\n\n2. 修正诉状，Despins 诉 Amazon Web Servs., Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 4。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n第三项请求：UPT [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n3. 诉状，Despins 诉 Direct Persuasion LLC（直接说服有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n4. 诉状，Despins 诉 Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n5. 诉状，Despins 诉 Arri Americas Inc.（阿莱美洲公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. 诉状，Despins 诉 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（特里斯—菲尼克斯有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n7. 诉状，Despins 诉 Phillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽有限责任合伙企业）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC]\n第三项请求：UPT [LPS]\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 87 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文档 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 102 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 86 页，共 102 页\n\n8. 诉状，Despins 诉 Gunderson（冈德森）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n9. 诉状，Despins 诉 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西 39 街 270 号公司有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [LPS]\n\n10. 诉状，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LSNY]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LSNY]\n第三项请求：UPT**\n\n11. 诉状，Despins 诉 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项请求：UPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\n第六项请求：(ST*)\n\n12. 诉状，Despins 诉 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安森健康计划公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [HCHKP]\n\n13. 诉状，Despins 诉 Fed. Express Corp.（联邦快递公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n14. 诉状，Despins 诉 DJD Creative LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 88 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文档 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 103 页，共 118 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 87 页，共 102 页\n\n15. 诉状，Despins 诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（B&H 摄影与电子公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项请求：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项请求：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项请求：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKT, GL]\n第六项请求：(ST*)\n\n16. 修正诉状，Despins 诉 Am. Express Co.（美国运通公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2025), ECF No. 30。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. 诉状，Despins 诉 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（奥察尔·什洛莫·所罗门珍宝有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. 诉状，Despins 诉 Zeta Glob. Corp.（泽塔全球公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n19. 诉状，Despins 诉 GroCyber LLC（格罗网络安全有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n20. 诉状，Despins 诉 Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）（关于 Kwok 案），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n21. 起诉状，Despins（德斯潘斯）诉 Mitchell（米切尔）（关于 Kwok（郭文贵）），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格联邦破产法院） Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LPS]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LPS]\n\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [LPS]\n\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [LPS]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 89 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 104 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 88 of 102\n\n22. 起诉状，Despins诉 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（安森健康优选保险公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. 起诉状，Despins诉 ModSquad Inc.（ModSquad公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n24. 起诉状，Despins诉 Cloudflare, Inc.（Cloudflare公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第三项主张：UPT* [LPS]\n\n25. 起诉状，Despins诉 3 Columbus Circle LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. 起诉状，Despins诉 Indium Software Inc.（铟软件公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第三项主张：UPT [HCHKT]\n\n27. 起诉状，Despins诉 Miller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC]\n\n28. 起诉状，Despins诉 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（现场家居装修公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [HCHKP]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 89 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 90 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 105 of 118\n\n29. 起诉状，Despins诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A.（V.X. Cerda律师事务所）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [GSNY]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY]\n\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [GSNY]\n\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [GSNY]\n\n第五项主张：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL]\n\n30. 修正起诉状，Despins诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024)，ECF No. 2。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC]\n\n31. 起诉状，Despins诉 Target Enters., LLC（目标企业有限责任公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT] 第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. 起诉状，Despins诉 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd.（统一费率搬家公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. 起诉状，Despins诉 Jamestown Assocs., LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n34. 起诉状，Despins诉 Nardello & Co., LLC（纳德洛公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, LPS]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, LPS]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 90 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 91 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 106 of 118\n\n35. 起诉状，Despins诉 Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC]\n\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [LC]\n\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [LC]\n\n第五项主张：UPT [LC, LPS]\n\n36. 修正起诉状，Despins诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（伯克利·罗有限责任公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2024)，ECF No. 23。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n37. 起诉状，Despins诉 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n38. 起诉状，Despins诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·亚森与阿内洛律师事务所）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. 起诉状，Despins诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\nAFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n\nAFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n\nCFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n\nCFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\n\nUPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\n\nST*\n\n40. 起诉状，Despins诉 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·柯什纳与林德律师事务所）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LC]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC]\n\n第三项主张：UPT [LC]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 92 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 107 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 91 of 102\n\n41. 起诉状，Despins诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（G4S安保系统〈香港〉有限公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, LSNY]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, LSNY]\n\n第三项主张：UPT [LC]\n\n42. 起诉状，Despins诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. 起诉状，Despins诉 Putnam's Landscaping LLC（普特南园林绿化有限责任公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, GL]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, GL]\n\n第三项主张：UPT [LC, HCHKP, GL]\n\n44. 起诉状，Despins诉 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024)，ECF No 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n45. 起诉状，Despins诉 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（塞奇威克房地产公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [LC]\n\n46. 起诉状，Despins诉 Cirrus Design Corp.（西锐设计公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n\n第五项主张：(ST)\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 92 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 93 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 108 of 118\n\n47. 第二次修正起诉状，Despins诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS加拿大有限公司）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2024)，ECF No. 22。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n第三项主张：UPT [GSNY, LC]\n\n48. 起诉状，Despins诉 Marcum LLP（马库姆有限责任合伙企业）（关于郭文贵），Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n第五项主张：UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n附录E 所选法定条款\n\n《破产法典》条款\n\n定义\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(54) “转让”一词是指——\n\n(A) 设定留置权；\n\n(B) 保留所有权作为担保权益；\n\n(C) 对债务人赎回权衡平权益的止赎；或\n\n(D) 以任何直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的方式处置或让与——\n\n(i) 财产；或\n\n(ii) 财产权益。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n(a) 根据本法典第301、302或303条启动案件，即设立破产财产。无论位于何处或由何人持有，该破产财产由下列全部财产构成：\n\n(1) 除本条(b)款和(c)(2)项另有规定外，债务人在案件启动时对财产享有的所有法定或衡平权益。\n\n撤销条款\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) 除第(2)项另有规定外，受托人可以撤销债务人就财产所享有权益作出的任何转让，或债务人承担的任何义务，只要该等转让或义务依适用法律可由持有本法典第502条允许的无担保债权，或者仅因本法典第502(e)条而不被允许的无担保债权的债权人撤销。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 94 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 95 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 110 of 118\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) 如债务人自愿或非自愿地有下列情形，受托人可以撤销债务人在提交申请之日前2年内或该日当日作出的、就债务人财产权益作出的任何转让（包括根据雇佣合同向内部人作出或为内部人利益作出的任何转让），或债务人承担的任何义务（包括根据雇佣合同向内部人承担或为内部人利益承担的任何义务）——\n\n(A) 债务人作出该等转让或承担该等义务时，具有实际意图阻碍、拖延或欺诈任何实体；在该等转让作出或义务承担之日或之后，债务人曾对该实体负债或成为对该实体负债；或\n\n(B) (i) 债务人就该等转让或义务所获得的对价低于合理等值；且\n\n(ii) (I) 在作出该等转让或承担该等义务之日已资不抵债，或因该等转让或义务而变得资不抵债；\n\n(II) 债务人正在从事或即将从事某项营业或交易，而债务人留存的任何财产构成不合理地不足的资本；\n\n(III) 债务人意图承担，或相信其将承担，到期时将超出其偿付能力的债务；或\n\n(IV) 债务人根据雇佣合同，向内部人或为内部人利益作出该等转让，或向内部人或为内部人利益承担该等义务，且该等行为并非在正常业务过程中作出。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) 除本条(b)款或(c)款另有规定外，受托人可以撤销对破产财产作出的转让——\n\n(1) 该转让发生于案件启动之后；且\n\n(2) (A) 该转让仅依据本法典第303(f)条或第542(c)条获得授权；或\n\n(B) 该转让未经本法典或法院授权。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4228-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:53:23 Page 96 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-3 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 111 of 118\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 95 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) 除本节另有规定外，就根据本法典第544、545、547、548、549、553(b)或724(a)条被撤销的转让而言，受托人可为破产财团的利益，从下列主体处追回已转让的财产，或者，如法院如此命令，追回该等财产的价值——\n\n(1) 该转让的初始受让人，或者为该转让利益而作出的实体；或者\n\n(2) 该初始受让人的任何直接或间接受让人。\n\n纽约统一可撤销交易法（NYUVTA）规定\n\n定义\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) “资产”是指债务人的财产，但该术语不包括：\n\n(1) 在受有效留置权负担的范围内的财产；\n\n(2) 在非破产法下通常可获豁免的范围内的财产；或者\n\n(3) 以整体租赁方式持有的财产权益，但仅限于该权益不受仅对其中一名承租人享有债权的债权人执行程序约束的范围内。\n\n. . .\n\n(f) “债务人”是指对某项债权负有责任的人。\n\n. . .\n\n(p) “转让”是指以任何直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的方式处置或让与资产或资产权益，包括支付金钱、解除、租赁、许可，以及设定留置权或其他负担。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 97 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 112 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 96 页，共 102 页\n\n撤销规定\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) 债务人作出的转让或承担的义务，如债务人具有下列情形之一，则无论债权人的债权是在该转让作出或该义务承担之前或之后产生，该转让或义务均可由债权人撤销：\n\n(1) 具有阻碍、拖延或欺诈债务人任何债权人的实际意图而作出该转让或承担该义务；或者\n\n(2) 未就该转让或义务获得合理等值的对价，且债务人：\n\n(i) 正在从事或即将从事某项业务或交易，而债务人剩余资产相对于该业务或交易而言不合理地过少；或者\n\n(ii) 意图承担，或者相信或合理地应当相信债务人将承担超过债务人到期偿付能力的债务。\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) 如债务人在未就该转让或义务获得合理等值对价的情况下作出转让或承担义务，且债务人在当时无力清偿债务，或者因该转让或义务而变得无力清偿债务，则对于债权在该转让作出或该义务作出或承担之前产生的债权人，该转让或义务可予撤销。\n\n(b) 如债务人向内部人就既存债务作出转让，债务人在当时无力清偿债务，且该内部人有合理理由相信债务人无力清偿债务，则对于债权在该转让作出之前产生的债权人，该转让可予撤销。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 97 页，共 102 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 98 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 113 页，共 118 页\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) 在根据本条就转让或义务寻求救济的诉讼中，债权人可在遵守本条第277节所规定限制的前提下，获得：\n\n(1) 在清偿债权人债权所必需的范围内撤销该转让或义务；\n\n(2) 如适用法律允许，对已转让资产或受让人的其他财产采取扣押或其他临时救济；以及\n\n(3) 在遵循衡平原则并依照适用民事诉讼规则的前提下：\n\n(i) 禁止债务人、受让人或二者进一步处分已转让资产或其他财产的禁令；\n\n(ii) 指定接管人接管已转让资产或受让人的其他财产；或者\n\n(iii) 情况可能需要的任何其他救济。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 99 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 114 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 98 页，共 102 页\n\n附录 F 纳入的针对另我实体的起诉状\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）（“Golden Spring”）\n\n纳入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins（德斯平斯）诉 Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd.（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）（Kwok（郭文贵）案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05018 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，July 25, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n被指称的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我实体。第二项请求：对该实体及/或其资产的受益所有权。第三项请求：撤销及追回实际欺诈性转让。\n\n处理结果：准许缺席判决动议的命令，Despins 诉 Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd.（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05018 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，Dec. 4, 2023），ECF No. 35。\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）\n\n纳入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05023 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，Oct. 26, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n被指称的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我实体（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项请求：对 Lamp Capital LLC 及/或其资产的受益所有权。第三项请求：另我实体（Hudson Diamond NY LLC〔哈德逊钻石纽约有限责任公司〕）。第四项请求：对 Hudson Diamond NY LLC 及/或其资产的受益所有权。第五项请求：另我实体（Leading Shine NY Ltd.〔领耀纽约有限公司〕）。第六项请求：对 Leading Shine NY Ltd.及/或其资产的受益所有权。\n\n处理结果：缺席判决，Despins 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（Kwok 案），案件编号 22- 50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05023 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，Feb. 1, 2024），ECF No. 66。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 100 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 115 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 99 页，共 102 页\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）\n\n纳入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（HCHK科技公司）（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，June 8, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n被指称的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我实体。第二项请求：对该实体及/或其资产的受益所有权。第三项请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：经修订的缺席判决及永久禁令，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，June 24, 2024），ECF No. 297。\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）\n\n纳入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，June 8, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n被指称的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我实体。第二项请求：对该实体及/或其资产的受益所有权。第三项请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：经修订的缺席判决及永久禁令，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，June 24, 2024），ECF No. 297。\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事公司）\n\n纳入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，June 8, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n被指称的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我实体。第二项请求：对该实体及/或其资产的受益所有权。第三项请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：经修订的缺席判决及永久禁令，Despins 诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，June 24, 2024），ECF No. 297。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 101 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 116 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 100 页，共 102 页\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）\n\n纳入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05005 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，Mar. 27, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n被指称的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我实体。第二项请求：对该实体的受益所有权。\n\n处理结果：简易判决，Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05005 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，July 2, 2024），ECF No. 134。\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.（领耀纽约有限公司）\n\n纳入的起诉状：起诉状，Despins 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（Kwok 案），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 23-05023 (JAM)（康涅狄格地区破产法院，Oct. 26, 2023），ECF No. 1。\n\n被指称的设立州：Delaware。第一项请求：另我实体（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项请求：对 Lamp Capital LLC 及/或其资产的受益所有权。第三项请求：另我实体（Hudson Diamond NY LLC）。第四项请求：对 Hudson Diamond NY LLC 及/或其资产的受益所有权。第五项请求：另我实体（Leading Shine NY Ltd.）。第六项请求：对 Leading Shine NY Ltd.及/或其资产的受益所有权。\n\n处理结果：待决。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 102 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 117 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 101 页，共 102 页\n\n对抗程序编号 动议 ECF 提交 异议 ECF 提交 答复 ECF 提交\n\n24-05056\nDespins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（FFP〔BVI〕有限公司） 17 8/12/24 20 10/11/24 22 11/11/24\n\n24-05110 19 5/24/24 23 7/23/24 24 8/22/24\nDespins 诉 Mitchell（米切尔）\n\n24-05134\nDespins 诉 V.X. Cerda（V.X. 塞尔达）& Assocs. P.A. 16 6/5/24 20 8/5/24 21 9/3/24\n\n24-05135\nDespins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（自由喷气机管理公司） 19 6/20/24 24 9/16/24 27 10/16/24\n\n24-05168\nDespins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所专业有限责任公司） 15 5/29/24 19 7/29/24 20 8/28/24\n\n24-05186\nDespins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（伯克利罗有限公司） 35 10/12/24 42 12/11/24 51 1/10/25\n\n24-05188\nDespins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔律师事务所专业有限责任公司） 11 4/22/24 17 6/21/24 27 8/2/24\n\n24-05199\nDespins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司） 21 5/24/24 26 7/23/24 27 8/22/24\n\n24-05204\nDespins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（G4S安保系统〔香港〕有限公司） 19 8/22/24 23 10/21/24 25 11/20/24\n\n24-05208\nDespins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司） 17 8/2/24 21 9/6/24 22 9/20/24\n\n24-05226\nDespins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（ACASS加拿大有限公司） 26 9/12/24 33 11/12/24 41 12/20/24\n\n附录 G 非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议的书面陈述\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4228-1 提交于 03/18/25 登记于 03/18/25 23:53:23 第 103 页，共 103 页 案件 22-50073 文件 4235-3 提交于 03/19/25 登记于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 118 页，共 118 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 登记于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 102 页，共 102 页\n\n附录 H 转让图示\n\n被指称的转让形式：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（共同被告） （通过另我实体 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n共同被告对转让形式的解释：\n\n*A（个人债务人） = B（另我实体） C（共同被告） （*另我实体认定） （转让 B 的财产）","key_entities":["Despins","Kwok","HCHK","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Guo","Paul Hastings","Geyer"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":11,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":15,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":16,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":17,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":18,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":20,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":21,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":22,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":23,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":24,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":28,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":30,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":32,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":35,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":61,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":63,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":66,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":67,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":134,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":297,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2532,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2578,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3163,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3511,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3577,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3848,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3857,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4189,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4228,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":35097,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-03-18 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-03-18","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:54:51"}