{"id":"court_ctb_475_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":475,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"JUDGMENT","filed_date":null,"title":"| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT | |--------------------------------|","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT |\n|--------------------------------|\n| DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT        |\n| BRIDGEPORT DIVISION            |\n\n| In re:        |            | CHAPTER 11                  |\n|---------------|------------|-----------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK,  |            | Case No. 22-50073(JAM)      |\n|               | Debtor.    |                             |\n| Rui Ma,<br>v. | Plaintiff, | Adv. Proc. No. ____________ |\n| Ho Wan Kwok,  | Defendant. |                             |\n\n## **COMPLAINT TO DETERMINE DISCHARGEABILITY**\n\nRui Ma (\"**Plaintiff**\"), by and through her undersigned attorneys, in support of her Complaint hereby, alleges and states as follows:\n\n#### **PARTIES**\n\n1. Plaintiff is a female Chinese national presently residing in China. At all times relevant to her claims at issue herein, Plaintiff was employed as an assistant to the Defendant primarily based in New York City.\n\n2. Ho Wan Kwok a/k/a Guo Wengui, also a Chinese national, is the defendant in this adversary proceeding and debtor in the above-captioned bankruptcy case (the \"**Defendant**\" or \"**Debtor**\"). Debtor purports to presently reside in Connecticut, and at all times relevant to Plaintiff and her claims, upon information and belief, Debtor resided in New York City.\n\n### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n3. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.\n\n4. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).\n\n5. Venue of this action is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).\n\n6. The bases for the relief requested in this Complaint are 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007 and 7001.\n\n7. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on her claims against the Debtor and does not consent to trial in this Court.\n\n## **RELEVANT BACKGROUND**\n\n8. In 2017, Movant commenced a civil action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County (the \"**State Court**\"), Index No. 158140/2017 (the \"**State Court Litigation**\"), against the Debtor and Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"**Golden Spring**\"), asserting claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, discrimination, and false imprisonment against the Debtor and related claims for negligence and violations of applicable New York state and city workplace laws and regulations against Golden Spring. In all, Plaintiff asserts eleven causes of action in the State Court Litigation arising from her injuries caused by the Debtor (collectively, the \"**Plaintiff Claims**\").\n\n9. A true and correct copy of the Plaintiff's amended complaint in the State Court Litigation setting forth the Plaintiff Claims (the \"**State Court Complaint**\") is attached hereto as Exhibit A. As alleged therein, the Plaintiff Claims result from more than a year of horrific abuse by the Debtor, as the Plaintiff was repeatedly assaulted, battered, terrorized, imprisoned, and raped by the Debtor between April 2015 and November 2016. *See, e.g.,* State Court Complaint ¶¶ 19- 76.\n\n10. The State Court Complaint is incorporated herein in its entirety by reference. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation of the State Court Complaint as if said allegation is fully set forth herein.\n\n11. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11, Title 11 of the United States Code (the \"**Bankruptcy Code**\") commencing this bankruptcy case.\n\n12. The Debtor's list of largest unsecured creditors identifies Movant as the second largest non-insider creditor in this case. (ECF Nos. 4, 20).\n\n13. On April 12, 2022, Plaintiff moved for relief from the automatic stay to proceed to liquidate her claims against the Debtor in the pending State Court Litigation for cause. [Case No. 22-50073, Docket No. 206] (the \"**Stay Relief Motion**\"). The grounds for the Stay Relief Motion included, among other things, that discovery is complete in the State Court Litigation and that action is already on the trial calendar. Stay Relief Motion ¶¶ 7, 21. In addition, the Plaintiff Claims are personal injury claims that are expressly excluded from matters in which bankruptcy courts may enter final judgments or that may be estimated by bankruptcy courts for distribution purposes, nor do bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to try such claims. Stay Relief Motion ¶ 16 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B), (O), 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(5)). Further, Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on her claims against the Debtor and did not (and does not) consent to trial in this Court. Stay Relief Motion ¶ 16.\n\n14. On May 27, 2022, this Court entered an order [Case No. 22-50073, Docket No. 445] granting the Stay Relief Motion and authorizing Plaintiff to proceed against the Debtor and liquidate the Plaintiff Claims in State Court.\n\n# **COUNT I – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the Battery Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n15. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n16. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n17. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n18. The first cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the intentional tort of battery (the \"**Battery Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 77-88. Debtor's conduct resulting in the Battery Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the Battery Claim, the Debtor's liability for the Battery Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **COUNT II – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the Assault Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n19. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n20. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n21. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n22. The second cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the intentional tort of assault (the \"**Assault Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 89-100. Debtor's conduct resulting in the Assault Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the Assault Claim, the Debtor's liability for the Assault Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **COUNT III – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the IIED Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n23. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n24. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n25. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n26. The third cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (the \"**IIED Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 101-108. Debtor's conduct resulting in the IIED Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the IIED Claim, the Debtor's liability for the IIED Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n#### **COUNT IV – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the NIED Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n28. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n29. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries. Debtor's conduct in abusing Plaintiff was careless and negligent as to the emotional health of Plaintiff.\n\n30. The fourth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (the \"**NIED Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 109-115. Debtor's conduct resulting in the NIED Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the NIED Claim, the Debtor's liability for the NIED Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **COUNT V – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the Negligence Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n31. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n32. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n33. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n34. The fifth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the negligent breach of his duty as Plaintiff's employer to protect her from injury while performing the duties and responsibilities of her employment (the \"**Negligence Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 116-125. Debtor's conduct resulting in the Negligence Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the Negligence Claim, the Debtor's liability for the Negligence Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n# **COUNT VI – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the False Imprisonment Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n36. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n37. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n38. The sixth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the confinement of Plaintiff against her will (the \"**False Imprisonment Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 126-134. Debtor's conduct resulting in the False Imprisonment Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the False Imprisonment Claim, the Debtor's liability for the False Imprisonment Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n# **COUNT VII – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the NYC Discrimination Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n40. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n41. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n42. The eighth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for sexual harassment as well as gender and other discrimination against Plaintiff in violation of the New York City Administrative Code (the \"**NYC Discrimination Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 144-155. Debtor's conduct resulting in the NYC Discrimination Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the NYC Discrimination Claim, the Debtor's liability for the NYC Discrimination Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n### **COUNT VIII – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the NYS Discrimination Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n44. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n45. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n46. The tenth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for sexual harassment as well as gender and other discrimination against Plaintiff in violation of the New York Executive Law § 296 (the \"**NYS Discrimination Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 170-180. Debtor's conduct resulting in the NYS Discrimination Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the NYS Discrimination Claim, the Debtor's liability for the NYS Discrimination Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\nWHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant judgment as follows:\n\n(a) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the Battery Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(b) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the Assault Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(c) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the IIED Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(d) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the NIED Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(e) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the Negligence Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(f) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the False Imprisonment Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(g) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the NYC Discrimination Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(h) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the NYS Discrimination Claim, as\n\ndetailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be\n\nnondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6); and\n\n(i) Granting such other and further relief to Plaintiff as may be just and proper.\n\nDated: June 20, 2022/s/ Kristin B. Mayhew\n\nKristin Mayhew **MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP** 30 Jelliff Lane Southport, CT 06890 (203) 319-4000 kmayhew@mdmc-law.com\n\n- and -\n\nCarollynn H.G. Callari (*pro hac vice*) David S. Forsh (*pro hac vice*) **CALLARI PARTNERS LLC** One Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor New York, NY 10020 (212) 202-3050 ccallari@callaripartners.com dforsh@callaripartners.com\n\n*Attorneys for Rui Ma*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）\n\nDISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分部）\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），案件编号：22-50073(JAM)\n债务人。\nRui Ma（马蕊），\n诉 原告，对抗性程序编号：____________\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），被告。\n确认不可免责起诉书\n\n原告 Rui Ma（马蕊）（以下简称“原告”），通过其下述署名律师，为支持其起诉，特此指控并陈述如下：\n当事人\n\n1. 原告为一名中国籍女性，目前居住在中国。在与本案所涉主张相关的所有时间内，原告受雇担任被告的助理，主要工作地点位于纽约市。\n\n2. Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵），又名郭文贵，亦为中国公民，系本对抗性程序中的被告及上述抬头破产案件中的债务人（以下简称“被告”或“债务人”）。债务人声称目前居住在康涅狄格州；根据所得信息与合理确信，在与原告及其主张相关的所有时间内，债务人均居住在纽约市。\n管辖权与审判地\n\n3. 根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 和 1334，本法院对各方当事人及本程序享有管辖权。\n\n4. 依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I)，本程序属于核心程序。\n\n5. 依据 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a)，本诉讼由本司法管辖区管辖属于审判地适当。\n\n6. 本起诉书所请求救济的依据为 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 以及《联邦破产诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure）第 4007 条和第 7001 条。\n\n7. 原告就其针对债务人的诉讼主张要求进行陪审团审理，且不同意在本法院进行审理。\n相关背景\n\n8. 2017 年，动议人向 New York County（纽约县）的 Supreme Court of the State of New York（纽约州最高法院）（以下简称“州法院”）提起民事诉讼，案卷号为 158140/2017（以下简称“州法院诉讼”），起诉债务人及 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（纽约金泉有限公司）（以下简称“金泉公司”），针对债务人主张侵权恐吓（assault）、殴打（battery）、故意施加精神痛苦（intentional infliction of emotional distress）、过失施加精神痛苦（negligent infliction of emotional distress）、过失（negligence）、歧视（discrimination）及非法拘禁（false imprisonment）等诉求，并针对金泉公司主张过失以及违反适用的纽约州和纽约市工作场所法律法规的相关诉求。原告在州法院诉讼中总共提出了十一项诉由，均因债务人对原告造成的伤害而引发（统称“原告诉讼主张”）。\n\n9. 原告在州法院诉讼中陈述原告诉讼主张的修正起诉书（以下简称“州法院起诉书”）的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本起诉书后。如其中所指控，原告诉讼主张系因债务人长达一年多的可怕虐待所致，在 2015 年 4 月至 2016 年 11 月期间，原告屡次遭到债务人的侵权恐吓、殴打、恐吓威胁、拘禁及强奸。参见，例如，州法院起诉书第 19-76 段。\n\n10. 州法院起诉书通过引用全文并入本起诉书。原告重申并再次指控州法院起诉书中的每一项指控，如同该等指控已在本文中完全载明。\n\n11. 2022 年 2 月 15 日，债务人依据《美国法典》第 11 编（以下简称“《破产法典》”）第 11 章提出了自愿救济申请，从而启动了本破产案件。\n\n12. 债务人的最大无担保债权人名单将动议人列为本案中第二大非内部人债权人。（ECF Nos. 4, 20）。\n\n13. 2022 年 4 月 12 日，原告基于正当事由提出动议，请求解除自动中止（automatic stay），以便在尚未审结的州法院诉讼中继续清算其对债务人的债权。[案件编号：22-50073，案卷编号：206]（以下简称“解除中止动议”）。提出解除中止动议的理由除其他各项外，还包括州法院诉讼中的证据开示已完成且该案已列入审判日程。解除中止动议第 7、21 段。此外，原告诉讼主张属于人身伤害诉讼主张，被明确排除在破产法院可作出终局判决的事项之外，破产法院亦不得出于分配目的对该等主张进行估算，且破产法院对此类主张不享有审判管辖权。解除中止动议第 16 段（援引 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B), (O), 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(5)）。此外，原告就其针对债务人的诉讼主张要求进行陪审团审理，且原先未曾（目前亦不）同意在本法院进行审理。解除中止动议第 16 段。\n\n14. 2022 年 5 月 27 日，本法院作出一项命令/裁定 [案件编号：22-50073，案卷编号：445]，批准了解除中止动议，并授权原告在州法院继续对债务人提起诉讼并清算原告诉讼主张。\n诉名项 I – 确认之诉 依据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 确认殴打诉求不可免责\n\n15. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段，如同已在本文中完全载明。\n\n16. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人对于“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成的蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务，均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n17. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉书中所述，债务人屡次且故意虐待原告。债务人多次对原告实施非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、抓扯并强行施暴强奸。债务人的行为属于故意、未经许可且具有严重冒犯性质的行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦及羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n18. 起诉书中的第一项诉由阐述了原告针对债务人提出的殴打故意侵权主张（以下简称“殴打诉求”）。起诉书第 77-88 段。债务人导致产生殴打诉求的行为构成了《破产法典》第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼中认定债务人对殴打诉求承担责任，债务人就殴打诉求所负的责任即为不可免责。\n诉名项 II – 确认之诉 依据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 确认侵权恐吓诉求不可免责\n\n19. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段，如同已在本文中完全载明。\n\n20. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人对于“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成的蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务，均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n21. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉书中所述，债务人屡次且故意虐待原告。债务人多次对原告实施非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、抓扯并强行施暴强奸。债务人的行为属于故意、未经许可且具有严重冒犯性质的行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦及羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n22. 起诉书中的第二项诉由阐述了原告针对债务人提出的侵权恐吓故意侵权主张（以下简称“侵权恐吓诉求”）。起诉书第 89-100 段。债务人导致产生侵权恐吓诉求的行为构成了《破产法典》第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼中认定债务人对侵权恐吓诉求承担责任，债务人就侵权恐吓诉求所负的责任即为不可免责。\n诉名项 III – 确认之诉 依据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 确认故意施加精神痛苦诉求不可免责\n\n23. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段，如同已在本文中完全载明。\n\n24. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人对于“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成的蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务，均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n25. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉书中所述，债务人屡次且故意虐待原告。债务人多次对原告实施非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、抓扯并强行施暴强奸。债务人的行为属于故意、未经许可且具有严重冒犯性质的行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦及羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n26. 起诉书中的第三项诉由阐述了原告针对债务人提出的故意施加精神痛苦主张（以下简称“IIED 诉求”）。起诉书第 101-108 段。债务人导致产生 IIED 诉求的行为构成了《破产法典》第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼中认定债务人对 IIED 诉求承担责任，债务人就 IIED 诉求所负的责任即为不可免责。\n诉名项 IV – 确认之诉 依据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 确认过失施加精神痛苦诉求不可免责\n\n27. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段，如同已在本文中完全载明。\n\n28. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人对于“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成的蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务，均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n29. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉书中所述，债务人屡次且故意虐待原告。债务人多次对原告实施非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、抓扯并强行施暴强奸。债务人的行为属于故意、未经许可且具有严重冒犯性质的行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦及羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。债务人虐待原告的行为对原告的精神健康构成了疏忽大意和过失。\n\n30. 起诉书中的第四项诉由阐述了原告针对债务人提出的过失施加精神痛苦主张（以下简称“NIED 诉求”）。起诉书第 109-115 段。债务人导致产生 NIED 诉求的行为构成了《破产法典》第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼中认定债务人对 NIED 诉求承担责任，债务人就 NIED 诉求所负的责任即为不可免责。\n诉名项 V – 确认之诉 依据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 确认过失诉求不可免责\n\n31. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段，如同已在本文中完全载明。\n\n32. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人对于“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成的蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务，均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n33. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉书中所述，债务人屡次且故意虐待原告。债务人多次对原告实施非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、抓扯并强行施暴强奸。债务人的行为属于故意、未经许可且具有严重冒犯性质的行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦及羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n34. 起诉书中的第五项诉由载明了原告针对债务人的主张，即债务人作为原告的雇主，疏忽违反了在原告履行其雇佣职责和责任期间保护其免受伤害的义务（以下简称“过失索赔”）。起诉书第 116-125 段。债务人导致过失索赔的行为构成了《破产法》（Bankruptcy Code）第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对过失索赔承担责任，债务人对过失索赔的责任即为不可免除债务。\n罪名项六 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 认定非法拘禁索赔具有不可免除性\n\n35. 原告重述并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在此处完整载明一样。\n\n36. 个人债务人根据《破产法》无权免除“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n37. 如上所述以及在通过引用并入本诉状的州法院起诉书中所载，债务人反复且故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了反复的拘禁、人身暴力和性侵犯行为。债务人对原告实施身体约束、殴打她、抓拽她并强行强奸她。债务人的行为在性质上属于故意的、未经授权的且极具冒犯性的。债务人故意造成原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦以及羞辱、被剥夺自由以及其他损害和伤害。\n\n38. 起诉书中的第六项诉由载明了原告针对债务人的主张，即违背原告意愿对原告进行拘禁（以下简称“非法拘禁索赔”）。起诉书第 126-134 段。债务人导致非法拘禁索赔的行为构成了《破产法》第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对非法拘禁索赔承担责任，债务人对非法拘禁索赔的责任即为不可免除债务。\n罪名项七 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 认定纽约市歧视索赔具有不可免除性\n\n39. 原告重述并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在此处完整载明一样。\n\n40. 个人债务人根据《破产法》无权免除“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n41. 如上所述以及在通过引用并入本诉状的州法院起诉书中所载，债务人反复且故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了反复的拘禁、人身暴力和性侵犯行为。债务人对原告实施身体约束、殴打她、抓拽她并强行强奸她。债务人的行为在性质上属于故意的、未经授权的且极具冒犯性的。债务人故意造成原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦以及羞辱、被剥夺自由以及其他损害和伤害。\n\n42. 起诉书中的第八项诉由载明了原告针对债务人的主张，即违反《纽约市行政法规》（New York City Administrative Code）对原告实施性骚扰以及性别和其他歧视（以下简称“纽约市歧视索赔”）。起诉书第 144-155 段。债务人导致纽约市歧视索赔的行为构成了《破产法》第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对纽约市歧视索赔承担责任，债务人对纽约市歧视索赔的责任即为不可免除债务。\n罪名项八 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 认定纽约州歧视索赔具有不可免除性\n\n43. 原告重述并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在此处完整载明一样。\n\n44. 个人债务人根据《破产法》无权免除“因债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产造成蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n45. 如上所述以及在通过引用并入本诉状的州法院起诉书中所载，债务人反复且故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了反复的拘禁、人身暴力和性侵犯行为。债务人对原告实施身体约束、殴打她、抓拽她并强行强奸她。债务人的行为在性质上属于故意的、未经授权的且极具冒犯性的。债务人故意造成原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦以及羞辱、被剥夺自由以及其他损害和伤害。\n\n46. 起诉书中的第十项诉由载明了原告针对债务人的主张，即违反《纽约行政法》（New York Executive Law）§ 296 对原告实施性骚扰以及性别和其他歧视（以下简称“纽约州歧视索赔”）。起诉书第 170-180 段。债务人导致纽约州歧视索赔的行为构成了《破产法》第 523(a)(6) 条含义内对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对纽约州歧视索赔承担责任，债务人对纽约州歧视索赔的责任即为不可免除债务。\n诉讼请求\n\n为此，原告谨请求法院作出如下判决：\n\n(a) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因殴打索赔对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；\n\n(b) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因恐吓索赔对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；\n\n(c) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因故意造成情绪困扰索赔（IIED Claim）对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；\n\n(d) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因过失造成情绪困扰索赔（NIED Claim）对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；\n\n(e) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因过失索赔对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；\n\n(f) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因非法拘禁索赔对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；\n\n(g) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因纽约市歧视索赔对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；\n\n(h) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告如起诉书中所详细载明且由州法院在州法院诉讼中所判定的、债务人因纽约州歧视索赔对原告承担的责任为不可免除债务；以及\n\n(i) 判予原告法院认为公正且适当的此等其他及进一步的救济。\n\n日期：2022年6月20日 /签名/ Kristin B. Mayhew（克里斯汀·B·梅休）\n\nKristin Mayhew（克里斯汀·梅休）\nMCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP（麦克尔罗伊、多伊奇、马尔瓦尼与卡彭特有限责任合伙）\n30 Jelliff Lane\nSouthport, CT 06890\n(203) 319-4000\nkmayhew@mdmc-law.com\n\n- 以及 -\n\nCarollynn H.G. Callari（卡罗琳·H·G·卡拉里）（特许代理）\nDavid S. Forsh（大卫·S·福什）（特许代理）\nCALLARI PARTNERS LLC（卡拉里合伙人有限责任公司）\nOne Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor\nNew York, NY 10020\n(212) 202-3050\nccallari@callaripartners.com\ndforsh@callaripartners.com\n\nRui Ma（马蕊）的代理律师","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":3112,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:35:40"}