{"id":"court_ctb_474_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":474,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2022-06-20","title":"Exhibit 2 Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **Exhibit 2**\n\n## Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss\n\n*Guo v. Cheng* Eight Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada\n\n|          | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 474-2<br>Filed 06/20/22                                        | Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16<br>Page 2 of 31<br>Electronically Filed<br>6/14/2019 4:33 PM<br>Steven D. Grierson<br>CLERK OF THE COURT |  |\n|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 1        | MDSM                                                                                |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 2        | Marc J. Randazza (NV Bar No. 12265)<br>Ronald D. Green (NV Bar No. 7360)            |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 3        | LaTeigra C. Cahill (NV Bar No. 14352)                                               |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 4        | RANDAZZA<br>LEGAL<br>GROUP,<br>PLLC<br>2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109            |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 5        | Las Vegas, NV 89117<br>Telephone: 702-420-2001                                      |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 6        | ecf@randazza.com                                                                    |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 7        | Attorneys for Defendant                                                             |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 8        | SHUIYAN CHENG                                                                       |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 9        | EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT                                                      |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 10       | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA                                                                |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 11       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 12       | WENGUI GUO a/k/a MILES KWOK,                                                        | Case No.<br>A-18-779172-C                                                                                                          |  |\n| 13       | Plaintiff,                                                                          | Dept. 32                                                                                                                           |  |\n| 14<br>15 | vs.                                                                                 | HEARING REQUESTED                                                                                                                  |  |\n| 16       | SHUIYAN CHENG a/k/a HUIYAN CHANG;                                                   | DEFENDANT SHUIYAN CHENG'S ANTI                                                                                                     |  |\n| 17       | FANG YONG a/k/a MA KE,                                                              | SLAPP SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS<br>UNDER NRS 41.660                                                                                |  |\n| 18       | Defendants.                                                                         |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 19       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 20       | Defendant Shuiyan Cheng hereby files his Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to               |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 21       | Dismiss Under NRS 41.660.                                                           |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 22       | This Motion is based upon the attached memorandum of points and                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 23       | authorities and attached exhibits, the papers and pleadings on file in this action, |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 24       | and any oral argument permitted by this Court.                                      |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 25       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 26       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 27       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 28       | - 1 -<br>Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss<br>A-18-779172-C                              |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n\n### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**\n\n#### 2 **1.0 INTRODUCTION**\n\n1\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Plaintiff's lawsuit against Mr. Cheng is a classic SLAPP suit. Plaintiff prides himself on his status as a public figure and his alleged work as a Chinese dissident. Mr. Cheng published several statements on Twitter criticizing this reputation as unearned and stating that Plaintiff had in fact undermined the political movement he claimed to support. Instead of responding to Mr. Cheng's speech with speech of his own, Plaintiff instead filed the instant lawsuit in an attempt to stop Mr. Cheng from speaking about him at all.1 This is precisely the kind of situation to which the Anti-SLAPP statute is meant to apply.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 Mr. Cheng's statements are either true, constitute rhetorical hyperbole or opinion, or at the very least he made them without actual malice. Plaintiff cannot prevail on any of his claims, and so the Court should dismiss these claims with prejudice and award Mr. Cheng his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending himself from these claims.\n\n#### 16 **2.0 FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n### **2.1 Plaintiff's Reputation as a Public Figure**\n\n18 19 20 21 22 Plaintiff is a high-profile Chinese political figure who has used social media to \"expose[] widespread corruption in the Chinese Communist Party ('CCP'), multiple senior officials of the Chinese Government, and their family members,\" and has \"made an unprecedented impact on the international image and\n\n17\n\n<sup>23</sup> 24 25 26 27 <sup>1</sup> Plaintiff has a long history of suing his critics instead of participating in the marketplace of ideas to address their criticisms. *See, e.g., Guo v. Yuan*, No. 2:18 cv-02276-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. 2018); *Guo v. Chen*, No. 2:18-cv-03800-MCA-MAH (D.N.J. 2018); *Guo v. Teng*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134475 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2018); *Guo v. Lian*, Index No. 151428/2018 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y., Cty. Of N.Y. 2018); *Guo v. Xing*, Index No. 151430/2018 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y., Cty. Of N.Y. 2018); *Guo v. Xia*, No. 1:18 cv-00174-LO-TCB (E.D. Va. 2018); *Guo v. Yuan*, No. 2:18-cv-02276-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 4 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 credibility of the [CCP].\" (Second Amended Complaint (\"SAC\") at ¶¶ 5-7.) His Twitter account has over 400,000, followers, most of whom are Chinese, and he claims to be \"the one man who single-handedly challenged the CCP and exposed the CCP's building of an intelligence network in the United States and other countries.\" (*Id*. at ¶¶ 8-9.) He became a billionaire real-estate magnate in China, when eventually in 2015 the CCP seized his family's assets and arrested hundreds of his family members and business colleagues. (*See id*. at ¶¶ 75-82.) He claims that his acts of whistle blowing following this seizure are \"regarded as one of the biggest political incidents in China since the Tiananmen Square Massacre.\" (*Id*. at ¶ 86.) It is safe to say that Plaintiff is a public figure in the context of his political activity.\n\n### **2.2 Reporting on Allegations Against Plaintiff**\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 While Plaintiff depicts himself as a noble and forthright warrior for democracy against Chinese censorship, the actual record is mixed, to the say the least. First, Plaintiff is not being honest regarding his origins as a dissident. He claims that he was arrested by the CCP in 1989 during the Tiananmen Square massacre for assisting protesting Chinese students. (*See* SAC at ¶ 43.) However, Mr. Cheng researched this claim and, according to records from the court of Puyang city, Henan province, China, show that he was arrested for a completely unrelated transaction 300 miles away from Tiananmen Square on charges including fraud and resisting arrest when he attacked a police offer after his brother attacked an officer with a knife. (*See* Declaration of Mr. Cheng in support of reply to opposition to Motion to Dismiss, attached as **Exhibit 1**, at ¶ 16 & *Sub-Exhibit 6*.)\n\n25 26 27 There is also a great deal of reporting on accusations of criminal, unethical, and otherwise objectionable activity against Plaintiff. An April 2017 article in the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the CCP had issued an international arrest notice\n\n12\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 5 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 with Interpol for the Plaintiff. (*See* Chun Han Wong, \"China Says Interpol Arrest Notice Issued for Businessman Guo Wengui,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 20, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 2**.)2 In May 2017, *Forbes* reported that Plaintiff was \"making largely unsubstantiated accusations\" against the CCP, which implied that Plaintiff was \"tainted by corruption,\" and explained that the Interpol arrest notice against Plaintiff was based on allegations of bribery. (*See* Nathan Vardi, \"The Chinese Fugitive Living in a \\$67 Million Manhattan Apartment,\" FORBES (May 19, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 3**.)3 It also reported on a Chinese reporter suing Plaintiff for defamation based on statements he made in retaliation for the reporter publishing an article accusing Plaintiff of using a sex tape to remove a Beijing deputy mayor so that he could acquire attractive real estate. (*See id*.)\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 In June 2017, the *Wall Street Journal* reported on a criminal trial in China against Plaintiff's business subordinates for fabricating documents that allowed one of Plaintiff's companies to obtain a lucrative contract and repeated the claim of Plaintiff using a sex tape against a politician for his own benefit. (*See* Josh Chin, \"China Cranks Up Heat on Exiled Tycoon Guo Wengui,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 10, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 4**.)4 The article also reported that one of the subordinates on trial testified that Plaintiff ordered her to fabricate the documents. (*See id*.) In a September 2017 article, the *Wall Street Journal* repeated many of the allegations against Plaintiff, including that \"Chinese courts\n\n- 21 22 23 <sup>2</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n- 24 <sup>3</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n25 26 27 <sup>4</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n1 2 3 4 5 have jailed and fined a number of Mr. Guo's former associates and subordinates for crimes including fraud and embezzlement. Chinese media have published articles portraying him as unscrupulous.\" (Chun Han Wong and Felicia Schwartz, \"China Wants Fugitive Guo Wengui Back – but He's Applied for U.S. Asylum,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 7, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 5**.)5\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 An October 2017 article in the *Wall Street Journal* reported that Plaintiff was using his fortune to defend himself from multiple defamation lawsuits and that a Chinese woman filed a civil suit against Plaintiff, accusing him of raping her while she was working as his personal assistant. (*See* Cezary Podkul and Chun Han Wong, \"Chinese Fugitive Guo Wengui Amasses War Chest to Battle Beijing,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 3, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 6**.)6 Later that month, the same paper reported that the CCP said \"it is investigating Mr. Guo in at least 19 major criminal cases that involve bribery, kidnapping, fraud, money laundering and rape.\" (O'Keefe, Viswanatha, and Podkul, \"China's Pursuit of Fugitive Businessman Guo Wengui Kicks Off Manhattan Caper Worthy of Spy Thriller,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 22, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 7**.)7\n\n17 18 19 20 In January 2018, the *New York Times* published a lengthy expose on Plaintiff and questioned his claims of being a whistleblower. (*See* Lauren Hilgers, \"The Mystery of the Exiled Billionaire Whistle-Blower,\" The New York Times (Jan. 10, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 8**.)8 It recounted that Plaintiff fled China in anticipation of\n\n <sup>5</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n23 24 <sup>6</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n25 <sup>7</sup> Available at: http\n\n26 1508717977(last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n27 <sup>8</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n21\n\n22\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 7 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 corruption charges against him that swept up business and political partners, as well as the accusations of corruption, bribery, and rape that surfaced around 2017, and noted that \"[m]ost of Guo's accusations [against the CCP] have proved nearly impossible to verify.\" (*See id*.) It notes that, according to a university professor specializing in Chinese governance, people should not take Plaintiff's claims at face value, and many Chinese political dissidents view him with skepticism due to the fact that he exiled himself to avoid corruption charges instead of persecution. (*See id*.) It explains that Western media outlets have had difficulty substantiating his claims, and that he has withheld simple biographical details such as his age and date of birth. (*See id*.) It reports that Plaintiff took out and defaulted on loans totaling \\$89 million, despite claiming never to have taken government loans. (*See id*.) It discusses Plaintiff's friendship with the vice minister of China's equivalent of the CIA and FBI, Ma Jian, who was arrested in 2015 as part of the CCP's crackdown on corruption. (*See id*.) It notes that details regarding the years leading up to Plaintiff's departure from China are particularly difficult to discern due to a swirl of political scandal and allegations of criminality from all sides. (*See id*.) And it explains that Plaintiff has verifiably fabricated some details of his story9 and has made ridiculously implausible claims, such as never wearing the same pair of underwear twice. (*See id*.)\n\n20 21 22 23 24 Throughout 2018, other media outlets reported on these and similar allegations against Plaintiff, including reporting that many of his claims against the CCP have remained unverified and are often considered sensationalist. (*See* David Barboza, \"Steve Bannon and a Fugitive Billionaire Target a Common\n\n- 25 26 27 <sup>9</sup> Plaintiff additionally lies in his SAC. He claims that Mr. Cheng does not know him personally (SAC at ¶ 110), yet there is photographic evidence that the two met as early as October 2017. (*See* **Exhibit 1** at ¶ 6 and *Sub-Exhibit 2*.)\n\t- 6 Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-18-779172-C\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 8 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Enemy: China,\" THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 9**;10 Chris Lau, \"Hong King police investigating fugitive Chinese tycoon Guo Wengui over alleged HK\\$32 billion money laundering conspiracy, court papers reveal,\" SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 14, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 10**;11 L. Todd Wood, \"Enemies abound for Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui,\" Washington Times (Dec. 19, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 11**;12 *and see* **Exhibit 1** at ¶¶ 18-20 and *Sub-Exhibits 9-11*.)) And in October 2018, the Chinese newspaper *Caixin* reported that five senior employees of one of Plaintiff's companies had been found guilty of multiple crimes, and that Plaintiff himself had embezzled over 2 billion yuan from a Chinese company. (*See* Xiankang, Jinbing, Wei, and Gang, \"Fugitive Billionaire Guo Wengui's Company Fined 60 Billion Yuan,\" Caixin (Oct. 13, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 12**.)13\n\n### **2.3 Mr. Cheng's Statements**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 This lawsuit is based on six statements (known as \"tweets\") Mr. Cheng posted on his publicly-accessible account on the social media web site Twitter. As an initial matter, there is a problem with the SAC; Mr. Cheng's tweets are in Chinese and the SAC (presumably by design) does not attach or display them, instead relying on Plaintiff's own unverified translations of them.\n\n13\n\n<sup>20</sup> 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <sup>10</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019). <sup>11</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019). <sup>12</sup> Available at: http enemies-abound-for-chinese-billionaire-guo-wengui/ (last accessed June 14, 2019). <sup>13</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 9 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 To determine what the statements at issue actually mean, Mr. Cheng retained Anmin Lee, a native speaker of Chinese fluent in English who has performed translations for a national political party in Belize. Upon review of the original tweets in question, he discovered that Plaintiff's translations contain significant flaws and omissions. (*See* Declaration of Anmin Lee [\"Lee Decl.\"], attached as **Exhibit 13**.)14\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 To begin with, the first allegedly defamatory statement identified in the SAC is missing half of the conversation. Mr. Cheng led into this tweet by writing, in regard to news that the CCP had released Plaintiff's family from custody: Everyone think about it, which is more likely, the Chinese communist party released Guo's family because: 1. Chinese Communist party is afraid of Guo and therefore they released Guo's family.\n\n- 2. Because Guo had done good by exposing information.\n- 3. The CCP is releasing Guo's family because some type of deal was made.\n- 4. Guo's family were detained to coincide with Guo's exposure of the information, this is done to bolster the credibility of Guo's exposure in the eyes of the masses.\"\n\n17 (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 10-12.)15 Mr. Cheng is thus presenting possible explanations for\n\n18 why the CCP decided to release the family of a high-profile political dissident,\n\n19 including the possibility that Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP.\n\n20 The first allegedly defamatory tweet reads as follows:\n\n- 21 22 23 Possibility 3 could be right, because Guo and Xi made a deal involving large sums of money. Guo does not resemble a (normal) businessman at all. His great wealth all came from extortions done in collusion with the communists. This time his shady dealings with Xi\n- 24 25 <sup>14</sup> Mr. Cheng continues to gather information on a regular basis that may impact this Motion. In the event any becomes available, he will supplement this Motion.\n\n26 27 <sup>15</sup> Mr. Lee provides a literal translation and a more natural translation for many of the statements at issue. Unless specified otherwise, this Motion refers to the natural translation for each statement.\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 10 of\n\ninvolve making a deal that's worth a heavenly sum. But this deal is built upon a deal whose price is the sacrifice of the lives and properties belonging to 1.4 billion people. Everyone knows that as Xi will do anything to stay in power, he can casually give away 100 billion, a trillion. It's hard for Guo's wealth to not grow explosively.\n\n(Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 14-16.) Mr. Cheng is thus stating that it is possible Plaintiff struck a\n\n31\n\ndeal with the CCP to have his family released, in light of his long-documented shady history with central figures in the CCP and his tremendous unexplained\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 The second complained-of tweet is in response to a Twitter user calling into question claims from Plaintiff as to the numbers of viewers on his YouTube channel. (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 17-18.) The tweet reads: \"Guo lies and lies and lies with disregard. The more lying Guo lies, the more absurd the lies, even while he's entangled in numerous lawsuits. He no longer has any regard for the laws of civilized Western countries, you can imagine how much worse he must have acted in China.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 19-21.)\n\n16 17 18 19 20 The third tweet at issue reads: \"Guo acts with impunity because he can. He continuously fabricates large amounts of shameless lies; this is the greatest shame for the whole of our overseas Chinese community. Can it really be that evil has overcome justice, the sky and the earth has flipped itself upside down?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 22.)\n\n21 22 The fourth tweet at issue reads: \"We can't even deal with one lying Guo, how can we overthrow the evil Chinese communist party?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 23-25.)\n\n27\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\nwealth.\n\na bunch of people, attacked and frightened some people, and seriously divided\n\na group of people so they caused harm to each other. In a short time, he\n\nmanaged to leave the overseas democracy movement in pieces, and they\n\nThe fifth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo confused a bunch of people, snared16\n\n31\n\ncompletely lost their ability to do battle.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 26.). The sixth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo deliberately manufactured large quantities of vulgar lies, and continuously makes enemies, his goal is to divert\n\n8 9 10 11 12 people's attention, divide and weaken democracy movement's ability to fight, and thus achieve the goal of overseas stability maintenance.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 27-28.) It is worth noting that a significant portion of the SAC's translation of this tweet is completely inaccurate and is found nowhere in the tweet itself. (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶ 29.)\n\n### 13 **3.0 LEGAL STANDARDS**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 Under Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute, NRS 41.635 *et seq*., if a lawsuit is brought against a defendant based upon the exercise of his First Amendment rights, the defendant may file a special motion to dismiss. Evaluating the Anti-SLAPP motion is a two-step process. The movant bears the burden on the first step, and the nonmoving party bears the burden on the second. *See John v. Douglas County Sch. Dist.*, 125 Nev. 746, 754 (2009).\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 First, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff's claim is \"based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.\" NRS 41.660(3)(a). One of the statutory categories of protected speech is \"[c]ommunication[s] made in direct connection with an issue\n\n26 27 <sup>16</sup> Mr. Lee explains that the character at issue here most likely means '\"to snare,' as in 'to lure or tempt someone into harm or error,\"' and that the SAC's translation, \"cheated on,\" \"is a stretch.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 26 fn.8.)\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n31\n\n1 2 of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum, which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.\" NRS 41.637(4).\n\n3 4 5 6 Second, once the defendant meets his burden on the first prong, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must make a *prima facie* evidentiary showing that he has a probability of prevailing on his claims. *See* NRS 41.660(3)(b); *see also John*, 125 Nev. at 754.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 Nevada treats an Anti-SLAPP motion as a species of a motion for summary judgment. *See Stubbs v. Strickland*, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (Nev. 2013); *see also Coker v. Sassone*, 432 P.3d 746, 748-49 (Nev. 2019). However, it has some additional procedures to avoid the abusive use of discovery, and if the court grants the motion to dismiss, the defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, as well as an award of up to \\$10,000. *See* NRS 41.670(1)(a)-(b).\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Due to a relative dearth of case law applying Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute, Nevada courts look to case law applying California's Anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, which shares many similarities with Nevada's law. *See John*, 125 Nev. at 756 (stating that \"we consider California case law because California's anti-SLAPP statute is similar in purpose and language to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute\"); *see also Shapiro v. Welt*, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (Nev. 2017) (same); *Sassone*, 432 P.3d at 749 n.3 (finding that \"California's and Nevada's statutes share a near-identical structure for anti-SLAPP review … Given the similarity in structure, language, and the legislative mandate to adopt California's standard for the requisite burden of proof, reliance on California case law is warranted\"); *and see* NRS 41.665(2) (defining the plaintiff's *prima facie* evidentiary burden in terms of California law).\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n### 31\n\n### 1 **4.0 ARGUMENT**\n\n2\n\n## **4.1 Mr. Cheng Satisfies the First Prong of the Anti-SLAPP Analysis**\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 As relevant here, the Anti-SLAPP statute protects any \"[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum … which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.\" NRS 41.637(4). A defendant therefore must make three showings to satisfy the first prong: (1) the claims are based upon communications made in direct connection with an issue of public interest; (2) the communications were made in a place open to the public or in a public forum; and (3) the communications are truthful or were made without knowledge of their falsehood. All three requirements are met here. Additionally, the merits of a plaintiff's claims, and the legality of the defendant's actions, are not the focus of the first prong analysis and, if relevant, should only be considered during the second prong analysis. *See Coretronic v. Cozen O'Connor*, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1388 (2d Dist. 2011); *see also Taus v. Loftus*, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 706-07, 713, 727-299 (2007).\n\n### **4.1.1 Plaintiff's Claims are Based Upon Protected Conduct**\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 \"Issue of public interest\" is defined broadly as \"any issue in which the public is interested.\" *Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula*, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1042 (2008). \"The issue need not be 'significant' to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute – it is enough that it is one in which the public takes an interest.\" *Id*. \"Although matters of public interest include legislative and governmental activities, they may also include activities that involve private persona, and entities, **especially when a large, powerful organization may impact the lives of many individuals**.\" *Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim*, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 650 (1996) (emphasis added). An activity does not need to \"meet the lofty standard of pertaining to the heart of self-government\" to qualify for Anti-SLAPP protection; \"social or even\n\n16\n\n27\n\n1 2 low-brow topics may suffice.\" *Hilton v. Hallmark Cards*, 599 F.3d 894 905 (9th Cir. 2009).\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The lifestyles and conduct of well-known public figures and even celebrities constitute an issue of public interest. *See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards*, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (celebrity Paris Hilton acknowledging that her \"privileged lifestyle and her catchphrase ('that's hot') are matters of widespread public interest\"). \"[T]here is a public interest which attaches to people who, by their accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities.\" *Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC*, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 667-68 (1st Dist. 2010). A California court found a suit by a former head football coach was subject to the Anti-SLAPP statute because the plaintiff's \"role as a head coach of a local university's football team already made him a public figure, and his employment termination was already a topic of widespread public interest.\" *McGarry v. University of San Diego*, 154 Cal. App. 4th 97, 110 (4th Dist. 2007). Issues that involve even private conduct by public figures may be of public interest. *See Sipple v. Foundation For Nat. Progress*, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 238 (2d Dist. 1999) (finding that lawsuit based on reported allegations against nationally prominent media strategist for political figures, accusing him of physically and verbally abusing his wife, involved a matter of public interest).\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 As explained in Section 4.2.1.2, *infra*, Plaintiff is unquestionably a public figure. More importantly, Mr. Cheng's statements discuss Plaintiff's involvement in a major political dispute with the CCP, including allegations of criminal corruption by the CCP against Plaintiff. This kind of international political intrigue falls well within the kind of \"issue of public interest\" the Anti-SLAPP statute contemplates. The court in *Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman*, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 783-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) found that communications questioning whether\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 15 of\n\nmoney designated for charity ever reached its final, charitable destination\n\n31\n\naddressed an issue of public interest. In the years leading up to Mr. Cheng's statements on Twitter, there were numerous reports of the CCP's allegations of\n\ncriminal conduct, corruption, and extortion against Plaintiff in renowned media outlets such as the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times*. And by his own account, Plaintiff is *the* preeminent dissident and critic of the CCP. Mr. Cheng's statements concern these allegations against Plaintiff, the authenticity of his \"dissident\" status, and his relationship with the CCP. There is no legitimate question that Mr. Cheng's statements are on an issue of public interest.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Even assuming *arguendo* some of the statements were not on a matter of public concern (which Mr. Cheng denies), they are inextricably linked with statements that are, making Plaintiff's claims a \"mixed\" cause of action for Anti-SLAPP purposes. These \"mixed cause[s] of action [are] subject to the Anti-SLAPP statute if **at least one of the underlying acts is protected conduct**, unless the allegations of protected conduct are merely incidental to the unprotected activity.\" *Lauter v. Anoufrieva*, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (emphasis added); *see also Salma v. Capon*, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1287 (2008) (holding that a cause of action based on both protected and unprotected activity under California's Anti-SLAPP statute is subject to an Anti-SLAPP motion); *Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin*, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 675 (2005) (finding that because plaintiffs' claims \"are based in significant part on [defendant's] protected petitioning activity,\" the first anti-SLAPP prong was satisfied\"). Taken as a whole, Mr. Cheng's complained-of statements overwhelmingly discuss matters of significant public concern, and so any statements that do not directly speak to such issues still properly fall under the statute's protections.\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 16 of\n\n31\n\n## **4.1.2 Mr. Cheng's Statements Were Made in a Public Forum** Mr. Cheng published his statements on the web site <twitter.com>. Publicly\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 accessible web sites are public forums for Anti-SLAPP purposes. *See Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates*, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1121 (2012). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that social media web sites such as Twitter are paradigmatic modern-day public forums. *See Packingham v. North Carolina*, 582 U.S. \\_\\_\\_, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-37 (2017) (noting that \"[s]ocial media users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics as diverse as human thought\"). There is no question that Mr. Cheng's statements in direct connection with a matter of public interest were made in a place open to the public or a public forum.\n\n## **4.1.3 Mr. Cheng Made His Statements in Good Faith**\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 To be protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, statements must \"truthful or … made without knowledge of [their] falsehood.\" NRS 41.637. Even if a statement is false, the defendant must have made it with *actual knowledge* that it was false; neither negligence nor even reckless disregard for the truth can defeat a defendant's showing under prong one. Furthermore, by the Anti-SLAPP statute's plan language, the \"good faith\" analysis is completely unrelated to a defendant's motivations in making a statement.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Plaintiff's only support for the allegation that Mr. Cheng knew his statements were false is the conclusory assertion that he made each statement \"with malicious intent and knowing it to be false.\" (*See* SAC at ¶¶ 18-23, 112-117.) This is not at all true. Rather, as explained in greater detail in Section 4.2.1.1, *infra*, Mr. Cheng's statements are expressions of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole based on widely available information and reporting about accusations against Plaintiff. For several months prior to Mr. Cheng publishing any of the statements at issue, newspapers like the *Wall Street Journal* and *The New York Times* had published\n\n12\n\n28\n\n31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 numerous articles regarding allegations of Plaintiff's criminality, extortion, and embezzlement, whether personally or through his business associates. This reporting, on the whole, permitted the conclusion that Plaintiff fled China on his own initiative to avoid corruption charges after exploiting his ties with prominent CCP members for his personal enrichment, then styled himself as a political dissident to further enrich himself and garner attention. After all, the reporting prior to Mr. Cheng's tweets indicated that most of Plaintiff's claims about the CCP and its members were false or unverifiable.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 There is also nothing to suggest that Mr. Cheng made claims of Plaintiff working with the CCP and Xi Jinping knowing they were false. This allegation stemmed from speculation by Mr. Cheng in July 2018 as to the reason for the CCP releasing Plaintiff's family from custody. Plaintiff had positioned himself as a vocal opponent of the CCP threatening to expose corruption at the top levels (yet, by and large, had not verifiably done so), and so it was not likely the CCP was trying to reward Plaintiff for his alleged whistleblowing, that the CCP was afraid of Plaintiff, or that the CCP for some reason wanted to bolster his credibility. To Mr. Cheng, then, that left one possibility: Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP. Given his extreme wealth, allegedly obtained at least in part by exploiting the Chinese people and China's political system (according to pending criminal allegations and court cases against him and his subordinates), this was the most plausible scenario.\n\n22 23 24 25 26 Accordingly, all of the statements at issue are thus opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, and thus cannot be false for purposes of this analysis or were made without knowledge of their falsity. Mr. Cheng satisfies his burden under the first prong of the Anti-SLAPP analysis, and now the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing on his claims. He cannot do so.\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 18 of\n\n31\n\n**4.2 Plaintiff Cannot Show a Probability of Prevailing on His Claims**\n\nproof that a plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California's anti-\n\nStrategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation law as of the effective date of this\n\nact.\" NRS 41.665(2). Plaintiff cannot simply make vague accusations or provide\n\nNRS 41.660 defines a plaintiff's burden of proof as \"the same burden of\n\na mere scintilla of evidence to defeat Mr. Cheng's Motion. Rather, to satisfy his evidentiary burden under the second prong of the Anti-SLAPP statute, Plaintiff\n\nmust present \"substantial evidence that would support a judgment of relief made in the plaintiff's favor.\" *S. Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P.*, 193 Cal. App. 4th 634, 670 (2011); *see also Mendoza v. Wichmann*, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1449 (2011) holding that \"substantial evidence\" of lack of probable cause was required to withstand Anti-SLAPP motion on malicious prosecution claim). Plaintiff cannot make this showing as to any of his claims.\n\n### **4.2.1 Plaintiff's Defamation Claims Fail**\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 To establish a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a false and defamatory statement by the defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual or presumed damages. *See Wynn v. Smith*, 117 Nev. 6, 10 (Nev. 2001); *see also Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 718 (2002). A statement is only defamatory if it contains a factual assertion that can be proven false. *See Pope v. Motel 6*, 114 P.3d 277, 282 (Nev. 2005). And, for a public figure, like the plaintiff, to prevail in a defamation action, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statements were made with actual malice. *See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc.*, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).\n\n26 27 A statement must include a false assertion of fact to be defamatory. \"[M]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity unless the inaccuracies 'would\n\n**4.2.1.1 Mr. Cheng's Statements are Not Actionable**\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n25\n\n1 2 3 4 have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.'\" *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17. If the \"gist\" or \"sting\" of a story is true, it is not defamatory even if some details are incorrect. *Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991).\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 A statement of opinion cannot be defamatory, as the First Amendment recognizes that there is no such thing as a \"false\" idea. *See Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 714 (Nev. 2002); *see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). Additionally, in Nevada, \"a statement is not defamatory if it is an exaggeration or generalization that could be interpreted by a reasonable person as 'mere rhetorical hyperbole.'\" *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 715 (citing *Wellman v. Fox*, 108 Nev. 83, 88 (Nev. 1992) (finding that \"exaggerated statements are permissible in contexts in which the statements would be interpreted by a reasonable person as mere rhetorical hyperbole\")); *see also Flowers v. Carville*, 310 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that references to tabloid articles as \"trash,\" \"crap,\" and \"garbage\" were not actionable); *and see Phantom Touring v. Affiliated Publ'ns*, 953 F.2d 724, 728, 730-31 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that theatre review calling a production \"a rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job\" was \"obviously protected hyperbole\" or incapable of being proven false). Politically-charged invective is typically considered an expression of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, even if the words used might be considered capable of defamatory meaning in different contexts. *See Rosenaur v. Scherer*, 88 Cal. App. 4th 260, 280 (2001) (finding that calling political foe a \"thief\" and a \"liar\" was not actionable). \"[B]road, unfocused and wholly subjective comment[s]\" are protected as opinion and are not actionable. *Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury news*, 216 Cal. App. 3d 172, 191 (1989) (finding that calling someone a \"crooked politician\" was not actionable).\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 20 of\n\nstatement of fact, or merely one of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. *See Balzaga*\n\n*v. Fox News Network, LLC*, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1325, 1339 (2009) (finding that \"the\n\nfact that a statement '[s]tanding alone' could be construed as false is not\n\nsufficient to support a defamation claim\"); *see also Lewis v. Time, Inc.*, 710 F.2d\n\nThe context of a statement is important in determining whether it is a\n\n31\n\n549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating \"even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of opinion, and thus be privileged, when made [under] circumstances in which 'an audience may anticipate efforts by the\n\nparties to persuade others to their position by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole'\") (quoting *Information Control Group v. Genesis One Computer*, 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)). If a publication containing an allegedly defamatory statement is surrounded by \"loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language,\" then any allegedly defamatory meaning may be negated by the publication's overall tenor. *See Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 23 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689 (1994).\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 It is particularly important to keep in mind that Mr. Cheng made his statements on an online forum, Twitter, a context in which there is a lesser expectation that statements will be factual. *See Krinsky v. Doe 6*, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1173, 1178 (2008) finding that in a chat room setting, anonymous post that corporate officers consisted of a \"cockroach,\" \"losers,\" \"boobs,\" and \"crooks\" were \"crude, satirical hyperbole which … constitute protected opinion\"); *see also James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.*, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12, 14 (1993) (finding that article describing lawyer as engaging in \"sleazy, illegal, and unethical practice\" fell into \"protected zone of 'imaginative expression' or 'rhetorical hyperbole'\").\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n- 19 - Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-18-779172-C\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 21 of 31\n\n### **4.2.1.1.1 Tweet One17**\n\nThe first allegedly defamatory tweet reads as follows:\n\nPossibility 3 could be right, because Guo and Xi made a deal involving large sums of money. Guo does not resemble a (normal) businessman at all. His great wealth all came from extortions done in collusion with the communists. This time his shady dealings with Xi involve making a deal that's worth a heavenly sum. But this deal is built upon a deal whose price is the sacrifice of the lives and properties belonging to 1.4 billion people. Everyone knows that as Xi will do anything to stay in power, he can casually give away 100 billion, a trillion. It's hard for Guo's wealth to not grow explosively.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 14-16.) Mr. Cheng is thus stating that it is possible Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP to have his family released, in light of his shady history with central figures in the CCP and his tremendous wealth. This is a follow-up to Mr. Cheng speculating as to possible explanations for the CCP releasing Plaintiff's family from custody, and in this tweet, he explains that the most likely explanation for this development is that Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP. This aspect of the statement is pure speculation and his immediately preceding tweet allows for multiple other interpretations of the disclosed fact that Plaintiff's family was released by the CCP. It is thus a statement of opinion incapable of being defamatory.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 To the extent Plaintiff contends the statement that he does not resemble a normal businessman and made his money via extortion, this is an expression of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. There is a wealth of media coverage, as well as allegations of criminality by the Chinese government, speculating or outright claiming that Plaintiff may be a shady businessman who made his billions by exploiting contacts within the CCP to enrich himself. While Plaintiff claims he has always kept himself at arms-reach from the CCP, this is far from established and\n\n26\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n<sup>27</sup> <sup>17</sup> For a side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff's translation alongside Mr. Lee's translation, *see* **Exhibit 14**.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 22 of\n\nthere is a sufficient basis in the public record for Mr. Cheng to reasonably believe\n\nthat he was intimately involved with the CCP at the time of his self-exile. Unless\n\npolitical corruption is so endemic in China that it is expected, this makes it so that\n\nMr. Cheng understood Plaintiff not to be a normal businessman, and the\n\n31\n\nenormous amount of political scandal and allegations against Plaintiff can accurately be summarized to include allegations of extortion in collusion with the\n\n8 9 10 11 12 As for the claim that Plaintiff is involved in a deal based on a deal at the cost of 1.4 billion people's lives and property, this is precisely the kind of \"loose, figurative\" language that clues the reader into the fact that Mr. Cheng is not making precise factual allegations, but is instead speaking rhetorically and offering his subjective opinion. This tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.2 Tweet Two**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The second complained-of tweet is in response to a Twitter user calling into question claims from Plaintiff as to the numbers of viewers on his YouTube channel. (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 17-18.) The tweet reads: \"Guo lies and lies and lies with disregard. The more lying Guo lies, the more absurd the lies, even while he's entangled in numerous lawsuits. He no longer has any regard for the laws of civilized Western countries, you can imagine how much worse he must have acted in China.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 19-21.)\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Vaguely calling someone, especially a politically-involved public figure, a \"liar\" repeatedly is precisely the kind of language courts have found to constitute protected opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. *See Rosenaur*, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 280; *Fletcher*, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 191; *James*, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14. Additionally, while an opinion need not be reasonable to be protected, it was entirely reasonable for Mr. Cheng to think of Plaintiff as a liar. There was plenty of media coverage by this time that Plaintiff was a defendant in defamation suits, that he\n\n13\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\nCCP.\n\n1 2 3 had been accused of dishonesty and fraud, and that his extreme claims against the CCP and its members were unreliable. This tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.3 Tweet Three**\n\n5 6 7 8 9 The third tweet at issue reads: \"Guo acts with impunity because he can. He continuously fabricates large amounts of shameless lies; this is the greatest shame for the whole of our overseas Chinese community. Can it really be that evil has overcome justice, the sky and the earth has flipped itself upside down?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 22.)\n\n10 11 12 13 14 As with the second statement, non-specifically calling Plaintiff a flagrant liar is not capable of any defamatory meaning. Furthermore, the tweet contains flowery language, \"evil has overcome justice, the sky and the earth has flipped itself upside down,\" that makes it clear to the reader Mr. Cheng is not made any specific factual allegation. This tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n## 15\n\n24\n\n28\n\n4\n\n### **4.2.1.1.4 Tweet Four**\n\n16 17 18 The fourth tweet at issue reads: \"We can't even deal with one lying Guo, how can we overthrow the evil Chinese communist party?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 23-25.)\n\n19 20 21 22 23 Again, this tweet consists of Mr. Cheng non-specifically calling Plaintiff a liar. Calling Plaintiff \"lying Guo\" is a familiar rhetorical construction in political discussion, as can be found repeatedly by figures such as President Donald J. Trump calling his opponents like \"crooked Hillary.\" (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶ 24.) The tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.5 Tweet Five**\n\n25 26 27 The fifth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo confused a bunch of people, snared a bunch of people, attacked and frightened some people, and seriously divided a group of people so they caused harm to each other. In a short time, he managed Case 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 24 of\n\nto leave the overseas democracy movement in pieces, and they completely lost\n\nto Plaintiff confusing, snaring, attacking, frightening, and dividing people. These\n\nstatements do not accuse Plaintiff of any specific actions, however, and are thus\n\nThere is no factual allegation in this tweet. Mr. Cheng non-specifically refers\n\n31\n\nno more actionable than statements vaguely accusing someone of being a \"crook\" or engaging in \"sleazy, illegal, and unethical practice.\" *See Krinsky*, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 1173, 1178; *see also James*, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14. Claiming\n\ntheir ability to do battle.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 26.)\n\nPlaintiff has weaken the overseas democracy movement is a classic statement of opinion, and the language used (\"in pieces\" and \"completely lost their ability to do battle\") is classic rhetorical hyperbole. This tweet is non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.6 Tweet Six**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 The sixth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo deliberately manufactured large quantities of vulgar lies, and continuously makes enemies, his goal is to divert people's attention, divide and weaken democracy movement's ability to fight, and thus achieve the goal of overseas stability maintenance.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 27-28.)\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 As with prior statements \"Guo deliberately manufactured large quantities of vulgar lies\" is a non-specific statement incapable of defamatory meaning. The statement that Plaintiff \"continuously makes enemies\" is not even potentially defamatory because it does not tend to harm Plaintiff's reputation, and in any event is a statement of opinion based on all the reporting that Plaintiff is constantly being sued for defamation, that he is a target of at least some CCP members, and that he has enemies within the Chinese political dissident movement. Mr. Cheng's statement that Plaintiff has weakened the democracy movement is another statement of opinion based on the fact that Plaintiff has made numerous\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n1 2 3 4 5 extreme claims of corruption and wrongdoing within the CCP, yet has rarely provided evidence that actually bears these claims out. A high-profile, fabulously wealthy self-proclaimed political dissident who constantly over-delivers and under-performs would indeed have a tendency to weaken the public's regard for actual, less flamboyant, Chinese dissidents.\n\n**4.2.1.2 Mr. Cheng Did Not Act with the Requisite Fault**\n\n7 8 9 Even assuming, *arguendo*, any of Mr. Cheng's statements are false statements of fact, he did not make them with the requisite degree of fault and cannot be liable for them.\n\n### **4.2.1.2.1 Plaintiff is a Public Figure**\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The degree of fault required by a defendant for defamation liability to attach depends upon the target and content of the defendant's speech. There are three categories of defamation plaintiffs: the general public figure, the limited purpose public figure, and the private individual. A limited purpose public figure \"voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.\" *Gerz v. Robert Welch*, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974); *see also Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 720. This is a question of law, and a court's determination is based \"on whether the person's role in a matter of public concern is voluntary and prominent.\" *Bongiovi v. Sullivan*, 122 Nev. 556, 572 (2006).\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 As explained in Section 2.1*, supra*, Plaintiff claims he is an extremely wealthy, extremely prominent (in fact, *the most* prominent) Chinese political dissident. And as shown in Section 2.2, *supra*, there has been voluminous coverage in international media of all the controversy surrounding Plaintiff and his reputation, including allegations that he is a liar, a fraud, a criminal, an embezzler, a rapist, that he was in bed with the CCP when he made his billions, and that, at the very least, he is an unreliable source of criticism against the CCP. If he is not a public\n\n6\n\n10\n\n1 2 3 4 figure for all purposes, Plaintiff is without doubt a public figure in the context of his status as a prominent political dissident and critic of the CCP. He is thus required to show that Mr. Cheng wrote his statements on Twitter with actual malice, which he has no hope of doing.\n\n### **4.2.1.2.2 Mr. Cheng Did Not Act with Actual Malice**\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 \"Actual malice\" is not ill will towards a plaintiff, but rather a defendant's knowledge that his statements are false, or reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. *Harte-Hanks Comm'n v. Connaughton*, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989). \"The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in defamation cases, the phrase 'actual malice' 'has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will.\"' *D.A.R.E. Am. v. Rolling Stone Magazine*, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting *Harte-Hanks*, 491 U.S. at 667 n.7). The definition of knowing falsity is self-evident. To show \"reckless disregard,\" a public figure must prove that the publisher \"entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.\" *St. Amant v. Thompson*, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); *see also Bose Corp*, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30. Under Nevada law, reckless disregard only exists when the defendant \"acted with a 'high degree of awareness of … [the] probable falsity' of the statement or had serious doubt as to the publication's truth.\" *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 719. The question is not \"whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.\" *Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court*, 690 P.2d 610, 617-18 (Cal. 1984); *see also St. Amant*, 390 U.S. at 731. Moreover, \"[a] publisher does not have to investigate personally, but may rely on the investigation and conclusions of reputable sources.\" *Id*. at 619. Finally, a defamation plaintiff must establish actual malice by **clear and convincing evidence**. *See Bose Corp.*, 466 U.S. at 511. This is a requirement that presents \"a heavy burden, far in excess of the preponderance\n\n28\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 27 of\n\n31\n\nsufficient for most civil litigation.\" *Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.*, 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"The burden of\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.\" *Copp v. Paxton*, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Major newspapers, including the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, reported on allegations against Plaintiff starting at least in 2017. These allegations included that Plaintiff fled China to avoid corruption charges which swept up high-profile CCP officials with whom he had close relations; that China had issued an arrest notice with Interpol; that Plaintiff had earned his billions by corruptly working with and influencing Chinese politicians, as well as defrauding investors and other companies; that his business subordinates claimed he instructed them to engage in criminal activity; that he was being investigated for several crimes including fraud and embezzlement; that he raped his former personal assistant; that many of his claims of the CCP's corruption have not been verified and are unverifiable; that he was a divisive figure amongst the Chinese dissident community; and that he was a defendant in multiple defamation lawsuits. (*See* **Exhibits 2-12**.) These were not the ramblings of anonymous madmen on the Internet, but rather respected media outlets and even a foreign government. It was thus eminently reasonable for Mr. Cheng to rely on these reports of allegations against Plaintiff in forming his opinions about Plaintiff and that he was likely not a true advocate against the CCP.\n\n25 26 27 In the face of all this evidence supporting the conclusions Mr. Cheng expressed on Twitter, Plaintiff makes no real attempt to show actual malice. Rather, he only provides a formulaic recitation of actual malice as defined by the\n\n28\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 28 of\n\nSupreme Court, without a single supporting factual allegation. This would fail to\n\nsatisfy Plaintiff's burden even under NRCP 12(b)(5), much less the more stringent\n\nburden under the Anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiff cannot make any showing that\n\nMr. Cheng knew his statements were false (to the extent he made any factual\n\nstatements at all) and cannot show that he made any statements with substantial\n\nsubjective doubt as to their accuracy. Plaintiff cannot meet his burden under the\n\n31\n\nAnti-SLAPP statute, and his defamation and defamation per se claims must be **4.2.2 Plaintiff's IIED Claim Fails** To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Plaintiff must affirmatively prove: \"(1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff's having suffered severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual or proximate causation.\" *Olivero v. Lowe*, 116 Nev. 395, 398-99 (2000) (citing *Star v. Rabello*, 97 Nev. 124, 125 (1981) (citations omitted). \"Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which is outside all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\" *Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car*, 114 Nev. 1, 4 (1998). Harm is only recognized for this tort if \"the stress [is] so severe and of such intensity that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.\" *Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp.*, 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993). Because he is a public figure, Plaintiff must also prove that Mr. Cheng's statements are false and were made with actual malice. *See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell*, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).\n\n24 25 26 Under *Falwell*, Plaintiff's IIED claim fails for the same reasons his defamation claims fail. Beyond that, however, Plaintiff cannot show any extreme or outrageous conduct, and cannot show severe emotional distress.\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\ndismissed.\n\n9\n\n10\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 29 of\n\nevery statement that one finds personally upsetting may provide the basis for\n\nliability. *See Chehade Refai v. Lazaro*, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1121-22 (D. Nev. 2009);\n\n*see also* Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d. While Plaintiff is not running\n\nThe bar for establishing extreme and outrageous conduct is high, and not\n\n31\n\nfor public office, his alleged work as a high-profile political dissident against the CCP is comparable to entering the rough-and-tumble jungle of a political fight,\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 where courts have repeatedly found that hurtful statements are not actionable. *See Harte-Hanks*, 491 U.S. at 687 (finding that \"[w]hen a candidate enters the political arena, he or she must expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal\"); *Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm.*, 669 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that \"[c]ampaigning for public office sometimes has the feel of a contact sport, with candidates, political organizations, and others trading rhetorical jabs and sound-bite attacks in hopes of landing a knockout blow at the polls. It is not for the thin-skinned or the fainthearted\"); *Desert Sun Pul'g Co. v. Sup. Ct.*, 97 Cal. App. 3d 49, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that \"[o]nce an individual decides to enter the political wars, he subjects himself to this kind of treatment[, and] deeply ingrained in our political history is a tradition of free-wheeling-irresponsible, bare knuckled, Pier 6, political brawls\").\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Mr. Cheng's statements on Twitter are not, by any stretch of the imagination, extreme or outrageous, especially in the context of speaking about the self-avowed most prominent Chinese political dissident on the planet. Mr. Cheng's statements are no harsher than the schoolyard taunt \"liar liar, pants on fire,\" and he goes no further than recounting what Chinese and American media have already reported about Plaintiff. It is not at all plausible to assert that mild criticisms no worse than what can be found on public fora like Twitter every day are so extreme that civilized society simply cannot tolerate them. This claim fails.\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 30 of\n\nPlaintiff cannot show he suffered severe emotional distress. For years, Plaintiff has\n\nwithstood allegations of extreme and monstrous criminal and unethical behavior\n\nby international media and the Chinese government, sources with far greater\n\nauthority and credibility than a man with a few thousand followers on Twitter. It is\n\nlaughable for Plaintiff to assert that he could bear the weight of all these\n\nEven if Mr. Cheng's statements were extreme and outrageous, however,\n\n31\n\nallegations, but that a man with little internet presence calling him a liar was enough to break him emotionally. Plaintiff cannot show severe emotional distress, and thus has no probability of prevailing on this claim. It must be dismissed. **5.0 CONCLUSION**\n\n11 12 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice and award both Mr. Cheng's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, as well as award him \\$10,000, to be sought by separate motion.\n\nDATED June 14, 2019. Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Marc J. Randazza Marc J. Randazza (NV Bar No. 12265) Ronald D. Green (NV Bar No. 7360) LaTeigra C. Cahill (NV Bar No. 14352) RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC 2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109 Las Vegas, NV 89117\n\nAttorneys for Defendant SHUIYAN CHENG\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n![](_page_30_Figure_0.jpeg)","body_zh":"附件2\n\n反SLAPP特别驳回动议\n\nGuo（郭文贵）诉 Cheng（程水燕） 内华达州克拉克县第八司法区法院\n\n案号 22-50073\n\n文件 474-2\n\n提交于 06/20/22　登记于 06/20/22 13:31:16\n\n电子提交\n\n6/14/2019 4:33 PM\n\nSteven D. Grierson（史蒂文·D.·格里尔森）\n\n法院书记官\n\n1　MDSM\n\n2　Marc J. Randazza（马克·J.·兰达扎）（内华达州律师执照编号 12265）\nRonald D. Green（罗纳德·D.·格林）（内华达州律师执照编号 7360）\n\n3　LaTeigra C. Cahill（拉泰格拉·C.·卡希尔）（内华达州律师执照编号 14352）\n\n4　RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC（兰达扎法律集团，PLLC）\n2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109\n\n5　Las Vegas, NV 89117\n电话：702-420-2001\n\n6　ecf@randazza.com\n\n7　被告代理律师\n\n8　SHUIYAN CHENG（程水燕）\n\n9　第八司法区法院\n\n10　内华达州克拉克县\n\n12　WENGUI GUO（郭文贵），又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵）　案号\nA-18-779172-C\n\n13　原告，　部门 32\n\n15　诉　要求举行听证会\n\n16　SHUIYAN CHENG（程水燕），又名 HUIYAN CHANG；　被告 SHUIYAN CHENG（程水燕）根据\n\n17　FANG YONG（方勇），又名 MA KE，　NRS 41.660 提出的反SLAPP\n\n特别驳回动议\n\n18　被告。\n\n20　被告 Shuiyan Cheng（程水燕）特此提交其根据 NRS 41.660 提出的反SLAPP特别驳回动议。\n\n22　本动议基于所附法律要点及依据备忘录、所附证据材料、本案卷宗中的文件及诉状，以及本法院准许的任何口头辩论。\n\n- 1 -\n\n反SLAPP驳回动议\n\nA-18-779172-C\n\n法律要点及依据备忘录\n\n2 1.0 引言\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 原告针对 Cheng 先生提起的诉讼是典型的 SLAPP 诉讼。原告以其公众人物身份及其所称中国异见人士工作而自豪。Cheng 先生在 Twitter（推特）上发表了若干言论，批评该声誉并非实至名归，并称原告实际上破坏了其自称支持的政治运动。原告没有以其自身言论回应 Cheng 先生的言论，而是提起本案诉讼，试图完全阻止 Cheng 先生谈论他。1 这正是反SLAPP法案意在适用的情形。\n\n11 12 13 14 15 Cheng 先生的言论要么真实，要么构成修辞性夸张或意见，或者至少而言，他发表这些言论时并无实际恶意。原告无法就其任何主张获得胜诉，因此法院应有终局效力地驳回这些主张，并裁定 Cheng 先生获得其为抗辩这些主张而产生的律师费及费用。\n\n16 2.0 事实背景\n\n2.1 原告作为公众人物的声誉\n\n18 19 20 21 22 原告是一名知名的中国政治人物，其利用社交媒体“揭露[]中国共产党（‘CCP’）、多名中国政府高级官员及其家属中普遍存在的腐败”，并且“对[中国共产党]的国际形象和\n\n23 24 25 26 27 1 原告长期以来一直起诉其批评者，而非在思想市场中参与讨论以回应其批评。参见，例如，Guo v. Yuan, No. 2:18 cv-02276-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. 2018); Guo v. Chen, No. 2:18-cv-03800-MCA-MAH (D.N.J. 2018); Guo v. Teng, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134475 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2018); Guo v. Lian, Index No. 151428/2018 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y., Cty. Of N.Y. 2018); Guo v. Xing, Index No. 151430/2018 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y., Cty. Of N.Y. 2018); Guo v. Xia, No. 1:18 cv-00174-LO-TCB (E.D. Va. 2018); Guo v. Yuan, No. 2:18-cv-02276-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018).\n\n案号 22-50073　文件 474-2　提交于 06/20/22　登记于 06/20/22 13:31:16　第 4 页，共 31 页\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 可信度产生了前所未有的影响。”（第二次修正起诉状（“SAC”）第 ¶¶ 5-7 段。）其 Twitter 账户拥有超过 400,000 名关注者，其中大多数为中国人；其自称是“单枪匹马挑战中国共产党并揭露中国共产党在美国和其他国家建立情报网络的那个人。”（同上，第 ¶¶ 8-9 段。）他在中国成为亿万富翁房地产巨头，后中国共产党于 2015 年没收了其家族资产，并逮捕了数百名其家属成员及商业同事。（参见同上，第 ¶¶ 75-82 段。）他声称，其在该次没收后所实施的举报行为“被视为自天安门广场屠杀以来中国最大的政治事件之一。”（同上，第 ¶ 86 段。）可以肯定地说，原告在其政治活动的语境中属于公众人物。\n\n2.2 对针对原告之指控的报道\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 尽管原告将自己描绘为一名反抗中国审查制度、为民主而战的高尚坦率战士，但实际记录至少可以说是褒贬不一。首先，原告对其作为异见人士的起源并不诚实。他声称，他于 1989 年天安门广场屠杀期间，因协助抗议的中国学生而被中国共产党逮捕。（参见 SAC 第 ¶ 43 段。）但是，Cheng 先生对该主张进行了调查，并根据中国河南省濮阳市法院的记录显示，他是在距离天安门广场 300 英里之外，因一宗完全无关的交易而被逮捕；在其兄弟持刀袭击一名警察后，他又袭击了一名警察，所涉指控包括欺诈及拒捕。（参见支持答复驳回动议异议的 Cheng 先生声明，作为附件 1 附后，第 ¶ 16 段及子附件 6。）\n\n25 26 27 此外，还有大量关于针对原告的犯罪、不道德及其他令人反感行为指控的报道。《华尔街日报》（THE WALL STREET JOURNAL）于 2017 年 4 月发表的一篇文章报道称，中国共产党已通过国际刑警组织（Interpol）对原告发布国际逮捕通知。（参见 Chun Han Wong（王春翰），《中国称已对商人郭文贵发布国际刑警组织逮捕通知》，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（Apr. 20, 2017），作为附件 2 附后。）2 2017 年 5 月，《福布斯》（FORBES）报道称，原告正在对中国共产党提出“在很大程度上未经证实的指控”，这暗示原告“受到腐败玷污”，并说明针对原告的国际刑警组织逮捕通知基于贿赂指控。（参见 Nathan Vardi（内森·瓦尔迪），《住在价值 $67 Million 曼哈顿公寓中的中国逃犯》，FORBES（May 19, 2017），作为附件 3 附后。）3 该报道还报道了一名中国记者因诽谤而起诉原告；该诉讼基于原告为报复该记者发表文章而作出的言论，该文章指控原告利用性爱录像带罢免一名北京市副市长，以便其取得有吸引力的房地产。（参见同上。）\n\n案号 22-50073　文件 474-2　提交于 06/20/22　登记于 06/20/22 13:31:16　第 5 页，共 31 页\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2017 年 6 月，《华尔街日报》报道了中国对原告商业下属进行的一场刑事审判；该等下属伪造文件，使原告的一家公司得以获得一份利润丰厚的合同。该报道还重述了原告为自身利益而利用性爱录像带对付一名政治人物的主张。（参见 Josh Chin（乔希·钦），《中国加大对流亡大亨郭文贵的压力》，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（June 10, 2017），作为附件 4 附后。）4 该文章还报道称，一名受审下属作证称，原告命令她伪造文件。（参见同上。）在一篇 2017 年 9 月的文章中，《华尔街日报》重述了针对原告的许多指控，包括“中国法院\n\n- 21 22 23 2 网址：http（最后访问于 June 14, 2019）。\n\n- 24 3 网址：http（最后访问于 June 14, 2019）。\n\n25 26 27 4 网址：http（最后访问于 June 14, 2019）。\n\n1 2 3 4 5 已对郭先生的多名前同事和下属判处监禁及罚款，所涉犯罪包括欺诈和侵占。中国媒体发表文章，将其描绘为不择手段之人。”（Chun Han Wong（王春翰）和 Felicia Schwartz（费利西亚·施瓦茨），《中国希望逃犯郭文贵回国——但他已申请美国庇护》，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（Sept. 7, 2017），作为附件 5 附后。）5\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 《华尔街日报》于 2017 年 10 月发表的一篇文章报道称，原告正在利用其财富为自己抗辩多起诽谤诉讼，一名中国女子提起民事诉讼，指控原告在其担任原告个人助理期间强奸了她。（参见 Cezary Podkul（切萨里·波德库尔）和 Chun Han Wong（王春翰），《中国逃犯郭文贵筹集资金对抗北京》，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（Oct. 3, 2017），作为附件 6 附后。）6 同月稍后，该报报道称，中国共产党称“其正在调查郭先生至少 19 起涉及贿赂、绑架、欺诈、洗钱和强奸的重大刑事案件。”（O'Keefe（奥基夫）、Viswanatha（维斯瓦纳塔）和 Podkul（波德库尔），《中国追捕逃亡商人郭文贵，拉开一出堪比间谍惊悚片的曼哈顿闹剧序幕》，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（Oct. 22, 2017），作为附件 7 附后。）7\n\n17 18 19 20 2018 年 1 月，《纽约时报》（The New York Times）发表了一篇关于原告的长篇揭露报道，并质疑其作为举报人的主张。（参见 Lauren Hilgers（劳伦·希尔格斯），《流亡亿万富翁举报人的谜团》，The New York Times（Jan. 10, 2018），作为附件 8 附后。）8 该报道叙述称，原告在预料到\n\n5 网址：http（最后访问于 June 14, 2019）。\n\n23 24 6 网址：http（最后访问于 June 14, 2019）。\n\n25 7 网址：http\n\n26 1508717977（最后访问于 June 14, 2019）。\n\n27 8 网址：http（最后访问于 June 14, 2019）。\n\n案号 22-50073　文件 474-2　提交于 06/20/22　登记于 06/20/22 13:31:16　第 7 页，共 31 页\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 针对其的腐败指控将其商业和政治伙伴卷入其中后逃离中国，也叙述了 2017 年前后浮现的腐败、贿赂和强奸指控，并指出，“郭对中国共产党提出的绝大多数指控已被证明几乎不可能核实。”（参见同上。）该报道指出，据一名专门研究中国治理的大学教授称，人们不应照单全收原告的主张，且许多中国政治异见人士因其为逃避腐败指控而非迫害而流亡，对其持怀疑态度。（参见同上。）该报道说明，西方媒体机构一直难以证实其主张，而且他一直隐瞒诸如年龄和出生日期等简单的个人履历细节。（参见同上。）该报道称，尽管原告声称从未取得政府贷款，但其取得了总额为 $89 million 的贷款并发生违约。（参见同上。）该报道讨论了原告与中国相当于中央情报局和联邦调查局的机构副部长 Ma Jian（马建）之间的友谊；马建于 2015 年作为中国共产党打击腐败行动的一部分被逮捕。（参见同上。）该报道指出，由于各方政治丑闻和犯罪行为指控交织，关于原告离开中国前数年的细节尤其难以辨明。（参见同上。）该报道还说明，原告确实编造了其故事中的某些细节9，并作出了荒谬而不可信的主张，例如从不两次穿同一条内裤。（参见同上。）\n\n20 21 22 23 24 在整个 2018 年，其他媒体机构均报道了针对原告的这些及类似指控，其中包括报道称，其针对中国共产党的许多主张仍未得到核实，并且常被视为耸人听闻。（参见 David Barboza（戴维·巴博萨），《Steve Bannon（史蒂夫·班农）与一名逃亡亿万富翁锁定共同目标\n\n- 25 26 27 9 原告还在其 SAC 中撒谎。他声称 Cheng 先生并不认识他本人（SAC 第 ¶ 110 段），然而有照片证据显示，两人最早于 2017 年 10 月已经会面。（参见附件 1 第 ¶ 6 段及子附件 2。）\n\n- 6 反SLAPP驳回动议 A-18-779172-C\n\n案号 22-50073　文件 474-2　提交于 06/20/22　登记于 06/20/22 13:31:16　第 8 页，共 31 页\n\n《Enemy: China》，THE NEW YORK TIMES（《纽约时报》）(Dec. 4, 2018)，随附为证据9；10 Chris Lau（克里斯·刘），《Hong Kong police investigating fugitive Chinese tycoon Guo Wengui（郭文贵）over alleged HK$32 billion money laundering conspiracy, court papers reveal》，SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST（《南华早报》）(Aug. 14, 2018)，随附为证据10；11 L. Todd Wood（L. 托德·伍德），《Enemies abound for Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui》，Washington Times（《华盛顿时报》）(Dec. 19, 2018)，随附为证据11；12 以及见证据1第¶¶ 18-20段及子证据9-11。)) 此外，2018年10月，中国报纸Caixin（财新）报道称，原告某家公司五名高级雇员被认定犯有多项罪行，且原告本人曾从一家中国公司侵吞超过2 billion yuan。（见Xiankang、Jinbing、Wei和Gang，《Fugitive Billionaire Guo Wengui's Company Fined 60 Billion Yuan》，Caixin (Oct. 13, 2018)，随附为证据12。）13\n\n2.3 Cheng先生（程先生）的陈述\n\n本案基于Cheng先生在社交媒体网站Twitter（推特）其公开可访问账户上发布的六项陈述（称为“推文”）。首先，SAC存在一个问题：Cheng先生的推文为中文，而SAC（推定为有意如此）并未附上或展示这些推文，反而依赖原告自行提供且未经核实的译文。\n\n10 可查阅地址：http（最后访问于June 14, 2019）。\n\n11 可查阅地址：http（最后访问于June 14, 2019）。\n\n12 可查阅地址：http enemies-abound-for-chinese-billionaire-guo-wengui/（最后访问于June 14, 2019）。\n\n13 可查阅地址：http（最后访问于June 14, 2019）。\n\n为确定所涉陈述的实际含义，Cheng先生聘请了Anmin Lee（李安民），其为中文母语者、精通英语，并曾为伯利兹的一个全国性政党进行翻译。在审阅所涉原始推文后，他发现原告的译文存在重大缺陷和遗漏。（见Anmin Lee声明［“Lee Decl.”］，随附为证据13。）14\n\n14 Cheng先生持续定期收集可能影响本动议的信息。如有任何信息可得，他将补充本动议。\n\n首先，SAC所认定的第一项涉嫌诽谤的陈述遗漏了该对话的一半。针对中国共产党（CCP）已将原告家人从羁押中释放的新闻，Cheng先生在该推文前写道：“大家想想看，哪一种更有可能：中国共产党释放郭的家人，是因为：1. 中国共产党害怕郭，因此释放了郭的家人；2. 因为郭通过披露信息做了好事；3. 中国共产党释放郭的家人，是因为达成了某种交易；4. 郭的家人被拘押，是为了与郭披露该信息相配合，此举旨在增强公众眼中郭披露信息的可信度。”\n\n（Lee Decl. 第¶¶ 10-12段。）15 因此，Cheng先生是在提出中国共产党为何决定释放一名知名政治异见人士家人的可能解释，其中包括原告可能与中国共产党达成交易。\n\n15 对于许多所涉陈述，Lee先生提供了直译和更自然的译文。除非另有说明，本动议就每项陈述均援引自然译文。\n\n第一项涉嫌诽谤的推文如下：“第3种可能性可能是对的，因为郭和Xi（习近平）达成了一项涉及巨额金钱的交易。郭根本不像一个（正常的）商人。他的巨额财富全都来自与共产党人勾结实施的敲诈。此次他与习近平的暗中交易，涉及达成一项价值天文数字的交易。但这项交易建立在另一项交易之上，而那项交易的代价是牺牲14亿人的生命和财产。大家都知道，习近平为了继续掌权什么都能做，他可以随意送出100 billion，a trillion。郭的财富很难不爆炸式增长。”（Lee Decl. 第¶¶ 14-16段。）因此，鉴于原告有长期记录可查的、与中国共产党核心人物不正当往来的历史及其巨额且无法解释的财富，Cheng先生是在表示，原告可能与中国共产党达成交易以使其家人获释。\n\n第二项被投诉的推文，是针对一名Twitter用户质疑原告关于其YouTube频道观看人数的说法作出的回应。（见Lee Decl. 第¶¶ 17-18段。）该推文写道：“郭肆无忌惮地一而再、再而三地撒谎。郭撒的谎越多，谎言就越荒谬，即使他正陷于众多诉讼之中。他已不再尊重西方文明国家的法律，你可以想象他在中国的行为必定糟糕得多。”（Lee Decl. 第¶¶ 19-21段。）\n\n第三项所涉推文写道：“郭能够逍遥法外，是因为他有这个能力。他不断编造大量无耻谎言；这是我们整个海外华人群体最大的耻辱。难道真的是邪恶战胜了正义，天地都颠倒了吗？”（Lee Decl. 第¶ 22段。）\n\n第四项所涉推文写道：“我们连一个撒谎的郭都对付不了，又怎能推翻邪恶的中国共产党？”（Lee Decl. 第¶¶ 23-25段。）\n\n第五项所涉推文写道：“郭迷惑了一群人，诱骗了16一群人，攻击并恐吓了一群人，并严重分化了一群人，以致他们彼此造成伤害。他在短时间内就使海外民主运动支离破碎，他们完全丧失了战斗能力。”（Lee Decl. 第¶ 26段。）\n\n16 Lee先生解释，此处所涉汉字最可能意为“诱捕”，即“引诱或诱惑某人陷入伤害或错误”，而SAC的译文“cheated on”是“牵强附会”。（Lee Decl. 第¶ 26段，脚注8。）\n\n第六项所涉推文写道：“郭故意制造大量粗俗谎言，并不断树敌；其目标是转移人们的注意力，分化并削弱民主运动的斗争能力，从而实现海外维稳的目标。”（Lee Decl. 第¶¶ 27-28段。）值得注意的是，SAC对该推文的译文中有相当一部分完全不准确，且在推文本身中根本不存在。（见Lee Decl. 第¶ 29段。）\n\n3.0 法律标准\n\n根据Nevada（内华达州）的反SLAPP法，NRS 41.635 et seq.，如诉讼系基于被告行使其第一修正案权利而对其提起，被告可以提出特别驳回动议。对反SLAPP动议的审查分为两个步骤。第一步由动议方承担举证责任，第二步由非动议方承担举证责任。见John v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 746, 754 (2009)。\n\n首先，被告必须以优势证据证明，原告的主张“基于为促进请愿权或与公共关切事项直接相关的言论自由权而作出的善意陈述。”NRS 41.660(3)(a)。受保护言论的法定类别之一是“在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛内，就公共利益事项直接作出的、真实或在不知其虚假的情况下作出的［陈述］。”NRS 41.637(4)。\n\n其次，一旦被告满足第一项要件中的举证责任，举证责任即转移至原告，原告必须初步证明其主张具有胜诉可能性。见NRS 41.660(3)(b)；另见John, 125 Nev. at 754。\n\nNevada将反SLAPP动议视为简易判决动议的一种。见Stubbs v. Strickland, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (Nev. 2013)；另见Coker v. Sassone, 432 P.3d 746, 748-49 (Nev. 2019)。但是，该动议另有一些程序以避免滥用证据开示；如法院准予驳回动议，被告有权获得合理费用及律师费，并可获判最高$10,000。见NRS 41.670(1)(a)-(b)。\n\n由于适用Nevada反SLAPP法的判例相对匮乏，Nevada法院参照适用California（加利福尼亚州）反SLAPP法，即Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16的判例；该法与Nevada法律有许多相似之处。见John, 125 Nev. at 756（称“我们考虑California判例，因为California的反SLAPP法在目的和措辞上与Nevada的反SLAPP法相似”）；另见Shapiro v. Welt, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (Nev. 2017)（同）；Sassone, 432 P.3d at 749 n.3（认定“California和Nevada的法律在反SLAPP审查方面具有近乎相同的结构……鉴于其在结构、措辞上的相似性，以及立法上要求采用California关于所需举证责任标准的规定，依赖California判例是有根据的”）；并见NRS 41.665(2)（依California法律界定原告的初步举证责任）。\n\n4.0 论证\n\n4.1 Cheng先生满足反SLAPP分析的第一项要件\n\n就本案相关而言，反SLAPP法保护任何“在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛内，就公共利益事项直接作出的……真实或在不知其虚假的情况下作出的［陈述］。”NRS 41.637(4)。因此，被告必须作出三项证明以满足第一项要件：(1) 主张基于就公共利益事项直接作出的陈述；(2) 该等陈述是在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛内作出；以及(3) 该等陈述是真实的，或在不知其虚假的情况下作出。本案满足全部三项要求。此外，原告主张的是非以及被告行为的合法性，并非第一项要件分析的重点；如属相关，应仅在第二项要件分析中予以考虑。见Coretronic v. Cozen O'Connor, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1388 (2d Dist. 2011)；另见Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 706-07, 713, 727-299 (2007)。\n\n4.1.1 原告的主张基于受保护的行为\n\n“公共利益事项”的定义很宽泛，即“公众感兴趣的任何事项。”Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1042 (2008)。“该事项无需具有‘重大性’方可受到反SLAPP法的保护——只要它是公众感兴趣的事项即可。”同上。“尽管公共利益事项包括立法和政府活动，但也可包括涉及私人个人及实体的活动，特别是在一个大型、强大的组织可能影响许多个人生活的情况下。”Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 650 (1996)（强调为原文所加）。一项活动无需“达到涉及自治核心的崇高标准”才符合反SLAPP保护资格；“社会性甚至通俗粗鄙的话题亦可。”Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 905 (9th Cir. 2009)。\n\n知名公众人物乃至名人的生活方式和行为构成公众利益事项。参见 Hilton v. Hallmark Cards（希尔顿诉贺曼卡片公司）, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2011)（名人 Paris Hilton（帕丽斯·希尔顿）承认其“优渥的生活方式及其口头禅（‘that's hot’）是受到广泛公众关注的事项”）。 “公众利益关注于那些因其成就、生活方式、职业地位或职业而使其活动获得正当且广泛关注的人。” Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC（斯图尔特诉《滚石》有限责任公司）, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 667-68 (1st Dist. 2010)。加利福尼亚州一家法院认定，一名前橄榄球主教练提起的诉讼受反SLAPP法规约束，因为原告“作为一所本地大学橄榄球队主教练的角色，已使其成为公众人物，其被解雇也已是受到广泛公众关注的话题。” McGarry v. University of San Diego（麦加里诉圣迭戈大学）, 154 Cal. App. 4th 97, 110 (4th Dist. 2007)。涉及公众人物私人行为的事项也可能属于公众利益事项。参见 Sipple v. Foundation For Nat. Progress（西普尔诉全国进步基金会）, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 238 (2d Dist. 1999)（认定，基于针对一名全国知名政治人物媒体策略师的报道指控而提起的诉讼，该指控称其对妻子实施身体和言语虐待，涉及公众利益事项）。\n\n如下文第4.2.1.2节所述，原告无疑是一名公众人物。更重要的是，Cheng先生（程先生）的陈述讨论了原告参与与 CCP（中国共产党）之间的一场重大政治争议，其中包括 CCP 对原告提出的刑事腐败指控。此类国际政治内幕完全属于反SLAPP法规所设想的“公众利益事项”范围。Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman（多夫音频公司诉罗森菲尔德、迈耶及萨斯曼律师事务所）, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 783-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)一案中的法院认定，就指定用于慈善目的的款项是否曾到达其最终的慈善目的地提出质疑的通信，涉及公众利益事项。在 Cheng先生于 Twitter 上发表相关陈述之前的数年间，Wall Street Journal（《华尔街日报》）和 New York Times（《纽约时报》）等知名媒体曾多次报道 CCP 对原告提出的犯罪行为、腐败和敲诈指控。而且，根据原告本人的说法，他是 CCP 最杰出的异见人士和批评者。Cheng先生的陈述涉及针对原告的这些指控、其“异见人士”身份的真实性以及其与 CCP 的关系。毫无正当理由可质疑 Cheng先生的陈述涉及公众利益事项。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 474-2 于 06/20/22 提交 于 06/20/22 13:31:16 登记 第 15 页，共\n\n即使为论证起见假定其中一些陈述并非涉及公众关切事项（Cheng先生对此否认），这些陈述也与属于该等事项的陈述密不可分，因此就反SLAPP而言，原告的请求构成“混合”诉因。若至少一项基础行为属于受保护行为，则此类“混合诉因受反SLAPP法规约束，除非有关受保护行为的指控仅属未受保护活动的附带部分。” Lauter v. Anoufrieva（劳特诉阿努夫里耶娃）, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2008)（强调部分为原文所加）；另见 Salma v. Capon（萨尔玛诉卡彭）, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1287 (2008)（裁定，基于加利福尼亚州反SLAPP法规下受保护和未受保护活动两者的诉因，受反SLAPP动议约束）；Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin（佩里格林融资公司诉谢泼德·马林律师事务所）, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 675 (2005)（认定，由于原告的请求“在重要部分基于[被告]受保护的请愿活动”，反SLAPP分析的第一项要件已获满足）。整体而言，Cheng先生被投诉的陈述绝大多数讨论了具有重大公众关切的事项，因此，任何未直接谈及该等事项的陈述仍适当地受到该法规的保护。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 474-2 于 06/20/22 提交 于 06/20/22 13:31:16 登记 第 16 页，共\n\n4.1.2 Cheng先生的陈述是在公共论坛中作出的 Cheng先生在网站 <twitter.com> 上发布了其陈述。\n\n可公开访问的网站，就反SLAPP而言属于公共论坛。参见 Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates（科尔诉帕特里夏·A·迈耶及其合伙人事务所）, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1121 (2012)。事实上，U.S. Supreme Court（美国最高法院）已确认，Twitter 等社交媒体网站是现代公共论坛的典型。参见 Packingham v. North Carolina（帕金厄姆诉北卡罗来纳州）, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-37 (2017)（指出，“社交媒体用户利用这些网站，在如同人类思想一般多样的话题上从事广泛的受第一修正案保护的活动”）。毫无疑问，Cheng先生就与公众利益事项直接相关的陈述，是在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛中作出的。\n\n4.1.3 Cheng先生系善意作出其陈述\n\n要受到反SLAPP法规保护，陈述必须“真实，或者……在不知其虚假的情况下作出。” NRS 41.637。即使某项陈述不实，被告也必须明知其为虚假而作出该陈述；过失乃至对真相的鲁莽漠视，均不能推翻被告就第一项要件所作的证明。此外，根据反SLAPP法规的明文规定，对“善意”的分析与被告作出陈述的动机完全无关。\n\n原告对 Cheng先生明知其陈述虚假的指控所提供的唯一支持，是其结论性主张，即 Cheng先生作出每项陈述时均“具有恶意意图并明知其为虚假。”（见 SAC 第 ¶¶ 18-23, 112-117 段。）这完全不属实。相反，如下文第4.2.1.1节更详细说明，Cheng先生的陈述是基于关于针对原告指控的广泛公开信息和报道所作出的意见表达或修辞夸张。在 Cheng先生发布任何涉案陈述之前数月，《华尔街日报》和《纽约时报》等报纸已发表多篇文章，涉及关于原告本人或通过其商业伙伴实施犯罪、敲诈和侵吞的指控。这些报道总体上允许得出如下结论：原告为利用与 CCP 知名成员的关系谋取私利后逃避腐败指控，而自行逃离中国；其后又将自己塑造成政治异见人士，以进一步谋取私利并吸引关注。毕竟，在 Cheng先生发布推文之前的报道表明，原告关于 CCP 及其成员的大部分主张均属虚假或无法核实。\n\n亦无任何迹象表明 Cheng先生声称原告与 CCP 和 Xi Jinping（习近平）合作时，明知该等主张为虚假。该指控源于 Cheng先生于 2018年7月就 CCP 释放原告家人脱离羁押的原因所作的推测。原告将自己定位为 CCP 的直言不讳反对者，声称将揭露最高层级的腐败（但总体而言并未经核实地如此做），因此，CCP 不大可能是为了奖励原告所称的举报行为，CCP 不大可能害怕原告，CCP 也不大可能出于某种原因希望增强其可信度。因此，对 Cheng先生而言，只剩下一种可能：原告与 CCP 达成了交易。鉴于其巨额财富据称至少部分是通过利用中国人民和中国政治制度取得的（根据针对其及其下属尚待审理的刑事指控和法院案件），这是一种最可信的情形。\n\n因此，所有涉案陈述均属意见或修辞夸张，故就本项分析而言不可能为虚假，或者是在不知其虚假的情况下作出的。Cheng先生已满足反SLAPP分析第一项要件下的举证责任，现举证责任转移至原告，由其证明其请求具有胜诉可能性。他无法做到这一点。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 474-2 于 06/20/22 提交 于 06/20/22 13:31:16 登记 第 18 页，共\n\n4.2 原告无法证明其请求具有胜诉可能性\n\nNRS 41.660 将原告的举证责任界定为“与本法生效之日加利福尼亚州反对阻碍公众参与的策略性诉讼法要求原告承担的相同举证责任。” NRS 41.665(2)。原告不能仅提出含糊指控或提供微不足道的证据来击败 Cheng先生的动议。相反，为满足反SLAPP法规第二项要件下的举证责任，原告必须提出“足以支持作出有利于原告的救济判决的实质性证据。” S. Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P.（S. Sutter有限责任公司诉LJ Sutter合伙企业）, 193 Cal. App. 4th 634, 670 (2011)；另见 Mendoza v. Wichmann（门多萨诉威希曼）, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1449 (2011)（裁定，为经受恶意诉讼请求中的反SLAPP动议，必须具有缺乏合理根据的“实质性证据”）。原告对其任何一项请求均无法作出该等证明。\n\n4.2.1 原告的诽谤请求不能成立\n\n为确立诽谤诉因，原告必须主张：(1) 被告作出的、涉及原告的虚假且诽谤性陈述；(2) 向第三人的非特权公开；(3) 至少达到过失程度的过错；以及 (4) 实际或推定损害。参见 Wynn v. Smith（温恩诉史密斯）, 117 Nev. 6, 10 (Nev. 2001)；另见 Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.（飞马诉里诺报业公司）, 118 Nev. 706, 718 (2002)。仅当陈述包含可被证明为虚假的事实断言时，该陈述才具有诽谤性。参见 Pope v. Motel 6（波普诉第六汽车旅馆）, 114 P.3d 277, 282 (Nev. 2005)。而且，像原告这样的公众人物要在诽谤诉讼中胜诉，必须以明确且令人信服的证据证明相关陈述是出于实际恶意作出的。参见 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc.（博士公司诉消费者联盟公司）, 466 U.S. 485 (1984)。\n\n诽谤性陈述必须包含虚假的事实断言。“除非该等不准确之处‘会对读者的思想产生与所主张的真实情况本应产生的不同影响’，否则轻微的不准确不构成虚假。” Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17。如果报道的“要旨”或“刺痛点”为真，即使某些细节不正确，也不构成诽谤。Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.（马森诉《纽约客》杂志公司）, 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)。\n\n4.2.1.1 Cheng先生的陈述不构成可诉事由\n\n观点陈述不可能构成诽谤，因为《第一修正案》承认不存在“错误”的思想。参见 Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.（Pegasus诉Reno Newspapers, Inc.案）, 118 Nev. 706, 714 (Nev. 2002)；另见 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.（Gertz诉Robert Welch, Inc.案）, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)。此外，在 Nevada（内华达州），“若某项陈述属于夸张或概括，且理性人可将其理解为‘纯粹的修辞性夸张’，则该陈述不构成诽谤。”Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715（引用 Wellman v. Fox（Wellman诉Fox案）, 108 Nev. 83, 88 (Nev. 1992)（认定“在理性人会将陈述理解为纯粹修辞性夸张的语境中，夸张性陈述是允许的”））；另见 Flowers v. Carville（Flowers诉Carville案）, 310 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)（认定将小报文章称为“垃圾”、“狗屁”和“废物”的表述不构成可诉事项）；并见 Phantom Touring v. Affiliated Publ'ns（Phantom Touring诉Affiliated Publ'ns案）, 953 F.2d 724, 728, 730-31 (1st Cir. 1992)（认定某剧评将一部作品称为“骗局、欺诈、丑闻、江湖骗术”属于“显然受保护的夸张”，或者无法证明其为虚假）。带有政治色彩的谩骂通常被视为观点表达或修辞性夸张，即使所使用的措辞在不同语境下可能被认为具有诽谤含义。参见 Rosenaur v. Scherer（Rosenaur诉Scherer案）, 88 Cal. App. 4th 260, 280 (2001)（认定称政治对手为“小偷”和“骗子”不构成可诉事项）。“宽泛、不聚焦且完全主观的评论”受作为观点的保护，且不构成可诉事项。Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury news（Fletcher诉San Jose Mercury news案）, 216 Cal. App. 3d 172, 191 (1989)（认定称某人为“腐败政客”不构成可诉事项）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 20 of 31\n\n在确定某项陈述是事实陈述，还是仅为观点或修辞性夸张时，陈述所处的语境至关重要。参见 Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC（Balzaga诉Fox News Network, LLC案）, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1325, 1339 (2009)（认定某项陈述“‘孤立地’看可能被解释为虚假”这一事实，不足以支持诽谤诉求）；另见 Lewis v. Time, Inc.（Lewis诉Time, Inc.案）, 710 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983)（指出，“即使表面上属于事实的陈述，在作出该陈述的情形使得‘听众可能预期当事人会使用贬称、激烈修辞或夸张来试图说服他人接受其立场’时，也可能具有观点陈述的性质，因而享有特权”）（引用 Information Control Group v. Genesis One Computer（Information Control Group诉Genesis One Computer案）, 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)）。若包含被指称为诽谤性陈述的出版物周围充斥着“松散、比喻性或夸张性语言”，则该出版物的整体基调可能消除任何被指称的诽谤含义。参见 Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior Court（Morningstar, Inc.诉Superior Court案）, 23 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689 (1994)。\n\n尤其应当牢记的是，Cheng 先生是在网络论坛 Twitter（推特）上发表其陈述，而在此语境中，人们对陈述具有事实性的期待较低。参见 Krinsky v. Doe 6（Krinsky诉Doe 6案）, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1173, 1178 (2008)（认定在聊天室环境中，一则将公司高管称为“蟑螂”、“失败者”、“蠢货”和“骗子”的匿名帖子属于“粗俗、讽刺性的夸张……构成受保护的观点”）；另见 James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.（James诉San Jose Mercury News, Inc.案）, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12, 14 (1993)（认定将一名律师描述为从事“卑劣、非法和不道德的执业”活动的文章，属于“‘富于想象的表达’或‘修辞性夸张’的受保护领域”）。\n\n- 19 - Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-18-779172-C\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 21 of 31\n\n4.2.1.1.1 推文一17\n\n第一则被指称为诽谤性的推文如下：\n\n可能性3可能是对的，因为郭和习达成了一项涉及巨额资金的交易。郭完全不像一名（正常的）商人。他的巨额财富全都来自其与共产党人勾结实施的敲诈勒索。这一次，他与习进行的见不得人的交易，是达成一项价值天文数字的交易。但这项交易建立在另一项交易之上，而后者的代价是14亿人的生命和财产。人人都知道，习为了保住权力什么都能做，他可以随意送出1000亿、1万亿。郭的财富很难不爆炸式增长。\n\n（Lee 声明第 ¶¶ 14-16 段。）因此，Cheng 先生是在表示，鉴于原告与 CCP（中国共产党）核心人物之间的见不得人的过往以及其巨额财富，原告可能与 CCP 达成了一项交易，以使其家人获释。这是对 Cheng 先生就 CCP 释放原告家人羁押一事可能存在的解释所作推测的后续；在该推文中，他解释称，这一事态发展的最可能解释是原告与 CCP 达成了一项交易。该陈述的这一部分纯属推测，而其紧接着的前一则推文允许对已披露的事实——即原告家人被 CCP 释放——作出多种其他解释。因此，这是一项不可能构成诽谤的观点陈述。\n\n在原告主张有关其不像正常商人以及其通过敲诈勒索赚钱的陈述构成诽谤的范围内，该陈述属于观点表达或修辞性夸张。有大量媒体报道，以及中国政府关于犯罪行为的指控，对原告可能是一名利用 CCP 内部联系为自己敛财的见不得人的商人进行推测或直接作出此种主张。尽管原告声称其始终与 CCP 保持距离，但这远未得到确立，而且公共记录中存在充分依据，使 Cheng 先生能够合理相信，原告在其自我流亡时与 CCP 有密切关联。\n\n17 有关原告译文与 Lee 先生译文的并列比较，参见附件14。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 22 of 31\n\n除非中国的政治腐败已普遍到为人所预期的程度，否则，这使得 Cheng 先生理解原告并非一名正常商人；针对原告的大量政治丑闻及指控，可准确概括为包括其与 CCP 勾结实施敲诈勒索的指控。\n\n至于原告参与了一项以14亿人的生命和财产为代价、建立于另一项交易之上的交易这一主张，这恰恰属于“松散、比喻性”的语言，它向读者表明 Cheng 先生并非提出精确的事实指控，而是在进行修辞性表达并提出其主观看法。因此，该推文整体不构成可诉事项。\n\n4.2.1.1.2 推文二\n\n第二则被投诉的推文，是对一名 Twitter 用户质疑原告关于其 YouTube（优兔）频道观看人数主张的回应。（见 Lee 声明第 ¶¶ 17-18 段。）该推文写道：“郭毫无顾忌地撒谎、撒谎、再撒谎。郭越撒谎，谎言就越荒谬，尽管他正深陷众多诉讼之中。他已不再尊重文明西方国家的法律，你可以想象他在中国的所作所为一定更加恶劣。”（Lee 声明第 ¶¶ 19-21 段。）\n\n含糊地反复称某人——尤其是一名参与政治的公众人物——为“骗子”，正是法院已认定构成受保护观点或修辞性夸张的语言。参见 Rosenaur, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 280；Fletcher, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 191；James, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14。此外，尽管受保护的观点无需合理，Cheng 先生认为原告是骗子完全合理。当时已有大量媒体报道指出，原告是诽谤诉讼的被告，他曾被指控不诚实和欺诈，并且其针对 CCP 及其成员的极端主张并不可靠。因此，该推文整体不构成可诉事项。\n\n4.2.1.1.3 推文三\n\n涉案第三则推文写道：“郭之所以肆无忌惮，是因为他可以如此。他不断编造大量无耻谎言；这是我们整个海外华人社区最大的耻辱。难道真的是邪恶战胜了正义，天地都颠倒了吗？”（Lee 声明第 ¶ 22 段。）\n\n与第二项陈述相同，非特定地称原告为明目张胆的骗子，不可能具有任何诽谤含义。此外，该推文包含“邪恶战胜了正义，天地都颠倒了”这一华丽措辞，使读者清楚 Cheng 先生并未作出任何具体的事实指控。因此，该推文整体不构成可诉事项。\n\n4.2.1.1.4 推文四\n\n涉案第四则推文写道：“我们连一个撒谎的郭都对付不了，又怎么能推翻邪恶的中国共产党呢？”（Lee 声明第 ¶¶ 23-25 段。）\n\n再次，该推文是 Cheng 先生非特定地称原告为骗子。将原告称为“撒谎的郭”是政治讨论中常见的修辞结构，正如 Donald J. Trump（唐纳德·J.·特朗普）总统反复将其对手称为“腐败的希拉里”。（见 Lee 声明第 ¶ 24 段。）因此，该推文整体不构成可诉事项。\n\n4.2.1.1.5 推文五\n\n涉案第五则推文写道：“郭迷惑了一帮人，诱骗了一帮人，攻击和恐吓了一些人，并严重分裂了一群人，以致他们彼此造成伤害。他在很短时间内就使海外民主运动支离破碎，他们完全丧失了战斗能力。”（Lee 声明第 ¶ 26 段。）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 24 of 31\n\n该推文中不存在事实指控。Cheng 先生非特定地提及原告迷惑、诱骗、攻击、恐吓及分裂他人。然而，这些陈述并未指控原告采取任何具体行动，因此，与含糊指控某人为“骗子”或从事“卑劣、非法和不道德的执业”活动的陈述一样，不比其更具可诉性。参见 Krinsky, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 1173, 1178；另见 James, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14。声称原告削弱了海外民主运动，是典型的观点陈述，而所使用的语言（“支离破碎”及“完全丧失了战斗能力”）是典型的修辞性夸张。因此，该推文整体不构成可诉事项。\n\n4.2.1.1.6 推文六\n\n涉案第六则推文写道：“郭故意制造大量粗俗谎言，并不断树敌，他的目标是转移人们的注意力，分裂并削弱民主运动的战斗能力，从而实现海外维稳的目标。”（Lee 声明第 ¶¶ 27-28 段。）\n\n如同先前的陈述，「Guo（郭）故意编造了大量粗俗的谎言」是一项不具体、无法具有诽谤含义的陈述。称原告「不断树敌」的陈述甚至不存在潜在诽谤性，因为其并不倾向于损害原告的声誉；而且无论如何，该陈述均属意见陈述，系基于所有报道所载：原告不断因诽谤被起诉；他是至少部分 CCP（中国共产党）成员的目标；以及他在中国政治异议人士运动内部有敌人。Cheng先生（程先生）称原告削弱了民主运动的陈述，也是基于以下事实作出的意见陈述：原告就 CCP 内部的腐败和不当行为提出了大量极端主张，却极少提供实际能够证实这些主张的证据。一名高调、极其富有、自称政治异议人士且屡屡作出过度承诺而又表现不佳的人，确实会倾向于削弱公众对真正的、较不张扬的中国异议人士的敬重。\n\n4.2.1.2 Cheng先生并未以所要求的过错程度行事\n\n即使为论证起见假定 Cheng先生的任何陈述属于虚假的事实陈述，他也并非以所要求程度的过错作出该等陈述，因而不应就此承担责任。\n\n4.2.1.2.1 原告是公众人物\n\n被告承担诽谤责任所需的过错程度，取决于被告言论的对象和内容。诽谤原告分为三类：一般公众人物、有限目的公众人物和私人个体。有限目的公众人物「自愿介入某一特定公共争议，或被卷入其中，从而就有限范围的问题成为公众人物。」Gerz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974); 另见 Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 720。这是一个法律问题，法院的认定以「该人在涉及公共关切事项中的角色是否自愿且突出」为基础。Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev. 556, 572 (2006)。\n\n如上文第 2.1 节所述，原告声称其是一名极其富有、极其知名（事实上是最知名）的中国政治异议人士。并且，如上文第 2.2 节所示，国际媒体对围绕原告及其声誉的全部争议进行了大量报道，其中包括指控其为骗子、诈骗者、犯罪分子、侵吞公款者、强奸犯；指控其在赚取数十亿美元时与 CCP 勾结；以及指控其至少是批评 CCP 的不可靠信息来源。如果原告并非在所有目的上均属公众人物，则在其作为知名政治异议人士和 CCP 批评者的身份这一语境中，他毫无疑问是公众人物。因此，他必须证明 Cheng先生在 Twitter（推特）上发表其陈述时具有实际恶意，而他毫无希望做到这一点。\n\n4.2.1.2.2 Cheng先生并未以实际恶意行事\n\n「实际恶意」并非指对原告的恶意或敌意，而是指被告明知其陈述虚假，或鲁莽地漠视其真伪。Harte-Hanks Comm'n v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989)。「联邦最高法院一再认为，在诽谤案件中，‘实际恶意’一语‘与不良动机或恶意毫无关系。’」D.A.R.E. Am. v. Rolling Stone Magazine, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667 n.7)。明知虚假的定义不言自明。为证明「鲁莽漠视」，公众人物必须证明出版者「对其发表内容的真实性抱有严重怀疑。」St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); 另见 Bose Corp, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30。根据 Nevada（内华达州）法律，仅当被告「对该陈述可能虚假具有‘高度认识’，或对发表内容的真实性抱有严重怀疑」时，才存在鲁莽漠视。Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 719。问题不在于「一名合理审慎之人是否会发表该内容，或者是否会在发表前进行调查。必须存在足够证据，以得出被告事实上对其发表内容的真实性抱有严重怀疑的结论。」Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610, 617-18 (Cal. 1984); 另见 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731。此外，「出版者不必亲自调查，而可以依赖信誉良好的来源所作的调查和结论。」Id. at 619。最后，诽谤原告必须以明确且令人信服的证据证明实际恶意。见 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511。这一要求构成「远超大多数民事诉讼所需优势证据标准的沉重负担。」Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)。「明确且令人信服证据的举证责任要求作出高度可能性的认定。该证据必须清楚到不留任何实质性疑问。其必须足够有力，以获得每一理性之人的毫不迟疑的赞同。」Copp v. Paxton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)。\n\n包括 New York Times（《纽约时报》）和 Wall Street Journal（《华尔街日报》）在内的主要报纸，最迟自 2017 年起便报道了针对原告的指控。这些指控包括：原告逃离中国，以逃避针对与其关系密切的高层 CCP 官员的腐败指控；中国已通过 Interpol（国际刑警组织）发布逮捕通知；原告通过与中国政治人物腐败合作并对其施加影响，以及欺诈投资者和其他公司，赚取其数十亿美元财富；其商业下属称他指示他们从事犯罪活动；他正因包括欺诈和侵吞公款在内的数项犯罪行为接受调查；他强奸了其前私人助理；其关于 CCP 腐败的许多主张尚未得到证实且无法证实；他是中国异议人士群体中一名造成分裂的人物；以及他是多起诽谤诉讼中的被告。（见证据附件 2-12。）这些并非互联网匿名疯子的胡言乱语，而是受人尊敬的媒体机构甚至一个外国政府的说法。因此，Cheng先生依赖这些关于原告的指控报道，以形成其关于原告以及原告很可能并非真正反对 CCP 的倡导者的意见，完全合理。\n\n面对所有支持 Cheng先生在 Twitter 上表达的结论的证据，原告并未真正尝试证明实际恶意。相反，他仅机械复述了联邦最高法院所界定的实际恶意，而未提出任何一项支持性的事实指控。即使依照 NRCP 12(b)(5)，这也不足以满足原告的举证责任，更不用说反 SLAPP 法规下更严格的举证责任。原告无法证明 Cheng先生明知其陈述虚假（即使其确实作出了任何事实陈述），也无法证明他在作出任何陈述时对其准确性存在实质性的主观怀疑。原告无法满足反 SLAPP 法规下的举证责任，其诽谤及当然诽谤请求必须被驳回。\n\n4.2.2 原告的 IIED 请求不能成立\n\n为确立故意造成情感伤害的诉因，原告必须积极证明：「(1) 具有造成情感伤害的故意或鲁莽漠视的极端且令人愤慨的行为，(2) 原告遭受严重或极端情感伤害，以及 (3) 实际或近因因果关系。」Olivero v. Lowe, 116 Nev. 395, 398-99 (2000) (citing Star v. Rabello, 97 Nev. 124, 125 (1981) (citations omitted)。「极端且令人愤慨的行为，是指超出一切可能的体面界限，并被认为在文明社会中完全不能容忍的行为。」Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 114 Nev. 1, 4 (1998)。仅当「该压力严重且强烈到任何合理的人均不能被期待承受」时，才承认该侵权行为的损害。Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993)。由于原告是公众人物，他还必须证明 Cheng先生的陈述虚假且系以实际恶意作出。见 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)。\n\n根据 Falwell，原告的 IIED 请求基于与其诽谤请求不能成立相同的理由而不能成立。此外，原告无法证明存在任何极端或令人愤慨的行为，也无法证明严重的情感伤害。\n\n认定极端且令人愤慨行为的门槛很高，并非每一项令个人感到不安的陈述都可构成责任基础。见 Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1121-22 (D. Nev. 2009); 另见 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d。尽管原告并未竞选公职，但其作为高调政治异议人士反对 CCP 的所谓工作，可比拟于进入一场政治斗争的激烈丛林；在此种情形中，法院一再认定伤人的陈述不构成可诉行为。见 Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 687（认定「当候选人进入政治舞台时，他或她必须预料到辩论有时会激烈且针对个人」）；Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2012)（称「竞选公职有时像一项身体接触运动，候选人、政治组织及其他人互相进行修辞讥讽和短句攻击，希望在投票站给予致命一击。它不适合脸皮薄或意志薄弱之人」）；Desert Sun Pul'g Co. v. Sup. Ct., 97 Cal. App. 3d 49, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)（称「一旦个人决定投入政治战争，他便使自己受到此类对待[, 而且]深植于我们政治历史之中的，是一种不受约束、不负责任、赤手空拳、Pier 6 式政治混战的传统」）。\n\nCheng先生在 Twitter 上的陈述，无论如何都不属于极端或令人愤慨的行为，尤其是在谈论这名自称为地球上最知名中国政治异议人士的人时更是如此。Cheng先生的陈述并不比校园讥讽「骗子骗子，裤子着火」更严厉，他也没有超出复述中国和美国媒体已经报道的关于原告的内容。声称比每天可在 Twitter 等公共论坛上见到的言辞更温和的批评，竟极端到文明社会根本无法容忍，完全不具有可信性。该项请求不能成立。\n\n原告无法证明其遭受了严重情感伤害。多年来，原告一直承受国际媒体和中国政府对其极端、骇人犯罪及不道德行为的指控；这些来源的权威性和可信度远高于一名在 Twitter 上只有几千名关注者的人。原告声称他能够承受所有这些的重压，实属可笑。\n\n即使Cheng先生（程水燕先生）的陈述属于极端且令人愤慨的行为，然而，指控称，而是一名几乎没有网络影响力的人称其为骗子就足以使其情绪崩溃。原告无法证明其遭受了严重精神痛苦，因此在该项主张上没有胜诉可能性。该项主张必须予以驳回。5.0 结论\n\n11 12 13 基于上述理由，法院应当有偏见地驳回原告的全部主张，并裁定Cheng先生获得其诉讼费用及合理的律师费，同时裁定向其支付$10,000，该款项将通过另行提交动议请求。\n\n日期：2019年6月14日。谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Marc J. Randazza\nMarc J. Randazza（马克·J·兰达扎）（NV Bar No. 12265）\nRonald D. Green（罗纳德·D·格林）（NV Bar No. 7360）\nLaTeigra C. Cahill（拉泰格拉·C·卡希尔）（NV Bar No. 14352）\nRANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC（兰达扎法律集团，PLLC）\n2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109\nLas Vegas, NV 89117\n\n被告SHUIYAN CHENG（程水燕）的代理律师","key_entities":["CCP","Guo","Chinese Communist Party","CIPA","Kwok"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":9967,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-06-20 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-06-20","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:08:21"}