{"id":"court_ctb_4390_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4390,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-05-06","title":" UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT","summary_zh":"上诉法院简要裁定及执行令 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #4390（2025-05-06立案）。第二巡回上诉法院维持地方法院判决，确认破产法院对 HK Parties 违反证据开示命令构成民事蔑视法庭的认定，并维持向第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins 及其代理律所 Paul Hastings LLP 支付 83,370.26 美元制裁赔偿的裁定。","summary_en":"Appellate Summary Order / Mandate — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui / 郭文贵), CTB 22-50073 ECF #4390 (filed May 6, 2025). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court judgment upholding bankruptcy court orders that held the HK Parties in civil contempt for discovery non-compliance and imposed $83,370.26 in monetary sanctions payable to Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins and counsel Paul Hastings LLP.","body_en":"\n\n## **UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**\n\n## **SUMMARY ORDER**\n\n**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION \"SUMMARY ORDER\"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**\n\nAt a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of March, two thousand twenty-five.\n\nPRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, DENNY CHIN, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, *Circuit Judges*.\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nIN RE: HO WAN KWOK,\n\n*Debtor.*\n\nLEE VARTAN, Esq.; CHIESA SHAHINIAN AND GIANTOMASI PC,\n\n*Appellants*,\n\nMEI GUO; HK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS (USA) LIMITED, LLC,\n\n*Counter-Defendants-Appellants,*\n\nv. 24-1271-bk\n\n# MANDATE ISSUED ON 05/06/2025\n\n### PAUL HASTINGS LLP,\n\n*Appellee*,\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, Chapter 11 Trustee,\n\n*Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee*. \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n| FOR APPELLANTS and COUNTER- | Lee D. Vartan, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: | PC, Roseland, NJ. |\n| FOR APPELLEE and DEFENDANT-
COUNTER-CLAIMANT-APPELLEE: | Dennis M. Carnelli, Douglas S. Skalka, Neubert,
Pepe
&
Monteith,
P.C.,
New
Haven,
CT;
Nicholas A. Bassett, Paul Hastings, LLP, New
York, NY. |\n\nAppeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dooley, *J.*).\n\n**UPON DUE CONSIDERATION**, the judgment of the District Court entered on April 11, 2024, is **AFFIRMED**.\n\nHK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA\") and Mei Guo (the \"HK Parties\"), together with their counsel, Lee Vartan, and his law firm, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC (collectively, \"appellants\"), appeal from the District Court's judgment affirming two orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (the \"Bankruptcy Court\"). Specifically, appellants challenge the Bankruptcy Court's orders (1) holding the HK Parties in civil contempt pursuant to Rule 9020 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Rules 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to comply with a discovery order and (2)\n\nimposing a monetary sanction in the amount of \\$83,370.26, to be awarded to Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins and his counsel, Paul Hastings LLP (collectively, \"appellees\"), pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants contend principally that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in entering these orders and that the District Court erred in affirming them. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.\n\n#### **STANDARD OF REVIEW**\n\n\"A district court's order in a bankruptcy case is subject to plenary review, meaning that this Court undertakes an independent examination of the factual findings and legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court.\" *In re Kalikow*, 602 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We review an award of sanctions by a bankruptcy court and any \"findings of contempt . . . for abuse of discretion.\" *In re Gravel*, 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2021). \"[A] bankruptcy court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.\" *In re Highgate Equities, Ltd.*, 279 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \"Bankruptcy courts enjoy wide discretion in determining reasonable fee awards, which discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court absent a showing that it was abused.\" *In re JLM, Inc.*, 210 B.R. 19, 23 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997) (citing *Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan*, 309 U.S. 382, 389 (1940)).\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\n#### **I. Contempt Order**\n\nBankruptcy courts have the power to hold parties in civil contempt under 11 U.S.C. §105(a) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020.1 Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a court to hold a party in contempt for failure to obey a discovery order, is applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7037; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii); *see also In re Anderson*, 641 B.R. 1, 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022) (\"Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7037, addresses the consequences of the failure to provide required disclosure or discovery.\"). \"The decisional law governing the procedure for imposition of civil sanctions by the district courts will be equally applicable to the bankruptcy courts.\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020, advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.\n\nContempt \"is a potent weapon to which courts should not resort where there is a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A finding of contempt requires a showing that: \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *Id.*\n\n1 A United States Bankruptcy Court \"may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.\" 11 U.S.C. §105(a).\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court held the HK Parties in contempt pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production and Show Cause Order.2 *See* Joint App'x at 136. Appellants contend that the District Court erred in affirming the Bankruptcy Court's contempt order. We conclude that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the HK Parties in contempt.\n\n*First*, the Order Compelling Production and Show Cause Order are clear and unambiguous. Appellants argue that the term \"agents and advisors\" is ambiguous in the Order Compelling Production. The Bankruptcy Court found this \"purported lack of understanding . . . objectively unreasonable,\" Joint App'x at 122, because, among other reasons, appellants had months to seek clarification and elected not to do so. *See id.* (\"At no other time has any argument been advanced suggesting that the Order Compelling Production is unclear.\"). The Bankruptcy Court also reviewed the relevant portions of the Order Compelling Production that appellants allege were unclear, concluding: \"[T]here is no fair ground of doubt\" as to the search terms or the language describing the nature of the documents that appellants were ordered to produce. *Id.* at 123. The Bankruptcy\n\n2 The Bankruptcy Court also held the HK Parties in contempt, in the alternative, pursuant to its inherent powers. Because we find that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in holding the HK Parties in contempt pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), we need not assess whether contempt under its inherent powers was appropriate.\n\nCourt was correct to find that the Order Compelling Production was clear and\n\nunambiguous.3\n\n*Second*, there was clear and convincing proof of the HK Parties' noncompliance\n\nwith both the Order Compelling Production and Show Cause Order; indeed, appellants do\n\nnot appear to contest this. The Bankruptcy Court found:\n\nAttorney Vartan and CSG, at best, materially misrepresented to the Court that it would proceed with production in its Motion for an Extension of Time. At worst, Attorney Vartan and CSG knowingly made false statements to the Court. Regardless, the actions of Attorney Vartan and CSG are not acceptable in any way. The Court relied on Attorney Vartan's and CSG's representations in crafting the Show Cause Order, which gave the HK Parties several additional weeks to comply. Moreover, it is clear . . . that this is part of a pattern of unacceptable, obstructionist behavior of Attorney Vartan and CSG.\n\n*Id.* at 137. Vartan also violated the Show Cause Order by filing his declaration more than\n\nthree hours after the Bankruptcy Court's already-extended deadline. The record thus\n\noffers clear and convincing proof of the HK Parties' noncompliance with the Bankruptcy\n\nCourt's orders.\n\n*Third*, the HK Parties did not diligently attempt to comply in a reasonable manner with the orders. As the District Court observed, \"the [Show Cause] Order was issued, in part, in reliance upon the HK Parties' representations that production was soon to begin and would be made on a rolling basis. Neither representation turned out to be accurate, which the Bankruptcy Court found to be at best, a material misrepresentation, or at worst,\n\n3 Appellants do not credibly argue that the Show Cause Order was ambiguous. Indeed, the Order stated the declaration had to be made by \"the HK Parties,\" Joint App'x at 176, a term which was clearly and unambiguously defined in that same Order as \"'HK USA,' . . . together with Ms. Mei Guo,\" *id.* at 174.\n\na deliberate falsehood.\" Special App'x at 4 n.4 (citation omitted); *see also* Joint App'x at 137. Indeed, appellants were given every opportunity to comply with both orders, including being granted extensions of time to file responses and produce documents. As the Bankruptcy Court noted, \"in entering the Show Cause Order, the Court effectively granted . . . an extension of over a month from the deadline set by the Order Compelling Production and almost *seven months* since the Subpoenas were served.\" Joint App'x at 133 (emphasis added). Simply stated, the HK Parties repeatedly promised to comply and never did so, despite representing to the Bankruptcy Court that production would occur \"on a rolling basis.\" *Id.* at 322. We agree with the Bankruptcy Court that the HK Parties engaged in \"a transparent and egregious attempt to avoid compliance,\" *id.* at 134, and that they did not diligently attempt to comply in a reasonable manner.\n\nIn sum, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in holding the HK Parties in contempt pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production and Show Cause Order. *See In re Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 511.\n\n#### **II. Order Awarding Fees**\n\nWe also find that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees as a sanction for the HK Parties' failures to comply with its orders pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C).\n\nThe imposition of a sanction awarding attorneys' fees and costs must be \"compensatory rather than punitive in nature.\" *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger*, 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017). Sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C) are mandatory \"unless\n\nthe failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (instructing that \"the court *must order* the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure\" to comply (emphasis added)).\n\nHere, the Bankruptcy Court found that the failure to comply with the orders \"was not 'substantially justified.'\" Joint App'x at 136 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)). Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court found that \"the HK Parties did not have any explanation at all\" for their noncompliance and that \"there are no circumstances that would make an award of expenses unjust.\" *Id.* Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the HK Parties, Vartan, and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC to pay \"reasonable attorneys' fees and costs related to the preparation and prosecution of the Motion to Compel and the continued efforts by the Trustee to bring the HK Parties into compliance, including any ongoing efforts.\" *Id.* at 138-39. The Bankruptcy Court then ordered appellees to submit \"fee application(s) . . . to be submitted on or before March 24, 2023.\" *Id.* at 140. Appellees' fee application clearly lists the attorneys' respective hourly rates and hours worked \"for services rendered in securing compliance with court-authorized subpoenas,\" *id.* at 385 (capitalization altered), and it further indicates that appellees \"*reduced* the amount of such fees *by 50%* for purposes of this Application,\" *id.* at 387, to arrive at the requested amount of \\$83,370.26.\n\nWe recognize that the Bankruptcy Court \"enjoy[s] wide discretion in determining reasonable fee awards,\" and we have no cause to disturb that discretion \"absent a showing that it was abused.\" *In re JLM, Inc.*, 210 B.R. at 23; *see also Fox v. Vice*, 563\n\nU.S. 826, 838 (2011) (instructing that when estimating reasonable attorneys' fees, the goal \"is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection\"). Appellants have not made such a showing here. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court was within its discretion to find that the sanctions award of \\$83,370.26 constitutes \"reasonable attorney's fees associated with the Trustee's efforts to secure compliance with the Court-authorized subpoenas as contemplated by the Sanctions Order.\" Joint App'x at 146.\n\nFinally, appellants' claims that they were denied due process in connection with the order awarding fees are unavailing. The record reveals that appellants had numerous opportunities to contest the award of fees, both before and after the order was entered. First, the Bankruptcy Court expressly ordered appellees to submit a fee application by March 24, 2023, thereby putting appellants on notice that it was planning to award fees. Second, as the District Court observed, the Bankruptcy Court's fee award was issued eleven days after appellees' request for fees was submitted, during which time appellants could have filed an objection or response. *See* Special App'x at 19 n.8. They did not do so. Third, the Bankruptcy Court thoroughly considered – and rejected – appellants' subsequent motion to reconsider the sanctions order. While it would have been better for the Bankruptcy Court to have given appellants an opportunity to be heard before granting the fee application, appellants \"were able to advance, and did advance, a number of challenges to the amount of the fee award\" in their motion for reconsideration. *Id.* Accordingly, we find no due process violation as to the Bankruptcy Court's order awarding fees.\n\nIn sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court's order awarding sanctions. *See In re Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 511.\n\nWe have considered appellants' remaining arguments and find them to be without\n\nmerit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is **AFFIRMED**.\n\nFOR THE COURT:\n\nCatherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court\n\n\n\n10","body_zh":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT（美国第二巡回联邦上诉法院）\nSUMMARY ORDER（简要裁定）\n\n简要裁定不具有先例效力。引用在 2007 年 1 月 1 日或之后提交的简要裁定是允许的，并受《联邦上诉程序规则》第 32.1 条及本院《本地规则》第 32.1.1 条的管辖。在向本院提交的文件中引用简要裁定时，当事人必须引用《联邦附录》或电子数据库（并注明“SUMMARY ORDER”）。引用简要裁定的当事人必须向任何未由律师代表的当事人送达其副本。\n\n在二千零二十五年三月十二日于纽约市 Foley 广场 40 号 Thurgood Marshall 美国法院举行的美国第二巡回联邦上诉法院法定庭期。\n\n出席法官：巡回法官 GUIDO CALABRESI、DENNY CHIN、SARAH A. L. MERRIAM。\n\n____________________________________________\n\n____________________________________________\n\n关于：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n债务人。\n\nLEE VARTAN, Esq.；CHIESA SHAHINIAN AND GIANTOMASI PC，\n\n上诉人，\n\nMEI GUO（郭美）；HK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS (USA) LIMITED, LLC，\n\n反诉被告-上诉人，\n\n诉 案号 24-1271-bk\n授权书签发于 05/06/2025\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所），\n\n被上诉人，\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，第 11 章受托人，\n\n被告-反诉原告-被上诉人。 ____________________________________________\n\n上诉人及反诉被告-上诉人之代理人：新泽西州 Roseland，Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 的 Lee D. Vartan。\n被上诉人及被告-反诉原告-被上诉人之代理人：康涅狄格州 New Haven，Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. 的 Dennis M. Carnelli、Douglas S. Skalka；纽约州纽约市，Paul Hastings, LLP 的 Nicholas A. Bassett。\n\n上诉自 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院）的判决（Dooley 法官）。\n\n经审慎审理，地区法院于 2024 年 4 月 11 日作出的判决予以维持（AFFIRMED）。\n\nHK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（“HK USA”）和郭美（“HK 当事人”），连同其代理律师 Lee Vartan 及其所在的律师事务所 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（统称“上诉人”），不服地区法院维持 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院，下称“破产法院”）两项裁定的判决，提起上诉。具体而言，上诉人对破产法院的以下裁定提出质疑：(1) 根据《联邦破产程序规则》第 9020 条以及《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 37(b)(1) 和 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) 条，因 HK 当事人未能遵守证据开示裁定而裁定其构成民事藐视法庭；以及 (2)\n\n根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 37(b)(2)(C) 条处以金额为 $83,370.26 的金钱制裁，裁定支付给第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins 及其法律顾问普衡律师事务所（统称“被上诉人”）。上诉人主要主张破产法院作出这些裁定滥用了自由裁量权，且地区法院予以维持属于错误。我们推定各当事人熟悉基础事实、诉讼程序历史以及上诉争议焦点，在此仅在解释我们维持原判的决定所必需的范围内予以提及。\n审查标准\n\n“破产案件中地区法院的裁定须接受全面审查（plenary review），这意味着本院将对破产法院的事实认定和法律结论进行独立审查。”In re Kalikow, 602 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2010)（引文及引号省略）。我们对破产法院裁决的制裁以及任何“藐视法庭认定……按滥用自由裁量权标准予以审查”。In re Gravel, 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2021)。“如果破产法院的裁决是基于对法律的错误理解或对证据的明显错误评估，则破产法院必然构成了滥用自由裁量权。”In re Highgate Equities, Ltd., 279 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)（引文及引号省略）。“破产法院在确定合理的律师费裁决方面享有广泛的自由裁量权，除非证明其存在滥用，否则上诉法院不得干预该自由裁量权。”In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19, 23 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997)（引用 Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 389 (1940)）。\n讨论\nI. 藐视法庭裁定\n\n根据 11 U.S.C. §105(a) 及《联邦破产程序规则》第 9020 条，破产法院有权裁定当事人构成民事藐视法庭。1 允许法院对不遵守证据开示裁定的当事人处以藐视法庭制裁的《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 37 条，适用于破产程序。参见 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7037；Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)；亦见 In re Anderson, 641 B.R. 1, 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022)（“由《联邦破产程序规则》第 7037 条所并入的《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 37 条，针对的是未能提供所需披露或证据开示的后果。”）。“规范地区法院实施民事制裁程序的判例法同样适用于破产法院。”Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020, advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment。\n\n藐视法庭“是一件强有力的武器，在对被告行为的不当性存在合理怀疑理由的情况下，法院不应动用。”King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995)（引文及引号省略）。认定构成藐视法庭需要证明：(1) 被指控藐视人未能遵守的裁定是清晰且明确的，(2) 不遵守裁定的证据是清晰且有说服力的，以及 (3) 被指控藐视人未曾以合理的方式努力尝试去遵守。同上。\n\n1 美国破产法院“可以签发为执行本编规定所必需或适当的任何命令、程序或判决。”11 U.S.C. §105(a)。\n\n破产法院根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) 条，因 HK 当事人未能遵守《强制提供证据裁定》（Order Compelling Production）和《说明理由裁定》（Show Cause Order），裁定其构成藐视法庭。2 参见 Joint App'x at 136。上诉人主张地区法院维持破产法院的藐视法庭裁定是错误的。我们认为，破产法院认定 HK 当事人构成藐视法庭并未滥用自由裁量权。\n\n首先，《强制提供证据裁定》和《说明理由裁定》是清晰且明确的。上诉人辩称《强制提供证据裁定》中的“代理人与顾问”（agents and advisors）一词含糊不清。破产法院认定这种“所谓的理解缺失……在客观上是不合理的”，Joint App'x at 122，原因之一在于上诉人有数月时间寻求澄清却选择不予寻求。参见同上（“在任何其他时间，均未提出过表明《强制提供证据裁定》不明确的论点。”）。破产法院还审查了上诉人声称不明确的《强制提供证据裁定》的相关部分，得出结论：“对于上诉人被勒令提供的文件的搜索词或描述文件性质的措辞，不存在合理的怀疑理由。”同上，第 123 页。破产\n\n2 破产法院亦作为备选依据，根据其固有权力裁定 HK 当事人构成藐视法庭。鉴于我们认定破产法院根据第 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) 条裁定 HK 当事人构成藐视法庭并未滥用自由裁量权，我们无需评估根据其固有权力处以藐视法庭是否恰当。\n\n法院认定《强制提供证据裁定》清晰明确是正确的。3\n\n其次，存在清晰且有说服力的证据表明 HK 当事人未遵守《强制提供证据裁定》和《说明理由裁定》；事实上，上诉人对此似乎并未提出异议。破产法院认定：\n\nVartan 律师及 CSG 在其《延期动议》中向法院所作的将着手提供证据的陈述，往最好里说，属于实质性虚假陈述。往最坏里说，Vartan 律师及 CSG 属于明知而向法院作出虚假陈述。无论如何，Vartan 律师及 CSG 的行为在任何方面都是不可接受的。法院在拟定《说明理由裁定》时信赖了 Vartan 律师及 CSG 的陈述，该裁定给予了 HK 当事人额外的数周时间来遵守。此外，显而易见的是……这是 Vartan 律师及 CSG 一贯不可接受的阻挠行为模式的一部分。\n\n同上，第 137 页。Vartan 提交其声明的时间比破产法院本已延长的截止期限晚了三个多小时，这也违反了《说明理由裁定》。因此，记录提供了清晰且有说服力的证据，证明 HK 当事人未遵守破产法院的各项裁定。\n\n第三，HK 当事人未曾以合理的方式努力尝试去遵守上述裁定。正如地区法院所指出的，“签发该［说明理由］裁定，部分原因是在于信赖了 HK 当事人作出的即刻开始提供证据并将以滚动方式进行的陈述。这两项陈述最终都不准确，破产法院认定这往最好里说是实质性虚假陈述，往最坏里说\n\n3 上诉人未能令人信服地辩称《说明理由裁定》含糊不清。事实上，该裁定规定该声明必须由“HK 当事人”作出，Joint App'x at 176，而该术语在同一份裁定中被清晰且明确地定义为“‘HK USA’……连同郭美女士”，同上，第 174 页。\n\n是蓄意捏造。”Special App'x at 4 n.4（引文省略）；亦见 Joint App'x at 137。事实上，上诉人获得了遵守这两项裁定的充分机会，包括被获准延长提交答复及提供文件的时间。正如破产法院所指出的，“在作出《说明理由裁定》时，法院实际上批准了……自《强制提供证据裁定》设定的截止日期起延长了一个多月，自送达传票以来延长了近七个月。”Joint App'x at 133（强调为原文所加）。简而言之，HK 当事人屡次承诺遵守却从未践行，尽管其向破产法院陈述称将“以滚动方式”提供证据。同上，第 322 页。我们同意破产法院的意见，即 HK 当事人进行了“规避遵守的显而易见且恶劣的企图”，同上，第 134 页，且其未曾以合理的方式努力尝试去遵守。\n\n综上所述，我们裁定，破产法院因 HK 当事人未能遵守《强制提供证据裁定》和《说明理由裁定》而根据第 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) 条裁定其构成藐视法庭，并未滥用自由裁量权。参见 In re Gravel, 6 F.4th at 511。\nII. 裁决律师费裁定\n\n我们亦认定，破产法院根据第 37(b)(2)(C) 条，对 HK 当事人未遵守其裁定的行为裁决律师费作为制裁，并未滥用自由裁量权。\n\n裁决支付律师费和费用的制裁在性质上必须“具有补偿性而非惩罚性”。Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017)。根据第 37(b)(2)(C) 条作出的制裁具有强制性，“除非\n\n该不履行具有实质上的正当理由，或者其他情形导致裁决承担费用显得不公正。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)（规定“法院必须责令不服从的当事人、向该当事人提供咨询的律师，或两者共同支付因不遵守裁定而导致的合理费用，包括律师费”（强调为原文所加））。\n\n在本案中，Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）认定，未能遵守命令的行为“并非‘具有实质正当理由’”。Joint App'x at 136（引用 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)）。事实上，破产法院认定，“HK Parties（香港当事方）对其不服从行为完全没有任何解释”，且“不存在使判给费用显得不公正的情形”。Id.。具体而言，破产法院裁定香港当事方、Vartan 以及 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 支付“与准备和提起强制作出披露动议，以及受托人为促使香港当事方服从而持续付出的努力（包括任何正在进行的努力）相关的合理律师费及开支”。Id. at 138-39。随后，破产法院命令被上诉人提交“费用申请……于 2023年3月24日 或之前提交”。Id. at 140。被上诉人的费用申请明确列出了律师各自的每小时费率以及“为促成对法院授权传票的服从而提供服务”的工作小时数，id. at 385（大写略有改动），且进一步表明被上诉人“为本申请之目的将此类费用金额减少了 50%”，id. at 387，从而得出所请求的金额 $83,370.26。\n\n我们认识到，破产法院“在裁定合理费用判给方面享有广泛的自由裁量权”，且“在未证明存在滥用裁量权的情况下”，我们没有理由干预该自由裁量权。In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. at 23；另见 Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)（指示在估算合理律师费时，目标“是实现大致公正，而非达到审计层面的完美”）。上诉人在本案中并未作出此类证明。因此，破产法院认定 $83,370.26 的制裁判给构成“与受托人促成对法院授权传票的服从所付出的努力相关的合理律师费，符合制裁裁定的预期”，这属于其自由裁量权范围内。Joint App'x at 146。\n\n最后，上诉人声称在判给费用的裁定方面被剥夺了正当程序权利，该主张不成立。记录显示，无论在裁定作出之前还是之后，上诉人均有多次机会对费用的判给提出异议。首先，破产法院明确命令被上诉人在 2023年3月24日 之前提交费用申请，从而通知了上诉人其计划判给费用。其次，正如 District Court（地区法院）所指出的，破产法院的费用判给是在被上诉人提交费用请求十一天后作出的，在此期间上诉人本可以提交异议或答复。见 Special App'x at 19 n.8。他们并未这样做。第三，破产法院全面考虑并驳回了上诉人随后提出的重新考虑制裁裁定的动议。虽然破产法院在批准费用申请之前给予上诉人陈述意见的机会更为妥当，但上诉人“在其重新考虑动议中能够提出、并且确实提出了多项针对费用判给金额的质疑”。Id.。因此，我们认定破产法院判给费用的裁定不存在违反正当程序的情形。\n\n总之，我们认定破产法院作出制裁裁定不存在滥用裁量权的情况。见 In re Gravel, 6 F.4th at 511。\n\n我们已审议了上诉人的其余论点，并认定其缺乏法律依据。基于上述理由，地区法院的判决书予以维持。\n\n代表法院：\n\nCatherine O'Hagan Wolfe，法院书记官","key_entities":["Guo","Je","Paul Hastings","Despins","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":45,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2371,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-05-06 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-05-06","updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:16:44"}