{"id":"court_ctb_4338_14","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4338,"sub_number":14,"doc_type":"JUDGMENT","filed_date":null,"title":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) Neutral Citation Number: [2023] EWHC 801 (Comm)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\nNeutral Citation Number: [2023] EWHC 801 (Comm)\n\nCase No: CL-2021-000556\n\n### **IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)**\n\nRoyal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL\n\nDate: 05/04/2023\n\n**Before**:\n\n**Peter MacDonald Eggers KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)**\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n\n**Between:**\n\n**DR MARKUS BOETTCHER**\n\n**Claimant**\n\n**- and -**\n\n**(1) XIO (UK) LLP (in liquidation) (2) CARSTEN GEYER (3) JOSEPH PACINI (4) ATHENE LI (5) MURPHY QIAO**\n\n**Defendants**\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n\n**William Day and Anca Bunda** (instructed by **Stewarts Law LLP**) for the **Claimant Paul Lowenstein KC and Maria Kennedy** (instructed by **Willkie Farr & Gallagher (UK) LLP**) for the **Second and Third Defendants**\n\nHearing date: 1st and 2nd February 2023\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n\n**Approved Judgment**\n\n## **I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic**.\n\n#### ............................. PETER MACDONALD EGGERS KC\n\nThis judgment was handed down by the judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and released to The National Archives. The date and time for handdown is deemed to be 5 April 2023 at 10:00am\n\n## **Peter MacDonald Eggers KC:**\n\n#### **Introduction**\n\n- 1. On 1st October 2021, the Claimant, Dr Boettcher, served a Claim Form in these proceedings within the jurisdiction on the Defendants, including the Second Defendant (Mr Geyer) and the Third Defendant (Mr Pacini). Dr Boettcher claims damages for misrepresentations allegedly made to induce him to enter into a contract of employment with the First Defendant (\"Xio UK\"). The claim is made in deceit, under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and for breach of a duty of care.\n- 2. On 19th October 2021, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini both acknowledged service and indicated that they intended to contest jurisdiction. On 26th October 2021, Waksman, J made an order permitting Dr Boettcher (on his without notice application) to serve the proceedings on Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini outside the jurisdiction.\n- 3. Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini dispute that the Court has or should exercise jurisdiction over Dr Boettcher's claims against them.\n\n# **The Parties**\n\n- 4. Dr Boettcher was employed by Xio UK as the \"*Global Head of Value Creation*\" from 1st January 2016 to 31st October 2016. Xio UK was the UK arm of the Xio Group, a global alternative investments firm, which was described as being headquartered in London, with operations in Germany, Switzerland, Hong Kong and China.\n- 5. The Claimant has commenced the present proceedings against Xio UK and four individuals all of whom had significant roles within Xio UK or the Xio Group being senior executives or partners.\n\t- (1) The Second Defendant (Mr Carsten Geyer) was Head of Europe and is a German national and has residency in Switzerland.\n\t- (2) The Third Defendant (Mr Joseph Pacini) was the Chief Executive Officer and is an Italian national.\n\t- (3) The Fourth Defendant (Ms Athene Li) was Chairperson and is a Chinese national resident in the People's Republic of China. Ms Li and the Claimant have agreed a confidential settlement and Ms Li is no longer a defendant in these proceedings.\n- (4) The Fifth Defendant (Mr Murphy Qiao) was Head of China and is a Chinese national. Mr Qiao has not taken an active part in these proceedings to date.\n- 6. After he left Xio UK's employment, Dr Boettcher maintains that he was unemployed until 1st June 2019, when he was appointed a partner at EY-Parthenon in Germany.\n- 7. From 15th February 2021, Xio UK has been in liquidation.\n- 8. Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini are now co-managing partners at SGT Capital Group, an alternative investments firm which was founded with other former colleagues from the Xio Group. SGT Capital is registered in the Cayman Islands and operates out of Germany and Singapore.\n\n#### **The Claim**\n\n- 9. Prior to his employment with Xio UK, Dr Boettcher was until 2015 a partner at Bain & Company Germany, Inc (\"Bain\") based in Munich, Germany and had substantial experience in the private equity industry.\n- 10. From September to November 2015, Dr Boettcher negotiated for employment by Xio UK. These negotiations involved a number of meetings and conference calls. In particular,\n\t- (1) On 29th September 2015, Dr Boettcher attended a meeting at the Sheraton Hotel in Munich, where he was interviewed by the Xio Group's managing director, Mr Marcel Normann.\n\t- (2) On 20th October 2015, Dr Boettcher attended a meeting at Xio UK's offices at The Shard in London, where he was interviewed by Mr Tim Robson, who was also a managing director of the Xio Group.\n\t- (3) On 4th November 2015, Dr Boettcher attended a meeting at Maritim Hotel at Düsseldorf Airport, Germany, where he was interviewed by Mr Geyer.\n\t- (4) On 6th November 2015, Dr Boettcher attended a conference call with Ms Li. Dr Boettcher participated in the call from Germany and Ms Li participated in the call from Hong Kong or elsewhere in China.\n\t- (5) On 6th November 2015, Dr Boettcher alleges that he attended a conference call from Germany with Mr Pacini. Mr Pacini disputes this and maintains that this call was rescheduled to 17th November 2015.\n\t- (6) On 7th November 2015, Dr Boettcher attended a further conference call from Germany during which he was interviewed by Mr Qiao, who participated in the call from China.\n\t- (7) On 13th November 2015, Dr Boettcher (as alleged by him) participated in a conference call with Mr Pacini. Mr Pacini maintains that he has no recollection of this conference call and that he was in Israel at this time.\n\t- (8) On 17th November 2015, Dr Boettcher emailed Mr Pacini stating that he Dr Boettcher - could not travel to London that day because of tonsillitis and\n\nsuggested \"*that we just use the scheduled time to have a call instead to discuss next steps regarding on-boarding at Xio … during my remaining time at Bain*\". Dr Boettcher's case is that, during their call on 17 November 2015, Mr Pacini confirmed the alleged representations made during earlier meetings and calls. Mr Pacini maintains that this conference call was the rescheduled call which had been arranged to take place on 6th November 2015. It is unclear on the evidence whether Mr Pacini accepts that the call on 17 November 2015 in fact took place, but in any event he stated that he had no recollection of what was said during this call (Mr Pacini's first witness statement, paragraphs 7 and 18).\n\n- 11. Interposed within these meetings and conference calls were the following events:\n\t- (1) On 11th November 2015, Xio UK sent an offer letter to Dr Boettcher setting out the key terms of Dr Boettcher's employment (\"the Offer Letter\"). The Offer Letter provided that a further service agreement would be entered into in due course. It stated: \"*You should signify your acceptance of these terms by signing and returning to me one copy of the letter by that date*\".\n\t- (2) On 16th November 2015, at 1414 hours UTC, Dr Marcel Normann, a managing director at the Xio Group, informed other Xio partners that Dr Boettcher \"*has accepted our offer and will join starting Jan 1st 2016 as Head of Value Creation*\". Soon afterwards (at 1418 hours UTC), Dr Boettcher returned a pdf of the countersigned Offer Letter to Mr Normann on behalf of Xio UK, stating that he was very much looking forward to joining Xio UK (although the countersignature is dated 17th November 2015). That day, 16th November 2015, Dr Boettcher gave notice of his resignation from his position at Bain.\n\t- (3) On 24th November 2015, Dr Boettcher signed a separation agreement with Bain, having tendered his resignation on 16th November 2015.\n- 12. On 1st January 2016, Dr Boettcher commenced his employment with Xio UK.\n- 13. While the Offer Letter envisaged that a service agreement would be entered into by Dr Boettcher, no such service agreement was in fact agreed, although a draft service agreement had been received by Dr Boettcher in March 2016.\n- 14. On 1st October 2016, Dr Boettcher gave Xio UK notice of his resignation and his employment was terminated on 31st October 2016.\n- 15. Dr Boettcher alleges that he was induced to leave his employment at Bain in 2015 and to join Xio UK by a series of alleged misrepresentations that the Xio Group was a private equity fund with funds of committed capital under management of US\\$3 billion from a diversified investor base. Dr Boettcher's case is that these representations were false because the Xio Group was set up as a vehicle for anonymous investment by or on behalf of a single Chinese billionaire, Mr Xie Zhikun, who committed capital to the Xio Group of less than US\\$900 million. Dr Boettcher's claim for damages is based on these alleged misrepresentations.\n- 16. On 22nd December 2017, Dr Boettcher sent a letter of claim addressed only to Xio UK, setting out his claims against Xio UK, but making the allegations in substance which are now made by Dr Boettcher in the current proceedings.\n- 17. In February 2021, Xio UK was placed into creditors' voluntary liquidation.\n- 18. On 20th May 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors (Stewarts Law) wrote to the liquidators of Xio UK enclosing a draft Particulars of Claim and proof of debt.\n- 19. On 15th June 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent a letter of claim by email to Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini. The letter of claim referred to Mr Geyer's address as (1) \"*Flat 10, Savile Row, London, W1S 3PZ*\", and (2) 16 Ennismore Gardens, London SW7 1AA.\n- 20. On 16th June 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent a letter of claim to the liquidators of Xio UK, enclosing draft Particulars of Claim.\n- 21. On 18th June 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent the letter of claim to Mr Geyer at two addresses, one in Savile Row and the other in Ennismore Gardens. However, the address referred to in the letter of claim did not record the full address, including the building number, but merely stated \"*Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ*\".\n- 22. On 22nd June 2021, the letter of claim sent to \"*Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ*\" was returned with the note \"*Address incomplete*\".\n- 23. On 16th July 2021, Xio UK's solicitors informed Dr Boettcher's solicitors that they wished to engage constructively with Dr Boettcher.\n- 24. On 2nd August 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent emails to Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini inviting them to accept service by email and offering pre-action mediation.\n- 25. On 2nd September 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent a letter of claim to Mr Geyer's addresses in Germany and Switzerland. Mr Geyer has confirmed in his evidence that he received this letter of claim in Switzerland (Mr Geyer's first witness statement, paragraph 46).\n- 26. On 3rd September 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent a further letter of claim to Mr Geyer by post to Flat 10, 33 Savile Row, London, W1S 3PZ (\"33SR\").\n- 27. On 14th September 2021, having had no response from Mr Geyer, Dr Boettcher's solicitors wrote both to Mr Geyer's current business address (SGT Capital) and also to the solicitors that Mr Geyer had instructed in certain Cayman Island proceedings, enclosing the letter of claim.\n- 28. On 24th September 2021, Dr Boettcher commenced these proceedings by the issuance of a Claim Form against all of the Defendants claiming damages for deceit, under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and for breach of a duty of care. Dr Boettcher claims approximately €4,556,609 for loss of earnings as well as unquantified damages for mental distress and/or disappointment and/or damage to his reputation and professional career.\n\n#### **Service of the Proceedings**\n\n29. On 1st October 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors purported to serve the Claim Form and related documents on Mr Geyer at 33SR by way of first class post. Mr Geyer disputes that this was valid service.\n\n- 30. On the same day, 1st October 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors also served the proceedings on Mr Pacini at The Shard, Suite 1502, 32 London Bridge Street, London SE1 9SG, care of the Xio Group, pursuant to section 1140 of the Companies Act 2006 on the basis that Mr Pacini was a registered director of Henry Street Properties Limited (a dormant England registered company). Mr Pacini does not challenge that the proceedings were validly served upon him at The Shard.\n- 31. On 13th October 2021, Xio UK filed an acknowledgment of service indicating its intention to defend the claim.\n- 32. On 13th October 2021, Dr Boettcher applied to the Court without notice for permission to serve these proceedings outside the jurisdiction upon Mr Geyer at his address in Switzerland and upon Mr Pacini at his address in the United States of America (Utah).\n- 33. On 19th October 2021, both Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini filed acknowledgments of service, indicating that they intended to contest jurisdiction.\n- 34. On 26th October 2021, Waksman, J granted permission for Dr Boettcher to serve Mr Geyer in Switzerland and Mr Pacini in the United States.\n- 35. On 30th November 2021, Mr Geyer applied to set aside the service of the proceedings on him at 33SR in this jurisdiction.\n- 36. Following orders made by the Court extending the time within which applications to contest jurisdiction could be made, on 5th September 2022, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini filed their applications contesting the Court's jurisdiction and for an order to set aside the order of Waksman, J.\n\n#### **The issues arising in connection with the challenge to the Court's jurisdiction**\n\n- 37. With the very helpful assistance from the parties' counsel, the issues which arise for determination by the Court in connection with Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's applications to contest the Court's jurisdiction over the claim brought by Dr Boettcher have been clearly identified.\n- 38. With respect to the proceedings served upon Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini within the jurisdiction, the issues are as follows:\n\t- (1) Was the service of the proceedings on Mr Geyer at 33SR valid? If not, then the Court has no jurisdiction over Mr Geyer by reason of such service. If it was valid, then the following issues arise in respect of the service on Mr Geyer, as they also arise in respect of the service on Mr Pacini (who does not challenge the validity of service upon him within the jurisdiction).\n\t- (2) Are Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini entitled to challenge the Court's jurisdiction on *forum non conveniens* grounds or have they submitted to the jurisdiction by reason of a statutory waiver (pursuant to CPR rule 11(5)(b)) or a common law waiver because they did not challenge the Court's jurisdiction in time? If they have submitted to the jurisdiction, then the Court has jurisdiction and the application by Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini to contest jurisdiction must be dismissed. If, however, there has been no such waiver, then the following issues arise.\n- (3) Are Mr Geyer and/or Mr Pacini entitled to a stay of the proceedings on the grounds that there is another jurisdiction (Germany) which is clearly and distinctly more appropriate as the forum for the determination of this dispute?\n- 39. If the Court concludes that the service of the proceedings on Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini within the jurisdiction was valid and that such proceedings should not be stayed, the issues arising in connection with the service of the proceedings outside the jurisdiction do not arise. If relevant, the following issues arise with respect to the proceedings served upon Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini outside the jurisdiction:\n\t- (1) Are Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini entitled to challenge the Court's jurisdiction or have they lost the right to contest jurisdiction because they did not file a fresh acknowledgment of service in accordance with CPR rule 11(2) after service of the proceedings outside the jurisdiction? If they have lost the right to challenge the Court's jurisdiction, then the Court has jurisdiction and the application by Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini to contest jurisdiction must be dismissed. If, however, they have not lost the right to contest the Court's jurisdiction, then the following issues arise.\n\t- (2) Can Dr Boettcher establish that there is a good arguable case that the relevant jurisdictional gateways have been satisfied pursuant to CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1 having regard to whether:\n\t\t- (a) Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini are necessary or proper parties (para. 3.1(3))? and/or\n\t\t- (b) The damage alleged to have been suffered by Dr Boettcher was sustained within the jurisdiction or resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction (para. 3.1(9))?\n\nIf the jurisdictional gateways are not satisfied, then the application to contest jurisdiction must be allowed.\n\n- (3) Can Dr Boettcher demonstrate that he has a real as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success on the claim (*i.e.* is there a serious issue to be tried)?\n- (4) If the jurisdiction gateways are met, is England the proper place in which to bring the claim (CPR rule 6.37(3)) or is Germany the appropriate forum for the determination of this dispute? If England is not the proper place in which to bring the claim, the application to contest jurisdiction must be allowed.\n- (5) If England is the proper place in which to bring the claim, should the Court's permission to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction be set aside by reason of an alleged breach by Dr Boettcher of the duty of full and frank disclosure which rests on the applicant when such permission is sought on a without notice basis?\n- 40. I shall consider each of these issues in turn.\n- 41. It is worth noting that insofar as a good arguable case must be established, the meaning of good arguable case has been clarified by the Supreme Court in *Four Seasons Holdings Inc v Brownlie* [2017] UKSC 80; [2018] 1 WLR 192, para. 7 and by the Court\n\nof Appeal in *Kaefer Aislamientos SA de CV v AMS Drilling Mexico SA de CV* [2019] EWCA Civ 10; [2019] 1 WLR 3514, para. 72-80, and entails the following requirements:\n\n- (1) The claimant must supply a plausible evidential basis for his or her position.\n- (2) If there is a dispute of fact about or some other reason for doubting the claimant's position, the Court must take a view on the material available if it can reliably do so.\n- (3) However, if the nature of the issue and limitations of an interlocutory application are such that no reliable assessment can be made, the good arguable case threshold is met by the plausible evidential basis even if it is contested. In this respect, where evidence is provided at an interlocutory hearing in the form of witness statements, such evidence generally should not be disbelieved unless it is incontrovertibly or manifestly wrong (*Kireeva v Bedzhamov* [2022] EWCA Civ 35; [2022] 3 WLR 1253, para. 34). Where, therefore, there is conflicting evidence provided by different witnesses, either that evidence is to be reconciled or, if it cannot be reconciled, the claimant's evidence is to be accepted for the purposes of the determination to be made at the interlocutory hearing, assuming it is plausible.\n\n## **Service within the jurisdiction**\n\n- 42. There is no dispute that the service of the proceedings on Mr Pacini at The Shard was valid. However, an issue arises as to the validity of the service of the proceedings on Mr Geyer at 33SR.\n- 43. Both Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini seek a stay of the proceedings on the grounds that Germany is clearly and distinctly more appropriate than England as the forum for the determination of this dispute.\n- (1) Validity of service on Mr Geyer at 33SR\n- 44. CPR rule 6.9(2) provides that the Claim Form must be served on an individual at his or her \"*Usual or last known residence*\".\n- 45. However, CPR rule 6.9(3) provides that \"*Where a claimant has reason to believe that the address of the defendant referred to in [CPR rule 6.9(2)] is an address at which the defendant no longer resides …, the claimant must take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant's current residence … ('current address')*\".\n- 46. CPR rules 6.9(4)-(6) then set out what the claimant may and must do upon taking such reasonable steps:\n\t- (1) If the claimant ascertains the defendant's current address, the Claim Form must be served at that address (CPR rule 6.9(4)(a)).\n\t- (2) If the claimant is unable to ascertain the defendant's current address, the claimant must consider whether there is (i) an alternative place where; or (ii) an alternative method by which, service may be effected (CPR rule 6.9(4)(b)). If\n\nthere is such a place or method, the claimant must make an application under CPR rule 6.15 (CPR rule 6.9(5)).\n\n- (3) If the claimant cannot ascertain the defendant's current residence and cannot ascertain an alternative place or an alternative method, the claimant may serve on the defendant's usual or last known residence in accordance with CPR rule 6.9(2) (CPR rule 6.9(6)).\n- 47. In this case, Dr Boettcher purported to serve the proceedings on Mr Geyer within the jurisdiction at 33SR on 1st October 2021. Mr Geyer's evidence (paragraph 8 of his first witness statement) and the evidence of his then solicitor, Ms Lydia Danon (her first witness statement, at paragraphs 33-36), is that Mr Geyer ceased to reside at 33SR from 31st January 2018 and surrendered his lease of the flat on 31st March 2018 (which lease was due to expire on 11th September 2018). Although Dr Boettcher does not admit this evidence, other than the evidence referred to below, there is no evidence contradicting it. Furthermore, Swiss residence cards and official correspondence evidence Mr Geyer's residence in Switzerland from on or around 1st March 2021 (Ms Danon's second witness statement, paragraph 18). Accordingly, 33SR was not Mr Geyer's usual residence.\n- 48. Mr William Day, who appeared with Ms Anca Bunda on behalf of Dr Boettcher, however, does not put his case on the basis that 33SR was Mr Geyer's usual residence, but that instead it was his last known residence.\n- 49. I was referred to a number of authorities which address the concept of \"*last known residence*\", in particular *Mersey Docks Property Holdings v Kilgour* [2004] EWHC 1638 (TCC), para. 62-64; *Marshall v Maggs* [2006] EWCA Civ 20; [2006] 1 WLR 1945, para. 66, 68 and 71; *Relfo Ltd (in liquidation) v Varsani* [2009] EWHC 2297 (Ch), para. 20 and 34; *Ivanchev v Velli* [2020] EWHC 1917 (QB), para. 36-38. Based on these authorities, the following observations may be made about the concept of the defendant's last known residence in order to test the validity of service at that address:\n\t- (1) The claimant must establish that there is a good arguable case that the address at which service was effected was the defendant's last known residence. This means that, on the evidence available, the claimant has the better of the argument on this issue than the defendant.\n\t- (2) The defendant's last known residence need not be the defendant's usual residence.\n\t- (3) The defendant may have more than one last known residence.\n\t- (4) The defendant's last known residence may be a residence at which the defendant is residing or no longer resides (having once resided there) at the time of the purported service of process. It cannot be an address at which the defendant never resided.\n\t- (5) Knowledge of the defendant's residence in this context refers to the claimant's actual knowledge or constructive knowledge, *i.e.* knowledge which the claimant could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. An honest or even\n\nreasonable belief is not sufficient if the defendant never resided at the relevant address.\n\n- (6) The claimant's state of knowledge is to be assessed as at the date on which the proceedings were served at the address in question.\n- 50. With these principles in mind, I turn to the evidence in connection with Dr Boettcher's case that 33SR was Mr Geyer's last known residence and Dr Boettcher had no reason to believe that Mr Geyer no longer resided there. Of course, Mr Geyer's evidence is that he had resided at 33SR but he ceased to reside at 33SR since January 2018.\n- 51. Mr Day on behalf of Dr Boettcher relied on the following matters:\n\t- (1) Dr Boettcher understood that Mr Geyer lived at 33SR because in December 2015 (immediately before he was due to start in his new role at Xio UK) he and Mr Geyer were to fly to Germany together and they shared a taxi from Central London (where Mr Geyer was collected at 33SR) to Heathrow Airport after the Xio Christmas party (Dr Boettcher's first witness statement, paragraph 5).\n\t- (2) After Dr Boettcher joined Xio UK in January 2016, Mr Geyer had informed him that he lived at 33SR and that it was his correct postal address and that the address had been entered into Dr Boettcher's Outlook details for Mr Geyer, although he was also aware that Mr Geyer had a property (and family) in Frankfurt (Dr Boettcher's first witness statement, paragraphs 6 and 9(i)).\n\t- (3) In February 2021, Dr Boettcher obtained, via a subscription data service, two writs of summons dated April and May 2019 from Cayman Island Court proceedings that referred to Mr Geyer. The first of these writs referred to Mr Geyer's address as \"*16 Ennismore Gardens, London SW7 1AA, United Kingdom and/or Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ, United Kingdom*\" (Dr Boettcher's first witness statement, paragraphs 7-9).\n\t- (4) On 15th June 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent a letter of claim by email to Mr Geyer. The addresses given on that letter were \"*Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ*\" and the Ennismore Gardens address. Mr Geyer must have received the letter of claim because there was no \"bounce-back\" or any automated response that the email address was no longer active and because, although Mr Geyer did not reply directly to Dr Boettcher's solicitors, he sent a text to a mutual contact at EY (where Dr Boettcher has worked since June 2019) with a message to pass on to Dr Boettcher; Dr Boettcher told the mutual contact that this was a matter between him and Mr Geyer and he did not want to get EY involved (the first witness statement of Ms Lorraine Lanceley, of Stewarts Law, at paragraph 25). Mr Geyer did not state that he no longer resided at 33SR. The letter of claim was sent by post to \"*Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ*\" (*i.e.*  without the building or street number) on 18th June 2021, but was returned on 22nd June 2021, because the address was incomplete.\n\t- (5) On 2nd August 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors (Stewarts Law) sent an email to Mr Geyer, referring to the letter of 15th June 2021, inviting him to accept service of proceedings by email and offering pre-action mediation. Stewarts Law stated that they have \"*made the reasonable assumption that you have safely*\n\n*received and considered the Letter of Claim* …\". In that email, a request was made that Mr Geyer \"*confirm your preferred postal address at your earliest convenience. This information is required for the purposes of formal service of our client's claim*\". Mr Geyer did not respond to this letter nor informed Dr Boettcher's solicitors that he no longer resided at 33SR (Ms Lanceley's first witness statement, para. 35).\n\n- (6) On 3rd September 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors sent a further letter of claim to Mr Geyer by Royal Mail Special Delivery to 33SR, because the letter of claim sent on 18th June 2021 had been returned marked \"*Address incomplete*\". This letter of claim was successfully delivered, because it was not returned and delivery was confirmed by the Royal Mail tracking information (Ms Lanceley's second witness statement, paragraphs 11, 15-16).\n- (7) On 14th September 2021, having had no response from Mr Geyer, Dr Boettcher's solicitors wrote both to Mr Geyer's current business address (SGT Capital) and also to the solicitors that Mr Geyer had instructed in the Cayman Island proceedings, enclosing the letter of claim, noting that correspondence was being sent to 33SR, and requesting acknowledgment of receipt. Mr Geyer did not respond to that letter.\n- (8) During September 2021, Dr Boettcher engaged a private investigation firm (Phoenix Consultancy), who identified non-specific connections in data sources from September 2014 to September 2021, with a \"*confirmed connection*\" on 6th June 2021 (Ms Lanceley's second witness statement, paragraph 23).\n- (9) On 21st September 2021, a search also suggested that SGT Capital (Mr Geyer's employer) had a presence at serviced offices in Stratton Street, Mayfair, a short walk from 33SR (Ms Lanceley's second witness statement, paragraph 25).\n- (10) Importantly, also on 21st September 2021, a senior paralegal at Stewarts Law (Dr Boettcher's solicitors), Ms Aarti Chadda, gave evidence that she obtained the telephone number for the porter at 33SR from an estate agency, she telephoned the porter's desk at 33SR (a call which lasted about one minute), and the porter on duty confirmed that Ms Geyer rented Flat 10, that he was \"*often seen coming and going*\", and that any letter sent to Mr Geyer by Royal Mail would have been placed in the post box for that flat (Ms Chadda's first witness statement, paragraphs 14-20).\n- (11) On 1st October 2021, Dr Boettcher's solicitors purported to serve the Claim Form and related documents on Mr Geyer at 33SR by way of first class post; these documents were not returned (Ms Lanceley's second witness statement, paragraph 26).\n- 52. Mr Day therefore submitted that:\n\t- (1) There is at least a plausible evidential case (if not significantly more than a plausible case) that Dr Boettcher served the proceedings at the place that he actually understood to be Mr Geyer's last known residence within the meaning of CPR rule 6.9(2), and he undertook more than reasonable diligence when seeking to verify that understanding.\n- (2) Dr Boettcher had received no information which contradicted his understanding of what was Mr Geyer's last known residence. Therefore, Dr Boettcher had no reason to believe that Mr Geyer no longer resided at 33SR.\n- (3) Dr Boettcher, by his solicitors, attempted to contact Mr Geyer on a number of occasions, and sought confirmation of his preferred address for the service of process, and while it is likely that Mr Geyer received this correspondence, he did not reply directly to Dr Boettcher or his solicitors and did not correct any mistake as to his residence.\n- 53. Mr Paul Lowenstein KC, who appeared with Ms Maria Kennedy on behalf of Mr Geyer (and Mr Pacini), submitted that there was no valid service of the Claim Form and the Particulars of Claim within the jurisdiction because 33SR was not Mr Geyer's \"*usual or last known residence*\". Mr Lowenstein KC contended that 33SR was not Mr Geyer's last known residence, because:\n\t- (1) Even on Dr Boettcher's own evidence, 33SR was not Mr Geyer's last known residence:\n\t\t- (a) After the letter of claim was returned to Dr Boettcher on 22nd June 2021 because the address was incomplete, Dr Boettcher did not then persist with service in London, but instead on 26th July 2021 submitted a request to Frankfurt City Hall for Mr Geyer's registered address in Frankfurt and was sent confirmation the next day that Mr Geyer had an address at Hansaalee 7, 60322, Frankfurt am Main, Germany (Dr Boettcher's first witness statement, paragraph 21; Ms Lanceley's second witness statement, paragraph 12). Dr Boettcher sent the letter of claim to Mr Geyer at the Frankfurt address (Dr Boettcher's first witness statement, paragraph 21).\n\t\t- (b) On 29th and 30th August 2021, Dr Boettcher identified a further address for Mr Geyer in Wilen bei Wollerau, Switzerland from about 1st March 2021 and arranged to have the letter of claim sent to Mr Geyer to the Swiss address (Dr Boettcher's first witness statement, paragraph 22 and 24).\n\t\t- (c) By no later than late August/early September 2021, Dr Boettcher knew that Mr Geyer resided in Switzerland, having previously resided in Germany, Mr Geyer did not reside at 33SR and thus 33SR was not Mr Geyer's usual or last known residence.\n\t\t- (d) When, on 1st October 2021, Dr Boettcher purported to serve the proceedings on Mr Geyer at 33SR (which documents were also forwarded by email), Mr Geyer responded on 8th October 2021 to say that he did not live at 33SR, he was resident in Switzerland and not in the United Kingdom and had not provided Dr Boettcher with an address for service in the United Kingdom. Mr Geyer repeated that he did not live at 33SR on 16th October 2021 and subsequently (Ms Danon's first witness statement, paragraphs 18 and 22; Ms Lanceley's second witness statement, paragraph 27).\n- (2) The Cayman Islands writ of summons dated 8th April 2019 relied on by Dr Boettcher as evidence of his knowledge of Mr Geyer's residence provides no evidential basis to establish that 33SR was Mr Geyer's usual or last known residence because:\n\t- (a) It was two and a half years old by the time Dr Boettcher purported to serve process at 33SR.\n\t- (b) It was not prepared by Mr Geyer, but by a law firm acting for the plaintiff in the Cayman Islands proceedings.\n\t- (c) It provides two possible addresses for Mr Geyer: (i) \"*Flat 10 Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ*\", which is incomplete lacking the building number and (ii) 16 Ennismore Gardens, London SW7 1AA.\n\t- (d) A later writ of summons in different Cayman Islands proceedings dated 8th May 2019 gives Mr Geyer's address only as that at Ennismore Gardens.\n\t- (e) The address at Ennismore Gardens was the address which Mr Geyer had provided in his affidavits filed in the Cayman Islands proceedings in June 2019 (Ms Danon's first witness statement, paragraph 44.2).\n- (3) As to Ms Chadda's evidence of her conversation with the porter at 33SR:\n\t- (a) On 20th October 2021, Mr Geyer's former solicitor (Ms Danon of Cooke Young & Keidan) spoke to the porter (named \"*Hassam*\") who checked his computer and confirmed that he was, in fact, on duty in the building at 33SR on 3rd and 21st September 2021. The porter confirmed that he would not have accepted a document on behalf of Mr Geyer because he was not resident at 33SR at that time, he did not recall any conversation with anyone on 21st September 2021 concerning Mr Geyer's residency at 33SR and that he was \"*doubtful*\" that any conversation with Stewarts Law took place, he had an up-to-date list of residents in the building and knew that Mr Geyer was not one of them (Ms Danon's first witness statement, paragraph 53).\n\t- (b) There are a number of gaps in Ms Chadda's evidence about her telephone conversation with the porter at 33SR, including the name of the porter, confirmation that the person with whom she spoke was the porter on duty, the telephone number she used to call the porter, the words used in her conversation and the questions put to the porter (Ms Danon's first witness statement, paragraphs 55-57).\n\t- (c) Ms Chadda's evidence does not establish that Dr Boettcher has the better of the argument as to Mr Geyer's last known residence.\n- (4) The evidence that 33SR was a short distance from the offices of SGT Capital provides no support for any conclusion that Mr Geyer resided at 33SR. Further, Mr Geyer has confirmed that SGT Capital has no office in Mayfair or indeed England (Mr Geyer's first witness statement, paragraph 44.1).\n- (5) The report by Phoenix Consultancy does not identify the instructions given by Dr Boettcher and further was produced in January 2022 three months after the purported service took place (Mr Geyer's first witness statement, paragraphs 50.1-50.3).\n- (6) Dr Boettcher therefore had good reason to believe that Mr Geyer's last known residence was in Switzerland and not in London.\n- (7) Alternatively, to the extent that the evidence of what was Mr Geyer's last known residence was inconclusive, it was open to Dr Boettcher to apply to the Court to undertake service by an alternative method, such as by email in accordance with CPR rules 6.9(4)-(5) and 6.15, but no such application was made.\n- (8) On any view, purported service on Mr Geyer at 33SR on 1st October 2021 was not good service on him.\n- 54. In my judgment, the evidence establishes a good arguable case that 33SR was Mr Geyer's last known residence, as far as Dr Boettcher was aware or ought to have been aware by the exercise of reasonable diligence, within the meaning of CPR rule 6.9(2) for the following reasons.\n- 55. First, Mr Geyer had resided at 33SR until January 2018 and Dr Boettcher had been informed by Mr Geyer, whilst Dr Boettcher worked at Xio UK, that he lived at 33SR but also had a property (and family) in Germany. However, it appears that Mr Geyer did not then reside in Germany (Mr Geyer's first witness statement, paragraph 46).\n- 56. Second, Dr Boettcher made a number of inquiries, by means of contacting Mr Geyer directly, the use of a private investigation consultant, obtaining information about Mr Geyer's address in Germany and Switzerland, and instructing his solicitors to make enquiries with the porter at 33SR. Those inquiries revealed that Mr Geyer still had a residence at 33SR, even if that was not accurate, and also had a residence in Germany and/or Switzerland. The only evidence which Dr Boettcher obtained which might be said to indicate that Mr Geyer no longer resided at 33SR was the evidence that Mr Geyer now had a residence in Switzerland. However, the fact that Mr Geyer had multiple residences is not a reason why 33SR could not be a last known, or even a usual, residence (*Relfo Ltd (in liquidation) v Varsani* [2009] EWHC 2297 (Ch), para. 34).\n- 57. CPR rule 6.9(5) applies only if Dr Boettcher had reason to believe that Mr Geyer no longer resided at 33SR. However, Dr Boettcher's inquiries did not give him reason to believe that Mr Geyer no longer resided at 33SR, especially having regard to the third and fourth reasons below.\n- 58. Third, a critical step in Dr Boettcher's conclusion that 33SR was Mr Geyer's last known residence is the conversation between Ms Chadda and the porter at 33SR. It is fair to say that this was a short telephone conversation, but the contents of the conversation reinforced, rather than contradicted, the conclusion that Mr Geyer continued to reside at 33SR. Ms Chadda's evidence was of course inconsistent with the evidence of Ms Danon's evidence of her own conversation with the porter at 33SR, assuming it was the same person (Ms Danon's conversation of course took place after service). I am not in a position to decide which of these accounts is to be preferred, assuming that there is an inconsistency. In my judgment, Ms Chadda's evidence affords a plausible basis on\n\nwhich to conclude that Dr Boettcher had no reason to conclude that Mr Geyer was no longer resident at 33SR and that any conflict in the evidence cannot be resolved for the purposes of this application.\n\n- 59. Fourth, Dr Boettcher through his solicitors had sent letters of claim to Mr Geyer by email which included 33SR (or \"*Flat 10, Savile Row, London, W1S 3PZ*\") as his identified address. The evidence suggests that Mr Geyer had received these letters of claim (and there is no evidence to suggest that Mr Geyer did not receive these letters of claim) but took no steps to inform Dr Boettcher or his solicitors that he no longer resided at 33SR, even though in one of the emails sent by Dr Boettcher's solicitors, Mr Geyer was asked to identify his preferred address for service. Dr Boettcher is entitled to rely on Mr Geyer's failure to correct any impression that Dr Boettcher had that 33SR was Mr Geyer's last known residence.\n- 60. Of course, Dr Boettcher became aware soon after the purported service of the Claim Form on Mr Geyer at 33SR on 1st October 2021 that Mr Geyer's position was that he was no longer resident at 33SR (Ms Lanceley's second witness statement, paragraph 27). That is of course irrelevant as the question whether 33SR was Mr Geyer's last known residence is to be determined as at the date of service (1st October 2021).\n- 61. Therefore, in my judgment, the service of the proceedings on Mr Geyer was valid service in accordance with CPR rule 6.9.\n- 62. However, the question arises whether the Court should accede to a stay of the proceedings on the grounds that there is a more appropriate forum than England for the determination of this dispute. Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini - who were validly served with process in England - apply for such a stay.\n- (2) Have Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini submitted to the jurisdiction?\n- 63. Dr Boettcher contends that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have submitted to the jurisdiction and are therefore precluded from applying for a stay of the proceedings on *forum non conveniens* grounds.\n- 64. On 19th October 2021, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini each filed an acknowledgment of service in respect of the proceedings served on them within the jurisdiction. In their acknowledgments of service, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini indicated that they intended to contest jurisdiction. Pursuant to CPR rule 58.7(2), any application to contest jurisdiction had to be filed within 28 days of the acknowledgment of service, *i.e.* by 16th November 2021.\n- 65. On 26th October 2021, Waksman, J made an order allowing Dr Boettcher's application to serve proceedings on Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini outside the jurisdiction.\n- 66. On 10th November 2021, Cooke Young & Keidan on behalf of Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini wrote to Dr Boettcher's solicitors (Stewarts Law) indicating that they intended to challenge \"*domestic service*\" and to seek to set aside the order of Waksman, J.\n- 67. On 14th November 2021, by separate letters, Dr Boettcher's solicitors (Stewarts Law) wrote to Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's solicitors (Cooke Young & Keidan) inviting them to agree to accept service of the proceedings by email addressed to Ms Danon in order\n\nto save the costs of service under the Hague Service Convention on the basis that this was without prejudice to Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's right to apply to set aside the Court's order dated 26th October 2021, and in exchange Dr Boettcher would agree to extend the time for the filing of any challenge to the Court's jurisdiction to 29th April 2022. In any event, Dr Boettcher was content to agree to extend the time for the making of any application to contest jurisdiction from 16th November 2021 to 30th November 2021.\n\n- 68. On 16th November 2021, Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's solicitors responded to the proposal of 14th November 2021, stating that they were considering it, and also agreed to the extension of time to 30th November 2021 for Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini to file their \"*evidence to challenge domestic service*\".\n- 69. On 18th November 2021, Mr Geyer rejected Dr Boettcher's proposal for the service of process by email, but Mr Pacini accepted Dr Boettcher's proposal.\n- 70. On 30th November 2021, Mr Geyer filed an application notice seeking an order that \"*there has not been valid service of the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim on the Second Defendant in the jurisdiction*\". The draft order accompanying the application provided that \"*This order shall not prejudice any application the Second Defendant makes under CPR Part 11 nor shall it be construed as a submission by the Second Defendant to the jurisdiction of the Court*\". The first witness statement of Ms Danon served in support of this application stated at paragraph 63 that \"*For the avoidance of doubt, this Witness Statement and the Application more generally are made without prejudice to D2's objection to the jurisdiction of the Courts of England and Wales. Nothing in this Witness Statement is intended to suggest that D2 submits to this jurisdiction. By making this Application D2 should not be regarded to have taken any step in the claims against him*\".\n- 71. On 8th December 2021, Stewarts Law on behalf of Dr Boettcher sent a letter to Mr Geyer's solicitors stating that \"*if it is established that Dr Boettcher has validly served Mr Geyer in the jurisdiction, Mr Geyer has lost his right to challenge jurisdiction*\". Stewarts Law made the same point again by email on 10th December 2021.\n- 72. On 15th December 2021, the Court made an order, with the parties' consent, extending the time within which Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini could file and serve their application to challenge jurisdiction and/or set aside the Court's order of 26th October 2021 giving permission to Dr Boettcher to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction. It is plain from the terms of the order that the extension of time was limited to preserving the parties' positions as regards the service of proceedings outside the jurisdiction, and was not concerned with the service of the proceedings on Mr Geyer at 33SR. That order expressly provided that:\n\n\"*Neither this order nor the Second or Third Defendants' consent thereto shall prejudice any application the Second or Third Defendant makes under CPR Part 11 (in respect of the Second Defendant challenging service out of the jurisdiction and save for any argument as to whether the Third Defendant could properly be served at the relevant address identified in the Order) or be construed as a submission by the Second or Third Defendant to the jurisdiction of the Court, or of acceptance by the Second Defendant of service in these proceedings*.\"\n\n73. On the same day, 15th December 2021, another order was made by the Court in respect of the dates for the filing of evidence in response to Mr Geyer's application dated 30th November 2021. That order also recorded that:\n\n> \"*Neither this order nor the Second Defendant's consent thereto shall prejudice any application the Second Defendant makes under CPR Part 11 challenging service out of the jurisdiction, or be construed as a submission by the Second Defendant to the jurisdiction of the Court, or of acceptance of service by the Second Defendant in these proceedings.*\"\n\n- 74. There followed a number of orders made by the Court with the consent of the parties extending the deadline for Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini \"*to challenge jurisdiction and/or set aside the Order of 26 October 2021*\".\n- 75. On 5th September 2022, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini issued an application notice seeking an order setting aside Waksman, J's order dated 26th October 2021 permitting service outside the jurisdiction and an order \"*Declaring that the English court has no jurisdiction to try the claim brought against either the Second or Third Defendant or that it will not exercise its jurisdiction*\".\n- 76. By reference to these matters, Mr Day on behalf of Dr Boettcher submitted that Mr Geyer had to file an application for a stay of the proceedings on *forum non conveniens* grounds by 30th November 2021, but as no such application was made by that time, Mr Geyer is \"*to be treated as having accepted that the court has jurisdiction to try the claim*\" (CPR rule 11(5)). Mr Day contended that this was a statutory submission to the jurisdiction (*Deutsche Bank AG London Branch v Petromena ASA* [2015] EWCA Civ 226; [2015] 1 WLR 4225, para. 36). Mr Day made a similar submission in respect of Mr Pacini's failure to file an application to contest the Court's jurisdiction on *forum non conveniens* grounds by 5th September 2022 in respect of the proceedings served on Mr Pacini at The Shard on 1st October 2021. In support of this argument, Mr Day relied on the following circumstances:\n\t- (1) The first occasion on which Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini purported to contest the Court's jurisdiction by seeking on *forum non conveniens* grounds a stay of the proceedings instituted by the service of the process on Mr Geyer on 1st October 2021 at 33SR was on 23rd December 2022 in the second witness statement of Mr Duncan Speller of Willkie Farr & Gallagher (UK) LLP (Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's solicitors), at paragraphs 11 and 13(a). This was after the deadlines of 30th November 2021 (in respect of Mr Geyer) and 5th September 2022 (in respect of Mr Pacini).\n\t- (2) By December 2022, however, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini had submitted to the jurisdiction pursuant to CPR rule 11(5).\n\t- (3) If necessary, Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's agreement to the order made on 15th December 2021, having been informed of the consequences of having not applied to contest the Court's jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings served on 1st October 2021 within the jurisdiction, would constitute a common law submission to jurisdiction (*Deutsche Bank AG London Branch v Petromena ASA* [2015] EWCA Civ 226; [2015] 1 WLR 4225, para. 32).\n- (4) No application has been made by Mr Geyer or Mr Pacini for the extension of time within which to make such an application to contest the Court's jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings served on them within the jurisdiction.\n- 77. I do not accept that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini submitted to the jurisdiction pursuant to CPR rule 11(5) or at common law, and were therefore precluded from applying for a stay of proceedings on *forum non conveniens* grounds, for the following related reasons.\n- 78. First, CPR rule 11(5) requires only that an application be made by the defendant to dispute the Court's jurisdiction within the time period specified in the Civil Procedure Rules, as extended by the Court. In the present case, both Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini had filed and served an application to contest the Court's jurisdiction.\n- 79. The Court's orders extending time for the filing of the applications expressly referred to an application to \"*challenge jurisdiction*\" in addition to referring to any application to set aside Waksman, J's order dated 26th October 2021. The first of the orders dated 15th December 2021 expressly provided that it did not prejudice \"*any application the Second or Third Defendant makes under CPR Part 11 (in respect of the Second Defendant challenging service out of the jurisdiction and save for any argument as to whether the Third Defendant could properly be served at the relevant address identified in the Order) or be construed as a submission by the Second or Third Defendant to the jurisdiction of the Court, or of acceptance by the Second Defendant of service in these proceedings*\". Similarly, the other order made on 15th December 2021 provided that \"*Neither this order nor the Second Defendant's consent thereto shall prejudice any application the Second Defendant makes under CPR Part 11 challenging service out of the jurisdiction, or be construed as a submission by the Second Defendant to the jurisdiction of the Court, or of acceptance of service by the Second Defendant in these proceedings*\". On my reading of these provisions, it was agreed and ordered that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were not prevented from contesting jurisdiction (save that Mr Pacini could not contest that he was validly served within the jurisdiction) and that they were not submitting to the jurisdiction.\n- 80. The applications contesting jurisdiction were lodged by Mr Geyer (on 30th November 2021 in respect of the service of process on him at 33SR) and by Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini (on 5th September 2022). It is true that the applications did not refer to seeking a stay of the proceedings on *forum non conveniens* grounds in respect of the proceedings served within the jurisdiction, but once Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini made the applications to dispute jurisdiction within the permitted time periods, it could not be said that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, I do not see how the statutory submission to jurisdiction referred to in CPR rule 11(5) could have any part to play. Similarly, I do not consider that any \"*disinterested bystander*\" with knowledge of the case would have concluded that Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's conduct amounted to unequivocal renunciation of their right to challenge the jurisdiction so as to give rise to a common law submission to jurisdiction (of the type identified by the Court of Appeal in *Deutsche Bank AG London Branch v Petromena ASA* [2015] EWCA Civ 226; [2015] 1 WLR 4225, para. 32).\n- 81. Once Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini contested jurisdiction by filing the relevant application to dispute jurisdiction in time, the fact that they later deployed additional arguments in support of their applications does not mean that they have surrendered the right to rely on such additional arguments in further support of their application as may occur to\n\nthem after the making of the applications (of course, separate considerations arise if the additional arguments arise very late in day which may prejudice the opposing parties or fall foul of the overriding objective, but there is no such suggestion in the present case).\n\n- 82. Therefore, in my judgment, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have not lost the right to contend that the Court should stay the proceedings served on the parties within the jurisdiction on *forum non conveniens* grounds.\n- (3) Is Germany the more appropriate forum?\n\n## *The law*\n\n- 83. Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini both were served with the proceedings within the jurisdiction. Accordingly, in support of their application for a stay on *forum non conveniens* grounds, it is incumbent on them to demonstrate that there is a clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum for the determination of the dispute between the parties than England. This represents the first stage in the disposal of any application by a defendant for a stay of such proceedings as laid down by the House of Lords in *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* [1987] AC 460, 476-478 (see also *VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp* [2013] UKSC 5; [2013] 2 AC 337, para. 190). This test looks to where the case should be tried \"*more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice*\" (*Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* [1987] AC 460, 474, 482- 484).\n- 84. Even if the defendant discharges this burden, it is open to the Court to refuse a stay if the claimant demonstrates that there are other factors which would entail a real risk that the claimant would be denied justice in the alternative forum. This is the second stage in the Court's consideration of the application as laid down in *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd*.\n- 85. The position was recently summarised by the Court of Appeal in *Município de Mariana v BHP Group (UK) Ltd* [2022] EWCA Civ 951, [2022] 1 WLR 4691, at para. 333:\n\n\"*The basic principles which apply where a defendant seeks a stay on forum non conveniens grounds of an action in which it has been served here as of right, were authoritatively identified in Spiliada [1987] AC 460 and Kyrgyz Mobil [2012] 1 WLR 1804. The defendant must discharge the evidential burden of satisfying the court that there is another available forum of competent jurisdiction which is clearly and distinctly more appropriate as the forum in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice: Spiliada at pp 476c, 476E, 477E. This is stage one. If the defendant satisfies the burden, the court will nevertheless refuse a stay if the claimant satisfies it, by cogent evidence, that there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires such refusal, including in particular if it is established by cogent evidence that there is a real risk that the claimant will not obtain justice in the foreign forum: Spiliada at p 478D-E, Kyrgyz Mobil at paras 91-95. This is stage two*.\"\n\n86. The first stage of this approach requires the defendant to demonstrate to the Court that there is a forum other than England which is demonstrably a more appropriate jurisdiction for the trial of the parties' dispute. The fact that the defendant has been served in the jurisdiction \"*as of right*\" is a significant consideration (Fentiman, *International Commercial Litigation* (2nd ed.) para. 13.39), but it does not mean that it will only be a rare case where a stay should be ordered; on the other hand, the stay is not one which should be lightly granted. The Court must be satisfied clearly that there is a jurisdiction other than England where the parties should have their dispute determined justly. The significance of the fact that the defendant was served within the jurisdiction is the greater where the defendant has a substantial connection with the jurisdiction, but that connection may also be more insubstantial. The depth of that connection forms part of the Court's consideration of the first stage of the *Spiliada* approach.\n\n87. In *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd*, Lord Goff said at page 477:\n\n\"*In my opinion, the burden resting on the defendant is not just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial, but to establish that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum. In this way, proper regard is paid to the fact that jurisdiction has been founded in England as of right (see MacShannon's case [1978] A.C. 795, per Lord Salmon); and there is the further advantage that, on a subject where comity is of importance, it appears that there will be a broad consensus among major common law jurisdictions. I may add that if, in any case, the connection of the defendant with the English forum is a fragile one (for example, if he is served with proceedings during a short visit to this country), it should be all the easier for him to prove that there is another clearly more appropriate forum for the trial overseas*.\"\n\n- 88. Having regard to the authorities and commentaries (which include *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* [1987] AC 460, 477-478, 481-482; *Konkola Copper Mines plc v Coromin* [2006] EWCA Civ 5; [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 437, para. 27; *VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp* [2013] UKSC 5; [2013] 2 AC 337, para. 10; *Tugushev v Orlov* [2019] EWHC 645 (Comm), para. 263-264; *Lungowe v Vedanta Resources Plc* [2019] UKSC 20; [2020] AC 1045, para. 66, 75, 82-84; Briggs, *Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments*(7th ed.), para. 22.12-22.15; *Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws* (16th ed.), para. 12.034-12.035), the factors which the Court can take into account in determining the question whether England is the more appropriate forum or another jurisdiction is the more appropriate include, but are by no means limited to:\n\t- (1) The connection between the factual elements of the dispute to the competing jurisdictions.\n\t- (2) The law governing the transaction.\n\t- (3) The location of the parties to the dispute both at the time of the events giving rise to the dispute and also during the course of the proceedings.\n\t- (4) Whether proceedings relating to the dispute between the applicant and the respondent would be fragmented by any order for or against a stay which the Court might make, and whether there would be concurrent proceedings in more than one jurisdiction, with the risk of inconsistent judgments being obtained in those jurisdictions.\n- (5) The location and availability of documentary evidence (although whether this is a material practical consideration depends on the ease with which such documents can be digitally copied and transferred and whether there are caches of documents which require review only at particular locations).\n- (6) The location and availability of witnesses (bearing in mind that this last consideration may be mitigated if evidence can or is to be given remotely consistent with the requirement of a just and fair proceeding).\n- 89. A consideration of the relevant factors will assist the Court in deciding where the warp in the litigation fabric leads to the location of the weight of the dispute, but the review of each of these factors should also be evaluated by a holistic view of the matter (*Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC 'VMZ Red October'* [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 149; Briggs, *Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments* (7th ed.), para. 22.17).\n- 90. Even if the dimensions and weight of a case indicate, clearly, that the dispute should be determined in a jurisdiction other than England, the Court might still refuse a stay if there is a real risk that any of the parties would not be justly dealt with or if the dispute would not be justly dealt with in that other jurisdiction, meaning in either case that there is a real risk of a substantial injustice in the other forum. This second stage enquiry goes beyond, although may well include, consideration of the factors which connect the dispute with that other jurisdiction (*Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws* (16th ed.), para. 12-041). This inquiry is not concerned with a mere difference of approach, whether as a matter of procedure or substantive law, without more, to the resolution of a dispute. This may involve consideration whether the claimant would be unjustly deprived of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage if the stay were ordered (*Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* [1987] AC 460, 482-484).\n\n# *The application of the law*\n\n- 91. Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's case is that Germany is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum for the resolution of the current dispute.\n- 92. Mr Lowenstein KC on behalf of Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini submitted that England is not, and Germany is, clearly or distinctly the most appropriate forum because:\n\t- (1) None of the participating parties is based in England.\n\t- (2) The alleged damage was suffered in Germany, not England.\n\t- (3) None of the alleged representations made by Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini is said to have been made in England. It is not alleged that Mr Geyer made any of the precontractual representations in or from England; Mr Geyer's and Dr Boettcher's only material interaction was at Dusseldorf Airport. It is alleged that Mr Pacini attended a conference call from England on 6th November 2015, but this was according to Mr Pacini - postponed. In fact, Dr Boettcher attended all relevant meetings and conference calls from Germany, with the exception of a meeting at The Shard with Mr Robson (who is not a defendant in these proceedings) on 20th October 2015.\n- (4) It is alleged that Mr Pacini made the relevant representations on three occasions on 6th, 13th and 17th November 2015, but none of these representations can be actionable in that:\n\t- (a) The alleged call on 6th November 2015 was postponed to 17th November 2015 (Mr Pacini's first witness statement, paragraphs 7-11 and 13; Mr Pacini's second witness statement, paragraphs 6-9, 11), although this is disputed by Dr Boettcher (Dr Boettcher's second witness statement, paragraphs 7-11).\n\t- (b) The alleged call on 13th November 2015 is not pleaded in paragraph 18 of the Particulars of Claim (where the alleged representations made to Dr Boettcher are pleaded), was first alleged late in the day (by Dr Boettcher's second witness statement, paragraph 13, on 28th November 2022), and Mr Pacini was in Israel that day and has no recollection of the call (Mr Pacini's second witness statement, paragraph 10).\n\t- (c) The alleged call on 17th November 2015, if it had happened at all, took place after Dr Boettcher had agreed to employment by Xio UK by signing and returning the Offer Letter on 16th November 2015, and so was made too late to be actionable.\n- (5) Dr Boettcher's previous role at Bain was based in Germany and, after leaving Xio UK, his next role (from 2019) at EY-Parthenon was also in Germany.\n- (6) Whilst he was at Xio UK, Dr Boettcher's role was centred largely in Germany, where he lived and was paid, although he carried out some work for Xio UK in London, Tel Aviv and California. The unsigned service agreement stated that \"*the place of ordinary and habitual residence of [Dr Boettcher] is Germany*\".\n- (7) The Xio Group's primary office was in Hong Kong and most of its operational activity took place in Asia and a substantial proportion of the Xio Group's board meetings took place in Germany, Israel and the Netherlands(Mr Pacini's second witness statement, paragraphs 24-25). The IT and HR functions of Xio UK were managed from China and Hong Kong respectively and team-building exercises took place in France, Shanghai and London (Mr Geyer's second witness statement, paragraphs 11-14).\n- (8) The law governing Dr Boettcher's claims is German law pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation because Dr Boettcher was domiciled and/or resident in Germany, worked at Bain Germany for approximately fifteen years prior to accepting a job at Xio UK, worked from Germany for a substantial portion of his time at Xio UK, and then accepted a position at EY in Germany, and Dr Boettcher's pecuniary loss was suffered in the place where the relevant receiving bank account is located (*Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October)* [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 94-96) and Dr Boettcher admits that his bank accounts were located in Germany (Dr Boettcher's second witness statement, paragraph 20). Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation does not assist Dr Boettcher because it cannot be shown that the misrepresentations were \"*manifestly more closely connected*\" with England than Germany. Article 12(1) is inapplicable because there was no direct actual\n\nor intended contractual relationship between Dr Boettcher on the one hand and Mr Geyer and/or Mr Pacini on the other hand. In the present case, the contract of employment was only ever between Dr Boettcher and Xio UK.\n\n- (9) There is no or no real risk of inconsistent decisions being reached by courts in different jurisdictions on effectively the same issues because Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have offered to submit to the jurisdiction of the German courts.\n- (10) As Xio UK is in liquidation, it will not participate in the dispute and so it is more likely that disclosure will focus on records held personally by Dr Boettcher, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini.\n- 93. Mr Lowenstein KC further submitted that Dr Boettcher will not suffer any injustice in Germany, the state of his domicile, because the longer six year limitation period applicable under English law (compared to the three year limitation period under German law) is not a legitimate juridical advantage, given that Dr Boettcher acted unreasonably in failing to issue protective proceedings in Germany in circumstances where he was considering a claim against Xio UK in December 2017, when he sent a letter of claim to Xio UK, and where even if the proceedings in England were not stayed, the limitation period applicable in Germany would be applied in England as German law is the applicable law. Further, Dr Boettcher has indicated a willingness to take action in Germany where it suits him in that, in December 2021, his German lawyers by letter threatened legal action in Germany if Mr Geyer did not undertake to refrain from making false statements about Dr Boettcher in the English proceedings (Mr Geyer's first witness statement, paragraphs 25-31; Mr Geyer's second witness statement, paragraph 15; Mr Geyer's third witness statement, paragraphs 9-13).\n- 94. Mr Day on behalf of Dr Boettcher submitted that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini had not discharged the burden of demonstrating that Germany is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum than England, having regard to the following considerations:\n\t- (1) Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini are not currently domiciled in Germany. If proceedings were commenced against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini in Germany, there are real questions as to whether the German Court would exercise jurisdiction, as they are not domiciled there and there are no grounds for special jurisdiction. Indeed, they have not offered to submit to the jurisdiction of the German Courts.\n\t- (2) Mr Geyer resided in England at the time of the events giving rise to the claim. Mr Pacini's evidence is that he was not resident in England in 2015 (Mr Pacini's second witness statement, paragraphs 15-18); Dr Boettcher's evidence was that Mr Pacini's wife told him in December 2015 that she lived in England at that time, suggesting that Mr Pacini was likewise resident in England at that time (Dr Boettcher's second witness statement, paragraph 33).\n\t- (3) All of the witnesses are fluent in English. The only custodian of documents and witness who is domiciled in Germany is Dr Boettcher, who wishes to continue these proceedings in England rather than issue fresh proceedings in Germany.\n\t- (4) The Xio Group has and had no presence in Germany. Mr Day referred me to a press release describing the Xio Group as follows: \"*Headquartered in London, XIO Group is a global alternative investments firm that employs an*\n\n*international team of more than 70 professionals. Representing more than 15 nationalities among its employees and its network of advisors, the firm has operations in the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Hong Kong and mainland China*\" (see also Ms Danon's first witness statement, paragraph 10).\n\n- (5) All of the underlying documents that will be the focus of the trial are likely to be in the English or Chinese language (Ms Lanceley's first witness statement, paragraph 151).\n- (6) Dr Boettcher's claim against the Defendants is based on a number of fraudulent misrepresentations allegedly made on different occasions during the recruitment of Dr Boettcher leading to his agreeing to a contract of employment with Xio UK. The occasions were either conference calls where the participants were in London or Germany (although there is no evidence that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were in Germany on those occasions) or elsewhere, during an interview in London and during a meeting at Dusseldorf Airport between Mr Geyer and Dr Boettcher.\n- (7) The alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were all directed at inducing Dr Boettcher to leave Bain and take a senior position at Xio UK in London. London was where Dr Boettcher's dedicated office and personal assistant were located, although Dr Boettcher travelled to Germany, Israel and latterly the United States to perform his duties (Dr Boettcher's second witness statement, paragraphs 41- 42). Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini also had offices in London and then resided in London and Surrey respectively, but also travelled; Xio UK's other employees were mainly based in London and mostly lived in or near London (Dr Boettcher's second witness statement, paragraphs 43-48).\n- (8) Dr Boettcher's employment contract and the draft service agreement were subject to English law and jurisdiction and identified London as Dr Boettcher's \"*normal place of work*\" (Dr Boettcher's second witness statement, paragraph 40; Ms Lanceley's first witness statement, paragraph 77).\n- (9) If the proceedings against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were stayed, this would result in a fragmentation of the proceedings against them on the one hand and Xio UK and Mr Qiao on the other hand.\n- (10) Dr Boettcher has a good arguable case that his claims are governed by English law pursuant to Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation, because the misrepresentations were made to induce the signing of Dr Boettcher's employment contract with Xio UK which was to be governed by English law; alternatively, pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, because that is where Dr Boettcher's damage was sustained. If, however, German law was the applicable law, the Court is well practised in considering evidence and submissions based on foreign law.\n- 95. Mr Day further submitted that even if Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have demonstrated that Germany is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum than England, it would result in an injustice to Dr Boettcher in that he would have to start fresh proceedings in Germany, but those proceedings might be time-barred because there is a three year limitation period applicable in Germany and time had started to run from December\n\n2020 (*Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws* (16th ed.), para. 12-049; Fentiman, *International Commercial Litigation* (2nd ed.) para. 13.82). This factor might however be neutralised if the applicant were to undertake to waive the time bar as a defence in the foreign proceedings (Fentiman, *International Commercial Litigation* (2nd ed.) para. 13.83), but no such waiver has been offered in this case. That all said, Dr Boettcher's case is that even if German law is applicable, there should be no limitation defence because the running of time for this purpose had been suspended.\n\n- 96. Given that proceedings were served in England as of right, the question is not whether England is the most appropriate forum, but whether Germany is clearly and distinctly a more appropriate forum than England.\n- 97. In my judgment, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have not demonstrated that Germany is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum for the determination of this dispute than England. My reasons are as follows.\n- 98. First, as regards the timing and making of the alleged misrepresentations, as matters communicated to Dr Boettcher, they cannot be said to be connected with Germany in any greater sense than they are connected with England.\n- 99. The significant factors connecting the making of the alleged representations with Germany is the fact that Dr Boettcher is currently located and domiciled in Germany, that there were two meetings in Germany (in Munich and Dusseldorf) at which precontractual representations are alleged to have been made (one of which involved Mr Geyer), and the conference calls which are alleged to have taken place involved Dr Boettcher in Germany. However, neither Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini, nor indeed anyone else on behalf of Xio UK or the Xio Group, participated in these calls from Germany.\n- 100. The significant factor connecting the making of the alleged representations with England is the fact that the representations allegedly made to Dr Boettcher were made on behalf of Xio UK. Xio UK was based in England and the Xio Group's European headquarters were in England. Some of those representations were made in England, during a meeting at The Shard, and possibly from England (that is, by Mr Pacini on 6th November 2015).\n- 101. On Dr Boettcher's case, there were a number of representations made both before and after the Offer Letter was signed. They were made and received in England, Germany, and/or elsewhere. In such circumstances, it is difficult to attribute these representations as a whole to one jurisdiction. Certainly, they cannot be attributed to having taken place solely or predominantly in Germany.\n- 102. There was much debate about whether the evidence supported the timing and making of these representations; however, the content of the representations was not the subject of the parties' submissions. I am unable to decide who has the better of the argument in respect of the timing and making of the representations and would wish not to do so, as I do not consider that it would help in establishing whether Germany, as opposed to England, is the more appropriate forum. However, I do comment on two of the representations:\n\t- (1) The first is the representation alleged to have been made on 13th November 2015. There is currently no pleaded case by Dr Boettcher as to this\n\nrepresentation. Accordingly, I take no account of it for the purposes of the present applications. If Dr Boettcher wishes to rely on this representation as part of his claim, then he must apply for permission to amend his Particulars of Claim. If this representation had been pleaded, it would not have altered the decision I have reached on the present applications.\n\n- (2) The second is the representation alleged to have been on 17th November 2015. Mr Lowenstein KC fairly pointed out that this representation was made after the conclusion of Dr Boettcher's employment contract with Xio UK on 16th November 2015. However, Dr Boettcher's claim is based on his having relied on this and the other alleged representations, not only in concluding this contract and giving notice of resignation to Bain on 16th November 2015, but also in signing a separation agreement with Bain on 24th November 2015 and commencing his employment with Xio UK on 1st January 2016 (Particulars of Claim, para. 21). In his second witness statement, Dr Boettcher said at paragraph 15 that \"*The Representations were repeated during the 17 November 2015 call and they influenced my decision to join [Xio UK]. I accept that I signed and returned the offer letter on 16 November 2015. However, this was only one step towards my departure from Bain and the damage that I subsequently suffered by joining [Xio UK]. I only signed the exit agreement with Bain on 24 November 2015. All of the discussions with the Defendants before that influenced my decision to join [Xio UK]*\".\n- 103. Second, the case advanced by Dr Boettcher is concerned with the truth or falsity of the representations allegedly made by or on behalf of the Defendants, including Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini, that the Xio Group was a private equity fund with funds of committed capital under management of US\\$3 billion from a diversified investor base. An inquiry into the truth of any alleged representations would not be focussed solely or principally on the source of funds or investments in Germany.\n- 104. Third, in my view, a significant connecting factor is that Dr Boettcher was being recruited to work for Xio UK and the representations were made for the purpose of engaging Dr Boettcher to work for Xio UK in England. Xio UK's operations were based in London. Although Dr Boettcher also carried out his duties in other countries, including Germany, the primary location for the purposes of the performance of his duties as an employee of Xio UK was to be, and was, in England. The Offer Letter was conditional on Dr Boettcher \"*being lawfully entitled to work in the United Kingdom*\" and made reference to no other country. The unsigned service agreement provided that \"*The Employee's normal place of work shall be the LLP's primary offices in London. The Employee shall, however, attend and work at any places of business in the United Kingdom or elsewhere as required or determined from time to time by the LLP* …\". The employment contract was intended to be governed by English law in that the Offer Letter referred to English legislation (Working Time Regulations 1998). There appeared to be no dispute that English law was the governing law of Dr Boettcher's employment contract.\n- 105. Of course, I also understand that Dr Boettcher lived in Germany during his employment with Xio UK, but that on its own does not make Germany a more appropriate forum than England for the determination of this dispute.\n- 106. Further, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini also had a presence in Xio UK's London office at least in the sense that they had an office and a personal assistant in London.\n- 107. Fourth, the practical considerations underlying the trial of the action in England, such as the location of witnesses and documentary evidence, do not gravitate towards Germany, or England for that matter. Dr Boettcher was and is domiciled in Germany, but the other witnesses are located elsewhere. The location of witnesses is less a matter of practical convenience to the extent that evidence fairly can be given remotely. The operations of Xio UK were conducted in England and so a substantial number of documents which may have to be disclosed could be said to have been originally located in England. Of course, the operations of the Xio Group were conducted in a number of jurisdictions and the digital copying of documents suggest that such documents could be located in other jurisdictions as well as in England for this purpose. I also note that the documentary evidence will be in the English or Chinese language, but I do not regard that as a matter which connects the dispute with one jurisdiction or another.\n- 108. Fifth, it is significant that, as matters stand, there is one set of proceedings against Xio UK, Mr Geyer, Mr Pacini and Mr Qiao. If the current proceedings against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were stayed, there would or might be two sets of proceedings - in England and, perhaps, in Germany - all concerned with the same factual issues. Of course, it might be said that it is open to question whether the proceedings against Xio UK, who is in liquidation and apparently without substantial assets, and against Mr Qiao, who has not taken an active part in these proceedings to date, would continue. However, at this juncture, that is speculative. Indeed, Xio UK has filed an acknowledgment of service form, presumably on the instructions of the liquidators, indicating an intention to defend the claim, and indeed has been represented by counsel and solicitors in these proceedings.\n- 109. Sixth, there is the matter of the law governing Dr Boettcher's claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini. There was substantial dispute between the parties as to whether the applicable law was English law in accordance with Article 12(1), alternatively Article 4(1), of the Rome II Regulation (on Dr Boettcher's case), or German law in accordance with Article 4(1) (on Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's case).\n- 110. In my judgment, there is a good arguable case that English law is the applicable law:\n\t- (1) Dr Boettcher has the better of the argument that English law is applicable to his claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini, at least pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, which provides that \"… *the law applicable to a noncontractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur*\". In this case, the damages claimed by Dr Boettcher for the alleged misrepresentations arose as a result of his entering into the contract of employment with Xio UK, in particular his claims for loss of earnings and damages for mental distress and/or disappointment and/or reputational damage. It was therefore his entry into the contract of employment with Xio UK, and his subsequent employment with Xio UK, in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations which constituted the relevant damage. That contract of employment was concluded by the receipt by Xio UK of Dr Boettcher's emailed acceptance of the Offer Letter - which was\n\ncommunicated by Dr Boettcher returning by email a pdf of the countersigned Offer Letter to Xio UK on 16th November 2015 - either on Xio UK's email server or upon being read by the named recipient (*Chitty on Contracts*, (34th ed., 2021), para. 4-061, 4-099, 4-100). That contract of employment was therefore concluded in England (*Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws* (16th ed.), para. 35-026; *MX1 Ltd v F* [2018] EWHC 1041 (Ch); [2018] 1 WLR 5553, para. 39(8); this is analogous to the occurrence of a harmful event in England where the relevant contract was signed in the context of Article 7(2) of the Brussel Regulation Recast: *Aspen Underwriting Ltd v Credit Bank Europe NV* [2018] EWCA Civ 2590; [2019] 1 Lloyd's Rep 221, para. 136-138; reversed on appeal but not on this ground: [2020] UKSC 11; [2021] AC 493). Moreover, that contract between Dr Boettcher and Xio UK was to be governed by English law and was to be performed to a substantial extent in England. There is no different conclusion to be drawn by reference to Article 4(3), because I do not consider that the alleged misrepresentations were \"*manifestly more closely connected with*\" Germany.\n\n- (2) Contrary to Mr Lowenstein KC's submission, I do not consider that for the purposes of Article 4(1) the location of Dr Boettcher's bank accounts represented the location of the damage suffered by Dr Boettcher, because unlike the position in *Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening* [2009] EWHC 716 (Comm); [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 47, para. 57-58 and *Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October)* [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 94-96, where the relevant moneys were due to be contractually paid into a nominated bank account, Dr Boettcher's claimed losses in the present case do not relate to moneys which should have been paid by the Defendants to Dr Boettcher. In any event, it was the conclusion of the employment contract with Xio UK which constituted the \"*direct damage*\" allegedly sustained by Dr Boettcher (Recital (16) of the Rome II Regulation; *Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws* (16th ed.), para. 35-024).\n- (3) The application of Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation presupposes that Article 12(1) does not apply. Article 12(1) provides that the law applicable to noncontractual obligations (such as those in the making of representations) arising out of dealings or negotiations leading to the conclusion of a contract shall be the law applicable to the contract. In this respect, I have concluded that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have the better of the argument that Article 12 is not applicable in respect of the claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini (*Angola v Perfectbit Ltd* [2018] EWHC 965 (Comm), para. 200; *Avonwick Holdings Ltd v Azitio Holdings Ltd* [2020] EWHC 1844 (Comm), para. 160-164; *Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws* (16th ed.), para. 35-090; Dickinson, *The Rome II Regulation*, para. 12.07-12.08). That said, I note the potential oddity that one law may be applicable to claims made against a contracting party who has made misrepresentations to induce the claimant to enter into a contract, but a different law might be applicable to the claim made against agents on behalf of the contracting party in respect of the same misrepresentations. In this case, this potential oddity does not arise, whether Article 4 or Article 12 applies, because, in my view, there is a good arguable case that English law would be applicable.\n- (4) I would add that the issue of applicable law may have to be determined finally at trial and that my conclusions in this respect are for the purposes of the current application alone. The parties are of course free to advance their respective cases on the applicable law at trial.\n- 111. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that Germany is clearly and distinctly a more appropriate forum for the determination of this dispute than England. If I had reached the contrary conclusion, save in one respect, I would not have concluded that, having regard to the second stage of the approach to addressing the matter of *forum non conveniens*, there is a real risk that Dr Boettcher would not be justly dealt with in Germany. In this respect, Dr Boettcher relied on the fact - which is common ground that if English law is applicable the claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini are not time-barred but if German law is applicable, there is a shorter limitation period, but there is a dispute as to whether the claims are time-barred under German law.\n- 112. It may well be that the existence of a limitation defence in Germany, which would not apply in England, is a legitimate advantage of which Dr Boettcher might be deprived if the current proceedings were stayed (see *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* [1987] AC 460, 482-484; *Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws* (16th ed.), para. 12- 049). However, the Rome II Regulation is applicable in England and in Germany, and so the law for the determination of the applicable law is, at least in theory, the same. This is not a case where the law determining the applicable law is different in the two jurisdictions; it is the same. Moreover, if the English Court were to hold at trial that German law is the applicable law, the shorter limitation period under German law might well be applicable under the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984. Any risk therefore arising from the possible limitation defence is the risk of two different courts coming to a different conclusion by applying the same law. However, an injustice might have occurred where the Claim Form instituting the English proceedings would not be regarded as stopping time for the purposes of the German law of limitation (insofar as it applies) where the law is applied in German proceedings, but would be so regarded in the English proceedings. In that event, even though Dr Boettcher's arguments that time is suspended under German law may not save Dr Boettcher from a limitation defence in Germany, it might save Dr Boettcher from a limitation defence in England.\n- (4) Conclusion with respect to service within the jurisdiction\n- 113. For these reasons, as both Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were served with the proceedings as of right within the jurisdiction and because Germany is not the clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum for the determination of the dispute, I decline to stay the current proceedings. The English Court is therefore entitled to and should exercise jurisdiction over Dr Boettcher's claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini.\n- 114. This makes it unnecessary to consider Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's application to set aside the order of Waksman, J on 26th October 2021 granting permission to Dr Boettcher to serve the proceedings out of the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as the parties presented full arguments on this application, I will address them.\n\n## **Service outside the jurisdiction**\n\n- 115. On 26th October 2021, Waksman, J granted an order permitting service outside of the jurisdiction of the proceedings on Mr Geyer (in Switzerland) and Mr Pacini (in the United States). The order was made upon a without notice application by Dr Boettcher.\n- 116. On 5th September 2022, following consent orders extending time within which such an application could be made, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini applied for orders declaring that the English Court has no jurisdiction, or will not exercise jurisdiction, to try the claim brought against either of them and setting aside Waksman, J's order on the grounds that there is no serious issue to be tried against either Defendant, Dr Boettcher is unable to show a good arguable case that his claim against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini falls within any of the grounds set out in CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1 on which Dr Boettcher relies, and because England is not the proper place in which to bring the claim against either Defendant. Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini also contended that Waksman, J's order should be set aside because Waksman, J did not benefit from full disclosure which Dr Boettcher was obliged to provide on his application for permission to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction.\n- 117. I shall consider this application. However, it is relevant only if my conclusion in the previous section (relating to the service of proceedings within the jurisdiction) is wrong.\n- 118. For this purpose, it is important to bear in mind the requirements to be satisfied in order that service may be legitimately served outside the jurisdiction (see *AK Investments CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd* [2021] UKPC 7; [2012] 1 WLR 1804, para. 71). In *Soriano v Forensic News LLC* [2021] EWCA Civ 1952; [2022] QB 533, Warby, LJ summarised the law on service outside the jurisdiction and *forum conveniens*, at para. 11-12, as follows:\n\n\"*11. This is well established. For present purposes, it can be adequately distilled as follows. The court can only give permission to serve a claim on a defendant outside the jurisdiction if it meets three conditions.*\n\n- *(1) The first is that the claim is of a kind that falls within one of the \"gateways\" set out in CPR PD 6B (\"the Gateway Requirement\"). On this question, the claimant has to satisfy the court that he has a good arguable case or, as it is sometimes put, the better of the argument. This connotes \"more than a serious issue to be tried or a real prospect of success, but not as much as proof on the balance of probabilities\": AstraZeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corpn [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 510, para 24 (Hamblen J).*\n- *(2) Secondly, the claimant must satisfy the court that he has a real as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success on the claim (\"the Merits Test\"). One way this has been put is that the claimant has to show that any \"reverse\" summary judgment application would fail.*\n- *(3) Thirdly, \"The court will not give permission unless it is satisfied that England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim\": CPR r 6.37(3) (\"the Forum Test\"). This is normally resolved by reference to the \"Spiliada\" principles as to the appropriate forum or (in the classic*\n\n*language) forum conveniens for the trial of the claim: see Spiliada Maritime Corpn v Cansulex Ltd (The Spiliada) [1987] AC 460, 478-480 (Lord Goff of Chieveley). The question is whether this jurisdiction is \"clearly or distinctly\" the most appropriate. The appropriate forum is the one in which the case \"may most suitably be tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice\". The first thing to consider is what is the \"natural forum\", namely the one \"with which the action [has] the most real and substantial connection\". If the court concludes that another forum is as suitable or more suitable than England, it will normally refuse permission. Again, the issue is not determined on the balance of probabilities; the claimant's task is to show that he has the better of the argument on the point. If he fails to do so, the application will be dismissed.*\n\n*12. A claimant seeking permission to serve outside the jurisdiction always bears the legal burden of proof on all these issues. That is so whether the matter is being considered on an application by the claimant at the initial, without notice stage, or at the hearing of a subsequent application by the defendant to set aside an order permitting service outside the jurisdiction. But a defendant challenging such an order needs to identify some other forum which does have jurisdiction; and even the initial application requires there to be another candidate with the requisite jurisdiction: Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies (UK) Ltd [2020] Bus LR 2422, paras 96-97. Where the claimant's contention that the case is a proper one for service out is disputed by the defendant on a specific ground the defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to that ground: see AstraZeneca (above) at paras 33–39 (Hamblen J)*.\"\n\n- 119. Dr Boettcher, however, has a prior objection to this application, namely that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have lost the right to contest the Court's jurisdiction in respect of the service of the proceedings outside the jurisdiction, because - although both Defendants filed an acknowledgment of service after the proceedings were served within the jurisdiction - neither of them filed an acknowledgment of service after and in respect of service out of the jurisdiction. I shall consider this prior objection first.\n- (1) Have Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini lost the right to contest jurisdiction?\n- 120. On 1st October 2021, Dr Boettcher served the proceedings on Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini within the jurisdiction.\n- 121. On 19th October 2021, both Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini filed acknowledgments of service, indicating that they intended to contest jurisdiction.\n- 122. On 26th October 2021, Waksman, J made an order permitting service of the proceedings on Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini outside the jurisdiction.\n- 123. No (additional) acknowledgement of service was filed by Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini after the proceedings were served outside the jurisdiction.\n- 124. Mr Day on behalf of Dr Boettcher submitted that CPR Part 11 only permits a jurisdiction challenge by a defendant who files an acknowledgment of service in accordance with CPR Part 10. CPR rule 11(2) provides that \"*A defendant who wishes*\n\n*to make such an application [i.e. for orders disputing the Court's jurisdiction or that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction] must first file an acknowledgment of service in accordance with Part 10*\". CPR rule 10.1(3)(b) likewise provides that \"*A defendant must file an acknowledgment of service if … they wish to dispute the court's jurisdiction*\". So, Mr Day argued, as Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini never acknowledged service of the proceedings out of the jurisdiction (as opposed to the acknowledgment of service of proceedings within the jurisdiction), that debars Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini from contesting jurisdiction based on service outside the jurisdiction, because these provisions of the CPR are mandatory (*Mansard Mortgages 2007-2 plc v Beyat Holdings Ltd* [2021] EWHC 3355 (Ch), para. 37-39).\n\n- 125. I do not accept this submission for the simply stated reason that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have each filed an acknowledgment of service indicating their intention to contest jurisdiction. I have addressed the significance of their acknowledgments of service in another context above. In the present context, the significance of the filing of the acknowledgment of service was to respond to the service of process, enter an appearance (including providing details of their representatives), and to signal their intentions (whether to defend the claim or to contest jurisdiction). This Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have done by reason of their acknowledgment of service forms filed on 19th October 2021.\n- 126. I do not see that this position would have been advanced by the filing of a second acknowledgment of service. Indeed, CPR Part 11 or CPR Part 10 or CPR rule 58.6 do not envisage the filing of more than one acknowledgment of service, except in the special case where an application to dispute the Court's jurisdiction has been unsuccessful (CPR rule 11(7)), in which case the first acknowledgment of service ceases to have effect.\n- 127. I also observe that Waksman, J's order required Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini to \"*file an acknowledgment of service by the date that is [21 or 22 days respectively] after service of the Particulars of Claim*\" or to file an admission or to file a defence. It is not obvious to me that Waksman, J was aware that an acknowledgment of service had already been filed by Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini (bearing in mind that the application for permission to serve out was made before, but the order was made after, the acknowledgments of service were filed). In any case, the order made by Waksman, J sets an end date for the filing of an acknowledgment of service, but not a date for the beginning of the period by which such an acknowledgment might have been filed. Moreover, the consent orders thereafter made by the Court extended the time within which Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were to file their application to contest jurisdiction, if such an application were to be made; however, those orders made no provision for extending time in which to file a second acknowledgment of service. If the Court's or the parties' intention had been to require the filing of a second acknowledgment of service, provision would have been made in these consent orders.\n- 128. Therefore, in my judgment, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini did not lose the right to contest jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings served outside the jurisdiction by reason of not having filed a second acknowledgment of service.\n- (2) Are the jurisdiction gateways satisfied?\n- 129. In making his application for permission for service outside the jurisdiction, Dr Boettcher relied on the following bases of jurisdiction in CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1.\n- 130. First, CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(3) provides that the claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the Court where:\n\n\"*A claim is made against a person ('the defendant') on whom the claim form has been or will be served (otherwise than in reliance on this paragraph) and –*\n\n- *(a) there is between the claimant and the defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try; and*\n- *(b) the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is a necessary or proper party to that claim*.\"\n- 131. Second, CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(9)(a) and (b) provide that the claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the Court where:\n\n\"*A claim is made in tort where –*\n\n- *(a) damage was sustained, or will be sustained, within the jurisdiction; [or]*\n- *(b) damage which has been or will be sustained results from an act committed, or likely to be committed, within the jurisdiction …*\"\n\n#### *(a) Are Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini necessary or proper parties?*\n\n- 132. In order that a claimant may rely on CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(3) to secure the Court's jurisdiction as against a defendant (see *The Libyan Investment Authority v Credit Suisse International* [2020] EWHC 1387 (Comm), para. 9), the claimant must have a good arguable case (the better of the argument) that:\n\t- (1) The claimant has made a claim against another defendant, the \"*anchor defendant*\", upon whom proceedings have been or will be served.\n\t- (2) There is a real issue between the claimant and the anchor defendant which it is reasonable for the Court to try.\n\t- (3) The defendant is a necessary or proper party to that claim against the anchor defendant.\n- 133. These matters are to be assessed as at the date on which the application for permission to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction was made (*Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October)* [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 44; *Satfinance Investment Ltd v Athena Art Finance Group* [2020] EWHC 3527 (Ch), para. 43).\n- 134. The matter in contention between the parties was the second of the above requirements, namely whether there is a real issue between Dr Boettcher and Xio UK which it is reasonable for the Court to try.\n- 135. Mr Day on behalf of Dr Boettcher submitted that:\n\t- (1) Assuming that jurisdiction can be established against Mr Pacini, he can be the anchor defendant for the purposes of any proceedings to be served on Mr Geyer outside the jurisdiction; similarly, Mr Geyer can be the anchor defendant for the purposes of any claim against Mr Pacini, assuming jurisdiction can be established as against Mr Geyer.\n\t- (2) In any event, Xio UK as the First Defendant can be the anchor defendant for the purposes of the proceedings to be served on Mr Geyer and/or Mr Pacini, given that Xio UK was served with the Claim Form within the jurisdiction, given Xio UK's intention to defend the claim, and given Dr Boettcher's determination to take the claim against Xio UK to trial, even though Xio UK is in liquidation. In this respect, it is to be noted that (a) Xio UK filed an acknowledgment of service - a week before the date of Waksman, J's order - which indicated an intention to defend the claim against it, (b) in March 2022, Xio UK applied by solicitors instructed on its behalf for an order staying the proceedings against it or an extension of time for the service of a defence, which application was dismissed by a consent order on 4th November 2022 in which Xio UK was ordered to serve its defence, if any, by 16th November 2022, but no such defence has been served, and although Xio UK's solicitors have been asked to explain the reasons for no defence being served, no answer to this correspondence has been received; (c) Xio UK's liquidators have refused to admit Dr Boettcher's claim as a debt in the insolvent estate (by contrast, in *Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October)* [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 78(i), the claimant had been admitted to the list of creditors), (d) Dr Boettcher will seek to hold the liquidators to account to investigate and pursue claims against those who used Xio UK as a \"*front*\" to hide the true nature of the investment being carried on through the company, and (e) Dr Boettcher has real concerns about the validity of the other proofs of debt lodged in the liquidation and will seek appropriate disclosure of such debts, but this has been refused by the liquidators (Ms Lanceley's fifth witness statement, paragraphs 44-49).\n- 136. Mr Lowenstein KC on behalf of Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini submitted that:\n\t- (1) Because CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(3) is not based on any territorial connection of the claim, \"*caution must always be exercised in bringing foreign defendants within our jurisdiction under [this gateway]\"*, especially where an anchor defendant is sued only for the purposes of exercising jurisdiction over a foreign defendant (*AK Investments CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd* [2021] UKPC 7; [2012] 1 WLR 1804, para. 73, 79).\n\t- (2) Xio UK is not an appropriate anchor defendant because there is no real issue between Xio UK and Dr Boettcher which it is reasonable for the Court to try in circumstances where (a) Xio UK is aware of the proceedings but is in liquidation and is taking no steps to dispute the proceedings (*Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October)* [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706,\n\npara. 78(i) and 79), (b) it is relevant to consider the likelihood of Xio UK being active defendants in the proceedings and it is unlikely that Xio UK will be an active defendant because it has few assets (Mr Speller's first witness statement, paragraph 30) (Briggs, *Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments* (7th ed.), para. 24.10, fn. 105).\n\n- 137. In my judgment, Dr Boettcher has the better of the argument that jurisdiction can be exercised on the ground set out in CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(3) insofar as Xio UK is the anchor defendant. This is because Dr Boettcher's claim is that he was induced to enter into a contract of employment with Xio UK by reason of representations made by or on behalf of Xio UK and the other Defendants, including Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini. Accordingly, the claim against Xio UK is integrally connected with the claim made against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini. Importantly, both Dr Boettcher and Xio UK indicated an intention to litigate the dispute between them. Indeed, less than a week after Dr Boettcher's application leading to Waksman, J's order, Xio UK by its solicitors, presumably on the instructions of the liquidators, filed an acknowledgment of service which indicated an intention to defend the claim. Further, the reasons given by Ms Lanceley on behalf of Dr Boettcher for pursuing the claim explain why Dr Boettcher intended, at the relevant date, to pursue Xio UK in these proceedings.\n- 138. I would add that, if I had concluded that the service of proceedings on Mr Geyer at 33SR was not valid, I would also have concluded that Mr Geyer would have been a necessary or proper party to the claim made by Dr Boettcher against Mr Pacini, who was served as of right within the jurisdiction.\n- *(b) Was the alleged damage sustained in, or by reason of acts, in the jurisdiction?*\n- 139. In order that Dr Boettcher can secure jurisdiction in respect of his claims in tort against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini under CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(9), he must have a good arguable case that:\n\t- (1) damage was sustained, or will be sustained, within the jurisdiction; or\n\t- (2) damage which has been or will be sustained results from an act committed, or likely to be committed, within the jurisdiction.\n- 140. With respect to the first of these requirements (para. 3.1(9)(a)), it is sufficient if substantial damage was sustained in England, whether or not damage was also sustained outside the jurisdiction (*Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc* [1990] 1 QB 391, 437). In *FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC v Lady Brownlie* [2021] UKSC 45; [2021] 3 WLR 1011, at para. 74, Lord Lloyd-Jones was careful to explain that this requirement is not to be interpreted with the strictness adopted for the purposes of the Brussels Regulation Recast, especially in cases of claims for pure economic loss (such as the present). On the other hand, if the financial loss is too remote, that would not be sufficient. At para. 75, Lord Lloyd-Jones said:\n\n\"… *there is an important difference in this regard between physical damage and \"the financial consequences of a tort which itself is wholly economic in nature\". The nature of pure economic loss creates a need for constraints on the legal consequences of remote effects and can give rise to complex and difficult issues as to where the damage was suffered, calling for a careful analysis of*  *transactions. As a result, the more remote economic repercussions of the causative event will not found jurisdiction*.\"\n\n- 141. In the present case, Dr Boettcher has the better of the argument that damage was sustained in England, at least where his contract of employment with Xio UK, as the result of the alleged misrepresentations, was concluded in England upon receipt by Xio UK of Dr Boettcher's emailed acceptance of the Offer Letter. This is the same reasoning which led to the identification of English law as the applicable law for the purposes of Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation (see above), although the requirements of the relevant statutory provisions are of course different.\n- 142. As regards the second of the requirements, namely that there were acts committed in the jurisdiction which gave rise to the relevant damage (para. 3.1(9)(b)), as there were a number of representations alleged and each of them were made and/or received in different locations, this is a more intricate inquiry. Obviously, insofar as the representations were made during an in-person meeting in England (in particular, the meeting at The Shard), this requirement is satisfied. The requirement is not satisfied in respect of the meetings held in Germany. The position in respect of the representations made during conference calls is more complex. As a result, as I do not need to address this question, I would prefer not to do so, given my decision on the basis of para. 3(1)(9)(a).\n\n# *Conclusion on the jurisdiction gateways*\n\n- 143. For the reasons given above, I have concluded that Dr Boettcher has a good arguable case that the requirements of CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(3) and 3.1(9)(a) are satisfied in this case.\n- (3) Does Dr Boettcher have a real prospect of success on the claim?\n- 144. The requirement that a claimant has a real prospect of success on the claim is to be judged on the same basis as a summary judgment application. This issue is often expressed in terms of there having to be a \"*serious issue*\" to be tried on the merits (*AK Investments CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd* [2021] UKPC 7; [2012] 1 WLR 1804, para. 71; *The Libyan Investment Authority v Credit Suisse International* [2020] EWHC 1387 (Comm), para. 8).\n- 145. Mr Lowenstein KC submitted that there was no such serious issue for the following independent reasons:\n\t- (1) With regard to both Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini, the law applicable to the claims is German law and the claim was time-barred by December 2020 under German law.\n\t- (2) With regard to Mr Pacini, Dr Boettcher cannot show that any actionable misrepresentations were made.\n- 146. As to the first of these arguments, I have reached the view for the purposes of these applications alone - that Dr Boettcher has the better of the argument that English law, not German law, is applicable. However, even assuming German law was applicable, although it is common ground that there is a three year limitation period applicable\n\nunder German law, Dr Boettcher disputes that his claim is time-barred under German law.\n\n- 147. Dr Boettcher's case is that, as a matter of German law, time was suspended for part of the standard limitation period for at least the nine days required to overcome the limitation defence, so that the claim was issued in time, because:\n\t- (1) There is a rule that limitation is suspended during periods of negotiation and Dr Boettcher entered into protracted pre-action correspondence with Xio UK whilst Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were still executive officers of the Xio Group. This is a factual question to be resolved at trial.\n\t- (2) A change of address can suspend the running of time. However, the parties' experts on German law disagree whether a change of address after time has started to run will result in suspension of time running. That disagreement between German law experts underlines the point that this is a triable issue.\n- 148. Accordingly, even if I had concluded that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini had the better of the argument that German law was the applicable law, I would have also concluded that there was a serious issue to be tried on the matter of limitation.\n- 149. As to the second of the arguments that there is no serious issue to be tried with respect to the allegations of misrepresentation made against Mr Pacini, Mr Lowenstein KC submitted that:\n\t- (1) Dr Boettcher has alleged that Mr Pacini participated in conference calls with him on 6th, 13th and 17th November 2015. None of these allegations has a real as opposed to fanciful chance of founding a claim for misrepresentation, in that:\n\t\t- (a) Dr Boettcher has no real prospect of showing that the 6th November 2015 call took place, because this call was postponed to 17th November 2015.\n\t\t- (b) There is no evidence that any actionable representations were made on the 13th November 2015 call, if it happened. The alleged call was not pleaded and was not alleged until Dr Boettcher's second witness statement of 28th November 2022. Therefore, there is no real prospect of Dr Boettcher showing on the evidence that this call is actionable.\n\t\t- (c) The 17th November 2015 call, if it happened at all, took place after the Offer Letter was signed and returned. Accordingly, Mr Pacini could not have intended Dr Boettcher to rely on any representations said to have been made on 17th November 2015 to induce him to enter employment with Xio UK.\n- 150. As to the first of these points, this is a substantial factual issue. Mr Day on behalf of Mr Boettcher states that Mr Pacini has advanced no documentary evidence to demonstrate the call of 6th November 2015 was cancelled and did not take place. Accordingly, I consider that there is a serious issue to be tried in this regard.\n- 151. As to the call alleged to have taken place on 13th November 2015, I have considered this above. The alleged representation has not been pleaded and so I take no account of it for the purposes of the current applications.\n- 152. As regards the 17th November 2015 call, as mentioned above, although Mr Lowenstein KC is right to point out that it took place after the Offer Letter was accepted, Dr Boettcher's claim is based on his having relied on the representation in entering into a separation agreement with Bain on 24th November 2015 and commencing his employment with Xio UK on 1st January 2016. Accordingly, there is a serious issue to be tried in this respect.\n- 153. Therefore, in my judgment, there is a serious issue to be tried and Dr Boettcher has a real prospect of success on his pleaded claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini.\n- (4) Is England the proper forum?\n- 154. CPR rule 6.37(3) provides that \"*The court will not give permission [for service outside of the jurisdiction] unless satisfied that England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim*\".\n- 155. In *Soriano v Forensic News LLC* [2021] EWCA Civ 1952; [2022] QB 533, Warby, LJ said with respect to CPR rule 6.37(3), at para. 11(3), \"*This is normally resolved by reference to the \"Spiliada\" principles as to the appropriate forum or (in the classic language) forum conveniens for the trial of the claim … The question is whether this jurisdiction is \"clearly or distinctly\" the most appropriate. The appropriate forum is the one in which the case \"may most suitably be tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice\". The first thing to consider is what is the \"natural forum\", namely the one \"with which the action [has] the most real and substantial connection\". If the court concludes that another forum is as suitable or more suitable than England, it will normally refuse permission. Again, the issue is not determined on the balance of probabilities; the claimant's task is to show that he has the better of the argument on the point. If he fails to do so, the application will be dismissed*\".\n- 156. Mr Day on behalf Dr Boettcher submitted that:\n\t- (1) If the claim is going to proceed against either Mr Geyer or Mr Pacini as of right, that will be because Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have failed to show that Germany is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum. In those circumstances, the test under CPR rule 6.37(3) necessarily will be satisfied. The Court cannot regard itself as not the proper place in which to bring the claim, if the claim is continuing as of right. And there will be no alternative forum left in play; Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini have suggested none beyond Germany.\n\t- (2) If, on the other hand, Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini are able to satisfy the Court at the prior stage of the analysis that Germany is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum, Dr Boettcher would accept that England is not the proper place in which to bring the claim and this means that the test under CPR rule 6.37(3) cannot be satisfied when the burden of proof is reversed and placed on him at this later stage of the analysis.\n- 157. Mr Day's binary position is not quite accurate, in my assessment. That is because although the relative appropriateness of England as the forum for the determination of the dispute is critical to an application for a stay where the proceedings are served as of right within the jurisdiction and is critical to the application for permission to serve proceedings outside the jurisdiction, the burden of proof is materially different (*Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* [1987] AC 460, 480-481). Where proceedings are served as of right within the jurisdiction, the burden is on the defendant to prove that another forum is the clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum for the determination of the dispute between the parties than England. Where proceedings are to be served, with the Court's permission, outside the jurisdiction, the burden is on the claimant to prove that England is the forum where the case may most suitably be tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice, although it is incumbent on the defendant to identify an alternative forum (*Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies (UK) Ltd* [2020] UKSC 37; [2021] 1 All ER 1141, para. 94, 96).\n- 158. The parties addressed the issue of *forum [non] conveniens* in the context of the application for a stay of the proceedings served within the jurisdiction and in the context of the application for permission for service outside the jurisdiction by reference to the same considerations.\n- 159. I have concluded, with respect to the proceedings served as of right in England, that Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini were unable to demonstrate that Germany was clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum for the determination of the dispute than England. The question now is whether Dr Boettcher can demonstrate that England is the more appropriate forum - where the case may most suitably be tried - than Germany (Germany being the forum identified by Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini).\n- 160. In my judgment, England is the jurisdiction where the case may most suitably be tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice. Having regard to the conclusion I reached in connection with the application for a stay, my reasons in summary are as follows:\n\t- (1) Although there were a number of alleged representations made to Dr Boettcher in a variety of jurisdictions, they were made for the purpose of recruiting Dr Boettcher as an employee of Xio UK where the normal place of work was to be in London.\n\t- (2) The contract of employment which was concluded between Dr Boettcher and Xio UK, allegedly as a result of the misrepresentations said to have been made by the Defendants, was to be governed by English law.\n\t- (3) There is a good arguable case that Dr Boettcher's claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini are governed by English law.\n\t- (4) Dr Boettcher's claims against Xio UK, Mr Geyer, Mr Pacini and Mr Qiao are best tried together in one set of proceedings, rather than being fragmented between England and Germany.\n\n## (5) Has there been a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure?\n\n- 161. There is a duty upon the applicant for permission to serve proceedings outside the jurisdiction where the application is made without notice to make full, fair and accurate disclosure of material information (significant factual, legal and procedural matters) which might reasonably be thought to weigh against the making of the order sought (Commercial Court Guide, Appendix 9, para. 6(c); *Memory Corporation v Sidhu (No 2)* [2000] 1 WLR 1443, 1460; *Tugushev v Orlov* [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7; *Valbonne Estates Ltd v Cityvalue Estates Ltd* [2021] EWCA Civ 973).\n- 162. The breach of the duty must concern the withholding of a substantial matter. As Sir Michael Burton said in *PJSC 'Pharmaceutical Firm Darnitsa' v Metabay Import/Export Ltd* [2021] EWHC 1441 (Comm) at para. 17:\n\n\"*There will be cases where the consequence of a non-disclosure can be shown to be that the order would not, or at least might not, have been made, had the truth been told. There may also be cases in which, even if the order would still have been made, the seriousness of a non-disclosure must be marked either by a discharge of the order or at any rate by a suitably penal order for costs. But in the ordinary case a judge on the return day or on a discharge application must really have his timbers shivered by something serious that has gone wrong, rather than a litany of matters that could have been put differently or could have been expanded. My timbers have not been shivered in this case* …\"\n\n- 163. It is generally inappropriate to seek to set aside an order for non-disclosure where it depends on proof of facts which are themselves in issue in the action, unless the facts are truly so plain that they can be readily and summarily established (*Tugushev v Orlov* [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7(viii)).\n- 164. If material non-disclosure is established, the court will be astute to ensure that a claimant who obtains the order sought without full disclosure is deprived of any advantage that party may thereby have derived. This is so even if the Court would have made the order had there been full and frank disclosure of the information not disclosed. Whether or not the non-disclosure was innocent is an important consideration, but not necessarily decisive (*Brink's-Mat Ltd v Elcombe* [1988] 1 WLR 1350, 1356-1357). Where the non-disclosure is deliberate, it will only be in exceptional circumstances that an order would not be discharged (*Tugushev v Orlov* [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7(ix)-(xi)).\n- 165. If a material non-disclosure is established, the Court has a discretion to (a) set aside the order without renewal, (b) set aside the order and require a fresh application (to be considered in the light of new facts which have arisen since the original application for service-out was first made), or (c) treat the claim form as validly served, and deal with the non-disclosure by a costs order (*NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina* [2011] UKSC 31; [2011] 2 AC 495, para. 136 and *Punjab National Bank (International) Ltd v Srinivasan* [2019] EWHC 3495 (Ch), para. 68(1)-(3)). The Court inclines towards the first of these options (*Evison Holdings Limited v International Company Finvision Holdings LLC* [2020] EWHC 239 (Comm), para. 60-61).\n- 166. Mr Lowenstein KC submitted that:\n- (1) The service out order should be set aside and not reinstated because Dr Boettcher was guilty of two material breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure on his without notice application. The application was determined by Waksman, J on paper on the basis of a witness statement (the first witness statement of Ms Lanceley), without the benefit of a skeleton argument.\n- (2) The first breach of the duty was a material misstatement of the *forum conveniens* test. The test is that Dr Boettcher, as the applicant, must \"*satisfy the court that in all the circumstances England is clearly or distinctly the appropriate forum for the trial of the dispute*\". The significance of the \"*clearly and distinctly*\" element was emphasised by Lord Goff in *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* [1987] AC 460. However, at paragraph 148 of Ms Lanceley's first witness statement stated that \"*CPR 6.37(3) requires Dr Boettcher to satisfy the Court that England is the proper place in which to bring the claim. In particular, the Court must be satisfied that the case can suitably be tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice*\". This evidence did not explain, as it should have done, the appropriate legal test as established in *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* and subsequent cases, namely that England is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum.\n- (3) The second breach of duty was that there was a material misstatement of the evidence and/or failure to set out an obvious defence, namely that the Offer Letter was accepted by Dr Boettcher on 16th November 2015 before the representations alleged on 17th November 2015 and any actionable representation had to be pre-contractual; therefore, the conclusion of the contract between Xio UK and Dr Boettcher could not have been influenced by the representations alleged to have been made on 17th November 2015. In addition, this alleged representation was relied on to justify the Court exercising its discretion to allow service of the proceedings outside the jurisdiction.\n- (4) These non-disclosures and misrepresentations were serious going to material matters at the heart of the service out application and culpable, being of such gravity as to warrant the exercise of the discretion to set aside the service out order. Dr Boettcher also failed to return to the Court to correct the position.\n- 167. Mr Day on behalf of Dr Boettcher submitted that:\n\t- (1) The complaint in this case is that, although Dr Boettcher correctly referred to CPR rule 6.37(3) in the without notice application, there was a material nondisclosure because the three words \"*clearly or distinctly*\" from *Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd* were not used in that application. There is nothing in this. The Court was not misled as to where the burden of proof lay, or what was involved. Ms Lanceley's description of the law is impossible to criticise. It tracks the language of CPR rule 6.37(3). Indeed, CPR rule 6.37(3) was designed to be the statutory encapsulation of the *Spiliada* formulation (*VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp* [2013] UKSC 5; [2013] 2 AC 337, para. 13; *Lungowe v Vedanta Resources Plc* [2019] UKSC 20, [2020] AC 1045, para. 66).\n\t- (2) As regards the non-disclosure relating to the alleged representations on 17th November 2015 (an allegation first raised in Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's\n\nskeleton argument), this is only relevant if the Court does not accept Dr Boettcher's case as to the representations made during the call on 6th November 2015 (which call is said by Mr Pacini to have been postponed to 17th November 2015). Even then, Dr Boettcher's case on inducement (causation) goes beyond the acceptance of the Offer Letter and extends to the separation agreement on 24th November 2015 and the commencement of Dr Boettcher's employment with Xio UK on 1st January 2016. Further, it is inappropriate to seek to set aside an order for non-disclosure where it depends on proof of facts which are themselves in issue in the action (*Tugushev v Orlov* [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7(viii)).\n\n- 168. In my judgment, there has been no breach by Dr Boettcher of his duty of disclosure in connection with the application for permission to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction. The alleged misstatement of the *forum conveniens* test was no misstatement at all. Ms Lanceley on behalf of Dr Boettcher referred to and quoted CPR rule 6.37(3). Indeed, I consider that any Commercial Judge determining such an application will have well understood the meaning and effect of this requirement. Similarly, there has been no breach of the duty of disclosure in connection with the representations alleged to have been made on 17th November 2015 for the reasons submitted by Mr Day.\n- (6) Conclusion with respect to service outside the jurisdiction\n- 169. For the reasons explained above, I am satisfied that Waksman, J's order dated 26th October 2021 was properly made in that Dr Boettcher demonstrated that there was gateway jurisdiction under CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(3) and 3.1(9)(a), that he has a real prospect of success on his claim, and that England is the appropriate forum within the meaning of CPR rule 6.37(3).\n\n# **Conclusion**\n\n- 170. For the reasons explained above, I am satisfied that the Court has and should exercise jurisdiction over Dr Boettcher's claims against Mr Geyer and Mr Pacini.\n- 171. Accordingly, I dismiss Mr Geyer's application dated 30th November 2021 and Mr Geyer's and Mr Pacini's applications dated 5th September 2022, as well as the application to stay the proceedings served as of right within the jurisdiction.\n- 172. I am grateful to counsel for their clear and helpful submissions.","body_zh":"中立引证编号： [2023] EWHC 801 (Comm)\n\n案号：CL-2021-000556\n英格兰和威尔士高等法院商务与财产法院商事法庭（KBD）\n\nRoyal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL\n\n日期：05/04/2023\n\n审理法官：\n\nPeter MacDonald Eggers KC（彼得·麦克唐纳·埃格斯御用大律师）（以高等法院副法官身份审理）\n\n当事人：\n\nDR MARKUS BOETTCHER（马库斯·博特彻博士）\n\n原告\n\n- 诉 -\n\n(1) XIO (UK) LLP（清算中）(2) CARSTEN GEYER（卡斯滕·盖耶）(3) JOSEPH PACINI（约瑟夫·帕西尼）(4) ATHENE LI（雅典娜·李）(5) MURPHY QIAO（墨菲·乔）\n\n被告\n\nWilliam Day（威廉·戴）和Anca Bunda（安卡·邦达）（由Stewarts Law LLP（斯图尔茨律师事务所）受委托）代表原告；Paul Lowenstein KC（保罗·洛文斯坦御用大律师）和Maria Kennedy（玛丽亚·肯尼迪）（由Willkie Farr & Gallagher (UK) LLP（威凯平和律师事务所〔英国〕）受委托）代表第二及第三被告\n\n开庭日期：2023年2月1日及2日\n\n核准判决书\n本人指示，不得对本判决书制作官方速记记录，并且本版本送达后，其副本可视为真实文本。\n............................. PETER MACDONALD EGGERS KC\n\n本判决书由法官通过电子邮件向各方代表发送而远程宣判，并提交至The National Archives（英国国家档案馆）。宣判日期和时间视为2023年4月5日上午10:00。\nPeter MacDonald Eggers KC：\n引言\n\n1. 2021年10月1日，原告Boettcher博士在本司法管辖区内向被告送达了本诉讼的起诉状，其中包括第二被告Geyer先生和第三被告Pacini先生。Boettcher博士就据称为诱使其与第一被告Xio UK（“Xio UK”）订立雇佣合同而作出的失实陈述请求损害赔偿。该请求基于欺诈、《Misrepresentation Act 1967（1967年失实陈述法）》以及违反注意义务而提出。\n\n2. 2021年10月19日，Geyer先生和Pacini先生均确认送达，并表示拟对管辖权提出异议。2021年10月26日，Waksman法官作出命令，准许Boettcher博士根据其不通知申请，向司法管辖区外的Geyer先生和Pacini先生送达本诉讼文件。\n\n3. Geyer先生和Pacini先生对法院是否对Boettcher博士针对他们提出的请求具有管辖权，或是否应行使该管辖权，提出异议。\n当事人\n\n4. 自2016年1月1日至2016年10月31日，Boettcher博士受雇于Xio UK，担任“Global Head of Value Creation（全球价值创造主管）”。Xio UK是Xio Group（Xio集团）的英国分支；Xio集团是一家全球另类投资公司，被描述为总部设于伦敦，并在德国、瑞士、香港和中国开展业务。\n\n5. 原告已对Xio UK及四名个人提起本案诉讼，该四名个人均作为高级管理人员或合伙人在Xio UK或Xio集团担任重要职务。\n\n(1) 第二被告Carsten Geyer先生曾任欧洲主管，是德国国籍，并在瑞士居住。\n\n(2) 第三被告Joseph Pacini先生曾任首席执行官，是意大利国籍。\n\n(3) 第四被告Athene Li女士曾任主席，是居住在中华人民共和国的中国国籍人士。Li女士与原告已达成保密和解，Li女士不再是本案被告。\n\n(4) 第五被告Murphy Qiao先生曾任中国主管，是中国国籍人士。迄今为止，Qiao先生未积极参与本诉讼。\n\n6. Boettcher博士称，在离开Xio UK后，其一直处于失业状态，直至2019年6月1日获任命为德国EY-Parthenon（安永帕特侬）的合伙人。\n\n7. 自2021年2月15日起，Xio UK一直处于清算中。\n\n8. Geyer先生和Pacini先生现为SGT Capital Group（SGT资本集团）的联席管理合伙人。SGT Capital Group是一家另类投资公司，由他们与Xio集团的其他前同事共同创立。SGT Capital注册于开曼群岛，并在德国和新加坡开展业务。\n请求\n\n9. 在受雇于Xio UK之前，Boettcher博士截至2015年一直是总部位于德国慕尼黑的Bain & Company Germany, Inc（“Bain”）的合伙人，并在私募股权行业拥有丰富经验。\n\n10. 自2015年9月至11月，Boettcher博士就受雇于Xio UK进行协商。该等协商包括多次会议和电话会议。具体而言：\n\n(1) 2015年9月29日，Boettcher博士在慕尼黑Sheraton Hotel（喜来登酒店）参加会议，并接受Xio集团董事总经理Marcel Normann先生的面试。\n\n(2) 2015年10月20日，Boettcher博士在伦敦The Shard（碎片大厦）的Xio UK办公室参加会议，并接受Tim Robson先生的面试；Robson先生亦为Xio集团董事总经理。\n\n(3) 2015年11月4日，Boettcher博士在德国杜塞尔多夫机场Maritim Hotel（马里蒂姆酒店）参加会议，并接受Geyer先生的面试。\n\n(4) 2015年11月6日，Boettcher博士与Li女士参加电话会议。Boettcher博士在德国参加该电话会议，Li女士在香港或中国其他地区参加该电话会议。\n\n(5) Boettcher博士称，2015年11月6日，其在德国与Pacini先生参加电话会议。Pacini先生对此提出异议，并称该电话会议改期至2015年11月17日举行。\n\n(6) 2015年11月7日，Boettcher博士在德国参加了另一电话会议，在该会议中接受Qiao先生的面试；Qiao先生在中国参加该电话会议。\n\n(7) 2015年11月13日，Boettcher博士（如其所称）与Pacini先生参加电话会议。Pacini先生称其不记得该电话会议，并称其当时在以色列。\n\n(8) 2015年11月17日，Boettcher博士向Pacini先生发送电子邮件，称Boettcher博士因扁桃体炎无法于当日前往伦敦，并建议“我们仅利用预定时间改为通话，以讨论有关加入Xio的后续步骤……在我于Bain的剩余任职期间”。Boettcher博士的主张是，在2015年11月17日的通话中，Pacini先生确认了在先前会议和通话中作出的所称陈述。Pacini先生称，该电话会议是原定于2015年11月6日举行的改期通话。根据证据，尚不清楚Pacini先生是否承认2015年11月17日的通话实际发生，但无论如何，其表示不记得该通话中说了什么（Pacini先生的第一份证人陈述，第7及18段）。\n\n11. 在该等会议和电话会议之间，发生了以下事件：\n\n(1) 2015年11月11日，Xio UK向Boettcher博士发送录用函，载明Boettcher博士雇佣关系的主要条款（“录用函”）。录用函规定，日后将订立进一步的服务协议。其载明：“你应于该日期前签署并向本人返还本函一份副本，以表明你接受这些条款。”\n\n(2) 2015年11月16日，UTC时间1414时，Xio集团董事总经理Marcel Normann博士通知其他Xio合伙人，Boettcher博士“已接受我们的录用，并将自2016年1月1日起加入，担任价值创造主管”。不久之后（UTC时间1418时），Boettcher博士代表Xio UK向Normann先生返还一份副签的录用函PDF，称其非常期待加入Xio UK（尽管副签日期为2015年11月17日）。当日，即2015年11月16日，Boettcher博士通知辞去其在Bain的职位。\n\n(3) 2015年11月24日，Boettcher博士在已于2015年11月16日提交辞呈后，与Bain签署离职协议。\n\n12. 2016年1月1日，Boettcher博士开始受雇于Xio UK。\n\n13. 尽管录用函预期Boettcher博士将订立服务协议，但实际上并未就任何此类服务协议达成一致，尽管Boettcher博士于2016年3月收到了一份服务协议草案。\n\n14. 2016年10月1日，Boettcher博士向Xio UK发出辞职通知，其雇佣关系于2016年10月31日终止。\n\n15. Boettcher博士称，其于2015年离开Bain并加入Xio UK，是受到一系列所称失实陈述的诱使，即Xio集团是一只私募股权基金，其管理的来自多元化投资者基础的承诺资本资金为US\\$3 billion。Boettcher博士的主张是，该等陈述不实，因为Xio集团是作为供一名中国亿万富翁Xie Zhikun先生或代表其进行匿名投资的工具而设立，而Xie Zhikun先生向Xio集团承诺的资本少于US\\$900 million。Boettcher博士的损害赔偿请求以该等所称失实陈述为依据。\n\n16. 2017年12月22日，Boettcher博士向仅以Xio UK为收件人的对象发送索赔函，载明其针对Xio UK的请求，但实质上作出Boettcher博士现于本诉讼中提出的指控。\n\n17. 2021年2月，Xio UK进入债权人自愿清算程序。\n\n18. 2021年5月20日，Boettcher博士的律师Stewarts Law致函Xio UK的清算人，随函附上诉讼详情草案和债权证明。\n\n19. 2021年6月15日，Boettcher博士的律师通过电子邮件向Geyer先生和Pacini先生发送索赔函。索赔函提及Geyer先生的地址为：(1) “Flat 10, Savile Row, London, W1S 3PZ”，以及(2) 16 Ennismore Gardens, London SW7 1AA。\n\n20. 2021年6月16日，Boettcher博士的律师向Xio UK的清算人发送索赔函，随函附上诉讼详情草案。\n\n21. 2021年6月18日，Boettcher博士的律师向Geyer先生的两个地址发送索赔函，一个位于Savile Row，另一个位于Ennismore Gardens。然而，索赔函中所提及的地址未记载包括楼号在内的完整地址，而仅载明“Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ”。\n\n22. 2021年6月22日，发送至“Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ”的索赔函被退回，并附注“Address incomplete（地址不完整）”。\n\n23. 2021年7月16日，Xio UK的律师告知Boettcher博士的律师，他们希望与Boettcher博士进行建设性接触。\n\n24. 2021年8月2日，Boettcher博士的律师向Geyer先生和Pacini先生发送电子邮件，邀请他们接受通过电子邮件送达，并提出进行诉前调解。\n\n25. 2021年9月2日，Boettcher博士的律师向Geyer先生在德国和瑞士的地址发送索赔函。Geyer先生在其证据中确认，其在瑞士收到该索赔函（Geyer先生的第一份证人陈述，第46段）。\n\n26. 2021年9月3日，Boettcher博士的律师通过邮寄方式向Geyer先生发送另一封索赔函，地址为Flat 10, 33 Savile Row, London, W1S 3PZ（“33SR”）。\n\n27. 2021年9月14日，在未收到Geyer先生回复后，Boettcher博士的律师向Geyer先生目前的营业地址（SGT Capital）以及Geyer先生在若干开曼群岛诉讼中委托的律师致函，随函附上索赔函。\n\n28. 2021年9月24日，Boettcher博士通过对全体被告签发起诉状提起本诉讼，就欺诈、根据Misrepresentation Act 1967第2(1)条以及违反注意义务请求损害赔偿。Boettcher博士就收入损失请求约€4,556,609，并就精神痛苦和/或失望和/或对其声誉及职业生涯的损害请求未量化的损害赔偿。\n诉讼文件的送达\n\n29. 2021年10月1日，Boettcher博士的律师声称通过一级邮递方式向33SR的Geyer先生送达起诉状及相关文件。Geyer先生对该送达是否有效提出异议。\n\n30. 同日，即2021年10月1日，Boettcher博士的律师还根据《2006年公司法》第1140条，向位于The Shard, Suite 1502, 32 London Bridge Street, London SE1 9SG、由Xio Group（Xio集团）代收的Pacini先生送达了诉讼程序，理由是Pacini先生是Henry Street Properties Limited（亨利街地产有限公司，一家在英格兰注册的休眠公司）的登记董事。Pacini先生并不对在The Shard向其有效送达诉讼程序提出异议。\n\n31. 2021年10月13日，Xio UK（Xio英国）提交了送达确认书，表明其拟对该项请求进行抗辩。\n\n32. 2021年10月13日，Boettcher博士在未通知的情况下向法院申请许可，以便在管辖区外向位于瑞士住址的Geyer先生及位于美利坚合众国（犹他州）住址的Pacini先生送达本诉讼程序。\n\n33. 2021年10月19日，Geyer先生和Pacini先生均提交了送达确认书，表明其拟对管辖权提出异议。\n\n34. 2021年10月26日，Waksman法官准许Boettcher博士向瑞士的Geyer先生及美国的Pacini先生送达。\n\n35. 2021年11月30日，Geyer先生申请撤销在本管辖区内向其位于33SR的地址送达诉讼程序。\n\n36. 法院作出命令延长提出管辖权异议申请的期限后，2022年9月5日，Geyer先生和Pacini先生提交了其对法院管辖权提出异议并申请撤销Waksman法官命令的申请。\n\n就对法院管辖权提出异议所产生的问题\n\n37. 在各方律师提供的极有助益的协助下，就Geyer先生和Pacini先生针对Boettcher博士提起的诉讼请求，对法院管辖权提出异议的申请所引起、需由法院裁决的问题，已得到清晰确定。\n\n38. 就在管辖区内向Geyer先生和Pacini先生送达的诉讼程序而言，问题如下：\n\n(1) 在33SR向Geyer先生送达诉讼程序是否有效？如无效，法院即不会因该等送达而对Geyer先生享有管辖权。如有效，则就向Geyer先生送达而言，下列问题即会产生；这些问题同样涉及向Pacini先生的送达（Pacini先生并不对在管辖区内向其送达的有效性提出异议）。\n\n(2) Geyer先生和Pacini先生是否有权以不方便法院为由对法院管辖权提出异议，或者其是否因法定放弃（根据CPR第11(5)(b)条）或普通法上的放弃而接受了管辖权，原因是其未及时对法院管辖权提出异议？如其已接受管辖权，则法院享有管辖权，Geyer先生和Pacini先生对管辖权提出异议的申请必须驳回。如不存在该等放弃，则产生下列问题。\n\n(3) Geyer先生和／或Pacini先生是否有权以存在另一明显且明确更适合作为裁决本争议法院地的管辖区（德国）为由，中止本诉讼程序？\n\n39. 如法院认定在管辖区内向Geyer先生和Pacini先生送达诉讼程序有效，且该等诉讼程序不应中止，则就管辖区外送达诉讼程序所产生的问题不会出现。如属相关，就在管辖区外向Geyer先生和Pacini先生送达的诉讼程序而言，产生下列问题：\n\n(1) Geyer先生和Pacini先生是否有权对法院管辖权提出异议，或者其是否因未在管辖区外送达诉讼程序后按照CPR第11(2)条提交新的送达确认书而丧失对管辖权提出异议的权利？如其已丧失对法院管辖权提出异议的权利，则法院享有管辖权，Geyer先生和Pacini先生对管辖权提出异议的申请必须驳回。然而，如其未丧失对法院管辖权提出异议的权利，则产生下列问题。\n\n(2) Boettcher博士能否证明，考虑到以下事项，其具有充分可争辩的理由表明已根据CPR PD 6B第3.1段满足相关管辖权入口条件：\n\n(a) Geyer先生和Pacini先生是否为必要或适当当事人（第3.1(3)段）；和／或\n\n(b) 据称Boettcher博士遭受的损害是否在管辖区内发生，或者是否由在管辖区内实施的行为所致（第3.1(9)段）？\n\n如未满足管辖权入口条件，则对管辖权提出异议的申请必须获准。\n\n(3) Boettcher博士能否证明，其就该项请求具有真实而非臆想的胜诉前景（即是否存在须审理的重大争议）？\n\n(4) 如满足管辖权入口条件，英格兰是否为提起该项请求的适当地点（CPR第6.37(3)条），或者德国是否为裁决本争议的适当法院地？如英格兰并非提起该项请求的适当地点，则对管辖权提出异议的申请必须获准。\n\n(5) 如英格兰为提起该项请求的适当地点，是否应因Boettcher博士被指称违反完全和坦诚披露义务，而撤销法院准许在管辖区外送达诉讼程序的许可；该义务由在未通知基础上申请该等许可的申请人承担？\n\n40. 我将依次审议上述各项问题。\n\n41. 值得注意的是，在必须证明具有充分可争辩的理由的范围内，最高法院在Four Seasons Holdings Inc v Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80; [2018] 1 WLR 192，第7段，以及上诉法院在Kaefer Aislamientos SA de CV v AMS Drilling Mexico SA de CV [2019] EWCA Civ 10; [2019] 1 WLR 3514，第72-80段中，已阐明“充分可争辩的理由”的含义，其包含以下要求：\n\n(1) 原告必须为其立场提供可信的证据基础。\n\n(2) 如就原告立场存在事实争议，或存在其他对原告立场产生怀疑的理由，法院如能可靠地作出判断，则必须根据现有材料作出判断。\n\n(3) 然而，如因问题的性质及中间申请的限制而无法作出可靠评估，即使该证据基础受到争议，只要其可信，充分可争辩的理由的门槛即已满足。在此方面，如在中间聆讯中以证人陈述书形式提供证据，除非该等证据无可辩驳地或明显地错误，否则通常不应不予采信（Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2022] EWCA Civ 35; [2022] 3 WLR 1253，第34段）。因此，如不同证人提供相互冲突的证据，则应调和该等证据；如无法调和，则为中间聆讯中所作裁决之目的，应采纳原告的证据，前提是该证据可信。\n\n管辖区内的送达\n\n42. 对于在The Shard向Pacini先生送达诉讼程序有效一事，并无争议。然而，就在33SR向Geyer先生送达诉讼程序的有效性，出现了争议。\n\n43. Geyer先生和Pacini先生均以德国明显且明确比英格兰更适合作为裁决本争议的法院地为由，寻求中止本诉讼程序。\n\n(1) 在33SR向Geyer先生送达的有效性\n\n44. CPR第6.9(2)条规定，诉状必须向个人在其“通常或最后已知住所”送达。\n\n45. 然而，CPR第6.9(3)条规定：“如原告有理由相信[CPR第6.9(2)条]所述被告地址是被告已不再居住的地址……，原告必须采取合理步骤查明被告现时住所的地址……（‘现时地址’）。”\n\n46. CPR第6.9(4)-(6)条继而规定，原告采取该等合理步骤后可以及必须采取的措施：\n\n(1) 如原告查明被告的现时地址，诉状必须在该地址送达（CPR第6.9(4)(a)条）。\n\n(2) 如原告无法查明被告的现时地址，原告必须考虑是否存在：(i) 可进行送达的替代地点；或(ii) 可进行送达的替代方法（CPR第6.9(4)(b)条）。如存在该等地点或方法，原告必须根据CPR第6.15条提出申请（CPR第6.9(5)条）。\n\n(3) 如原告无法查明被告的现时住所，且无法查明替代地点或替代方法，原告可根据CPR第6.9(2)条在被告通常或最后已知住所向其送达（CPR第6.9(6)条）。\n\n47. 在本案中，Boettcher博士于2021年10月1日声称在管辖区内向Geyer先生位于33SR的地址送达诉讼程序。Geyer先生的证据（其第一份证人陈述书第8段）及其当时律师Lydia Danon女士的证据（其第一份证人陈述书第33-36段）表明，Geyer先生自2018年1月31日起不再居住于33SR，并于2018年3月31日交还该公寓的租赁权（该租赁权原定于2018年9月11日届满）。尽管Boettcher博士不承认该等证据，但除下文所述证据外，没有与之相矛盾的证据。此外，瑞士居留证及官方函件证明，Geyer先生自2021年3月1日前后起居住于瑞士（Danon女士的第二份证人陈述书第18段）。因此，33SR并非Geyer先生的通常住所。\n\n48. 然而，代表Boettcher博士与Anca Bunda女士一同出庭的William Day先生，并非以33SR是Geyer先生的通常住所为其论点基础，而是主张33SR是其最后已知住所。\n\n49. 我获援引若干涉及“最后已知住所”概念的判例，尤其是Mersey Docks Property Holdings v Kilgour [2004] EWHC 1638 (TCC)，第62-64段；Marshall v Maggs [2006] EWCA Civ 20; [2006] 1 WLR 1945，第66、68及71段；Relfo Ltd (in liquidation) v Varsani [2009] EWHC 2297 (Ch)，第20及34段；Ivanchev v Velli [2020] EWHC 1917 (QB)，第36-38段。根据这些判例，为检验在该地址送达的有效性，就被告最后已知住所的概念可作出下列观察：\n\n(1) 原告必须证明，其具有充分可争辩的理由表明，实施送达的地址是被告的最后已知住所。这意味着，根据现有证据，原告在该问题上的论点优于被告。\n\n(2) 被告的最后已知住所无须是被告的通常住所。\n\n(3) 被告可能有一个以上的最后已知住所。\n\n(4) 被告的最后已知住所，可以是在声称送达法律程序时被告正在居住的住所，或被告曾居住但已不再居住的住所。该住所不可能是被告从未居住过的地址。\n\n(5) 在此语境下，对被告住所的知悉，是指原告的实际知悉或推定知悉，即原告通过尽合理勤勉本可获得的知悉。如被告从未在相关地址居住，即使是诚实甚至合理的相信亦不足够。\n\n（6）应以诉讼文书送达至相关地址之日为准，评估申请人的知情状况。\n\n50. 铭记上述原则后，我转而审查与博彻博士（Dr Boettcher）主张33SR是盖耶先生（Mr Geyer）的最后已知住所、且博彻博士没有理由相信盖耶先生已不再居住于该处有关的证据。当然，盖耶先生的证词是，他曾居住于33SR，但自2018年1月起已不再居住于33SR。\n\n51. 代表博彻博士的戴先生（Mr Day）依赖以下事项：\n\n（1）博彻博士理解盖耶先生居住于33SR，因为2015年12月（即他即将开始在Xio UK（Xio英国）担任新职务之前），他与盖耶先生原定一同飞往德国，并在Xio圣诞派对后共同乘坐出租车从伦敦市中心（盖耶先生在33SR被接上车）前往希思罗机场（博彻博士的第一份证人陈述，第5段）。\n\n（2）博彻博士于2016年1月加入Xio UK后，盖耶先生曾告知他，其居住于33SR，该地址是其正确的邮寄地址，该地址已被录入博彻博士的Outlook中关于盖耶先生的资料，尽管他也知道盖耶先生在法兰克福有一处房产（及家人）（博彻博士的第一份证人陈述，第6段和第9(i)段）。\n\n（3）2021年2月，博彻博士通过一项订阅数据服务，取得了开曼群岛法院（Cayman Island Court）诉讼程序中两份日期分别为2019年4月和5月、提及盖耶先生的传唤令。第一份传唤令将盖耶先生的地址列为“*16 Ennismore Gardens, London SW7 1AA, United Kingdom and/or Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ, United Kingdom*”（博彻博士的第一份证人陈述，第7至9段）。\n\n（4）2021年6月15日，博彻博士的律师通过电子邮件向盖耶先生发送了一封索赔函。该函所列地址为“Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ”及Ennismore Gardens地址。盖耶先生必定已收到该索赔函，因为没有出现“退信”或任何表明该电子邮箱地址已不再有效的自动回复；并且，尽管盖耶先生未直接回复博彻博士的律师，他向安永（EY）的一名共同联系人发送了短信，要求其向博彻博士转达一则信息（博彻博士自2019年6月起在安永工作）；博彻博士告知该共同联系人，这是他与盖耶先生之间的事项，他不希望将安永牵涉其中（Stewarts律师事务所（Stewarts Law）的洛林·兰斯利女士（Ms Lorraine Lanceley）的第一份证人陈述，第25段）。盖耶先生并未表示其已不再居住于33SR。该索赔函于2021年6月18日以邮寄方式寄往“Flat 10, Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ”（即未写明楼宇或街道号码），但因地址不完整，于2021年6月22日被退回。\n\n（5）2021年8月2日，博彻博士的律师（Stewarts律师事务所）向盖耶先生发送电子邮件，提及2021年6月15日的信函，邀请其接受通过电子邮件送达诉讼文书，并提出诉前调解。Stewarts律师事务所表示，他们“作出了合理假设，即您已安全收到并考虑过索赔函……”。该电子邮件要求盖耶先生“*confirm your preferred postal address at your earliest convenience. This information is required for the purposes of formal service of our client's claim*”。盖耶先生既未回复该信函，也未告知博彻博士的律师其已不再居住于33SR（兰斯利女士的第一份证人陈述，第35段）。\n\n（6）2021年9月3日，博彻尔博士（Dr Boettcher）的律师通过皇家邮政特别递送服务向盖耶尔先生（Mr Geyer）在33SR的地址发送了另一封索赔函，因为2021年6月18日发送的索赔函被退回，并标注“地址不完整”。该索赔函已成功送达，因为其未被退回，且皇家邮政追踪信息确认了送达（兰斯利女士（Ms Lanceley）的第二份证人陈述，第11、15-16段）。\n\n（7）2021年9月14日，在未收到盖耶尔先生回复后，博彻尔博士的律师同时致函盖耶尔先生现时的营业地址（SGT Capital（SGT资本）），以及盖耶尔先生在开曼群岛诉讼中委托的律师，随函附上索赔函，说明通信正在寄往33SR，并请求确认收悉。盖耶尔先生未回复该信函。\n\n（8）2021年9月期间，博彻尔博士聘请了一家私人调查公司菲尼克斯咨询公司（Phoenix Consultancy），该公司在2014年9月至2021年9月的数据来源中识别出非特定关联，并于2021年6月6日发现“一项已确认的关联”（兰斯利女士的第二份证人陈述，第23段）。\n\n（9）2021年9月21日，一项检索还显示，SGT Capital（盖耶尔先生的雇主）在梅费尔区斯特拉顿街（Stratton Street）的服务式办公场所设有办公点，距离33SR步行很近（兰斯利女士的第二份证人陈述，第25段）。\n\n（10）重要的是，同在2021年9月21日，斯图尔茨律师事务所（Stewarts Law）（博彻尔博士的律师）的一名高级律师助理阿尔蒂·查达女士（Ms Aarti Chadda）作证称，她从一家房地产中介处获得了33SR门房的电话号码；她致电33SR门房值班台（通话约持续一分钟）；当值门房确认盖耶尔女士（Ms Geyer）租住10号公寓，盖耶尔先生“经常被看见进出”，且任何通过皇家邮政寄给盖耶尔先生的信件都会被放入该公寓的信箱（查达女士的第一份证人陈述，第14-20段）。\n\n（11）2021年10月1日，博彻尔博士的律师声称通过普通一级邮寄方式在33SR向盖耶尔先生送达了起诉状及相关文件；该等文件未被退回（兰斯利女士的第二份证人陈述，第26段）。\n\n52. 因此，戴先生（Mr Day）提出：\n\n（1）至少存在一项可成立的证据基础（即使并非显著强于可成立的基础），表明博彻尔博士在其实际理解为盖耶尔先生在CPR rule 6.9(2)含义下最后已知住所的地点送达了诉讼文书，并且其在寻求核实该理解时已尽到超过合理程度的审慎义务。\n\n（2）博彻尔博士未收到任何与其对盖耶尔先生最后已知住所的理解相矛盾的信息。因此，博彻尔博士没有理由相信盖耶尔先生已不再居住于33SR。\n\n（3）博彻尔博士通过其律师，多次尝试联系盖耶尔先生，并寻求确认其首选的诉讼文书送达地址；尽管盖耶尔先生很可能收到了该等通信，他并未直接回复博彻尔博士或其律师，也未纠正关于其住所的任何错误。\n\n53. 代表盖耶尔先生（及帕西尼先生（Mr Pacini））出庭的保罗·洛文斯坦御用大律师（Mr Paul Lowenstein KC）与玛丽亚·肯尼迪女士（Ms Maria Kennedy）提出，在本管辖区域内并未对起诉状及诉状详情作出有效送达，因为33SR并非盖耶尔先生的“通常住所或最后已知住所”。洛文斯坦御用大律师主张，33SR并非盖耶尔先生的最后已知住所，理由如下：\n\n（1）即使依据博彻尔博士自身的证据，33SR也并非盖耶尔先生的最后已知住所：\n\n（a）在索赔函因地址不完整于2021年6月22日被退回博彻尔博士后，博彻尔博士并未继续在伦敦进行送达，而是于2021年7月26日向法兰克福市政厅请求提供盖耶尔先生在法兰克福的登记地址，并于次日收到确认，载明盖耶尔先生的地址为Hansaalee 7, 60322, Frankfurt am Main, Germany（博彻尔博士的第一份证人陈述，第21段；兰斯利女士的第二份证人陈述，第12段）。博彻尔博士向盖耶尔先生位于法兰克福的地址发送了索赔函（博彻尔博士的第一份证人陈述，第21段）。\n\n（b）2021年8月29日及30日，博彻尔博士查明盖耶尔先生自约2021年3月1日起在瑞士Wilen bei Wollerau另有一个地址，并安排将索赔函寄送至盖耶尔先生的瑞士地址（博彻尔博士的第一份证人陈述，第22及24段）。\n\n（c）最迟至2021年8月底／9月初，博彻尔博士已知盖耶尔先生居住在瑞士，此前居住在德国，盖耶尔先生并不居住于33SR，因此33SR并非盖耶尔先生的通常住所或最后已知住所。\n\n（d）当博彻尔博士于2021年10月1日声称在33SR向盖耶尔先生送达诉讼文书时（该等文件亦通过电子邮件转发），盖耶尔先生于2021年10月8日回复称，他并不居住于33SR，其居住在瑞士而非英国，并且未向博彻尔博士提供英国境内的送达地址。盖耶尔先生于2021年10月16日及其后再次表示其并不居住于33SR（达农女士（Ms Danon）的第一份证人陈述，第18及22段；兰斯利女士的第二份证人陈述，第27段）。\n\n（2）博彻尔博士援引作为其知悉盖耶尔先生住所的证据、日期为2019年4月8日的开曼群岛传票，并未提供任何证据基础以证明33SR是盖耶尔先生的通常住所或最后已知住所，理由如下：\n\n（a）至博彻尔博士声称在33SR送达诉讼文书时，该传票已是两年半前的文件。\n\n（b）该传票并非由盖耶尔先生制作，而是由代表开曼群岛诉讼原告的一家律师事务所制作。\n\n（c）该传票载有盖耶尔先生两个可能的地址：（i）“Flat 10 Savile Row, London W1S 3PZ”，该地址因缺少建筑物编号而不完整；及（ii）16 Ennismore Gardens, London SW7 1AA。\n\n（d）日期为2019年5月8日、涉及不同开曼群岛诉讼的后一份传票，仅将盖耶尔先生的地址列为Ennismore Gardens的地址。\n\n（e）Ennismore Gardens的地址，是盖耶尔先生在2019年6月提交于开曼群岛诉讼的宣誓书中提供的地址（达农女士的第一份证人陈述，第44.2段）。\n\n（3）关于查达女士所作其与33SR门房通话的证据：\n\n（a）2021年10月20日，盖耶尔先生此前的律师（库克·杨与凯丹律师事务所（Cooke Young & Keidan）的达农女士）与门房（名为“Hassam”）交谈；该门房查阅其电脑后确认，其实际上于2021年9月3日及21日在33SR大楼值班。门房确认，其不会代表盖耶尔先生接收文件，因为盖耶尔先生当时并不居住于33SR；其不记得在2021年9月21日与任何人就盖耶尔先生在33SR的居住情况进行过交谈；其“怀疑”曾与斯图尔茨律师事务所进行任何交谈；其持有该楼住户的最新名单，并知道盖耶尔先生并非其中之一（达农女士的第一份证人陈述，第53段）。\n\n（b）查达女士关于其与33SR门房电话交谈的证据存在若干缺口，包括门房姓名、与其交谈者是否为当值门房的确认、她用于致电门房的电话号码、其交谈中使用的措辞以及向门房提出的问题（达农女士的第一份证人陈述，第55-57段）。\n\n（c）查达女士的证据并未证明，就盖耶尔先生最后已知住所的问题而言，博彻尔博士的论点更具优势。\n\n（4）33SR距离SGT Capital办公室很近的证据，并不支持盖耶尔先生居住于33SR的任何结论。此外，盖耶尔先生已确认，SGT Capital在梅费尔区乃至英格兰均无办公室（盖耶尔先生的第一份证人陈述，第44.1段）。\n\n（5）菲尼克斯咨询公司的报告未明确博彻尔博士所作的指示，且该报告于2022年1月制作，距声称送达发生已有三个月（盖耶尔先生的第一份证人陈述，第50.1-50.3段）。\n\n（6）因此，博彻尔博士有充分理由相信，盖耶尔先生的最后已知住所位于瑞士，而非伦敦。\n\n（7）或者，如关于盖耶尔先生最后已知住所的证据尚无定论，博彻尔博士本可依照CPR rules 6.9(4)-(5) and 6.15向法院申请以替代方式进行送达，例如通过电子邮件送达，但其并未提出该等申请。\n\n（8）无论如何看待此事，于2021年10月1日在33SR向盖耶尔先生声称作出的送达，均不构成对其的有效送达。\n\n54. 我认为，基于下列理由，证据确立了一项可成立的论据，即就博彻尔博士所知或通过尽到合理审慎义务本应知悉的范围而言，33SR是盖耶尔先生在CPR rule 6.9(2)含义下的最后已知住所。\n\n55. 第一，盖耶尔先生一直居住于33SR直至2018年1月；在博彻尔博士任职于Xio UK（Xio英国公司）期间，盖耶尔先生曾告知博彻尔博士，其居住于33SR，但在德国亦有一处房产（及家人）。然而，盖耶尔先生当时似乎并不居住在德国（盖耶尔先生的第一份证人陈述，第46段）。\n\n56. 第二，博彻尔博士进行了多项调查，包括直接联系盖耶尔先生、使用私人调查顾问、获取关于盖耶尔先生在德国和瑞士地址的信息，以及指示其律师向33SR门房查询。该等调查显示，盖耶尔先生仍在33SR拥有住所，即使该情况并不准确，且其在德国和／或瑞士亦有住所。博彻尔博士取得的唯一可能被认为表明盖耶尔先生已不再居住于33SR的证据，是盖耶尔先生现时在瑞士拥有住所的证据。然而，盖耶尔先生拥有多个住所这一事实，并不构成33SR不能成为最后已知住所，乃至通常住所的理由（Relfo Ltd（Relfo有限公司，清算中）v Varsani（瓦尔萨尼）[2009] EWHC 2297 (Ch), para. 34）。\n\n57. CPR rule 6.9(5)仅在博彻尔博士有理由相信盖耶尔先生已不再居住于33SR时适用。然而，博彻尔博士的调查并未使其有理由相信盖耶尔先生已不再居住于33SR，尤其考虑到下文第三及第四项理由。\n\n58. 第三，博彻尔博士认定33SR为盖耶尔先生最后已知住所的一个关键步骤，是查达女士与33SR门房之间的交谈。公平地说，这是一次简短的电话交谈，但该交谈内容强化而非反驳了盖耶尔先生继续居住于33SR这一结论。查达女士的证据当然与达农女士就其本人和33SR门房交谈所作的证据不一致，前提是该门房为同一人（达农女士的交谈当然发生于送达之后）。在假定存在不一致的情况下，我无法裁定应采信哪一叙述。我认为，查达女士的证据提供了一个可成立的基础，据此可认定博彻尔博士没有理由得出盖耶尔先生已不再居住于33SR的结论，且为本申请之目的，证据中的任何冲突均无法得到解决。\n\n59. 第四，博彻博士（Dr Boettcher）通过其律师以电子邮件向盖耶先生（Mr Geyer）发送了索赔函，其中将33SR（或“Flat 10, Savile Row, London, W1S 3PZ”）列为其确定的地址。证据表明，盖耶先生已收到这些索赔函（且没有证据表明盖耶先生未收到这些索赔函），但其未采取任何措施告知博彻博士或其律师其已不再居住于33SR，尽管在博彻博士律师发送的一封电子邮件中，曾要求盖耶先生说明其首选送达地址。博彻博士有权依据盖耶先生未纠正博彻博士对于33SR是盖耶先生最后已知住所这一印象的行为。\n\n60. 当然，博彻博士在2021年10月1日于33SR向盖耶先生 purportedly 送达起诉状后不久，即获悉盖耶先生的立场是其已不再居住于33SR（兰斯利女士（Ms Lanceley）的第二份证人陈述，第27段）。当然，这与本案无关，因为33SR是否为盖耶先生最后已知住所的问题，应以送达之日（2021年10月1日）为准确定。\n\n61. 因此，我认为，根据《民事诉讼规则》（CPR）第6.9条，对盖耶先生送达本诉讼程序构成有效送达。\n\n62. 然而，问题在于，鉴于存在比英格兰更适合裁决本争议的法院，法院是否应同意中止本诉讼程序。已在英格兰被有效送达诉讼文书的盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生（Mr Pacini）申请该项中止。\n\n（2）盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生是否已接受本法院管辖？\n\n63. 博彻博士主张，盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生已接受本法院管辖，因而不得以不方便法院为由申请中止本诉讼程序。\n\n64. 2021年10月19日，盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生分别就其在本管辖区内被送达的诉讼程序提交了送达确认书。在其送达确认书中，盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生表示其拟对管辖权提出异议。根据《民事诉讼规则》第58.7(2)条，任何对管辖权提出异议的申请均须在送达确认后28日内提交，即于2021年11月16日前提交。\n\n65. 2021年10月26日，Waksman法官（Waksman, J）作出命令，准许博彻博士提出的在管辖区外向盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生送达诉讼程序的申请。\n\n66. 2021年11月10日，Cooke Young & Keidan律师事务所（Cooke Young & Keidan）代表盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生致函博彻博士的律师Stewarts Law律师事务所（Stewarts Law），表示其拟对“境内送达”提出质疑，并寻求撤销Waksman法官的命令。\n\n67. 2021年11月14日，博彻博士的律师Stewarts Law律师事务所分别致函盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生的律师Cooke Young & Keidan律师事务所，邀请其同意接受通过发送至Danon女士（Ms Danon）的电子邮件送达诉讼程序，以节省根据《海牙送达公约》进行送达的费用；该安排不损害盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生申请撤销法院2021年10月26日命令的权利，作为交换，博彻博士将同意将提交任何对法院管辖权提出异议的期限延长至2022年4月29日。无论如何，博彻博士同意将提出任何管辖权异议申请的期限从2021年11月16日延长至2021年11月30日。\n\n68. 2021年11月16日，盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生的律师就2021年11月14日的提议作出回应，表示其正在考虑该提议，并同意将盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生提交其“对境内送达提出质疑的证据”的期限延长至2021年11月30日。\n\n69. 2021年11月18日，盖耶先生拒绝博彻博士关于通过电子邮件送达诉讼文书的提议，但帕奇尼先生接受了博彻博士的提议。\n\n70. 2021年11月30日，盖耶先生提交申请通知，寻求作出如下命令：“在本管辖区内，未对第二被告有效送达起诉状和诉讼请求书。”随申请附具的命令草案规定：“本命令不得损害第二被告根据《民事诉讼规则》第11部分提出的任何申请，亦不得被解释为第二被告接受本法院管辖。”为支持该申请而送达的Danon女士第一份证人陈述在第63段中载明：“为免生疑义，本证人陈述及该申请总体上均不损害D2对英格兰和威尔士法院管辖权所提出的异议。本证人陈述中的任何内容均无意表明D2接受该管辖权。D2提出该申请，不应被视为已在针对其的诉讼请求中采取任何步骤。”\n\n71. 2021年12月8日，Stewarts Law律师事务所代表博彻博士向盖耶先生的律师发送函件，称：“如确定博彻博士已在本管辖区内有效向盖耶先生送达，盖耶先生即已丧失对管辖权提出质疑的权利。”Stewarts Law律师事务所于2021年12月10日再次通过电子邮件提出同一点。\n\n72. 2021年12月15日，经各方同意，法院作出命令，延长盖耶先生和帕奇尼先生提交及送达其对管辖权提出质疑和／或撤销法院2021年10月26日准许博彻博士在管辖区外送达诉讼程序之命令的申请的期限。从该命令的措辞可明显看出，延长期限仅限于保留各方关于在管辖区外送达诉讼程序的立场，并不涉及在33SR向盖耶先生送达诉讼程序。该命令明确规定：\n\n“本命令及第二或第三被告对此的同意，均不得损害第二或第三被告根据《民事诉讼规则》第11部分提出的任何申请（就第二被告而言，为对管辖区外送达提出质疑；除就第三被告能否在命令中确定的相关地址被适当送达所作的任何论证外），亦不得被解释为第二或第三被告接受本法院管辖，或第二被告接受本案送达。”\n\n73. 同日，即2021年12月15日，法院就提交回应盖耶先生2021年11月30日申请的证据的日期作出另一项命令。该命令亦记载：\n\n“本命令及第二被告对此的同意，均不得损害第二被告根据《民事诉讼规则》第11部分提出的、对管辖区外送达提出质疑的任何申请，亦不得被解释为第二被告接受本法院管辖，或第二被告接受本案送达。”\n\n74. 随后，经各方同意，法院作出若干命令，延长Geyer先生（盖耶尔）和Pacini先生（帕西尼）“对管辖权提出异议及/或撤销2021年10月26日命令”的期限。\n\n75. 2022年9月5日，Geyer先生和Pacini先生发出申请通知，请求作出命令，撤销Waksman法官（沃克斯曼）于2021年10月26日作出的准许在管辖区外送达的命令，并作出命令，“宣告英格兰法院（英格兰法院）对针对第二被告或第三被告提起的请求均无管辖权审理，或者其将不行使管辖权”。\n\n76. Day先生（戴）代表Boettcher博士（伯彻）援引上述事项主张，Geyer先生必须在2021年11月30日前以不方便法院为由提交中止诉讼程序的申请，但由于届时未提出该等申请，Geyer先生“应被视为已接受法院有管辖权审理该请求”（CPR rule 11(5)）。Day先生主张，这构成依法对管辖权的接受（Deutsche Bank AG London Branch v Petromena ASA [2015] EWCA Civ 226; [2015] 1 WLR 4225, para. 36）。就Pacini先生未能于2022年9月5日前，就于2021年10月1日在The Shard（碎片大厦）向Pacini先生送达的诉讼程序，以不方便法院为由提交对法院管辖权提出异议的申请，Day先生提出了类似主张。为支持该论点，Day先生援引下列情形：\n\n（1）Geyer先生和Pacini先生首次声称通过以不方便法院为由请求中止于2021年10月1日在33SR向Geyer先生送达诉讼文书而提起的诉讼程序，对法院管辖权提出异议，是在2022年12月23日Willkie Farr & Gallagher (UK) LLP（威凯律师事务所〔英国〕有限责任合伙）（Geyer先生和Pacini先生的律师）的Duncan Speller先生（邓肯·斯佩勒）的第二份证人陈述第11段及第13(a)段中。该日期晚于2021年11月30日（就Geyer先生而言）及2022年9月5日（就Pacini先生而言）的期限。\n\n（2）然而，截至2022年12月，Geyer先生和Pacini先生已依CPR rule 11(5)接受管辖权。\n\n（3）如有必要，在已被告知未就于2021年10月1日在管辖区内送达的诉讼程序申请对法院管辖权提出异议的后果后，Geyer先生和Pacini先生同意于2021年12月15日作出的命令，将构成普通法上对管辖权的接受（Deutsche Bank AG London Branch v Petromena ASA [2015] EWCA Civ 226; [2015] 1 WLR 4225, para. 32）。\n\n（4）Geyer先生或Pacini先生均未申请延长提出该等申请的期限，以便就向其在管辖区内送达的诉讼程序对法院管辖权提出异议。\n\n77. 我不接受Geyer先生和Pacini先生依CPR rule 11(5)或普通法接受管辖权，因而被排除在外、不得以不方便法院为由申请中止诉讼程序的主张，理由如下，且这些理由彼此相关。\n\n78. 首先，CPR rule 11(5)仅要求被告在《民事诉讼规则》规定并经法院延长的期限内提出申请，对法院管辖权提出异议。在本案中，Geyer先生和Pacini先生均已提交并送达对法院管辖权提出异议的申请。\n\n79. 法院延长提交申请期限的命令，除提及任何撤销Waksman法官于2021年10月26日作出的命令的申请外，还明确提及“对管辖权提出异议”的申请。2021年12月15日作出的第一项命令明确规定，其不损害“第二被告或第三被告根据CPR Part 11提出的任何申请（就第二被告而言，涉及对管辖区外送达提出异议，并保留关于是否可以在命令所确定的相关地址向第三被告适当送达的任何论点），亦不得被解释为第二被告或第三被告接受法院管辖权，或第二被告接受本诉讼程序中的送达”。同样，于2021年12月15日作出的另一项命令规定，“本命令及第二被告对此的同意，均不损害第二被告根据CPR Part 11提出的、对管辖区外送达提出异议的任何申请，亦不得被解释为第二被告接受法院管辖权，或第二被告接受本诉讼程序中的送达”。根据我对这些规定的理解，各方同意并命令，Geyer先生和Pacini先生并未被禁止对管辖权提出异议（但Pacini先生不得对其已在管辖区内被有效送达提出异议），且他们并未接受管辖权。\n\n80. Geyer先生于2021年11月30日（就于33SR向其送达诉讼文书而言）以及Geyer先生和Pacini先生于2022年9月5日提交了对管辖权提出异议的申请。诚然，这些申请并未提及就管辖区内送达的诉讼程序，以不方便法院为由请求中止诉讼程序，但一旦Geyer先生和Pacini先生在获准期限内提出对管辖权提出异议的申请，即不能说双方接受了管辖权。因此，我看不出CPR rule 11(5)所述依法接受管辖权如何能够发挥任何作用。同样，我不认为任何知悉案情的“无利害关系旁观者”会得出结论，认为Geyer先生和Pacini先生的行为构成对其挑战管辖权权利的明确放弃，从而产生普通法上对管辖权的接受（即上诉法院在Deutsche Bank AG London Branch v Petromena ASA [2015] EWCA Civ 226; [2015] 1 WLR 4225, para. 32中认定的类型）。\n\n81. 一旦Geyer先生和Pacini先生通过及时提交相关的对管辖权提出异议申请而对管辖权提出异议，其后为支持其申请而提出补充论点这一事实，并不意味着他们放弃了依赖在提出申请后可能想到的该等补充论点，以进一步支持其申请的权利（当然，如补充论点在很晚阶段才提出，可能损害对方当事人或违反首要目标，则会产生不同考量，但本案中并无此种主张）。\n\n82. 因此，依我判断，Geyer先生和Pacini先生并未丧失主张法院应以不方便法院为由中止向当事人在管辖区内送达的诉讼程序的权利。\n\n（3）德国是否为更适当的审判地？\n\n法律\n\n83. Geyer先生和Pacini先生均在管辖区内被送达诉讼程序。因此，为支持其以不方便法院为由申请中止诉讼程序，他们有责任证明，与英格兰相比，存在一个明显且显著更适合裁决双方当事人争议的审判地。这构成上议院在Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 476-478（另见VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp [2013] UKSC 5; [2013] 2 AC 337, para. 190）中规定的、对被告提出此类中止诉讼程序申请进行裁决的第一阶段。该标准考察案件应在何处审理，“更适合所有当事人的利益及实现司法公正”（Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 474, 482-484）。\n\n84. 即使被告履行该举证责任，如原告证明存在其他因素，致使原告在替代审判地面临被剥夺司法公正的真实风险，法院仍可拒绝中止诉讼程序。这是Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd规定的法院审理该申请的第二阶段。\n\n85. 上诉法院最近在Município de Mariana v BHP Group (UK) Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 951, [2022] 1 WLR 4691, para. 333中概述了该立场：\n\n“当被告在本地依法被送达的诉讼中，以不方便法院为由请求中止诉讼程序时适用的基本原则，已在Spiliada [1987] AC 460和Kyrgyz Mobil [2012] 1 WLR 1804中得到权威确认。被告必须履行举证责任，使法院确信存在另一有管辖权且可供使用的审判地，该审判地明显且显著更适合作为审理案件的审判地，能够更适合所有当事人的利益及实现司法公正：Spiliada at pp 476c, 476E, 477E。这是第一阶段。如被告履行该责任，若原告以有力证据证明存在因而要求法院拒绝中止诉讼程序的情形，法院仍将拒绝中止，尤其是在有力证据证明原告在外国审判地无法获得司法公正的真实风险已得到确立时：Spiliada at p 478D-E, Kyrgyz Mobil at paras 91-95。这是第二阶段。”\n\n86. 该方法的第一阶段要求被告向法院证明，除英格兰外，存在一个显然更适合审理双方当事人争议的管辖区。被告“依法”在管辖区内被送达这一事实是重要考量（Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd ed.) para. 13.39），但这并不意味着只有在罕见案件中才应当命令中止诉讼程序；另一方面，也不应轻易准许中止。法院必须明确确信，除英格兰外存在一个应由当事人在其中公正裁决其争议的管辖区。被告在管辖区内被送达这一事实的重要性，在被告与该管辖区具有实质联系时更为重大，但该联系也可能较不实质。该联系的深度构成法院对Spiliada方法第一阶段考量的一部分。\n\n87. 在Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd案中，Goff勋爵（戈夫）在第477页称：\n\n“我认为，被告承担的责任不仅是表明英格兰并非审理案件的自然或适当审判地，而是证明存在另一可供使用的审判地，其明显或显著比英格兰审判地更适当。如此，便可适当顾及管辖权已在英格兰依法确立这一事实（见MacShannon's case [1978] A.C. 795，Salmon勋爵意见）；此外，在礼让具有重要性的事项上，似乎将能在主要普通法管辖区之间形成广泛共识。我还要补充，如在任何案件中，被告与英格兰审判地的联系较为脆弱（例如，其在短暂访问本国期间被送达诉讼程序），则其应更容易证明，境外存在另一明显更适合审理案件的审判地。”\n\n88. 鉴于下列判例与评注（包括 Spiliada Maritime Corp（斯皮利亚达海事公司） v Cansulex Ltd（坎苏莱克斯有限公司） [1987] AC 460, 477-478, 481-482；Konkola Copper Mines plc（孔科拉铜矿公众有限公司） v Coromin（科罗明） [2006] EWCA Civ 5；[2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 437, para. 27；VTB Capital plc（VTB资本公众有限公司） v Nutritek International Corp（纽崔泰克国际公司） [2013] UKSC 5；[2013] 2 AC 337, para. 10；Tugushev（图古舍夫） v Orlov（奥尔洛夫） [2019] EWHC 645 (Comm), para. 263-264；Lungowe（隆戈韦） v Vedanta Resources Plc（韦丹塔资源公众有限公司） [2019] UKSC 20；[2020] AC 1045, para. 66, 75, 82-84；Briggs（布里格斯）, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments(7th ed.), para. 22.12-22.15；Dicey, Morris & Collins（戴西、莫里斯和柯林斯）, on the Conflict of Laws (16th ed.), para. 12.034-12.035），法院在判断英格兰是否是较适宜的法院地，抑或另一司法管辖区是否较适宜时可以考虑的因素，包括但绝不限于：\n\n（1）争议事实要素与相互竞争的司法管辖区之间的联系。\n\n（2）管辖该项交易的法律。\n\n（3）争议双方在引发争议的事件发生时及诉讼进行期间的所在地。\n\n（4）申请人与被申请人之间有关争议的诉讼，是否会因法院可能作出的中止或不予中止裁定而被分割；以及是否会在一个以上司法管辖区出现并行诉讼，从而产生在该等司法管辖区作出不一致判决的风险。\n\n（5）书面证据的所在地及可得性（尽管这是否构成实质性的实际考量，取决于该等文件能否容易地以数字形式复制和传输，以及是否存在仅须在特定地点审阅的文件库）。\n\n（6）证人的所在地及可得性（须注意，如证据能够或将会以符合公正公平程序要求的远程方式提供，则最后一项考量可能得到缓解）。\n\n89. 考虑相关因素将有助于法院判断诉讼织物中的经线通向何处，从而确定争议重心所在；但对上述各项因素的审查亦应通过对事项的整体视角加以评估（Erste Group Bank AG (London)（第一储蓄银行股份公司〔伦敦〕） v JSC 'VMZ Red October'（股份公司“VMZ红十月”） [2015] EWCA Civ 379；[2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 149；Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (7th ed.), para. 22.17）。\n\n90. 即使案件的规模和分量清楚表明争议应由英格兰以外的司法管辖区裁决，若存在真实风险，即任何一方当事人不会得到公正对待，或争议不会在该另一司法管辖区得到公正处理，亦即在任一情形下均存在在该另一法院地发生重大不公的真实风险，法院仍可能拒绝中止诉讼。第二阶段的审查超出但很可能包括对将争议与该另一司法管辖区相联系的因素的考量（Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th ed.), para. 12-041）。该审查并不涉及仅因程序法或实体法方面对争议解决方式存在差异这一事实。这可能涉及考量：如作出中止裁定，原告是否会被不公正地剥夺一项合法的个人或法律优势（Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 482-484）。\n\n法律的适用\n\n91. Geyer先生（盖耶尔先生）和Pacini先生（帕奇尼先生）的主张是，德国显然且明显地是解决当前争议的更适宜法院地。\n\n92. 代表Geyer先生和Pacini先生的 Lowenstein KC（洛文斯坦御用大律师）提交称，英格兰并非、德国才是明显或显著最适宜的法院地，理由如下：\n\n（1）没有任何参与方以英格兰为所在地。\n\n（2）所称损害发生于德国，而非英格兰。\n\n（3）据称由Geyer先生和Pacini先生作出的任何陈述，均非在英格兰作出。据称Geyer先生并未在英格兰境内或自英格兰作出任何订约前陈述；Geyer先生与 Boettcher博士（伯切尔博士）唯一重要的互动发生在Dusseldorf Airport（杜塞尔多夫机场）。据称Pacini先生于6th November 2015自英格兰参加电话会议，但据Pacini先生称，该会议被延期。事实上，除Boettcher博士于20th October 2015在The Shard（碎片大厦）与 Robson先生（罗布森先生）举行的一次会面外（Robson先生并非本案被告），Boettcher博士均自德国参加所有相关会面和电话会议。\n\n（4）据称Pacini先生于6th、13th及17th November 2015三次作出相关陈述，但该等陈述均不构成可诉事项，原因在于：\n\n（a）据称于6th November 2015进行的电话会议被延期至17th November 2015（Pacini先生的第一份证人陈述，第7-11及13段；Pacini先生的第二份证人陈述，第6-9及11段），尽管Boettcher博士对此提出异议（Boettcher博士的第二份证人陈述，第7-11段）。\n\n（b）据称于13th November 2015进行的电话会议，并未在诉状详情第18段中提出主张（该段载明据称向Boettcher博士作出的陈述）；该项主张于很晚阶段才首次提出（Boettcher博士于28th November 2022作出的第二份证人陈述第13段）；且Pacini先生当日身在以色列，并不记得该电话会议（Pacini先生的第二份证人陈述，第10段）。\n\n（c）据称于17th November 2015进行的电话会议，即使确有发生，也是在Boettcher博士于16th November 2015签署并交回聘用函、同意受雇于Xio UK（Xio英国）之后才进行，因此作出时间过晚，不能构成可诉事项。\n\n（5）Boettcher博士此前在 Bain（贝恩公司）任职的职位以德国为所在地；在离开Xio UK后，他在 EY-Parthenon（安永帕特农）担任的下一职位（自2019起）亦在德国。\n\n（6）Boettcher博士在Xio UK期间，其职位主要以德国为中心；他在德国居住并领取薪酬，尽管他亦在伦敦、特拉维夫及加利福尼亚为Xio UK开展部分工作。未签署的服务协议载明：“[Boettcher博士]的通常及惯常居住地为德国”。\n\n（7）Xio Group（Xio集团）的主要办事处位于香港，其大部分运营活动在亚洲进行；Xio Group相当大比例的董事会会议在德国、以色列和荷兰举行（Pacini先生的第二份证人陈述，第24-25段）。Xio UK的信息技术及人力资源职能分别自中国和香港管理，团队建设活动则在法国、上海和伦敦举行（Geyer先生的第二份证人陈述，第11-14段）。\n\n（8）根据 Rome II Regulation（《罗马II条例》）的 Article 4(1)，管辖Boettcher博士请求的法律为德国法，因为Boettcher博士的住所地在德国和/或居住于德国；在接受Xio UK的职位前，他在 Bain Germany（贝恩德国）工作约十五年；其在Xio UK任职期间有相当长时间自德国工作；此后又接受了EY在德国的职位；且Boettcher博士的金钱损失发生于相关收款银行账户所在地（Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2015] EWCA Civ 379；[2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 94-96），而Boettcher博士承认其银行账户位于德国（Boettcher博士的第二份证人陈述，第20段）。Rome II Regulation的 Article 4(3)无助于Boettcher博士，因为无法证明该等失实陈述与英格兰之间的联系比与德国之间的联系“显然更为密切”。Article 12(1)不适用，因为一方的Boettcher博士与另一方的Geyer先生和/或Pacini先生之间不存在直接、现实存在或拟议的合同关系。在本案中，雇佣合同始终仅存在于Boettcher博士与Xio UK之间。\n\n（9）对于实质上相同的问题，不存在或不存在真实风险，即不同司法管辖区的法院会作出不一致的裁决，因为Geyer先生和Pacini先生已提出接受 German courts（德国法院）的管辖。\n\n（10）由于Xio UK正在清算中，其不会参与该争议，因此文件披露更有可能聚焦于Boettcher博士、Geyer先生和Pacini先生个人持有的记录。\n\n93. Lowenstein KC进一步提交称，Boettcher博士在作为其住所地所在国的德国不会遭受任何不公，因为英国法规定的较长六年时效期间（相较于德国法规定的三年时效期间）并非一项合法的法律优势；Boettcher博士在2017年12月考虑向Xio UK提出请求并向其寄送索赔函时，未在德国提起保护性诉讼程序，属不合理行为；而且，即使英格兰的诉讼未被中止，因德国法为准据法，德国适用的时效期间亦将在英格兰适用。此外，Boettcher博士已表明，如对其有利，他愿意在德国采取行动：于2021年12月，其德国律师在信函中威胁称，若Geyer先生不承诺避免在英格兰诉讼中就Boettcher博士作出虚假陈述，将在德国采取法律行动（Geyer先生的第一份证人陈述，第25-31段；Geyer先生的第二份证人陈述，第15段；Geyer先生的第三份证人陈述，第9-13段）。\n\n94. 代表Boettcher博士的 Day先生（戴先生）提交称，鉴于下列考量，Geyer先生和Pacini先生未能完成证明德国明显且显著地比英格兰更适宜作为法院地的举证责任：\n\n（1）Geyer先生和Pacini先生目前并不以德国为住所地。若在德国对Geyer先生和Pacini先生提起诉讼，德国法院是否会行使管辖权存在实际疑问，因为他们并不以德国为住所地，亦不存在特别管辖权依据。事实上，他们并未提出接受德国法院的管辖。\n\n（2）在引发该请求的事件发生时，Geyer先生居住于英格兰。Pacini先生的证据是，他于2015年并未居住于英格兰（Pacini先生的第二份证人陈述，第15-18段）；Boettcher博士的证据是，Pacini先生的妻子于2015年12月告诉他，她当时居住于英格兰，这表明Pacini先生当时同样居住于英格兰（Boettcher博士的第二份证人陈述，第33段）。\n\n（3）所有证人均能流利使用英语。唯一以德国为住所地的文件保管人及证人是Boettcher博士；他希望在英格兰继续本案诉讼，而非在德国重新提起诉讼。\n\n（4）Xio Group现在及过去均未在德国设有业务。Day先生向我援引了一份新闻稿，其中对Xio Group的描述如下：“总部设在伦敦的XIO Group是一家全球另类投资公司，雇用了一支由逾70名专业人士组成的国际团队。该公司的员工及其顾问网络涵盖逾15个国籍，并在英国、德国、瑞士、香港和中国大陆开展业务”（另见 Danon女士（达农女士）的第一份证人陈述，第10段）。\n\n- (5) 审判将着重审查的所有基础性文件很可能为英文或中文文件（Lanceley 女士（兰斯利女士）的第一份证人陈述，第151段）。\n- (6) Boettcher 博士（博特歇尔博士）针对被告提出的请求，基于据称在招募 Boettcher 博士、促使其同意与 Xio UK（Xio英国）订立雇佣合同的过程中，于不同场合作出的若干虚假陈述。该等场合包括：参与者身处伦敦或德国的电话会议（尽管没有证据表明 Geyer 先生（盖耶尔先生）和 Pacini 先生（帕西尼先生）在这些场合身处德国），或其他地点；在伦敦进行的一次面试；以及 Geyer 先生与 Boettcher 博士在杜塞尔多夫机场举行的一次会议。\n- (7) 所称的虚假陈述均旨在诱使 Boettcher 博士离开 Bain（贝恩），并在伦敦的 Xio UK 担任高级职位。Boettcher 博士的专属办公室及私人助理均位于伦敦，尽管其曾前往德国、以色列以及后来的美国履行职责（Boettcher 博士的第二份证人陈述，第41-42段）。Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生在伦敦也设有办公室，并且当时分别居住在伦敦和萨里，但也经常出行；Xio UK 的其他雇员主要以伦敦为工作地点，且大多居住在伦敦或其附近（Boettcher 博士的第二份证人陈述，第43-48段）。\n- (8) Boettcher 博士的雇佣合同及服务协议草案均受英格兰法律和管辖权约束，并将伦敦确定为 Boettcher 博士的“通常工作地点”（Boettcher 博士的第二份证人陈述，第40段；Lanceley 女士的第一份证人陈述，第77段）。\n- (9) 如中止针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生的诉讼程序，将导致一方面针对二人的诉讼程序，与另一方面针对 Xio UK 和 Qiao 先生（乔先生）的诉讼程序相互割裂。\n- (10) Boettcher 博士有充分可争辩的理由主张，根据《罗马II条例》第12(1)条，其请求受英格兰法律管辖，因为该等陈述是为诱使其签署与 Xio UK 订立、并将受英格兰法律管辖的雇佣合同而作出；或者，根据《罗马II条例》第4(1)条，其请求受英格兰法律管辖，因为该地是 Boettcher 博士遭受损害之处。然而，即使德国法为适用法律，本院亦十分熟练于审议基于外国法的证据及陈述。\n- 95. Day 先生（戴先生）进一步主张，即使 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生已证明德国显然且明显比英格兰更为适宜的法院地，这也将对 Boettcher 博士造成不公，因为他必须在德国重新提起诉讼程序，但该等程序可能已超过时效，因为德国适用三年的时效期间，且时效自2020年12月起已开始计算（Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th ed.), para. 12-049; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd ed.) para. 13.82）。然而，如申请人承诺在外国诉讼程序中放弃以时效届满作为抗辩，则该因素可能被中和（Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd ed.) para. 13.83），但本案中并未提出此类放弃。尽管如此，Boettcher 博士的立场是，即使适用德国法，也不应存在时效抗辩，因为为此目的的时效期间计算已被中止。\n\n- 96. 鉴于诉讼程序已当然在英格兰送达，问题并非英格兰是否为最适宜的法院地，而是德国是否显然且明显比英格兰更为适宜的法院地。\n- 97. 我认为，Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生未能证明，就裁决本争议而言，德国显然且明显比英格兰更为适宜的法院地。我的理由如下。\n- 98. 首先，关于所称陈述作出的时间及作出方式，作为向 Boettcher 博士传达的事项，不能说其与德国的联系在任何程度上大于其与英格兰的联系。\n- 99. 将所称陈述的作出与德国联系起来的重要因素是：Boettcher 博士目前位于德国并以德国为住所地；在德国举行了两次会议（在慕尼黑和杜塞尔多夫），据称在会议中作出了订约前陈述（其中一次涉及 Geyer 先生）；以及据称举行的电话会议中，Boettcher 博士身处德国。然而，Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生，以及事实上代表 Xio UK 或 Xio Group（Xio集团）的任何其他人，均非从德国参与这些电话会议。\n- 100. 将所称陈述的作出与英格兰联系起来的重要因素是，据称向 Boettcher 博士作出的陈述是代表 Xio UK 作出的。Xio UK 设在英格兰，Xio Group 的欧洲总部也位于英格兰。其中部分陈述是在英格兰作出的，即在碎片大厦举行的一次会议期间，以及可能从英格兰作出的（即 Pacini 先生于2015年11月6日作出的陈述）。\n- 101. 按照 Boettcher 博士的主张，在签署要约函之前及之后作出了若干陈述。该等陈述是在英格兰、德国和／或其他地点作出及接收的。在此情形下，难以将这些陈述作为整体归属于某一司法管辖区。当然，不能将其归因于仅在或主要在德国发生。\n- 102. 双方就证据是否支持这些陈述作出的时间及作出方式进行了大量辩论；然而，陈述的内容并非双方陈词的主题。我无法就有关陈述作出的时间及作出方式的论点确定哪一方更有理据，并且不愿如此行事，因为我不认为这将有助于确定德国而非英格兰是否为更适宜的法院地。然而，我就其中两项陈述作出评论：\n\t- (1) 第一项是据称于2015年11月13日作出的陈述。Boettcher 博士目前并未就该陈述提出经诉状陈述的主张。因此，为本次申请之目的，我不予考虑该陈述。如 Boettcher 博士希望将该陈述作为其请求的一部分予以依赖，则必须申请许可修改其诉讼请求书。即使该陈述已在诉状中陈述，也不会改变我就本次申请作出的决定。\n\n（2）第二项是据称于 17th November 2015 作出的陈述。Lowenstein KC（洛温斯坦御用大律师）先生公允地指出，该陈述作出于 Boettcher（伯切尔）博士于 16th November 2015 与 Xio UK（Xio英国公司）订立雇佣合同之后。然而，Boettcher 博士的主张基于其依赖该陈述及其他被指称的陈述，不仅订立该合同并于 16th November 2015 向 Bain（贝恩）发出辞职通知，而且还于 24th November 2015 与贝恩签署离职协议，并于 1st January 2016 开始受雇于 Xio UK（Particulars of Claim, para. 21）。在其第二份证人陈述中，Boettcher 博士于第15段称：“该等陈述在 17 November 2015 的电话中被重复，并影响了我加入 [Xio UK] 的决定。我承认，我于 16 November 2015 签署并交回了聘用函。然而，这只是我离开贝恩，以及我随后因加入 [Xio UK] 而遭受损害的其中一个步骤。我直到 24 November 2015 才与贝恩签署离职协议。在此之前与被告方进行的所有讨论均影响了我加入 [Xio UK] 的决定。”\n\n103. 第二，Boettcher 博士提出的案件涉及被指称由被告方或代表被告方作出的陈述的真实性或虚假性，包括 Geyer（盖耶）先生和 Pacini（帕奇尼）先生作出的陈述，即 Xio Group（Xio集团）是一家私募股权基金，其管理的来自多元化投资者基础的承诺资本资金为 US$3 billion。对于任何被指称陈述真实性的调查，并不会仅仅或主要聚焦于德国的资金来源或投资。\n\n104. 第三，我认为，一个重要的连接因素是，Boettcher 博士是被招募为 Xio UK 工作，而作出这些陈述的目的，是聘用 Boettcher 博士在英格兰为 Xio UK 工作。Xio UK 的业务以伦敦为基地。尽管 Boettcher 博士亦在其他国家（包括德国）履行其职责，但就其作为 Xio UK 雇员履行职责而言，主要地点应当是且确实是英格兰。聘用函以 Boettcher 博士“依法有权在英国工作”为条件，且未提及任何其他国家。未签署的服务协议规定：“雇员的正常工作地点应为有限责任合伙企业位于伦敦的主要办公室。然而，雇员应按有限责任合伙企业不时要求或决定，前往并在英国或其他地方的任何营业地点工作……”该雇佣合同拟适用英格兰法，因为聘用函提及英格兰立法（Working Time Regulations 1998）。看来对于英格兰法是 Boettcher 博士雇佣合同的准据法，并无争议。\n\n105. 当然，我也理解 Boettcher 博士在受雇于 Xio UK 期间居住在德国，但仅凭此点，并不能使德国成为较英格兰更适宜审理本争议的法院地。\n\n106. 此外，Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生在 Xio UK 的伦敦办公室亦有业务存在，至少在他们在伦敦设有办公室和私人助理这一意义上如此。\n\n107. 第四，支撑在英格兰审理本案的实际考量，例如证人和书证所在地，并不倾向于德国，当然也不倾向于英格兰。Boettcher 博士过去及现在均定居于德国，但其他证人位于别处。在可以公正地远程提供证据的范围内，证人所在地较少构成实际便利问题。Xio UK 的业务在英格兰开展，因此，大量可能必须披露的文件，可以说最初位于英格兰。当然，Xio 集团的业务在多个司法管辖区开展，而文件的数字复制表明，为此目的，该等文件可能位于英格兰以及其他司法管辖区。我还注意到，书证将以英文或中文载明，但我并不认为这是将本争议与某一司法管辖区而非另一司法管辖区相联系的事项。\n\n108. 第五，重要的是，就目前情况而言，针对 Xio UK、Geyer 先生、Pacini 先生及 Qiao（乔）先生的一组诉讼程序正在进行中。如中止目前针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生的诉讼程序，则将会或可能会有两组诉讼程序——在英格兰以及或许在德国——均涉及相同的事实争点。当然，可以说，针对正在清算且显然没有大量资产的 Xio UK，以及针对迄今未积极参与本诉讼程序的 Qiao 先生的诉讼程序是否会继续，尚存疑问。然而，在现阶段，这纯属推测。事实上，Xio UK 已提交送达确认表，推定是根据清算人的指示，表明其拟对该项主张进行抗辩，并且确已由大律师和事务律师在本诉讼程序中代理。\n\n109. 第六，涉及适用于 Boettcher 博士针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生之主张的法律。双方对于适用法是依据 Rome II Regulation（《罗马II条例》）第12(1)条，或备选地第4(1)条的英格兰法（依 Boettcher 博士的主张），还是依据第4(1)条的德国法（依 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生的主张），存在重大争议。\n\n110. 依我判决，有充分可争辩的理由认为适用法为英格兰法：\n\n（1）Boettcher 博士关于英格兰法适用于其针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生之主张的论证更为有力，至少根据 Rome II Regulation 第4(1)条；该条规定：“……适用于因侵权行为/不法行为产生的非合同义务的法律，应为损害发生地所在国的法律，而不论引起该损害的事件发生于何国，亦不论该事件的间接后果发生于何国。”在本案中，Boettcher 博士就被指称的虚假陈述所主张的损害赔偿，源于其与 Xio UK 订立雇佣合同，尤其是其关于收入损失以及精神痛苦和/或失望和/或声誉损害的赔偿主张。因此，其依赖被指称的虚假陈述而与 Xio UK 订立雇佣合同，以及其随后受雇于 Xio UK，构成相关损害。该雇佣合同于 Xio UK 收到 Boettcher 博士通过电子邮件发送的对聘用函的接受时订立——即 Boettcher 博士于 16th November 2015 通过电子邮件将副签后的聘用函 PDF 交回 Xio UK 而作出的通知——该邮件或在 Xio UK 的电子邮件服务器上收到，或在指定收件人阅读时收到（Chitty on Contracts, (34th ed., 2021), para. 4-061, 4-099, 4-100）。因此，该雇佣合同在英格兰订立（Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th ed.), para. 35-026; MX1 Ltd v F [2018] EWHC 1041 (Ch); [2018] 1 WLR 5553, para. 39(8)；这类似于在 Brussel Regulation Recast 第7(2)条的语境下，相关合同在英格兰签署时有害事件发生于英格兰：Aspen Underwriting Ltd v Credit Bank Europe NV [2018] EWCA Civ 2590; [2019] 1 Lloyd's Rep 221, para. 136-138；该案在上诉中被推翻，但并非基于此理由：[2020] UKSC 11; [2021] AC 493）。此外，Boettcher 博士与 Xio UK 之间的该合同应适用英格兰法，并应在很大程度上于英格兰履行。援引第4(3)条亦不会得出不同结论，因为我不认为被指称的虚假陈述与德国“显然具有更密切的联系”。\n\n（2）与 Lowenstein KC（洛温斯坦御用大律师）的陈述相反，我不认为，就第4(1)条而言，Boettcher 博士（伯彻博士）银行账户所在地构成其所受损害发生地，因为不同于 Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening [2009] EWHC 716 (Comm); [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 47, para. 57-58 以及 Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, para. 94-96 中的情形——在该等案件中，相关款项按合同约定应支付至指定银行账户——Boettcher 博士在本案中主张的损失并不涉及被告本应向其支付的款项。无论如何，构成 Boettcher 博士所称“直接损害”的，是其与 Xio UK（Xio英国）订立雇佣合同这一事实（《罗马II条例》序言第(16)项；Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws（第16版），para. 35-024）。\n\n（3）《罗马II条例》第4条的适用以第12(1)条不适用为前提。第12(1)条规定，因导致订立合同的交易或谈判而产生的非合同义务（例如作出陈述时产生的义务），应适用该合同所适用的法律。在这方面，我已得出结论，Geyer 先生（盖耶先生）和 Pacini 先生（帕奇尼先生）关于第12条不适用于针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生之请求的论证更为可取（Angola v Perfectbit Ltd [2018] EWHC 965 (Comm), para. 200; Avonwick Holdings Ltd v Azitio Holdings Ltd [2020] EWHC 1844 (Comm), para. 160-164; Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws（第16版），para. 35-090；Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation, para. 12.07-12.08）。不过，我注意到一种可能显得不协调的情况：对于针对作出失实陈述以诱使原告订立合同的合同当事人所提出的请求，可能适用一种法律；而对于就同一失实陈述针对代表该合同当事人的代理人所提出的请求，则可能适用另一种法律。在本案中，无论适用第4条还是第12条，这种潜在的不协调均不会出现，因为依我之见，有充分可争辩的理由认为应适用英格兰法。\n\n（4）我补充指出，适用法律问题可能必须在审判中作出最终裁断，而我在这方面的结论仅为处理当前申请之目的。当事人当然可在审判中分别就适用法律提出其主张。\n\n111. 在此情形下，我并不确信德国显然且明确地比英格兰更适合作为裁决本争议的法院地。倘若我得出相反结论，除一项事项外，鉴于处理不方便法院问题的两阶段方法中的第二阶段，我不会认定存在 Boettcher 博士在德国无法获得公正对待的真实风险。在此方面，Boettcher 博士依赖以下事实——双方对此并无争议：如适用英格兰法，则针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生的请求并未超过时效；但如适用德国法，则时效期间较短，不过对于该等请求是否已依德国法超过时效存在争议。\n\n112. 德国存在一项在英格兰不会适用的时效抗辩，这很可能是一项正当利益；如中止当前诉讼，Boettcher 博士可能会丧失该利益（见 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 482-484；Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws（第16版），para. 12-049）。然而，《罗马II条例》在英格兰和德国均适用，因此，确定适用法律的法律至少在理论上是相同的。本案并非两个司法管辖区确定适用法律的法律不同的情形；该法律是相同的。此外，如英格兰法院在审判中认定德国法为适用法律，则德国法规定的较短时效期间很可能根据 Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 适用。因此，因可能的时效抗辩而产生的任何风险，都是两个不同法院适用同一法律而得出不同结论的风险。然而，如在德国诉讼中适用德国时效法时，提起英格兰诉讼的起诉状不被视为中断时效，但在英格兰诉讼中却被如此视为，则可能已发生不公正。在该情况下，即使 Boettcher 博士关于根据德国法时效中止的论点无法使其免于在德国面临时效抗辩，该论点仍可能使其免于在英格兰面临时效抗辩。\n\n（4）关于在管辖区内送达的结论\n\n113. 基于上述理由，鉴于 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生均已在管辖区内依法获送达诉讼文书，且德国并非显然且明确地更适合作为裁决该争议的法院地，我拒绝中止当前诉讼。因此，英格兰法院有权并应当对 Boettcher 博士针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生的请求行使管辖权。\n\n114. 因此，无需审议 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生提出的申请，即撤销 Waksman 法官于 26th October 2021 作出的准许 Boettcher 博士向管辖区外送达诉讼文书的命令。然而，鉴于双方就该申请提出了完整论证，我将对此加以处理。\n\n管辖区外送达\n\n115. 于 26th October 2021，Waksman 法官作出命令，准许向位于瑞士的 Geyer 先生及位于美国的 Pacini 先生在管辖区外送达诉讼文书。该命令系根据 Boettcher 博士的单方申请作出。\n\n116. 于 5th September 2022，在经双方同意作出的延长提出该申请期限的命令之后，Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生申请作出命令，宣告英格兰法院对针对其二人中任何一人提起的请求不具有管辖权，或将不行使管辖权进行审理，并撤销 Waksman 法官的命令，理由是针对两名被告中任何一人均不存在应予审理的实质争议，Boettcher 博士无法证明其针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生的请求属于 CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1 所列其所援引的任何依据，且英格兰并非对针对两名被告中任何一人提出该请求的适当地点。Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生还主张，应撤销 Waksman 法官的命令，因为 Waksman 法官未获益于 Boettcher 博士在其申请准许于管辖区外送达诉讼文书时负有义务提供的完整披露。\n\n117. 我将审议该申请。然而，只有当我在前一部分中所作的结论（涉及在管辖区内送达诉讼文书）错误时，该申请才具相关性。\n\n118. 为此，重要的是牢记，为使在管辖区外送达具有合法性，必须满足的要求（见 AK Investments CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2021] UKPC 7; [2012] 1 WLR 1804, para. 71）。在 Soriano v Forensic News LLC [2021] EWCA Civ 1952; [2022] QB 533 一案中，Warby 上诉法官就管辖区外送达及方便法院的法律，在 para. 11-12 中作出如下概述：\n\n“11. 这已得到充分确立。就当前目的而言，可充分归纳如下。法院仅在满足三项条件时，方可准许向管辖区外的被告送达请求。\n\n(1) 第一项条件是，该请求属于 CPR PD 6B 所列的某一‘管辖门槛’范围内（‘管辖门槛要求’）。就此问题，原告必须使法院确信其具有充分可争辩的理由，或者有时称为，其论证更为可取。这意味着‘高于存在应予审理的实质争议或存在真实胜诉前景，但未达到以盖然性权衡标准证明的程度’：AstraZeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corpn [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 510, para 24 (Hamblen J)。\n\n(2) 第二，原告必须使法院确信，其就该请求具有真实而非臆想的胜诉前景（‘实体审查标准’）。对此的一种表述是，原告必须证明任何‘反向’简易判决申请均会失败。\n\n(3) 第三，‘除非法院确信英格兰和威尔士是提出该请求的适当地点，否则法院不会准许’：CPR r 6.37(3)（‘法院地审查标准’）。这通常参照关于适当法院，或以经典用语称为审理该请求的 forum conveniens 的‘Spiliada’原则加以解决：见 Spiliada Maritime Corpn v Cansulex Ltd (The Spiliada) [1987] AC 460, 478-480 (Lord Goff of Chieveley)。问题在于，本司法管辖区是否‘显然或明确地’为最适当的法院地。适当法院是在其中‘为所有当事人的利益及为实现司法公正，案件最适宜审理’的法院。首先应考虑的是何为‘自然法院地’，即与该诉讼‘具有最真实和实质性联系’的法院地。如法院认定另一法院地与英格兰同样适当或更为适当，通常将拒绝准许。同样，该问题并非依盖然性权衡标准确定；原告的任务是表明其在该问题上的论证更为可取。如其未能做到，申请将被驳回。\n\n12. 寻求准许在管辖区外送达的原告，始终就所有这些问题承担法律上的举证责任。无论该事项是在初始的单方阶段由原告提出申请时审议，还是在其后被告申请撤销准许管辖区外送达命令的听证中审议，均是如此。然而，质疑该命令的被告须指明另一具有管辖权的法院地；即使在初始申请中，也须存在另一具有所需管辖权的候选法院地：Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies (UK) Ltd [2020] Bus LR 2422, paras 96-97。如被告基于特定理由对原告主张本案适合管辖区外送达提出异议，则被告就该理由承担证据责任：见 AstraZeneca（上引案）paras 33–39 (Hamblen J)。”\n\n- 119. 然而，Boettcher博士（博彻博士）对本申请提出了一项先决异议，即Geyer先生（盖耶尔先生）和Pacini先生（帕奇尼先生）已丧失就域外送达诉讼程序事项对法院管辖权提出异议的权利，原因是——尽管两名被告均在诉讼程序于管辖区内送达后提交了送达确认书——二人均未在域外送达后就该域外送达提交送达确认书。我将首先审议该先决异议。\n\n- （1）Geyer先生和Pacini先生是否已丧失对管辖权提出异议的权利？\n\n- 120. 2021年10月1日，Boettcher博士在管辖区内向Geyer先生和Pacini先生送达了诉讼程序。\n\n- 121. 2021年10月19日，Geyer先生和Pacini先生均提交了送达确认书，表明其拟对管辖权提出异议。\n\n- 122. 2021年10月26日，Waksman法官（沃克斯曼法官）作出命令，准许在管辖区外向Geyer先生和Pacini先生送达诉讼程序。\n\n- 123. 在诉讼程序于管辖区外送达后，Geyer先生和Pacini先生均未提交（额外的）送达确认书。\n\n- 124. 代表Boettcher博士的Day先生（戴先生）主张，《民事诉讼规则》第11部分仅允许已依照《民事诉讼规则》第10部分提交送达确认书的被告提出管辖权异议。《民事诉讼规则》第11.2条规定：“希望提出此类申请［即请求作出对法院管辖权提出异议，或认为法院不应行使管辖权的命令］的被告，必须首先依照第10部分提交送达确认书。”《民事诉讼规则》第10.1(3)(b)条同样规定：“如……被告希望对法院管辖权提出异议，则必须提交送达确认书。”因此，Day先生主张，由于Geyer先生和Pacini先生从未确认域外送达的诉讼程序（而非确认在管辖区内送达的诉讼程序），该等情形禁止Geyer先生和Pacini先生基于域外送达对管辖权提出异议，因为《民事诉讼规则》的这些规定具有强制性（Mansard Mortgages 2007-2 plc v Beyat Holdings Ltd [2021] EWHC 3355 (Ch), 第37-39段）。\n\n- 125. 我不接受该项主张，理由很简单：Geyer先生和Pacini先生均已提交送达确认书，表明其拟对管辖权提出异议。我已在上文另一语境中论述了其送达确认书的重要性。在当前语境中，提交送达确认书的重要性在于回应送达的诉讼文书、出庭应诉（包括提供其代理人详情），并表明其意图（是抗辩该项诉请还是对管辖权提出异议）。Geyer先生和Pacini先生已通过其于2021年10月19日提交的送达确认书表格完成上述事项。\n\n- 126. 我认为，提交第二份送达确认书不会推进这一立场。事实上，《民事诉讼规则》第11部分、第10部分或第58.6条均未设想提交多于一份送达确认书，唯一例外是对法院管辖权提出异议的申请未获成功这一特殊情形（《民事诉讼规则》第11.7条）；在该情形下，第一份送达确认书不再有效。\n\n- 127. 我还注意到，Waksman法官的命令要求Geyer先生和Pacini先生“在送达诉讼请求书后［分别为21日或22日］届满之日或之前提交送达确认书”，或者提交承认书或提交答辩书。对我而言，并不明显Waksman法官知悉Geyer先生和Pacini先生已提交送达确认书（考虑到申请准许域外送达是在提交送达确认书之前提出，但命令是在提交送达确认书之后作出）。无论如何，Waksman法官作出的命令规定了提交送达确认书的截止日期，但未规定可提交该确认书的期间起算日期。此外，法院其后作出的同意命令延长了Geyer先生和Pacini先生在拟提出管辖权异议申请时提交该申请的期限；但该等命令并未规定延长提交第二份送达确认书的期限。若法院或当事人的意图是要求提交第二份送达确认书，则本应在这些同意命令中作出规定。\n\n- 128. 因此，依我之判决，Geyer先生和Pacini先生并未因未提交第二份送达确认书而丧失就域外送达的诉讼程序对管辖权提出异议的权利。\n\n- （2）管辖权连接点是否得到满足？\n\n- 129. Boettcher博士在提出域外送达许可申请时，援引了《民事诉讼规则实践指引6B》第3.1段规定的下列管辖权依据。\n\n- 130. 第一，《民事诉讼规则实践指引6B》第3.1(3)段规定，在下列情形下，经法院许可，原告可以在管辖区外送达起诉状：\n\n“针对已向或将向其送达起诉状的人（‘被告’）提出诉请（并非依赖本段送达），且——\n\n- （a）原告与被告之间存在适宜由法院审理的真实争议；并且\n- （b）原告希望向作为该诉请必要或适当当事人的另一人送达起诉状。”\n\n- 131. 第二，《民事诉讼规则实践指引6B》第3.1(9)(a)及(b)段规定，在下列情形下，经法院许可，原告可以在管辖区外送达起诉状：\n\n“就侵权行为提出诉请，而——\n\n- （a）损害已在或将会在管辖区内发生；［或］\n- （b）已发生或将会发生的损害，源于已在或可能在管辖区内实施的行为……”\n\n（a）Geyer先生和Pacini先生是否为必要或适当当事人？\n\n- 132. 为使原告可依赖《民事诉讼规则实践指引6B》第3.1(3)段，以确立法院对被告的管辖权（见The Libyan Investment Authority v Credit Suisse International [2020] EWHC 1387 (Comm), 第9段），原告必须具有胜诉可能性较高的可争辩理由，证明：\n\n\t- （1）原告已对另一名被告，即“锚定被告”提出诉请，且该被告已被或将被送达诉讼程序。\n\t- （2）原告与锚定被告之间存在适宜由法院审理的真实争议。\n\t- （3）该被告是针对锚定被告的该项诉请中的必要或适当当事人。\n\n- 133. 应以提出域外送达诉讼程序许可申请之日为时点评估这些事项（Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, 第44段；Satfinance Investment Ltd v Athena Art Finance Group [2020] EWHC 3527 (Ch), 第43段）。\n\n- 134. 当事人之间存在争议的是上述要求中的第二项，即Boettcher博士与Xio UK（Xio英国公司）之间是否存在适宜由法院审理的真实争议。\n\n- 135. 代表Boettcher博士的Day先生主张：\n\n\t- （1）假定可对Pacini先生确立管辖权，则就拟在管辖区外向Geyer先生送达的任何诉讼程序而言，Pacini先生可作为锚定被告；同样，假定可对Geyer先生确立管辖权，则就针对Pacini先生的任何诉请而言，Geyer先生可作为锚定被告。\n\t- （2）无论如何，作为第一被告的Xio UK可就拟向Geyer先生和／或Pacini先生送达的诉讼程序作为锚定被告，鉴于Xio UK已在管辖区内获送达起诉状，鉴于Xio UK拟对该项诉请进行抗辩，且鉴于Boettcher博士决意将针对Xio UK的诉请提交审判，尽管Xio UK正处于清算中。就此应当注意：（a）Xio UK在Waksman法官命令作出日前一周提交了送达确认书，表明其拟对针对其的诉请进行抗辩；（b）2022年3月，Xio UK通过受其委托的律师申请命令中止针对其的诉讼程序，或延长送达答辩书的期限；该申请于2022年11月4日经同意命令被驳回，该命令要求Xio UK如有答辩，应于2022年11月16日之前送达答辩书，但并未送达任何该等答辩书，且尽管已要求Xio UK的律师解释未送达答辩书的原因，亦未收到对该函件的答复；（c）Xio UK的清算人拒绝将Boettcher博士的诉请确认为无力偿债财产中的债务（相比之下，在Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, 第78(i)段中，原告已被列入债权人名单）；（d）Boettcher博士将寻求追究清算人的责任，以调查并追诉那些利用Xio UK作为“幌子”来隐瞒通过该公司进行的投资真实性质之人的诉请；以及（e）Boettcher博士对清算程序中提交的其他债权证明的有效性存有真实担忧，并将寻求适当披露该等债务，但清算人已拒绝披露（Lanceley女士（兰斯利女士）的第五份证人陈述，第44-49段）。\n\n- 136. 代表Geyer先生和Pacini先生的Lowenstein御用大律师（洛温斯坦御用大律师）主张：\n\n\t- （1）由于《民事诉讼规则实践指引6B》第3.1(3)段并非基于诉请的任何地域联系，“在依照［该连接点］将外国被告纳入本法院管辖权时，始终必须谨慎”，尤其是在仅为对外国被告行使管辖权之目的而起诉锚定被告的情况下（AK Investments CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2021] UKPC 7; [2012] 1 WLR 1804, 第73、79段）。\n\t- （2）Xio UK并非适当的锚定被告，因为在下列情况下，Xio UK与Boettcher博士之间不存在适宜由法院审理的真实争议：（a）Xio UK知悉该诉讼程序，但正在清算中，且未采取任何步骤对该诉讼程序提出异议（Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2015] EWCA Civ 379; [2015] 1 CLC 706, 第78(i)及79段）；（b）考虑Xio UK在诉讼程序中成为积极被告的可能性具有相关性，而Xio UK不大可能成为积极被告，因为其资产甚少（Speller先生（斯佩勒先生）的第一份证人陈述，第30段）（Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (7th ed.), 第24.10段，脚注105）。\n\n137. 依我判断，就Xio UK（希奥英国）作为锚定被告而言，Boettcher博士（博彻博士）关于可依据CPR PD 6B第3.1(3)段所载理由行使管辖权的主张更具说服力。这是因为，博彻博士主张，他因Xio UK及其他被告，包括Geyer先生（盖耶尔先生）和Pacini先生（帕奇尼先生）作出或代表其作出的陈述而受诱使，与Xio UK订立雇佣合同。因此，针对Xio UK的请求与针对盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生提出的请求密不可分地关联。重要的是，博彻博士和Xio UK均表示有意就其之间的争议进行诉讼。事实上，在博彻博士提出申请并导致Waksman法官作出命令后不足一周，Xio UK通过其律师，推定系根据清算人的指示，提交了一份送达确认书，表明其有意对该请求进行抗辩。此外，Lanceley女士代表博彻博士所说明的继续追究该项请求的理由，解释了为何博彻博士在相关日期有意在本诉讼中继续追究Xio UK。\n\n138. 我还要补充，如我已认定在33SR向盖耶尔先生送达诉讼文书无效，我亦会认定盖耶尔先生是博彻博士针对帕奇尼先生所提出请求的必要当事人或适格当事人；帕奇尼先生已在本管辖区内依法获得送达。\n\n(b) 所主张的损害是否在本管辖区内发生，或因在本管辖区内实施的行为而发生？\n\n139. 为使博彻博士能够根据CPR PD 6B第3.1(9)段，就其针对盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生的侵权请求取得管辖权，他必须具有良好可争辩理由证明：\n\n(1) 损害已在或将会在本管辖区内发生；或\n\n(2) 已发生或将会发生的损害，系因在本管辖区内实施或可能实施的行为所致。\n\n140. 就第一项要求（第3.1(9)(a)段）而言，只要在英格兰发生了实质性损害即为足够，无论损害是否亦在管辖区外发生（Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391, 437）。在FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC v Lady Brownlie [2021] UKSC 45; [2021] 3 WLR 1011第74段中，Lloyd-Jones勋爵（劳埃德-琼斯勋爵）谨慎地说明，该项要求不应按照为《布鲁塞尔条例（重述）》之目的所采纳的严格程度加以解释，尤其是在纯粹经济损失请求（如本案）的情形中。另一方面，如财务损失过于遥远，则不足以满足该项要求。Lloyd-Jones勋爵在第75段中称：\n\n“……就此而言，实体损害与‘本身完全具有经济性质的侵权行为所产生的财务后果’之间存在重要区别。纯粹经济损失的性质要求对遥远影响所产生的法律后果加以限制，并可能引发关于损害发生地的复杂且困难的问题，因而需要对交易进行审慎分析。因此，致损事件所产生的较为遥远的经济后果不足以构成管辖权依据。”\n\n141. 在本案中，博彻博士关于损害已在英格兰发生的主张更具说服力，至少在其因所主张的不实陈述而与Xio UK订立的雇佣合同，于Xio UK收到博彻博士以电子邮件发送的对《要约函》的接受后在英格兰订立的范围内如此。这与为《罗马Ⅱ条例》第4条之目的认定英国法为准据法的推理相同（见上文），当然，相关法定条文的要求并不相同。\n\n142. 就第二项要求，即存在在本管辖区内实施并导致相关损害的行为（第3.1(9)(b)段）而言，由于被主张存在多项陈述，且各项陈述均在不同地点作出和／或接收，因此这是一个更为复杂的审查。显然，就在英格兰举行的面对面会议期间作出的陈述而言（尤其是在The Shard举行的会议），该项要求得到满足。就德国举行的会议而言，该项要求未获满足。就电话会议期间作出的陈述而言，情况更为复杂。因此，由于我无须处理该问题，鉴于我基于第3(1)(9)(a)段作出的决定，我倾向于不予处理。\n\n关于管辖权连接点的结论\n\n143. 基于上述理由，我已认定，博彻博士具有良好可争辩理由证明，本案满足CPR PD 6B第3.1(3)段及第3.1(9)(a)段的要求。\n\n(3) 博彻博士对该项请求是否具有真实的胜诉可能性？\n\n144. 原告对该项请求具有真实胜诉可能性的要求，应按照简易判决申请所适用的相同标准加以判断。该问题通常表述为，就实体而言必须存在有待审理的“重大争点”（AK Investments CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2021] UKPC 7; [2012] 1 WLR 1804, para. 71; The Libyan Investment Authority v Credit Suisse International [2020] EWHC 1387 (Comm), para. 8）。\n\n145. Lowenstein御用大律师（Lowenstein KC）提出，不存在该等重大争点，理由如下，且各项理由彼此独立：\n\n(1) 就盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生两人而言，适用于该等请求的法律为德国法，且该请求根据德国法已于December 2020时效届满。\n\n(2) 就帕奇尼先生而言，博彻博士无法证明曾作出任何可诉的不实陈述。\n\n146. 就第一项论点而言，仅为本申请之目的，我已形成如下观点：博彻博士关于适用英国法而非德国法的主张更具说服力。然而，即使假定德国法适用，尽管双方一致承认德国法规定适用三年的时效期间，博彻博士仍对其请求已根据德国法时效届满提出争议。\n\n147. 博彻博士（Dr Boettcher）的主张是，根据德国法，在通常时效期间的部分期间内，时效已被中止至少九日，而该九日为克服时效抗辩所必需，因此该诉请及时提出，理由如下：\n\n（1）有一项规则规定，在协商期间时效中止；在盖耶尔先生（Mr Geyer）及帕奇尼先生（Mr Pacini）仍为Xio集团（Xio Group）的高级管理人员期间，博彻博士与Xio UK（Xio英国）进行了长期的诉前通信。这是应在审判中解决的事实问题。\n\n（2）地址变更可以中止时效期间的进行。然而，当事人各自的德国法专家对于在时效期间已经开始计算后发生地址变更是否会导致时效期间中止存在分歧。德国法专家之间的该等分歧突显了这是一个可供审理的问题。\n\n148. 因此，即使我已认定盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生关于德国法为准据法的论点更具说服力，我也会认定在时效问题上存在应予审理的重大争议。\n\n149. 关于认为就针对帕奇尼先生作出的失实陈述指控不存在应予审理的重大争议这一论点中的第二项，洛温斯坦御用大律师（Mr Lowenstein KC）提出：\n\n（1）博彻博士称，帕奇尼先生于2015年11月6日、13日及17日与其参加了电话会议。上述指称均不具有提出失实陈述请求的真实而非臆想的可能性，原因是：\n\n（a）博彻博士没有真实前景证明2015年11月6日的通话确曾发生，因为该通话被推迟至2015年11月17日。\n\n（b）没有证据表明，如2015年11月13日的通话确曾发生，其间作出了任何可诉的陈述。所称通话并未载入诉状，直至博彻博士于2022年11月28日提交的第二份证人陈述中才提出。因此，博彻博士没有真实前景能够基于证据证明该通话具有可诉性。\n\n（c）即使2015年11月17日的通话确曾发生，该通话亦发生于要约函（Offer Letter）签署并交回之后。因此，帕奇尼先生不可能意图使博彻博士依赖据称于2015年11月17日作出的任何陈述，以诱使其与Xio UK建立雇佣关系。\n\n150. 关于上述第一点，这是一个实质性的事实争议。代表博彻博士的戴先生（Mr Day）称，帕奇尼先生未提出任何书面证据证明2015年11月6日的通话已被取消且未曾发生。因此，我认为就此存在应予审理的重大争议。\n\n151. 关于所称于2015年11月13日发生的通话，我已于上文予以审议。所称陈述未载入诉状，因此我在当前申请中不予考虑。\n\n152. 关于2015年11月17日的通话，如上所述，尽管洛温斯坦御用大律师正确指出该通话发生于要约函获接受之后，博彻博士的请求基于其依赖该陈述，于2015年11月24日与贝恩（Bain）订立离职协议，并于2016年1月1日开始在Xio UK任职。因此，就此存在应予审理的重大争议。\n\n153. 因此，我认为存在应予审理的重大争议，且博彻博士就其针对盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生已在诉状中提出的请求具有真实的胜诉前景。\n\n（4）英格兰是否为适当法院？\n\n154. CPR rule 6.37(3)规定：“除非法院确信英格兰和威尔士（England and Wales）是提起该请求的适当地点，否则法院不会准许[在辖区外送达]。”\n\n155. 在Soriano v Forensic News LLC [2021] EWCA Civ 1952; [2022] QB 533一案中，沃比上诉法官（Warby, LJ）就CPR rule 6.37(3)于第11(3)段指出：“通常参照有关审理请求的适当法院，或（以经典术语表述）forum conveniens的‘Spiliada’原则解决此问题……问题在于，本辖区是否‘显然或明确地’为最适当者。适当法院是指案件‘最适宜为了所有当事人的利益及实现司法目的而受审’的法院。首先须考虑的是何为‘自然法院’，即与该诉讼‘具有最真实及实质性联系’的法院。如法院认定另一法院与英格兰同样适当或较英格兰更适当，通常将拒绝准许。再次强调，该问题并非依优势证据标准裁定；原告的任务是证明其在该问题上的论点更具说服力。如其未能做到，申请将被驳回。”\n\n156. 代表博彻博士的戴先生提出：\n\n（1）如该请求将依法继续针对盖耶尔先生或帕奇尼先生中的任何一人进行，这将是因为盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生未能证明德国显然且明确地是更适当的法院。在此情况下，CPR rule 6.37(3)规定的标准必然得到满足。如该请求依法继续进行，法院不能认为其自身并非提起该请求的适当地点。且不会再有其他替代法院可供考虑；盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生除德国外未提出任何其他法院。\n\n（2）另一方面，如盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生能够在分析的先前阶段使法院确信德国显然且明确地是更适当的法院，博彻博士将承认英格兰并非提起该请求的适当地点；这意味着，在分析的后一阶段举证责任倒置并由其承担时，CPR rule 6.37(3)规定的标准无法得到满足。\n\n157. 我认为，戴先生的二分立场并不完全准确。这是因为，尽管英格兰作为裁定争议的法院的相对适当性，对于已依法在辖区内送达程序时提出的中止程序申请至关重要，且对于申请准许在辖区外送达程序亦至关重要，但举证责任存在实质差异（Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 480-481）。如程序已依法在辖区内送达，被告负有证明另一法院显然且明确地较英格兰更适合裁定当事人之间争议的责任。如程序拟经法院准许在辖区外送达，原告负有证明英格兰是最适宜为了所有当事人的利益及实现司法目的审理案件的法院的责任，尽管被告有责任指明替代法院（Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies (UK) Ltd [2020] UKSC 37; [2021] 1 All ER 1141, para. 94, 96）。\n\n158. 当事人参照相同的考量因素，在已于辖区内送达程序的中止程序申请中，以及在申请准许于辖区外送达中，就forum [non] conveniens问题进行了陈述。\n\n159. 我已认定，就依法在英格兰送达的程序而言，盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生未能证明德国显然且明确地较英格兰更适合裁定该争议。现须考虑的问题是，博彻博士能否证明英格兰较德国更为适当——即案件最适宜受审之处——（德国为盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生所指明的法院）。\n\n160. 我认为，英格兰是最适宜为了所有当事人的利益及实现司法目的审理本案的辖区。鉴于我就中止程序申请所作出的结论，理由概述如下：\n\n（1）尽管据称在多个辖区向博彻博士作出了若干陈述，但这些陈述是为了招募博彻博士担任Xio UK的雇员，其通常工作地点本应位于伦敦。\n\n（2）据称因被告所作的失实陈述，博彻博士与Xio UK订立的雇佣合同应受英格兰法管辖。\n\n（3）存在具有充分可争辩性的案件，表明博彻博士针对盖耶尔先生和帕奇尼先生的请求受英格兰法管辖。\n\n（4）博彻博士针对Xio UK、盖耶尔先生、帕奇尼先生及乔先生（Mr Qiao）的请求，最适宜在同一组程序中一并审理，而非分散于英格兰和德国审理。\n\n（5）是否违反了全面且坦诚披露义务？\n\n161. 在未经通知提出申请的情况下，申请准许在辖区外送达程序的申请人负有全面、公平且准确披露重大信息的义务，该等信息包括可能被合理认为不利于作出所寻求命令的重要事实、法律及程序事项（Commercial Court Guide, Appendix 9, para. 6(c); Memory Corporation v Sidhu (No 2) [2000] 1 WLR 1443, 1460; Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7; Valbonne Estates Ltd v Cityvalue Estates Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 973）。\n\n162. 对该义务的违反必须涉及隐瞒实质性事项。正如迈克尔·伯顿爵士（Sir Michael Burton）在PJSC 'Pharmaceutical Firm Darnitsa' v Metabay Import/Export Ltd [2021] EWHC 1441 (Comm)第17段所述：\n\n“在某些案件中，可以证明未披露的后果是，如果如实陈述，则该命令不会作出，或者至少可能不会作出。也可能存在这样的案件：即使命令仍会作出，未披露的严重性也必须通过撤销该命令，或至少通过作出适当具有惩罚性的费用命令来体现。但是，在通常案件中，法官在复庭日或撤销申请中，必须确实因某些严重错误而受到震动，而非面对一连串本可作不同表述或本可加以扩展的事项。本案并未使我受到震动……”\n\n163. 如撤销不披露裁定须依赖于对本案争议事实的证明，则通常不宜申请撤销该裁定，除非该等事实确实如此明确，以致可以迅速并经简易程序予以确立（Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7(viii)）。\n\n164. 如已证实存在重大不披露，法院将谨慎确保，未经充分披露而取得所请求裁定的原告，丧失该方可能因此获得的任何利益。即使法院在已对未披露信息作出充分且坦诚披露的情况下亦会作出该裁定，亦是如此。不披露是否属无意，是一项重要考量，但不一定具有决定性（Brink's-Mat Ltd v Elcombe [1988] 1 WLR 1350, 1356-1357）。如不披露系故意为之，除非情况例外，否则裁定将被撤销（Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7(ix)-(xi)）。\n\n165. 如已证实存在重大不披露，法院有酌处权：(a) 撤销裁定且不予续发；(b) 撤销裁定并要求重新提出申请（该申请应根据首次提出境外送达申请后出现的新事实予以审理）；或(c) 将起诉状视为已获有效送达，并以费用命令处理不披露问题（NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina [2011] UKSC 31; [2011] 2 AC 495, para. 136 and Punjab National Bank (International) Ltd v Srinivasan [2019] EWHC 3495 (Ch), para. 68(1)-(3)）。法院倾向于上述第一种选择（Evison Holdings Limited v International Company Finvision Holdings LLC [2020] EWHC 239 (Comm), para. 60-61）。\n\n166. Lowenstein KC（洛文斯坦御用大律师）先生陈述：\n\n(1) 境外送达裁定应予撤销且不应恢复，因为 Boettcher（伯切尔）博士在其无通知申请中两次实质性违反充分且坦诚披露义务。该申请由 Waksman, J（瓦克斯曼法官）根据一份证人陈述（Lanceley（兰斯利）女士的第一份证人陈述）在书面材料基础上作出裁定，且未获益于书面提纲。\n\n(2) 第一项违反义务的行为，是对不方便法院原则检验标准的重大错误陈述。该标准是，作为申请人的 Boettcher 博士必须“使法院确信，在一切情况下，英格兰显然或明确是审理该争议的适当法院”。“显然和明确”这一要素的重要性，已由 Goff（戈夫）勋爵在 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 中强调。然而，Lanceley 女士第一份证人陈述第148段载称：“CPR 6.37(3)要求 Boettcher 博士使法院确信，英格兰是提起该项诉请的适当地点。尤其是，法院必须确信，为全体当事人的利益及为实现司法公正，该案件能够获得适当审理。”该证据未能如其本应所为，阐明由 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd 及后续案件确立的适当法律标准，即英格兰显然且明确是更为适当的法院。\n\n(3) 第二项违反义务的行为，是对证据的重大错误陈述及／或未陈述一项显而易见的抗辩，即 Boettcher 博士于2015年11月16日接受了要约函，而该日早于所指称于2015年11月17日作出的陈述；任何可诉陈述均须为合同订立前作出。因此，Xio UK（Xio英国公司）与 Boettcher 博士之间合同的订立，不可能受到所指称于2015年11月17日作出的陈述影响。此外，该项被指称的陈述被援引，以证明法院行使其酌处权，准许在管辖区外送达诉讼程序具有正当性。\n\n(4) 该等不披露和错误陈述严重涉及境外送达申请核心的重大事项，且具有可归责性；其严重程度足以证明行使酌处权撤销境外送达裁定具有正当性。Boettcher 博士亦未返回法院纠正该情况。\n\n167. Day（戴）先生代表 Boettcher 博士陈述：\n\n(1) 本案的指控是，尽管 Boettcher 博士在无通知申请中正确提及 CPR rule 6.37(3)，但由于该申请未使用 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd 中的“显然或明确”三个词，故构成重大不披露。该指控毫无根据。法院并未被误导有关举证责任由何方承担或其所涉内容。Lanceley 女士对法律的说明无可指摘。该说明遵循 CPR rule 6.37(3) 的措辞。事实上，CPR rule 6.37(3) 旨在成为对 Spiliada 表述的法定概括（VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp [2013] UKSC 5; [2013] 2 AC 337, para. 13; Lungowe v Vedanta Resources Plc [2019] UKSC 20, [2020] AC 1045, para. 66）。\n\n(2) 关于涉及所指称于2015年11月17日作出的陈述的不披露（该指控首次在 Geyer（盖耶尔）先生和 Pacini（帕奇尼）先生的书面提纲中提出），仅在法院不接受 Boettcher 博士关于2015年11月6日通话期间所作陈述的主张时才具有相关性（Pacini 先生称，该通话被推迟至2015年11月17日）。即使如此，Boettcher 博士关于诱因（因果关系）的主张，不仅涉及接受要约函，亦延伸至2015年11月24日的离职协议，以及 Boettcher 博士于2016年1月1日开始受雇于 Xio UK。进一步而言，如撤销不披露裁定须依赖于对本案争议事实的证明，则申请撤销该裁定并不适当（Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), para. 7(viii)）。\n\n168. 依我判决，Boettcher 博士就申请准许在管辖区外送达诉讼程序而言，未违反其披露义务。所指称对不方便法院原则检验标准的错误陈述，根本并非错误陈述。Lanceley 女士代表 Boettcher 博士提及并引述了 CPR rule 6.37(3)。事实上，我认为，任何审理该等申请的商业法官均会充分理解该项要求的含义和效力。同样，基于 Day 先生所陈述的理由，就所指称于2015年11月17日作出的陈述而言，亦不存在违反披露义务的情形。\n\n(6) 关于管辖区外送达的结论\n\n169. 基于上述理由，我确信，Waksman, J 于2021年10月26日作出的裁定作出适当，因为 Boettcher 博士证明，根据 CPR PD 6B, para. 3.1(3) and 3.1(9)(a)，存在管辖权连接点；其诉请具有真实胜诉前景；并且，在 CPR rule 6.37(3) 所指的含义内，英格兰是适当法院。\n\n结论\n\n170. 基于上述理由，我确信，法院对 Boettcher 博士针对 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生提出的诉请具有并应行使管辖权。\n\n171. 因此，我驳回 Geyer 先生日期为2021年11月30日的申请，以及 Geyer 先生和 Pacini 先生日期为2022年9月5日的申请，并驳回就依法在管辖区内送达的诉讼程序提出的中止诉讼申请。\n\n172. 我感谢各位律师所作清晰而有帮助的陈述。","key_entities":["Geyer","CIPA","Je"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":22020,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:01:33"}