{"id":"court_ctb_50_4","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":50,"sub_number":4,"doc_type":"EXHIBIT","filed_date":"2022-02-28","title":"EXHIBIT 19 From: Sent: To: **Subject:** Attachments:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 1 of 159\n\n# **EXHIBIT 19**\n\nFrom: Sent: To: **Subject:** Attachments:\n\nSusan Hennelly Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:31 PM BoardOfDirectors Sale of Apartment 1801 and Maid's Room 2219 Kwok board package.pdf\n\n**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 2 of 159\n\nWe have received a contract for the sale of the 2,950 shares allocated to Apartment 180'1 and the 50 shares allocated to Maid's Room 2219 from Sherry 1800s, LLC (Haroche) to Genever Holdings LLC (Miles Kwok).\n\nAttached are copies of the contract of sale1 Mr. Kwok's application and several letters of reference.\n\nThe purchase price is \\$67,500,000, plus \\$2,500))00 for the furnishings. The 2015 maintenance is \\$55,214 per month plus an additional \\$936 for the Maid's Room. This is a residential apartment and will be used by Mr. Kwok and his family.\n\nDue to Mr. Kwok's foreign status and purchasing in an LLC, he will be required to sign an occupancy agreement and personally guarantee the lease. He will also be required to provide a security deposit.\n\nThis apartment encompasses the entire floor and is approximately 7,300 sq. ft. plus 2,170 sq. ft. of terraces. Attached is a floor plan.\n\nMr. Kwok has also entered into a contract to purchase Maid's Room 719 which he will purchase simultaneously, if approved.\n\nMichael Horvitz and Fred Seegal have interviewed Miles Kwok and his son, Mileson Kwok. His wife, Hing Chi, was present via Skype.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nMichael J. Ullman Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer The Sherry Netherland Hotel 781 Fifth A venue New York, NY 10022 P: 212-231-6811 F: 212-832-4845 For reservations and special offers, go to\n\n## Executed Contract of Sale\n\n#### CONSULT YOUR LA WYER l3EP'ORE SIGNJNC THIS AGREEMENT Contrllc(of Salc-\\_Cooperative Apartment\n\nT/Jis Contract is marle as of February \\_\\_\\_ , *2015* between the \"Seller\" and the \"Purchaser)I identified be!ow.\n\nJ Certain Dcfinlt!ons And foformation ! . I The: \"Parties\" arc: J.f.'Z \"Purclrnsor\"; Gcncver Holdingi LLC\n\n*1.1.1* ''Seller\"; Sherry l800s, LLC *Prtor Hames 1.1.ud by Sellar: ;fddrc~s. l 233 Rock Rimmon RMr/i Sf(lmf1'rd, CT 06903*\n\n*Tcv: ID. No .. l0-0780J54*\n\n*A dd1e,1·,r* · *SS. No .. •*\n\n1.2 Tl1e \"Atcornc:ys\" ort *(name, firm name, address <111d telephone.fax).* 1.2. I \"Seller's Allorney\" ! .2.2 ''Pun:haser's Attorney''\n\nMichael *J.* Jones, Esq, Im Gilbert, **Esq, 170 Muon** *Street,* Greenwich, CT O@JIJ 1285 Avenue of the Amerl.:11 Tel: 203-661..{;000 New Ywk1 [';\\' 10019-6064 Fax: *203-661,1088* **Tei;** 2l2ft.W-.,1JMl6il-·-O-f--O-booft-C~fflfflt{moot-~t.ir-..to/-U1e fixtures, central a.ir-<.:ondition/ng **;and/or** window or sleeve unit:;, 6%ft~!ffi~-Ga~.:i+, washing 111aci1ine;;, *cryrrs,* screen:; .ind storm wiodows, window +~~P.¼lr-\\lfl~-may-af})lly--feHiFWM~nH~oo-Yrlth-lhts !m1rmcnts. switch pJatcs, door h:mJwllfc, mirrors. buif:-ins not ~-&-~H1~as~RHJ0Hgalien-to-fHtl'OOtlSfH.l1ltlef-4.is-GMtffi~-tS excluded Jn *1* l.12 tllld all of the 'urnishiogs n,,ekt1**LLC Paul, Weiss, **Rffkl11ci 1**Wlrnrton & Gnrr!son, LLP igllbcrt@pa ulwclss .com\n\n1see l.12 below0\n\nt. !2 Sp.c,;;;.fi.1;..iUy..cx,.;Juo,:,J../.;o~l..illL&.s11lc-u .all..J1\"t.501Jl'i .. pt0f~- **-!lwi.** in1 s* Room# 15191/ f Pw-ktftg-SpslOOJ\n\n(\"lnch,Jed !nten:sts\") 1.14 TI1e \"Closing\" is the transfer of ownership of the !-ihares and Lease,\n\n1.15 The dato scheduled for Closing is no later than 3/6/15 C'Scheduled Closing Date\"} at I0:00 **A.M.** (Sec ml *9* and lO)\n\nI. t6 The uPurchase Price\" is: \\$67,500,000.00\n\n1.16.1 The \"Contract Deposit\" is: \\$7,000,0-00.00\n\nl .16.2 The HBalance\" of the Purchase Price due al Closing is;\n\n\\$63rOOO,OOO.OO (See~ 2.2.2) See SR18 in Second Rider\n\n1.17 The monthly \"Ma.lntc1111ncc\" charge is \\$57,085.53 (Sec i\n\n4) LI 8 The \"As:;i;ssment\", if any, payable to the Corporation, n(\n\n*the* date of this Contract *is* NONE, pay11bfc *as* follows:\n\nI.I I \"Personally\" is lht: following person11/ property, to the *+.-a~tftfttlfflg-GptiiiFY.,-{~le-AWH,/-lh.e-{o/lewittg* ?11 *UI.I,*\n\nspecifically excluded in 1.2.2), including but uroH1-loon--of-~----f1•HJ~(unn--0~----.ye,m;..:1r-1;uch-J£1r,1;t,r not UJtlited t..o 411 it~ms set t,oxth i.ri trie series of videos contained in the DVD(the \"DVD\") delivered by Brown Harris Stevens to Unit 1801 at L:Ou pm or i-ebruary :LU, 201 o.\n\n(j 1.12 - Specifically excluded from this sate are thirteen (13) **paintings** and drawings; one antique secretary desk on east wall of LR *(to* be replaced by a piece of furniture that resembles this desk); personal 'knick knacks' such as small boxes, docks, picture frames, pictures, etc. (but if 'knick knacks' are in the DVD, they are included); file cabinets in Gil's office and contents thereof; all the clothing, framed photographs(except specific frame to be designated by buyer) and the model of the Seller's private yacht located in Seller's office.\n\n**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 5 of 159\n\n> c,,:1nut *,(* j,1,ft (ll~jtHttl','t n.pl'l(/l,j(fli1 1-:.00 I J'cop.r,,I h) \"'' (.',,,,,,i,rr11 1Gonovcr f-loldlngs LLC\n\n*Prior Hattuu 1md by Sd!ar: Addr!!n: 1233 Rock Rlt11mott Read, Sla11tf(}nf1 CT 0690J*\n\n*Tax ID. No.: 'J0-0780.fJ'I*\n\n*Addre,v.,;·: S.S. N1J,:*\n\n1.2 The \"Attorneys\" ore *(nam,, firm name, add,·e.rs and ulephone, fax),* 1.2. I \"Seller's /\\tcornoy\" ! .2.2 \"Purchast:r's Allomey'' Mlch11e! J. *Jones,* E;q, *il'R* GUbert, *tsq,* Ivty, 131mn1m & O1 M11r11 1 LLC Poul, **Weiss,** Rll'kfnd, Wh11rton & G11rrlsori1 LLP *1 '70* Muon *Street,* Groenwlch1 CT 06830 l:28~ Avenue o(the America Tel: 203-661-6000 New York, N\\' 10019-6064 Fu: 203-651-7088 Tri: Zl2-J7J.JSl9 mJorie.s@lhofow.com Fin:: **212-492•0529**\n\nl .3 The \"E~crowcc\" *Is 1he /Seller 'J}* A Horney.\n\nl ,4 The Managing l\\genl is *(Ham,e, addres., and telep!wrra, fu.X): Slfttrry Nti1(11:rin11d Hori:( Susan H1m11el{J! 781 Flftlt Avttnw.:, 1'1 1 Nt!W fork, NY 10011 Td: :Jl].J3J,681J P~ JJJ-8J:.i-fU5*\n\n*1.5* TI1c real cstat~ 1 'Brnl<~r(s)\" (see~ 12) ls/are: John Burger, 1rnd Kathy S1011.ne, Drown **Harris** *Stevens ind* Serena Dondm•n, Sotheby'\\$ 1.v The name of the ccoporatlve hol.l!llng corporal/on ( 11C-Orporarlon\") b: Sherry Netherland, Inc.\n\nI. 7 'Jl10 \"Unit\" 1wmber I:;: 1801, which eticompaues the entire•\n\n! , *8* The Unii ls locate..J-tlf'-/-;-J{):1-) frcc,.crs,* ranges, *ovens,* bul/(•in m lcrowovo oven~, dish washers, ~~r-fifi8:fKttilf:-tlH9fHl-eeHeA-Wkfl---#lJs gorb~ge dlspo5fll units, Cftblnets DJld counter.i, llghtlng fj:,:turcs, ~1&-P-uf'OOB~&Hgatwn-4~hl&-Ooo\\taCHil chn11dollers, wal/-10-wflll *carpo:ing,* plumbing ond he!lting &OOt-ffi&:~~~er--Oy--tlie *f1xturos,* Qan(rai alr...cundhlon/ng ;and/or window or sleeve uni!s, l,,ffn fl-WHIHhf5 treafmcnt5, switch piatcs, door h!mlware, mirrors, buil:•lns no! ealiHl~~UgaHen-40-p1;1HJtWJ&-u~Hltl~ excluded /11 Y l. 12 *and* all of tit~ .. urn/.,hJni:.v tR1ktdf1tg-b«l-tt&! IHl~gtlflt--upon--i~o~n-{;emmltmool-le¼Wr H11tf~- **-~~d** 'tr - c-ftfti11 ;-p-&f,,---p1'1ltr,-ci,oirinir-H'C m,, ~~~1:1,-tiwi~1~tofi00-with fltt **tw1tt1e; 1tt-wttl-M-c-ry,<-11-t 1Mltt'\"1tttd--d~e1t!lieNr -e~** m-tm,\n\nlgllbor(@pllulwob-.com\n\n1soe 1.12 helow0\n\nI. 12 Spc.;;!kt1Uy..e;..;;lu.;JuLCl'.,ru....i.h~alc.J\\$.lllLp,:ironaJ.propco.y .• mJl• tn-t,looe,d ..Jn ~\"a-1 *\"\"1-1-u .. i.* all-400tt..u'-Jw:;Juded. .ia..t!ie-.-i.1+:t~ **wfff\"t-+ite--e«\"t><~J.J..p~,g1r«ffQ4f°ffW~~~ te«l&fff')'~&tt-ffM--Wili-ff.1.J+twUI-IJ+-~r~ttWH- \"knl-t.1<'1ffl1ttkt1'-~t-•t-e~~~~lfH--ff•Mff\\ plct11'1\"C3;e((',** I. 1J nw safo [dtwsJ [~) lnclude Scllc(s !ntttest io (Sto~t,i)/ [Servnnt's Room 1115191/ (PsAEi11g opaaej (•tncJudol.f **Jntt1ro-il.f')**\n\n1.14 The ~closing\" i, the tram:for of ownership of tho Shares and **Lcase,**\n\n*I.IS* The date scheduled for Closing ts no later than 3/6/15 ('1\n\nScheduled Closing Date\") *at* I0:00 **A.M.** (Seo *V'\\19* and 10)\n\nI, 16 The \"Purohuse Price\" Js: \\$67,500,000.00\n\nI, 16, l Tho \"Contraot Deposit\" *Is:* \\$71000,000,00 LI *6,2* The \"13alence\" of the Purchase Price dUI! a( Closing !s:\n\n\\$6J,ooo,ooo.oo (See~ 2.2,2) See SR18 in Second Rider\n\nLI 7 The rnonthly \"Malnlcnoncc'' charge fs \\$S7,0BS.5J (Sec 1 4)\n\n1.18 The \"As~i:ssrnenl\", If any, payable to the Cnrporatlo11, 111 the dale ofthfs Contract is NON€, payable as fol!uw:;:\n\nf. I r uri:rson11/!y\" is tile followlng pmon11I propcrt1, to th or a new Lease. 10,2 At Closing, Purchaser shall:\n\nt0.2, I PRY the 8Rlancc In 11ocordonce with ~2.2,2;\n\n10.2,2 execute and deliver to Seller and the Corporation an agreement wisumlng the Lease, in the form required by the Corporation; and\n\nto,2.3 if requested by the Corporation, execute nnd deliver **counterparts** of a new **lease** substantially the same 11s the Lease, for the **bu:ance** of the Lease term, in which cflse the Lease shall be canceled and surrendered to the Corporation togeiher whh Seller's assignment tl1ereofto Purch11Rer\n\n10.J At Closing, the Parlics shall complete end execute all documents necessury:\n\nI0.3, l for Internal Revenue Ser.ice (\"IRS\") form !099-S or othor ,9/mll0r requirements:\n\nI 0.3.2 to comply with smoke detecior requiremonts and any applicnble transfer tux ftl!ngs; and\n\nt 0.3 .3 to trnnsfer Seller's lnteresl, if any, In and to the Personalty and Included rnterests.\n\nI 0.4 Purchnser shrill not be. obligurcd to close urilcs,q, u1 Closing, the Corporntion dellvers ·\n\n10.4, 1 to Purchaser u new certli: cute for (he Shares in the nume of Purcha5er; and\n\nI 0.4.2 a written statement by an officer or nuthori1.cd agent of tho Corporation consenting *to* the traMfcr of tho Shares and Lease to Purchaser and setting forth the amounts of *and* payment status of all sums owed by Seller to tne Corporation, Including Molntenance and any Assessments, nnd the date.'! tn which e!lch has been paid.\n\n#### ll **Closing Fees, Tftxca llnd Apportionments**\n\n11. l At *or* prior to Clo.,fng,\n\nI 1.1, l Seller shnll pny, if t1ppl!cuble:\n\n**11,** I. f, i the cost of stock tram fer .stamps; and\n\n11. r, 1,2 transfer taxes, except as set forth in l I. l. 2 .2\n\n11. 1.2 Purchaser shnl! pt1y, if 11pplicable:\n\nl I, 1,2, l any foe Jmpo~cd by the Corporntion relRting to Purcha:rnr's financing; 11nd\n\n11.1.2.2 trnr.~fcr taxes imposed by statute pdnrnrlly on Purchaser (e.g., the ''mAn,ion ~ux 11 ),\n\n! l.2 The Flip Tax, if any, shall b1; paid by the Purty sr,ec1ficd In ,, I.I 9,\n\nI I J Any fee imposed by the Corporation and not specified in this Contract she\\! be p1tld by the Party upon whom such fee Is expressly *imposed* hy the Co•ror•tlon, nnd 1f 110 Pr1r1y !~ sped fied by the Corporation, t·1en :mch foe sh11ll be p!iid by Seller,\n\n114 Tht\". Port/c3 sluill npportlon es of ! 1 :59..P.M. o: lhc *day* preceding tho Closing, the Malrtcnance, 11nd anyother periodic charges due the Corporation 'other thun Assessments) und STAR Tax Exumption (if tho Uolt ls tht: beneficiary of &amo), 'oas~d on \\he 11umber of the days in the month of Closin6,\n\nl l *.5* Assessment,, whether fnyablc In II lump sum or instflllmenls, *shall* not be apportioned, out shall be paid by UH: Party who is the owner of the **Shues** on the d!lte specified by the Corporation for payrnenL Purch~ser slwl! pay nny lnstollments payable after Closing provided Selier had the right and oiected to pay tl1e Assessment 111 installmonts,\n\nI l .6 E11ch Party sh&IJ timely pay any transfer **taxes** for which it is prlmndly ltabte purs1111n1 tn law by cashier's, official bank, i:;1iriiiied *or* Rl!orney's escrow chock, Th/9 l 1.6 shul. survive Closing,\n\nI l. 7 Any computational errors Cli' omissions shall be l.)Orrected within 6 months after Clo~ing, *Ths* ~I l 7 shall **survive** Closing, 12 Broker\n\n12. l Each Pa11y represents that SL ch Party hes not dealt with 1rny pe,3011 uctin~ Iii/ a broker, whctfier licensed or onliceirned, in connection wlU1 this transactlnn other thnn the Broker(-'>) named in~ U.\n\n12.2 **Seller** ~hall pay lhc l3roket's commis~ion pursuant to a suporntc Rgreemcnl The Broker(s) shn/1 not be dccmcc to be a third-party bt:neficiary of this Crmtrnct.\n\n12.3 \"111/s ~l2 shall survive Cioslng, conce!lntlon or (er:nim1Uon of th is Contract.\n\n#### 13 Def11ults 1 Remedies *and* Indumnities\n\nI J. l In the event of n dofo11!t or m i:.rcpros\\!ntotlon by Purchaser, Sollcr's soto und exclutiivo rcn.;:dics shall he to ctmce! thl~ Contract, rctt1l11 lho Contract Depos1t as liquldtncd d11rnages und, *If* npp/lcoblc, Soller may enforce the indomnlty in , l3.3 as co brokcrago comrnl!slon or sue uncer ii l 3.4. Purchaser prcfors to limit Purchaser's exposure for actual damages to the amount of the Controct Deposit, which Purchasor e.groc:; constltuta11 a fair ond reasonable amount of compensation for S~ller>s tl!images under Hie clroutnstnnces and is not a penally, The principles of real property law shtill apply to this liquidated damogcs provision.\n\n13.2 ln the event of a default o· mlsrcprcscntatlon by Seller, Purchager shall have:: su(.:h remedies as Purchaser Is entitled to nl *11\\W M* in equity, i11cludi11g sped1-: pr.:rformirncc, bccuuse tit,;: Unit and possession tbereof can no: be dup/ icated,\n\n13.3 Subject to th¢ provi:1ions of~ 4.3, **ea.oh** Party indemnifies nnd holds harmless the other egalnst and from an} claim, Judgment, los~, liability, cosl or cxpen:.e rt:sultlng from the indcmnltor's breach of ony of Its rt:prescntations or ccvenants stated to survive Closing, cence l11tion or tennltlation of this Con(racc Purchtl-'icr indtrnnlfles and holds harmles~ Seller nguinsi and from any cloim, Judiment, [oss, li~blllty, i:;ost or i;:xpense resulting from the Lct\\sc '.)b/igations 11ccru!ng from ond after the Closing. Each indernnit) in..:lud~s, without llmltatlon, reasonable attorneys' **fees** and disbursernc:nt.~, court ccsts und l!tlga\\ion expenses arising from the defense of any cliim and cnforcemcn1 or coliectio11 of fl judgment under this indemnity, provided the indemnitoc is glvea Nollce nnd upportunlly lo defend th¢ cluil11, Thi~ ii IJ,J shall survive Closing, cuncclfa!ion or l<.:rm inatlon of th is Contract,\n\n13 .4 In the event 11ny instrument for the payment of the Contrnc( Dopo~it falls of collection, Seiter shall have the right to sue on the uncollected instrument. In nrlditlon, such fullurn of collect Ion shall be a defo.ult under this Contract, provided Selle1 gives Purchaser Notice of such raHun: of collcctlon and, within 3 business dayi after Notice ls givi,n, E,gcrowee do~ not recelvc from Purchaser an unondor:.ed good cortlfiod check, bank che-ck or immediately avalfab/e funds in th\" amount of the uncollected funds, failure to cure \\$UCh default shall en!ltle Seller to the remedies set forth in **1** 13. I and to retain 1111 sums as mny be coHcctcd and/or recovered\n\n#### 14 Entire Agreement; Modlfk1H!on\n\n!4.1 l'dl prlM ord! or written rcprcsentntl11nfi, understandings nnd **11greemcnts** had between Hie P;;rtJI::, wl\\h rclµte\\ lo the subjecl ,nnttcr of thb Contract, nnd with the Escrnwcc as to 27, aro merged in lhi11 Con!racl, whlch alone fully and compk:tely expresses the Parties' find Escrowee•~ t1greement. 14.2 The Attorneys may extend In wrl1f og any of the time llmlM:t!ons ~tat~d in thio Contract.. Any otllef provi1,lon of !his Contrnc( ,rniy bo chtinse-d or wuived only in writing signed by !he Party or Bscrnwcc to **be** charged,\n\n#### **15** Removal of Liens rrnd Judgm~nts\n\nl *5,* 1 Purchnscr shall deliver or cnuse to be delivered to Seller or Seller's Atto1·noy, not less than l O oulendnr 1lhen Seller shall have the right to adjourn the Clolllng for periods nol exceeding 60 calendar days in !he **llggregate,** bul not extending beyond the expiration of Purch11ser'i Loan Commitment Letter, lffi l .20. J or 1.20.2 app!les.\n\nl 6.2 ff Seller does not duct tu ad}ourn tho Closing or (if odjournod) on tho odjournod date of Closing Seller is stlll unflhle :o perform. tl1en unless Purchaser clecti to proceed with lhe Closing without abatement of the Purchase Price, either Party may cancel this Contract on Notlce to the other Party given e.t any time thereafter.\n\n16.J In the even~ of such cancel let ion, lhti sole liability of Seller shall be to cause the Contract Deposit lo be refunded to Purchaser nnd to reimburse Purchaser *for* the actual *casts* incurred for Purcha.sc's lion and tltle !iea.rch, If 11ny,\n\n#### 17 Notice, nnd Contrnct Delivery\n\n17.1 Any notlcti or demond (\"Norioe\") shnll be in writing ond delivered either by hand. Overnight llel1very or certified or registeroct :ntill, return reoeipt rcque,ted, to the; Party ~d j/mu!tancously, in like manner, to such Party's Attorney, if uny, and to ERcrowee ut their respective 11ddn:sses or to such other 11ddrtlss as shall hereafter be designntcd by Notice g!vcn pursuant to this i1 17.\n\nnot reqt-Jir11d tG flpply ffl6ttt~~\n\ndatt¾-\n\n~.J.2 Puroha:ser 11hall-4¼Hv-0f-No;roe-of-eoo00Hauoo~»t>r wkhin-5-iw&i06Ss-day1r-1tfter-th!'r•t->&a~\n\n159\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 10 of\n\n+-&.lr+rt~~t-400--bea»-G~Hf¼ffittf'f!?l\\{~(tf tlfl1taeffi•ng--f211roha8~--L1-11ot **Ale( (d.g. Jl11Fehoso1 1 j**fmanolal oofltl.W011 **91 IIA1pl0~1 HHIRI 6ta(Le 6t:1fte1s 8FI ~~oo--reJ.a~e-&&le-ot:-o11 e1tlstlAg n,,leenaa, ele.) el'**\n\nI 8 **a,? J ewo** to **1h11** ~11p~t-a--beoo-•G~mmiIBH)ll~ ~tte'B,* whenever tl!e *context so* requires. lf *more* !hl¾n one person cons1ltutes Seller or Purchaser, their obi fgafions as such Party shall be Joini and ~evcra/.\n\n#### 20 **No** Sundv11i\n\nNo representation and/or co~nant contained herein shell survive Closing except as exprc.ssly provided. Payment of the Delancc sh~ll constitute *a* dlscha:-ge and release by Purchaser of nil of Seller's obligations hemmder except those expressly stuted to survive Cio~ing.\n\n#### 2l lnsp11ctio11s\n\nPurchaser Md Purchnser's representatives sho/J he.ve the ri&hl to Inspect the U11it within 48 hour.; prioi· to Closing, anc at other misonable times upon nmona.bk request *tq* Seller.\n\n#### 22 Governing LRw and Venue\n\nThis Contract !ihttll be governed by the laws o[thc Ste.tc of New York without regard to principies of conflict ofh1ws. Any 11ctlon or proceedini **Oiising** o\\lt or this Contrnct slrnl I b~ brought In tile county or Federal district whe!'! the Unit is located and the Parties hereby consent to said venue.\n\n#### 23 No **Assignment** by Purclrnser; Death of Purchaser\n\n2J, I Purchescr may *not* ns.slin this Contract or any of Purchaser'~ right:i hereunder. A:iy such purported assignment :Jhiill be null ond *void*\n\n23,2 This Contract shnll ttrmirrnte upon the death of ft!. persons comprising Purchaser ond the Contract Deposit shall be refunded 10 the Purchaser. Upon maklng .mch ref'md and rvimtium:ment. ncilhc:r Party she.II have any further liability or claim against tile **other hereu11del',** except !lS Sllt forth In ,r 12,\n\n#### 24 **Cooparatlon** of Parties\n\n24. l The ?~rtics shall each CJopernte with the other, the Corporation and Purchaser's hstltutlonal Lender and title compc1ny, if *any,* and obtain execule and delive1· such documents as are reasonably necessary (a consummate 1.11. sale. 24,2 The Parties shall timely f le all required documents in vonncclion witb nil governmentil fl!lngs that are reqJlred by luw. Each *Pany represents* ro the *otiwr that its* 1.tatementJ In *such tilings* shall be true end complete. This **,i** 24.2 :,hall survive Clo~ing,\n\n#### 25 **FIRPTA**\n\nThe parties she!I comply with !RC \\*1 897, 1445 and the regulation~ thereunder e.~ :mme m.!ly be amended (\"FIRPTA\"). If appllcoblc, Seller shalt execute and deliver to purc!111Ser 11t Closlng a Ccrtlflcntlon of Non~ Foreign Stulus (\"C~S\") or Jeli11et ti Withho!dlng Certi(1catc from **the** JRS, ff Seller fails to deliver a CNS or a Wlthhoidhig Certiflcale, Purchaser shall withhold from the Balance, ond ~emit lo the IRS, such sum **11s** may be required *by* law. Seller he·eby waivos any right of action nga!nst Purchaser on account of such withholdlng ond rcrniHance. This 12,~ shall survive Closlnli',,\n\n#### 26 Additional Rcq11irement.s\n\n26.1 Purchaser shall not be oblfb'(ltcd lo closi.; unle:;s all of 1he following requirements **are** sntisfied at the time o(the Cbsing;\n\n26, i. I the Corporation *19* !n good standing;\n\n26. l .2 cho Corporntlon hos fee or leasehold title to the Premises, whether or :10t mttrkc111b(e or Insurable; and\n\n26, l.3 there is no pending *In rem* action, rnx certiticate/ Jon sule *or* foreclosure action of any unde dying mongogc affecting the Prcmi~cs,\n\n26.2 lf any rcqulremcnt in 26. l ls not sa{isfred o.t !he time of lhe Closing, Purchaser .~hnll give Seller Notict:l and if the some L'.l noi sulisflcd wlth!n a reasom1bk period of time thereafti.;r, Chen either Party *way* cancel this Contract (pursuant to ,i 16.3) by Notice,\n\n#### **2 7 Escrow** Terms\n\n27.1 The Contmct Deposit shul! he deposited by Rscrowoe ln un escrow account us set forth tn *'i* l ,24 and !lie proceeds held 1md disbursed in 11ccordancc **with** the ti.:rms of this Conlract At Closing, 1he Contract Deposit shall be p11id by Escrowee to Seller. If the Closlng does nor occur *and* eHher Party gives Notice lo Escrnwcc demundlng payment of the Contract De:po81t, Escrowee shall gfve prompt Notlcc to the other Party of such demand. lf Esctowee does not receive a Notice of objection to the proposed pAyment from such o~her Party within l 0 bus(ness dny5 after the **giving** of l3scrowee's Notice, B:icrowce **b** h\\lrcby 11uthorizcd and directed to make such p11ymcnt to the domand[ng party. If Escrowee does receive such *a* Nottcc of objoctlon within soid period, or if for any reason Escrowee in good faith e!ecls not to make such paycrn:ml, Escrowco may continue to hold the Contnict Deposit until otherwise directed by a joint Notice by tht: Partlos or a fins!, non-appealeble judimcnt, order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. However, Bscrowee shall hnve the right at ony time to dcpo~lt the Contract Deposit er,d the interest thereon, if any, with t.hc cl~rk of fl court In tho cou1ty as set forth in 1 22 and shall give Notico of such deposit to each Party, Upon disposition of the Contrac.:t Depo5it *and* Interest thereon, *if* any, in accordance wl\\h this 27, Escrowee shall be **released and** discharged of all e~crow\n\n**obligations** and **liabilities,**\n\n**27.2 The** Pnrty whose **Attorney** is Escrowce shall be llable for loss of the Contract Deposit. **Jf the** Escrowee is Scl!cr'i **attorney,** then Purchaser shall be credited with the amount or !he **contract** Deposit at Closing.\n\n27.3 Escrawee wlll ~erve without compensotlon. Escrowec **is** tlctrng solely as a stakeho!dcr at the Par(le61reque8C ~nd for their convenience, Escrowee :shull not be liable to either Party for a11y oct *or* omissfon unless lt involves bad faith, willful disregard or this Contract or gniss negligence. [n the evenl of any dispute, Seller nnd Purchns1;:r sh.ti! jointly and severally (with rJght of contribution) defend (by 11ttorneys elected by Escrowec}, indemnify and hold harmlti~a' Escrowee erom and against any chtlm, judgment, foss, !iab!lity, cost and tJxpensts tncurred in connection with the performance of Escrowee's acts or omissions not lnvolvlng bad fallh, wl llful disrer.ard of thls Contract *or* gross negligence. This Indemnity *Includes,* without limitation, rcRsonnble attornoys' fees either p!ild lo retoin nttomeys or repre~entlng the fair value of loge.I services rendered by Escrowee to itself and disbursements, court (;OSts and litigation expenses.\n\n27.4 Escrowcc i,.cknowlodges receipt of the Contract Deposit, by check subject to collection.\n\n27.5 Rscrowoe agrees *to* tho provisions of this~ 27.\n\n?.7.6 If Escrowcc Is the Attorney for **a** Party, E:icrowec shall be\n\npt:rmltted to t'eprosent such Party !n ,my d{spulc or lawsuit. 27.7 Thi~ 1 27 shall survive Closing, canctilla(ion or \\~rmlnlllion\n\n#### of this Contrncl 28 M~rgln Headlnis\n\n**The margin** bending do not constitute part of lhc tcxl of ~his Conlrnct.\n\n#### **29 Misccllancou.s**\n\nThis Contract sh1t!I not bt, binding units~ nnd until Seller delivers **a** fully executed counterpart of this Controct lo Purchaser (or P Jrchaser's Attorney) purrnont to 17.2 and I 7.3. This Contract shal! bind\n\nonrt Inure to tho benefit of the Porties hereto 11nct their respective helm, ptrsorrnl and kgul represe11tellv~~ and successors In i:Herest\n\n30 Lead Paint If appJlcabfo, lho oomplote and fully executed Disclosure or lnformlltlon on Lead Based Paint and or Lead•Basod Paint Hanrd3 Is attached hereto and mid,; a part hereof.\n\nIn Witness Whereof, the Parties horeto havo duly executed this Contract us of tho date flrst above written.\n\n**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 11 of 159\n\n| S .d(1mo TO: | SBLLER:
SUB:RRY 1800s, LLC
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_______ | PUR.CHASBR:
G!NEVER HOLD~QS LLC
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~-+••··--- |\n| | | |\n\n#### **FIRST RIDER ANNEXED TO AND FORMING A PART OF CONTRACT OF SALE FOR THE 18TH FLOOR KNOWN AS UNIT 1801 AT SHERRY NETHERLAND**• **INC .• 781 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT BETWEEN SHERRY 1800s, LLC, AS SELLER, AND GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC, AS PURCHASER, DATED FEBRUARYZ..I, 2015**\n\n31. In the event of any conflict between the provision of this Rider or any other Rider, and the provisions of the Contract to which this Rider is attached, the provisions of this Rider shall control.\n\n32. In addition to the representation made by Purchaser in Paragraph 4 of this Contract) Purchaser) jointly and severally, represents and warrants to Seller that Purchaser knows of no outstanding judgments or tax liens and knows of no threatened lawsuit or claim (including criminal and/or tax proceedings).\n\n33. Supplementing Paragraph 20, the acceptance of the Shares and the assumption of the Lease by Purchaser anc the delivery of possession of the Unit and keys by Seller shall be deemed full perfonmmce by Seller of Seller's obligations under this Contract, except any of which that survive Closing, and such acceptance and assumption by Purchaser shall discharge Seller from all terms• conditions, representations and agreements required to be performed by Seller under this Contract1 except any of which that survive Closing. No liability on the part of Seller shall survive the Closing except as expressly set forth *in* this Contract.\n\n34. In the event that there is any refund on real estate taxes attributable to the time period in which Seller has owned the Unit, such refund shall belong solely to Seller. In this regard, Purchaser shall cooperate with Seller in connection with obtaining such refund and Purchaser agrees to sign any reasonable documentat:on to assist Seller in obtaining such refund, If such refund is delivered to Purchaser (or credited t::Jwards Purchaser's monthly maintenance by the Corporation), Purchaser shall promptly remit such refund to Seller. The Parties acknowledge that the provision of this Paragraph 34 shall survive the Closing\n\n35. An increase in the maintenance or the imposition of an assessment after the date hereof shall not be deemed a misreprcsentF,ltion or breach by Seller hereunder. In this regard, any assessment imposed by the Corporation after the date of this Contract, shall be solely the obligation of Purchaser if such assessment is payable on or after the date of Closing, Seller will send Purchaser a copy of any notices from the Corporation regarding material facts relating to the Corporation including any maintenance increases.\n\n3 6. A \"Disc~osure of Infonnation on Lead.Based Paint and/or Lead Based Paint Hazards\" *is* attached hereto as Exhibit A hereto. Such document may be executed in counterpruis, This Contract shall be ceemed executed when signed by the parties hereto notwithstanding that the Broker's signature on such Exhibit A have not yet been obtained. Purchaser acknowledges that Purchaser has received the pamphlet Protect Your Home From Lead in Your Home and Purchaser hereby waives the opportunity to conduct a. risk assessment or inspection for the presence of lead• based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in the Unit and/or the Premises. Purchaser acknowledges that Seller has made no representations to Purchaser concerning the presence of lead paint in the Premises except in the Unit and then only to the extent expressly set forth in the attached disclosure form. Notwithstanding any requirements pursuant to any Local Law, Purchaser\n\nthe Premises and Unit in their current 11as is 11 condition concerning the presence of lead paint and any hazards related to same,\n\n**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 13 of 159\n\n> 37. All representations made by the Seller in the Contract or any Rider thereto are made to the best of Seller's knowledge and belief without independent investigation and shall not survive the closing.\n\n**IN WITNESS WHEREOF,** of the parties hereto have executed this Rider to Contract of Sale as of the date first above written.\n\n#### **SELLER:**\n\n**PURCHASER:**\n\n**GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC**\n\nSECOND RlDER TO CONTRACT *OF* SALE DATED AS OF FEBRUARYjJ\\_, 2015, BETWEEN SHERR v 1800S LLC, AS SELLER, AND GENEVER HOLDrNGS LLC, AS PURCHASER, COVERING PREMISES LOCATED AT 781 FIFTH A VENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, 18TH FLOOR (UNITS 1801, 1804, 1807, 18091 1811, SERVANTS ROOM 1519)\n\n159\n\nSR 1. In case of any inconsistency or conflict between the printed portion of this Contract or the First Rider, and the provisions of this Second Rider, the provisions of this Second Rider shall control,\n\nSR2. Seller shall, promptly after receipt thereof, deliver to Purchaser copies of any written notices from the Corporation receiwd after the Delivery Date and relating to: (1) any increase in the amount of the monthly Maintenance as set forth in paragraph 1.1 7; (2) any intended or proposed assessment other than the Assessment; (3) any intended or proposed changes to the \"flip tax\" or other transfer fee charged by the Corporation or its Managing Agent; ( 4) any proposed amendment or modification of the Lease, the Certificate ofincorporation of the Corporation or the Cc-rporation's By-Laws; (5) any proposed construction or repair work the cost of which is intended to be borne by the Corporation, its insurers or its shareholders; (6) any refinancing or other material change with respect to any mortgage affecting the Premises; or (7) any damage or casualty to the Unit or the Premises.\n\nSR3. Supplementing paragraph 3.3: In the event Setler removes any light fixtures from the Unit, such fixtures will be replaced with standard fixtures, so that no exposed wiring or bulbs remain in place of the removed fixtures. Seller shall, at its own expense and prior to the Closing, remove from the Unit all furniture, furnishings and other personal property and/or fixtures not included in this transaction and shall repair in a good and workmanlike manner any material damage caused cy such removal. Any of Seller's personal property not included in the sale contemplated hereby which is not removed from the Unit prior to the Closing shall be deemed abandoned property. Purchaser may (but shall not be obligated to) cause any such abandoned property to be removed from the Unit at Seller's risk and expense. The provisions of this paragraph shall survive the Closing.\n\nSR4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 7 or any other provision of this Contract to the ccntrary, Seller represents and warrants that the plumbing, heating, electrical and air conditioning systems and fixtures and all Personalty shall be in working order at the Closing, to the extent the responsibility of Seller under the Lease.\n\nSR5. (a) As 1i material inducement to Purchaser entering into this Contract, Seller hereby represents that Seller has obtained all necessary approvals, pennits and certificates from the Corporation and the New York City Department of Buildings for any work done by Seller to the Unit. Fu:iher, Seller is not obligated to perform any work or expend any monies\n\nD(1cY: US! 984 I I 54v4\n\n( other than maintenance) pursuant to any agreement ( other than the Lease and other Co-op Documents) with the Corporation that would be binding on Purchaser after Closing.\n\n159\n\n(b) Prior to Closing, Seller shall, at its sole cost and expense, cause any and all open permits against the Unit to be closed, discharged, and otherwise paid **for,** and shall deliver satisfactory proof of same to Purchaser. A Letter of Completion from the NYC Department of Buildings shall be deemed satisfactory proof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Seller shall not be required to close two open permits that are listed by the New York City Department of Buildings as Job Nos. 101785169 and 101778836, copies of which Jobs are attached hereto. The parties acknowledge the reason for the prior sentence is that the Corporation has stated it will agree in writing to duly close these two open pennits. In the event the Corporation does not deliver such written agreement, then Seller may either elect to close these permits, but if it does not, then either party may terminate this Contract.\n\n(c) Seller shall either (a) deliver to Purchaser a letter of completion from the New York City Deprrtment of Buildings evidencing that the Unit has been legally combined, or (b) at Closing, execu:e and file with the transfer taxes returns an affidavit stating the reELo;;ons that the Unit is properly and legally considered to be a single unit with one kitchen and that transfer tax should be paid to New York City at the rate of 1.425%. Seller shall also deliver an indemnity letter to Purchaser indemnifying Purchaser against any costs and damages (including, but not limited to penalties and interest for late payment) resulting from the City's requiring payment at a higher rate of taxafon. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if (i) Seller is unable to deliver a letter of completion as set ::'brth above, and (ii) Seller elects to pay the New York City transfer tax at the rate of 1.425% (rather than the so-called \"bulk rate\" of 2.625% ), then Seller's attorneys shall hold in escrow the sum of \\$840,000 representing the difference between these rates of taxation. Seller's attorneys shall hold such sum for the shorter of (i) two (2) years (representing the current audit period for this tax by the New York City Department of Finance (\"DOF\")i or (ii) until such time that the Corporation delivers satisfactory written evidence from the New York City Department of Buildings (and/or other appropriate governmental entities) that the Unit has been properly and legally combined. Seller's attorneys shall either release the balance to Seller if it is determined thet 1.425% was the appropriate rate of taxation, or pay this sum, plus interest and penalties, if any, in the event it is determined by DOF that 2.625% was the appropriate transfer tax rate.\n\nSR6. Supplementing paragraph 4.1: \"4.1.10. To Seller's knowledge, Seller has not received any written notice of any major repairs or replacements contemplated to the Premises or to the building systems in the Premises (including, without limitation, the heating, plumbing and electrical systems~ that could materially affect the Premises or the Unit.\n\n\"4.1.1 L To Seller 1 s knowledge, there are currently no water leaks into the Unit and there have been no such leaks during the twelve (12)- month period immediately\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 16 of\n\n3\n\npreceding the date hereof. In addition, Seller has not been notified during said twelve ( 12) month period of any water leaks elsewhere in the Premises which were purported to emanate from the Unit.\"\n\n\"4.1.12 During Seller's ownership of the Unit, to Seller's knowledge, Seller has not been aware of (a)° the presence any toxic mold in either the Unit, or (b) any bedbug infestation in the Unit.\"\n\n\"4. 1. 13 That to Seller's knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits or legal proceedings of any kind pending or threatened (in writing), wrjch affect the Unit, Seller's ownership of the Unit or which may cause a lien of any kind to be imposed against the Unit or the Seller.''\n\n''4.1.14 To Seller's knowledge, in the last twelve ( 12) months, that neither Seller, nor any person acting on behalf of Seller, has made any complaint **(in writing,** electronic communication or by telephone) to tl:e Corporation, Managing Agent, superintendent or any other unit owner or tenant-shareholder at the Premises regarding noise, offensive odors, offensive conduct, lack of heat or hot water, or any other disturbance or adverse condition affecting the Unit.\"\n\nSR 7. All representations, warranties and covenants of Seller set forth in this Contract shall be true in all material respects as of the Closing, and Purchaser's obligation to perform under this Contract is expressly conditioned upon there being no breach, inaccuracy or misrepresentation in any of the same.\n\nSR8. If the Corporation approves the Purchaser's application but conditions its consent upon Purchaser complying with requirements outside the scope of the Contract, such as a demand for the Purchaser to deposit funds into escrow, then Purchaser may elect, in its sole discretion, to either (i) comply with such conditions and proceed with the Purchase, or (ii) decline to comply wi-:h such conditions. If Purchaser decHnes *to* comply, then Purchaser shall deliver to Seller written notice of same and this Contract shall be deemed canceled, and Escrowee shall promptly refund ,the Contract Deposit to Purchaser. Further, Seller acknowledges and agrees that Purchaser shall only be required to disclose to the Corporation liquid assets of \\$420,000,000.00 (more than five times the Purchase Price), with supporting docwnentation as may be required by the Corporation as *to* the aforesaid amount (such as bank statements), Submission by Purch3.ser of the foregoing shall be deemed complete for purposes of the \"Financial Statemenf', \"Statement of Assets and Liabilities signed by Purchaser or Accountant\" and supporting \"Veri4cation of Assets\" which are required by the Corporation as part of its HStandard Transfer Requirements\" Board application. Purchaser may, in its sole discretion, decline any request by the Corporation to submit any documentation showing liquid assets in excess of the aforesaid amount, so th2.t in the event the Corporation rejects the Purchaser's\n\nDoc# US I 984 I I 54v4\n\napplication for any reason (other than willful bad faith by Purchaser), this Contract shall be deemed canceled, and Escrowee shall promptly refund the Contract Deposit to Purchaser.\n\n159\n\nSR9. Supplementing paragraph 11. l. 1.2: Seller's obligation with respect to payment of transfer taxes shall apply to transfer taxes imposed by both the City and the State of New York. Within fourteen (14) days following the Closing, Seller shall furnish to Purchaser's attorney proof of filir:g of such transfer taxes. Seller shall indemnify and hold Purchaser harmless from and against any and all costs, loss or expenses incurred by Purchaser, including reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements, by reason of Seller's failure to timely perform its obligations with respect to such transfer taxes. The provisions of this paragraph shall survive the Closing.\n\nSR 10. Supplementing paragraph 13: \"13 *.5* Should either party willfully default in its obligations hereunder, it shall be liable to the other for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the other party in enforcing this Contract as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. In the event that either party purports to cancel this Contract and Seller elects to retain the Contract Deposit as liquidated damages, the prevailing party in any subsequent lawsuit shall recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs from the non~prevailing party. The award of such attorneys' fees and costs shall be recoverable as actual compensatory damages in addition to the amour:t of the Contract Deposit and/or liquidated damages which may be payable hereunder by either party.\"\n\nSRl 1. Supplementing paragraph 15.1: Purchaser may also deliver a supplemental list of s·.1ch Liens at a later date but not subsequent to the Closing if Purchaser becomes aware of the same at such later date.\n\nSR12. Supplementing paragraph 16: \"16.4. Seller shall not be deemed unable to transfer the Lease anc. the Shares if such inability can be overcome by the payment of a sum of money by Seller not in excess of the Purchase Price less any loan payoff, brokerage commission, transfer truces and customary closing costs.\"\n\nSR! 3. Seller agrees to deliver to Purchaser, at or prior to the execution of this Contract, to the extent within Seller) s actual possession, all drawings and plans of the Unit, including the original floor plans, and all renderings of any proposed or completed renovations therein. In addition, Seller agrees to deliver to Purchaser, at or prior to the Closing and to the extent within Seller's actual possession, originals of all instruction manuals and all guaranties and warranty agreements affecting the Unit or any of the appliances or other personalty included in this sale, the rights under which shall be deemed assigned, to the extent assignable, to Purchaser at the Closing.\n\nSRI 4. This Contract may be executed in any number of counterparts. Each such counterpart shaH for all purposes be deemed to be an original, and all such counterparts shalJ\n\nDocJ/: {JS i ;984 t I 54v4\n\ntogether constitute and be but one and the same instrument. Facsimile signatures or scanned signatures sent by e~mail shall bind the parties,\n\n159\n\nSRI 5 Seller hereby agrees to cooperate with Purchaser if Purchaser elects to obtain leasehold title insurance or the Eagle 9 UCC Cooperative Interest Insurance Policy in connection with Purchaser's purchase of the Unit, including, without limitation, signing a title affidavit in the form requested by the issuer of the Eagle 9 UCC Cooperative Interest Insurance Policy.\n\nSR16. 1ffor any reason the Corporation does not permit the Purchaser to purchase the Unit1 then Purchaser may assign this Contract to another entity within the control of the Purchaser herein.\n\nSR 1 7. Each of the parties hereto desire that this Contract and the terms thereof (the \"Confidential Aspects\") be kept confidential to the greatest extent practicable. Accordingly, each of the parties hereto shall, and s~all instruct his or her agents, representatives and contractors to, maintain the confidentiality of the Confidential Aspects. It is understood, however, that the Co:ifidentia1 Aspects may be disclosed: (a) to the professional advisors of each of the parties (for example, without limitation, their attorneys and accountants), and to various other third parties (such as, for example, title insurance companies) who may be involved in aspects of the transactions or are otherwise necessary in order to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby; (b) if required to be disclosed by court order, subpoena, or other government process, or ifrequired by law; (c)with the consent of the parties; or (d) if already in the public domain,\n\nSRI 8. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the parties hereby agree that the sum of (a) \\$67,500,000 is hereby allocated to the Purchase Price for the Unit, and that the adc:.itional sum of (b) \\$2,500,000 is hereby allocated to the Personalty included in the Unit. Accordingly, appropriate New York State and City transfer taxes shall be paid by the respective parties based upon the sum of \\$67,500,000, and, in addition, Purchaser shall pay the New York State sales tax on the Personalty, whlch Seller shall collect at Closing. *() fY1 flt7*\n\nSRl 9. Seller represents it will cause the third party sale of an additional maid'{n the Building to Purchaser either prior to or simultaneously with the closing of this transaction, In the event that Pmchaser is unable to buy this additional maid's room either prior to or simultaneous with the actual Closing of this transaction, Seller acknowledges that Purchaser may terminate this Contra~t and receive a full and prompt refund of the Contract Deposit, with interest. It is within the sole discretion of Purchaser whether to exercise or waive thls option to terminate. It is also r..oted that the Brokers listed ln this Contract shall pay for the maid's room, including costs and expenses associated therewith (including transfer **taxes).**\n\nDoc/I: *US* I :984 l ( 54v4\n\n5\n\n*I / l*\n\n6\n\nSR20. In the event th2.t for any reason the parties are unable to close this transaction by March *6,* 2015, then Purchaser may terminate this Contract and receive a full refund of the Contract Deposit. It is within the sole discretion of Purchaser whether to exercise or waive this option t:) terminate.\n\n159\n\nSR21. Seller shal! pay the brokerage commissions based upon the total consideration being paid by Purchase:- for both the Unit and Personalty (which is the sum of \\$70,000,000.00).\n\nSHERRY 1800s LLC, Seller ,,,., -•~~•~•••~'<~•••,\\_. · \">' vs•••••••~,.V,•--\n\nName: Title:\n\nGENEVER HOLDINGS LLC, Purchaser V\\..- \\.../ 1 (.., ,\\_ <- l,-'\"', By: ~-? */J\"'J,.,~~'=-~/,* , *c:--:-:~::-;;.~i r~* Ira J. Gi~ert 1 Authorized Person\n\nDoc#: USl :98411 **S4v4**\n\n159\n\n![](_page_19_Picture_2.jpeg)\n\n• 3142--Ludp,i•l• C'FR Put ,S, Cfll fu, *?<1\\$, 9+96,*\n\n## **Disclosure** of **Information on Lead-Based Paint and/or Lead-Based Paint Hazards**\n\n#### **SALES**\n\n## **Lead Warning Statement**\n\n**Ev~ry purchaser of any interest in residential** real property on which a residential dwelling was **built prior to 1978 is notified that such property** mny present exposurt: to lead from lead-1:msed paint **that may place young children at risk of developing** lt>,t1d poisoning. Lead poisoning in young children **may produce permanent neurological damage,** including learning disabilities, reduced intclti~cnce quotient, behavioral problems, and impaired memory. I.,ead poisoning also poses a particular nsk to pregnant women. The seller of any interest in residential real property is required to provide the buyer with any inlbmrntion on lead-bused paint hazards from risk assessments or inspections in the seUer's possession and notify the buyer of any known lead-based paint haiards. A risk assessment or inspec~ tion for possible lend~based paint hazards is recommended prior to purchase.\n\n## **Seller's Disclosure**\n\n(a) ~resence of lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards *(Check (i) or (ii) below):*\n\n(1) D Known lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards are present in the housing *(explain).*\n\n<<' \"•••• •••••\"\\*·•' • ••••'·\"•'''\"'\"' •• •••••••••• •• ••~•••• .,.,.,.,, •• n,;, ,,, \"' ,.,.,,,,, . ., .... ,,, .............................. ,.,.,0.,,, .. 0.,,,,.,, •• ,\\_.,,,u•,•••• •••••••••• •~•• ••\"••••• •••• ,,.,,, ,.,., .-..,\n\n![](_page_19_Picture_12.jpeg)\n\n/P~··::··:.·::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·:::::::::::·:::::::::::::·::::::::.:::·::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·:::::::::::::::::::::·:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: (ii) Seller has no bow ledge of lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in the housing. /\n\n(b) Records and reports available to the seller *(Check (i) or (ii) below):*\n\n- (i) Cl Seller has provided the purchaser with all available records and reports pertaining to lead- *fii/J* based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in the housing *(list documents below).*\n- *w* .. , .. ,,,.,::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.,::.::::::.::::::.::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::\n\t- (ii) eller has no reports or records pertaining to lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint aza ·ds in the housing.\n\n## **Purchaser's Acknowledgment** *(initial)*\n\n(c) Purchaser has received copies of all infonnation listed above. *\\_L* Purchaser has received the pamphlet *Protect Your Family from lead in four lf ome.*\n\n- ··-·· --··· Purchaser has *(check (i) or (ii) below):*\n- (i) D received a lQ .. day opportunity (or mutually agreed upon period) to conduct a risk assess- ,m;nt or inspection for the presence of lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazMds; or\n\n(ii) 05- wai vcd the opportunity to conduct a risk assessment or inspection for the presence of lead- \\_..- based paint and/or lead-based paim hazards,\n\n## **Agent's Acknowledgment** *(initial)*\n\n(f) \\_\\_\\_ Agent has bfonned the seller of the seller's obligations under 42 U.S.C. 4852d and is aware of his/her responsibility to ensure compliance.\n\n## Certfficatton **of Accuracy**\n\n| The following parties have reviewed the information above and certify, to the best of their knowledge,
Iha< the information they have provioed is true and | ac~
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IDAre: | Pu~t;M,i.,.1.a:r-r | DATE |\n\n;\n\n*[*\n\n#### Purchase Application\n\n159\n\nPt:rchase Application\n\nNew York . Fe~ru~\\_ry 26 20 15 Apoiicant's N.irn,! 11Miles\" KwokJ:i?.\\IY~\\_r:!\\_JGeneve£ t{\\_olqLQ\\_gs L\\_!:-\\_fJ \\_\\_ (t-fam~ or Nam~~ mu,t f.><: t!nt;,r1>d ~hove i11 manner rhat Srcrk Cert1[icole ~nd oilier Doc.Jm~I),IS ,rn tc b~ drawl\\.) Applicant's Attorney Ira Gi!bert Esq. (igilbert@paulweiss~\\_:>-~rduphoiw 212-373-3529 1\\1tomey'~ Firm and Addrn\\$, \\_\\_\\_ eaul: ~~is\\_s\\B\\_i!\\_½\\_i~S!, Y\\'harton, & Ga\\_r[i~q\\_n L~p 1285.A.v\\_eoue.ofJhe.8.rnencas. New York,.NYJ0O19:6064 Se!ltn's Nnme **She,r~ 1800s,b~Q** Seller's Attorney MifhaE?J J. Jones) Es\\_q. J'elq:ho11!'\\_?9~::.?~1~E3gpo Attonwis Fi~.n and :\\ddrcs.~ \\_\\_ Jvey, Barnum & O'Ma\\_r.c1.~~q\\_ .. -------~- 170 MafiQn S.tr~~t Greenwich, CT 0683D Closing Date and Tirne\\_Jj\\_Q lat~J.tb~D *~L6{16* at 1 O.am \\_\\_\\_\\_ .\\_ D~f-? of Po9session\\_l'J9 later tnan *316115* ThP u11dcrs11-;ned lwrnby 1.,if,11\\ to p~(rcha:;r 3,000 .shares of the 1.\\1p,hli stvd: n/ Ttw :::iiwrry-Nrlhelland, Inc. and the ;1,:t:ompa11yu,g prupr1eta1y li.!aiie lot Ap.irtm(•nr :J..B.OJ\\* \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ in thQ huildit·,g !oc,1ted a1 781 Fifth /\\vcmh!, *:,.Jew* Yc,rk, New York, en !lw lolfr\\_,v,nng term•; m-:.i condtll()OS • and Maid's room 1519 Purchase Pnce d Stock\\$ 67,500,000 Mcnrh *1,* 57,085.53 \\_Present Estimated Prnpriu'.ary Rental Per DCf!OSit S \\_\\_ Z,QQO,OQQ\\_\\_\\_ Specla: conditions, ff ;mv:.6Q.ditiqnal sum of \\$2.,\\_;)QQ,QOO is allocated to the personal prop~rty inc:ludE?c1Jn the ~nit-F1nar.c-,ns: Yes • No(8J 1\\mOi.HI!\\_ **None \\_\\_ ·~---**Bank. \\_\\_\\_ ~----- :he undersigned h;c;s filled 0ci! the irformation sheei below and understands fr,,;t thif> inform,,!ion is essential lo considering this appllcatlcm. 1t is further und<:rstood th.it t.his appl.cat1on, wher signed by rhe under~igned, ts to be subiect to appruval by the Seller or Authorlzed Representative and to the Terms and Conditions on the r nllmber and their apprc,xmtate ;,ge~:(1) Kwok Ho Wa, Purchc!\\_~~L(?Jf\\lgok Hmg\\_Chi;yVife *of* PL1rchas€lr 13) QLJo\\_ Qia ng\\_; \\$c:>n\\_ 9,( Purchaser ('1J QJJ\\_o Mei:. Daug.hter.of...2u.rctiaseL(5).Yaz Qinghua;\\_ Sister of Purchaser:s Wife N,11\\_nes of a!l :.·Jubs ar,d society m,m1bersi1ipsl fraterr\\llies and honorary societies to which ;;ppl1cant t-;elongs: .Mar:~.--~~~g c.,Ll~, Pa,.m Beach: FL Jru\\_rnp Golf Cql)\\_rse. Palm Beach. FL Schools ,md coll,•rts .3t'.end1•d by hu;-;l;<11id, wdP and chi!dr,,11:. \\_\\_\\_\\_ , Mr and \\_ty1rs. \\_rwwk receiye.cJ\\_H1e.ir education in GJtlr29 Guo of Mr. Kv\\_.iokj attended Bard-College\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 23 of 159\n\n| | | No
Does applicant wish to maintain pets, and lf so please spHcify: |\n|----|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | | |\n| | Landlwd: | |\n| | | Present Landlord or Agent Own a p_rivat~!:_e5idenc~_ |\n| | | • Addrt'»> !~:='??_Lilh ~ay Road_,_ ~r1JL K2D.9 |\n| | | Approximate L~ngth oi Occupancy_ |\n| | | Previous Landlord or i\\r,cnl __ _ |\n| | | |\n| | | Address of previous rcsidertce and approx,rnate l&ngth of ,v:cup,mcy: ___ _ |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | _ -· _ --·······
Ste':~~_ Wong
(Bank- Personal Account) |\n| | | Addr~s,
UBSA~~2.fF Two l~tE:_rnational fir1~11ce Centre.!8f=ir1anc~_Street, Central, Hong Kong |\n| A. | | (Business) H~~~_!:<'.l, Pa_rtner~~tev~_!lS_C>_n, Wor_igJtQQ_ |\n| B | | ,\\,Mrm Centraf To~er,. ?§.9.U§EJn'sRq~cf. C~n.trnl, t!,Q[19152rt9 |\n| | | Stock Brol |\n| C | | i\\dJrc;; ____ . |\n| | | For Information regarding source of income contact. |\n| | | _______ ····---··\" |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | N.1m,• | ··\"···
_!he Rt Hon. Tony Blah~_
|\n| | | ,\\ |\n| | | |\n| | | |\n| | | ----
··- ------~~ |\n| 4 | | |\n\nPlease give any additlonai information which may be pertinent or h.elpftil: .. Mr.- and Mrs. Kwok are Y~!'/\\_ir,nprei.segvv,itl1\\_Th<;<§herry-NEitb1:1rlen~2nct .... look forward to making The Sherry-Netherland the principle residence for ffielffamr1y ·•·············· ······ ···· · ·· -·· · ·-- ····-·\n\nPurchase Application\n\n| | | New York _______ ~20_,_ | |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|\n| KWOK
Applicant's Name | ·~-ll:.->-a-k'\\,A |
__________ _ | |\n| (Name or Names must be entenro abQve in manner that Stock Certibcatund other DocW!lents are to be drawn.) | Ira_. J. t:td~ ~~Te!ephonelJ,I )-J jj | | 3 3;.).tj |\n| Applicant's Attorney
inn and Address~~~~~~-WNL.b¼d:•
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Seller's Name, ____________________________ _ | | | |\n| Seller's Attomey ________________ Telephone ______ | | | _ |\n| Attorney's Firm and Address ______________________ _ | | | |\n| Closing Date and Time ______________ Dateof Possession ___ _ | | | |\n| The undersigned hereby o{fers to purchase __________ .shares of the
capital stock of The Sherry-Netherland, Inc. and the accompanying proprietary lease for
_____
Apartment
the foHowing terms and conditions. | ln the building located at 781 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, on | | |\n| Purchase Price of Stock \\$ _________ ,Prt>sent Estimated Proprietary Rental Per
___
Month\\$
_ | | | |\n| | Special conditions, if any;, ____________ _ | | |\n| Yes D Nol:8J
( Note: 'Th.is proposal shall r\"sult in no legal obligation u.niiI a formal contract of purchase and ~e i:!. executed by the
parties <:oncer11ed.)
The undersigned has filled out the information sheet below and understands that this
information is essential in considering this application. It is further understood that this
application, when signed by the undersigned, is to be subject to approval by the Seller or
Authorized Representative and to the Terms and Conditions on the
Broker ___________ _ | Amount _______ Sank _______ | reof. | -------- |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n\n## Personal Letter of Reference\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 26 of 159\n\nFrom The Rt Hon Tony Blair\n\nFebruary 2015\n\nLadies and Gentlemen *9f* the Board of The Sherry Netherland,\n\nIt is my great pleasure that I am writing you this letter of reference for Miles Kwok as a potential owner in your building. I have known Miles for seven years and have only the highest respect for him in business and as a friend. I have worked closely with Miles over the years and have always admired his honesty and loyalty.\n\nMiles is dependable, sincere and extremely responsible as an individual; conducting himself with dignity and intelligence. Miles is honest, forthright and has impeccable taste.\n\nI would highly recommend him to your building as I know that Miles would be a wonderful addition as your neighbour at The Sherry Netherland. Miles is a very accomplished man and, in my opinion, would be a most valuable asset to The Sherry Netherland.\n\nPO Box 60619 London W27JU\n\n## Business Letter of Reference\n\n| | FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM | | | | INDEX NO. 652077/2017 |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 | Case 22-50073 | Doc 50-4
Filed 02/28/22 | | Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 | Page 28 of
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 |\n| | Stevenson Wong &Co. | | 159 | Wi!ly Y.P. Cheng- 0 | ~::;::ii
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Angus Forsyth1n | | | | )er·ior Consultant:
Angus Forsyth1n | |\n| Rep!y Fax | | | | Consuf!ant
Sher!ynn G. Chan | |\n| | 17 February 2015 | | | Notary Public of Hong K0ng
~~,;,:-::m:~Rt | |\n| | | | | o China-Appointed Attesting Officer
q:i:ffl~H.i;lifA | |\n| BY POST | | | | • Civil CelebiJnt of fAarriages
~~~-lf}, | |\n\nBoard of Directors of The Sherry-Netherland The Sherry-Netherland 781 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10022\n\nDear Board members of The Sherr/ Netherland,\n\nI am writing this letter of recommendation rn support of the application of Mr. Kwok Ho Wan (also known as Miles Kwok) to become a resident shareholder of your cooperative.\n\nI first met Miles when he engaged my /aw firm in one of his business transactions about seven years ago. I was and am a partner of my firm. We have since established a long-standing relationship. Over the years, my firm has acted for Miles in various business transactions in different areas, including project financing, fund-raising, corporate mergers and acquisitions and acquisition of aircrafts, leisure boats and properties in Hong Kong, China and different parts of the world.\n\nMiles is a successful businessman and a polite, dependable and responsible individual who conducts himself with dignity and intelligence. Putting aside our work relations, Miles has also been a good friend of mine. Personally, I know Miles to be delightful, considerate and respectful. I trust that his personal qualities will definitely make him a good neighbor and responsible steward of your building.\n\nIn my opinion, Miles will be a valued addition to your building.\n\nIf you wish to contact me personally, please feel free to call me at +852 2533 2552,\n\nq\n\n**[ Hank** Lo Partner\n\nSTEVENSON, WONG & CO.\n\n*t1!~~,* Tt.~!: i 852 2526 6.J 11 **·WJ,i** fax, ~e52 2845 0638 **l!lt(l** [m,,i/ info(\\llsv,;-hk.com *\\NWW.* S\\V~hk.corr,\n\ng™ 1N .. dfJ it B *i&, W* itr\\_;, t,U·ti ri;ii \\* ;;,tt; i **i.HH** *i-1,:Jf* % *it'.* a~ Hong Kong Cuangzhou 5h;:,ngha. -~anjing Shenz~ien Suzhou !n!erl.:i-v 19/l.1\n\n18 February 2015\n\n**BY POST**\n\nBoard of Directors of The Sherry-Netherland The Sherry-Netherland 781 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10022\n\nDear Ladies and Gentlemen of the Board of The Sherry Netherland,\n\nIt is a great pleasure for me to recommend Kwok Ho Wan, also known as Miles Kwok, to be a shareholder in The Sherry-Netherland, Inc. and~ resident in your building. I am a managing director of the Wealth Management and Swiss Bank Department at UBS AG and attach my name card for your kind reference. I *have* known Miles for about five years since he first began working with UBS AG. Miles has since been working with us in the areas of securities investment and also in financing his various projects in areas such as aircraft acquisitions.\n\n159\n\nMiles has been a successful and accomplished entrepreneur who has developed and managed a number of companies, both domestically and internationally. Over the years, Miles has earned his credibility in our bank. He is very reliable and always fulfills his repayment obligations. For this reason, our bank is happy to have him as our long-term client.\n\nFrom a personal standpoint, Miles is a sincere and modest gentleman with a warm heart. He is financially sound but very humble. He is also one of the most intelligent, genuine and respectful people I have ever known.\n\nBased on my long standing relationship with Miles, I do recommend Miles to be a shareholder in your cooperative and a resident in your building. I am sure your community will be pleased to have him and his family join you at The Sherry.\n\nIf you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at stephen-kc. wong@ubs.com.\n\nYours faithfully,\n\n## Financial Letter of Reference\n\n.UDu\n\n159\n\nHong Kong Branch 52/F Two International Finance Centre 8 Finance Street, Central, Hong Kong Tel. +852-2971 8888 Fax +852-2971 8001\n\nFeb. 23, 2015\n\nBoard of Directors of the Sherry-Netherland The Sherry-Netherland 781 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10022\n\nDear Sirs,\n\n## **Bank Reference - [Application for Real Estate Investments]**\n\nWe have been asked to provide a reference letter in connection with Application for Real Estate Investments. We confirm that:\n\n#### **Kwok Ho Wan**\n\n[client's ID: P746467(7)J\n\nhas been a client of ours through a personal investment company since July 2012 and during this time Mr. Kwok Ho Wan has had a satisfactory banking relationship with us. As at 18 Feb, 2015, the funds involved in thts banking relationship is not less than USD400, 000,000.\n\nThe above information is based on our experience of this banking relationship as at current date and is given in confidence for your private use only, without any responsibility on the part of UBS AG or its employees. This letter may only be used in the business context outlined at the beginning of this letter and does not constitute a guarantee or any other obligation on the part of UBS AG. In particular, we are under no obligation to inform you of any subsequent change of circumstances in this banking relationship.\n\nYours faithfuliy, For and on behalf of UBS AG Hong Kong Branch\n\n~})/ rom4 Che6ng\n\nManaging1Director\n\nStephen ong Managing Director\n\n![](_page_31_Figure_0.jpeg)\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 33 of 159\n\n# **EXHIBIT 20**\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/05/2016 07:09 PM** INDEX NO. 653316/2015 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 27 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/05/2016 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 34 of 159\n\n## **SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------------x | | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------|\n| ACE DECADE HOLDINGS LIMITED, | | : |\n| | | : |\n| | Plaintiff, | : Index No. 653316/2015 (Bransten, J.) |\n| | | : |\n| -v.- | | : Motion Sequence No. 001 |\n| | | : |\n| UBS AG, | | : |\n| | | : |\n| | Defendant. | : |\n| -------------------------------------------------------------x | | |\n\n## **AFFIDAVIT OF KWOK HO WAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT**\n\nKWOK HO WAN being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says:\n\n1. I am the employer of Yong Yu, the Director and sole shareholder of Ace Decade\n\nHoldings Limited (\"Ace Decade\").\n\n2. I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.\n\n3. I first began having discussions with UBS AG (\"UBS\") about potential\n\ninvestments in 2010. I have been a client of UBS since July 2012.\n\n4. My main contact person at UBS has been Stephen Wong, who is a Managing\n\nDirector of the Wealth Management and Swiss Bank Department at UBS.\n\n5. I met Mr. Wong in May 2010. Since that time, Mr. Wong has advised me on\n\nnumerous matters relating to investments and financing on projects such as aircraft acquisitions.\n\nOver the years, I have depended and relied upon Mr. Wong's and UBS's knowledge and\n\nexpertise in making investment and financing decisions.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 35 of 159\n\n6. In addition, I have had an account at UBS since July 2012 for an investment vehicle that I control. Since then, I have opened other accounts at UBS for two other investment vehicles that I control and have obtained financing from UBS for two airplanes.\n\n7. In early to mid-2014, I began discussions with UBS regarding an investment opportunity (the \"Investment\") in an upcoming placement of H-shares (the \"Shares\") of Haitong Securities Co., Ltd. (\"Haitong\").\n\n8. From 2014, when I first began discussions with UBS, to May 13, 2015, when Ms. Yu and I authorized the final payment of HK \\$2 billion (approximately US \\$260 million) to enter into this Investment, Mr. Wong and I communicated frequently through telephone calls, inperson meetings, and electronic messages. Throughout this period, including after January 9, 2015 when I moved to New York, Mr. Wong made numerous misrepresentations, which I relied upon in deciding to make this Investment.\n\n9. UBS was a joint global coordinator and placement agent for the Shares, and held itself out as knowledgeable and experienced in providing advice on this Investment.\n\n10. At the outset, Mr. Wong assured me that if UBS got my business, it would protect my interests and provide the best possible terms for a loan to finance part of the Investment. Mr. Wong told me that because of the size of the Investment that I was planning to make, senior executives from UBS globally would participate in structuring the deal. Mr. Wong told me that he would serve as my personal contact and as UBS's representative throughout the Investment but that he would be acting under the instructions of senior executives from UBS offices in the United States, Switzerland, England, and Hong Kong.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 36 of 159\n\n11. Based on these representations that senior executives at UBS globally would be involved in structuring and overseeing this Investment and that UBS would act in my best interests, I entrusted UBS to act as my advisor for the Investment.\n\n12. I have read Mr. Wong's affirmation submitted in support of UBS's motion to dismiss Ace Decade's complaint. In it, he affirmed under penalty of perjury that \"[t]he first time I heard of Ace Decade was when I learned of this lawsuit in October 2015.\" (Affirmation of Stephen Wong ¶ 3.) I was astonished when I read this statement because it is false. To the contrary, Mr. Wong and UBS not only had previously heard of Ace Decade, but also they were the ones who advised me on which of my employees to appoint as sole shareholder and Director of Ace Decade, to utilize Ace Decade to enter into a side agreement with an intermediary entity that would hold legal title to the Shares, and how best to transfer the funds necessary for the Investment from one of my UBS accounts to the Ace Decade account. In sum, Mr. Wong and UBS knew that the ultimate investor in the Investment was Ace Decade.\n\n13. UBS advised that because the planned Investment comprised greater than 5% of the outstanding H-shares of Haitong, if I invested through Ace Decade directly, applicable disclosure requirements would require certain filings.\n\n14. UBS advised that if I invested through an intermediary entity, with the intermediary entity holding legal title to the Shares, no such disclosure would be required.\n\n15. UBS recommended that I select Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co., Ltd. (\"Haixia\") as the intermediary for the Investment. UBS said that it recommended Haixia because Haixia was best qualified to act for Ace Decade. UBS further stated that Haixia was independent of UBS and would protect my and Ace Decade's interests. Relying on these representations, I selected Haixia as the intermediary for the Investment.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 37 of 159\n\n16. At no time did UBS disclose that Haixia was controlled by its joint venture partner, State Development & Investment Corp. (\"SDIC\"). Nor did UBS disclose that Lu Bo, who served as the principal contact between UBS and Haixia, was previously the CFO of the joint venture between UBS and SDIC. I did not become aware of Haixia's close relationship with UBS until July 21, 2015 (after Ace Decade had made the Investment and after UBS had liquidated the Shares), when Mr. Wong disclosed that relationship during a telephone call, which I took from my office in New York.\n\n17. Mr. Wong initially said that if we chose Haixia as the intermediary to make the Investment, we would not need to undergo Haixia's Know Your Customer (\"KYC\") process. However, he later said that we needed to prepare some paperwork to undergo a background examination for Haixia, but he did not explain if this paperwork was for Haixia's KYC process. Mr. Wong asked to review the resumes of some of my employees to assess whose background would most likely satisfy Haixia's requirements so that such employee could be appointed as the Director and sole shareholder of Ace Decade. He reviewed these resumes and advised that Ms. Yu's resume and background was best suited to satisfy Haixia's requirements and thus, that I should appoint Ms. Yu as the Director and sole shareholder of Ace Decade. Mr. Wong said that he would provide comments on Ms. Yu's resume and asked her to send it to him. (*See* Ace Decade Exhibits 3 and 4.)\n\n18. Mr. Wong subsequently gave comments on Ms. Yu's resume to make it more likely to satisfy Haixia's requirements.\n\n19. Mr. Wong and I also discussed on multiple occasions potential financing for the Investment. Mr. Wong stated that Ace Decade should obtain financing for part of the Investment\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 38 of 159\n\nthrough UBS rather than another bank because UBS would handle the financing on the most favorable terms to Ace Decade.\n\n20. During discussions about the loan financing, I told Mr. Wong that Ace Decade would not make the Investment unless the loan documents did not include any provisions that would permit UBS to demand repayment of the loan (a \"margin call\") based on short term price fluctuations of the Shares and unless UBS represented that it would provide Ace Decade with adequate time (for example, five business days to pay the first 25%, 10 business days to pay the second 25%, and 20 business days to pay the remaining 50%) to meet any margin calls.\n\n21. Mr. Wong stated on more than one occasion in 2014 that the loan financing documents would be consistent with my requirements, specifically that there was no repayment or margin call trigger based on short term price fluctuations.\n\n22. Mr. Wong also stated on several occasions in 2014 and 2015 that UBS would work with Ace Decade to allow it to meet any margin calls and UBS would not sell any of the Shares as a result of any margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time.\n\n23. Mr. Wong also stated numerous times in 2014 and 2015 that UBS had made a loan to a large shareholder of Ping An Insurance Group (\"Ping An\"). Mr. Wong explained that the Ping An shareholder's loan was substantially larger than Ace Decade's, but that UBS had never sold off any of the shares owned by that shareholder following a margin call. Mr. Wong stated that when a margin call had been triggered, UBS had worked with the Ping An shareholder to resolve the situation without selling any of his shares. Mr. Wong said repeatedly that UBS would give Ace Decade the same treatment as it gave to the Ping An shareholder and would work cooperatively to allow Ace Decade to meet any margin calls but in any event would not sell the Shares following a margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 39 of 159\n\n24. Throughout our discussions about the Investment, Mr. Wong repeatedly stated that I could trust him and UBS, and that he and UBS were always working in my best interests.\n\n25. On December 14, 2014, while discussing the Investment, Mr. Wong told me in a message on WhatsApp (a mobile messaging application for smart phones): \"Once I've promised General Manager Guo, I'll definitely make utmost efforts; I'm only hoping General Manager Guo will trust me.\" Later that day, he told me in another message: \"I have no reason not to strive for the best for General Manager Guo!\" (General Manager Guo is what Mr. Wong called me.)\n\n26. Also on December 14, 2014, Mr. Wong left me a voice message, stating that during the negotiations over the Investment \"General Manager Guo's interests must be guaranteed,\" and that he had involved top UBS management from offices around the world to assist.\n\n27. On December 15, 2014, Mr. Wong left me a voice message stating that he was working on the terms of the Investment in order to \"protect [me].\"\n\n28. On December 19, 2014, Mr. Wong left me a voice message stating: \"General Manager Guo, you can rest absolutely assured, and I will completely protect your interests.\"\n\n29. As a result, I believed that Mr. Wong and UBS were acting in Ace Decade's best interests and I trusted that the representations Mr. Wong made about the loan financing documents were true and that UBS would not sell the Shares without working with Ace Decade to allow it to meet any margin calls.\n\n30. On January 9, 2015, while I was still negotiating the terms of the Investment with UBS, I moved to New York with Ms. Yu and other employees with the intention of expanding my business projects to New York and to find investors interested in investing in Ace Decade.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 40 of 159\n\n31. I first discussed this plan to move to New York to find investors for Ace Decade with Mr. Wong in December 2014. I subsequently had multiple discussions with Mr. Wong about finding investors for Ace Decade by telephone from New York in March, May, and June 2015.\n\n32. On February 9, 2015, Ace Decade signed a Memorandum of Understanding (the \"MOU\"), governed by U.S. law, with China Golden Spring Group (Hong Kong) Limited (\"Golden Spring Hong Kong\"). The MOU provided that Ace Decade would acquire Haitong Shares and Golden Spring Hong Kong would establish a branch in New York to find investors for projects relating to the Haitong Shares.\n\n33. In furtherance of the MOU, Golden Spring Hong Kong formed a company called Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"Golden Spring New York\"), which was incorporated in March 2015 in Delaware and registered to do business in New York. Golden Spring New York is wholly owned by Golden Spring Hong Kong.\n\n34. Shortly thereafter, Golden Spring New York signed a lease for part of the 46th Floor of the General Motors Building at 767 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10153. Ms. Yu and I conduct business relating to Ace Decade from our offices at 767 Fifth Avenue.\n\n35. Not only had I discussed with UBS my plans to move to New York and to operate my business projects out of New York in December 2014, I also asked for UBS's help in setting up my operations in New York. In March 2015, Mr. Wong and others at UBS, including Agnes Fu and Liz Lam, arranged to transfer funds from one of my accounts at UBS to my personal JPMorgan Chase account in New York.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 41 of 159\n\n36. In April 2015, Mr. Wong, Ms. Fu, and Ms. Lam assisted me with setting up Golden Spring New York by transferring funds from one of my accounts at UBS to Golden Spring New York's JPMorgan Chase bank account in New York.\n\n37. UBS also submitted reference letters on my behalf in connection with my purchase of an apartment in a New York cooperative building. In a letter dated February 18, 2015 from Mr. Wong to the building's board of directors, Mr. Wong wrote, \"I have known Miles for about five years since he first began working with UBS AG.\" (Miles is my English name.) Mr. Wong also stated, \"Over the years, Miles has earned his credibility in our bank. He is very reliable and always fulfills his repayment obligations. For this reason, our bank is happy to have him as our long-term client.\" (Ace Decade Exhibit 1.)\n\n38. Mr. Wong and Tommy Cheung, also a UBS Managing Director, submitted another reference letter on my behalf to the board of the apartment building on February 23, 2015, stating: \"Kwok Ho Wan has been a client of ours through a personal investment company since July 2012.\" (Ace Decade Exhibit 2.)\n\n39. On March 6, 2015, I purchased an apartment in this building. I, along with Ms. Yu and other employees and representatives of Ace Decade and Golden Spring New York, have lived in the apartment since the purchase.\n\n40. During this period of time after I had moved to New York, Mr. Wong and I communicated frequently through telephone calls and voice and instant messages. Mr. Wong spoke to me by telephone while I was in New York dozens of times and sent numerous electronic messages to me while I was in New York. Ms. Yu joined me on some of the calls with Mr. Wong. At a minimum, Mr. Wong spoke to me by telephone while I was in New York on the following dates:\n\n- January 26, 2015 (three calls)\n- January 28, 2015 (two calls)\n- March 2, 2015\n- March 4, 2015 (three calls)\n- March 5, 2015\n- March 13, 2015\n- March 15, 2015\n- March 16, 2015 (six calls)\n- March 17, 2015 (two calls)\n- March 18, 2015 (two calls)\n- March 24, 2015\n- March 31, 2015\n- April 28, 2015 (three calls)\n- April 30, 2015 (five calls)\n- May 6, 2015 (two calls)\n- May 11, 2015 (three calls)\n- June 23, 2015 (two calls)\n- July 21, 2015\n\n41. During these calls in 2015, which I participated in from New York, Mr. Wong and I discussed the Investment and the UBS loan on numerous occasions. On one or more of these calls, Mr. Wong and I also discussed my concerns about the loan, including a margin call trigger based upon the loan-to-value ratio (\"LTV ratio\"), the size of the loan, the interest rate on\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 43 of 159\n\nthe loan, and the issuance price of the Haitong shares. Mr. Wong and I also discussed the status of my efforts to seek investors in New York for Ace Decade.\n\n42. During this period of time in 2015, I did not raise with Mr. Wong again my concerns about repayment triggers conditioned on short term price fluctuations of the Shares because Mr. Wong had previously told me that there were no such triggers.\n\n43. However, during several of these calls in March, April, and May 2015, Mr. Wong and I discussed the topic of margin calls generally, and specifically the LTV ratio trigger. Mr. Wong said that I did not have to worry because UBS would act in my best interests, that UBS would give Ace Decade adequate time to meet any margin calls, and that UBS would make every effort to work with Ace Decade to allow it to meet any margin calls. He also reminded me several times during this period that UBS had never sold the shares of the Ping An shareholder following a margin call on its loan, and stated that Ace Decade would receive the same treatment as the Ping An shareholder.\n\n44. While I was in New York, Mr. Wong also sent me numerous WhatsApp messages about the Investment and the UBS loan. For example, on March 21 and 22, 2015, Mr. Wong and I exchanged a series of WhatsApp messages in which we discussed the UBS loan for the Investment. I told Mr. Wong that some of UBS's proposed conditions, such as the margin call trigger based upon the LTV ratio for the UBS loan, were \"definitely not okay\" and \"we would rather not do it than agree to your clauses.\" Had I not been relying upon Mr. Wong's prior representations that the loan financing documents did not contain repayment triggers based on short term price fluctuations of the Shares, I would have raised that issue again with Mr. Wong and not focused our discussions solely on the margin call trigger based on the LTV ratio.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 44 of 159\n\n45. Mr. Wong replied that he understood my concerns about potential margin calls, and told me: \"You rest assured!. . . I'm working for General Manager Guo! Don't worry.\" I relied upon Mr. Wong's representations that he and UBS were looking out for my interests. All of these discussions occurred while I was in New York.\n\n46. On May 8, 2015, Haitong announced that it had obtained the shareholder and regulatory approvals necessary (in February and May, respectively) to issue the Shares, which was expected to occur on May 15. Haitong also announced that because the trading price of Haitong's shares during the 30 trading days prior had surpassed a pre-agreed threshold, the subscription price would be increased.\n\n47. After this announcement, I had several discussions with Mr. Wong, by telephone and WhatsApp messages, in order to finalize the terms of the Investment. Among the topics we discussed were the fact that the loan would have to be increased to reflect the increase in the per share price of Haitong's shares, the amount of the payment required, the LTV ratio, the interest rate, and the method by which we should exchange U.S. dollars for the Hong Kong dollars required for the payment.\n\n48. During one of our discussions after May 8, Mr. Wong stated yet again that Ace Decade would receive the same treatment as the Ping An shareholder with respect to any margin calls.\n\n49. Relying on these representations, I decided to make the Investment. I discussed with Mr. Wong during telephone conversations on May 11 how best to transfer the funds necessary for the Investment from one of my UBS accounts to the Ace Decade account. Mr. Wong said that I first needed to exchange the funds from U.S. dollars to Hong Kong dollars in my UBS account. He also gave instructions not to transfer the funds from my UBS account\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 45 of 159\n\ndirectly to the Ace Decade account, but rather to transfer the funds from my UBS account to an account at another bank and then to transfer the funds from that account to the Ace Decade account.\n\n50. Relying upon Mr. Wong's advice, I decided to transfer the funds from my UBS account first to an account at China Minsheng Banking Corp., Ltd. Hong Kong Branch (\"China Minsheng Account\") and then to transfer the funds from the China Minsheng Account to the Ace Decade account.\n\n51. On May 11, 2015, Ms. Fu sent an e-mail to Ms. Yu, copying Mr. Wong and Ms. Lam, and asked Ms. Yu to obtain my signature on a payment instruction document that UBS had prepared. The document contained a request to transfer HK \\$860 million (approximately US \\$111 million) from my UBS account to the China Minsheng Account that Mr. Wong had instructed me to use.\n\n52. In reliance upon Mr. Wong's representations about the Investment and the UBS loan, I signed the document authorizing the wire transfer.\n\n53. Later that day, Ms. Lam sent an e-mail to Ms. Yu, copying Mr. Wong and Ms. Fu, attaching a confirmation of the outgoing transfer from my UBS account.\n\n54. Following Mr. Wong's instructions, I then authorized the transfer of the funds from the China Minsheng Account to the Ace Decade account.\n\n55. After the funds reached the Ace Decade account, on May 13, 2015, Ms. Yu and I authorized a payment of HK \\$2 billion (approximately US \\$260 million) from Ace Decade's account to an account held by Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\"), a special purpose vehicle and wholly-owned subsidiary of a Haixia fund, to fund the Investment of the Shares to be issued on May 15. Prior to this, I had authorized an initial down payment of approximately US \\$250\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 46 of 159\n\nmillion from Ace Decade's account, through Dawn State, to a UBS security account. That payment would have been returned to Ace Decade had the Investment not been completed.\n\n56. All of the steps I took to make the Investment, including requesting the wire transfers of approximately HK \\$860 million (approximately US \\$111 million) from one of my UBS accounts to the China Minsheng Account and ultimately to the Ace Decade account and authorizing the payment of HK \\$2 billion (approximately US \\$260 million) from the Ace Decade account to Dawn State's account on May 13, 2015, occurred from my office or my apartment in New York.\n\n57. I would not have made the Investment or authorized this payment in May 2015 had I known that UBS had lied that the loan financing documents did not contain repayment triggers based on short term price fluctuations of the Shares and that UBS would refuse to work with Ace Decade to meet any margin calls and would sell off Ace Decade's Shares immediately if a margin call were made.\n\n58. Under the terms of an agreement between Ace Decade and Haixia, Haixia was required to transfer Dawn State (the entity that held legal title to the Shares) to Ace Decade after July 13, 2015 upon Ace Decade's request.\n\n59. However, on the morning of July 6, 2015 New York time—just a week before Haixia would have had to transfer Dawn State to Ace Decade—I learned that UBS was demanding that I repay approximately US \\$200 million in less than 24 hours due to short-term price fluctuation of the Shares.\n\n60. Had I known that it was possible for UBS to demand payment in such a short period of time and that UBS had lied about providing adequate time to meet any margin calls, I would have ensured that Ace Decade had sufficient funds available to make such payment.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 47 of 159\n\n61. Before UBS's deadline, Ace Decade informed UBS that we could obtain the necessary funds quickly, but not before UBS's deadline.\n\n62. However, on July 6, 2015, Mr. Wong stated that UBS would not give Ace Decade any additional time. Mr. Wong stated that UBS had already identified buyers for the Shares and would make a substantial profit by selling the Shares instead of allowing Ace Decade to make the payment.\n\n63. On July 7th, I sent Mr. Wong a WhatsApp message telling him that UBS's margin call was \"illegal.\" Mr. Wong did not disagree with me or deny that he had told me that there were no repayment triggers based upon short term price fluctuations of the Shares. Instead, he said that he had told senior management to cancel the sale of the Shares and said that he would ask UBS to return the Shares to me. Mr. Wong told me that the Shares were still under UBS's control and he promised to come up with a plan for their repurchase. Mr. Wong reassured me: \"I've always been standing by General Manager Guo.\"\n\n64. On July 9th, Mr. Wong stated that the decision to sell the shares was made by UBS executives outside of Hong Kong and China.\n\n65. On July 17th, I reminded Mr. Wong that he had said on numerous prior occasions that \"there would never be\" a margin call based on short term price fluctuations of the Shares and the many times he had stated that UBS had not sold off the shares of a large Ping An shareholder following a margin call.\n\n66. In another message on July 17, I said to Mr. Wong: \"I told you, it was since last year that I've come to the U.S. for better opportunities, didn't I? All the information I sent you from the U.S., my requirements, you know them all. . . . Under these circumstances, all were\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 48 of 159\n\nhanded over to you, [I] all listened to you. It was you who introduced Haixia . . . . It turned out to be messed up like this now.\"\n\n67. Mr. Wong did not deny that he had made these misrepresentations and in fact replied that he understood.\n\n68. In another message on July 17, I said to Mr. Wong: \"You told me several times that you UBS would not liquidate assets like that; otherwise how I would trust you.\" I also told him: \"If it weren't for you to tell me that margin call was like Ping An, it would not be like that. There would be reasonable time to get some assets to deal with it.\"\n\n69. On July 17, I also said to Mr. Wong: \"You said UBS signed the agreement with them [Haixia] to permit UBS to sell all the shares within 24 hours of the margin call. How was that signed? How did they implement that? It's not fair. You told me back then that was not the case.\"\n\n70. Mr. Wong replied \"I've always been firmly opposing them, but they ignored me and told me it was an order by the Swiss CEO.\" He did not deny my assertion that he had previously stated that the loan agreement would not permit UBS to sell the Shares within 24 hours of the margin call.\n\n71. At no point during any of our discussions did Mr. Wong deny that he had stated that UBS would treat Ace Decade the same as the Ping An shareholder.\n\n72. At no point during any of our discussions did Mr. Wong deny that he had stated that the loan documents would not contain repayment triggers based on short-term price fluctuations of the Shares.\n\n73. At no point during any of our discussions did Mr. Wong deny that he had stated that UBS would work with Ace Decade and provide it adequate time to meet any margin call.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 49 of 159\n\n74. At no point during any of our discussions did Mr. Wong deny that UBS had engaged in misconduct.\n\n75. Mr. Wong told me that on July 7, 2015, UBS sold all of the Shares belonging to Ace Decade at HK \\$11.12, a 20% discount off the closing price of Haitong stock on July 7.\n\n76. As a result of losing the Haitong shares, Ace Decade lost New York investors, whom I had met with after I had relocated to New York in 2015 and who had been interested in investing in Ace Decade. For example, on four occasions in New York in April through June 2015, my representatives and/or I met with a co-founder of a private investment firm based in New York. The firm expressed significant interest in investing in Ace Decade. However, following UBS's sale of the Haitong Shares belonging to Ace Decade, Ace Decade lost this potential investor.\n\nI swear that the foregoing is true and correct.\n\n[Signature of Kwok Ho Wan on Chinese version] Kwok Ho Wan\n\n[Notarization on Chinese version]\n\nCITY OF Meseryqy COUNTY OF Ceno Gordo ) ) ) ss.:\n\nI, Linmag lds- being duly swom, depose and say that I aur fluent in both the English and Chinese languages. I hereby certiS that the attached document is an accurate hanslation of the Chinese version of \"Affidavit of Kwok Ho Wan.\"\n\nSwomto before me this\n\nLou, ofl\\*qec|ts €ebr^-^-r1 gotb\n\nNotary Public\n\n![](_page_50_Picture_7.jpeg)\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 52 of 159\n\n# **EXHIBIT 21**\n\n**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/01/2021 04:48 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 833 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/01/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 53 of 159\n\n1\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK : CIVIL TERM : PART 61 ------------------------------------------X PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P., Plaintiff, INDEX NO: -against- 652077/2017 KWOK HO WAN, a/k/a KWOK HO, a/k/a GWO WEN GUI, a/k/a GUO WENGUI, a/k/a GUO WENGUI, a/k/a WAN GUE HAOYUN, a/k/a MILES KWOK, a/k/a HAOYUN GUO, GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION, and GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC, Defendants. ------------------------------------------X MICROSOFT TEAMS May 27, 2021 B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE BARRY OSTRAGER, J U S T I C E A P P E A R A N C E S: O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP Attorney for the Plaintiff Times Square Tower New York, New York 10036 BY: EDWARD MOSS, ESQ. STUART SARNOFF, ESQ. BAKER HOSTETLER, LLP Attorney for the Defendant 45 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10111 BY: MELISSA CARVALHO, ESQ. JOHN SIEGAL, ESQ. LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC Attorney for the Defendant GENEVER 162 E. 64th Street New York, New York 10065 BY: AARON A. MITCHELL, ESQ.\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/01/2021 04:48 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 833 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/01/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 54 of\n\n| 1 | YANKWITT LLP | |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 2 | Attorney for the Defendant
140 Grand Street, Suite 705 | |\n| 3 | New York, New York
NY
BY:
DANIEL ALTER ESQ. | |\n| 4 | | |\n| 5 | | |\n| 6 | | |\n| 7 | | |\n| 8 | | |\n| 9 | | |\n| 10 | | |\n| 11 | | |\n| 12 | | |\n| 13 | | |\n| 14 | | |\n| 15 | | |\n| 16 | | |\n| 17 | | |\n| 18 | | |\n| 19 | | |\n| 20 | | |\n| 21 | Karen Mangano, CSR | |\n| 22 | Senior Court Reporter | |\n| 23 | | |\n| 24 | | |\n| 25 | | |\n| | | |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/01/2021 04:48 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 833 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/01/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 55 of 159\n\n| | 8
Proceedings |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | there is an actual burden. |\n| 2 | I want to just end on one particular argument on |\n| 3 | the subpoena point because I expect Mr. Alter will focus on |\n| 4 | it.
We ask -- we do.
He's right.
We ask for information |\n| 5 | about 60 people and entities, no one knowing to be |\n| 6 | associated with Kwok. |\n| 7 | Mr. Alter quips in the brief, well, known by whom? |\n| 8 | Known by whom?
Known by us, Judge.
Known by us based on |\n| 9 | spending a lot of money and lot of time to dig through |\n| 10 | public records, court filings, social media accounts because |\n| 11 | that's the game Mr. Kwok has forced us to play. |\n| 12 | The reason we have to ask for this information is |\n| 13 | because Golden Springs is the hub.
We can't spend the rest |\n| 14 | of our lives chasing 100 entities.
I mean, my grandkids |\n| 15 | would be doing this.
Golden Springs is the entity that has |\n| 16 | the information.
It's produced documents relating to Shiny |\n| 17 | Times, the entity that was involved in the underlying case. |\n| 18 | It has the documents.
It is the hub of the empire.
If it |\n| 19 | doesn't have information about a couple of these entities, |\n| 20 | if we're wrong about one or two, okay, fine.
Then they |\n| 21 | should run the search and tell us they don't have it and not |\n| 22 | produce it.
But run the search terms, collect the ESI and |\n| 23 | provide the documents. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
All right, Mr. Moss.
I understand your |\n\n25 argument. I also understand that Mr. Kwok is incurring\n\nKM\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/01/2021 04:48 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 833 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/01/2021\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 56 of\n\n9\n\n159\n\n| | Proceedings | |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 1 | \\$500,000 a day in contempt penalties.
I understand that Mr. | |\n| 2 | Kwok believes that these court proceedings are a game of | |\n| 3 | evasion that he -- that he wants to play. | |\n| 4 | And let me hear from counsel for Golden Springs. | |\n| 5 | MR. ALTER:
Good afternoon, your Honor.
It's | |\n| 6 | Daniel Alter, and we've just heard a lot of talk but | |\n| 7 | relatively little truth, and I'd like to step back and | |\n| 8 | clarify some issues that were quite muddied. | |\n| 9 | First of all, to correct two specifically | |\n| 10 | inaccurate statements, it's my understanding that Mr. Kwok | |\n| 11 | has never said that he is entirely unrelated or has no | |\n| 12 | connection to Golden Springs.
Quite the opposite.
He said | |\n| 13 | that it is his family office.
So let's be accurate about | |\n| 14 | that. | |\n| 15 | The second thing is that, you know, apparently -- | |\n| 16 | they take the position that Mr. Kwok has entirely funded | |\n| 17 | Golden Springs.
Well, I don't see the evidence of that. | |\n| 18 | What I see is a statement in the record that he initially | |\n| 19 | provided capital to Golden Springs, but I see no evidence | |\n| 20 | that he's continued to do so or that the capital there now | |\n| 21 | is his.
Let me step back a moment and talk about this. | |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Before you do so, Mr. Alter, because | |\n| 23 | rightly or wrongly, Mr. Kwok has exhausted the Court's | |\n| 24 | patience with his antics. | |\n| 25 | It's quite undisputed that Golden Springs has | |\n| | | |\n\nKM\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/01/2021 04:48 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 57 of\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 833 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/01/2021 159\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\nfunded seven-figure payments to facilitate Mr. Kwok's lifestyle, and Mr. Kwok leads a rather extravagant lifestyle, purports to have zero assets whatsoever. So the plaintiff is a judgment creditor. The plaintiff knows that Golden Springs is funding expenses for Mr. Kwok. Not minor inconsequential expenses. Major expenses. And the judgment creditor is entitled to have discovery of the entity that is funding Mr. Kwok's expenses. The judgment creditor is also entitled to an order directing Golden Springs not to transfer, dispose or otherwise dissipate whatever assets Golden Springs has because the best evidence that has been made available to the Court compellingly suggests that any assets that Golden Springs has were provided to Golden Springs by Mr. Kwok. Now if the discovery that the judgment creditor is seeking from Golden Springs disproves that, well, then we\n\nProceedings\n\nhave a different situation than the situation we now have.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 Under the CPLR, a judgment creditor is entitled to discovery of third parties of which in this case may well be alteregos of Mr. Kwok, but it's not necessary for the judgment creditor to establish that Golden Springs is an alterego of Mr. Kwok.\n\n23 24 25 MR. ALTER: You know, your Honor, we haven't - that's not our position. That's the straw man that has been presented.\n\nKM\n\n#### 10 of 19\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 58 of 159\n\n# **EXHIBIT 22**\n\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------|--|\n| UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------------- | X | 6/22/2021 | |\n| | : | | |\n| EASTERN PROFIT CORPORATION LIMITED, | : | | |\n| Plaintiff, | :
: | | |\n| | : | 18-cv-2185
(LJL) | |\n| -v | : | | |\n| | : | FINDINGS OF FACT AND | |\n| STRATEGIC VISION US LLC, | : | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW | |\n| | : | | |\n| Defendant. | : | | |\n| | : | | |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | X | | |\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:\n\nPlaintiff Eastern Profit Corporation Limited (\"Plaintiff\" or \"Eastern\") brings this action against Defendant Strategic Vision US LLC (\"Defendant\" or \"Strategic\") for breach of contract, a declaratory judgment, and unjust enrichment. 1 Strategic asserts counterclaims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.\n\nAn in-person bench trial commenced on April 19, 2021 and concluded on April 23, 2021. Closing statements were made remotely on April 30, 2021. This opinion constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52.\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Court finds for Eastern on its claim seeking a declaratory judgment that the research agreement at issue is void and unenforceable as a matter of Virginia law and public policy.\n\n1 Eastern also previously brought a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, but the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of that claim. *See* Dkt. No. 299 ¶ 6.\n\n## **I. FINDINGS OF FACT**\n\n## **A. Relevant Persons**\n\nEastern is a private limited company registered under the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.\n\nEastern is, in essence, a shell corporation for an individual named Guo Wengui, also known as Mile Kwok (\"Guo\"). Eastern is not registered to do business in the United States. It has no office in the United States and no operations in the United States. It also has no operations in Hong Kong where it is registered. Its only asset is a bank account in Hong Kong that was frozen by the Hong Kong High Court in 2007 and that now has \\$80,000 in it. Prior to 2017, the owner and sole director of Eastern was an individual named Han Changhui (\"Han\"). In 2017, Han transferred ownership and control to Guo's daughter, Guo Mei, who was a friend of Han's and who is now the owner and sole director of Eastern.\n\nGuo is a former resident of China who now resides in the United States. He has achieved some notoriety in this country and internationally as he has made claims that are critical of the policies and practices of the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\") while at the same time making statements supportive of individuals within the Chinese government. He has applied for asylum in the United States. Guo maintains a family office under the name Golden Spring New York Ltd. (\"Golden Spring\").\n\nYvette Wang (\"Wang\") is an associate of Guo and is the president and director of his company Golden Spring.\n\nDefendant Strategic is a limited liability company registered and in good standing with the Nevada Secretary of State. Strategic's principal place of business is in Arlington, Virginia.\n\nAmong other services, Strategic provides private \"investigatory research\" to clients within the United States in exchange for monetary compensation.\n\nFrench Wallop (\"Wallop\") was and is Strategic's sole manager and only member. Wallop was married to Malcolm Wallop, the U.S. Senator representing Wyoming from 1977 to 1994, who is now deceased. Wallop resides in Arlington, Virginia.\n\nJ. Michael Waller (\"Waller\") is a long-time friend and professional acquaintance of Wallop and is an active member of the community of persons in the United States opposed to the CCP. He holds a Ph.D. in international security affairs from Boston University and has an extensive academic background. In addition to his work with Strategic, he is also currently employed as a senior analyst for strategy at the Center for Security Policy, a think tank based in Washington D.C. Waller has worked with Strategic on a number of projects since 2016 or 2017.\n\nStrategic has never had employees. Nor has Eastern.\n\n## **B. The Origins of the Agreement**\n\nThe case concerns a research agreement (the \"Agreement\") dated December 29, 2017 and signed by Strategic and Eastern on January 6, 2018. Wallop signed on behalf of Strategic. Wang signed the name Han on behalf of Eastern.\n\nThe Agreement stated that it was \"for the purpose of [Strategic] providing business research, reporting, documentation, and other consulting services.\" The Agreement also reflected Strategic's promise to \"conduct high quality original research and prepare reports on subjects chosen at [Eastern's] discretion, for the purpose of detecting, stopping, and preventing crime or other harm to innocent people.\" PX1.\n\nThe Agreement had its origins in meetings among Wallop, Waller, and Guo and persons associated with Guo in late 2017.\n\nGuo was introduced to Wallop and Waller in late October or early November of 2017, by an individual named Linchao Han (\"L. Han\"). A former reporter for the Washington Free\n\nBeacon and current reporter for the Washington Times named Bill Gertz (\"Gertz\"), who is a mutual acquaintance of Guo, Wallop, and Waller, was also involved in the introduction.\n\nBoth Gertz and L. Han are members of the community of persons in the United States who are opposed to the CCP and self-identify as \"China Hawks.\" L. Han had immigrated to the United States from China and worked in the United States Senate for several years (including for the late Senator Wallop) on matters relating to China. Before he immigrated and after the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, L. Han helped found the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars. Gertz has opposed the CCP through his writings and books. He met Guo when he interviewed him in June or July 2017 and was asked by Guo to be a director of the Rule of Law Foundation, an organization established by Guo in October 2018 to bring about democratic reform in China.\n\n Wallop and Waller also have been involved in activities dedicated to the overthrow of the CCP.\n\nIn late 2017, Gertz approached Wallop and offered to introduce her to L. Han with respect to a project Gertz thought might be of interest to Wallop. L. Han, who is a lawyer, was helping Guo with his application to obtain asylum in the United States. Gertz believed that Wallop could provide strategic communications support to Guo who was engaged in activities to oppose the CCP.\n\nWallop and Waller met with L. Han and Gertz in late October or early November 2017 at Wallop's home in Virginia. L. Han described Guo to Strategic as a wealthy businessman who had moved to the United States to escape political persecution in China and who had recently purchased the penthouse at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel in Manhattan. According to L. Han and Gertz, Guo had developed several broad goals involving the Chinese government that would be\n\nbeneficial to the people of China. In particular, Gertz described Guo as a dissident who had broken with the CCP, who was engaged in a whistleblower campaign, and who wanted to devote his resources to undermining the CCP and causing it to collapse. L. Han believed that Guo needed to sustain an image as a \"whistleblower\" against the CCP. To be a \"whistleblower,\" L. Han believed Guo needed to obtain and publish well-researched information against highranking government officials.\n\nThereafter, Wallop and Waller held several meetings with Guo in late 2017. Other meetings were held with Wang and L. Han. The first meeting, held by Wallop with Guo, was at Guo's apartment in New York City. Subsequent meetings, which were held by Wallop and Waller with L. Han and Wang, were held in Virginia or in Washington, D.C.\n\nWallop and Waller first met with Guo at his New York apartment on November 21, 2017. L. Han was also in attendance. Guo stated that he was on a mission to dismantle the CCP and described himself as an enemy of the CCP who wanted to use his wealth and influence and contacts to bring out information to expose the contradictions within the CCP to bring it down.\n\nWallop presented a document reflecting a \"Vision\" for Guo \"to remain safely in [the United States] and accomplish his mission back home,\" i.e., in China. DX38. The document was prepared at the request of L. Han, who Strategic understood to be Guo's emissary but who in fact acted simply as an intermediary between Strategic and Guo. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 57. The \"Vision\" document tracked Wallop's then-understanding of the services Guo desired. It was addressed both to his asylum application and to activities intended to help him undermine figures in the CCP. It was also addressed to transforming Guo's public image. The document reflected the objective for Guo to \"transform himself from an apolitical businessman to an international statesman\" and to \"build a global moral standing, with a sound philosophical or principled base,\n\nto show a positive vision for his country's future that will unite people who ordinarily would never follow a wealthy businessman\" as well as to \"bring Mr. G into a new community of leaders and follows to accomplish his objectives.\" DX38.\n\nIn the \"Vision,\" Strategic proposed to provide services to Guo to change his public image and to build that community. Strategic stated it would \"focus on building those communities [of support] in this country, for the purpose of preventing any chance of [Guo] being forcibly repatriated, and as a base from which to expand publicly.\" *Id.* The services would include helping to change his public image, expanding sources of respect, developing a social engagement presence for Guo with policymakers, media figures, and decisionmakers in Washington D.C., making Guo a thought-leader and policy leader, and building a foundation to educate people from the United States and China on Guo's ideas. Among the services promised to Eastern was that Strategic would deploy a secretive and untraceable network of persons supportive of and associated with then-President Donald J. Trump. Strategic proposed to provide an \"aggressive defense\" against attacks that were expected to intensify and to develop a network of surrogates who could speak on Guo's behalf without being traced back to him and who would be developed from online networks supportive of President Trump. Wallop proposed a \"three-year effort [with] an experienced team in [Washington D.C.] to advise Mr. G and help him navigate the political and policy terrain, develop strategy, execute programming, and coordinate messaging.\" DX38.\n\nAt the meeting, Guo stated that he \"want[ed] now immediately information\" and that the \"[f]irst month is critical for quality of information.\" Trial Tr. at 383-84.\n\nThose ideas were further developed at a second meeting between Guo, Wallop, and Waller on December 4, 2017. Trial Tr. at 134. L. Han and Yang were also at the meeting. At\n\nthis meeting, Wallop presented a three-year timeline for the campaign. The objectives were stated to be the following: \"Remain free in the United States; Become a thought-leader and an international statesman; Change thinking on China and incubate new ideas and strategies; Develop and build self-replicating personal networks; Successfully drive long-term change back home.\" DX39.\n\nThe proposal had several components, including the establishment of a foundation that would be supportive of Guo's objectives but would be structured so as to avoid the requirement to register with the United States government as an agent of a foreign government or individual. The components included: (1) the creation of \"a personal presence in Washington, build friends and allies, make it impossible for US to deport back to China,\" including the development of \"support among Washington influencers and decision-makers\" and \"support among the president's nationwide grassroots base\"; (2) \"[d]evelopment of a proper personal presence sufficient to rival the regime,\" including the purchase of a \"Washington residence to show purpose and power, and provide hospitality\" (a specific location was mentioned in Georgetown); and (3) the creation of an institutional presence, including through a \"Washington-based educational and cultural foundation\" that would not have to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\"), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, and through the acquisition of a \"[p]hysical office in downtown Washington, D.C.\" *Id.* The three-year timeline concluded: \"Implementation of the three-year effort will require an experienced team in Washington to advise Mr. G. and navigate the political and policy terrain, develop strategy, execute programming, and coordinate messaging. These will all be direct and transparent. Most can be done through the Foundation, which eliminates any need to register under FARA.\" *Id.*\n\nStrategic also proposed that it would marshal the social media network developed by President Trump and would deploy alternative media to support Guo in ways that Strategic was reluctant to put in writing. It noted that Strategic could provide an \"'[a]ctive defense' campaign\" against those who were expected to \"apply intense pressure on the US government to deport Mr. G back to China,\" including through \"aggressive second-tier journalists in alternative media (compartmented from the Foundation),\" which \"will be described verbally,\" and by \"[o]rchestrat[ing] social media campaigns to promote Mr. G, attack his critics when needed, and generate a groundswell of support among the President's nationwide grassroots base to ensure that Mr. G is never forced to leave the US against his will. This is also compartmented from the Foundation.\" DX39. Strategic proposed to charge anywhere from \\$33,000 to \\$120,000 per month for its services. *Id.*\n\nA subsequent meeting occurred between Wallop, Waller, and L. Han on December 10, 2017. Trial Tr. at 134-35.\n\nWallop and Waller had a third meeting with Guo on December 11, 2017. *Id.* at 134-36. L. Han was also present at the meeting. *Id.* At that third meeting, the parties' discussions turned to the investigative services Strategic could provide to Guo. *Id.* at 137. Guo stated he was interested in conducting an investigation into members of the CCP with the ultimate objective of helping to overturn the regime. *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 133, 137, 632-38. Strategic described its extensive background in investigation, including its relationships with federal law enforcement and other federal agencies that it could exploit. The investigative services Strategic proposed are described in a PowerPoint prepared by Waller in consultation with L. Han and Wallop entitled, \"Time To Get Them: Beginning the psycho-political campaign for China,\" a portion of which\n\nbecame the foundation for the Agreement. PX2. The PowerPoint described six parts of Phase 1 of the proposed work (the \"Plan\"):\n\n- Run micro-targeted intelligence collection and analysis;\n- Active threat reduction;\n- Establish foundation and get it running;\n- Network with Russian opposition;\n- Acquire appropriate Washington, DC residence; and\n- Acquire appropriate Washington, DC foundation offices.\n\nThe Plan was discussed at a fourth meeting among Wallop, Waller, Guo, L. Han, and Yang on or about December 21, 2017. Trial Tr. at 134-37, 252.\n\nThe first part of Phase 1 of the Plan became the foundation for the Agreement. The goal was to \"[b]uild and operate a secret system for micro-targeted intelligence and collection analysis.\" PX2. The PowerPoint observed that \"[t]his is an extremely sensitive capability that must be handled with extreme care.\" *Id.* In several bullet points, it describes the \"intelligence and collection analysis.\" *Id.* It would involve ten targets (described as \"fish\"), who would be monitored \"for several months to understand their habits, patterns, personal and professional networks, businesses, corruption.\" *Id.* The objectives were to \"[k]now what they are going to do before they do it, so we can anticipate, pre-empt, and disrupt,\" to obtain \"leverage to gain concessions, protect people, use as political weapon, or as aid in criminal prosecution and asset recovery,\" to \"[p]rovoke confusion, panic, and infighting within CCP; divide opponents, peel away potential allies; break the Party's control of corruption information; operate more quickly than Party can react,\" to \"[e]xpand the capability to go after all desired targets,\" to \"[b]urrow into commercial and political networks for business purposes,\" and to \"[b]uild an image of invincibility.\" *Id.* Strategic thus understood that Guo wanted the investigation to uncover\n\ncorruption relating to members of the CCP, including crimes committed by members of the CCP, such as the illegal removal of funds from the country. Trial Tr. at 66. Other aspects of the Plan included \"reduc[ing] political threats to [Guo] and [his] cause\" by \"aggressive, grassroots, online social media/activist network in the United States,\" establishing a foundation for Guo, networking with exiled Russian opposition leaders and internal Russian opposition activists, acquiring a Washington, D.C. residence for Guo, and acquiring a Washington, D.C. office for Guo's foundation office. PX2.\n\n#### **C. The Negotiation of the Agreement**\n\nBy mid to late December 2017, the parties were in a position to negotiate the terms of what became the Agreement. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 137. The terms were initially negotiated by Wallop and Waller with Guo and L. Han. At the final stages, Wang negotiated the terms of the Agreement with Wallop and Waller.\n\nAs reflected in the Plan's PowerPoint describing the Plan, it appears that the parties agreed early on that Strategic would obtain information on at least ten targets and that such information would include financial information, tracking information, and information derived from social media.\n\nFrom the evidence before the Court, the bulk of the negotiations concerned the financial terms of the Agreement. The parties initially disagreed over those terms. Strategic wanted to be paid a monthly retainer and to receive a large \"evergreen\" deposit that it could hold until the last payment was made in light of the large start-up costs that the operation would require. Guo wanted to pay only on a per report basis. Eastern was willing to pay a deposit but only if it could be recovered if Strategic failed to provide the deliverables as defined in the Agreement. Trial Tr. at 268-69.\n\nStrategic expected Wang to sign the Agreement; Wang had become the liaison for Guo by the end of negotiations. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 139-40. Strategic expected Wang to sign by December 29, 2017, in Virginia, as she had traveled to Washington D.C. the day prior, but the parties still had an ongoing disagreement about the payment terms. Instead, on December 29, 2017, Wallop gave L. Han and Wang a tour of a number of estates and larger properties in Washington D.C. and its environs that were good candidates for Guo to purchase. *Id.* at 139-41.\n\nThe negotiations stalled for a few days but on January 5, 2018, Wang sent a text message to Wallop stating that \"both L [L. Han] and M [Guo] advised me that we [sic] supposed to meet again.\" *Id.* at 149; DX16. Negotiations then continued.\n\nWallop's negotiations with Wang and with Guo, both before and after January 5, focused on the request that Strategic investigate an additional five subjects, as well on the concept of a \"waterline\" in the \"tank, \" (i.e., a minimum amount of work that Strategic would need for the work to be worthwhile). As to the former request, Strategic agreed to investigate an additional five subjects but only for the month of January. As to the latter request, Strategic insisted on a minimum payment and a minimum number of subjects in order to commence the investigation but agreed on a scale for the valuation of each report so that if the parties agreed that Strategic would not deliver a particular report for a particular \"fish,\" an equivalent report would be delivered for another fish.\n\nAs expressed in the text messages, Strategic would be paid a monthly fee of \\$750,000 for each of the first three months of the agreement (January, February, and March of 2018) and would investigate 15 subjects for the first month and 10 subjects for each of February and March. The number of subjects and the monthly rate would be adjusted thereafter. The fee structure was further expressed in a January 5, 2018 text message from Wallop to Wang:\n\nThe agreement for 3 months is correct. January we have allowed 15 fish. 10 fish each for Feb and March. We will determine the subsequent monthly costs obviously by the next numbers of fish in the tank, once we have recapped the previous 3 months. That has not changed. We will agree that we will always have 10 fish minimum in the tank which may be adjusted by agreement each month thereafter March 30, 2018 depending on the actual fish count. We have fish count. We have discussed this and agreed to this formula from the beginning with your boss—that we remain flexible with his additions. Naturally if your boss adds or subtracts the number, we shall prorate or add amounts due the following month. The entire point of the water line in the tank was to keep the costs to a minimum and a planned budget for your boss. All of this was to give 30 units of reports per month as planned and agreed. Some months may therefore cost far large amounts than your boss has budgeted, then there will be additional fees per fish, solely becau . . . [the message was cut off].\n\n#### DX16. The reference to \"boss\" was to Guo.\n\nIn response, Wang wrote: \"Can you please send the contract here? . . . There is of course no impasse here. I work with several people, M [Guo] is one of them, saying for this project, he is not the only boss.\" *Id.* Wang and Wallop agreed that Wang would sign the contract the next day, January 6, 2015, in person. Wang wrote: \"[T]his contract and all communications from contract signed tomorrow, are exclusively between NY [Guo], you, M [Waller] and me—four of us.\" DX17; *see* Trial Tr. at 153-55.\n\nThe last-minute negotiations and changes to the terms of the arrangement are reflected in the difference between a draft of the Agreement that Wang was given to negotiate with Wallop and the final Agreement. *Compare* DX6 (draft)*, with* DX4*, and* PX1 (final). The draft of the Agreement, which is dated January 1, 2018, was virtually identical to the final Agreement with a few significant exceptions. The third page of the draft Agreement recited prices of \\$300,000 annually per subject for each of the three reports Strategic was to prepare: forensic financial reports, tracking reports, and social media reports. It calculated a total of \\$3,000,000 per year \"for 10 units or deliverables for the first stage . . . or \\$250,000 per month for 12 months.\" DX6. Each \"unit\" was a target or fish. It further provided:\n\nThese units or deliverables may be mixed and matched as the Client requests. As one unit is deleted from one fish, an extra fish with the equivalent deliverable is added, as shown in the attached charts. *Such payments will be made following receipt of the agreed-upon number of reports per month.*\n\nDX6 (emphasis added).\n\nThe final Agreement similarly required regular monthly installments. It calculated a total of \\$9,000,000 per year for 30 units, i.e., 10 subjects each with 3 reports, \"or \\$750,000 per month for 12 months.\" DX4; PX1.\n\nThe final Agreement, however, contained a significant change in the language. It provided the same language: \"These units or deliverables may be mixed and matched as, the Client requests. As one unit is deleted from one fish, an extra fish with the equivalent deliverable is added, as shown in the attached charts.\" DX4; PX1. But it deleted the following sentence from the draft Agreement: \"Such payments will be made following receipt of the agreed-upon number of reports per month.\" The change reflected the parties' agreement that Strategic would be paid a flat fee regardless of the number of reports delivered on any particular month. There might be a variation in the number of reports delivered in a particular month depending, for example, on whether Eastern added a new fish. On average, however, Strategic would deliver three reports per month on each subject.\n\nIn addition, the concept that the obligation to make regular monthly payments would extend only for the first three months of the contract, as reflected in the draft, was replaced by a new concept in the final Agreement that the term of the Agreement would be three years with \\$9,000,000 due each year, but that the parties would meet \"after the March reports and payments [were] made\" to \"recap the accounting\" and that such meeting would take place \"prior to moving forward with the next quarter.\" DX4; PX1. Thus, the obligation to make regular monthly payments at a rate of \\$750,000 per month would continue throughout the term of the\n\nAgreement—and the Agreement was terminable by either side on 30 days' notice—but the parties agreed to assess the value of the relationship and whether the terms should be changed after the three-month period.\n\nIn short, the compromise gave Strategic the comfort that, before it began work, it would receive \\$1 million that it could devote to the establishment of an infrastructure and that Eastern would not be able to terminate the Agreement without 30 days' notice, thus providing Strategic with an additional \\$750,000. The compromise additionally assured Eastern that it was not irrevocably committing itself to the arrangement for the full three years, and that after three months, the parties would look back to review the quality of the work before deciding how to further proceed under the Agreement or whether changes should be made to it. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 269-78; PX1 (stating that after the first three months, the parties \"will meet to recap the accounting, prior to moving forward with the next quarter\" and \"that with any change to the numbers above 10 fish in the tank, that [Strategic] will reserve the right to renegotiate [the] financial Agreement\").\n\n#### **D. The Insertion of Eastern into the Agreement**\n\nDuring negotiations, Guo requested that, to protect his confidentiality and anonymity, he would not sign or be a party to the Agreement but that a separate entity would sign and be a party. Strategic agreed.\n\nEither on the day the Agreement was signed (January 6, 2018) or only shortly before the witnesses disagree—Eastern's name was first mentioned to Strategic. Strategic did very little, if any, investigation into the identity of Eastern. Wallop simply assumed that it was a shell company associated with Guo and determined that the company was registered in Hong Kong to Guo's daughter but did no other research. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 285.\n\nBoth Wang and Han testified that, prior to Eastern being added as the party to the Agreement, the two had a conversation in which Wang asked Han if Eastern would be interested in commissioning Strategic to conduct research on figures in the CCP and in funding that research and Han agreed. *Id.* at 413-14.2 The Court finds that testimony not to be credible. Wang signed interrogatories in connection with this case. One of the interrogatories asked for Eastern to identify the names of each person with knowledge of the Agreement, including its negotiation. Wang, who signed on behalf of Eastern, did not include the name Han. DX5. The Court finds that the testimony regarding Han was an after-the-fact creation to make it appear that Eastern was an entity, separate from Guo.\n\nThe more plausible inference, and the one that the Court draws, is that Guo told Wang to provide the name Eastern to Strategic and to sign Han's name to the Agreement. If there was any conversation between Wang and Han, it was perfunctory, to confirm the arrangement that Guo had already made and directed. At the time, Eastern was registered to the same address as Guo's family office in Hong Kong. It is now registered to an address that is also the residential address of Guo's daughter. Although at the time Han was the ostensible owner of Eastern, it has now been transferred to Guo's daughter but Han could not testify that he received anything in exchange. Trial Tr. at 596. Eastern is a shell for Guo and his family.\n\nThe Court draws that conclusion from several facts. At the time of the supposed conversation, Eastern was essentially a defunct entity. Although, according to Han, its purpose\n\n2 Wang testified that she met briefly with Han, told him that the investigation firm was very capable and could assist in the investigation of high-level governmental officials from China, and asked Han if he had an interest \"to be part of this.\" Trial Tr. at 414-15. She testified that she told him the contract requested a \\$1 million deposit and that Han said he would figure out how to get the money for the project. *Id.* at 415. He later called Wang to say he would take care of the payment and that he was onboard and asked Wang to negotiate the contract. *Id.*\n\nwas to make real estate investments, it had made no such investments. It had no assets other than the \\$80,000 frozen in a Hong Kong bank account and it had no operations and no employees. *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 595-96. Its location was in the offices of Guo's family company in Hong Kong and its sole director was Guo's daughter. It had no reason to be fund the research and no ability to pay for the research. There was no evidence that anyone from Eastern read the Agreement or even understood its terms before its name was put on the Agreement. Guo's daughter did not testify at trial. Han testified but his testimony was that he called Guo's daughter, told her about the project and that Eastern was going to participate, and that she agreed on the spot and authorized him to take care of it. *Id.* at 567-69. He admitted that he was not aware of the name Strategic until after this litigation began, that he never saw the Agreement, and that—aside from the obligation to pay \\$1 million—he did not understand or know any of the terms of the Agreement. *Id.* at 603-05. Han did not even see the Agreement at any time prior to signing, and the first time he saw the Agreement was at his deposition in this case. Even at trial, he testified that he did not know the content of the Agreement and that he had never read the Agreement from beginning to end. Moreover, Wang did not tell Han of the obligation and Han did not know of the obligation Eastern supposedly was assuming to pay Strategic \\$750,000 a month or even of the obligation ultimately reflected in the Agreement that Eastern would pay Strategic \\$9 million a year for Strategic's services over a three-year period. *Id.* at 606.\n\nAside from supposedly arranging for the payment of a \\$1 million deposit, there is no evidence that Eastern did anything with respect to the Agreement. It did not make payments to Strategic or provide the names of the persons to be investigated to Strategic (or even know which names were being provided to Strategic).\n\nFinally, the testimony of both witnesses was largely conclusory and when accompanied by details, those details were discredited. Wang did not provide any details of the supposed conversation with Han; her testimony as a whole was undermined by the repeated examples of the prior inconsistent statements that she made at deposition. While Han's prior inconsistent statements were less pronounced than Wang's, his testimony was no more convincing. Finally, no director of Eastern even signed the Agreement; the Agreement was signed by Wang who forged Han's signature.\n\n#### **E. The Terms of the Agreement**\n\nOn January 6, 2018, Eastern and Strategic signed the Agreement. The Agreement is dated December 29, 2017. Eastern is identified as the Client and Strategic as the Contractor.\n\nThe parties executed the Agreement at Wallop's home in Virginia. The Agreement was ultimately signed by Wang and Wallop. Wang signed the Agreement in the name Han after Guo approved its final terms for Eastern, which Wang read him over the phone.\n\nThe Agreement is stated to be \"for the purpose of providing business research, reporting, documentation, and other consulting services.\" PX1. Under the Agreement, Strategic agreed to \"conduct high quality original research and prepare reports on subjects chosen at [Eastern's] discretion for the purposes of detecting, stopping, and preventing crime or other harm to innocent people\" and to prepare research and reports on . . . three subject categories: A) Financial forensic Historical research; B) Current Tracking research; and C) Social media research.\" *Id.* Eastern was to provide Strategic \"the necessary basic information, and desired areas of focus . . . to research,\" including the \"specified subjects\" of the reports, identified in the Agreement as \"fish.\" *Id.* Strategic was to provide Eastern with \"comprehensive confidential reports\" on 10 \"fish\" per year on a timetable set forth in the Agreement. *Id.*\n\nThe \"Financial forensic Historical research\" was to \"consist of, but not be limited to, indepth and detailed reports of existing and historical business and financial transactions, on subjects selected by [Eastern], and relations of the subject as identified by [Eastern].\" *Id.* at 1. Strategic was required to produce a weekly progress report, a preliminary report in the first month of the Agreement, one comprehensive report within three months of the Agreement, and update reports each following month. *Id.* at 2. Under \"Deliverables,\" the Agreement specifies that Strategic was required to produce these reports \"as specified above one time per subject, subject to occasional updating throughout the year.\" *Id.* at 3.\n\n\"Current Tracking research\" was to \"consist of, but not be limited to, in-depth and detailed reports on movements of specified subjects by land, air, and sea (private and commercial); schedules and itineraries, addresses and lodging, means of transportation, names of carriers, manifests, geolocation, major events and significant contacts the subjects involved, videos and audio that can be accessed remotely, and other data that may be of relevance to the overall research, such as past travel records that may [sic] significant to the research.\" *Id.* at 2. Strategic was required to produce weekly reports in the first month of the Agreement and thereafter research on a monthly basis. *Id.* Under \"Deliverables,\" the Agreement specifies that Strategic was required to produce reports for each subject \"monthly or more frequently as [Eastern] directs.\" *Id.* at 3.\n\n\"Social media research\" was to \"consist of, but not be limited to, in-depth and detailed reports on the social media usage and networks of specified subjects and public figures.\" *Id.* at 2. Strategic was required to produce research on a weekly basis for the first month of the Agreement and on a monthly basis thereafter. *Id.* Under \"Deliverables,\" the Agreement\n\nspecifies that Strategic was also required to produce reports for each subject \"monthly or more frequently as [Eastern] directs.\" *Id.* at 3.\n\nIn all, Strategic was to provide deliverables on 10 subjects (or fish) on each of the three topics for a total of 30 reports per year. *Id.* (Confusingly, the monthly and weekly deliverables were also referred to as \"reports\" but were also considered to be \"units.\") For the first month of the Agreement (January 2018), Strategic was to provide \"comprehensive confidential reports\" for up to \"15 fish for a total of 30 reports.\" *Id.* at 4. That figure was to \"decrease to 10 fish for a total of 30 reports at the beginning of the second month (February) and for (March) and for the duration of [the Agreement].\" *Id.*\n\nThe research was to be \"based on the best practices and standards of the industry, comparable to other top firms with similar services\" and Strategic was obligated to \"make most diligent efforts to ensure the served render[ed] are of very high quality, revealing a true, complete and full profile of the subject.\" *Id.* Strategic guaranteed \"that all information provided is genuine.\" *Id.* at 3.\n\nAt the same time, the Agreement also reflected the understanding that \"occasional unforeseen challenges may arise that will slow or block comprehensive research, and that there may be periods in which information is irregular, unavailable, or incomplete.\" *Id.* In such circumstances, Strategic was obligated to \"endeavor to make all research and reports as complete was possible in a timely scheduled manner.\" *Id.*\n\nThe Agreement reflected the further understanding that Eastern \"may not wish for each of the 10 fish to be the subject of all three reports, and that the number of report work duties [sic] per month will vary.\" *Id.*\n\nThe parties agreed that the identity of the fishes or subject might change: \"It is also understood that [Eastern] may find it necessary to remove certain fish from time to time, or [Strategic] may find circumstances do not permit sufficient work to research a given fish.\" *Id.* When a fish was removed from consideration, \"a new fish will be put in its place by [Eastern], keeping the number of fish being monitored at any time at 10.\" *Id.*\n\nIn exchange for Strategic's commitment to conduct the identified research and to deliver the reports, Eastern agreed to pay Strategic a monthly fee calculated on a scale of \\$300,000 for each of the financial forensic historical research, current tracking research, and social media research on a single \"fish\" for a total of \\$900,000 per fish per year for an aggregate of \\$9,000,000 for the 10 fish (or \\$750,000 per month) to which Eastern and Strategic were committing.\n\nThe actual payment for Strategic's services and reports was \"to be made in regular monthly installments of US\\$750,000, at the end of each month.\" *Id.* at 5. The parties agreed that \"for the first 3 months of th[e] Agreement, January, February and March 2018, . . . the payment of \\$750,000. USD will be wired per [Strategic's] instructions to [Strategic's] US Bank account.\" *Id.* at 4. \"[A]fter the March reports and payments are made, [] all involved Parties will meet to recap the accounting, prior to moving forward with the next quarter.\" *Id.* Strategic reserved the \"right to renegotiate [the] financial Agreement\" \"with any change to the numbers above 10 fish in the tank.\" *Id.*\n\nThe parties also agreed that Eastern would pay Strategic \"a deposit of US\\$1,000,000 (one million dollars) upon signing the contract,\" which would \"be credited on a prorated basis to the final 1-1/3 (1.3) months of the contract.\" *Id.* at 5.\n\nThe term of the Agreement was three (3) years from the date of signing but the Agreement also provided that \"[e]ither party may terminate the contract with 30 days' written notice.\" No cause was required. *Id.*\n\nThe Agreement contemplated that Eastern might want additional subjects to be investigated and gave Eastern the right to \"direct [Strategic] to conduct other research, not specified in th[e Agreement] for an additional fee.\" *Id.* at 4. It noted that both parties anticipated that the contract \"could expand to many more subject of research\" and that Eastern had \"expressly stated that there could be as many as 4000 such 'fish in the tank.'\" *Id.* at 5. It provided, \"Obviously, negotiations for the far larger range will be agreed upon in writing at a later date.\" *Id.*\n\nSeveral provisions of the Agreement reflected the sensitive nature of the assignment and the parties' desire for confidentiality. The Agreement begins with the statement:\n\nBoth parties agree that the nature of this contract, and work related to it, is highly confidential. Both parties are bound by the strictest secrecy not to disclose the existence of the contract, sources and methods used to execute the contract; and participants in formulating, supervising, or executing the contract's provisions, to any third party, except as required under United States law or the laws of the State of Nevada.\n\nPX1.\n\nIt includes the agreement that \"there will be single line of communication between [Strategic] and [Eastern]\" and that \"[t]he individuals through which such communication will be made will be identified upon the initiation of this contract.\" *Id.* at 1. \"Any and all materials provided by [Eastern] to [Strategic] will be treated with absolute confidentiality and will not be shared by [Strategic] with any other entity.\" *Id.*\n\nIt also provides that \"[Eastern] may direct other entities to pay [Strategic], and that such payments will be deemed satisfactory compensation by [Strategic].\" *Id.* at 4.\n\nAll of the deliverables were to be provided \"by USB drive only\"; oral reports were insufficient. *Id.* at 3.\n\n## **F. ACA Capital Group Limited Provides the Deposit**\n\nEven before the signing of the Agreement and as part of the negotiations that ultimately led to the Agreement, Wallop had requested that Eastern provide a \\$1 million deposit.\n\nThe deposit ultimately was provided by an organization called ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\"). On January 2, 2018, before the Agreement was finalized, ACA sent two \\$500,000 wire transfers to Strategic that Strategic understood to be the deposit that the parties had previously discussed in relation to the Agreement then under negotiation.\n\nThe parties disagree as to the nature of the relationship between ACA and Eastern and the basis upon which ACA funded the security deposit.\n\nEastern claims that it borrowed the money from ACA. It points to a loan agreement dated December 29, 2017 (the \"Loan Agreement\") signed by Han on behalf of Eastern and a William Je (\"Je\") on behalf of ACA. The document has the formalities associated with a true loan agreement. It purports to document a \\$1 million loan from ACA to Eastern with a 6-month term and an interest rate of 2% compounded monthly \"or otherwise mutually agreed by the Lender and the Borrowing in writing from time to time.\" 3 PX11. The 2% interest is equivalent to \\$20,000 for the first month. The Loan Agreement reflects that the loan is not collateralized and that ACA would wire transfer the \\$1 million to a bank designated by Eastern.\n\nStrategic claims that the \\$1 million reflects an investment by ACA in the research venture launched by Eastern and Strategic and that, in reality, Eastern did not borrow the \\$1 million from\n\n3 The Court overrules the objection to the authenticity of the Loan Agreement. There is sufficient information before the Court to support its authenticity for the purposes of admissibility (i.e., a factfinder could find it to be authentic). But, as factfinder, the Court finds that the document does not reflect a genuine loan agreement.\n\nACA and does not owe \\$1 million to ACA. It contends that the return of \\$1 million to Eastern rather than to ACA would represent a windfall to Eastern because Eastern would have no obligation to pay the funds over to ACA.\n\nThe Court finds that the \\$1 million paid from an ACA bank account does not represent a genuine loan from ACA to Eastern. It reaches that conclusion largely for the reasons identified by Strategic. First, Eastern's evidence regarding the extension of the loan is wholly implausible. It is based almost entirely on the testimony of Han, the purported representative of Eastern. According to his testimony, Han, who at the time had ceased his role as owner and director of Eastern, called Je, whom he described as a good friend, upon learning of the obligation to pay Strategic \\$1 million. Han knew Je as an opponent of the CCP and believed he might be interested in funding anti-CCP research. Je stated that he was willing to extend the \\$1 million loan and the parties agreed on a six-month term for the loan and a 2% interest rate. Han testified that he saw the Loan Agreement for the first time on December 29, 2017 when he met Je at the Palace Hotel in New York to sign the agreement. The meeting lasted 20 minutes. Han, who does not read English, did not read the agreement which was in English and which he was supposedly signing on behalf of Eastern; Je just pointed out to him the amount of the loan, the interest rate, and the term. Han also did not get approval for the loan from Guo's daughter—the ostensible owner of Eastern—and the agreement he was signing on her behalf. He testified: \"I don't need her approval; however, I did report such a matter to her.\" Trial Tr. at 598-99.\n\nThere was no discussion between Han and Je as to how Eastern would repay the loan. Han stated that he gave the issue some thought but his testimony was not credible. He testified that Guo's daughter, who was interested in film, would be able through her film investments to operate Eastern to make it profitable and to generate the \\$1 million (plus interest) necessary to\n\nrepay ACA. *Id.* at 605-06, 610. As Han put it: \"I also believe that after the company transferred to Guo Mei and since she is very good in film, I believe she can operate this company and make it profitable.\" *Id.* at 606; *see also id.* at 610 (\"Even though at the time that was 80,000 only, we could still be operating and then we could still be investing in film.\"). Wang also suggested that the Hong Kong authorities might agree to lift the freeze on the funds based on Strategic's research. *Id.* at 439-40, 510-11. The testimony is implausible. Eastern's assets were limited to \\$80,000 in a frozen bank account. Regardless of the skill of Guo's daughter as a film investor (as to which no evidence was introduced), there would have been no way for Eastern to satisfy the terms of the purported loan or to repay even the principal that it presumably owed, much less the interest. The monies were more in the form of a gift.\n\nNotably, in its interrogatory responses, Eastern stated that it was Guo who, on behalf of Eastern, ordered the two \\$500,000 wires totaling \\$1 million to be sent to Strategic. DX5.\n\nStrategic also points out that after the Agreement was signed, an additional \\$750,000 the first monthly payment in January 2018—would have been due in just a few weeks, further adding to Eastern's debt load. In all, over \\$27 million would have been due over the three-year term of the Agreement. Those terms thus had no economic substance for a company with the value of Eastern.\n\nIf ACA had loaned the money to Eastern, one would have expected each party to know how much Eastern owed ACA. But the evidence at trial established that Eastern has not repaid the loan, made any principal payments, or made any interest payments. At trial, Han was unable to testify as to how much Eastern owed per month in interest on the loan. Trial Tr. at 607. According to Han, Eastern's only plan to repay the loan is if it wins the litigation. *Id.* at 574. But that is a wholly implausible understanding of the obligations under the loan, which was\n\nreached before there was any litigation and which was made in order for Strategic to perform under the Agreement.\n\nWang also could not say with confidence what Eastern owed under the loan or what its terms were. Despite being Eastern's corporate representative—who had claimed authority to act for Eastern even during the negotiation of the Agreement, through performance, and through the litigation itself—Wang had not even seen the purported loan agreement when she first testified at her deposition in January 2019, only later seeing it in the litigation file of her prior counsel. *Id.* at 508-09. Although she testified that the counterparty to the loan, Je, had contacted her orally and in person about repayment, that testimony was not credible. All she remembered was that he said that he wanted the loan to be repaid. *Id.* at 504-07. He did not mention what ACA was owed.\n\nThere are also irregularities in the loan document and its production. Eastern's agent, Han, is shown to have signed the loan document as \"Director,\" but he was not Eastern's Director at the time. In addition, Eastern did not keep a copy of the loan document after it was signed. There are no accounting records indicating a loan obligation to ACA.\n\nAt the same time, however, the evidence does not support that ACA was an investor in the research project. ACA did not provide the names of subjects to be investigated, it did not receive any of the results of the research, there is no evidence that it made any arrangements in advance to receive the results of the research, and there is no credible evidence that it made requests after the fact to see the research. Although there is reference in certain documents to \"investors,\" the Court found convincing Wang's testimony that the reference was to constituents who might use or benefit from the research and not persons who contributed money to fund the Agreement. The source of the funds sent by ACA is unknown to the Court and was not the\n\nsubject of testimony. But regardless of whether those funds are ultimately traceable to Guo as Strategic suggested or are independent from him, the Court finds that they were a gift on behalf of Eastern (and Guo) and not provided out of any obligation.\n\n#### **G. Strategic's Performance Under the Agreement**\n\nThe execution of the Agreement imitates a fact pattern imagined by Robert Ludlum and played out in the Pink Panther. It was shrouded in the secrecy befitting the best spy novels. It was beset with mishaps befitting of Inspector Clouseau.\n\nBecause of security concerns and for fear that any electronic communications would be hacked or be transparent to the CCP, the parties agreed in advance that they would exchange reports and identification of research subjects only by USB drives and through in-person contact at secure locations.\n\nStrategic would coordinate with subcontractors (i.e., intelligence analysts in the U.S. and overseas) to perform the research that Strategic would then incorporate into the reports for Guo. Guo would not be allowed to contact the team/network because Strategic's relationships and approach to the research were proprietary, and Strategic declined to reveal the names or titles of team members. Pursuant to Guo's instructions and the parties' agreement, instructions to the investigators who would conduct the work, as well as the actual products of the research, could not be transmitted by email but only in-person.\n\nThe negotiated start date for the work under the contract was January 16, 2018. *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 156, 161, 304, 319. The parties agree that the weekly Financial Forensic Reports, Current Tracking Reports, and Social Media Reports were due no later than January 23, 2018, January 30, 2018, February 6, 2018 and February 13, 2018. *See also* PX1. The parties also agree that the first monthly Financial Forensic Reports, Current Tracking Reports, and Social Media Reports were due no later than February 16, 2018.\n\nThe parties further agree Strategic ultimately never delivered any \"financial forensic [h]istorical research\" called for under the Agreement. Dkt. No. 299-1 (\"JSOAF\") ¶ 54. The parties also agree Strategic did not deliver to Eastern any \"current tracking research\" called for under the Agreement. *Id.* ¶ 55. The parties further agree Strategic did not deliver to Eastern any \"social media research\" called for under the Agreement. *Id.* ¶ 56.\n\nOn or about January 6, 2018—the same day that the Agreement was signed—Wang delivered to Wallop's home in Virginia a set of USB drives containing information for a list of 15 individuals that Eastern wanted investigated under the Agreement (the \"Subject List\"). Trial Tr. at 156-57; JSOAF ¶ 50. But when Wallop tried to access the USB drives, she discovered that they were all corrupted. Surprisingly, Wallop brought the USB drives to a person described as \"a neighbor,\" despite the fact that the Agreement and the information it sought were described as highly secretive. The \"neighbor\" tested them and discovered that they did not contain any readable files. Trial Tr. at 156-57.\n\nOn January 8, 2018, Wallop met Wang in New York and obtained three more USB drives. Fortunately, one of those worked and Wallop was able to download the files for the persons who would be the subject of the investigation. *Id.* at 76-77, 157-58. The individuals were virtually all high-ranking CCP members or persons closely related to high-ranking CCP members or their children living in the United States and elsewhere. PX7.\n\nWallop and Waller agreed to split the work. Wallop would focus on domestic investigation. Waller would focus upon investigation done by investigators overseas.\n\nIn early January 2018, Waller travelled to Europe and engaged a 10-person team of computer and data analytic engineers to conduct data mining and research, including research into the \"dark web\" (\"Team 1\"). *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 198, 289-92. Team 1 was led by a person\n\nwhom Waller knew. The operation was shrouded in secrecy. Waller purchased computers for the team in cash in three separate countries in order to prevent any electronic tracing of the serial numbers of the devices to the purchaser. He also purchased electronic material in a fourth country for the purposes of camouflaging the actual activity that was taking place. Information could not even be exchanged by encrypted email or encrypted phone. *Id.* at 292. Per the instructions of Guo, information could only be exchanged in person by exchanging USB drives. There was compartmentalization to make sure that if any link in the chain was broken it could not betray the other links in the chain. Travel was onerous because it would take two or three days to do a round trip to meet in a third location to exchange data. Before Waller could give the list of the 15 names to Team 1, he had to print out the names from a computer not connected to the internet, scan them, and then place them onto a new encrypted drive to be delivered to Europe. *Id.* at 304. Guo had also instructed that Strategic not have Mandarin speakers on Team 1 in case they were spies for the CCP. L. Han eventually permitted Waller to hire retired European diplomats who spoke with fluent Mandarin who were not of Chinese background.\n\nWaller gave the names to Team 1 in Washington D.C. and traveled to Europe a few days later to obtain a status report and to collect the research that the team had conducted (which was stored on a USB drive). He received a drive from Team 1 on January 24, 2018 and delivered that material to Wang two days later. *Id.* at 304-05.\n\nWallop met with Guo at the end of January 2018. *Id.* at 162. At the meeting, Guo stated that he needed the reports by January 26, 2018—10 days after the negotiated start date of the Agreement but three days after the first deadline for the weekly reports.\n\nStrategic delivered a first USB drive to Eastern on January 26, 2018, after Waller's return from Europe. Strategic has admitted that the information contained on the USB drive delivered\n\nto Eastern on January 26, 2018 was \"of no use to Mr. Guo or Eastern because it was nothing more than the researchers' own work to familiarize themselves with the fifteen subjects using open-source information.\" *Id.* at 199; DX2 at 35 ¶ 45. At a meeting with Wang, Waller stated that the drive reflected the work that the team had done to orient itself and that several of the 15 names were misspelled. Trial Tr. at 307-310, 313-14. He also stated that the drive contained the location of some offshore companies and the password to a computer server of the Chinese government. Wang responded with disappointment as to the information, stating that it was not \"good enough\" and was \"all junk.\" *Id.* at 314. In addition, while L. Han expressed the view that Strategic had good leads and should keep working on them, 4 he also relayed that Guo was angry with the information that was delivered under the Agreement and believed that it reflected that Strategic was incompetent and trying to \"rip him off.\" *Id.* at 320.5\n\nWaller traveled to Ireland to receive the second USB drive a few days later and delivered it to Wang in Pennsylvania Station in New York on January 30, 2018. *Id.* at 199, 327-28.\n\nWang took the second USB drive to Guo and placed it in the \"virgin\" laptop that had been left by Strategic from the last meeting. The two discovered that the drive did not contain useful information. The information on the drive was limited to raw code that was not actionable by the client but was intended to show that the work was being executed. *Id.* at 200. The parties agree that this second USB drive was not \"of any use\" to Eastern and that it contained\n\n4 L. Han, who did not testify at trial, also testified under oath at deposition that the hard drive that Strategic provided contained only \"lots of junk information.\" Trial Tr. at 368. But L. Han was an intermediary between Strategic and Guo and not Guo's agent. *Id.* at 365.\n\n5 Waller testified that he did report to Wang or L. Han that Eastern had discovered from sources other than social media that one of the people on Eastern's list was carrying a counterfeit non-Chinese passport of a NATO ally. Trial Tr. at 320-21.\n\n\"incomplete work product . . . in the form of raw research data.\" *Id.* at 78-79, 199, 200-01, 359, 383; DX2 at 28 ¶ 24. Among the information on the drive were encrypted email addresses and passwords of communist figures on Guo's list. Trial Tr. at 329. Strategic did not deliver any other USB drives to Eastern and Strategic admits it \"was unable to prepare any detailed reports.\" *Id.* at 79, 359.\n\nAfter the second meeting, and after Wang had conveyed the message in the wake of that meeting that work with Strategic might not be continued for a second month, Waller made arrangements with a new team (\"Team 2\"). Team 2 was from an obscure organization called the Allied Special Operations Group (\"ASOG\"), which was purportedly based in Dallas, Texas. Conspicuously, Strategic offered no evidence regarding the bona fides, qualifications, or legitimacy of this organization. It would conduct the research using different methodologies from those used by Team 1. Rather than using data mining and intrusive computer capabilities, ASOG claimed it would work with other commercially available databases and contacts within the federal government to do the research.\n\nWaller testified he met with ASOG in Texas in the first couple of days of February 2018 and presented ASOG with the list of subjects to be investigated, asking the organization to research a selection of those names to see what it could discover using its own methods. Within a week, ASOG replied to Waller with its results and Waller flew back to Texas to meet with it. Waller testified that ASOG gave him an oral report at the meeting and permitted him to view but not take—the research ASOC conducted, which Waller testified included detailed tracking information on the subjects. *Id.* at 95-96, 344-45.\n\nWaller further testified that he told L. Han at a subsequent meeting that ASOG had told him that it was illegal to obtain this information under federal law given the nature of what was\n\nobtained.6 In particular, Waller testified that he stated that he had been told that it would be a federal crime to investigate further the five subjects ASOG had investigated because the National Clandestine Service of the CIA had classified the individuals in a category that ASOG said was called \"records protected.\" *Id.* at 351-52. He testified that he was told and conveyed that this classification is intended to protect foreign subjects from database searches for the purpose of protecting their records either because they were subjects of criminal or national security investigations or because they were cooperating with the United States government. *Id.* Waller testified L. Han told him that he understood that the information was classified and that he would come up with new names. Trial Tr. at 352-53. At the same time, however, ASOG was reluctant to continue work on the assignment without knowing the identity of Strategic's client. *Id.* at 354. L. Han, however, ultimately did not provide additional names. *Id.*\n\nThe testimony regarding ASOG is of dubious veracity. As noted, Strategic offered no evidence of the qualifications of ASOG or its competence to do the work that it supposedly performed. It also offered no evidence that ASOG actually did any work, save for the testimony of Waller that he saw work and an invoice for \\$104,595 that ASOC reduced to \\$5,412 supposedly based on a \"termination credit.\" DX56; Trial Tr. at 345, 350. There was no evidence offered—from either a fact or expert witness, or in the form of a document or stipulation—that a classification of \"records protected\" even existed, much less that there was any prohibition on ASOG sharing any work it performed with Strategic or with Eastern. Waller himself had never heard of the term \"records protected\" before ASOG mentioned it to him and he does not know of a legal source for it. Trial Tr. at 369-71. All that was offered is the\n\n6 Waller testified that he was instructed by Wang on or about January 30, 2018 that he should not contact her in connection with the project anymore and that he should work solely with L. Han. Trial Tr. at 349-50.\n\ntestimony of what Waller was told, which was received solely for Waller's state of mind and as background for what he told L. Han, and not for the truth of what was stated.\n\nA few weeks later in February 2018, Wallop and Waller met with L. Han at Wallop's home. *Id.* at 354-56. L. Han told the two to stand down their work.\n\n#### **H. Eastern Terminates the Agreement With Strategic**\n\nNeither Eastern nor ACA made the first monthly \\$750,000 payment that was due on February 16, 2018 under the Agreement. Strategic did not deliver any of the monthly reports.\n\nOn February 23, 2018, Eastern delivered a letter to Strategic terminating the Agreement. Trial Tr. at 163; DX8; JSOAF ¶ 58.\n\nThe letter purported to terminate the Agreement effective immediately and demanded a full and complete refund of the \\$1 million deposit. After noting that the start date of the Agreement had been delayed from January 6, 2018 to January 16, 2018, the letter listed a number of missteps by Strategic that Eastern claimed constituted a breach of contract and demonstrated that Strategic had fraudulently misrepresented its capabilities. These missteps included the failure to deliver the reports required by the Agreement and the failure to meet the schedule laid out in the Agreement. Eastern demanded that Strategic cease work immediately and return or destroy all materials and information provided by Eastern to Strategic. The letter demanded that the \\$1 million deposit be returned to ACA at a Singapore address.\n\nStrategic did not return the deposit.\n\n## **I. Guo's Alleged Misrepresentations**\n\nStrategic, through Wallop and Waller, claims that Guo misrepresented his identity and his objectives and that they reasonably relied upon his misrepresentations to Strategic's detriment.\n\nSpecifically, Guo represented to Wallop and Waller that he was an opponent of the CCP and that he wanted to use the research Strategic would provide to sow discord in that\n\norganization and ultimately to overthrow the CCP and the current regime in China.7 Wallop and Waller both testified that they were comfortable entering into an agreement with Guo because they believed that he held the same anti-CCP views that they did and shared their objective of undermining the CCP. Strategic claims it later learned that Guo was in fact affiliated with the CCP and if it had known that prior to signing the Agreement, it would not have entered into the Agreement.\n\nThe Court finds that Wallop and Waller did not rely on Guo's statements that he was anti-CCP, that any such reliance would not have been reasonable given the facts here, and that Strategic has not proved a misrepresentation by Guo.\n\nFirst, Wallop and Waller's testimony that they relied on Guo's statements was largely conclusory and was undermined by the fact that, despite purportedly being investigators, they did no investigation into Guo's identity or allegiances, much less the identity and allegiances of Eastern, the corporate entity that was later introduced into the transaction. Guo undoubtedly represented that he was anti-CCP. He made that point vehemently in his testimony at trial. However, from the evidence, it appears and the Court finds that what attracted Wallop and Waller was the nature of the work: an investigation into alleged corruption by high-ranking members of the CCP, funded by a person who claimed to be a billionaire who would pay them \\$750,000 per month in order to do that research. They were less interested in the identity of the funder, Guo, his personal political beliefs, and which faction he sided with in the internecine battles within China.\n\n7 Gertz and L. Han made similar representations about Guo, but they did not do so as Guo's agent and their statements are not attributable to Guo.\n\nSecond, any such reliance would have been unreasonable. According to their testimony, Wallop and Waller largely relied—to the extent they relied on anything—on the testimonials of Gertz and L. Han. They knew that Gertz and L. Han held similar views to their own views, that Gertz and L. Han had introduced Guo to Strategic, and that if Gertz and L. Han were willing to associate with Guo and to make the introduction, Wallop and Waller simply assumed they should be willing to associate with Guo.\n\nHowever, much of the information that Strategic now relies upon to suggest that Guo was not genuinely opposed to the current leadership in China was in the public record before the first meetings Wallop and Waller held with Guo and well before the Agreement was signed. Sufficient evidence was available that should have caused Strategic to investigate. The fact that it did not do any investigation, or ask Guo to make any representations, undermines the reasonableness of any reliance it claims on Guo's statements. Even before its first meeting with Guo, Strategic had received information that \"some suspect that [Guo] may simply represent a faction in an internal leadership struggle.\" DX38; *see, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 58-59, 203. Waller was also aware of reports that Guo owed his fortune to ties to the CCP and that he maintained close ties to senior CCP leaders after he left China. Trial Tr. at 203-04, 206. In the words of Waller, Guo had made it \"very public\" that he rose up through the CCP and the secret police apparat, Ministry of State Security (\"MSS\"), with MSS's Deputy Head of Security Ma Jian (\"Jian\"). *Id.* at 205, 207.\n\nAgainst this backdrop, it is telling that Strategic did not investigate Guo but rather simply placed blind faith on the fact that Gertz and L. Han vouched for Guo. *Id.*; *see also id.* at 85-86, 88. By that time, however, Gertz had written an article dated May 23, 2017, stating Guo has \"close ties to senior Chinese Communist Party leaders, including government ministers and\n\nPolitburo members\" and \"access to Ministry of State Security (MSS) operations overseas and in the United States.\" DX43. The article also reported that Guo's wife and daughter were permitted to visit him in the United States but were required to return to China after 20 days where they could be used as political leverage against him—information that Strategic now says is evidence of Guo's relationship with the CCP. By October 9, 2017, Gertz had publicly written that \"Guo said he maintains close ties to supporters within the Chinese government and security system and is able to obtain many internal documents.\" DX32. Also in October 2017, the Wall Street Journal published reports—of which Waller was aware—that Guo had met with four officials from China's MSS in his New York apartment. DX34. It is precisely these \"close ties,\" the relationship with the MSS, and the fortune Guo made from the CCP that Strategic now relies on to say that Guo is secretly allied with the CCP.\n\nWallop testified that she did not know what Eastern or Guo were going to do with the research and thought maybe Guo was going to \"run it both ways.\" Trial Tr. at 89. Yet neither Wallop nor Waller insisted that Guo or Eastern make any representation about their being anti-CCP or using the research only for anti-CCP purposes. At trial, Strategic, presumably a sophisticated party, claimed that it did not include a representation in the Agreement because it was concerned about confidentiality. That explanation was undermined, however, by the evidence that the parties took to keep the Agreement (with its terms) confidential, including that \"there's no decrypted electronic copy anywhere.\" *Id.* at 386. The terms of the Agreement themselves were confidential and kept highly confidential. The parties could have included a representation in the Agreement regarding how the information would be used or about Guo's objectives had Guo's objectives or his allegiances been important to Strategic. The fact that Strategic did not even suggest that such a representation was ever made is revealing, in that it\n\nshows both that Strategic did not rely on any view regarding Guo's politics or allegiances and that any such reliance was not reasonable. Waller ultimately admitted that the reason that Strategic did not include a representation—despite the fact that Eastern says it considered Guo's anti-CCP ties to be material—was because of the assumption that one was not needed: \"[I]t was just second nature to what we both wanted.\" *Id.* at 386-87.\n\nFinally, there also is no clear and convincing evidence as to whether Guo is a supporter or opponent of the CCP. Guo asserted forcefully at trial that he was an opponent of the CCP. But other witnesses testified with equal force as to their belief that he was a friend of the CCP. There is evidence of statements by him that are consistently hostile to the CCP. But there was also evidence introduced at trial of a conversation that he had with officials of the CCP at his apartment in which he declared his loyalty to Chinese President Xi Jinping and the CCP. *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 628-32, 716-21, 727-34, 736-50; DX114B.\n\nThe Court credits a portion of the testimony of Waller. He stated: I've worked a lot with communist defectors over the years, actually since I was an undergraduate at George Washington University, and had some of them as professors. I learned over the years, as well as talking, learning through a lot of people in U.S. intelligence and counter-intelligence, that it's very hard to discern whether someone who has broken with a communist system, whether it's Soviet or Chinese or others, to discern conclusively whether or not they still maintain a loyalty.\n\nTrial Tr. at 204.\n\nWaller went on to state that many defectors and dissidents \"still maintain ties because they had families or other connections, and those ties would be valuable if they were indeed dissidents or genuine opponents because they could mine those ties for information that would be useful to the United States, to do damage to their own system.\" *Id.* at 204-05. Thus, Waller\n\nadmitted that evidence of a relationship that someone has with people within the CCP on its own is not necessarily indicative of the fact that he or she is a supporter of the CCP.8\n\nStrategic's evidence that Guo was a secret supporter of the CCP largely consisted of the testimony of another member of the Chinese dissident community, Sasha Gong (\"Gong\"); statements by Guo himself; and circumstantial evidence. Guo testified assertively that he was genuinely anti-CCP, and Eastern offered evidence of its own in support of that contention.\n\nGong is a journalist and dissident. Gong testified that she interviewed Guo several times beginning in April 2017 and continuing through 2018. The interviews were conducted both off the record and live on-air. In the interviews, Guo claimed to Gong, and has also publicly claimed, that he was arrested for his support of the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement. But Guo also told Gong that, after a time in Hong Kong following Tiananmen Square, he came back to mainland China, where he built real estate, made many high-ranking friends, and became one of the major players in China's intelligence community. Gong claims that Guo said he was one of only three people who could visit Hu Jintao, the former general secretary of the CCP (predecessor to President Jinping) without an appointment. He used this access to battle with the former Vice Mayor of Beijing by allying with MSS Deputy Head Jian. Guo told Gong he maintained connections with senior Chinese leaders and that he believed President Jinping was a good leader; Guo's only goal was to target corrupt persons in the CCP. Strategic argued that those statements are consistent with a continuing relationship with the CCP.\n\nStrategic also argued that there is evidence Guo has moved money from Hong Kong or mainland China since he began speaking out as a dissident through ACA and that persons\n\n8 Waller gave similar testimony when asked if Elliott Broidy, who was revealed to be funding Strategic's defense, was associated with the CCP. Trial Tr. at 387-88; *see also id.* at 181\n\nassociated with Guo, such as Han and Wang, were comfortable with sending money from Hong Kong or China into the United States and repaying the obligation to ACA by a transfer of funds into China. It claims that Guo would not have been able to do so without the cooperation of the CCP.\n\nFinally, Strategic argues that Guo has attacked dissidents such as Gong and Bob Fu (\"Fu\"). Strategic argues that in continuing to attack members of the China Hawk community and dissidents by claiming they are actually controlled by the CCP, Guo continues to turn members of this community against each other.\n\nThe evidence is not sufficient to establish that Guo is a supporter of the CCP.\n\nThe force of Gong's testimony—that she now believes Guo is a supporter of the CCP based on his associations with certain political leaders, his later harassment of her, and certain pro-CCP statements he is accused of making—is undermined by the fact that even after Guo made the statements to her and after she was aware of his supposed continuing relationships with persons who are members of the CCP, she wrote a letter on his behalf to the United States government supporting Guo's application for asylum and claiming that he was an opponent of the CCP. In her letter, Gong wrote that Guo had challenged the legitimacy of communist leaders in China, worked Chinese intelligence services, and financed operations investigating overseas corruption by Chinese government officials, all of which made him valuable to the United States government. *Id.* at 794-98; DX123.\n\nAs to Guo's alleged transfers of money and other circumstantial evidence, Strategic's arguments are based on speculation. It offered no evidence, expert or otherwise, regarding the inferences that can be drawn from the fact that money travelled from Hong Kong or mainland China to the United States supposedly on behalf of Guo. Indeed, Strategic's presentation was\n\ntelling for its failure or apparent inability to offer any expert testimony regarding the inferences to be drawn from Guo's relationships.\n\nAs to the attacks on Chinese dissidents, Guo testified that his attacks were only ever in retaliation: \"I have never initiated any attack to any Chinese person. Always it was []they who attacked me, then I retaliate.\" Trial Tr. at 747. \"I have never attacked. I was always on the side of retaliation.\" *Id.* at 748. He added: \"I have never initiated any attacks on any person, only under attack under the natural protection do I retaliate. And also, there were millions of people or up to a million people online who were attacking me, and . . . it's not possible that I would retaliate against every one of them either.\" *Id.* at 748.9 The evidence shows that Guo is extraordinarily combative, as are other members of the Chinese dissident community. It does not demonstrate on which side of the political battle Guo stands.\n\nFinally, there is evidence to question whether Strategic even believed it was defrauded. Strategic did not assert a counterclaim for fraud when it filed its initial pleadings in this case. Dkt. No. 22. Nor did it in its amended pleadings. Dkt. No. 47. It only asserted such claim after it received litigation funding from an alleged opponent of Guo with an interest in undermining his assertions of hostility to the CCP, a wealthy United States businessperson named Elliott Broidy, whose credibility also is subject to question. *See* Dkt. Nos. 114, 127. Broidy was convicted of federal crimes before he received a presidential pardon in 2020.10 The evidence\n\n9 When asked about whether he had accused Sasha Gong of being a communist spy, Guo testified: \"It was after she called me a spy, then I retaliate.\" Trial Tr. at 748.\n\n10 Eastern offered evidence that Broidy himself was a supporter of the CCP as proof that Strategic, which accepted litigation funding from him, did not truly care about the political allegiances of those with whom it did business. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 181:24-184:17. Some of the evidence was subject to evidentiary challenge. The Court need not resolve those evidentiary challenges because it is satisfied from the testimony of Wallop and Waller that they did not actually or reasonably rely on Guo's representations.\n\nsuggests that the claim of fraud was not based on any evidence that Strategic discovered or on any genuine view that Strategic was defrauded but on a recognition that the assertion of a fraud claim would have strategic value in the case or otherwise.\n\n#### **II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**\n\nEastern brings three claims: a declaratory judgment that the contract is illegal and void as against public policy, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Dkt. No. 93. Strategic brings two counterclaims for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. Dkt. No. 127.\n\n#### **A. Eastern's Declaratory Judgment Claim**\n\nEach party contends that the other breached the Agreement and that it is entitled to damages. Before addressing the breach of contract claims, however, the Court must address the argument in Eastern's declaratory judgment claim that the Agreement is void and unenforceable because it violates Virginia's private security services statute and thus Eastern is entitled to a refund of its deposit regardless of whether any party breached the Agreement. The Court holds that the services contemplated by and performed under the Agreement fall within the conducted prohibited by the statute and that the Agreement is therefore void and unenforceable. Eastern is entitled to its deposit back.\n\n#### **1. Virginia Private Security Services Statute**\n\nUnder Virginia law, \"a contract made in violation of a statute is void, and there can be no recovery thereon, unless it is apparent from the statute that the legislature did not intend to make the contract void and unenforceable.\" *Massie v. Dudley*, 3 S.E.2d 176, 180 (Va. 1939) (holding plaintiffs could not recover under an express contract for a real estate commission where they were not licensed as brokers); *see F. S. Bowen Elec. Co. v. Foley*, 72 S.E.2d 388, 394 (Va. 1952) (violation of statute preventing a contractor from \"engaging in business until he has been licensed and registered, and the acts prohibited are termed unlawful and punishment is provided\n\nin the statute for the violation thereof . . . is illegal, not merely invalid\") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \"[I]mplicit in *Bowen* and *Massie* is that failure to abide by the provisions of a specific statute renders a contract invalid,\" *Am. Demolition & Design v. Pinkston*, 96 Va. Cir. 142, 2017 WL 11452748, at \\*8 n.2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2017), and \"[w]here the Court has declared contracts void under this doctrine the plaintiff has not been able to recover damages otherwise due him,\" *Beard v. Ragan*, 51 Va. Cir. 229, 2000 WL 33258655, at \\*3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 2000). Under Virginia law, the \"policy behind [a] licensing statute and the underlying voidability of contracts for noncompliance\" is to \"protect the public from inexperienced, unscrupulous, irresponsible, and incompetent contractors . . . [where] [e]nforcement of the contract is denied the unregistered contractor, not because of the nature of the transaction, but as a penalty for failing to comply with the registration statutes.\" *Butler v. Creative Design Builders, Inc.*, 24 Va. Cir. 362, 1991 WL 11015277, at \\*2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 7, 1991) (quoting *Bacigalupo v. Fleming*, 102 S.E.2d 321, 324 (Va. Ct. App. 1958)). In essence, it would undermine the policy of the statute for a court to award in damages monies for which a party was not entitled to receive pursuant to law or regulation.\n\nVirginia's \"Private Security Services Statute\" is a licensing statute that requires persons who perform or contract to provide certain private investigatory work to have a license. It makes it unlawful for a person to \"engage in the private security services business or solicit private security business in the Commonwealth [of Virginia] without having obtained a license from the Department [of Criminal Justice Services].\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-139(A). The statute defines a \"private security services business\" to mean \"any person engaged in the business of providing, or who undertakes to provide . . . private investigators . . . to another person under contract, express or implied.\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138. A \"private investigator,\" in turn, is defined to mean \"any\n\nindividual who engages in the business of, or accepts employment to make, investigations to obtain information on (i) crimes or civil wrongs; (ii) the location, disposition, or recovery of stolen property; (iii) the cause of accidents, fires, damages, or injuries to persons or to property; or (iv) evidence to be used before any court, board, officer, or investigative committee.\" *Id.*\n\nStrategic first argues that it did not violate the Private Security Services Statute by entering into the Agreement because the work performed under the Agreement does not fall within the purview of the statute. Specifically, it argues that Strategic did not provide private investigators in Virginia: there was no actual investigation in Virginia as Team 1 and ASOG were located elsewhere and there was no evidence that there was a target in Virginia.\n\n\"[T]he constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, that intention must be gathered from the words used.\" *Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (Va. 2003). Thus, when interpreting statutes, \"we start with the plain language.\" *U.S. Dep't of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass'n*, 377 F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004); *see also Lamie v. United States Tr.*, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (\"It is well established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.\") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \"[C]ourts apply the plain language of a statute unless the terms are ambiguous, or applying the plain language would lead to an absurd result.\" *Boynton v. Kilgore*, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (Va. 2006) (internal citations omitted). \"Ambiguity exists if the text can be 'understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously [or] when the language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness or definiteness.'\" *Id.* at 926 n.8 (quoting *Brown v. Lukhard*, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Va. 1985)). \"The phrase 'absurd result' is used 'to describe situations in which the law would be internally inconsistent or otherwise incapable of operation.'\" *Id.* at 926 n.9 (quoting *Cook v.*\n\n*Commonwealth*, 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Va. 2004)). But even \"if the literal text of the statute produces a result that is, arguably, somewhat anomalous,\" the courts \"are not simply free to ignore unambiguous language because we can imagine a preferable version.\" *Sigmon Coal Co., Inc. v. Apfel*, 226 F.3d 291, 308 (4th Cir. 2000), *aff'd sub nom. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.*, 534 U.S. 438 (2002).\n\nUnder the plain language of the statute, Strategic' conduct can qualify as that of a private security services business not only if it is \"engaged in the business of providing\" a private investigator but also if it \"undertakes to provide\" private investigators under contracts. The focus of the statute is not limited to the actual performance of security services or the actual investigation of crimes or civil wrongs; it also is addressed to the agreement to undertake such services, regardless of whether the services are actually performed by the party to the agreement or by someone with whom that party subcontracts. *See Ervin B. Davis & Co. v. Dep't of Crim. Just. Servs.*, 49 Va. Cir. 447 (1999), *judgment entered*, No. 160-97, 1999 WL 907550 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13, 1999) (\"[T]he statute makes no reference to a quantity of private security services in which the business must engage before the statute applies.\"). The act of \"undertaking to provide\" is what must occur in Virginia. The statute does not require that the private investigator, or the information he or she seeks to obtain, must be located in Virginia as well.\n\nThat the statute requires a private security services business to be licensed if, while in Virginia, it \"undertakes to provide\" private investigators is reinforced by the statute's reciprocity provision. Under Section 9.1-140(10), Virginia exempts from its license requirement \"[l]icensed or registered private investigators from other states entering Virginia during an investigation originating in their state of licensure or registration when the other state offers similar reciprocity to private investigators licensed and registered by the Commonwealth.\" Va. Code Ann.\n\n§ 9.1-140(10). The statute anticipates that a private security services business operating in Virginia may require its private investigators, whether acting as employees or independent contractors, to enter other states and so it affords consideration to out-of-state investigators entering Virginia. That Virginia considers allows out-of-state private investigators to enter Virginia \"during an investigation originating in their state of licensure or registration\" and gives reciprocity to such out-of-state investigators, suggests that the Virginia legislature was focused at least in part on where the investigation \"originates\" rather than where the investigation may lead. Indeed, the provision making it unlawful for an unlicensed person to engage in a private security services business in Virginia extends that prohibition to the \"undertaking\" of such business in Virginia as well.\n\nSetting aside the second question of whether the services that Strategic undertook to provide constitute \"private investigation\" as defined by the statute, Strategic's conduct manifestly occurred in Virginia. Strategic operated and continues to operate out of Wallop's home in Virginia. Trial Tr. at 37. The Agreement setting forth the services Strategic undertook to provide was executed at Wallop's home in Virginia. Trial Tr. at 69. Additionally, much of the work that Strategic did in connection with the Agreement took place in Virginia. Strategic received the Subject List and the first USB drive from Team 1 in Virginia. Trial Tr. at 319, 420.\n\nIn light of this reading, the Court asked the parties to brief whether, to the extent that the statute could be deemed to regulate commerce outside of its borders, the statute violated the Commerce Clause. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to \"regulate commerce . . . among the several States.\" U.S. Const., Art. I § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause contains a dormant aspect that denies the states \"the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.\" *Or. Waste Sys.,*\n\n*Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Quality*, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). A statute's extraterritorial effect can violate the Commerce Clause when it seeks to regulate commerce that takes place \"wholly outside of its borders.\" *Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.*, 491 U.S. 324, 328 (1989). But the \"critical question\" is \"where the transaction being regulated is consummated\" and \"in grappling with whether the practical effect of a regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State, the circuit courts have focused on the location (or locations) where the contract was formed.\" *Berman v. City of New York*, 2012 WL 13041996, at \\*18 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012); *see also Brown v. Hovatter*, 561 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting plaintiffs' challenge to \"the way [the State] authorizes them to do business within the State in a profession regulated by the State\" because such \"complaints do not involve burdens placed on the interstate movement of goods, materials, or other articles of commerce, and the matters of which they complain—the manner of professional practice in [the State]—are not matters protected by the dormant Commerce Clause\"). That is because \"there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it.\" *Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del.*, 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (quoting *S. Pacific Co. v. Arizona*, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)).\n\nThe statute here does not seek to regulate commerce that takes place \"wholly outside of its borders.\" Virginia has an interest in regulating and licensing not just those who take investigative actions within its borders but also those who in Virginia offer such services to persons in Virginia regardless of where the services are actually performed. The statute reflects that interest. It regulates private security services businesses in Virginia where that \"private security services business\" is defined as engaged in the business of providing, or undertaking to provide, private investigators by implied or express contract. A \"private security services\n\nbusiness\" thus is subject to regulation when in Virginia it undertakes to provide private investigators. That reading is also consistent with the purpose of the overall statute, which is to create a local licensing and regulatory scheme. \"In the immediate case, Virginia is not attempting to regulate a contract occurring wholly outside the Commonwealth. The contract in question was entered into in the Commonwealth of Virginia . . . [and] [w]hile it may be true that elements of the transaction occurred outside of the Commonwealth of Virginia, this does not necessarily deprive Virginia of its interest in regulating the transaction.\" *Atl. Mach. & Equip., Inc. v. Tigercat Indus., Inc.*, 427 F. Supp. 2d 657, 666 (E.D. Va. 2006).\n\nStrategic argues, second, that the services it undertook to provide did not include investigations of the type enumerated in the statute: \"(i) crimes or civil wrongs; (ii) the location, disposition, or recovery of stolen property; (iii) the cause of accidents, fires, damages, or injuries to persons or to property; or (iv) evidence to be used before any court, board, officer, or investigative committee.\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-139(A).\n\nThe parties agree that there is little law on this statute. One Virginia state court interpreting the definition of \"private investigator\" under the statute held that a company fell within the definition of a \"private security services business\" because it employed \"private investigators\" to obtain information listed in the statute.11 In *Ervin B. Davis & Co.*, the court held that the \"activities in which the corporation engage[d] as evidenced by the Plaintiff's answers to Defendant's Interrogatories and as described by the company's advertisements, including the web page information submitted . . . comport[ed] with the statutory definition of a\n\n11 *United States v. Commonwealth*, 139 F.3d 984, 986 (4th Cir. 1998), which dealt with the question of whether *Leslie Miller v. Arkansas*, 352 U.S. 187 (1956) precluded the application of the Virginia's licensing and registration requirements to private investigators working solely for the FBI in its Background Investigation Contract Services Program, did not address the question at issue in this case.\n\nprivate security services business.\" 1999 WL 33722350, at \\*2. The court, however, did not describe in its opinion what those precise activities were and how they fell into clauses (i)-(iv). It did note that the company's employees had performed surveillance investigations, but it did not say what information was so surveilled.12 The court ultimately held that the company was subject to a statutory exception to the licensing requirement due to its status as a claims adjuster. *See id.* The case thus does not offer much guidance. Little guidance is also offered from cases interpreting similar statutes passed in other states.13\n\n\"In considering the meaning of particular language in context, '[w]ords in a statute should be interpreted, if possible, to avoid rendering [other] words superfluous.\" *Eley v. Commonwealth*, 826 S.E.2d 321, 324 (Va. App. Ct. 2019) (quoting *Cook v. Commonwealth*, 597 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 2004)). \"It is one of the fundamental rules of construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from a view of the whole and every part of the statute taken and compared together, giving to every word and every part of the statute, if possible, its due effect and meaning.\" *Epps v. Commonwealth*, 626 S.E.2d 912 (Va. App. Ct. 2006) (en banc), *aff'd*, 641 S.E.2d 77 (Va. 2007) (quoting *Posey v. Commonwealth*, 96 S.E. 771\n\n12 It also held that any employees of the company who qualify as private investigators, including its proprietor, would be subject to the registration requirement. *Ervin B. Davis & Co.*, 1999 WL 33722350, at \\*2.\n\n13 Both parties agree that comparable private investigator statutes are of little help in attempting to ascertain the definition of \"crimes or civil wrongs.\" Strategic submits that most states requiring licenses typically define \"private investigation\" to include attempts to obtain information about \"crimes or civil wrongs\" but limit that prong to crimes or wrongs against the state and are therefore of little use. *See* Dkt. No. 360 at 2 & n.2. Other states' statutes do not provide such a limitation but have a catch-all prong that defines private investigation more broadly to include information about \"the identity, habits, conduct, business, occupation, honestly, integrity, etc. of any person.\" *Id.* at 2. Connecticut's equivalent statute comes closest to matching Virginia's, but the parties have not identified case law on the definition of \"crimes or civil wrongs,\" and the statute contains additional definitional prongs for \"conducting surveillance activity\" and \"conducting background investigations.\" *Id.*; *see* Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-152u(4).\n\n(Va. 1918)). Moreover, under the canon of ejusdem generis, \"when a particular class of persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular words.\" *Sainani v. Belmont Glen Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.*, 831 S.E.2d 662, 667 (Va. 2019) (quoting *Martin v. Commonwealth*, 295 S.E.2d 890 (Va. 1982)).\n\nApplying those canons, reading the statute as a whole and interpreting each provision of clauses (i)-(iv) of the statute both individually but also as part of a collective group, the Court concludes that they cover certain of the services Strategic undertook to provide in the Agreement and therefore that Strategic violated the statute by entering into the Agreement. The Agreement cannot be enforced.\n\nThe meaning of the statute can be gleaned from several of its terms. It addresses only \"business\" or \"employment.\" It does not address persons who act as volunteers or do work for themselves and not for others. Second, the business that is regulated is that of providing \"investigations to obtain information\"; research that is incidental to some other service is not governed. A person must be contracted to conduct an \"investigation to obtain information.\" Third, the information must be of a particular type or quality. As to type, a person is a private investigator if he or she is in the business or accepts employment to make an investigation of three types of information: information regarding \"crimes or civil wrong,\" information regarding \"the location, disposition, or recovery of stolen property,\" and information regarding \"the cause of accidents, fires, damages, or injuries to persons or to property.\" As to the quality of the information, a person is also a private investigator if he or she conducts an investigation to obtain \"evidence to be used for any court, board, officer, or investigative committee.\" Clause (iv) thus\n\naddresses an investigation of any subject matter but so long as its objective is to obtain items that would qualify as \"evidence.\"\n\nThe Court rejects Strategic's argument that a person can be a private investigator only if he or she is engaged in the process of collecting evidence to be used in some formal proceeding or to prosecute an individual for a specific crime. That argument runs afoul of the principle that the Court must strive to give meaning to each word in a statute and that state legislatures do not write meaningless or superfluous language. Clause (iv) is addressed to the collection of \"evidence.\" It specifically focuses on the collection of information to be used as evidence for a court or an officer, including the collection of evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. Under the principle of avoiding surplusage, clauses (i)-(iii) must mean something different. They cannot be limited to the collection of evidence for a formal proceeding. Instead, those provisions by their terms are directed to the subject of the investigation—if a person is to offer investigative services for money, it must be licensed if the investigation is to fall within one of the three categories set forth in clauses (i)- (iii).\n\nThe Court also rejects Strategic's argument that for an investigation to be of \"crimes or civil wrongs\" the investigator must be retained to investigate \"some specific prosecutable criminal act, rather than generally wrong or detestable behavior involving no particular victim.\" Strategic's Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 38 ¶ 3. That interpretation makes no sense and would exclude from the statute much activity that is commonly understood to be private or public investigative activity. It is not an infrequent occurrence that an investigator who sets out on an investigation does not know where it will lead. He or she may start off with a suspicion that the subject may have engaged in one form of conduct that may implicate any number of different laws (none of which is specified in advance) only to come\n\nacross conduct that may violate another law. There is no reason to think that the Virginia legislature intended to protect the client who starts with a suspicion of specific criminal activity engaged in by the subject and directs the investigator to follow the evidence but deny protection to the putative client who merely starts out with the suspicion that the subject is generally a criminal and asks the investigator to use its know-how to confirm the suspicion. Strategic does not argue that an investigation that starts out with a broad net would fall outside of the protections of the Virginia statute. But that is the implication of its argument. An investigator could opt out of the statute and deprive the client of its protections by the mere expedient of securing an engagement to investigate all crimes, rather than a specific crime.\n\nStrategic's argument that an investigation must concern a \"particular victim\" is no more persuasive. The number of criminal statutes, both federal and state, that address \"victimless\" crimes is legion.14 Victimless crimes are generally understood to include crimes of public corruption where the victim is not an identifiable individual but rather the public at large.15 Strategic has offered no reason why the Virginia legislature would require a license for the investigation of a crime with an identifiable victim but not for the investigation of a victimless crime.\n\nOnce the scope of the statute is properly understood, it is evident that Strategic engaged in a private security services business by undertaking to provide private investigators. First, the\n\n14 *See, e.g.*, Uniform Crime Reporting Program's National Incident-Based Reporting System (2019) (reporting \"crimes against society\" as 15.8% of reported offenses in 2019); Matthew K. Suess, *Punishment in the State of Nature: John Locke and Criminal Punishment in the United States of America*, 7 Wash. U. Juris. Rev. 367, 384, 388 (2015) (\"[T]he expansion of criminal codes in the United States has led to the widespread prosecution of victimless crime. . . . In line with the states, the majority of federal prisoners are convicted of victimless crimes.\") 15 *See, e.g.*, Mat Tromme, *Waging War Against Corruption in Developing Countries: How Asset Recovery Can Be Compliant with the Rule of Law*, 29 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 165, 218 (2019) (\"[C]orruption is often seen as a victimless crime.\").\n\nAgreement itself reflects that Strategic was hired to conduct research and prepare reports for \"the purpose of detecting, stopping, and preventing crime or other harm to innocent people.\" PX1. It thus was engaged to obtain information through investigators on \"crimes or civil wrongs.\" It is no matter that the Agreement required Strategic to conduct research for the purpose of \"detecting . . . crimes,\" *id.*, while the statute defines a private investigator as one \"who . . . accepts employment to make [] investigations to obtain *information* on . . . crimes or civil wrongs,\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138 (emphasis added). The \"research\" methods Strategic was to deploy are those involved in investigations and the detection of crime is merely the outcome of the enterprise of engaging in the collection of investigation of crime. It also is no matter that Guo (and Eastern) had ulterior purposes for their detection of criminal activity—to bring down the CCP and to bolster Guo's chances for obtaining asylum. Persons do not hire private investigators only for public-minded reasons. They occasionally will do so because a criminal investigation and a criminal conviction will advance their private interests. Strategic also is not exempted from the coverage of the statute because it undertook to investigate the \"crimes\" of the ten subjects generically as opposed to specific crimes. To the contrary, the evidence at trial established that Guo had a suspicion that the subjects whom he asked to be investigated had engaged in corruption and other public wrongs and tasked Strategic with finding information regarding that corruption and those public wrongs.\n\nThe conclusion that Strategic engaged in conduct regulated by the Virginia Private Security Services Statute but without the license required by that statute is reinforced by the nature of the \"reports\" Strategic undertook to deliver and the methods it would use to prepare those reports. The reports were not limited to the information that could be gleaned from conventional internet searches or reviews of readily available public information such as a\n\nnewspaper reporter or a book author might employ. To prepare the financial reports, Strategic was to review confidential and not readily accessible information, such as \"statements, capital sources, inflow and outflow information, bank receipts, financial instruments, financial products, statements of credits, precious metals transfers, commodity transfers, crypto currency exchange, stocks and other equities, business ownership, real property ownership, trusts, large amounts of spending, specific information to indicate the transaction participants, and other data required by [Eastern].\" PX1 at 1-2. This information is the stuff of private investigatory work, not mere research. To prepare the tracking research, Strategic was to engage in the activities that are engaged in by those who conduct surveillance, including tracking travel, private or commercial, by land, air, or sea, and obtaining geolocation information and videos and audios that can be accessed remotely. *See id.* To conduct the social media research, Strategic was to review such other information accessible to private investigators, such as criminal databases, sex offender and child abuse databases, passports and identification documents, and comments on social media. *See id.*\n\nAs Strategic admitted, the work thus included hacking into Chinese government servers, obtaining evidence of forged U.S. documents, obtaining information regarding social security fraud and tax fraud, finding the location of certain offshore companies, and obtaining information regarding CCP members' bank accounts. *See* Trial Tr. at 308, 314-317. All of this work was to be done \"based on the best practices and standards of the industry, comparable to other top firms with similar services,\" i.e., comparable to others engaged in private investigations—the only conceivable industry with which to compare the services offered by Strategic. PX1 at 3.\n\nThus, Strategic understood that a portion of the services that Guo sought pertained to the investigation of crimes committed by CCP members. Wallop testified that Guo wanted \"to uncover corruption relating to members of the CCP . . . [i]ncluding crimes committed by members of the CCP\" and \"information about funds stolen by the members of the CCP and taken out of China illegally.\" Trial Tr. at 65. Wallop testified at her deposition that Guo wanted Strategic to \"investigate and retrieve\" information on the \"great deal of corruption within the leadership\" of the CCP, such as \"funds that would have been taken out of the country illegally, cash payments.\" *Id.* at 66. Guo also sought to obtain \"information about location and disposition and recovery of stolen assets,\" and the \"cause of injuries to persons or property.\" *Id.* at 40.\n\nThe conclusion that Strategic was engaged in the private security services business, as defined by Virginia law, is further supported by the work that Strategic performed after it was engaged. Wallop admitted that she engaged in surveillance on at least one occasion. Waller hired private investigators. Those investigators included Team 1, which engaged in data mining and research, including research into the dark web, and Team 2, or ASOG, which accessed commercially available databases and also contacts within the federal government. *See supra*. Waller testified that he told Guo that he and Wallop could do the type of work he requested. Trial Tr. at 191-92.\n\nAnalyzing the definition of \"private investigator\" by the company it keeps in the statutory definition of private security services business—which includes persons who fill such quasi law enforcement functions as security officers, personal protection specialists, and electronic security employees—those whom Strategic undertook to employ, and did in fact employ, comfortably fit in. In Strategic's own words, it was to deploy \"an extremely sensitive\n\ncapability that must be handled with extreme care.\" PX2. Strategic's investigators were engaged in the types of activities engaged in by law enforcement.\n\nStrategic argues that its work did not constitute private investigation because Eastern never reported or made an appointment to report any of the results to law enforcement, nor did Eastern contract with another party to do so such research after the Agreement was terminated. Aspects of that argument read as if Strategic is trying to benefit from its own failures. Under Strategic's argument, if a firm is unable to find information on crimes to report to law enforcement, it means it could not have undertaken to find such information and therefore it does not need to be licensed. That argument would require licensure only of good private investigators; those who are unsuccessful would not ever need to be licensed. That result would be plainly inconsistent with the intent of the Virginia legislature and the terms of the statute. More importantly, however, the statute's focus is on an unlicensed business's offer to undertake private security services and not on the actual use by the counterparty of the information that is provided. If a firm as part of its business undertakes to investigate crimes within the meaning of the statute and agrees to do so, it is irrelevant whether the party with whom it contracts ultimately decides to bring the fruits of the investigation to law enforcement or not.\n\nBecause Strategic undertook work that fell within the scope of Virginia's Private Security Services Statute, but failed to secure the requisite license therein, the Agreement is void and unenforceable. *See Urban Protective Servs. v. Great Latin Restaurants*, 2007 WL 1660374 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 2007) (noting prior ruling that plaintiff \"could not contract to engage in private security services as it was not licensed as required by the Code and that the contract was illegal as a matter of law\"); *see also Massie*, 3 S.E.2d at 181; *Bacigalupo*, 102 S.E.2d at 324-25.\n\nStrategic argues that the Agreement cannot be void because Strategic did not commit a \"willful\" violation of the statute. It devoted much time at trial to the evidence that Wallop and Waller did not believe a license was necessary and that they had engaged in investigations in the past without obtaining a license, as if by long usage, Strategic would acquire the right to act without being regulated. It cites to the language in *Massey*, which states that \"where a licensing statute is a police regulation, having for its object the protection of the public, making it unlawful for a person to engage in a business without a license, *and imposing a penalty for its violation*, a contract made by an unlicensed person is void and unenforceable.\" *Massie*, 3 S.E.2d at 181 (emphasis added). It argues that Virginia only penalizes \"willful\" private security licensing violations under Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-147(B), which are knowing or intentional, *see Correll v. Commonwealth*, 607 S.E.2d 119, 124 (Va. 2005), and that because any licensing mistake was not willful, the Agreement cannot be void. Assuming that Strategic did not knowingly or willfully violate Virginia law, it still is not entitled to retain Eastern's deposit.\n\nSections 9.1-147–150 provide for penalties in connection with violations of the statute. Strategic focuses on Section 9.1-147(A), which reads, \"It shall be unlawful for any person to: 1. Practice any trade or progression licensed, certified or registered under this article without obtaining the necessary license, certification or registration required by statute or regulation . . . 4. Violate any statute or regulation governing the practice of the private security services businesses or training schools regulated by this article.\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-147(A). \"Any person who is convicted of willful violation of [this subsection] shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.\" *Id.* § 9.1-147(B).\n\nBut the other sections on penalties—one of which applies here—do not require willful violations. Section 9.1-148 provides that any person convicted of a violation of its provisions,\n\nwithout reference to willful violation, shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. *Id.* § 9.1-148. Section 9.1-149 provides that any person convicted of a violation of its provisions, without reference to willful violation, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. *Id.* § 9.1-149.\n\nRelevant here also is Section 9.1-150, which provides: \"Any person required to be licensed, certified or registered by the Board pursuant to this article who violates any statute or Board regulation who is not criminally prosecuted is subject to the monetary penalty provided in this section.\" *Id.* § 9.1-150. In other words, if Strategic violated Section 9.1-139(A) by engaging in the private security services business without the requisite license from the Department of Criminal Justice Services in Virginia, but did so in a non-willful way, it could be subject to monetary penalty under Section 9.1-150. If the violation was willful, Strategic could be subject to criminal penalties under Section 9.1-147(A). *Massie*'s holding does not require a willful violation; the court requires only that the statute impose a penalty for \"a violation.\" *Massie*, 3 S.E.2d at 181. It thus does not require that a willful violation be imposed to render a contract by an unlicensed person void and unenforceable, only that there is some type of penalty. *See id.*\n\nThe Court need not address Strategic's alternative argument that if the Agreement fell within clause (iv), it also falls within the exemption to clause (iv) under Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-140(29), which exempts any individual engaged in \"computer or digital forensic services . . ., the acquisition, review, or analysis of digital or computer-based information, in order to obtain or furnish information for evidentiary purposes or to provide expert testimony before a court.\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-140(29). The Court does not rest its conclusion on a finding that the Agreement sought to obtain information on \"evidence to be used before any court, board, officer, or investigative committee\" under clause (iv), but rather on a finding that Strategic undertook to provide persons to conduct an investigation to obtain information on \"crimes\" under clause (i).\n\nThe Court also rejects Strategic's in pari delicto defense.16 Strategic argues that even if the Agreement were void as against public policy, Virginia courts will not afford equitable relief where the \"objects sought to be achieved\" by the plaintiff were also illegal. *Am.-LaFrance & Foamite Indus. v. Arlington Cty.*, 192 S.E. 758, 761 (Va. 1937). It argues that the object of the Agreement was illegal because Eastern intended to share the results of Strategic's investigation with third parties, including ACA and Golden Spring, in exchange for value.\n\nThe in pari delicto doctrine provides that where a \"the contract is illegal, as involving an immoral purpose, or one for which a punishment is provided, and both parties have knowingly joined therein, they are held to be in pari delicto, and the court will not render aid to relieve either party of the consequences of their acts, but will leave them where it finds them. If the contract is, however, merely invalid, or is based upon a transaction involving no moral turpitude, and is simply contrary to some legal provision relating to the manner, method, or terms of its performance, with no penalty provided other than its invalidity, the court will not require performance of either the express contract or a contract by implication.\" *Id.* \"The doctrine of in pari delicto, like the related doctrine of unclean hands, 'prohibits a party from recovering damages arising from misconduct for which the party bears responsibility, bears fault, or which resulted from [ ] [its] wrongdoing.\" *Concord Crossroads, LLC v. Human Cap. Res. and Concepts, Inc.*, 2020 WL 9367543, at \\*11 (E.D. Va. Sept. 2, 2020) (quoting *Ashmore for Wilson v. Dodds*, 262 F. Supp. 3d 341, 353 (D.S.C. 2017)). It is \"based on the principle that a party who consents to and participates in an illegal act may not recover from other participants for the consequences of that act.\" *Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.*, 497 S.E.2d 328, 329 (Va. 1998); *see also Stith v. Thorne*, 488 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 n. 6 (E.D. Va. 2007) (\"The doctrine of in pari\n\n16 Strategic also failed to plead this affirmative defense in its Answer. *See* Dkt. No. 127.\n\ndelicto stands for the principle that 'a plaintiff who has participated in the wrongdoing may not recover the damages resulting from the wrongdoing.'\") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 806 (8th ed. 2004)); *see also In re Bogdan*, 414 F.3d 507, 514 (4th Cir. 2005)).\n\nVirginia's Private Security Services Statute does not penalize a party receiving the research from a private security services firm for sharing that research for free with a third party. There is no evidence that Eastern intended to resell the information or that it had contracted to do so. The Court has found that the contribution by ACA was a gift and not part of a sale. The only prohibition on sharing the research comes from the Agreement which contains a confidentiality provision. *See* PX1 (\"Both parties agree that the nature of this contract, and work related to it, is highly confidential.\"). But even if Eastern had shared the information with ACA or others, that action would result in a breach of the Agreement and would not be illegal in and of itself. In short, the wrong here is Strategic offering and agreeing to provide services to Eastern it was not licensed to provide. It was not Eastern's acceptance of those services.\n\nFinally, the Court rejects Strategic's belated argument that the Virginia Private Security Statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The argument is waived.17 It also is without merit. A statute is overbroad if it prohibits or chills a substantial amount of protected speech. \"The substantiality of the overbreadth is determined examining the amount of protected speech affected in relation to the amount of unprotected speech legitimately regulated by the statute.\" *Nitke v. Ashcroft*, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A statute is vague if it \"fails to\n\n17 Strategic first made this argument in its post-trial brief, which was also not an issue on which the Court had asked for post-trial briefing. *See Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.*, 771 F.2d 672, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1985) (district court erred in considering claim raised for first time in a post-trial brief); *U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as trustee for Registered Holders of CD 2005-CD1 Com. Mortg. Tr., Com. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates v. 2150 Joshua's Path, LLC*, 2020 WL 5417085, at \\*10 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2020) (\"Plaintiff's remaining arguments—raised for the first time in its post-trial briefs—will not be considered at this juncture.\").\n\n'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.'\" *Id.* at 608 (quoting *Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).\n\nStrategic argues that the statute is overbroad and vague because it would regulate other types of research, without giving notice to the parties conducting the research, including \"political candidates conducting research on opponents, business consultants hired to evaluate competitors, and authors or journalists gathering data for books and reports.\" Dkt. No. 360 at 9. It cites to *Gurley v. Mo. Bd. of Priv. Investigator Exam's*, 361 S.W.3d 406, 411 (Mo. 2012) in which a plaintiff challenged a private investigator licensing statute as overbroad because it reached further than professional private investigators by requiring, as plaintiff argued, \"ordinary citizens to obtain licensure before engaging in all manner of protected First Amendment activity.\" *Id.* Specifically, the statute made it unlawful for \"any person to engage in the private investigator business in [Missouri] unless such person is licensed as a private investigator\" where \"private investigator business\" was defined as:\n\n[T]he furnishing of, making of, or agreeing to make, any investigation for the purpose of obtaining information pertaining to:\n\n(a) Crimes or wrongs done or threatened against the United States or any state or territory of the United States;\n\n(b) The identity, habits, conduct, business, occupation, honesty, integrity, credibility, knowledge, trustworthiness, efficiency, loyalty, activity, movement, whereabouts, affiliations, associations, transactions, acts, reputation, or character of any person;\n\n(c) The location, disposition, or recovery of lost or stolen property;\n\n(d) Securing evidence to be used before any court, board, officer, or investigating committee;\n\n(e) Sale of personal identification to the public; or\n\n(f) The cause of responsibility for libel, losses, accident, or damage or injury to persons or property or protection of life or property.\n\n*Id.* at 412. Plaintiff argued that this statute swept in numerous First Amendment-protected activities,\n\npointing specifically to subdivision (9)(b), which could include persons who use a social networking\n\nwebsite \"to locate a former classmate or to search for a potential romantic partner.\" *Id.*\n\nNoting that the \"primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning,\" the court determined that the term \"business\" in the definition of \"private investigator business\" limited the scope of private investigator-related activities listed in the definition and indicated that the statute included within its sweep \"only investigations conducted by commercial entities.\" *Id.* at 413 (quoting *S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee's Summit*, 278 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. 2009)). The court thus held that the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulated the activities listed in the statute \"only when done as part of a commercial enterprise carried on for profit or as part of a particular occupation habitually engaged in for livelihood or gain\" and that \" none of the hypothetical unconstitutional applications suggested by [plaintiff] are authorized by the statute when it is so construed.\" *Id.*\n\nHere too, Virginia's Private Security Services Statute refers to a \"private security services business,\" defining it as \"any person engaged in the business of providing, or who undertakes to provide . . . private investigators.\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138. A private investigator is also defined only in connection with a commercial enterprise. *See id.* (defining a \"private investigator\" as \"any individual who engages in the business of, or accepts employment to make, investigations to obtain information\"). Thus, the statute does not cover ordinary citizens doing social media research. Nor, as the Court held above, does the statute address persons who act as volunteers or do work for themselves, thus alleviating Strategic's concern that the statute would require the license of investigations by \"authors or journalists gathering data for books and reports\" or by political candidates conducting their own research on opponents. Dkt. No. 360 at 9. The statute also clearly does not cover a business consultant who is hired to evaluate a\n\ncompetitor's business—Strategic's third hypothetical in its parade of horribles—but who is not in the business of investigating the specific information listed under the statute, or if that consultant was not engaged \"to obtain information on (i) crimes or civil wrongs; (ii) the location, disposition, or recovery of stolen property; (iii) the cause of accidents, fires, damages, or injuries to persons or to property; or (iv) evidence to be used before any court, board, officer, or investigative committee.\" Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138. If such information arose during the course of the consultant's work, that research would be \"incidental\" to the consultant's other work, as the statute's focus is on an unlicensed business's offer to undertake private security services and not on the counterparty's actual use of the information that is provided. *See supra.* Indeed, construing the reference to private investigator by the company it keeps in the Virginia Private Security Services Statute, and considering the activities Strategic performed and agreed to perform, what is distinctive about those activities and what qualifies them for regulation is that they constitute conduct, and in particular, conduct that is conventionally engaged in by law enforcement but which Strategic here sold privately for commercial gain.\n\nStrategic's remaining cited cases are either inapposite or do not support its argument. *See Gray v. Dep't of Pub. Safety*, 248 A.3d 212, 217, 223 (Me. 2021) (rejecting challenge to professional investigator licensing requirement that applicants must have \"demonstrated good moral character\" because it did not prohibit or constrain speech and because denial of plaintiff's application based on his presentation of false information as fact was \"narrowly tailored to serve the significant governmental interest in maintaining standards for licensing professional investigators, who are responsible for researching and reporting on some of the most consequential details of people's lives\"); *Castillo v. Ingram*, 2015 WL 3559104, at \\*1 (D. Nev. June 5, 2015) (not reaching question of whether Nevada statute requiring individuals who work\n\nas private investigators in Nevada be licensed by the state violated the Free Speech Clause because plaintiff lacked injury-in-fact); *K-Mart Corp. v. St. Louis Cty.*, 672 S.W.2d 127, 132-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (ordinance requiring private investigators to first obtain a private watchman's license from the superintendent of police was not overbroad or vague because the state has power to regulate police power and because the \"ordinance conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices\").\n\n#### **2. Relief**\n\nBecause the Agreement is void, Eastern is entitled to restitution in the amount of \\$1 million.\n\nA restitution measure of damages \"aims to restore the nonbreaching party to as good a position as the one she occupied before the contract was made, without attempting to compensate her for consequential harms.\" *360Networks Corp. v. Geltzer (In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd.)*, 404 B.R. 335, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); *Daniel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 2013 WL 5723704, at \\*8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2013).\n\nVirginia and New York follow the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment to determine whether a party may recover the value of performance rendered in connection with an illegal and consequently void contract. *See, e.g.*, *T. Musgrove Constr. Co., Inc. v. Young*, 840 S.E.2d 337, 342 (Va. 2020); *Mazzei v. Money Store*, 308 F.R.D. 92, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), *aff'd*, 829 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2016).\n\nUnder Section 32 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment:\n\nA person who renders performance under an agreement that is illegal or otherwise unenforceable for reasons of public policy may obtain restitution from the recipient in accordance with the following rules:\n\n(1) Restitution will be allowed, whether or not necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if restitution is required by the policy of the underlying prohibition.\n\n(2) Restitution will also be allowed, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the allowance of restitution will not defeat or frustrate the policy of the underlying prohibition. There is no unjust enrichment if the claimant receives the counterperformance specified by the parties' unenforceable agreement.\n\n(3) Restitution will be denied, notwithstanding the enrichment of the defendant at the claimant's expense, if a claim under subsection (2) is foreclosed by the claimant's inequitable conduct (§ 63).\n\nRestatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 32.\n\nWhere Section 32(1) applies, the Court need not engage in a traditional unjust enrichment analysis. *Id.* cmt. C. Instead, under Section 32(1), the party that performed under an agreement that is void as against public policy is entitled to recover the value of that performance, without considering whether that party derived any benefit thereunder, where the demands of policy so require. *Id.* § 32(1), Illustration 21. For example, where a client pays for services to a contractor that is not licensed to provide those services, Section 32(1) requires the contractor to return the payments made by the client irrespective of whether it conferred some type of benefit upon the Client. *Id.* Illustration 21 states:\n\n21. A pays B \\$2000 in advance for a series of medical treatments. After two visits to B's office, A learns that B is not licensed to practice medicine. A repudiates the agreement and asks for his money back. A is entitled to recover \\$2000 from B by the rule of § 32(1). It is irrelevant to A's recovery that he may have derived benefit from B's services.\n\n*Id.*; *see also* Illustration 4; Illustration 18.\n\nRestitution damages can include, for example, the return of a deposit paid under a contract that the defendant has failed to perform. *See In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd.*, 404 B.R. at 342 (stating that restitution damages are particularly appropriate when used to recover a deposit or down payment paid pursuant to a contract that was not performed by the other party);\n\n*Gulati v. Coyne Int'l Enters. Corp.*, 805 F. Supp. 365, 371 (E.D. Va. 1992) (similar); *Busman v. Beeren & Barry Invs., LLC*, 69 Va. Cir. 375, 379 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) (similar).\n\nHere, pursuant to Section 32(1) of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment and consistent with Illustration 21, Eastern is entitled to recover the \\$1 million deposit it paid to Strategic, and it is irrelevant whether it derived any benefit from Strategic's attempt to perform under the Agreement.\n\nThe Agreement authorized Eastern to \"direct other entities to pay [Strategic], and that such payments will be deemed satisfactory compensation.\" PX1 at 5. The \\$1 million deposit was paid by ACA. As the payor of the \\$1 million deposit, it may be that ACA has a claim to that restitution amount as against Eastern. However, the fact that ACA was the immediate payor of the monies due from Eastern does not relieve Strategic of its liability to Eastern in this matter. Nor does it permit Strategic to retain the sums. It is sufficient that the payment of the \\$1 million relieves Strategic of any liability in restitution to either Eastern or ACA. *See* Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 48 (\"If a third person makes a payment to the defendant to which (as between claimant and defendant) the claimant has a better legal or equitable right, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the defendant as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.\"); *see also id.* § 64 cmt. c & Illustration 3.\n\n## **B. Remaining Claims**\n\nThe Court's ruling that the Agreement is void and that Strategic is not entitled to retain the \\$1 million deposit but must return it to Eastern disposes of this case. The Court nonetheless addresses the parties' remaining claims in the alternative. The Court concludes that even if the Agreement were not in violation of the Virginia Private Security Services Statute, Eastern would be entitled to the return of \\$250,000 of its deposit.\n\n#### **1. Breach of Contract**\n\nStrategic and Eastern each claim that the other materially breached the Agreement. Eastern claims that Strategic breached by failing to provide the weekly reports and monthly reports and thus that it is entitled to return of its deposit on that basis alone. Strategic disputes that it materially breached the agreement and argues that it was Eastern who breached the Agreement by failing to pay the monthly fee as due on February 16, 2019.\n\nThe elements of a breach of contract claim under Virginia law are: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance or offers by the plaintiff to perform under the contract; (3) the defendant's failure to perform under the contract or breach of the agreement; and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach.\" *Car Pool LLC v. Hoke*, 2012 WL 4854652, at \\*3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2012) (citing *Filak v. George*, 594 S.E.2d 610, 614 (Va. 2004)); *see also Dodge v. CDW Gov't, Inc.*, 2009 WL 1605010, at \\*3 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2009) (stating same). Similarly, under New York law, the elements of a breach of contract claim include: \"(1) the existence of an agreement, (2) adequate performance of the contract by the plaintiff, (3) breach of contract by the defendant, and (4) damages.\" *Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.*, 837 F. Supp. 2d 162, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting *Harsco Corp. v. Segui*, 91 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir. 1996)); *see also Tessler v. NBC Universal, Inc.*, 2009 WL 866834, at \\*6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2009), *aff'd sub nom. Tessler v. Nat'l Broad. Co.*, 364 F. App'x 5 (4th Cir. 2010) (\"[B]oth New York and Virginia law essentially require the same elements for a legally enforceable contract.\").18\n\n18 Strategic cites to New York law for the breach of contract claim, while Eastern cites to both New York and Virginia law. \"Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law.\" *Ellington Credit Fund*, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 179-80 (citing *Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.*, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)). The Court has included references to both New York and Virginia law but \"[w]here both parties rely upon New York law in their briefs, the Court may assume the parties impliedly consent to the application of New York law.\" *Fort Prods., Inc v. Men's Med.*\n\n#### **a. The Parties' Claims**\n\nEastern alleges that Strategic breached by failing to provide quality information in the form of the weekly reports by the Agreement's deadlines and that it is entitled to restitution damages in the amount of the \\$1 million deposit because Strategic conferred no benefit. It argues that Strategic was in material breach no later than January 30, 2018 after it failed to timely deliver the first weekly report on January 23 and when it delivered the USB drives with the \"useless\" information on January 26 and January 30. Strategic does not deny that it did not provide the report, but rather defends that Eastern substantially hindered its performance and therefore Strategic cannot held it in breach, i.e., it argues frustration of purpose and lack of good faith and fair dealing. It also argues that to the extent it breached the Agreement, the breaches were not material. In addition, Strategic argues, Wang and L. Han instructed Strategic to keep working and thus Eastern lost its right to terminate the contract based on the alleged breaches.\n\nStrategic's counterclaim alleges that Eastern first breached the Agreement by failing to pay the \\$750,000 monthly payment due on February 16, 2018. 19 It argues Eastern breached the Agreement again when it delivered a termination letter without 30 days' notice. Eastern responds that Strategic's performance was to precede Eastern's payment of the \\$750,000 and because there was no performance, it did not breach in its failure to pay. In addition, Eastern argues that because \\$1 million was to be credited to work performed on a prorated basis to the final 1 1/3 months of the Agreement, PX1, it did not fail to pay Strategic the \\$750,000 because Strategic had the \\$1 million in its account that it could prorate. If both parties breached, Eastern\n\n*Clinic, LLC*, 2016 WL 797577, at \\*1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2016) (citing *Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc.*, 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (\"The parties' briefs assume that New York law controls, and such implied consent . . . is sufficient to establish choice of law.\") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).\n\n19 The Court rejects Strategic's argument that Eastern breached the contract by having ACA pay the \\$1 million deposit. *See supra*.\n\nargues it would still get its \\$1 million deposit less any substantiated benefit conferred by Strategic, which it claims was zero or at most, \\$338,709.68 for the 14 days of work performed by Strategic prior to its breach.\n\nThe Court concludes that Strategic did not materially breach the Agreement by delivering the \"useless\" USB drives or failing to deliver the weekly reports, but that it did breach by failing to deliver the first monthly report on February 16, 2018 in accordance with the Agreement. Eastern also breached by failing to pay the \\$750,000 monthly fee on February 16, 2018. There is thus a simultaneous breach. As a result, Eastern was within its rights in terminating the Agreement shortly after February 16 and Strategic is not entitled to performance or damages from Eastern. Eastern also is not entitled to performance or damages from Strategic.\n\n#### **b. Eastern's Claim**\n\nEastern argues that Strategic breached the Agreement by failing to deliver the progress report on the financial forensic research each week in the first month of the Agreement, weekly current tracking reports each week during that first month, and social media research each week during the first month. The parties agree Strategic never delivered any financial forensic historical research, current tracking research, or social media research called for under the Agreement. JSOAF ¶¶ 54-56. The two USB drives that Strategic delivered were useless: the first contained only the researchers' own work to familiarize themselves with the subjects based on open source information while the second was unreadable raw material delivered from a subcontractor who refused to provide the actual information. Strategic also never provided any monthly reports. Eastern argues that Strategic breached the Agreement. Strategic claims that any breaches were immaterial or were caused by Eastern who frustrated its performance.\n\nThe Court begins, as always, with the Agreement. *See, e.g.*, *Kelly v. Ammado Internet Servs., Ltd.*, 2012 WL 4829341, at \\*3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2012) (\"To interpret a contract's terms,\n\nVirginia courts 'consider the words of [the] contract within the four corners of the instrument itself.'\") (quoting *Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp.*, 724 S.E.2d 196, 201 (Va. 2012)). The Agreement is not a model of clarity. Each side presents powerful arguments. The Court concludes that the failure to deliver the weekly reports or research during the first month was not a material breach.\n\n\"A material breach is a failure to do something that is so fundamental to the contract that the failure to perform that obligation defeats an essential purpose of the contract.\" *Horton v. Horton*, 487 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Va. 1997); *see VFS Fin., Inc. v. Falcon Fifty LLC*, 17 F. Supp. 3d 372, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (\"A breach is material if it \"go[es] to the root of the agreement between the parties [and] is so substantial that it defeats the object of the parties in making the contract.\").\n\nIn some senses, the Agreement here is akin to an installment contract. Strategic was to conduct research on three topic areas with respect to ten individuals designated by Eastern and to deliver the fruits of that research in the form of periodic reports: (i) weekly and then a preliminary report in the first month for financial forensic historical research, (ii) weekly and then monthly in the case of current tracking research, and (iii) weekly and then monthly for social media research. \"[T]he most effective way\" for Eastern to have made clear that the failure to deliver each of the specified reports each week during the first month would have been to say that time was of the essence in the Agreement. *ADC Orange, Inc. v. Coyote Acres, Inc.*, 857 N.E.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. 2006). For example, where a party has failed to make payment in a contract for the purchase of real estate, \"whether [a] [party]'s late installment payment constitutes a material breach depends on whether time [i]s of the essence with respect to that payment.\" *Id.* (contract for purchase of real property). Whatever its expressed desires in the\n\nAgreement or during contract negotiation, Eastern here did not insist on a provision that time would be of the essence. It thus cannot avail itself of that doctrine.\n\nThe absence of an explicit \"time is of the essence\" provision is not dispositive, however, of Eastern's claim. It just requires the exercise of judicial interpretation. Although \"[t]ime is generally of the essence where a definite time of performance is specified in a contract,\" that is not so where \"circumstances indicate a contrary intent.\" *Burgess Steel Prod. Corp. v. Mod. Telecomms., Inc.*, 613 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (1st Dep't 1994). \"The mere designation of a date upon which a thing is to be performed does not alone bring about [the] result [that time is of the essence].\" *Ring 57 Corp. v. Litt,* 280 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (2d Dep't 1967). \"What constitutes a reasonable time for performance depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.\" *Zev v. Merman*, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988). Indeed, courts have held that \"[i]n the absence of a provision that time was of the essence, the plaintiff was required to communicate unequivocal notice that tardy payments would not be accepted.\" *Cmty. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Joseph*, 504 N.Y.S.2d 185, 185 (2d Dep't 1986).\n\nReviewing the Agreement as a whole, the Court concludes that the requirement that Eastern deliver reports on all three subjects for the 15 fish in each week of the first month was not a material term of the Agreement and that the failure to deliver those weekly reports did not defeat an essential purpose of the Agreement. The Court starts with the fact that the Agreement was intended to create a long-term relationship between the parties. Eastern retained Strategic to conduct research over a three-year period terminable only on 30 days' notice. Although the Agreement gave Eastern the right to \"remove certain fish from time to time,\" it was not necessarily the case that Eastern would choose to do so or that Strategic would find \"circumstances do not permit sufficient work to research a given fish.\" PX1 at 3. The\n\nAgreement contemplated that Strategic might continue its research on a given subject throughout the entire three-year period. *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 2 (noting that, for current tracking research, Eastern could direct more frequent reporting \"for up to a six-month period\"). In these circumstances, it is impossible to say that the failure to deliver research on one or more or even all of the subjects in the first couple of weeks of the Agreement would frustrate or defeat the purpose of the Agreement as a whole.\n\nThat conclusion is reinforced by numerous other provisions of the Agreement. In the first instance, the timing of the weekly reports and the form which they were to take are stated in the Agreement in somewhat vague terms, hardly the unequivocal and definitive language one would expect if time were of the essence for each of the reports. The financial forensic research was to be in the form of \"a progress report . . . each week in the first month,\" with no specific date set for delivery or specific content required. *Id.* The language with respect to the weekly current tracking research and social media research similarly is general: it refers to \"research\" not reports and provides for that research to be delivered weekly without setting a date certain. *See id.* It stands in contrast to the more definitive language with respect to the monthly reports a \"preliminary report\" on financial forensic historical research in the first month, *id.*; \"Current Tracking reports for each subject . . . produced monthly,\" *id.* at 3; and \"Social media reports . . . produced monthly,\" *id.* Indeed, the weekly reports are not even singled out as \"Deliverables.\" *See id.*\n\nMoreover, Eastern did not give Strategic the final list of subjects to research and was not required to do so until the Agreement was signed, one week before the first weekly reports were due. *See id.* at 1. It thus could not have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties that Strategic would have been required to deliver actionable information as to each and every\n\none of the subjects in the first couple of weeks of the Agreement. Strategic did not even know for certain who the subjects were and whether they would be able to be researched. Indeed, the Agreement itself recognized that the \"circumstances [might] not permit sufficient work to research a given fish.\" *Id.* at 3.\n\nFurthermore, Strategic was not even required to continue the research for five of the original 15 subjects designated by Eastern beyond the first month, and Eastern would not be entitled to reports on those subjects in the ensuing months. Strategic was required to research 15 subjects in the first month. It was required to research only ten subjects in each of the following months. At the time the Agreement commenced, the parties did not know which, if any, of the 15 initial subjects would form the group of ten subjects for the rest of the research. It is inconceivable that the failure to deliver information in the first couple of weeks for a subject as to whom research might not continue beyond those first couple of weeks would defeat the purpose of the Agreement.\n\nFinally, after Eastern still had not received the fourth weekly report due by February 13, 2018, it did not warn Strategic that it was late on its payments, in breach of the Agreement, or otherwise indicate that \"time was of the essence\" in the Agreement. Even if the Agreement could be considered a time of the essence contract, \"a party, by acquiescence or failure to pursue rights diligently under a time of the essence provision, eliminates or waives the provision as a term or implied term of the contract.\" *Lockheed Martin Transp. Sec. Sols. v. MTA Cap. Constr. Co.*, 2014 WL 12560686, at \\*22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (collecting cases); *see Atateks Foreign Trade Ltd. v. Priv. Label Sourcing, LLC*, 2009 WL 1803458, at \\*21 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009), *aff'd*, 402 F. App'x 623 (2d Cir. 2010) (\"[I]t is improper for a party who has waived its right to timely performance to attempt suddenly to cancel the contract without first notifying its\n\ncounterparty that time is of the essence and re-setting the time for performance within a reasonable time by clear, distinct, and unequivocal notice.\") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *see also Ring 57 Corp.*, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 332 (\"[A]cquiescence in [a] series of delays\" waives default).\n\nFor those reasons, the Court concludes that the failure to deliver the research or the weekly reports for the first month of the Agreement did not constitute a material breach.\n\nThe Court reaches a different conclusion with respect to the monthly reports: the preliminary financial forensic research reports due in the first month and the current tracking and social media reports whose production monthly was listed as a deliverable. The failure to produce those monthly reports was material. The monthly reports play an important role within the context of the Agreement. It was on the basis of the monthly reports that Eastern was to dictate the work to be done by Strategic. The Agreement provided that it was \"understood that [Eastern] may not wish for each of the 10 fish to be the subject of all three reports, and that the number of report work duties per month [would] vary.\" PX1 at 3. That was particularly so with respect to the first month—the reports for which would dictate which ten of the 15 subjects would become the focus of the future reports. Without those reports, Eastern would have no means by which to determine who Strategic should focus on in the ensuing months. And, without a basis to determine who Strategic should investigate, an essential purpose of the Agreement would be defeated.\n\nThe monthly reports for the first month also play an important part in the accounting provision of the Agreement. That provision, it will be recalled, reflected that after the \"March reports and payments [were] made, . . . all involved Parties will meet to recap the accounting, prior to moving forward with the next quarter.\" *Id.* at 4. There might be an increase the number\n\nof \"fish\" thereafter. *Id.* The parties might also decide to renegotiate the terms of their agreement. It was to be at that March meeting that the parties were to discuss whether they found \"the proper information requested on target A and any of the couple of categories under target A,\" and where \"this ma[d]e sense or should [they] stop and move on to a different target with a different parameter, and was this working properly.\" Trial Tr. at 274. It is the only provision for a recap set in the Agreement, and that provision for a recap was an essential provision of the Agreement. It was the basis for the compromise between Strategic, which wanted a monthly retainer regardless of results, and Eastern, which wanted to pay by result. But, in order for that accounting mechanism to function properly, it could not be based solely on the results of one month's reporting—even the most recent month. The parties would need to have some trajectory and to understand whether the results for a particular month reflected an increase in what had been found and might suggest additional work to be done, or instead reflected that after exhaustive work a dead-end had been reached. Strategic's failure to deliver monthly reports thus frustrated an essential provision of the Agreement.\n\n#### **c. Strategic's Counterclaim**\n\nStrategic's counterclaim alleges that Eastern first breached the Agreement by failing to pay the \\$750,000 monthly payment due on February 16, which it argues, was required under the Agreement regardless of the deliverables and which it needed to fund Team 1's research.20 It also argues Eastern breached the Agreement again when it delivered a termination letter without 30 days' notice. As shown below, it does not follow from the fact that Strategic failed to deliver the monthly reports that Eastern was privileged to withhold the \\$750,000 payment. Analyzing the facts and the law, the correct result is that Eastern still owes Strategic the \\$750,000 and its\n\n20 The Court rejects Strategic's argument that Eastern breached the contract by having ACA pay the \\$1 million deposit. *See supra*.\n\nbreach will be satisfied by allowing Strategic to withhold that sum from the money it is holding as a deposit. At the same time, however, Strategic's breach did entitle Eastern to declare that it would cease performing under the Agreement and not pay the next \\$750,000 installment.\n\nThe Court rejects Eastern's interpretation that it was obligated to pay Strategic only upon the delivery of a report and thus that it had no obligation to pay Strategic the \\$750,000 in mid-February.\n\nEastern's argument is based on the section of the Agreement headed \"Prices.\" That section states in pertinent part: \"The prices for each deliverable \"A,\" \"B,\" and \"C\" are \\$300,000 each per subject per year, for a total of \\$900,000 per fish per year.\" PX1 at 3. It further states that the pricing for the first month \"will include up to 15 fish for a total of 30 reports and will decrease to 10 fish for a total of 30 reports at the beginning of the second month (February) and for (March) [sic] and for the duration of this contract.\" *Id.* at 4. It contains a paragraph that states:\n\n(A) Comprehensive historical reports: \\$300,000 per report (or report-equivalent) per year.\n\n(B) Tracking reports: \\$300,000 per report (or report-equivalent) per year.\n\n(C) Social media reports: \\$300,000 per report (or report-equivalent) per year.\n\n*Id.*\n\nThe \"Prices\" section, however, also states that the \"solution [of prices per report] does not provide for predictable budgeting or workloads,\" \"[t]o ensure the maximum workload for predictability of the agreed price, [Strategic] will measure the deliverables as 30 units per year (10 fish x 3 reports [A+B+C] each = 30 jobs/reports at any given time),\" and \"[t]he pricing for 30 units or deliverables per year remains a constant \\$9,000,000 per ear, or \\$750,000 per month for 12 months.\" *Id.* at 3-4.\n\nThe parties disagree as to the import of this language. Eastern argues that it reflects an agreement by the parties that Eastern would pay \\$300,000 per report only when the reports were delivered. Strategic responds that the language sets forth the methodology by which the \\$750,000 per month and \\$9,000,000 was derived. The Court concludes that Strategic has the better of the argument.\n\nFirst, the Court is obliged to give meaning and effect to all of the provisions of the Agreement and to avoid rendering any provision surplusage or meaningless. *See Goodman v. Resol. Tr. Corp.*, 7 F.3d 1123, 1127 (4th Cir. 1993) (\"Contract terms must be construed to give meaning and effect to every part of the contract, rather than leave a portion of the contract meaningless or reduced to mere surplusage.\"); *Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.*, 2021 WL 508727, at \\*9 (W.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2021) (\"[N]o word or clause in a contract will be treated as meaningless if a reasonable meaning can be given to it, and parties are presumed not to have included needless words in the contract.\") (quoting *TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., L.L.C.*, 557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Va. 2002)); *Berry v. Klinger*, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Va. 1983) (\"The court must give effect to all of the language of a contract if its parts can be read together without conflict.\"). The Agreement states, in several places, that Eastern is obligated to pay Strategic a monthly fee of \\$750,000 for Strategic's agreement to the terms of the contract. That language is unambiguous: \"Payment is to be made in regular monthly installments of US\\$750,000, at the end of each month.\" PX1 at 5.\n\nSecond, Strategic's interpretation is the best way to construe the Agreement as a whole to satisfy the purposes of the parties. *See First Am. Bank of Va. v. J.S.C. Concrete Const., Inc.*, 523 S.E.2d 496, 501 (Va. 2000) (\"[T]he court will not treat any word or clause as meaningless if any reasonable interpretation consistent with the other portions of the contract can be ascribed to\n\nit.\"). As Strategic points out, the Agreement contemplated that there would be circumstances where it would not deliver, or be able to deliver, three reports a month. With respect to financial forensic reports, Strategic's obligation was only to produce \"update reports\" on a monthly basis after the three-month marker. Most importantly, as Strategic highlights, Eastern had the unfettered discretion to substitute subjects over the term of the Agreement: if it deemed it necessary to remove one subject, it had the right to designate an additional subject to be investigated and thus \"the number of report work duties per month will vary.\" PX1 at 3. The substitution of one subject for another would result in delay in reporting and increased costs for Strategic. But Strategic was willing to accept those increased costs and the discretion that the Agreement gave Eastern over the timing of reports because Eastern would pay a flat monthly fee in exchange for Strategic's agreement to provide the agreed number of reports or report equivalents over the course of the year.\n\nThird, reflecting the fact that Strategic's obligation was measured on an annual and not a monthly basis, the very language to which Eastern points reflects the price per deliverable \"per year.\" There is no price per deliverable per month. Thus, Eastern's own reading of the Agreement, applied literally, would lead to a result that not even Eastern urges—that (notwithstanding the language regarding \\$750,000 per month), Eastern's only obligation was to pay \"\\$900,000 per fish per year.\" *Id.*\n\nContrary to Eastern's argument, Strategic's interpretation does give effect and meaning to each provision of the Agreement. Given the flexibility the Agreement accorded Eastern to request the reports and to the timing of their delivery, as well as with respect to the subjects to be investigated, there was a need to set forth a methodology showing the correspondence between reports owed and money to be paid. In the absence of such a provision, there would be no ready\n\nmethod to determine whether Eastern received all the reports it was owed in a circumstance where, for example, it had substituted subjects and mixed and matched reports. The language to which Eastern points provided such a method. Eastern's failure to pay \\$750,000 by its due date was a material breach of the Agreement. *See, e.g.*, *Tandberg, Inc. v. Advanced Media Design, Inc.*, 2009 WL 4067717, at \\*4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 23, 2009) (\"[It] is well-settled that failure to make timely payment constitutes a material breach.\") (collecting cases).\n\nFinally, Eastern's argument that Strategic was to deliver quality reports in the first weeks and that if it did not do so, Eastern would have the right both to declare a material breach and to obtain the return of its deposit is, in essence if not in form, an attempt to achieve through contrived contract interpretation the very right to make payment contingent on the delivery of reports and to deprive Strategic of the value of the deposit that it attempted but failed to achieve through contract negotiation. During contract negotiation, Eastern argued that the payments should be due based on deliverables and that if the reports were not of the quality Eastern expected, it would be able to obtain the return of its deposit. Strategic objected to those requests and insisted that it needed the security of a regular monthly payment, a \\$1 million evergreen deposit, and one-month notice before the contract could be terminated. Those provisions were needed before Strategic embarked on the venture and made the investments necessary to establish a research network, without knowing in advance whether it would be able to successfully research any or all of the subjects. The Agreement permitted Eastern to terminate at any time and for any reason, but that termination would not be effective for one month ensuring that Strategic would be able to recoup through the deposit the investment it made to begin the research. Eastern's argument would essentially reverse those provisions and frustrate the expressed intent of the parties at the time of contracting. If accepted, it would permit Eastern\n\nto condition payment on the quality of the reports and to recoup its deposit, notwithstanding the 30-day notice provision.\n\nStrategic brings a second, separate claim based on Eastern's failure to provide the proper termination notice under the Agreement, which provides that \"[e]ither party may terminate the contract with 30 days' written notice.\" PX1. Eastern submitted a letter on February 23, 2018 stating that it was terminating the contract and made no payments thereafter. The Agreement indicates that termination would be effective only 30 days after notice of termination. However, when a party materially breaches a contract, the other party is relieved of its future obligations. *See New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. v. Meyers*, 442 F.3d 101, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"When a party has breached a contract, that breach may excuse the nonbreaching party from further performance if the breach is 'material.'\"). Given Strategic's material breach, Eastern was permitted to terminate the Agreement without giving 30 days' notice, and this basis for the counterclaim thus fails.\n\n#### **d. Relief**\n\nThe evidence establishes that Strategic and Eastern both materially breached the Agreement and did so at the same time. Strategic breached by failing to deliver the monthly report on February 16, 2018. Eastern breached when it failed to pay the \\$750,000 installment on February 16, 2018.\n\nIt is black letter law that, upon a material breach of contract, the non-breaching party may elect to cease performance and seek damages. *See, e.g.*, *Lovink v. Guilford Mills, Inc.*, 878 F.2d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 1989) (\"A total breach justifies termination of the contract and damages for complete failure of performance.\"); *The Est. of Mantle v. Rothgeb*, 2007 WL 4548127, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2007) (\"If plaintiff did materially breach the Agreement, defendants would have been entitled to terminate the contract and sue for damages.\"). Absent circumstances not\n\napplicable here, a party who fails to perform cannot itself seek damages. *See Optima Media Grp. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P.*, 2021 WL 1941878, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2021) (\"In order to recover for breach of contract, a party must first show it substantially performed under that contract\"); *Car Pool*, 2012 WL 4854652, at \\*3 (requiring plaintiff's adequate performance of the contract to state a claim). It follows that, upon Strategic's failure to deliver the monthly reports, Eastern had the right to send the termination notice and direct Strategic not to perform any further activities for Eastern. Eastern is not liable for any portion of the \\$750,000 payment that would have been due in mid-March for services performed from mid-February on, after Eastern validly terminated the Agreement. It also follows that upon Eastern's failure to pay the \\$750,000 in consideration of the retention of Strategic from mid-January to mid-February, Strategic was no longer required to engage in investigative services for Eastern. Eastern's beach gave it the right at that time to immediately elect to stop working for Eastern and not to incur any additional expenses on its behalf.\n\nIt does not follow that either of Eastern or Strategic is entitled to contract damages. Eastern has not identified any damages it suffered by failing to receive the first monthly reports. In addition, by failing to tender payment and materially breaching the Agreement, Eastern is not entitled to damages. At the same time, Strategic too is not entitled to recover damages for Eastern's breach of contract. Had Strategic performed and delivered the monthly reports (regardless of their quality), it would have been entitled to damages for Eastern's premature termination of the Agreement in the amount of at least \\$750,000—representing the payment it would have been owed for the 30-day period it was entitled to payment after Eastern served a notice of termination (and which was due on February 16). But it did not perform on February 16, and thus it cannot complain that it did not receive the \\$750,000.\n\nWhere \"each party breached an obligation due and owing under the contract . . . neither party is entitled to damages from the other.\" *Buffardi v. Parillo*, 563 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950 (3d Dep't 1990) (finding \"no merit in each party's claim that he was relieved from the obligation to perform by the other party's failure to perform\" because \"[n]either party engaged in the type of conduct that frustrated or prevented the other party from performing, and since both conditions were to be fulfilled in a reasonable time, neither party was justified in waiting for the other party to perform first\") (internal citation omitted).\n\nA different conclusion follows with respect to whether Eastern is entitled to recover the full \\$1 million deposit it paid Strategic at the beginning of the Agreement. It is not entitled to do so on a breach of contract theory. Eastern does not dispute that the parties had agreed that the \\$1 million deposit could be credited by Strategic against the final 1 and 1/3 months of the Agreement. *See* PX1 at 5. As described above, that agreement was critical to Strategic's agreement to perform investigative services—had Eastern not agreed to provide an advance against its obligations and had it not further agreed that Strategic could retain that sum for as long as the Agreement was in effect, up to a maximum of 1 and 1/3 months, Strategic would not have invested in the infrastructure necessary to carry out the Agreement. The Agreement here was in effect for one month, from January 16, 2018 to February 16, 2018. It follows that, had Strategic not violated the Virginia Private Security Services Statute, Strategic would have been entitled to retain that portion of the \\$1 million that it earned while the Agreement was in effect, or \\$750,000. That amount and Strategic's right to retain it are not contingent upon Strategic's\n\n*delivery* of reports—that is the precise contractual provision Eastern demanded but was not able to obtain during contract negotiations. 21\n\nEastern is entitled to restitution in the amount of \\$250,000 on a breach of contract theory. That represents the \\$1 million deposit Eastern paid less the \\$750,000 amount that Strategic is owed and entitled to keep under the Agreement. \"[I]f a party justifiably refuses to perform on the ground that his remaining duties of performance have been discharged by the other party's breach, the party in breach is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred by way of part performance or reliance in excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach.\" Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374 (1981); *see also New Windsor*, 442 F.3d at 118 (\"[A] plaintiff whose breach was not willful and deliberate may, in some instances, recover so much as his efforts have actually benefited the non-breaching party.\"). Even if Eastern breached the Agreement by failing to pay the \\$750,000 due on February 16, it is still entitled to restitution for the benefit it conferred on Strategic, which is equal to the amount in excess of the \\$750,000 that Strategic is owed, i.e., \\$250,000. However, that sum is subsumed within the \\$1 million Eastern is entitled to recover on its claim based on the Virginia Private Security Services Statute.\n\n#### **2. Eastern's Unjust Enrichment Claim**\n\nEastern also bring a claim for unjust enrichment. That claim does not provide any relief for Eastern.\n\nThe elements of unjust enrichment are: \"(1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) knowledge on the part of the defendant of the conferring of the benefit; and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant in circumstances that render it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value.\" *The Christian Broad.*\n\n21 That the \\$750,000 is not contingent on Strategic's delivery of services distinguishes Eastern's reliance on Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 234 cmt. e, f.\n\n*Network, Inc. v. Busch*, 2006 WL 2850624, at \\*7-8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2006) (collecting cases); *see Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein*, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (N.Y. 2011) (same).\n\n\"Where the parties executed a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter, recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment for events arising out of that subject matter is ordinarily precluded.\" *IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.*, 907 N.E.2d 268, 274 (N.Y. 2009) (plaintiff could not use unjust enrichment claim to recover fee paid because it arose from services governed by engagement letter). The parties do not dispute that the Agreement is enforceable and that payment of the \\$1 million deposit was required by the Agreement. Regardless of whether its breach of contract claim succeeds, Eastern cannot recover for the \\$1 million under an unjust enrichment claim. *See UETA Latinamerica, Inc. v. Zafir*, 10 N.Y.S.3d 566, 568 (2d Dep't 2015) (claim for unjust enrichment \"only applies in the absence of an express agreement, and is not really a contract at all, but rather an equitable obligation imposed in order to prevent a party's unjust enrichment\"); *The Christian Broad. Network*, 2006 WL 2850624, at \\*8 (\"Unjust enrichment claims arise 'when there is no contractual relationship.'\") (quoting *Aerotek, Inc. v. Tyonek Native Corp.*, 2005 WL 3372872, at \\*3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2005)); *see also Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp.*, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (\"If a valid, enforceable contract existed between the parties, then [plaintiff] cannot recover under a theory of unjust enrichment. However, if no valid contract was in place regarding the sale of the goods, [plaintiff] has failed to state a claim for relief under the theory of unjust enrichment because, absent a contract, the benefit that [defendant] garnered from selling the merchandise was not at [plaintiff]'s expense.\").\n\n#### **3. Strategic's Fraud Counterclaim**\n\nStrategic argues that Eastern cannot recover the \\$1 million deposit because it was paid by ACA and because it was the victim of fraud by Guo and Eastern. The Court rejects these arguments.\n\nUnder Virginia law, the elements of actual fraud are: \"(1) a false representation, (2) of a material fact, (3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to mislead, (5) reliance by the party misled, and (6) resulting damage to the party misled.\" *Winn v. Aleda Constr. Co.*, 315 S.E.2d 193, 195 (Va. 1984). The burden of proof applicable to fraud under Virginia law is \"clear and convincing evidence,\" which is \"higher than a mere preponderance.\" *Sweely Holdings, LLC v. SunTrust Bank*, 820 S.E.2d 596, 604 (Va. 2018); *see Hitachi Credit Am. Corp. v. Signet Bank*, 166 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 1999).\n\nSimilarly, under New York law, \"a claim of fraudulent inducement requires proof (1) that the defendants made a representation, (2) as to a material fact, (3) which was false, (4) and known to be false by the defendants, (5) that the representation was made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, (6) that the other party rightfully did so rely, (7) in ignorance of its falsity, (8) to his injury.\" *Internet L. Libr., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt., LLC*, 2005 WL 3370542, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2005), *aff'd sub nom. ITIS Holdings Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt. LLC*, 329 F. App'x 299 (2d Cir. 2009). \"Each element of [a] fraud claim must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, at the summary judgment stage as well as at trial.\" *Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp.*, 528 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), *aff'd*, 354 F. App'x 496 (2d Cir. 2009)\n\nTo prevail on a fraud claim under both Virginia and New York law, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant made a false statement. Strategic here failed to do so. Strategic's claim is based on the notion that, at the time Guo requested Strategic to perform investigative\n\nservices for Eastern, Guo falsely represented that he was anti-CCP and that he would use the research obtained by Strategic for the purposes of sowing discord in the CCP and eventually overthrowing it. Thus, to prove its case, Strategic would have had to show either that Guo was a proponent of the CCP or at best indifferent to the CCP, or that Guo did not intend to use the research for the stated purposes.\n\nThe evidence did not establish Strategic's claim. Although there is evidence that Guo has made statements in favor of the CCP and of some conduct that would suggest that he is not hostile to the Chinese government (or at least not to all parts of it), Guo also testified to being an opponent of the CCP and to an intent to use the Strategic research in a manner hostile to the Chinese government. There is also evidence that Guo made statements consistent with a person who is hostile to the CCP. The evidence at trial does not permit the Court to decide whether Guo is, in fact, a dissident or a double agent. In the absence of a definitive or at least clear answer to that question, Strategic has not satisfied its burden of providing a false statement. Others will have to determine who the true Guo is.\n\nThe evidence before the Court also does not establish that Strategic reasonably or actually relied on Guo's representations about his political allegiances and the purposes for which he sought the research.\n\n\"In assessing the reasonableness of a plaintiff's alleged reliance, [the Court] considers the entire context of the transaction, including factors such as its complexity and magnitude, the sophistication of the parties, and the content of any agreements between them.\" *Meisel v. Grunberg*, 651 F. Supp. 2d 98, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting *Glidepath Holding B.V. v. Spherion Corp.*, 590 F. Supp. 2d 435, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). \"In applying the test of reasonableness, the court must determine whether the plaintiff availed itself of the means\n\navailable to it given its size and sophistication.\" *Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.*, 2016 WL 7374210, at \\*12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \"Factors to be considered in making this determination may include the particular parties' prior course of dealing, the roles of other participants in the transaction, the time and expense of the investigation, the feasibility of practical[ity] of the plaintiff's performance of a particular type of investigation before entering into the transaction, the foreseeable risk to the plaintiff of failing to undertake the investigation, and responsible industry custom.\" *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n\nBefore reasonably relying on a representation regarding information material to participation in a significant transaction, a sophisticated party \"has a duty to conduct an independent appraisal of the risk it is assuming and a duty to investigate the nature of its business transactions.\" *Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.*, 58 F. Supp. 2d 228, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); *see id.* (noting that they \"cannot be heard to complain when they fail to make diligent inquiries\"). \"Where sophisticated businessmen engaged in major transactions enjoy access to critical information but fail to take advantage of that access, . . . courts are particularly disinclined to entertain claims of justifiable reliance.\" *Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., Inc.*, 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2006). \"[I]f false representations are made regarding matters of fact, and the means of knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties, and the party, instead of resorting to them, sees fit to trust himself in the hands of one whose interest is to mislead him, the law, in general, will leave him where he has been placed by his own imprudent confidence.\" *Persaud Cos., Inc. v. IBCS Grp., Inc.*, 425 F. App'x 223, 226 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Costello v. Larsen*, 29 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1944). \"Succinctly put, a party will not be heard to complain that he has been defrauded when it is his own evident lack of due care which is responsible for his\n\npredicament.\" *Rodas v. Manitaras*, 552 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (1st Dep't 1990); *accord Crigger*, 443 F.3d at 235; *see also Hitachi Credit*, 166 F.3d at 629 (\"A plaintiff cannot claim that its reliance was reasonable and justified when it makes a partial inquiry, with full opportunity of complete investigation, and elects to act upon the knowledge obtained from the partial inquiry.\").\n\nSimilarly, to establish actual reliance in a fraud action under New York law, \"the plaintiff must show a belief in the truth of the representation and a change of position in reliance on that belief.\" *Hecht v. Components Int'l, Inc.*, 867 N.Y.S.2d 889, 895 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (citing *CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co.*, 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. 1990)). Put another way, the plaintiff must show that the \"defendant's misrepresentation induced plaintiff to engage in the transaction in question[.]\" *Laub v. Faessel*, 745 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (1st Dep't 2002). Actual reliance requires proof \"that 'but for the claimed misrepresentations or omissions, the plaintiff would not have entered into the detrimental securities transaction.'\" *Basis PAC-Rim Opportunity Fund (Master) v. TCW Asset Mgmt. Co.*, 48 N.Y.S.3d 654, 656 (1st Dep't 2017) (quoting *Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.*, 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005)).\n\nStrategic is and holds itself out to be a sophisticated entity. Its business includes the investigation of people, including their backgrounds and their financial relationships. Information was available to it that called Guo's political allegiances and objectives into question. Gertz had written an article on May 23, 2017, prior to the Agreement, that described Guo's \"close ties to senior Chinese Communist Party leaders, including government ministers and Politburo members,\" indicated Guo had \"access to Ministry of State security operations overseas and in the United States,\" and noted that \"Guo's wife and daughter currently have been allowed by Chinese authorities to visit him in New York but are required to return to China after 20 days, where they can be used for political leverage against Guo.\" Trial Tr. at 82; DX 43.\n\nWallop denied seeing this article, despite Strategic's focus on \"research and analysis of political intelligence,\" her 30-year relationship with Gertz, and the fact that Gertz introduced her to Guo. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. at 34; *see also id.* at 55-56. In another article, dated October 9, 2017, Gertz had noted that \"Guo said he maintains close ties to supporters within the Chinese government and security system.\" Trial Tr. at 84-85; DX32. It was therefore a matter of public knowledge that Guo had provided funds to security forces in China and maintained relationships with highlevel members of the CCP. If Wallop and Waller were concerned that such relationships were consistent with support of the CCP or at least ambivalence towards it, they could have investigated or inquired further. Instead they did not. *See, e.g.*, *PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Dominion Energy Mgmt., Inc.*, 2018 WL 1768061, at \\*11 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2018) (\"Examples of unreasonable reliance include 'where a party had information that would excite the suspicions of a reasonably prudent person' or 'where one relies upon an oral statement that is contrary to a written statement in his possession.'\") (citation omitted).\n\nIf Guo's allegiances and the purpose for which Eastern commissioned the research had been important to Strategic, as it testified, it could have protected itself. It could, for example, have asked for a representation of Guo's loyalties, or at least a recital in a whereas clause in the Agreement. It need not necessarily have feared that including such a representation or recital would have undermined the purpose of the Agreement and the parties' mutual desire for confidentiality. Representations are included in the most confidential of agreements. Moreover, the parties already went to extensive lengths to preserve confidentiality, including by having a confidentiality provision in the Agreement, by using \"virgin laptops\" to transfer the research data, and by making sure no non-encrypted electronic versions of the Agreement were available.\n\nMoreover, although Strategic argued that Guo did not want references to himself in the Agreement, Strategic need not have acceded to that request.\n\nIndeed, the structure of the Agreement and the deliverables Strategic was obligated to provide to Eastern are themselves inconsistent with the notion of reasonable reliance. The Agreement gave Eastern (and Guo) alone the power to dictate Strategic's research agenda. Strategic did not have input into the subjects of investigation or a veto over them. The Agreement provides that Eastern \"will provide the necessary basis information, and desired areas of focus, to [Strategic] to research.\" PX1. It also provided that Eastern could \"direct [Strategic] to conduct other research, not specified in this agreement, for a fee.\" *Id.* Eastern had the right to select fish. If Eastern had demanded that Strategic research an opponent of the CCP, the Agreement would have required Strategic to do so. Strategic's only option not to investigate a subject was if \"circumstances do not permit sufficient work to research a given fish.\" *Id.*\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons explained above, the Court concludes that Eastern prevails on its claim for a declaratory judgment that the Agreement is unenforceable and void, and Eastern is entitled to restitution in the amount of the \\$1 million Strategic was never entitled to collect from Eastern. The Court has reviewed the remaining arguments and defenses, which fail.\n\nThe parties are directed to meet and confer regarding a proposed form of judgment and to file with the Court a joint stipulation or judgment by June 29, 2021.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nNew York, New York LEWIS J. LIMAN\n\nDated: June 22, 2021 \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nUnited States District Judge\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 148 of 159\n\n# **EXHIBIT 23**\n\n**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 149 of 159\n\n![](_page_148_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n*MILES KWOK October 3, 2018*\n\n![](_page_148_Picture_3.jpeg)\n\n*Original File 247294.TXT Min-U-Script® with Word Index*\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 150 of 159\n\n| 1 | SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n| 2 | COUNTY OF NEW YORK | | |\n| 3 | ------------------------------------------------x
PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P., | | |\n| 4 | Plaintiff, | | |\n| 5 | -against- | | |\n| 6 | KWOK HO WAN, a/k/a KWOK HO, a/k/a GWO WEN | | |\n| 7 | GUI, a/k/a GUO WENGUI, a/k/a GUO WEN-GUI,
a/k/a WAN GUE HAOYUN, a/k/a MILES KWOK, | | |\n| 8 | a/k/a HAOYUN GUY, | | |\n| 9 | Defendant. | | |\n| 10 | Index No.: 652077/2017
------------------------------------------------x | | |\n| 11 | | | |\n| 12 | 7 Times Square | | |\n| 13 | New York, New York | | |\n| 14 | October 3, 2018
9:39 a.m. | | |\n| 15 | | | |\n| 16 | Videotaped Examination Before Trial | | |\n| 17 | of the MILES KWOK, before Kristi Cruz, a Notary | | |\n| 18 | Public of the State of New York. | | |\n| 19 | | | |\n| 20 | | | |\n| 21 | | | |\n| 22 | | | |\n| 23 | ELLEN GRAUER COURT REPORTING CO. LLC | | |\n| 24 | 126 East 56th Street, Fifth Floor
New York, New York 10022 | | |\n| 25 | 212-750-6434
REF:
247294 | | |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 151 of 159\n\n| 1 | | A P P E A R A N C E S: | | | |\n|----|-------------------------|------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| 2 | | | | | |\n| 3 | O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP | | | | |\n| 4 | Attorneys for Plaintiff | | | | |\n| 5 | | Times Square Tower | | | |\n| 6 | | 7 Times Square | | | |\n| 7 | | New York, New York 10036 | | | |\n| 8 | BY: | EDWARD MOSS, ESQ. | | | |\n| 9 | | STUART SARNOFF, ESQ. | | | |\n| 10 | | SARA N. PAHLAVAN, ESQ. | | | |\n| 11 | | 212.326.2000 | | | |\n| 12 | | emoss@omm.com | | | |\n| 13 | | ssarnoff@omm.com | | | |\n| 14 | | spahlavan@omm.com | | | |\n| 15 | | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | | |\n| 17 | HODGSON RUSS LLP | | | | |\n| 18 | Attorneys for Defendant | | | | |\n| 19 | | 605 Third Avenue, Suite 2300 | | | |\n| 20 | | New York, New York 10158 | | | |\n| 21 | BY: | MARK A. HARMON, ESQ. | | | |\n| 22 | | JILLIAN MARIE SEARLES, ESQ. | | | |\n| 23 | | 212.751.4300 | | | |\n| 24 | | mharmon@hodgsonruss.com | | | |\n| 25 | | jsearles@hodgsonruss.com | | | |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 152 of\n\n| 1 | A P P E A R A N C E S:
(Cont'd) |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | |\n| 3 | ALSO PRESENT: |\n| 4 | ELIZABETH YAOYING JIANG, Mandarin Interpreter |\n| 5 | DAN MACOM, Videographer |\n| 6 | KARIN MAISTRELLO, Golden Spring |\n| 7 | |\n| 8 | |\n| 9 | |\n| 10 | |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 153 of 159\n\n| 1 | | ------------------- I N D E X ------------------- | |\n|----|--------------|---------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 2 | WITNESS | EXAMINATION BY
PAGE | |\n| 3 | MILES KWOK | MR. MOSS
8 | |\n| 4 | | | |\n| 5 | | | |\n| 6 | DIRECTIONS: | PAGE
17, 18, 19, 58, 59, 61, | |\n| 7 | | 62, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, | |\n| 8 | | 78, 101, 102, 117, 118, | |\n| 9 | | 126, 128, 129 | |\n| 10 | | | |\n| 11 | | | |\n| 12 | | --------------- DOCUMENT REQUESTS --------------- | |\n| 13 | PAGE:
129 | Document evidencing agreement | |\n| 14 | | with Zhang Wei relating to the | |\n| 15 | | hotel | |\n| 16 | | | |\n| 17 | | | |\n| 18 | | ---------------- E X H I B I T S ---------------- | |\n| 19 | KWOK | DESCRIPTION
FOR I.D. | |\n| 20 | Exhibit 1 | Genever Holdings LLC
33 | |\n| 21 | | Corporate Documents | |\n| 22 | Exhibit 2 | Printout from YouTube
59 | |\n| 23 | Exhibit 3 | Federal Complaint
69 | |\n| 24 | Exhibit 4 | Letter with attached
73 | |\n| 25 | | financial information | |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 154 of 159\n\n| 1 | KWOK |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | opposition to its attachment motion Mr. Kwok |\n| 3 | filed a brief dated May 16, 2018, and relating |\n| 4 | to this issue on page 15, the brief reads as |\n| 5 | follows: |\n| 6 | \"Yet Frances,\" who is PAX's |\n| 7 | investigator, \"offers no proof beyond his own |\n| 8 | assertion that the voices are those of Kwok |\n| 9 | and his associates or that Kwok or anyone |\n| 10 | associated with him uploaded the audio |\n| 11 | recording in question, and there is |\n| 12 | substantial reason to question both the |\n| 13 | authenticity of the audio and the motives |\n| 14 | behind the individual or entity who uploaded |\n| 15 | it and represented that it was, in fact, Kwok |\n| 16 | making the statements in question.\" |\n| 17 | Now I'm going play the audio. |\n| 18 | (Whereupon, an audio/video is |\n| 19 | played.) |\n| 20 | THE WITNESS:
I refuse to listen. |\n| 21 | I'm not going to listen. |\n| 22 | Q.
Sorry, Mr. Kwok, were you covering |\n| 23 | your ears? |\n| 24 | A.
This is all communist.
Everything |\n| 25 | here is all communist.
Unless you prove this |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 155 of 159\n\n| 1 | KWOK |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | is not communist, then I will listen.
They |\n| 3 | have recorded over a million of tax audios, |\n| 4 | videos that are fake.
Unless you could prove |\n| 5 | this is real, otherwise I will not listen to |\n| 6 | it.
What relationship is this to me?
Unless |\n| 7 | you could prove this is what I have said, that |\n| 8 | this is my words, my audio, my video, then I |\n| 9 | will listen to it. |\n| 10 | Q.
You refuse to listen to the video? |\n| 11 | DI
MR. HARMON:
I object on the same |\n| 12 | basis and direct the witness not to answer |\n| 13 | the
question. |\n| 14 | A.
I have a sensation of committing |\n| 15 | suicide if you're going play that.
This is |\n| 16 | communist.
Very simple.
There is like a |\n| 17 | number of place that the communist that have |\n| 18 | been proven by the FBI to be fake.
So you |\n| 19 | want me to commit suicide?
Are you here to |\n| 20 | kill me?
I here seriously declare for all the |\n| 21 | videos that you would show as outside the |\n| 22 | parameters that's causing me mental distress, |\n| 23 | I will reserve my right to sue.
I like my |\n| 24 | attorney to note I reserve my right of the |\n| 25 | personal attacks by the other party against |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 156 of 159\n\n| 1 | KWOK |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | me, and I like to ask for the authenticity of |\n| 3 | this documents with a person's authenticity. |\n| 4 | I like to request an investigation of it.
I'm |\n| 5 | done. |\n| 6 | Q.
So, Mr. Kwok, you will not answer |\n| 7 | any questions about the video? |\n| 8 | DI
MR. HARMON:
Same objection.
Same |\n| 9 | direction.
Beyond the scope of what I |\n| 10 | believe appropriate to ask in discovery. |\n| 11 | A.
I believe this is humiliation, these |\n| 12 | are threats and will need to pay |\n| 13 | responsibility for these actions. |\n| 14 | MR. MOSS:
Please let the record |\n| 15 | reflect that when Mr. Kwok asked me to |\n| 16 | stop playing the video, I stopped playing |\n| 17 | the video.
I will not play it anymore. |\n| 18 | I note that Mr. Harmon has objected |\n| 19 | to this line of questioning and instructed |\n| 20 | Mr. Kwok not to answer any questions about |\n| 21 | this video. |\n| 22 | I have that right, right, |\n| 23 | Mr. Harmon? |\n| 24 | MR. HARMON:
I'm sorry? |\n| 25 | MR. MOSS:
I got it right?
You're |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 157 of 159\n\n| 1 | KWOK |\n|----|----------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | instructing -- |\n| 3 | MR. HARMON:
I thought you said you |\n| 4 | I have that right, as opposed to it's my |\n| 5 | right to something. |\n| 6 | MR. MOSS:
Fair enough.
I'm |\n| 7 | correct, you're instructing the witness -- |\n| 8 | MR. HARMON:
I'm instructing the |\n| 9 | witness not to answer the questions for |\n| 10 | the reasons I've already stated on the |\n| 11 | record. |\n| 12 | Q.
What is Golden Spring New York Ltd.? |\n| 13 | A.
It is Hong Kong Golden Spring, a |\n| 14 | company that they have expanded in New York. |\n| 15 | Q.
Who is \"they\"? |\n| 16 | A.
Hong Kong Golden Spring. |\n| 17 | Q.
Who owns Golden Spring New York? |\n| 18 | A.
Hong Kong Golden Spring owns. |\n| 19 | Q.
Who owns Hong Kong Golden Spring? |\n| 20 | A.
Guo Qiang. |\n| 21 | THE INTERPRETER:
G-U-O, Q-I-A-N-G, |\n| 22 | phonetic spelling. |\n| 23 | Q.
Is Guo Qiang a family member of |\n| 24 | yours? |\n| 25 | A.
Yes. |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 158 of 159\n\n| 1 | | KWOK |\n|----|------------|--------------------------------------|\n| 2 | Q. | What is the relation? |\n| 3 | A. | My son. |\n| 4 | Q. | Do you have any ownership interest |\n| 5 | | in Golden Spring Hong Kong? |\n| 6 | A. | No. |\n| 7 | Q. | Is Guo Qiang the same son as Mileson |\n| 8 | | or is it a different son? |\n| 9 | A. | It's the same person. |\n| 10 | Q. | Do you have any ownership interest |\n| 11 | | in Golden Spring New York? |\n| 12 | A. | No. |\n| 13 | Q. | So Golden Spring is owned by your |\n| 14 | son? | |\n| 15 | A. | My son also represents the family in |\n| 16 | owning it. | |\n| 17 | Q. | Does the son represent you in owning |\n| 18 | it? | |\n| 19 | A. | No. |\n| 20 | Q. | Your son represents other family |\n| 21 | | members in owning it? |\n| 22 | A. | Yes. |\n| 23 | Q. | Does your son represent Zhang Wei in |\n| 24 | | owning Golden Spring? |\n| 25 | A. | Yes. |\n\n## **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 159 of 159\n\n| 1 | KWOK | |\n|----|--------------------------------------------|--|\n| 2 | Q.
Is your son the sole shareholder of | |\n| 3 | Golden Spring? | |\n| 4 | MR. HARMON:
Object to the form of | |\n| 5 | the question. | |\n| 6 | A.
I'm not really sure. | |\n| 7 | Q.
Do you know of any other | |\n| 8 | shareholders of Golden Spring? | |\n| 9 | MR. HARMON:
Object to the form of | |\n| 10 | the question. | |\n| 11 | A.
I'm not sure.
I don't know. | |\n| 12 | Q.
Does Golden Spring have any | |\n| 13 | directors? | |\n| 14 | MR. HARMON:
Object to the form of | |\n| 15 | the question. | |\n| 16 | A.
I'm not sure. | |\n| 17 | MR. MOSS:
Mark, what's wrong, you | |\n| 18 | don't like that I'm not using one of the | |\n| 19 | entities? | |\n| 20 | MR. HARMON:
I don't know which | |\n| 21 | entity -- | |\n| 22 | MR. MOSS:
Hong Kong or New York? | |\n| 23 | MR. HARMON:
I don't know which one | |\n| 24 | you're talking about, or both. | |\n| 25 | Q.
Do any of the Golden Spring entities | |","body_zh":"案号 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交日期 02/28/22 登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 1 页，共 159 页\n附件 19\n\n发件人： 发送时间： 收件人： 主题： 附件：\n\nSusan Hennelly（苏珊·亨内利） 2015 年 3 月 3 日，星期二，下午 3:31 BoardOfDirectors（董事会） 出售 1801 号公寓及 2219 号女佣房 Kwok board package.pdf\n\n纽约县书记官办公室已备案：11/28/2018 12:22 PM　索引号 652077/2017　NYSCEF 文件编号 256　NYSCEF 收讫：11/28/2018　案号 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交日期 02/28/22 登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 2 页，共 159 页\n\n我们已收到一份出售合同，内容为将分配给 1801 号公寓的 2,950 股及分配给 2219 号女佣房的 50 股，由 Sherry 1800s, LLC（雪莉1800年代有限责任公司）（Haroche（阿罗什））出售给 Genever Holdings LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司）（Miles Kwok（郭文贵））。\n\n随附出售合同、Kwok 先生的申请书及若干推荐信副本。\n\n购买价为 $67,500,000，另加家具价款 $2,500,000。2015 年每月管理费为 $55,214，女佣房另加 $936。该房产为住宅公寓，将由 Kwok 先生及其家人使用。\n\n鉴于 Kwok 先生的外国人身份且其通过有限责任公司购买，他将须签署入住协议并亲自为租约提供保证。他还将须提供保证金。\n\n该公寓占据整层，面积约为 7,300 平方英尺，另有 2,170 平方英尺露台。随附平面图。\n\nKwok 先生还已签订购买 719 号女佣房的合同；如获批准，他将同时购买该房间。\n\nMichael Horvitz（迈克尔·霍维茨）和 Fred Seegal（弗雷德·西格尔）已面谈 Miles Kwok（郭文贵）及其儿子 Mileson Kwok（郭美）。其妻 Hing Chi（邢琪）通过 Skype 出席。\n\n谨致敬意，\n\nMichael J. Ullman（迈克尔·J·厄尔曼）\n执行副总裁兼首席运营官\nThe Sherry Netherland Hotel（雪莉荷兰酒店）\n781 Fifth Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n电话：212-231-6811\n传真：212-832-4845\n如需预订及特别优惠，请访问\n\n已签署的出售合同\n签署本协议前请咨询您的律师\n出售合同——合作公寓\n\n本合同于 February ___, 2015 由下述“卖方”和“买方”订立。\n\n一、若干定义及信息　1.1 “当事人”为：1.1.1“买方”：Genever Holdings LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司）\n\n1.1.1“卖方”：Sherry 1800s, LLC（雪莉1800年代有限责任公司）　卖方此前使用的名称：　地址：1233 Rock Rimmon Road, Stamford, CT 06903\n\n税务识别号：10-0780154\n\n地址：　社会保障号码：\n\n1.2 “律师”为（姓名、律师事务所名称、地址及电话、传真）：　1.2.1“卖方律师”　1.2.2“买方律师”\n\nMichael J. Jones, Esq.（迈克尔·J·琼斯律师），Ivey, Barnum & O’Mara, LLC（艾维、巴纳姆和奥马拉有限责任公司），170 Mason Street, Greenwich, CT 06830，电话：203-661-6000，传真：203-661-1088，mjones@iholow.com　　Ira Gilbert, Esq.（艾拉·吉尔伯特律师），Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP（保罗·韦斯、里夫金德、沃顿和加里森律师事务所），1285 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10019-6064，电话：212-373-3529，传真：212-492-0529，igilbert@paulweiss.com\n\n1.3 “托管代理人”为卖方律师。\n\n1.4 管理代理人为（姓名、地址及电话、传真）：Sherry Netherland Hotel（雪莉荷兰酒店），Susan Hennelly（苏珊·亨内利），781 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022，电话：212-231-6811，212-832-4845。\n\n1.5 房地产“经纪人”（见第 12 条）为：John Burger（约翰·伯格）和 Kathy Sloane（凯茜·斯隆），Brown Harris Stevens（布朗·哈里斯·史蒂文斯），以及 Serena Boardman（塞雷娜·博德曼），Sotheby’s（苏富比）。\n\n1.6 合作住房公司的名称（“公司”）为：Sherry Netherland, Inc.（雪莉荷兰公司）。\n\n1.7 “单元”编号为：1801，占据整层。\n\n1.8 该单元位于称为“房产”的地址：781 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY。\n\n1.9 “股份”是分配给该单元的公司股份。\n\n第 18 层，电梯走廊除外，并包括 1519 号女佣房。\n\n1.10 “租约”是公司就该单元授予的专有租约或入住协议。\n\n1.19 买方应支付公司的转让税、转让费（不包括过户代理费）及／或选择权放弃费（“转让税”），如有。\n\n截至本合同日期，单元内现有的物品包括：冰箱、冷冻柜、炉灶、烤箱、嵌入式微波炉、洗碗机、垃圾处理装置、橱柜和台面、照明装置、吊灯、满铺地毯、管道和供暖装置、中央空调及／或窗式或套管式空调机、洗衣机、烘干机、纱窗和防风窗、窗帘、开关面板、门五金、镜子、未在第 1.12 条中明确排除的内置设施，以及全部家具和个人财产（第 1.12 条、第 1.20 条或第 1.21 条另有规定者除外）。\n\nIvey, Barnum & O’Mara, LLC（艾维、巴纳姆和奥马拉有限责任公司）　Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP（保罗·韦斯、里夫金德、沃顿和加里森律师事务所）\nigilbert@paulweiss.com\n\n见下文第 1.12 条。\n\n1.12 本次出售明确排除十三（13）幅油画及素描；位于客厅东墙的一张古董秘书桌（将由一件与该桌相似的家具替代）；诸如小盒子、钟表、相框、照片等个人“小摆设”（但如“小摆设”出现在 DVD 中，则包括在内）；Gil 办公室内的文件柜及其内容物；卖方办公室内的全部衣物、装框照片（买方指定的特定相框除外）以及卖方私人游艇模型。\n\n1.13 本次出售［不］［确］包括卖方对［储藏室］／［1519 号佣人房］／［停车位］的权益（“包括的权益”）。\n\n1.14 “交割”是股份和租约所有权的转让。\n\n1.15 预定交割日期不迟于 3/6/15（“预定交割日期”）上午 10:00（见第 9 条和第 10 条）。\n\n1.16 “购买价”为：$67,500,000.00\n\n1.16.1 “合同定金”为：$7,000,000.00\n\n1.16.2 交割时应付的购买价“余额”为：\n\n$63,000,000.00（见第 2.2.2 条）见第二补充条款中的 SR18\n\n1.17 每月“管理费”为 $57,085.53（见第 4 条）。\n\n1.18 截至本合同日期，应付给公司的“特别摊款”（如有）为 NONE，支付方式如下：\n\n1.11 “动产”是下列个人财产，包括但不限于交付至 1801 单元的 DVD（“DVD”）所载系列视频中列明的全部物品。该 DVD 由 Brown Harris Stevens（布朗·哈里斯·史蒂文斯）于 February 20, 2015 下午 1:00 交付。\n\n纽约县书记官办公室已备案：11/28/2018 12:22 PM　索引号 652077/2017　NYSCEF 文件编号 256　NYSCEF 收讫：11/28/2018　案号 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交日期 02/28/22 登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 5 页，共 159 页\n\n纽约州律师协会制定的合作公寓和公寓出售合同范本\n签署本协议前请咨询您的律师\n出售合同——合作公寓\n\n本合同于 February ___, 2015 由下述“卖方”和“买方”订立。\n\n一、若干定义及信息　1.1 “当事人”为：1.1.1“卖方”：Sherry 1800s, LLC（雪莉1800年代有限责任公司）　1.1.2“买方”：Genever Holdings LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司）\n\n卖方此前使用的名称：　地址：1233 Rock Rimmon Road, Stamford, CT 06903\n\n税务识别号：10-0780154\n\n地址：　社会保障号码：\n\n1.2 “律师”为（姓名、律师事务所名称、地址及电话、传真）：　1.2.1“卖方律师”　1.2.2“买方律师”　Michael J. Jones, Esq.（迈克尔·J·琼斯律师），Ivey, Barnum & O’Mara, LLC（艾维、巴纳姆和奥马拉有限责任公司），170 Mason Street, Greenwich, CT 06830，电话：203-661-6000，传真：203-661-7088，mjones@iholow.com　　Ira Gilbert, Esq.（艾拉·吉尔伯特律师），Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP（保罗·韦斯、里夫金德、沃顿和加里森律师事务所），1285 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10019-6064，电话：212-373-3529，传真：212-492-0529，igilbert@paulweiss.com\n\n1.3 “托管代理人”为卖方律师。\n\n1.4 管理代理人为（姓名、地址及电话、传真）：Sherry Netherland Hotel（雪莉荷兰酒店），Susan Hennelly（苏珊·亨内利），781 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022，电话：212-231-6811，传真：212-832-4845。\n\n1.5 房地产“经纪人”（见第 12 条）为：John Burger（约翰·伯格）和 Kathy Sloane（凯茜·斯隆），Brown Harris Stevens（布朗·哈里斯·史蒂文斯），以及 Serena Boardman（塞雷娜·博德曼），Sotheby’s（苏富比）。\n\n1.6 合作住房公司的名称（“公司”）为：Sherry Netherland, Inc.（雪莉荷兰公司）。\n\n1.7 “单元”编号为：1801，占据整层。\n\n1.8 该单元位于称为“房产”的地址：781 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY。\n\n1.9 “股份”是分配给该单元的公司股份：第 18 层，电梯走廊除外，并包括 1519 号女佣房。\n\n1.10 “租约”是公司就该单元授予的专有租约或入住协议。\n\n1.19 买方应支付公司的转让税、转让费（不包括过户代理费）及／或选择权放弃费（“转让税”），如有。\n\n截至本合同日期，单元内现有的物品包括：冰箱、冷冻柜、炉灶、烤箱、嵌入式微波炉、洗碗机、垃圾处理装置、橱柜和台面、照明装置、吊灯、满铺地毯、管道和供暖装置、中央空调及／或窗式或套管式空调机、窗饰、开关面板、门五金、镜子、未在第 1.12 条中明确排除的内置设施，以及全部家具和个人财产。\n\nigilbert@paulweiss.com\n\n见下文第 1.12 条。\n\n1.12 本次出售明确排除十三（13）幅油画及素描；位于客厅东墙的一张古董秘书桌（将由一件与该桌相似的家具替代）；诸如小盒子、钟表、相框、照片等个人“小摆设”（但如“小摆设”出现在 DVD 中，则包括在内）；Gil 办公室内的文件柜及其内容物；卖方办公室内的全部衣物、装框照片（买方指定的特定相框除外）以及卖方私人游艇模型。\n\n1.13 本次出售［不］［确］包括卖方对［储藏室］／［1519 号佣人房］／［停车位］的权益（“包括的权益”）。\n\n1.14 “交割”是股份和租约所有权的转让。\n\n1.15 预定交割日期不迟于 3/6/15（“预定交割日期”）上午 10:00（见第 9 条和第 10 条）。\n\n1.16 “购买价”为：$67,500,000.00\n\n1.16.1 “合同定金”为：$7,000,000.00\n\n1.16.2 交割时应付的购买价“余额”为：\n\n$63,000,000.00（见第 2.2.2 条）见第二补充条款中的 SR18\n\n1.17 每月“管理费”为 $57,085.53（见第 4 条）。\n\n1.18 截至本合同日期，应付给公司的“特别摊款”（如有）为 NONE，支付方式如下：\n\n1.11 “动产”是下列个人财产，包括但不限于第 1.18 条所列物品以及个人财产（第 1.20 条或第 1.21 条另有规定者除外）。\n\n具体在1.12中排除的物品），包括但不限于 Brown Harris Stevens（布朗哈里斯史蒂文斯）于 February 20, 2016 2:00 pm 交付至 1801 单元的 DVD（以下简称“DVD”）所载系列视频中列明的所有物品。\n\n1.12 本次出售中明确排除的物品包括十三（13）幅绘画和素描；位于 LR 东墙的一张古董写字台（将以一件与该写字台相似的家具替换）；个人“小摆设”，例如小盒子、时钟、相框、照片等（但如“小摆设”包含在 DVD 中，则包括在内）；Gil 办公室内的文件柜及其内容物；所有衣物、装框照片（买方指定的特定相框除外），以及位于卖方办公室内的卖方私人游艇模型。\n\n买方应支付……【原文 OCR 损毁，无法辨识】。\n\n1.22 本合同的“交付日期”系指依照第 17.3 条规定，本合同一份经完整签署的副本被视为已交付给并由买方或买方律师收到之日。\n\n1.23 该单元的所有“拟入住人”为：\n\n1.23.1 人员及其与买方的关系：\n\n1.23.2 宠物：\n\n1.24 合同定金应存放于（A）非 IOLA 托管账户中。如该账户为非 IOLA 账户，则利息应支付给有权取得合同定金的一方。取得利息的一方应就该利息缴纳任何所得税。该托管账户应为设于以下存款机构的独立银行账户：BNY MELLON（纽约梅隆银行）\n\n地址：10 Mamo Street, Greenwich, CT 06830（见第 127 条）\n\n1.25 本合同由所附附加条款继续构成。\n\n2 买卖协议；购买价款；托管\n\n2.1 卖方同意向买方出售，买方同意向卖方购买卖方的股份、租约、动产及任何包括在内的权益，以及本次出售中包括的所有其他物品，购买价款及条件均以本合同所载为准。\n\n2.2 买方应按以下方式向卖方支付购买价款：\n\n2.2.1 于买方签署本合同时，以开具给托管人的有效支票支付合同定金；以及\n\n2.2.2 于交割时支付余额，但仅可通过由买方开具、直接支付给卖方的银行本票、官方银行支票或保付支票支付。该等支票应由与该单元位于同一城市或县的商业银行、储蓄银行、储蓄及贷款协会或信托公司之分支机构开具并付款。卖方可于交割前，在合理通知（定义见第 17 条）后，指示将全部或部分余额支付给卖方以外的其他人（见第 17.7 条）。\n\n3 动产\n\n3.1 在不影响公司或任何其租约从属于其下的抵押权持有人之任何权利的前提下，本次出售包括卖方对动产及包括在内的权益所享有的一切权益（如有）。\n\n3.2 不就动产或包括在内的权益支付任何对价；如交割未发生，则不向买方出售任何物品。\n\n3.3 于交割前，卖方应从该单元移走本次出售未包括的所有家具、陈设及其他财产，并修复因该等移除造成的任何损坏。\n\n4 陈述与承诺\n\n4.1 在不影响有关该房产产权的任何事项的前提下（就该等事项，卖方不作任何陈述或承诺），卖方陈述并承诺：\n\n4.1.1 卖方目前为且于交割时仍应为股份、租约、动产及包括在内的权益的唯一所有人，并拥有出售及转让该等财产的完整权利、权力及授权；卖方应及时作出安排，以清偿股份和租约上现有的担保权益，并于交割时交付相关文件（见第 10 条）；\n\n4.1.2 该等股份已被适当发行、已全额缴付且无需追加缴款；\n\n4.1.3 租约目前有效，且于交割时仍完全有效；目前不存在且于交割时亦不存在任何租约项下的违约通知；\n\n4.1.4 截至本合同日期应支付的维护费及特别摊派费用，分别载于第 1.17 条和第 1.18 条；\n\n4.1.5 截至本合同日期，卖方既不实际知悉，亦未收到任何书面通知，表明公司董事会已通过但尚未反映在第 1.17 条及第 1.18 条所列金额中的任何维护费增加或任何特别摊派；\n\n4.1.6 卖方未在未取得公司所需同意的情况下，或据卖方实际所知，未在未遵守所有适用法律的情况下，对该单元作出任何重大改建或增建。本条款不在交割后继续有效。\n\n4.1.7 卖方未订立、不会订立，并且不实际知悉任何影响交割后该单元产权或其使用和/或占用的协议（租约除外），或任何会在交割后对买方具有约束力或对买方产生不利影响的协议（例如转租协议或改建协议）；\n\n4.1.8 除第 1.1.1 条所列者外，卖方在过去 10 年内未以任何其他姓名为人所知。\n\n4.1.9 于交割时，依照第 15.2 条：\n\n4.1.9.1 不应存在任何针对卖方、且尚未就该单元提供保证以防止从该单元追偿的未清偿判决（“判决”）；\n\n4.1.9.2 股份、租约、动产及任何包括在内的权益应不存在任何留置权（公司就股份享有的一般留置权除外，且该留置权下不应欠付任何款项）、产权负担及不利权益（“留置权”）；\n\n4.1.9.3 截至紧接交割日期前的付款期间届满之日，应付公司的所有款项均应由卖方全额支付；\n\n4.1.9.4 卖方不得欠付可能导致就该单元或该房产提交机械师留置权通知的劳务费或材料费；以及\n\n4.1.9.5 不得有任何登记在案、股份及租约所有人依租约有义务予以补救的违规事项。\n\n4.2 买方陈述并承诺：\n\n4.2.1 买方购买股份和租约，仅供第 1.23 条所确定的拟入住人居住使用；\n\n4.2.2 买方目前不是且在过去 7 年内未曾是破产程序的主体；\n\n4.2.3 如第 1.20.3 条适用，买方不得就本次购买申请融资；\n\n4.2.4 构成买方的每一自然人均已年满 13 周岁，并为买方自身账户而购买（受益所有权及登记所有权）；\n\n4.2.5 买方不得向公司作出任何与前述内容相抵触的陈述，并应提供公司就买方申请批准本次交易所要求的全部证明文件；以及\n\n4.2.6 目前不存在且于交割时亦不存在针对买方的任何未缴税款留置权或金钱判决。\n\n4.3 各方承诺，其载于第 4 条的陈述和承诺于交割时应真实且完整；除第 4.1.6 条外，该等陈述和承诺应在交割后继续有效，但任何基于该等陈述和承诺提起的诉讼必须在交割后一年内提出。\n\n5 公司文件\n\n买方已审阅并对下列文件感到满意，或者（除卖方在本合同中就任何事项作出陈述者外）接受并承担未审阅下列文件的风险：租约、公司的公司注册证书、章程细则、住户规则、股东和董事会议记录、最近经审计的财务报表，以及根据《国内税收法典》（“IRC”）§216（或任何继任法规）可供公司股东使用的最近税项扣除说明。\n\n6 所需批准及推荐材料\n\n6.1 本次出售须经公司无条件同意。\n\n6.2 买方应善意地：\n\n6.2.1 向公司或管理代理人提交关于本次出售的申请，申请应采用公司要求的表格，载明公司要求的数据并随附公司要求的文件，同时支付公司向买方收取的适用费用和收费。前述全部材料应在交付日期后 10 个营业日内提交；如第 1.20.1 条或第 1.20.2 条适用且公司要求提供贷款承诺函，则应在以下较早发生之日后 3 个营业日内提交：（i）贷款承诺日期（定义见第 1.21 条）；或（ii）收到贷款承诺函（定义见第 18.1.2 条）之日；\n\n6.2.2 按公司要求，参加（并促使任何拟入住人参加）一次或多次个人面谈；以及\n\n6.2.3 及时向公司提交公司合理要求的进一步推荐材料、数据和文件。\n\n6.3 任一方在得知公司的决定后，应立即通知另一方。如公司未在预定交割日当日或之前作出决定，则交割应延期 30 个营业日，以取得该等同意。如在该等延期日期前未获同意，任一方可通过通知取消本合同，但前提是公司的同意尚未在发出该取消通知之前作出。如该等同意在任何时间被拒绝，任一方可通过通知取消本合同。根据本第 6.3 条取消合同时，托管人应将合同定金退还给买方。\n\n6.4 如该等同意因买方恶意行为而被拒绝或未获给予，买方应构成违约，并应适用第 13.1 条。\n\n7 该单元及动产的状况；占有\n\n7.1 卖方不就该单元、动产、包括在内的权益或该房产的实体状况或维修状态作出任何陈述。买方已检查或放弃检查该单元、动产及包括在内的权益，并应按本合同日期的“现状”接收该等财产，但合理损耗除外。然而，于交割时，电器应处于可运行状态，且应已安装并可正常运作所需的烟雾探测器。\n\n7.2 于交割时，卖方应按第 7.1 条规定的状况交付该单元、动产及包括在内的权益的占有，包括已清扫干净、腾空且不存在任何占用人或占有权利。\n\n8 损失风险\n\n8.1 经本合同修改后的《一般义务法》§ 5-1311 的规定，应适用于本次交易，如同该交易为不动产出售。就本段而言，“单元”一词包括内置动产。\n\n8.2 如合理估计恢复该单元所需费用超过购买价款的 5%，则根据 GOL § 5-1311，毁损应被视为“重大”。\n\n8.3 如该单元或该房产发生任何毁损，且该单元的法定所有权和占有均尚未转移给买方，卖方应最迟于交割日或损失发生后 7 个营业日内（以较早者为准）向买方发出损失通知（“损失通知”）。\n\n8.4 如该单元发生并非因买方过错造成的重大毁损，本合同应依第 16.3 条视为取消，除非买方通过通知卖方选择在降低购买价款的情况下完成购买；或\n\n8.5 无论该单元是否发生任何毁损，如并非因买方过错导致该房产中超过 10% 的单元无法居住，或无法合理进入该单元，则买方有权通过通知卖方，依第 16.3 条取消本合同。\n\n8.6 买方根据第 8.4 条或第 8.5 条发出的通知，应在发出损失通知后 7 个工作日内发出；但如卖方未发出损失通知，买方的通知可在交割时或交割前任何时间发出。\n\n8.7 如该单元发生任何毁损，买方无权获得以下范围的购买价款减免：(i) 超过合理估计的修理及恢复费用的部分；或 (ii) 公司有义务修理或恢复的任何损失；但卖方应无追索权地向买方转让卖方就该等损失对公司享有的任何索赔权。\n\n9 交割地点\n\n交割应在公司指定的地点举行；如未作出该等指定，则在卖方律师的办公室举行。\n\n10 交割\n\n10.1 在交割时，卖方应交付或促成交付：\n\n10.1.1 已妥为背书转让给买方的股份卖方证书，或附有一份单独妥为签署的、授予买方的股票转让授权书；且无论何种情形，均应附有公司要求的对卖方签名的任何担保；\n\n10.1.2 卖方持有的租约正本对应副本、产权链中的全部转让及承继文件，以及一份按公司要求格式妥为签署的向买方转让该租约的转让书；\n\n10.1.3 第 25 条要求的 FIRPTA 文件；\n\n10.1.4 该单元的钥匙，包括其入口钥匙，以及如适用，车库、邮箱、储物单元和该单元内任何储物柜的钥匙；\n\n10.1.5 如被要求，将卖方在动产及附带权益中的权益转让给买方；\n\n10.1.6 为遵守第 15.2 条所需的任何文件及付款；\n\n10.1.7 如卖方无法交付第 10.1.1 条或第 10.1.2 条所要求的文件，则卖方应交付或促成交付公司为签发新的股份证书或新租约所要求的全部文件及付款。\n\n10.2 在交割时，买方应：\n\n10.2.1 按照第 2.2.2 条支付余额；\n\n10.2.2 按公司要求的格式签署并向卖方及公司交付一份承继租约的协议；以及\n\n10.2.3 如公司要求，签署并交付一份新租约的对应副本，该新租约在实质上与租约相同，期限为租约剩余期限；在该情形下，租约应被取消并交还公司，同时交还卖方向买方作出的该租约转让书。\n\n10.3 在交割时，双方应完成并签署所有必要文件：\n\n10.3.1 用于 Internal Revenue Service（美国国税局，“IRS”）表格 1099-S 或其他类似要求；\n\n10.3.2 为遵守烟雾探测器要求及任何适用的转让税申报要求；以及\n\n10.3.3 转让卖方在动产及附带权益中的任何权益。\n\n10.4 除非在交割时公司交付以下文件，否则买方无义务完成交割：\n\n10.4.1 以买方名义签发的新的股份证书；以及\n\n10.4.2 由公司高级职员或获授权代理人出具的书面声明，同意将股份及租约转让给买方，并列明卖方欠公司全部款项（包括管理费及任何摊派款）的金额及付款状态，以及每笔款项的付款日期。\n\n11 交割费用、税款及分摊\n\n11.1 在交割时或交割前，\n\n11.1.1 卖方应在适用情况下支付：\n\n11.1.1.1 股票转让印花税费用；以及\n\n11.1.1.2 转让税，但第 11.1.2.2 条规定的除外。\n\n11.1.2 买方应在适用情况下支付：\n\n11.1.2.1 公司就买方融资收取的任何费用；以及\n\n11.1.2.2 法律主要向买方征收的转让税（例如“豪宅税”）。\n\n11.2 如有转售税（Flip Tax），应由第 1.19 条规定的一方支付。\n\n11.3 公司征收而本合同未具体规定的任何费用，应由公司明确规定承担该费用的一方支付；如公司未指定任何一方，则该费用应由卖方支付。\n\n11.4 双方应以交割前一日晚上 11:59 为基准，按交割月份的天数比例分摊管理费、应付公司的任何其他定期费用（摊派款除外）以及 STAR 税收减免（如该单元享有该减免）。\n\n11.5 摊派款，无论一次性支付或分期支付，均不予分摊，而应由公司规定付款日当日的股份所有人支付。买方应支付交割后到期的任何分期款项，但前提是卖方有权且已选择分期支付该摊派款。\n\n11.6 双方均应以银行本票、官方银行支票、保付支票或律师托管支票，及时支付其依法主要应承担的任何转让税。本第 11.6 条在交割后继续有效。\n\n11.7 任何计算错误或遗漏应在交割后 6 个月内更正。本第 11.7 条在交割后继续有效。\n\n12 经纪人\n\n12.1 各方声明，该方未曾就本交易与任何以经纪人身份行事的人（无论持牌或无牌）打交道，但第 11 条所列经纪人除外。\n\n12.2 卖方应根据一项单独协议支付经纪人佣金。经纪人不应被视为本合同的第三方受益人。\n\n12.3 本第 12 条在本合同交割、取消或终止后继续有效。\n\n13 违约、救济及赔偿\n\n13.1 如买方违约或作出不实陈述，卖方唯一且排他的救济为取消本合同，保留合同定金作为约定损害赔偿；并且，如适用，卖方可就经纪佣金执行第 13.3 条规定的赔偿，或根据第 13.4 条提起诉讼。买方希望将买方对实际损害赔偿的责任限于合同定金金额，买方同意该金额在该等情形下构成对卖方损失的公平合理补偿，而非罚金。不动产法原则应适用于本约定损害赔偿条款。\n\n13.2 如卖方违约或作出不实陈述，买方应享有其在法律或衡平法上有权获得的救济，包括强制履行，因为该单元及其占有权无法复制。\n\n13.3 在遵守第 4.3 条规定的前提下，各方应就因赔偿方违反其任何声明或承诺（该等声明或承诺明确规定在交割、取消或终止本合同后继续有效）而产生的任何索赔、判决、损失、责任、成本或费用，赔偿另一方并使其免受损害。买方应就交割时及交割后产生的租约义务所导致的任何索赔、判决、损失、责任、成本或费用，赔偿卖方并使其免受损害。每项赔偿包括但不限于因抗辩任何索赔，以及执行或收取本赔偿项下判决而产生的合理律师费及支出、诉讼费用和诉讼开支，但被赔偿方应获得通知及抗辩该索赔的机会。本第 13.3 条在本合同交割、取消或终止后继续有效。\n\n13.4 如任何用于支付合同定金的票据未能收款，卖方有权就未收款票据提起诉讼。此外，该等未能收款构成本合同项下的违约，但前提是卖方向买方发出该等未能收款的通知，并且在发出通知后 3 个工作日内，托管人未从买方收到金额等于未收款资金的、未经背书的有效保付支票、银行支票或可即时使用资金。未能补救该等违约，应使卖方有权获得第 13.1 条规定的救济，并保留可能收取和/或追回的所有款项。\n\n14 完整协议；修改\n\n14.1 双方之间此前就本合同标的事项作出的所有口头或书面陈述、谅解及协议，以及托管人与双方就第 27 条所作的协议，均并入本合同；本合同单独、完整地表达双方及托管人的协议。\n\n14.2 律师可书面延长本合同中规定的任何期限。除外，本合同任何其他条款仅可通过由被要求承担责任的一方或托管人签署的书面文件予以修改或放弃。\n\n15 留置权及判决的清除\n\n15.1 买方应在预定交割日之前不少于 10 个日历日，向卖方或卖方律师交付或促成交付留置权及判决检索结果；但在续查中首次披露的留置权或判决，应在收到该等结果后 2 个工作日内、但不迟于交割时向卖方报告。卖方有权根据第 16 条延期交割，以清除任何该等留置权及判决。买方未及时交付该等检索结果或续查结果，不构成对第 4 条中卖方有关留置权及判决承诺的放弃。但如交割仅因未及时交付留置权及判决检索结果而延期，第 11 条项下的分摊应以第 1.15 条所述预定交割日前一日晚上 11:59 为基准进行。\n\n15.2 卖方应自费取得并向买方交付为确保解除、清偿、终止、注销或从记录中移除任何留置权及判决所必需的文件及付款。卖方可将购买价款的任何部分用于该等目的。\n\n15.3 本第 15 条在交割后继续有效。\n\n16 卖方不能履行\n\n16.1 如卖方因卖方未能作出所需付款或其他故意作为或不作为以外的任何原因，无法按照本合同转让第 2.1 条所列项目，则卖方有权延期交割，累计延期期间不得超过 60 个日历日，但如第 1.20.1 条或第 1.20.2 条适用，则不得延至买方贷款承诺函届满之后。\n\n16.2 如卖方未选择延期交割，或如已延期，在延期后的交割日卖方仍无法履行，则除非买方选择在不减免购买价款的情况下继续交割，否则任何一方均可在此后任何时间向另一方发出通知取消本合同。\n\n16.3 如发生该等取消，卖方的唯一责任应为促使合同定金退还给买方，并偿还买方为其留置权及产权检索实际发生的费用（如有）。\n\n17 通知及合同交付\n\n17.1 任何通知或要求（“通知”）均应以书面形式，通过专人递送、隔夜递送、经认证邮件或挂号邮件（要求回执）送达一方；并应同时以同样方式送达该方律师（如有）及托管人，寄送至其各自地址，或寄送至此后根据本第 17 条发出的通知所指定的其他地址。\n\n无需申请抵押贷款\n\n日期\n\n17.2 买方应在……之后 5 个工作日内交付……通知……\n\nNYSCEF 文件编号 256，NYSCEF 收到：11/28/2018；案件 22-50073，文件 50-4，提交：02/28/22，录入：02/28/22 21:19:53，第 10 页，共\n\n……（例如，购买……财务状况……）\n\n……（……）\n\n19 单数/复数及连带/分别责任\n\n在文义要求时，单数应视为包括复数，反之亦然。若卖方或买方由一人以上构成，其作为该方的义务应为连带及分别责任。\n\n20 不存续\n\n除非另有明确规定，本协议所载的任何陈述和/或约定均不在交割后继续有效。买方支付尾款即构成买方解除并免除卖方在本协议项下的所有义务，但明确规定在交割后继续有效的义务除外。\n\n21 检查\n\n买方及买方代表有权在交割前48小时内检查该单元，并可在向卖方提出合理请求后的其他合理时间进行检查。\n\n22 适用法律及管辖地\n\n本协议应适用纽约州法律，不考虑法律冲突原则。因本协议引起的任何诉讼或程序，应在该单元所在地的县或联邦地区提起，双方特此同意该管辖地。\n\n23 买方不得转让；买方死亡\n\n23.1 买方不得转让本协议或买方在本协议项下的任何权利。任何该等拟议转让均属无效。\n\n23.2 如构成买方的全体人员死亡，本协议应终止，且合同定金应退还给买方。在作出该等退款和偿还后，除第12条规定者外，任何一方均不再对另一方承担本协议项下的任何责任，亦不再对另一方提出任何请求。\n\n24 双方合作\n\n24.1 双方应各自与对方、公司、买方的机构贷款人及产权保险公司（如有）合作，并取得、签署及交付为完成出售而合理必要的文件。\n\n24.2 双方应及时提交法律要求的与所有政府申报有关的全部必要文件。各方均向另一方陈述，其在该等申报中的陈述应真实、完整。本第24.2条应在交割后继续有效。\n\n25 FIRPTA\n\n双方应遵守IRC §§ 897、1445及其项下经不时修订的法规（“FIRPTA”）。如适用，卖方应于交割时向买方签署并交付非外国人身份认证书（“CNS”）或美国国税局（IRS）的预先扣缴证明书。如卖方未交付CNS或扣缴证明书，买方应从尾款中扣缴并向IRS汇付法律可能要求的金额。卖方特此放弃因该等扣缴及汇付而对买方提起诉讼的任何权利。本第25条应在交割后继续有效。\n\n26 附加要求\n\n26.1 除非在交割时满足以下所有要求，买方无义务完成交割：\n\n26.1.1 公司*19*处于良好存续状态；\n\n26.1.2 公司对该房产拥有完全所有权或租赁产权，无论该等产权是否适于出售或可投保；以及\n\n26.1.3 不存在任何影响该房产的未决对物诉讼、税务证书/留置权出售，或对任何基础抵押权的止赎诉讼。\n\n26.2 如在交割时未满足第26.1条中的任何要求，买方应向卖方发出通知；如其后在合理期限内仍未满足该要求，则任何一方均可通过通知，根据第16.3条取消本协议。\n\n27 托管条款\n\n27.1 合同定金应由托管人按第1.24条规定存入托管账户，并应依照本协议条款持有和支付。于交割时，托管人应将合同定金支付给卖方。如交割未发生，且任何一方向托管人发出通知要求支付合同定金，托管人应立即向另一方发出该等要求的通知。如托管人在发出托管人通知后10个营业日内，未收到该另一方对拟议付款提出异议的通知，托管人特此获授权并被指示向提出要求的一方作出该等付款。如托管人在上述期限内收到该等异议通知，或托管人因任何理由善意地选择不作出该等付款，托管人可继续持有合同定金，直至双方共同通知或有管辖权法院作出最终、不可上诉的判决、命令或裁定另行指示为止。但是，托管人有权在任何时候将合同定金及其利息（如有）存入第22条所规定县内法院的书记官处，并应向各方发出该等存款通知。依照本第27条处置合同定金及其利息（如有）后，托管人应解除并免除所有托管义务和责任。\n\n27.2 其律师担任托管人的一方，应对合同定金的损失负责。如托管人为卖方的律师，则买方应在交割时获得相当于合同定金金额的抵扣。\n\n27.3 托管人不收取报酬。托管人仅作为应双方请求并为双方便利而设的保管人行事；除非涉及恶意、故意无视本协议或重大过失，托管人不对任何一方的任何作为或不作为承担责任。如发生任何争议，卖方和买方应连带及分别承担责任（并享有分担权），为托管人进行抗辩（由托管人选择的律师进行），赔偿并使托管人免受因履行托管人的作为或不作为而产生的任何请求、判决、损失、责任、成本和费用，但不包括涉及恶意、故意无视本协议或重大过失的作为或不作为。本赔偿包括但不限于：为聘请律师而支付的合理律师费，或托管人为自身提供的法律服务的合理价值，以及支出、诉讼费和诉讼费用。\n\n27.4 托管人确认已收到以支票支付、但须待收款的合同定金。\n\n27.5 托管人同意本第27条的规定。\n\n27.6 如托管人为一方的律师，托管人可在任何争议或诉讼中代理该方。\n\n27.7 本第27条应在本协议交割、取消或终止后继续有效。\n\n28 页边标题\n\n页边标题不构成本协议正文的一部分。\n\n29 其他规定\n\n除非及直至卖方依照第17.2条和第17.3条向买方（或买方律师）交付本协议的完整签署副本，否则本协议不具有约束力。本协议对本协议双方及其各自的继承人、个人及法定代表人以及权益继受人具有约束力，并使其受益。\n\n30 铅漆\n\n如适用，完整签署的《铅基涂料和/或铅基涂料危害信息披露书》附于本协议，并构成本协议的一部分。\n\n兹证明，双方已于文首所载日期正式签署本协议。\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK（纽约县书记官）11/28/2018 12:22 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 11 of 159\n\n……致：卖方：\nSHERRY 1800s, LLC（雪莉1800s有限责任公司）\n/\n~#\"v· -~x/\n签字：• f!:.\n··-········\n_______　买方：\nGENEVER HOLDINGS LLC（杰尼弗控股有限责任公司）\n,,~~-\n签字：vi'Ji-,< LL_(\n代表：~\\!,,.,,X:,<,\n\n~-+••··---\n\n关于位于纽约州纽约市第五大道781号、SHERRY NETHERLAND- INC.（雪莉荷兰公司）内称为1801单元的第18层的销售合同之第一附加条款；该公寓为合作公寓，卖方为SHERRY 1800s, LLC，买方为GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC，日期为2015年2月21日。\n\n31. 如本附加条款或任何其他附加条款的规定与本附加条款所附协议的规定存在任何冲突，应以本附加条款的规定为准。\n\n32. 除买方在本协议第4条中作出的陈述外，买方进一步以连带及分别责任向卖方陈述并保证，买方知悉不存在任何未清偿判决或税务留置权，且知悉不存在任何已受威胁的诉讼或请求（包括刑事和/或税务程序）。\n\n33. 对第20条作补充，买方接受股份并承接租约，以及卖方交付该单元的占有和钥匙，应视为卖方已完全履行其在本协议项下的义务，但在交割后继续有效的义务除外；买方作出的该等接受和承接，应解除卖方依本协议须履行的所有条款、条件、陈述和协议，但在交割后继续有效的条款、条件、陈述和协议除外。除本协议明确规定外，卖方的任何责任均不在交割后继续有效。\n\n34. 如存在可归属于卖方拥有该单元期间的任何房地产税退款，该等退款应完全归卖方所有。就此而言，买方应配合卖方取得该等退款，并同意签署任何合理文件，以协助卖方取得该等退款。如该等退款交付给买方（或由公司抵扣买方的每月维护费），买方应立即将该等退款汇付给卖方。双方确认，本第34条应在交割后继续有效。\n\n35. 本协议日期后维护费的增加或征收特别摊派，不应视为卖方在本协议项下作出不实陈述或违约。就此而言，如公司在本协议日期后征收任何特别摊派，且该特别摊派于交割日或之后应付，则该特别摊派应完全由买方承担。卖方将向买方发送公司就与公司有关的重大事实（包括任何维护费增加）发出的任何通知副本。\n\n36. 本协议附有作为附件A的《铅基涂料和/或铅基涂料危害信息披露书》。该文件可分别签署。本协议双方签署后，即应视为已签署，尽管尚未取得经纪人在该附件A上的签字。买方确认，买方已收到《保护您的家庭免受家中铅危害》小册子，且买方特此放弃就该单元和/或该房产内是否存在铅基涂料和/或铅基涂料危害进行风险评估或检查的机会。买方确认，除该单元内的情况且仅限于所附披露表中明确规定的范围外，卖方未就该房产内是否存在铅漆向买方作出任何陈述。尽管任何地方法律项下有任何要求，买方按该房产和该单元目前“按现状”的状态接受该房产和该单元，且该等接受涉及铅漆的存在及与其有关的任何危害。\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK（纽约县书记官）11/28/2018 12:22 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 13 of 159\n\n37. 卖方在本合同或其任何附加条款中作出的所有陈述，均系在未经独立调查的情况下，基于卖方尽其所知及确信而作出，且不在交割后继续有效。\n\n兹证明，本协议双方已于上文首次载明的日期签署本《买卖合同附加条款》。\n\n卖方：\n\n买方：\n\nGENEVER HOLDINGS LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）\n\n作为卖方的 SHERR v 1800S LLC 与作为买方的 GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）于 2015 年 FEBRUARYjJ\\_ 签订的《买卖合同》第二附加条款，所涉房产位于 781 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK，第 18 层（单元 1801、1804、1807、1809、1811，佣人房 1519）。\n\nSR 1. 如本合同的印刷部分或第一附加条款与本第二附加条款的规定之间存在任何不一致或冲突，应以本第二附加条款的规定为准。\n\nSR2. 卖方应在收到后立即向买方交付卖方在交付日后收到的、由公司发出的任何书面通知副本，且该等通知涉及：(1) 第 1.17 段所列每月维护费金额的任何增加；(2) 除评估费外任何拟议或计划征收的评估费；(3) 公司或其管理代理人收取的“转售税”或其他转让费用的任何拟议或计划变更；(4) 对租约、公司注册证书或公司章程的任何拟议修订或修改；(5) 拟由公司、其保险人或其股东承担费用的任何拟议建筑或修理工程；(6) 就影响该房产的任何抵押贷款进行的任何再融资或其他重大变更；或 (7) 对该单元或该房产造成的任何损害或事故。\n\nSR3. 补充第 3.3 段：如卖方从该单元拆除任何灯具，该等灯具将以标准灯具替换，以使被拆除灯具的位置不留有裸露电线或灯泡。卖方应自行承担费用，并在交割前从该单元移除本交易未包括的所有家具、陈设及其他个人财产和/或固定装置，并应以良好且符合工艺标准的方式修复因该等移除造成的任何重大损坏。卖方在本协议拟议出售中未包括的任何个人财产，如未在交割前从该单元移除，应视为遗弃财产。买方可以（但无义务）由卖方承担风险和费用，安排将任何该等遗弃财产从该单元移除。本段规定在交割后继续有效。\n\nSR4. 尽管第 7 段或本合同任何其他相反规定另有约定，卖方声明并保证，在交割时，管道、供暖、电气和空调系统及装置，以及所有个人财产，均应处于正常工作状态，但以卖方根据租约承担责任的范围为限。\n\nSR5. (a) 作为促使买方签订本合同的重要诱因，卖方特此声明，卖方已就卖方对该单元所作的任何工程，取得公司和 New York City Department of Buildings（纽约市建筑局）的一切必要批准、许可和证书。此外，卖方不负有根据与公司达成的任何协议（租约及其他合作公寓文件除外）履行任何工程或支出任何款项（维护除外）的义务，而该等协议将在交割后对买方具有约束力。\n\nD(1cY: US! 984 I I 54v4\n\n(b) 在交割前，卖方应自行承担全部费用，使针对该单元的任何及所有未结许可得到关闭、解除并以其他方式付清，并向买方交付令其满意的证明。纽约市建筑局出具的竣工证明函应视为满意的证明。尽管有上述规定，卖方无需关闭纽约市建筑局列示为项目编号 101785169 和 101778836 的两项未结许可，该等项目副本附于本协议。双方确认，前句的原因在于公司已表示其将书面同意妥为关闭该两项未结许可。如公司未交付该书面同意，则卖方可选择关闭该等许可；但如其不关闭，则任一方均可终止本合同。\n\n(c) 卖方应当：(a) 向买方交付纽约市建筑局出具的竣工证明函，证明该单元已依法合并；或 (b) 在交割时，签署并随转让税申报表提交一份宣誓书，说明该单元被适当地、合法地视为具有一个厨房的单一单元的理由，以及应按 1.425% 的税率向纽约市缴纳转让税。卖方还应向买方交付一份赔偿函，就因纽约市要求按较高税率缴税而产生的任何费用和损害（包括但不限于逾期付款的罚金和利息）向买方作出赔偿。尽管有上述规定，如 (i) 卖方无法按上述规定交付竣工证明函，且 (ii) 卖方选择按 1.425% 的税率缴纳纽约市转让税（而非所谓的 2.625%“批量税率”），则卖方的律师应将 \\$840,000 存入托管账户，该金额代表上述税率之间的差额。卖方的律师应在以下两者中较短的期间内持有该款项：(i) 两 (2) 年（即纽约市财政局（“DOF”）目前对该税项的审计期间）；或 (ii) 直至公司交付纽约市建筑局（和/或其他适当政府实体）出具的、令买方满意的书面证据，证明该单元已被适当地、合法地合并。若确定 1.425% 为适用税率，卖方的律师应将余额发还给卖方；若 DOF 确定 2.625% 为适用的转让税税率，则卖方的律师应支付该款项以及利息和罚金（如有）。\n\nSR6. 补充第 4.1 段：“4.1.10. 据卖方所知，卖方未收到关于拟对该房产或该房产内建筑系统（包括但不限于供暖、管道及电气系统）进行任何重大修理或更换的任何书面通知，而该等修理或更换可能对该房产或该单元产生重大影响。\n\n“4.1.11. 据卖方所知，目前不存在渗入该单元的漏水，且在紧接本协议日期之前的十二 (12) 个月期间内未发生该等漏水。此外，在所述十二 (12) 个月期间内，卖方未获通知该房产其他位置发生任何据称源自该单元的漏水。”\n\n“4.1.12 在卖方拥有该单元期间，据卖方所知，卖方并不知悉 (a) 该单元内存在任何有毒霉菌，或 (b) 该单元内存在任何臭虫侵扰。”\n\n“4.1.13 据卖方所知，不存在任何尚未解决或受到书面威胁的任何种类的索赔、诉讼、诉讼案件或法律程序，影响该单元、卖方对该单元的所有权，或可能导致对该单元或卖方设定任何种类留置权。”\n\n“4.1.14 据卖方所知，在过去十二 (12) 个月内，卖方及任何代表卖方行事的人均未就噪音、令人反感的气味、令人反感的行为、缺乏供暖或热水，或影响该单元的任何其他干扰或不利状况，向公司、管理代理人、楼宇管理员或该房产内任何其他单元业主或租户股东提出任何投诉（以书面、电子通信或电话方式）。”\n\nSR 7. 本合同中载明的卖方所有陈述、保证及承诺在交割时均应在所有重大方面真实；买方履行本合同项下义务的义务，明确以不存在对其中任何一项的违约、不准确或虚假陈述为条件。\n\nSR8. 如公司批准买方的申请，但将其同意以买方遵守本合同范围之外的要求为条件，例如要求买方将资金存入托管账户，则买方可自行酌定选择：(i) 遵守该等条件并继续进行购买；或 (ii) 拒绝遵守该等条件。如买方拒绝遵守，买方应向卖方交付有关情况的书面通知，本合同应视为取消，托管代理人应立即向买方退还合同定金。此外，卖方确认并同意，买方仅须向公司披露 \\$420,000,000.00 的流动资产（超过购买价的五倍），并提供公司就上述金额可能要求的证明文件（如银行对账单）。买方提交上述材料，就公司作为其“标准转让要求”董事会申请组成部分所要求的“财务报表”、“由买方或会计师签署的资产和负债表”及支持性“资产核验”而言，应视为完整。买方可自行酌定拒绝公司要求提交显示超过上述金额的流动资产的任何文件，因此，如公司以任何理由拒绝买方的申请（买方故意恶意行为除外），本合同应视为取消，托管代理人应立即向买方退还合同定金。\n\nDoc# US I 984 I I 54v4\n\nSR9. 补充第 11.1.1.2 段：卖方有关支付转让税的义务，应适用于纽约市和纽约州征收的转让税。在交割后十四 (14) 日内，卖方应向买方律师提供已提交该等转让税申报的证明。卖方应赔偿并使买方免受因卖方未及时履行其有关该等转让税的义务而由买方产生的任何及所有成本、损失或费用，包括合理的律师费和支出。本段规定在交割后继续有效。\n\nSR 10. 补充第 13 段：“13.5 如任何一方故意不履行其在本协议项下的义务，则其应对另一方为执行本合同而产生的、由有管辖权法院确定的合理律师费和费用承担责任。如任何一方声称取消本合同，且卖方选择保留合同定金作为约定损害赔偿金，则在其后的任何诉讼中胜诉的一方应向未胜诉方追偿其合理的律师费和费用。除任一方可能根据本协议应付的合同定金和/或约定损害赔偿金金额外，该等律师费和费用的裁定可作为实际补偿性损害赔偿予以追偿。”\n\nSRl 1. 补充第 15.1 段：如买方于较后日期知悉该等留置权，买方亦可于较后日期交付该等留置权的补充清单，但不得迟于交割日。\n\nSR12. 补充第 16 段：“16.4. 如卖方通过支付不超过购买价减去任何贷款清偿款、经纪佣金、转让税及惯常交割费用的款项即可克服该等不能，卖方不应被视为无法转让租约及股份。”\n\n第3条。卖方同意在签署本合同之时或之前，在卖方实际持有的范围内，向买方交付该单元的所有图纸和规划，包括原始平面图，以及其中任何拟议或已完成翻修的所有效果图。此外，卖方同意在交割时或之前，在卖方实际持有的范围内，向买方交付影响该单元或本次出售所含任何电器或其他动产的所有使用说明书正本以及所有保证书和保修协议；该等文件项下的权利将在可转让的范围内于交割时视为已转让给买方。\n\n第4条。本合同可签署任意数量的副本。就所有目的而言，每一该等副本均应视为正本，且所有该等副本\n\nDocJ/: {JS i ;984 t I 54v4\n\n共同构成同一份且唯一的文书。通过传真或电子邮件发送的扫描签名，对各方均具有约束力。\n\n第5条。卖方特此同意，如买方选择就其购买该单元取得租赁权产权保险或 Eagle 9 UCC Cooperative Interest Insurance Policy，卖方将与买方合作，包括但不限于签署 Eagle 9 UCC Cooperative Interest Insurance Policy 签发人要求格式的产权宣誓书。\n\n第6条。如因任何原因，公司不允许买方购买该单元，则买方可将本合同转让给由本合同项下买方控制的另一实体。\n\n第7条。本合同各方均希望本合同及其条款（“保密事项”）在最大可行范围内予以保密。因此，本合同各方均应，并应指示其代理人、代表及承包商，对保密事项予以保密。但是，双方理解，保密事项可在下列情形披露：(a) 向各方的专业顾问（例如但不限于其律师和会计师），以及可能参与交易各方面或为完成本合同所设想交易所必需的其他各种第三方（例如产权保险公司）披露；(b) 如法院命令、传票或其他政府程序要求披露，或法律要求披露；(c) 经各方同意；或 (d) 如已属公共领域。\n\n第8条。尽管本合同载有任何相反规定，各方特此同意，(a) \\$67,500,000 分配为该单元的购买价格，及额外的 (b) \\$2,500,000 分配为该单元所含动产。因此，适当的纽约州及纽约市转让税应由各自当事人以 \\$67,500,000 为基础缴纳；此外，买方应就该等动产缴纳纽约州销售税，由卖方于交割时收取。() fY1 flt7\n\n第9条。卖方声明，其将促成将该楼宇内另一间女佣房向买方出售，该出售应在本交易交割之前或与本交易交割同时完成。如买方无法在本交易实际交割之前或与其同时购买该额外女佣房，卖方承认买方可终止本合同，并获得合同保证金及利息的全额及时返还。是否行使或放弃该终止选择权，由买方全权酌定。另应注意，本合同所列经纪人应支付该女佣房的费用，包括与其相关的成本和费用（包括转让税）。\n\nDoc/I: US I :984 l ( 54v4\nI / l\n\n第20条。如因任何原因各方无法于 March *6,* 2015 前完成本交易的交割，则买方可终止本合同并获得合同保证金的全额返还。是否行使或放弃该终止选择权，由买方全权酌定。\n\n第21条。卖方应按照买方就该单元及动产支付的全部对价（即 \\$70,000,000.00）支付经纪佣金。\n\nSHERRY 1800s LLC，卖方 ,,,., -•~~•~•••~'<~•••,\\_. · \">' vs•••••••~,.V,•--\n\n名称：职务：\n\nGENEVER HOLDINGS LLC，买方 V\\..- \\.../ 1 (.., ,\\_ <- l,-'\"', 代表：~-? /J\"'J,.,~~'=-~/, , c:--:-:~::-;;.~i r~ Ira J. Gilbert（艾拉·J·吉尔伯特） 授权人士\n\nDoc#: USl :98411 S4v4\n\n• 3142--Ludp,i•_,:'::,} !'½-to, l·\\'s\"\\<\nj}　/Ill ta\ne\"Jr\n卖方\n'\n\\ (f~f!. v'\". 11r\n---\nb　'1i/:!;!-P\nT\n--}\n买方\n日期：买方　日期\n\n;\n\n[\n购买申请\n\n购买申请\n\nNew York（纽约）, February 26 20 15 申请人姓名：11Miles\" Kwok（郭文贵）\\_? \\_IY~\\_r:!\\_JGeneve£ Holdings LLC（Geneve Holdings 有限责任公司）\\_\\_（姓名或名称必须以上述方式填写，以便股票证书及其他文件据此开具。）申请人律师：Ira Gilbert Esq.（艾拉·吉尔伯特律师）(igilbert@paulweiss~\\_:>-~rduphoiw 212-373-3529 律师事务所及地址：\\_\\_\\_ Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, & Garrison LLP（保罗·韦斯、里夫金德、沃顿及加里森律师事务所）1285 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10019-6064 卖方名称：Sherry 1800s LLC（Sherry 1800s 有限责任公司） 卖方律师：Michael J. Jones, Esq.（迈克尔·J·琼斯律师）电话：\\_?9~::.?~1~E3gpo 律师事务所及地址：\\_\\_ Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara, LLC（艾维、巴纳姆及奥马拉有限责任公司）-------~- 170 Mason Street, Greenwich, CT 06830 交割日期及时间：\\_Jj\\_Q 晚于 March *6,* 2015 上午 10 时 \\_\\_\\_\\_ 。\\_ 交付占有日期：\\_不晚于 *3/6/15*。下列签署人特此提出购买 The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.（谢里-尼德兰公司）普通股 3,000 股，以及位于 781 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 的楼宇内 Apartment 3601（3601 号公寓）\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ 所附专有租约，具体条款和条件如下：以及 Maid's room 1519（1519 号女佣房）。购买价格及股票：\\$67,500,000 每月 *1,* 57,085.53 \\_现估计每月专有租金 保证金 \\$\\_\\_ 2,000,000\\_\\_\\_ 特别条件（如有）：额外的 \\$2,500,000 分配为该单元所含个人财产。融资：是 • 否（8J）金额：\\_无 \\_\\_ ·~---银行：\\_\\_\\_ ~----- 下列签署人已填写以下信息表，并理解该等信息对考虑本申请至关重要。另行理解，本申请经下列签署人签署后，须经卖方或授权代表批准，并受本页背面条款和条件的约束。经纪人：卖方：Eisurger\\_Brown Harris Stevens（布朗·哈里斯·史蒂文斯）和 Serena Boardman（塞雷娜·博德曼），Sotheby's（苏富比）买方：Kathy Sloane（凯西·斯隆），Brown Harris Stevens（布朗·哈里斯·史蒂文斯）购买申请人签名：\\_!JJlQL!l1.i1ltQlJ...&\\_f..ii1:4.i.L~rmLK£!.C! 住址：\\_6A，\\_\\_ \\_~\\_oyth Bay Road，--~!9.~9 \\_\\_ ~?fl[ \\_\\_\\_\\_ 电话：+852 2169 0888 商业联系及职位：业主（证券及房地产投资）商务地址：\\_39/F, Bank of China Tower（中国银行大厦），\\_\\_ \\_ 电话：+852 2160 0888 家庭成员姓名：\\_1~~~11f1~~~{,; 9,fQ;[~;'/;8:;~.1~~~~ 如有子女，请说明人数及其大致年龄：(1) Kwok Ho Wa（郭文贵），买方；(2) Kwok Hing Chi（郭庆芝），买方之妻；(3) Guo Qiang（郭强），儿子；(4) Guo Mei（郭美），买方之女；(5) Yaz Qinghua（雅清华），买方之妻的姐妹。申请人所属的所有俱乐部及社团会员资格、兄弟会及荣誉社团名称：Mar-a-Lago Club（海湖庄园俱乐部），Palm Beach, FL；Trump Golf Course（特朗普高尔夫球场），Palm Beach, FL。丈夫、妻子及子女就读的学校：\\_\\_\\_\\_ Mr. and Mrs. Kwok（郭先生及郭太太）在 China（中国）接受教育。Mr. Kwok（郭先生）的儿子就读于 Bard College（巴德学院）。\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 23 of 159\n\n否\n申请人是否希望饲养宠物？如是，请具体说明：\n\n房东：\n现任房东或代理人 自有私人住宅\n• 地址：\\_?\\?_Lilh Bay Road，\\_r1JL K2D.9\n大致居住期限：\n前任房东或代理人：___ _\n\n前一住所地址及大致居住期限：___ _\n\nStephen Wong（黄先生）\n\n（银行—个人账户）\n\n地址：\nUBS AG（瑞银集团）52/F Two International Finance Centre，8 Finance Street，Central，Hong Kong\n\nA. （业务）Hank H.F. Lo（汉克·H.F.·罗），合伙人，Stevenson Wong & Co.（史蒂文森黄律师事务所）\n\nB. Central Tower，28 Queen's Road，Central，Hong Kong\n\n股票经纪人、律师、注册会计师、遗嘱执行人（如有）\n\nC. 地址：\n\n有关收入来源的信息，请联系：\n_______\n\n姓名：\nThe Rt Hon. Tony Blair（尊敬的托尼·布莱尔阁下）\n\n地址：PO Box 60619，London W27JU，UK\n\n请提供任何可能相关或有帮助的补充信息：郭先生和郭太太对The Sherry-Netherland（谢里-尼德兰大厦）印象非常深刻，并期待将The Sherry-Netherland作为其家庭的主要住所。\n\n购买申请书\n\nNew York _______，20___\n\nKWOK\n\n申请人姓名　郭文贵\n__________ _\n（姓名必须以上述方式填写，以便制作股票证书及其他文件。）Ira. J. Etd（艾拉·J.·埃特德）　电话（___）___\n\n申请人律师\n\n律师事务所及地址：\n\n卖方名称，____________________________ _\n\n卖方律师 ________________ 电话 ______　_\n\n律师事务所及地址 ______________________ _\n\n交割日期和时间 ______________ 取得占有日期 ___\n\n下列签署人特此要约购买The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.（谢里-尼德兰公司）的__________股股本，以及随附的专有租约，涉及位于New York, New York，781 Fifth Avenue大楼内的_____\n\n公寓\n\n依下列条款及条件。\n\n股票购买价格 \\$_________，目前预计每月专有租金\n\n___\n\n\\$_\n\n特别条件（如有）：_____________\n\n是 D 否\n\n（注：本要约在有关各方签署正式购房及租赁合同之前，不产生任何法律义务。）\n\n下列签署人已填写以下信息表，并理解该等信息对于审议本申请至关重要。进一步理解，本申请经下列签署人签署后，须经卖方或授权代表批准，并受下列条款及条件约束。\n\n经纪人 ___________　金额 _______ 银行 _______　--------\n\n个人推荐信\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 256 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 26 of 159\n\n来自The Rt Hon Tony Blair（尊敬的托尼·布莱尔阁下）\n\n2015年2月\n\nThe Sherry Netherland董事会各位女士、先生：\n\n我非常高兴为Miles Kwok（郭文贵）作为贵楼潜在业主出具此推荐信。我认识Miles已有七年，无论在商业上还是作为朋友，我都对他抱有最高的敬意。多年来，我与Miles密切合作，并始终钦佩他的诚实和忠诚。\n\nMiles作为个人可靠、真诚且极具责任感；其举止庄重而睿智。Miles诚实、坦率，且品味无可挑剔。\n\n我强烈推荐他入住贵楼，因为我知道，作为贵楼在The Sherry Netherland的邻居，Miles将是极佳的补充。Miles是一位成就卓著的人士，并且依我之见，将成为The Sherry Netherland极具价值的资产。\n\nPO Box 60619 London W27JU\n\n商业推荐信\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/28/2018 12:22 PM　INDEX NO. 652077/2017\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 256　Case 22-50073　Doc 50-4\nFiled 02/28/22　Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53　Page 28 of\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/28/2018\n\nStevenson Wong & Co.（史蒂文森黄律师事务所）　159　Willy Y.P. Cheng（威利·Y.P.·郑）\nHank H.F. Lo（汉克·H.F.·罗）\nCatherine K.G. Por（凯瑟琳·K.G.·波尔）\nEric C.H. Lui（埃里克·C.H.·吕）\nNeville J.J. Watkins（内维尔·J.J.·沃特金斯）\nWendy W.S. Lim（温迪·W.S.·林）\nLai S. Lam（赖·S.·林）\n\n本所档案号　EYC/HLO(P)/75450/15　Cornelia W.C. Chu（科妮莉亚·W.C.·朱）\nJanice L.H.（贾尼斯·L.H.）\nHeidi H. Chui（海蒂·H.·崔）\n\n贵方档案号\n\n高级顾问：\nAngus Forsyth（安格斯·福赛思）\n\n回复传真　顾问\nSherlynn G. Chan（舍琳·G.·陈）\n\n2015年2月17日　Hong Kong（香港）公证人\n中华人民共和国委任见证官\n婚姻监礼人\n\n邮寄\n\nThe Sherry-Netherland董事会\nThe Sherry-Netherland\n781 Fifth Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n\nThe Sherr/ Netherland董事会成员：\n\n本人致函推荐Mr. Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵，亦称Miles Kwok）成为贵合作公寓的住户股东，以支持其申请。\n\n大约七年前，Miles就其一项商业交易聘请我的律师事务所时，我首次认识他。我当时及现在均为本所合伙人。此后，我们建立了长期关系。多年来，本所曾在多个不同领域的商业交易中代理Miles，包括项目融资、筹资、公司合并与收购，以及在Hong Kong（香港）、China（中国）及世界不同地区收购飞机、休闲船只和房地产。\n\nMiles是一位成功的商人，也是举止庄重而睿智、礼貌、可靠且负责任的人。撇开我们的工作关系不谈，Miles也是我的好朋友。就个人而言，我知道Miles令人愉悦、体贴且尊重他人。我相信，他的个人品质必定会使他成为贵楼的好邻居和负责任的管理者。\n\n依我之见，Miles将是贵楼宝贵的补充。\n\n如您希望亲自联系我，请随时致电+852 2533 2552，\n\nHank Lo（汉克·罗）\n合伙人\n\nSTEVENSON, WONG & CO.（史蒂文森、黄律师事务所）\n\nHong Kong Guangzhou Shanghai Nanjing Shenzhen Suzhou\n\n2015年2月18日\n\n邮寄\n\nThe Sherry-Netherland董事会\nThe Sherry-Netherland\n781 Fifth Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n\nThe Sherry Netherland董事会各位女士、先生：\n\n本人非常高兴推荐Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵，亦称Miles Kwok）成为The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.的股东及贵楼住户。我是UBS AG财富管理及瑞士银行部的董事总经理，并随附我的名片以供贵方参考。自Miles首次开始与UBS AG合作以来，我认识他约五年。此后，Miles一直在证券投资领域与我们合作，也就飞机收购等领域的各类项目融资与我们合作。\n\nMiles是一位成功且成就卓著的企业家，曾在国内外创办并管理多家公司。多年来，Miles已在我行赢得信誉。他非常可靠，并始终履行还款义务。因此，我行很高兴拥有他这位长期客户。\n\n从个人角度而言，Miles是一位真诚、谦逊且热心的绅士。他财务状况良好但十分谦逊。他也是我所认识的最聪明、真诚和值得尊敬的人之一。\n\n基于我与Miles长期的关系，我确实推荐Miles成为贵合作公寓的股东及贵楼住户。我确信，贵社区将很高兴Miles及其家人加入The Sherry。\n\n如有任何问题，请随时通过stephen-kc. wong@ubs.com联系我。\n\n谨启，\n\n财务推荐信\n\nHong Kong Branch\n52/F Two International Finance Centre\n8 Finance Street, Central, Hong Kong\nTel. +852-2971 8888\nFax +852-2971 8001\n\n2015年2月23日\n\nSherry-Netherland董事会\nThe Sherry-Netherland\n781 Fifth Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n\n敬启者：\n\n银行推荐信—[房地产投资申请]\n\n我们受要求就房地产投资申请提供一封推荐信。我们确认：\n\nKwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）\n\n[客户身份证号：P746467(7)J]\n\n自2012年7月起，其一直通过一家个人投资公司成为我行客户，在此期间，Kwok Ho Wan先生与我行保持着令人满意的银行关系。截至2015年2月18日，该银行关系所涉资金不少于USD400, 000,000。\n\n上述信息基于截至当前日期我们对该银行关系的经验，仅为供贵方私人使用而以保密方式提供，UBS AG或其雇员对此不承担任何责任。本函仅可用于本函开头所述的业务背景，并不构成UBS AG的保证或任何其他义务。特别是，我行没有义务通知贵方该银行关系情况随后发生的任何变化。\n\n谨启，代表UBS AG Hong Kong Branch\n\nTom Cheung（汤姆·张）\n董事总经理\n\nStephen Wong（史蒂芬·黄）\n董事总经理\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 33 of 159\n\n证据20\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 02/05/2016 07:09 PM INDEX NO. 653316/2015 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 27 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/05/2016 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 34 of 159\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK（纽约州纽约县最高法院）\n\nACE DECADE HOLDINGS LIMITED（艾斯十年控股有限公司），　：\n\n原告，　：案号：653316/2015（Bransten法官）\n\n诉　：动议序号：001\n\nUBS AG（瑞银集团），　：\n\n被告。　：\n\nKWOK HO WAN（郭文贵）支持原告反对被告驳回起诉书动议的宣誓书\n\nKWOK HO WAN经依法宣誓，特此陈述如下：\n\n1. 我是Yong Yu（俞勇）的雇主；Yong Yu为Ace Decade Holdings Limited（“Ace Decade”）的董事及唯一股东。\n\n2. 我根据本人亲身所知作出本宣誓书。\n\n3. 我于2010年首次开始与UBS AG（“UBS”）讨论潜在投资。我自2012年7月起一直是UBS的客户。\n\n4. 我在UBS的主要联系人一直是Stephen Wong，其为UBS财富管理及瑞士银行部董事总经理。\n\n5. 我于2010年5月认识Wong先生。自那时起，Wong先生就与飞机收购等项目的投资和融资有关的众多事项向我提供建议。多年来，我在作出投资和融资决定时，一直依赖并信赖Wong先生和UBS的知识与专业经验。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 35 of 159\n\n6. 此外，自2012年7月起，我就在UBS为我控制的一项投资工具持有账户。此后，我又为我控制的另外两项投资工具在UBS开设账户，并从UBS获得两架飞机的融资。\n\n7. 2014年初至年中，我开始与UBS讨论在Haitong Securities Co., Ltd.（海通证券股份有限公司，以下简称“Haitong”）即将进行的H股（以下简称“股份”）配售中的一项投资机会（以下简称“投资”）。\n\n8. 自2014年我首次开始与UBS讨论起，至2015年5月13日我与Yu女士授权支付最终HK \\$2 billion（约US \\$260 million）以参与该投资之日止，Wong先生与我经常通过电话、面对面会面及电子消息进行沟通。在此期间，包括在我于2015年1月9日迁居New York之后，Wong先生作出了多项失实陈述；我在决定进行该投资时依赖了这些陈述。\n\n9. UBS是股份的联席全球协调人和配售代理人，并宣称其在就该投资提供建议方面具有知识和经验。\n\n10. 起初，Wong 先生（黄先生）向我保证，如果 UBS（瑞银）获得我的业务，它将保护我的利益，并为融资该项投资的一部分提供尽可能最优的贷款条件。Wong 先生告诉我，由于我计划进行的投资规模较大，UBS 全球的高级管理人员将参与安排该交易。Wong 先生告诉我，在整个投资过程中，他将担任我的个人联系人以及 UBS 的代表，但他将按照 UBS 位于美国、瑞士、英国和香港的办事处高级管理人员的指示行事。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交于 02/28/22 录入于 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 36 页，共 159 页\n\n11. 基于上述陈述，即 UBS 全球的高级管理人员将参与安排和监督该项投资，且 UBS 将为我的最大利益行事，我委托 UBS 担任该项投资的顾问。\n\n12. 我已阅读 Wong 先生为支持 UBS 要求驳回 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）起诉状的动议而提交的声明。在该声明中，他在伪证处罚的约束下确认：“我第一次听说 Ace Decade，是在我于 2015 年 10 月得知本诉讼时。”（Stephen Wong（史蒂芬·黄）的声明，第 3 段。）我读到这一陈述时感到震惊，因为该陈述不实。恰恰相反，Wong 先生和 UBS 不仅此前已听说 Ace Decade，而且正是他们就下列事项向我提供建议：应任命我的哪一名员工担任 Ace Decade 的唯一股东及董事；利用 Ace Decade 与将持有该等股份法定所有权的中介实体订立附带协议；以及如何将该项投资所需资金从我的一个 UBS 账户以最佳方式转入 Ace Decade 账户。总而言之，Wong 先生和 UBS 知道该项投资的最终投资者是 Ace Decade。\n\n13. UBS 建议，由于计划中的投资占 Haitong（海通）已发行 H 股的比例超过 5%，如果我通过 Ace Decade 直接投资，适用的披露要求将要求提交某些申报文件。\n\n14. UBS 建议，如果我通过一家中介实体进行投资，由该中介实体持有该等股份的法定所有权，则无需作出该等披露。\n\n15. UBS 建议我选择 Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co., Ltd.（海峡汇富资产投资基金管理有限公司，以下简称“Haixia”）作为该项投资的中介方。UBS 表示，其推荐 Haixia 是因为 Haixia 最有资格代表 Ace Decade 行事。UBS 进一步表示，Haixia 独立于 UBS，并将保护我和 Ace Decade 的利益。基于这些陈述，我选择 Haixia 作为该项投资的中介方。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交于 02/28/22 录入于 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 37 页，共 159 页\n\n16. UBS 从未披露 Haixia 受其合资企业合作伙伴 State Development & Investment Corp.（国家开发投资公司，以下简称“SDIC”）控制。UBS 亦未披露，担任 UBS 与 Haixia 之间主要联系人的 Lu Bo（吕波）此前曾担任 UBS 与 SDIC 合资企业的首席财务官。直到 2015 年 7 月 21 日，我才知悉 Haixia 与 UBS 的密切关系；当时 Ace Decade 已进行该项投资，且 UBS 已清算该等股份，Wong 先生在一次电话交谈中披露了该关系，我是在纽约办公室接听该电话的。\n\n17. Wong 先生起初称，如果我们选择 Haixia 作为进行该项投资的中介方，我们将无需经过 Haixia 的“了解你的客户”（Know Your Customer，“KYC”）程序。然而，他后来称，我们需要准备一些文件以接受 Haixia 的背景审查，但他并未解释这些文件是否用于 Haixia 的 KYC 程序。Wong 先生要求审阅我的一些员工的履历，以评估谁的背景最有可能满足 Haixia 的要求，从而可任命该员工担任 Ace Decade 的董事及唯一股东。他审阅了这些履历，并建议 Yu 女士（于女士）的履历和背景最适合满足 Haixia 的要求，因此我应任命 Yu 女士担任 Ace Decade 的董事及唯一股东。Wong 先生称，他将对 Yu 女士的履历提出意见，并要求她将履历发送给他。（见 Ace Decade 证物 3 和 4。）\n\n18. 此后，Wong 先生对 Yu 女士的履历提出修改意见，以增加其满足 Haixia 要求的可能性。\n\n19. Wong 先生和我还多次讨论了该项投资的潜在融资。Wong 先生表示，Ace Decade 应通过 UBS 而非另一家银行为该项投资的一部分取得融资，因为 UBS 将以对 Ace Decade 最有利的条件处理该融资。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交于 02/28/22 录入于 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 38 页，共 159 页\n\n20. 在讨论贷款融资期间，我告诉 Wong 先生，除非贷款文件不包含任何允许 UBS 基于该等股份短期价格波动要求偿还贷款的条款（即“追缴保证金通知”），且除非 UBS 表示将给予 Ace Decade 足够时间，例如五个营业日支付首个 25%、10 个营业日支付第二个 25%、以及 20 个营业日支付剩余的 50%，以应对任何追缴保证金通知，否则 Ace Decade 不会进行该项投资。\n\n21. Wong 先生于 2014 年不止一次表示，贷款融资文件将符合我的要求，具体而言，不会因短期价格波动而触发还款或追缴保证金通知。\n\n22. Wong 先生还于 2014 年和 2015 年多次表示，UBS 将与 Ace Decade 合作，使其能够应对任何追缴保证金通知；UBS 不会因任何追缴保证金通知而出售任何该等股份，除非先给予 Ace Decade 足够时间。\n\n23. Wong 先生还于 2014 年和 2015 年多次表示，UBS 曾向 Ping An Insurance Group（平安保险集团，以下简称“Ping An”）的一名大股东发放贷款。Wong 先生解释称，该平安股东的贷款金额远高于 Ace Decade 的贷款金额，但 UBS 从未在该股东收到追缴保证金通知后出售其持有的任何股份。Wong 先生称，当触发追缴保证金通知时，UBS 曾与该平安股东合作解决该情况，而未出售其任何股份。Wong 先生反复表示，UBS 将给予 Ace Decade 与给予该平安股东相同的待遇，并将进行合作，使 Ace Decade 能够应对任何追缴保证金通知；但无论如何，UBS 不会在追缴保证金通知后出售该等股份，除非先给予 Ace Decade 足够时间。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交于 02/28/22 录入于 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 39 页，共 159 页\n\n24. 在我们关于该项投资的讨论过程中，Wong 先生一再表示，我可以信任他和 UBS，且他和 UBS 始终在为我的最大利益行事。\n\n25. 2014 年 12 月 14 日，在讨论该项投资时，Wong 先生通过 WhatsApp（一款智能手机移动通讯应用程序）向我发送消息称：“一旦我向郭总作出承诺，我一定会竭尽全力；我只希望郭总能信任我。”当日稍后，他在另一条消息中告诉我：“我没有理由不为郭总争取最好的结果！”（“郭总”是 Wong 先生对我的称呼。）\n\n26. 同于 2014 年 12 月 14 日，Wong 先生给我留下语音留言，称在就该项投资进行的谈判中，“必须保障郭总的利益”，并称他已请全球各地办事处的 UBS 最高管理层提供协助。\n\n27. 2014 年 12 月 15 日，Wong 先生给我留下语音留言，称他正在就该项投资的条款开展工作，以“保护[我]”。\n\n28. 2014 年 12 月 19 日，Wong 先生给我留下语音留言，称：“郭总，您可以完全放心，我将全面保护您的利益。”\n\n29. 因此，我相信 Wong 先生和 UBS 正在为 Ace Decade 的最大利益行事；我相信 Wong 先生就贷款融资文件所作的陈述是真实的，并且相信 UBS 不会在未与 Ace Decade 合作、使其能够应对任何追缴保证金通知的情况下出售该等股份。\n\n30. 2015 年 1 月 9 日，在我仍与 UBS 就该项投资的条款进行谈判期间，我与 Yu 女士及其他员工迁往纽约，意图将我的业务项目扩展至纽约，并寻找有意投资 Ace Decade 的投资者。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交于 02/28/22 录入于 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 40 页，共 159 页\n\n31. 我于 2014 年 12 月首次与 Wong 先生讨论迁往纽约以为 Ace Decade 寻找投资者的该计划。随后，我于 2015 年 3 月、5 月和 6 月从纽约通过电话与 Wong 先生多次讨论为 Ace Decade 寻找投资者。\n\n32. 2015 年 2 月 9 日，Ace Decade 与 China Golden Spring Group (Hong Kong) Limited（中国金泉集团（香港）有限公司，以下简称“Golden Spring Hong Kong”）签署了一份受美国法律管辖的谅解备忘录（以下简称“MOU”）。该 MOU 规定，Ace Decade 将收购海通股份，而 Golden Spring Hong Kong 将在纽约设立分支机构，为与海通股份有关的项目寻找投资者。\n\n33. 为推进该 MOU，Golden Spring Hong Kong 成立了一家名为 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司，以下简称“Golden Spring New York”）的公司，该公司于 2015 年 3 月在 Delaware（特拉华州）注册成立，并登记取得在纽约开展业务的资格。Golden Spring New York 由 Golden Spring Hong Kong 全资拥有。\n\n34. 此后不久，Golden Spring New York 就位于 New York, NY 10153, 767 Fifth Avenue 的 General Motors Building（通用汽车大厦）第 46 层的部分区域签订了租赁协议。Yu 女士和我在位于 767 Fifth Avenue 的办公室开展与 Ace Decade 有关的业务。\n\n35. 我不仅于 2014 年 12 月与 UBS 讨论了迁往纽约并在纽约运营我的业务项目的计划，我还请求 UBS 协助我在纽约设立运营业务。2015 年 3 月，Wong 先生及 UBS 的其他人员，包括 Agnes Fu（傅女士）和 Liz Lam（林女士），安排将资金从我的一个 UBS 账户转入我在纽约的个人 JPMorgan Chase（摩根大通）账户。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 50-4 提交于 02/28/22 录入于 02/28/22 21:19:53 第 41 页，共 159 页\n\n36. 2015 年 4 月，Wong 先生、Fu 女士和 Lam 女士通过将资金从我的一个 UBS 账户转入 Golden Spring New York 在纽约的摩根大通银行账户，协助我设立 Golden Spring New York。\n\n37. UBS 还就我购买纽约一栋合作公寓大楼中的公寓一事，代表我提交了推荐信。在 Wong 先生于 2015 年 2 月 18 日致该大楼董事会的一封信中，Wong 先生写道：“自 Miles（迈尔斯）首次开始与 UBS AG 合作以来，我认识他约五年了。”（Miles 是我的英文姓名。）Wong 先生还称：“多年来，Miles 在我行赢得了信誉。他非常可靠，且始终履行其还款义务。因此，我行很高兴拥有他作为长期客户。”（Ace Decade 证物 1。）\n\n38. Wong 先生和同为 UBS 董事总经理的 Tommy Cheung（张先生）于 2015 年 2 月 23 日代表我向该公寓大楼董事会提交了另一封推荐信，称：“Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）自 2012 年 7 月以来，一直通过一家个人投资公司成为我们的客户。”（Ace Decade 证物 2。）\n\n39. 2015 年 3 月 6 日，我购买了该大楼中的一套公寓。自购买以来，我与 Yu 女士以及 Ace Decade 和 Golden Spring New York 的其他员工及代表一直居住于该公寓。\n\n40. 在我迁往纽约后的该段期间内，Wong 先生和我经常通过电话、语音信息和即时信息进行沟通。在我位于纽约期间，Wong 先生数十次通过电话与我交谈，并在我位于纽约期间向我发送了大量电子信息。Yu 女士参加了我与 Wong 先生的一些通话。Wong 先生至少在下列日期于我位于纽约期间通过电话与我交谈：\n\n- 2015年1月26日（三次通话）\n- 2015年1月28日（两次通话）\n- 2015年3月2日\n- 2015年3月4日（三次通话）\n- 2015年3月5日\n- 2015年3月13日\n- 2015年3月15日\n- 2015年3月16日（六次通话）\n- 2015年3月17日（两次通话）\n- 2015年3月18日（两次通话）\n- 2015年3月24日\n- 2015年3月31日\n- 2015年4月28日（三次通话）\n- 2015年4月30日（五次通话）\n- 2015年5月6日（两次通话）\n- 2015年5月11日（三次通话）\n- 2015年6月23日（两次通话）\n- 2015年7月21日\n\n41. 在2015年的这些通话中，我在纽约参与了通话，Wong先生与我多次讨论了该项投资及瑞银（UBS）贷款。在其中一次或多次通话中，Wong先生与我还讨论了我对该贷款的担忧，包括基于贷款价值比（“LTV比率”）的追加保证金通知触发条件、贷款金额、贷款利率以及海通（Haitong）股份的发行价格。Wong先生与我还讨论了我在纽约为Ace Decade寻找投资者的工作进展。\n\n案号22-50073 文件50-4 提交于02/28/22 录入于02/28/22 21:19:53 第43页，共159页\n\n42. 在2015年该期间内，我没有再次向Wong先生提出我对以股份短期价格波动为条件的还款触发条件的担忧，因为Wong先生此前曾告诉我，不存在此类触发条件。\n\n43. 然而，在2015年3月、4月和5月期间的数次通话中，Wong先生与我讨论了一般意义上的追加保证金通知，特别是LTV比率触发条件。Wong先生说，我无需担心，因为瑞银会以我的最大利益为重，瑞银会给予Ace Decade充足时间应对任何追加保证金通知，并且瑞银会尽一切努力与Ace Decade合作，使其能够应对任何追加保证金通知。在此期间，他还数次提醒我，瑞银从未在平安（Ping An）股东的贷款发生追加保证金通知后出售该股东的股份，并表示Ace Decade将获得与该平安股东相同的待遇。\n\n44. 在纽约期间，Wong先生还就该项投资及瑞银贷款向我发送了大量WhatsApp信息。例如，2015年3月21日和22日，Wong先生与我互发了一系列WhatsApp信息，其中讨论了该项投资的瑞银贷款。我告诉Wong先生，瑞银提出的一些条件，例如基于瑞银贷款LTV比率的追加保证金通知触发条件，“绝对不能接受”，并且“我们宁可不做，也不会同意你们的条款”。如果我当时并未依赖Wong先生先前所作的陈述，即贷款融资文件不包含基于股份短期价格波动的还款触发条件，我本会再次向Wong先生提出该问题，而不会只将我们的讨论聚焦于基于LTV比率的追加保证金通知触发条件。\n\n案号22-50073 文件50-4 提交于02/28/22 录入于02/28/22 21:19:53 第44页，共159页\n\n45. Wong先生回复说，他理解我对潜在追加保证金通知的担忧，并告诉我：“你放心！……我是在为郭总工作！别担心。”我依赖Wong先生所作的陈述，即他和瑞银都在维护我的利益。所有这些讨论均发生在我身处纽约期间。\n\n46. 2015年5月8日，海通宣布，其已取得发行该等股份所必需的股东和监管批准（分别于2月和5月取得），预计将于5月15日发行。海通还宣布，由于此前30个交易日期间海通股份的交易价格已超过预先约定的门槛，认购价格将会上调。\n\n47. 在该公告之后，为最终确定该项投资的条款，我通过电话和WhatsApp信息与Wong先生进行了数次讨论。我们讨论的议题包括：贷款必须增加以反映海通每股股份价格的上涨、所需付款金额、LTV比率、利率，以及我们应如何将美元兑换为支付所需的港元。\n\n48. 在5月8日后的一次讨论中，Wong先生再次表示，就任何追加保证金通知而言，Ace Decade将获得与平安股东相同的待遇。\n\n49. 依赖这些陈述，我决定进行该项投资。在5月11日的电话交谈中，我与Wong先生讨论了如何最好地将进行该项投资所需的资金从我的一个瑞银账户转入Ace Decade账户。Wong先生说，我首先需要在我的瑞银账户中将资金从美元兑换为港元。他还指示，不要将资金从我的瑞银账户直接转入Ace Decade账户，而应将资金从我的瑞银账户转入另一家银行的账户，然后再将资金从该账户转入Ace Decade账户。\n\n案号22-50073 文件50-4 提交于02/28/22 录入于02/28/22 21:19:53 第45页，共159页\n\n50. 依照Wong先生的建议，我决定先将资金从我的瑞银账户转入中国民生银行股份有限公司香港分行（China Minsheng Banking Corp., Ltd. Hong Kong Branch，以下简称“中国民生账户”）的账户，然后将资金从中国民生账户转入Ace Decade账户。\n\n51. 2015年5月11日，Fu女士向Yu女士发送电子邮件，抄送Wong先生和Lam女士，并要求Yu女士取得我对瑞银拟定的一份付款指示文件的签名。该文件载有一项请求，要求将HK $860 million（approximately US $111 million）从我的瑞银账户转入Wong先生指示我使用的中国民生账户。\n\n52. 基于对Wong先生就该项投资和瑞银贷款所作陈述的信赖，我签署了授权该电汇的文件。\n\n53. 当天稍后，Lam女士向Yu女士发送电子邮件，抄送Wong先生和Fu女士，并附上了从我的瑞银账户汇出的转账确认书。\n\n54. 遵照Wong先生的指示，我随后授权将资金从中国民生账户转入Ace Decade账户。\n\n55. 在资金到达Ace Decade账户后，2015年5月13日，Yu女士和我授权从Ace Decade账户向由海峡基金（Haixia）全资拥有的特殊目的实体兼子公司Dawn State Limited（道恩州有限公司，以下简称“Dawn State”）持有的账户支付HK $2 billion（approximately US $260 million），以资助于5月15日发行的股份投资。在此之前，我已授权从Ace Decade账户经由Dawn State向一个瑞银证券账户支付约US $250 million的初始首付款。如果该项投资未能完成，该笔付款本应返还给Ace Decade。\n\n案号22-50073 文件50-4 提交于02/28/22 录入于02/28/22 21:19:53 第46页，共159页\n\n56. 我为进行该项投资所采取的所有步骤，包括要求将约HK $860 million（approximately US $111 million）从我的一个瑞银账户电汇至中国民生账户并最终转入Ace Decade账户，以及授权于2015年5月13日从Ace Decade账户向Dawn State账户支付HK $2 billion（approximately US $260 million），均是在我位于纽约的办公室或公寓内进行的。\n\n57. 如果我知道瑞银谎称贷款融资文件不包含基于股份短期价格波动的还款触发条件，并且瑞银会拒绝与Ace Decade合作以应对任何追加保证金通知，而且一旦发出追加保证金通知便会立即出售Ace Decade的股份，我就不会进行该项投资，也不会在2015年5月授权该笔付款。\n\n58. 根据Ace Decade与海峡基金之间协议的条款，在2015年7月13日之后，如Ace Decade提出请求，海峡基金须将Dawn State（持有该等股份法定所有权的实体）转让给Ace Decade。\n\n59. 然而，按纽约时间2015年7月6日上午——即海峡基金本应将Dawn State转让给Ace Decade前仅一周——我得知，瑞银因该等股份的短期价格波动，要求我在不足24小时内偿还约US $200 million。\n\n60. 如果我知道瑞银有可能在如此短的期限内要求付款，并且瑞银谎称会提供充足时间以应对任何追加保证金通知，我本会确保Ace Decade有足够可用资金作出该等付款。\n\n案号22-50073 文件50-4 提交于02/28/22 录入于02/28/22 21:19:53 第47页，共159页\n\n61. 在瑞银规定的期限之前，Ace Decade告知瑞银，我们能够迅速取得所需资金，但无法在瑞银规定的期限之前取得。\n\n62. 然而，2015年7月6日，Wong先生表示，瑞银不会给予Ace Decade任何额外时间。Wong先生表示，瑞银已经为该等股份确定买家，并且瑞银通过出售该等股份而非允许Ace Decade付款，将获得巨额利润。\n\n63. 7月7日，我向Wong先生发送WhatsApp信息，称瑞银的追加保证金通知“违法”。Wong先生没有反驳我，也没有否认他曾告诉我不存在基于股份短期价格波动的还款触发条件。相反，他说他已要求高级管理层取消出售该等股份，并说他将要求瑞银将该等股份返还给我。Wong先生告诉我，该等股份仍处于瑞银控制之下，并承诺提出一项回购方案。Wong先生向我保证：“我一直站在郭总身边。”\n\n64. 7月9日，Wong先生表示，出售该等股份的决定是由香港和中国境外的瑞银高管作出的。\n\n65. 7月17日，我提醒Wong先生，他此前曾多次表示，绝“不会”发生基于股份短期价格波动的追加保证金通知，并且他曾多次表示，瑞银在一名大型平安股东发生追加保证金通知后并未出售该股东的股份。\n\n66. 在7月17日的另一则信息中，我对Wong先生说：“我告诉过你，自从去年以来，我就是来美国寻找更好机会的，不是吗？我从美国发给你的所有信息、我的要求，你都知道。……在这种情况下，所有事情都交给你了，[我]都听你的。是你介绍了海峡基金……结果现在搞成这个样子。”\n\n案号22-50073 文件50-4 提交于02/28/22 录入于02/28/22 21:19:53 第48页，共159页\n\n67. Wong先生没有否认他作出了这些虚假陈述，实际上回复说他理解。\n\n68. 在7月17日的另一则信息中，我对Wong先生说：“你多次告诉我，你们瑞银不会那样清算资产；否则我怎么会信任你。”我还告诉他：“如果不是你告诉我追加保证金通知会像平安那样，事情就不会是这样。会有合理时间筹措一些资产来处理。”\n\n69. 7月17日，我还对Wong先生说：“你说瑞银与他们[海峡基金]签署了协议，允许瑞银在发出追加保证金通知后24小时内出售全部股份。那是怎么签的？他们是如何执行的？这不公平。你当时告诉我不是这样的。”\n\n70. Wong先生回复：“我一直坚决反对他们，但他们不理会我，并告诉我这是瑞士首席执行官的命令。”他没有否认我的主张，即他此前曾表示贷款协议不会允许瑞银在发出追加保证金通知后24小时内出售该等股份。\n\n71. 在我们任何一次讨论中，Wong先生从未否认他曾表示，瑞银会给予Ace Decade与平安股东相同的待遇。\n\n72. 在我们任何一次讨论中，Wong先生从未否认他曾表示，贷款文件不会包含基于股份短期价格波动的还款触发条件。\n\n73. 在我们的任何讨论中，Wong先生（Mr. Wong）从未否认其曾表示，UBS（瑞银）将与Ace Decade（Ace Decade）合作，并给予其充足时间以应对任何追加保证金通知。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 50-4，提交日期 02/28/22，登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53，第 49 页，共 159 页\n\n74. 在我们的任何讨论中，Wong先生从未否认UBS曾有不当行为。\n\n75. Wong先生告诉我，2015 年 7 月 7 日，UBS以 HK $11.12 的价格出售了属于Ace Decade的全部股份，该价格较 7 月 7 日海通股票的收盘价低 20%。\n\n76. 由于失去海通股份，Ace Decade失去了纽约投资者；我于 2015 年迁居纽约后曾与这些投资者会面，他们曾有意投资Ace Decade。例如，2015 年 4 月至 6 月期间，我的代表和／或我曾四次在纽约会见一家总部位于纽约的私人投资公司的一名联合创始人。该公司表示对投资Ace Decade有重大兴趣。然而，在UBS出售属于Ace Decade的海通股份后，Ace Decade失去了这名潜在投资者。\n\n本人宣誓，上述内容真实、正确。\n\n[中文版本中郭浩云的签名] Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）\n\n[中文版本中的公证]\n\n梅森城（Mason City）市　塞罗戈多县（Cerro Gordo County） ) ) ) 宣誓证明：\n\n本人，Linmag lds-，经依法宣誓后陈述并声明，本人精通英语和中文。本人特此证明，所附文件是《Kwok Ho Wan宣誓书》中文版本的准确译文。\n\n于 2018 年 2 月的某日，在本人面前宣誓。\n\n公证人\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 50-4，提交日期 02/28/22，登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53，第 52 页，共 159 页\n\n证据 21\n\n已提交：纽约县书记官 06/01/2021 04:48 PM，案卷编号 652077/2017，NYSCEF 文件编号 833，NYSCEF 收件日期：06/01/2021，案号 22-50073，文件 50-4，提交日期 02/28/22，登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53，第 53 页，共 159 页\n\n纽约州最高法院\n纽约县\n民事审判庭\n第 61 部\n------------------------------------------X\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业），\n原告，\n\n案卷编号：\n-诉-\n652077/2017\n\nKWOK HO WAN（郭文贵），又名 KWOK HO，又名 GWO WEN GUI，又名 GUO WENGUI，又名 GUO WENGUI，又名 WAN GUE HAOYUN，又名 MILES KWOK，又名 HAOYUN GUO，GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION（GENEVER 控股公司）及 GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC（GENEVER 控股有限责任公司），\n被告。\n------------------------------------------X\n\nMICROSOFT TEAMS\n2021 年 5 月 27 日\n\n出庭法官：\n尊敬的 BARRY OSTRAGER（巴里·奥斯特拉格）法官\n\n出庭人员：\n\nO'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（奥麦律师事务所）\n原告代理律师\nTimes Square Tower\nNew York, New York 10036\n代理律师：\nEDWARD MOSS（爱德华·莫斯），ESQ.\nSTUART SARNOFF（斯图尔特·萨诺夫），ESQ.\n\nBAKER HOSTETLER, LLP（贝克霍斯泰特勒律师事务所）\n被告代理律师\n45 Rockefeller Plaza\nNew York, New York 10111\n代理律师：\nMELISSA CARVALHO（梅利莎·卡瓦略），ESQ.\nJOHN SIEGAL（约翰·西格尔），ESQ.\n\nLAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC（劳沃尔及米切尔有限责任公司）\nGENEVER被告代理律师\n162 E. 64th Street\nNew York, New York 10065\n代理律师：\nAARON A. MITCHELL（亚伦·A·米切尔），ESQ.\n\n已提交：纽约县书记官 06/01/2021 04:48 PM，案卷编号 652077/2017，NYSCEF 文件编号 833，NYSCEF 收件日期：06/01/2021，案号 22-50073，文件 50-4，提交日期 02/28/22，登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53，第 54 页，共 159 页\n\nYANKWITT LLP（扬克维特律师事务所）\n\n被告代理律师\n140 Grand Street, Suite 705\nNew York, New York\nNY\n代理律师：\nDANIEL ALTER（丹尼尔·奥尔特），ESQ.\n\nKaren Mangano（凯伦·曼加诺），CSR\n高级法庭记录员\n\n已提交：纽约县书记官 06/01/2021 04:48 PM，案卷编号 652077/2017，NYSCEF 文件编号 833，NYSCEF 收件日期：06/01/2021，案号 22-50073，文件 50-4，提交日期 02/28/22，登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53，第 55 页，共 159 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n确实存在实际负担。我想就传票问题中的一项具体论点作结，因为我预计Alter先生将会重点讨论该问题。我们要求——我们确实要求——关于 60 名个人和实体的信息，而没有任何人知晓他们与Kwok有关联。Alter先生在书面意见中讥讽道，嗯，是谁知道？是谁知道？是我们知道，法官阁下。我们是基于花费大量金钱和时间查阅公共记录、法院文件和社交媒体账户而知晓的，因为这正是Kwok先生迫使我们参与的游戏。\n\n我们必须要求这些信息的原因是，Golden Springs（戈尔登斯普林斯）是中枢。我们不能用余生追查 100 个实体。我的意思是，我的孙辈都可能还在做这件事。Golden Springs是掌握该等信息的实体。其已出示了与Shiny Times（闪耀时代）有关的文件，该实体涉及基础案件。它持有相关文件。它是该帝国的中枢。如果它没有关于其中几个实体的信息，如果我们对其中一两个判断错误，好吧，没关系。那么他们应当进行检索并告诉我们他们没有该等信息，而不出示相关材料。但是，应运行检索词，收集ESI，并提供文件。\n\n法庭：好的，Moss先生。我理解你的论点。我也理解Kwok先生每天正在承担 $500,000 的藐视法庭罚款。我理解Kwok先生认为这些法院程序是一场他——他想要参与的规避游戏。现在让我听取Golden Springs代理律师的陈述。\n\nALTER先生：下午好，法官阁下。我是Daniel Alter。我们刚刚听到了很多说法，但相对而言真相很少。我想退一步，澄清一些被严重混淆的问题。\n\n首先，为纠正两项具体的不准确陈述，据我了解，Kwok先生从未表示他与Golden Springs完全无关，或与其没有任何联系。恰恰相反。他说那是他的家族办公室。因此，我们应当准确说明这一点。\n\n第二件事是，你知道，显然——他们的立场是Kwok先生完全资助了Golden Springs。嗯，我没有看到这方面的证据。我所看到的是案卷中一项陈述，即他最初向Golden Springs提供了资本，但我没有看到证据表明他持续如此，或者目前该处的资本属于他。让我退一步谈谈此事。\n\n法庭：在你这样做之前，Alter先生，无论是对还是错，Kwok先生的种种行为已经耗尽了本庭的耐心。毫无争议的是，Golden Springs已支付了七位数的款项，以维持Kwok先生的生活方式，而Kwok先生过着相当奢华的生活，却声称自己完全没有资产。因此，原告是判决债权人。原告知道Golden Springs正在支付Kwok先生的费用。并非微小且无关紧要的费用，而是重大费用。判决债权人有权对为Kwok先生支付费用的实体进行证据开示。判决债权人还有权取得一项命令，指示Golden Springs不得转让、处分或以其他方式耗散Golden Springs拥有的任何资产，因为向本庭提交的最佳证据有力地表明，Golden Springs拥有的任何资产均由Kwok先生提供。现在，如果判决债权人向Golden Springs寻求的证据开示证明并非如此，那么我们面临的情况就与目前的情况不同。\n\n庭审记录\n\n根据《民事诉讼法与规则》（CPLR），判决债权人有权向第三方进行证据开示；在本案中，该等第三方很可能是Kwok先生的另一个自我，但判决债权人无须证明Golden Springs是Kwok先生的另一个自我。\n\nALTER先生：法官阁下，我们并未——那不是我们的立场。那是被提出的稻草人论证。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 50-4，提交日期 02/28/22，登记日期 02/28/22 21:19:53，第 58 页，共 159 页\n\n证据 22\n\n美国联邦地区法院\n纽约南区（SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK）\n----------------------------------------------------------------------　X　6/22/2021\n\nEASTERN PROFIT CORPORATION LIMITED（东方利润有限公司），　：\n原告，　：\n\n：　18-cv-2185\n(LJL)\n-诉　：\n：　事实认定及\nSTRATEGIC VISION US LLC（战略愿景美国有限责任公司），　：　法律结论\n\n被告。　：\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------　X\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J·利曼），美国联邦地区法院法官：\n\n原告Eastern Profit Corporation Limited（以下简称“原告”或“Eastern”）对被告Strategic Vision US LLC（以下简称“被告”或“Strategic”）提起本案，主张违约、确认判决及不当得利。1 Strategic提出反诉，主张违约及欺诈诱导。\n\n现场法官审判于 2021 年 4 月 19 日开始，并于 2021 年 4 月 23 日结束。结案陈述于 2021 年 4 月 30 日远程进行。本意见构成本庭根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 作出的事实认定及法律结论。\n\n基于下述理由，本庭就Eastern请求确认涉案研究协议依弗吉尼亚州法律及公共政策无效且不可执行的诉讼请求，判决Eastern胜诉。\n\n1 Eastern此前还提出欺诈性失实陈述的诉讼请求，但双方约定有偏见地驳回该请求。见 Dkt. No. 299 ¶ 6。\n\n一、事实认定\n\nA. 相关人员\n\nEastern是一家根据中华人民共和国香港特别行政区法律注册成立的私人有限公司。\n\nEastern实质上是为一名名为Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、又名Mile Kwok的个人设立的空壳公司（以下简称“Guo”）。Eastern未登记获准在美国开展业务。其在美国没有办公场所，也没有在美国开展经营活动。其在注册地香港亦无经营活动。其唯一资产是一个香港银行账户；该账户于 2007 年被香港高等法院冻结，目前账户内有 $80,000。在 2017 年之前，Eastern的所有人及唯一董事是一名名为Han Changhui（韩长辉）的人士（以下简称“Han”）。2017 年，Han将所有权及控制权转让给Guo的女儿Guo Mei（郭美）；Guo Mei是Han的朋友，现为Eastern的所有人及唯一董事。\n\nGuo是中国前居民，现居住于美国。他因一方面提出批评中国共产党（以下简称“CCP”）政策和做法的主张，同时又发表支持中国政府内部人士的言论，而在美国及国际上获得了一定知名度。他已在美国申请庇护。Guo以Golden Spring New York Ltd.（金泉纽约有限公司）的名义维持一家家族办公室（以下简称“Golden Spring”）。\n\nYvette Wang（王雁南，以下简称“Wang”）是Guo的关联人士，并担任其公司Golden Spring的总裁及董事。\n\n被告Strategic是一家在内华达州州务卿处注册并信誉良好的有限责任公司。Strategic的主要营业地位于弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿。\n\n除其他服务外，Strategic向美国境内客户提供私人“调查研究”服务，以换取金钱报酬。\n\nFrench Wallop（弗伦奇·沃洛普，以下简称“Wallop”）过去及现在均为Strategic的唯一经理和唯一成员。Wallop曾与Malcolm Wallop（马尔科姆·沃洛普）结婚；Malcolm Wallop曾于 1977 年至 1994 年担任代表怀俄明州的美国联邦参议员，现已去世。Wallop居住于弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿。\n\nJ. Michael Waller（J. 迈克尔·沃勒，下称“Waller”）是 Wallop（沃洛普）的长期朋友和职业熟人，也是美国反对 CCP（中国共产党）人士群体中的活跃成员。他拥有 Boston University（波士顿大学）国际安全事务博士学位，并具有广泛的学术背景。除在 Strategic（战略公司）任职外，他目前还担任位于 Washington D.C.（华盛顿哥伦比亚特区）的智库 Center for Security Policy（安全政策中心）的战略高级分析师。自 2016 年或 2017 年起，Waller 已与 Strategic 合作开展多个项目。\n\nStrategic 从未有过雇员。Eastern（东方公司）亦然。\n\nB. 协议的起源\n\n本案涉及一份日期为 December 29, 2017、由 Strategic 和 Eastern 于 January 6, 2018 签署的研究协议（下称“协议”）。Wallop 代表 Strategic 签署。Wang（王）代表 Eastern 签署 Han（韩）之名。\n\n协议载明，其“目的为由 [Strategic] 提供商业研究、报告、文件编制及其他咨询服务。”协议还体现了 Strategic 作出的承诺，即“就由 [Eastern] 自行决定选择的主题开展高质量原创研究并编写报告，以侦查、制止和预防犯罪或对无辜人士造成的其他伤害。”PX1。\n\n该协议源于 Wallop、Waller、Guo（郭文贵）以及与 Guo 有关联人士于 2017 年末举行的会面。\n\n2017 年 10 月末或 11 月初，一名名为 Linchao Han（韩林超，下称“L. Han”）的人将 Guo 介绍给 Wallop 和 Waller。一名曾任 Washington Free Beacon（《华盛顿自由灯塔报》）记者、现任 Washington Times（《华盛顿时报》）记者，名为 Bill Gertz（比尔·格茨，下称“Gertz”）的人也参与了该介绍；Gertz 是 Guo、Wallop 和 Waller 的共同熟人。\n\nGertz 和 L. Han 均为美国反对 CCP 人士群体的成员，并自称为“China Hawks（中国鹰派）”。L. Han 从中国移民至美国，并曾在 United States Senate（美国参议院）工作数年，就与中国有关的事务任职，其中包括为已故 Senator Wallop（沃洛普参议员）工作。在移民之前以及 1989 年 Tiananmen Square Massacre（天安门广场大屠杀）之后，L. Han 协助创立了 Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars（中国学生学者独立联合会）。Gertz 通过其文章和著作反对 CCP。他于 2017 年 6 月或 7 月采访 Guo 时认识了 Guo，并受 Guo 请求担任 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会）的董事；该组织由 Guo 于 October 2018 设立，旨在推动中国的民主改革。\n\nWallop 和 Waller 也参与了致力于推翻 CCP 的活动。\n\n2017 年末，Gertz 接洽 Wallop，并提出就一项 Gertz 认为 Wallop 可能感兴趣的项目向她介绍 L. Han。作为律师的 L. Han 正在协助 Guo 申请在美国获得庇护。Gertz 认为，Wallop 可以为从事反对 CCP 活动的 Guo 提供战略传播支持。\n\nWallop 和 Waller 于 2017 年 10 月末或 11 月初在 Wallop 位于 Virginia（弗吉尼亚州）的住所与 L. Han 和 Gertz 会面。L. Han 向 Strategic 介绍称，Guo 是一名富有商人，为逃避在中国遭受的政治迫害而搬到美国，并且最近购得 Manhattan（曼哈顿）Sherry-Netherland Hotel（谢里-内德兰酒店）的顶层公寓。据 L. Han 和 Gertz 称，Guo 已形成若干涉及中国政府的宏大目标，将有利于中国人民。具体而言，Gertz 将 Guo 描述为一名与 CCP 决裂、正在开展吹哨人运动，并希望投入其资源以削弱并促使 CCP 垮台的异见人士。L. Han 认为，Guo 需要维持其作为反对 CCP 的“吹哨人”的形象。L. Han 认为，要成为“吹哨人”，Guo 需要获得并公布针对政府高级官员的、经过充分研究的信息。\n\n此后，Wallop 和 Waller 于 2017 年末与 Guo 举行了数次会面。还与 Wang 和 L. Han 举行了其他会面。首次会面由 Wallop 与 Guo 在 Guo 位于 New York City（纽约市）的公寓举行。后续会面由 Wallop 和 Waller 与 L. Han 及 Wang 举行，地点在 Virginia 或 Washington, D.C.\n\nWallop 和 Waller 于 November 21, 2017 首次在 Guo 位于纽约的公寓与其会面。L. Han 也出席了会议。Guo 表示，他肩负着瓦解 CCP 的使命，并称自己是 CCP 的敌人，希望利用其财富、影响力和人脉披露信息，揭露 CCP 内部的矛盾，以使其垮台。\n\nWallop 出示了一份文件，其中载有关于 Guo“安全留在 [the United States（美国）] 并完成其在家乡的使命”的“Vision（愿景）”，即在中国完成其使命。DX38。该文件系应 L. Han 的要求编制；Strategic 理解 L. Han 为 Guo 的特使，但事实上，他仅作为 Strategic 与 Guo 之间的中间人行事。参见，例如，Trial Tr. at 57。“愿景”文件反映了 Wallop 当时对 Guo 所期望服务的理解。该文件既针对其庇护申请，也针对旨在协助其削弱 CCP 内部人物的活动。该文件还涉及改变 Guo 的公众形象。文件体现的目标是使 Guo“从一名不涉政治的商人转变为一名国际政治家”，并“建立全球性的道德声望，具备稳固的哲学或原则基础，展现其国家未来的积极愿景，从而团结通常绝不会追随一名富有商人的人”，以及“使 G 先生融入一个由领导者和追随者组成的新社群，以实现其目标。”DX38。\n\n在“愿景”中，Strategic 提议向 Guo 提供服务，以改变其公众形象并建立该社群。Strategic 表示，其将“专注于在本国建立那些[支持]社群，目的在于防止 [Guo] 被强制遣返的任何可能性，并作为从中公开扩展的基础。”Id. 该等服务包括协助改变其公众形象、扩大受尊重的来源、为 Guo 发展与 Washington D.C. 政策制定者、媒体人士和决策者进行社会接触的渠道，使 Guo 成为思想领袖和政策领袖，以及建立一个基金会，向美国和中国人士介绍 Guo 的理念。Strategic 向 Eastern 承诺提供的服务之一是，部署由支持并与时任 President Donald J. Trump（唐纳德·J.·特朗普总统）有关联人士组成的秘密且不可追踪网络。Strategic 提议对预计将加剧的攻击提供“积极防御”，并发展一个可代表 Guo 发言、却无法追溯至 Guo 的代理人网络；该网络将从支持特朗普总统的在线网络中发展而来。Wallop 提议开展“一项为期三年的工作，由 [Washington D.C.] 一支经验丰富的团队为 G 先生提供建议，并协助其应对政治和政策环境、制定战略、执行项目并协调信息传递。”DX38。\n\n在该会议上，Guo 表示，他“现[在]立即想要信息”，并且“[第]一个月对信息质量至关重要。”Trial Tr. at 383-84。\n\n这些想法在 Guo、Wallop 和 Waller 于 December 4, 2017 举行的第二次会议上得到进一步发展。Trial Tr. at 134。L. Han 和 Yang（杨）也出席了该会议。在此次会议上，Wallop 出示了该运动的三年时间表。所述目标如下：“留在美国并保持自由；成为思想领袖和国际政治家；改变对中国的思维方式并培育新的理念和战略；发展并建立可自我复制的个人网络；成功推动家乡的长期变革。”DX39。\n\n该提案包含若干组成部分，包括设立一个支持 Guo 目标、但结构上避免须作为外国政府或个人代理人向美国政府登记的基金会。该等组成部分包括：(1) 创建“在 Washington 的个人存在，建立朋友和盟友，使美国不可能将[其]遣返中国”，包括发展“Washington 有影响力人士和决策者的支持”以及“总统全国基层基础的支持”；(2)“发展足以与该政权抗衡的适当个人存在”，包括购买一处“Washington 住所，以显示目的和实力，并提供接待”（提及了 Georgetown（乔治城）的一个具体地点）；以及 (3) 创建机构性存在，包括通过一个“位于 Washington 的教育和文化基金会”，该基金会无须依据 Foreign Agents Registration Act（《外国代理人登记法》，下称“FARA”）, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. 登记，并通过购置“位于 Washington, D.C. 市中心的实体办公室。”Id. 该三年时间表总结道：“实施这项为期三年的工作将需要一支位于 Washington 的经验丰富团队，为 G 先生提供建议，并应对政治和政策环境、制定战略、执行项目并协调信息传递。这些都将是直接且透明的。大部分可通过基金会完成，从而无需根据 FARA 登记。”Id.\n\nStrategic 还提议，将调动由特朗普总统发展起来的社交媒体网络，并将部署替代媒体，以 Strategic 不愿书面载明的方式支持 Guo。其指出，Strategic 可以针对预计将“向美国政府施加强大压力以将 G 先生遣返中国”的人士，提供一项“‘积极防御’运动”，包括通过“替代媒体中积极进取的二线记者（与基金会隔离）”，其“将以口头方式说明”，以及通过“[组织]社交媒体运动以宣传 G 先生，在必要时攻击其批评者，并在总统全国基层基础中形成支持浪潮，以确保 G 先生绝不会违背其意愿被迫离开美国。这也与基金会隔离。”DX39。Strategic 提议就其服务每月收费 \\$33,000 至 \\$120,000。Id.\n\nWallop、Waller 和 L. Han 于 December 10, 2017 举行了后续会议。Trial Tr. at 134-35。\n\nWallop 和 Waller 于 December 11, 2017 与 Guo 举行了第三次会议。Id. at 134-36。L. Han 也出席了该会议。Id. 在该第三次会议上，当事方的讨论转向 Strategic 能够向 Guo 提供的调查服务。Id. at 137。Guo 表示，他有意对 CCP 成员开展调查，最终目标是协助推翻该政权。参见，例如，id. at 133, 137, 632-38。Strategic 介绍了其在调查方面的丰富背景，包括其与联邦执法部门及其他联邦机构之间可利用的关系。Strategic 所提议的调查服务载于 Waller 在与 L. Han 和 Wallop 协商后编制的一份 PowerPoint（幻灯片）中，标题为“Time To Get Them: Beginning the psycho-political campaign for China（该收拾他们了：开启针对中国的心理政治运动）”；其中一部分成为协议的基础。PX2。该 PowerPoint 描述了拟议工作第一阶段（下称“计划”）的六个部分：\n\n• 开展微目标化情报收集和分析；\n\n• 积极降低威胁；\n\n• 设立基金会并使其运转；\n\n• 与俄罗斯反对派建立网络；\n\n• 购置合适的 Washington, DC 住所；以及\n\n• 购置合适的 Washington, DC 基金会办公室。\n\n该计划在 Wallop、Waller、Guo、L. Han 和 Yang 于 December 21, 2017 前后举行的第四次会议上进行了讨论。Trial Tr. at 134-37, 252。\n\n计划第一阶段的第一部分成为该协议的基础。其目标是“[b]uild and operate a secret system for micro-targeted intelligence and collection analysis（建立并运行一个用于微定向情报和搜集分析的秘密系统）。”PX2。该PowerPoint指出，“[t]his is an extremely sensitive capability that must be handled with extreme care（这是一项极其敏感的能力，必须以极其谨慎的方式处理）。”同上。其以若干要点说明了“intelligence and collection analysis（情报和搜集分析）”。同上。这将涉及十个目标对象（称为“鱼”），其将被监控“数月，以了解其习惯、模式、个人及职业网络、企业、腐败情况。”同上。目标是“[k]now what they are going to do before they do it, so we can anticipate, pre-empt, and disrupt（在他们行动之前了解他们将要做什么，以便我们能够预判、先发制人并加以破坏）”，获取“leverage to gain concessions, protect people, use as political weapon, or as aid in criminal prosecution and asset recovery（用于取得让步、保护人员、作为政治武器使用，或协助刑事起诉和资产追回的筹码）”， “[p]rovoke confusion, panic, and infighting within CCP; divide opponents, peel away potential allies; break the Party's control of corruption information; operate more quickly than Party can react（在CCP〔中国共产党〕内部引发混乱、恐慌和内斗；分化对手，拉拢潜在盟友；打破该党对腐败信息的控制；以快于该党反应的速度行动）”， “[e]xpand the capability to go after all desired targets（扩大追查所有预期目标的能力）”， “[b]urrow into commercial and political networks for business purposes（为商业目的深入商业和政治网络）”，以及“[b]uild an image of invincibility（建立不可战胜的形象）。”同上。因此，Strategic（Strategic公司）理解到，Guo（郭文贵）希望该调查揭露与中国共产党成员有关的腐败行为，包括中国共产党成员实施的犯罪，例如非法将资金转移出境。Trial Tr. at 66。该计划的其他方面包括，通过“在美国建立积极、基层化的在线社交媒体／活动人士网络”来“[r]educ[e] political threats to [Guo] and [his] cause（减少对郭文贵及其事业的政治威胁）”，为郭文贵设立一个基金会，与流亡的俄罗斯反对派领导人及俄罗斯境内反对派活动人士建立联系，为郭文贵购置一处Washington, D.C.（华盛顿哥伦比亚特区）住所，以及为郭文贵的基金会办公室购置一处Washington, D.C.办公室。PX2。\n\nC. 协议的谈判\n\n至2017年12月中下旬，各方已具备就后来成为该协议的条款进行谈判的条件。参见，例如，Trial Tr. at 137。相关条款最初由Wallop（沃洛普）和Waller（沃勒）与郭文贵及L. Han（L. 韩）谈判。在最后阶段，Wang（王）与沃洛普和沃勒谈判该协议的条款。\n\n如描述该计划的PowerPoint所反映，各方似乎很早就同意，Strategic将获取至少十个目标对象的信息，且该等信息将包括财务信息、追踪信息和源自社交媒体的信息。\n\n根据本院面前的证据，谈判的大部分内容涉及该协议的财务条款。各方最初就这些条款存在分歧。Strategic希望按月收取预付顾问费，并获得一笔可持有至最后一笔付款完成时的大额“常备”保证金，鉴于该业务将需要高额启动成本。郭文贵希望仅按每份报告付费。Eastern（Eastern公司）愿意支付保证金，但仅限于Strategic未能提供协议所界定的交付成果时该保证金可以收回。Trial Tr. at 268-69。\n\nStrategic预期王将签署该协议；至谈判结束时，王已成为郭文贵的联络人。参见，例如，Trial Tr. at 139-40。Strategic预期王将在Virginia（弗吉尼亚州）于2017年12月29日签署协议，因为她于前一日已前往Washington D.C.，但各方对于付款条款仍存在持续分歧。相反，2017年12月29日，沃洛普带L.韩和王参观了Washington D.C.及其周边若干适合郭文贵购买的庄园和较大型房产。同上，at 139-41。\n\n谈判停滞了数日，但于2018年1月5日，王向沃洛普发送短信称：“both L [L. Han] and M [Guo] advised me that we [sic] supposed to meet again（L〔L. Han〕和M〔Guo〕均告诉我，我们〔原文如此〕应当再次会面）。”同上，at 149；DX16。谈判随后继续进行。\n\n沃洛普与王及郭文贵在1月5日之前和之后进行的谈判，均集中于要求Strategic额外调查五名对象，以及“鱼缸”中的“水位线”概念（即，为使该工作值得进行，Strategic所需的最低工作量）。就前一项要求而言，Strategic同意额外调查五名对象，但仅限于1月份。就后一项要求而言，Strategic坚持在启动调查前须有最低付款额和最低对象数量，但同意按每份报告设定估值标准，以便如果各方同意Strategic不就某一特定“鱼”提交某一特定报告，则将就另一条鱼提交一份等值报告。\n\n如短信所述，Strategic将在协议最初三个月（2018年1月、2月和3月）中的每个月收取$750,000月费，并于第一个月调查15名对象，于2月和3月各调查10名对象。其后将调整对象数量和月费。收费结构亦载于沃洛普于2018年1月5日向王发送的一则短信：\n\n三个月的协议是正确的。1月我们同意15条鱼。2月和3月各10条鱼。在我们回顾此前三个月后，显然将根据缸中下一批鱼的数量确定后续每月费用。这一点没有改变。我们同意，缸中将始终至少有10条鱼；2018年3月30日后，可根据实际鱼的数量每月经协议调整。我们有鱼的数量。我们从一开始就与您的老板讨论并同意了这一公式——即我们对他增加的对象保持灵活性。当然，如果您的老板增加或减少数量，我们将在次月按比例计算或增加应付款项。缸中水位线的全部目的，是为您的老板将成本维持在最低水平，并保持计划内的预算。所有这些都是为了按计划和约定每月提供30个报告单位。因此，有些月份的费用可能远高于您的老板所预算的金额，届时将按每条鱼收取额外费用，仅仅因 . . . ［该信息被截断］。\n\nDX16。对“老板”的提及是指郭文贵。\n\n作为回应，王写道：“Can you please send the contract here? . . . There is of course no impasse here. I work with several people, M [Guo] is one of them, saying for this project, he is not the only boss（你能否把合同发到这里？……当然，这里不存在僵局。我与几个人共事，M〔Guo〕是其中之一；就这个项目而言，他并非唯一的老板）。”同上。王与沃洛普同意，王将于次日，即2015年1月6日，当面签署合同。王写道：“[T]his contract and all communications from contract signed tomorrow, are exclusively between NY [Guo], you, M [Waller] and me—four of us（这份合同以及自明天签署合同起的所有通信，仅限于NY〔Guo〕、你、M〔Waller〕和我——我们四人之间）。”DX17；参见Trial Tr. at 153-55。\n\n最后时刻的谈判和对安排条款的修改，反映在王获交用于与沃洛普谈判的协议草案与最终协议之间的差异中。比较DX6（草案）与DX4*和PX1（最终文本）。日期为2018年1月1日的协议草案与最终协议几乎相同，但存在若干重大例外。协议草案第三页载明，Strategic拟编制的三类报告——法务财务报告、追踪报告和社交媒体报告——每类报告按每一对象每年$300,000计价。其计算每年总额为$3,000,000，“for 10 units or deliverables for the first stage . . . or $250,000 per month for 12 months（第一阶段10个单位或交付成果……或12个月中每月$250,000）。”DX6。每个“单位”均为一个目标对象或一条鱼。其进一步规定：\n\n这些单位或交付成果可按客户要求任意组合。一条鱼的一个单位被删除时，将增加一条鱼及其等值交付成果，如所附图表所示。该等付款将在收到每月约定数量的报告后支付。\n\nDX6（着重号为原文所加）。\n\n最终协议同样要求定期按月分期付款。其计算30个单位的每年总额为$9,000,000，即10名对象各有3份报告，“or $750,000 per month for 12 months（或12个月中每月$750,000）。”DX4；PX1。\n\n然而，最终协议的措辞作出了一项重大变更。其载有相同措辞：“These units or deliverables may be mixed and matched as the Client requests. As one unit is deleted from one fish, an extra fish with the equivalent deliverable is added, as shown in the attached charts（这些单位或交付成果可按客户要求任意组合。一条鱼的一个单位被删除时，将增加一条鱼及其等值交付成果，如所附图表所示）。”DX4；PX1。但其删除了协议草案中的以下句子：“Such payments will be made following receipt of the agreed-upon number of reports per month（该等付款将在收到每月约定数量的报告后支付）。”该变更反映了各方的约定，即无论任何特定月份交付的报告数量为何，Strategic均将收取固定费用。例如，特定月份交付的报告数量可能因Eastern是否增加一条新鱼而有所变化。不过，平均而言，Strategic将就每名对象每月交付三份报告。\n\n此外，如草案所反映，定期按月付款义务仅延续至合同最初三个月的概念，被最终协议中的新概念所替代：协议期限为三年，每年应付$9,000,000，但各方将在“after the March reports and payments [were] made（3月报告和付款〔完成〕后）”会面，以“recap the accounting（回顾账目）”，且该会议将在“prior to moving forward with the next quarter（推进下一季度之前）”举行。DX4；PX1。因此，以每月$750,000的费率定期按月付款的义务将在协议期限内持续——任一方均可提前30日通知终止协议——但各方同意，在三个月期满后评估该关系的价值以及是否应修改条款。\n\n简言之，该妥协使Strategic确信，在其开始工作前，将收到可用于建立基础设施的$1 million，并且Eastern无法在未提前30日通知的情况下终止协议，从而为Strategic提供额外的$750,000。该妥协还向Eastern保证，其并非不可撤销地承诺在完整三年期间内维持该安排，并且三个月后，各方将在决定如何依协议进一步推进或是否应对协议作出变更之前，回顾审查工作质量。参见，例如，Trial Tr. at 269-78；PX1（载明，在最初三个月后，各方“will meet to recap the accounting, prior to moving forward with the next quarter（将在推进下一季度之前会面回顾账目）”，并且“that with any change to the numbers above 10 fish in the tank, that [Strategic] will reserve the right to renegotiate [the] financial Agreement（如缸中的鱼数量发生超过10条的任何变化，〔Strategic〕将保留重新谈判〔该〕财务协议的权利）”）。\n\nD. 将Eastern纳入协议\n\n在谈判期间，郭文贵要求，为保护其保密性和匿名性，其不会签署协议或成为协议一方，而将由一个独立实体签署协议并成为协议一方。Strategic表示同意。\n\n证人对于是在协议签署当日（2018年1月6日）还是仅在此之前不久存在分歧——Eastern的名称首次被提及给Strategic。Strategic对Eastern的身份几乎没有进行任何调查。沃洛普只是认为其为与郭文贵有关联的空壳公司，并确认该公司在Hong Kong（香港）登记于郭文贵女儿名下，但未进行其他研究。参见，例如，Trial Tr. at 285。\n\n王（Wang）和韩（Han）均作证称，在 Eastern（东方）被列为《协议》的当事方之前，两人曾进行过一次谈话。在谈话中，王问韩，Eastern 是否有兴趣委托 Strategic（战略）对中国共产党（CCP）内的人物开展调查研究并为该研究提供资金，韩表示同意。Id. at 413-14.2 本院认定该证言不可信。王就本案签署了书面质询答复。其中一项书面质询要求 Eastern 列明每一位知悉《协议》及其谈判情况的人员姓名。王代表 Eastern 签署答复时，并未列入韩的姓名。DX5。本院认定，关于韩的证言是事后杜撰，旨在造成 Eastern 是一个独立于郭文贵（Guo）的实体这一表象。\n\n2 王作证称，她曾与韩短暂会面，告诉他该调查公司能力很强，能够协助调查来自中国的政府高级官员，并询问韩是否有兴趣“参与此事”。Trial Tr. at 414-15。她作证称，她告诉韩该合同要求支付 $1 million 的保证金，而韩表示他会想办法为该项目筹集资金。Id. at 415。其后，他致电王，称他会负责付款，表示他愿意参与，并要求王谈判该合同。Id.\n\n更为合理的推论，也是本院作出的推论是，郭指示王向 Strategic 提供 Eastern 这一名称，并在《协议》上签署韩的姓名。即使王与韩之间确有任何谈话，该谈话也只是例行性的，用以确认郭已经作出并指示的安排。当时，Eastern 的注册地址与郭在香港的家族办公室地址相同。现其注册地址亦为郭女儿的住所地址。尽管当时韩是 Eastern 的名义所有人，现该实体已转让给郭的女儿，但韩无法作证证明其获得了任何对价。Trial Tr. at 596。Eastern 是郭及其家人的空壳实体。\n\n本院根据若干事实得出该结论。在所称谈话发生时，Eastern 实质上已是一个停止运营的实体。尽管据韩称，其目的\n\n是进行房地产投资，但其从未进行过任何此类投资。除香港一个银行账户中被冻结的 $80,000 外，其没有任何资产，也没有业务或雇员。See, e.g., id. at 595-96。其所在地位于郭在香港的家族公司办公室内，其唯一董事是郭的女儿。其既没有为该研究提供资金的理由，也没有支付该研究费用的能力。没有证据表明，在其名称被列入《协议》之前，Eastern 的任何人员曾阅读《协议》或甚至理解其条款。郭的女儿未在审判中作证。韩作证称，他致电郭的女儿，告诉她该项目以及 Eastern 将参与其中，她当场同意并授权他处理此事。Id. at 567-69。他承认，在本诉讼开始后才知道 Strategic 的名称；他从未见过《协议》；除支付 $1 million 的义务外，他并不理解或知悉《协议》的任何条款。Id. at 603-05。韩在签署前的任何时候甚至都未见过《协议》，而他首次见到《协议》是在本案的证言录取中。即使在审判中，他仍作证称，他不知道《协议》的内容，且从未从头到尾阅读过《协议》。此外，王并未将该义务告知韩，韩也不知道 Eastern 据称承担了每月向 Strategic 支付 $750,000 的义务，甚至不知道最终载入《协议》的义务，即 Eastern 将在三年期间为 Strategic 的服务每年向 Strategic 支付 $9 million。Id. at 606。\n\n除据称安排支付 $1 million 的保证金外，没有证据表明 Eastern 就《协议》采取了任何行动。其未向 Strategic 付款，也未向 Strategic 提供应被调查人员的姓名（甚至不知道向 Strategic 提供了哪些姓名）。\n\n最后，两名证人的证言大多只是结论性陈述，而在附有细节之处，该等细节均已被否定。王未提供其与韩所称谈话的任何细节；她在证言录取中多次作出前后不一致陈述的事例，整体上削弱了其证言。尽管韩先前前后不一致的陈述不如王明显，但其证言同样没有更具说服力。最后，Eastern 的任何董事甚至均未签署《协议》；《协议》由王签署，而王伪造了韩的签名。\n\nE. 《协议》的条款\n\n2018年1月6日，Eastern 与 Strategic 签署了《协议》。《协议》的日期为2017年12月29日。Eastern 被列为客户，Strategic 被列为承包商。\n\n双方在 Wallop（沃洛普）位于弗吉尼亚州的住所签署《协议》。《协议》最终由王和沃洛普签署。郭为 Eastern 批准最终条款后，王通过电话向其宣读该等条款，并以韩的名义签署《协议》。\n\n《协议》载明，其“目的在于提供商业研究、报告、文件编制及其他咨询服务”。PX1。根据《协议》，Strategic 同意“根据 [Eastern] 的酌情选择，对相关对象进行高质量的原创研究并编制报告，以发现、制止和预防犯罪或对无辜人员的其他伤害”，并就……三类对象编制研究和报告：A) 财务法证历史研究；B) 当前追踪研究；及 C) 社交媒体研究。”Id. Eastern 应向 Strategic 提供“开展研究所需的基本信息及期望重点领域……”，包括报告中指定的“对象”，其在《协议》中被称为“鱼”。Id. Strategic 应按照《协议》载明的时间表，每年就 10 条“鱼”向 Eastern 提供“全面的保密报告”。Id.\n\n“财务法证历史研究”应“包括但不限于：就 [Eastern] 选择的对象，以及由 [Eastern] 确定的该对象关系，编制有关现有及历史商业和金融交易的深入、详细报告”。Id. at 1。Strategic 必须每周编制进度报告，在《协议》第一个月内编制初步报告，在《协议》签订后三个月内编制一份全面报告，并在其后每月编制更新报告。Id. at 2。在“交付成果”项下，《协议》规定，Strategic 必须“按上述规定，就每一对象制作一次该等报告，但全年可不时更新”。Id. at 3。\n\n“当前追踪研究”应“包括但不限于：就指定对象通过陆路、空中和海上（私人及商业）移动情况编制深入、详细的报告；包括日程和行程、地址和住宿、交通工具、承运人名称、载货清单、地理定位、对象参与的重大事件和重要联系、可远程访问的视频和音频，以及可能与整体研究相关的其他数据，例如可能 [原文如此] 对研究具有重要意义的既往旅行记录”。Id. at 2。Strategic 必须在《协议》的第一个月内每周编制报告，此后每月开展研究。Id. 在“交付成果”项下，《协议》规定，Strategic 必须就每一对象“每月或按 [Eastern] 指示更频繁地”编制报告。Id. at 3。\n\n“社交媒体研究”应“包括但不限于：就指定对象和公众人物的社交媒体使用情况及网络编制深入、详细的报告”。Id. at 2。Strategic 必须在《协议》的第一个月内每周开展研究，此后每月开展研究。Id. 在“交付成果”项下，《协议》\n\n规定，Strategic 还必须就每一对象“每月或按 [Eastern] 指示更频繁地”编制报告。Id. at 3。\n\n总计，Strategic 应就 10 个对象（或“鱼”）中的每一个对象，针对三个主题分别提供交付成果，即每年共 30 份报告。Id.（令人困惑的是，每月和每周的交付成果也被称为“报告”，但也被视为“单位”。）在《协议》的第一个月（2018年1月），Strategic 应就最多“15 条鱼，共计 30 份报告”提供“全面的保密报告”。Id. at 4。该数量应“在第二个月（二月）开始时，以及在（三月）和在 [《协议》] 期限内，减少为 10 条鱼，共计 30 份报告”。Id.\n\n该研究应“基于行业最佳实践和标准，与提供类似服务的其他顶尖公司相当”，且 Strategic 有义务“尽最大勤勉努力确保所提供的服务具有极高质量，展现对象真实、完整和全面的画像”。Id. Strategic 保证“所提供的全部信息均是真实的”。Id. at 3。\n\n同时，《协议》亦反映双方的理解，即“可能偶尔出现无法预见的挑战，减缓或阻碍全面研究，并且可能存在信息不规律、无法获得或不完整的时期”。Id. 在该等情况下，Strategic 有义务“努力以及时、按计划的方式，使所有研究和报告尽可能完整”。Id.\n\n《协议》反映双方进一步理解，Eastern“可能不希望 10 条鱼中的每一条均成为全部三份报告的对象，且每月报告工作职责 [原文如此] 的数量将有所不同”。Id.\n\n双方同意，“鱼”或对象的身份可能改变：“还应理解，[Eastern] 可能不时认为有必要移除某些鱼，或者 [Strategic] 可能认为情况不允许对某一特定鱼开展充分的研究。”Id. 当一条鱼被移出考虑范围时，“[Eastern] 将以一条新鱼替代，使任何时候受监测的鱼的数量保持为 10 条”。Id.\n\n作为 Strategic 承诺开展所列研究并提交报告的对价，Eastern 同意按照以下标准向 Strategic 支付月费：就单一“鱼”的每一项财务法证历史研究、当前追踪研究及社交媒体研究，各支付 $300,000；即每条鱼每年合计 $900,000，10 条鱼合计 $9,000,000（或每月 $750,000），这是 Eastern 和 Strategic 所承诺的金额。\n\nStrategic 服务和报告的实际付款应“于每月月底以定期每月分期付款的方式支付，每期 US$750,000”。Id. at 5。双方同意，“在本《协议》的前 3 个月，即2018年1月、2月和3月，……应按照 [Strategic] 的指示，将 $750,000. USD 汇入 [Strategic] 的 US Bank 账户。”Id. at 4。“[在]三月份的报告和付款完成后，[]所有相关方将召开会议，汇总会计情况，然后再进入下一季度。”Id. Strategic 保留“就本财务《协议》重新谈判”的“权利”，条件是“池中鱼的数量高于 10 条时”。Id.\n\n双方还同意，Eastern 应在“签署合同时向 Strategic 支付 US$1,000,000（one million dollars）的保证金”，该保证金将“按比例计入合同最后 1-1/3 (1.3) 个月”。Id. at 5。\n\n《协议》的期限自签署之日起为三（3）年，但《协议》还规定，“任何一方均可提前30天发出书面通知终止合同”。无需理由。Id.\n\n该协议设想，Eastern（伊斯特恩）可能希望对更多对象展开调查，并赋予Eastern有权“指示[Strategic（斯特拉蒂吉克）]开展本协议未载明的其他研究，但须另行支付费用。”同上，第4页。协议指出，双方均预期该合同“可能扩展至更多研究对象”，且Eastern“明确表示，可能有多达4000条这样的‘缸中之鱼’。”同上，第5页。协议规定：“显然，关于范围大得多的事项的谈判，将在日后以书面形式达成一致。”同上。\n\n该协议的若干条款反映了该项委托的敏感性质以及双方对保密的要求。协议开篇载明：\n\n双方同意，本合同的性质及与其相关的工作均属高度机密。除非美国（United States）法律或内华达州（State of Nevada）法律要求，双方均受最严格保密义务约束，不得向任何第三方披露合同的存在、执行合同所使用的来源和方法，以及参与制定、监督或执行合同条款的人员。\n\nPX1。\n\n协议包括如下约定：“[Strategic]与[Eastern]之间将有单一沟通渠道”，且“用于进行该等沟通的人员将在本合同启动时确定。”同上，第1页。“[Eastern]向[Strategic]提供的任何及全部材料均应绝对保密，且[Strategic]不得与任何其他实体分享。”同上。\n\n协议还规定：“[Eastern]可以指示其他实体向[Strategic]付款，该等付款应被[Strategic]视为满意的报酬。”同上，第4页。\n\n所有交付成果均须“仅以USB驱动器提供”；口头报告不足以满足要求。同上，第3页。\n\nF. ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA资本集团有限公司）提供保证金\n\n甚至在协议签署之前，并作为最终促成该协议的谈判的一部分，Wallop（沃洛普）已要求Eastern提供$1 million保证金。\n\n该保证金最终由一家名为ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA资本集团有限公司，以下简称“ACA”）的组织提供。2018年1月2日，在协议最终确定之前，ACA向Strategic汇入两笔各为$500,000的电汇款项，Strategic理解该款项即为双方此前就当时正在谈判的协议所讨论的保证金。\n\n双方就ACA与Eastern之间关系的性质，以及ACA据以支付该保证金的基础存在争议。\n\nEastern主张其向ACA借入了该款项。其援引一份日期为2017年12月29日的贷款协议（“贷款协议”），该协议由Han（韩）代表Eastern签署，并由William Je（杰，以下简称“Je”）代表ACA签署。该文件具有真实贷款协议通常具备的正式要件。文件表明，ACA向Eastern提供一笔$1 million贷款，期限为6个月，月复利利率为2%，“或由贷款人和借款人不时以书面形式另行共同约定。”PX11。³ 2%的利息相当于首月$20,000。贷款协议表明，该贷款未设担保，且ACA将向Eastern指定的银行电汇$1 million。\n\nStrategic主张，该$1 million反映了ACA对Eastern和Strategic发起的研究项目的投资，并且实际上Eastern并未向ACA借入该$1 million，亦不欠ACA $1 million。Strategic认为，将$1 million返还给Eastern而非ACA，将构成Eastern的意外之利，因为Eastern没有义务将该资金支付给ACA。\n\n³本院驳回对贷款协议真实性提出的异议。就可采性而言，本院面前已有充分信息支持其真实性（即，事实裁判者可以认定其为真实）。但是，作为事实裁判者，本院认定该文件并不反映一项真实贷款协议。\n\n本院认定，从ACA银行账户支付的$1 million并不构成ACA向Eastern提供的真实贷款。本院主要基于Strategic所指出的理由得出该结论。首先，Eastern关于发放该贷款的证据完全不可信。该证据几乎完全基于Han的证言，Han是Eastern所谓的代表人。根据其证言，Han当时已不再担任Eastern的所有人和董事；在得知须向Strategic支付$1 million的义务后，他致电Je，并称Je是其好友。Han知道Je是中国共产党（CCP）的反对者，并相信他可能有兴趣资助反CCP研究。Je表示愿意提供该$1 million贷款，双方同意贷款期限为六个月，利率为2%。Han证称，他于2017年12月29日在纽约（New York）的Palace Hotel（皇宫酒店）与Je会面签署协议时，首次见到贷款协议。会面持续了20分钟。Han不懂英文，没有阅读该英文协议，而他本应代表Eastern签署该协议；Je仅向他指出了贷款金额、利率和期限。Han亦未从Guo（郭）的女儿——Eastern表面上的所有人——处取得对该贷款以及他代表其签署的协议的批准。他证称：“我不需要她的批准；但是，我确实向她报告了该事项。”审判记录，第598-99页。\n\nHan与Je之间并未讨论Eastern将如何偿还贷款。Han称其曾考虑过这一问题，但其证言不可信。他证称，Guo的女儿对电影感兴趣，能够通过电影投资经营Eastern，使其盈利，并产生偿还ACA所必需的$1 million（加利息）。同上，第605-06、610页。正如Han所述：“我还相信，在公司转给Guo Mei（郭梅）之后，由于她非常擅长电影，我相信她能够经营这家公司并使其盈利。”同上，第606页；另见同上，第610页（“尽管当时只有80,000，我们仍然可以继续经营，并且仍然可以投资电影。”）。Wang（王）还暗示，香港当局可能会基于Strategic的研究同意解除对该资金的冻结。同上，第439-40、510-11页。该证言不可信。Eastern的资产仅限于一个被冻结银行账户中的$80,000。无论Guo的女儿作为电影投资人的能力如何（对此未提出任何证据），Eastern均不可能满足所谓贷款的条款，或偿还其推定所欠的甚至本金，更不用说利息。该款项更像是一项赠与。\n\n值得注意的是，Eastern在其书面询问答复中陈述，是Guo代表Eastern下令将两笔各为$500,000、合计$1 million的电汇款项发送给Strategic。DX5。\n\nStrategic还指出，在协议签署后，2018年1月的第一笔月度付款另计$750,000，将在仅数周后到期，从而进一步增加Eastern的债务负担。协议三年期限内，到期款项合计将超过$27 million。因此，对于具有Eastern价值的公司而言，该等条款不具有任何经济实质。\n\n如果ACA已将该款项借给Eastern，则可以预期各方均会知道Eastern欠ACA多少款项。但审判证据表明，Eastern尚未偿还贷款、支付任何本金或支付任何利息。在审判中，Han无法就Eastern每月应支付多少贷款利息作证。审判记录，第607页。根据Han所述，Eastern偿还该贷款的唯一计划是其在本诉讼中胜诉。同上，第574页。但这完全不可能是对贷款项下义务的理解，因为该贷款是在任何诉讼发生之前达成，且其作出目的是使Strategic能够履行协议。\n\nWang同样无法有把握地说明Eastern在贷款项下欠多少款项或贷款条款为何。尽管Wang是Eastern的公司代表——其声称即使在协议谈判期间、履行期间及本诉讼期间均有权代表Eastern行事——她在2019年1月首次于证言录取中作证时，甚至尚未见过所谓的贷款协议，只是在之后于其前任律师的诉讼档案中才见到该协议。同上，第508-09页。尽管她证称，贷款相对方Je曾口头并亲自与其联系要求还款，但该证言不可信。她唯一记得的是，他称希望该贷款得到偿还。同上，第504-07页。他并未提及ACA被欠付多少款项。\n\n贷款文件及其提交过程亦存在不规范之处。Eastern的代理人Han在贷款文件上以“董事”身份签字，但他当时并非Eastern的董事。此外，Eastern在贷款文件签署后未保留副本。不存在显示对ACA负有贷款义务的会计记录。\n\n但与此同时，证据也不支持ACA是该研究项目的投资者。ACA未提供应受调查对象的姓名，未收到任何研究结果，没有证据表明其曾事先作出安排以收取研究结果，也没有可信证据表明其事后曾要求查阅该研究。尽管某些文件中提及“投资者”，本院认为Wang的证言具有说服力，即该表述是指可能使用或受益于该研究的相关人士，而非出资资助协议的人员。本院不知道ACA所发送资金的来源，且该问题并非证言的主题。但无论该等资金最终是否如Strategic所主张可追溯至Guo，或与其无关，本院认定该等资金是代表Eastern（及Guo）作出的赠与，而非基于任何义务提供。\n\nG. Strategic在协议项下的履行\n\n该协议的履行如同Robert Ludlum（罗伯特·拉德勒姆）所设想并在Pink Panther（粉红豹）中上演的事实模式。其笼罩于最优秀间谍小说所应有的秘密之中。其又充满了Inspector Clouseau（克卢索探长）式的意外失误。\n\n出于安全顾虑，并担心任何电子通信会遭到黑客攻击或对CCP完全透明，双方事先同意，仅以USB驱动器并通过在安全地点的当面接触交换报告及研究对象的身份信息。\n\nStrategic将与分包商协调（即美国及海外的情报分析师），开展研究；Strategic随后将该等研究纳入为Guo编制的报告中。Guo不得联系该团队/网络，因为Strategic与该等研究的关系及方法属于专有信息，且Strategic拒绝披露团队成员的姓名或职务。根据Guo的指示及双方协议，向将开展该项工作的调查人员发出的指示，以及研究的实际成果，均不得通过电子邮件传送，只能当面传送。\n\n合同项下工作的协商起始日期为2018年1月16日。参见，例如，同上，第156、161、304、319页。双方同意，每周的财务法证报告、当前追踪报告及社交媒体报告最迟应分别于2018年1月23日、2018年1月30日、2018年2月6日和2018年2月13日到期。另见PX1。双方还同意，首份月度财务法证报告、当前追踪报告及社交媒体报告最迟应于2018年2月16日到期。\n\n各方进一步一致认为，Strategic最终从未交付《协议》所要求的任何“财务取证[h]历史调查”。Dkt. No. 299-1（“JSOAF”）¶ 54。各方还一致认为，Strategic未向Eastern交付《协议》所要求的任何“当前追踪调查”。同上 ¶ 55。各方进一步一致认为，Strategic未向Eastern交付《协议》所要求的任何“社交媒体调查”。同上 ¶ 56。\n\n2018年1月6日前后——即《协议》签署当日——Wang将一套USB驱动器送至Wallop位于Virginia的住所，其中包含Eastern希望根据《协议》调查的15名个人名单的信息（“调查对象名单”）。Trial Tr. at 156-57; JSOAF ¶ 50。但是，当Wallop试图访问这些USB驱动器时，她发现它们均已损坏。令人惊讶的是，尽管《协议》及其所寻求的信息被描述为高度保密，Wallop仍将这些USB驱动器带给了一名被称为“邻居”的人。“邻居”对其进行了测试，发现其中不含任何可读取的文件。Trial Tr. at 156-57。\n\n2018年1月8日，Wallop在New York与Wang会面，并取得另外三个USB驱动器。幸运的是，其中一个可以使用，Wallop得以下载将成为调查对象的人员的文件。同上 at 76-77, 157-58。这些个人几乎全部为中共高级成员，或与中共高级成员密切相关的人士，或其居住在United States及其他地区的子女。PX7。\n\nWallop和Waller同意分工。Wallop将专注于国内调查。Waller将专注于由海外调查人员进行的调查。\n\n2018年1月初，Waller前往Europe，并聘请了一支由10名计算机和数据分析工程师组成的团队进行数据挖掘和调查，包括对“暗网”的调查（“Team 1”）。参见，例如，Trial Tr. at 198, 289-92。Team 1由Waller认识的一人领导。该行动笼罩在保密之中。Waller在三个不同国家以现金为该团队购买计算机，以防止通过电子方式将设备序列号追溯至购买者。他还在第四个国家购买电子材料，以掩饰正在进行的实际活动。信息甚至不能通过加密电子邮件或加密电话交换。同上 at 292。根据Guo的指示，信息只能通过当面交换USB驱动器的方式交换。为确保链条中任何一环被破坏时都不会泄露链条中的其他环节，采取了信息分隔措施。出行十分繁重，因为前往第三地点会面以交换数据并往返需要两到三天。在Waller能够将15个姓名的名单交给Team 1之前，他必须从一台未连接互联网的计算机打印出这些姓名，对其进行扫描，然后将其存入一个新的加密驱动器，送往Europe。同上 at 304。Guo还指示Strategic不要在Team 1中配备普通话使用者，以防他们是中共的间谍。L. Han最终允许Waller聘用普通话流利且并非华人背景的退休欧洲外交官。\n\nWaller在Washington D.C.将姓名交给Team 1，并于数日后前往Europe获取进度报告及收集该团队完成的调查资料（存储于USB驱动器中）。他于2018年1月24日从Team 1收到一个驱动器，并于两天后将该材料交付给Wang。同上 at 304-05。\n\nWallop于2018年1月底与Guo会面。同上 at 162。在该次会面中，Guo表示他需要在2018年1月26日前获得报告——即《协议》经协商确定的开始日期后10天，但也是每周报告的首个截止日期后3天。\n\n在Waller从Europe返回后，Strategic于2018年1月26日向Eastern交付第一个USB驱动器。Strategic已承认，2018年1月26日交付给Eastern的USB驱动器中所含信息“对Guo先生或Eastern毫无用处，因为那不过是研究人员利用公开来源信息熟悉这十五名调查对象所做的工作。”同上 at 199; DX2 at 35 ¶ 45。在与Wang的一次会面中，Waller表示，该驱动器反映了该团队为熟悉情况所完成的工作，并且15个姓名中有数个拼写错误。Trial Tr. at 307-310, 313-14。他还表示，该驱动器包含一些离岸公司的所在地以及中国政府一台计算机服务器的密码。Wang对该信息表示失望，称其“不够好”且“全是垃圾”。同上 at 314。此外，尽管L. Han表示Strategic掌握了良好线索且应继续进行调查，4他还转达称，Guo对根据《协议》交付的信息感到愤怒，并认为该信息表明Strategic不称职且试图“敲诈他”。同上 at 320。5\n\n4 L. Han虽未在审判中作证，但他也在证词录取中宣誓作证称，Strategic提供的硬盘仅包含“大量垃圾信息”。Trial Tr. at 368。但是，L. Han是Strategic与Guo之间的中间人，而非Guo的代理人。同上 at 365。\n\n5 Waller作证称，他确实向Wang或L. Han报告，Eastern已从社交媒体以外的来源发现，Eastern名单上的一人持有北约盟国的伪造非中国护照。Trial Tr. at 320-21。\n\n数日后，Waller前往Ireland接收第二个USB驱动器，并于2018年1月30日在New York的Pennsylvania Station将其交付给Wang。同上 at 199, 327-28。\n\nWang将第二个USB驱动器带给Guo，并将其插入Strategic在上次会面时留下的“未使用过的”笔记本电脑。二人发现该驱动器并不含有用信息。驱动器上的信息仅限于客户无法实际利用的原始代码，其意在表明工作正在进行。同上 at 200。各方一致认为，该第二个USB驱动器对Eastern“毫无用处”，并且其中包含“以原始调查数据形式呈现的不完整工作成果……”。同上 at 78-79, 199, 200-01, 359, 383; DX2 at 28 ¶ 24。该驱动器上的信息包括Guo名单上共产主义人物的加密电子邮件地址和密码。Trial Tr. at 329。Strategic未向Eastern交付任何其他USB驱动器，并且Strategic承认其“无法编制任何详细报告”。同上 at 79, 359。\n\n在第二次会面后，并在Wang传达因该次会面而可能不会在第二个月继续与Strategic合作的信息后，Waller与一个新团队作出安排（“Team 2”）。Team 2来自一个名为Allied Special Operations Group（“ASOG”）的鲜为人知组织，据称总部设于Texas州Dallas。值得注意的是，Strategic未就该组织的诚信、资质或合法性提供任何证据。该组织将使用不同于Team 1所用方法的方法进行调查。ASOG声称，其不会使用数据挖掘和侵入性计算机能力，而将利用其他商业数据库以及联邦政府内部的联系人进行调查。\n\nWaller作证称，他于2018年2月最初几日与ASOG在Texas会面，并向ASOG出示待调查对象名单，要求该组织调查其中选定的一些姓名，以了解其能够使用自身方法发现何种信息。一周内，ASOG向Waller回复了其结果，Waller飞回Texas与其会面。Waller作证称，ASOG在会面中向他作出口头报告，并允许他查看但不得带走ASOC进行的调查；Waller作证称，该调查包括关于调查对象的详细追踪信息。同上 at 95-96, 344-45。\n\nWaller还作证称，他在随后的一次会面中告诉L. Han，鉴于所获得信息的性质，ASOG已告诉他，根据联邦法律获取该信息是非法的。6具体而言，Waller作证称，他表示有人告诉他，进一步调查ASOG已经调查的五名对象将构成联邦犯罪，因为CIA的National Clandestine Service已将这些个人归入ASOG所称的“受保护记录”类别。同上 at 351-52。他作证称，有人告诉他且他已转达，该分类旨在保护外国对象免受数据库检索，以保护其记录，原因可能是他们属于刑事或国家安全调查的对象，或者正在与United States政府合作。同上。Waller作证称，L. Han告诉他，他理解该信息属于保密信息，并会提出新的姓名。Trial Tr. at 352-53。然而与此同时，ASOG不愿在不知道Strategic客户身份的情况下继续开展该项任务。同上 at 354。然而，L. Han最终并未提供额外姓名。同上。\n\n6 Waller作证称，Wang于2018年1月30日前后指示他，不应再就该项目与她联系，而应仅与L. Han合作。Trial Tr. at 349-50。\n\n有关ASOG的证词真实性可疑。如前所述，Strategic未提供有关ASOG资质或其完成其据称已完成工作的能力的任何证据。除Waller关于其看到工作成果的证词，以及一张金额为\\$104,595、ASOC据称基于“终止抵扣”降至\\$5,412的发票外，其亦未提供ASOG实际完成任何工作的证据。DX56; Trial Tr. at 345, 350。无论是事实证人、专家证人、文件还是约定，均未提供证据证明“受保护记录”这一分类确实存在，更遑论证明ASOG向Strategic或Eastern分享其完成的任何工作受到任何禁止。Waller本人在ASOG向他提及“受保护记录”一词之前从未听说过该术语，也不知道其法律来源。Trial Tr. at 369-71。所提供的仅是关于Waller被告知内容的证词；该证词仅为证明Waller当时的心理状态以及作为其向L. Han所述内容的背景而被采纳，而非为证明所述内容的真实性。\n\n2018年2月数周后，Wallop和Waller在Wallop家中与L. Han会面。同上 at 354-56。L. Han告诉二人停止其工作。\n\nH. Eastern终止与Strategic的协议\n\nEastern和ACA均未支付根据《协议》于2018年2月16日到期的首笔每月\\$750,000付款。Strategic未交付任何月度报告。\n\n2018年2月23日，Eastern向Strategic送达一封终止《协议》的信函。Trial Tr. at 163; DX8; JSOAF ¶ 58。\n\n该信函声称立即终止《协议》，并要求全额退还\\$1 million保证金。该信函指出，《协议》的开始日期已从2018年1月6日延后至2018年1月16日，随后列举了Strategic的多项失误；Eastern称这些失误构成违约，并表明Strategic对其能力作出了欺诈性虚假陈述。这些失误包括未交付《协议》要求的报告，以及未遵守《协议》规定的时间表。Eastern要求Strategic立即停止工作，并返还或销毁Eastern向Strategic提供的全部材料和信息。该信函要求将\\$1 million保证金退还至ACA在Singapore的地址。\n\nStrategic未退还该保证金。\n\nI. Guo被指称的虚假陈述\n\nStrategic（战略公司）通过Wallop（瓦洛普）和Waller（沃勒）主张，Guo（郭文贵）虚假陈述了其身份及其目标，且他们合理地信赖了其虚假陈述，致使Strategic遭受损害。\n\n具体而言，Guo向Wallop和Waller表示，他是CCP（中国共产党）的反对者，并希望利用Strategic将提供的研究在该组织内部制造不和，并最终推翻CCP及中国现政权。7 Wallop和Waller均作证称，他们愿意与Guo订立协议，是因为他们相信他持有与其相同的反CCP观点，并与其拥有削弱CCP的共同目标。Strategic主张，其后来得知Guo实际上与CCP有关联；若其在签署《协议》前知悉该事实，便不会订立《协议》。\n\n本院认定，Wallop和Waller并未信赖Guo关于其反CCP的陈述；鉴于本案事实，即使存在该等信赖，也并不合理；且Strategic未能证明Guo作出了虚假陈述。\n\n首先，Wallop和Waller关于其信赖Guo陈述的证词大多为结论性陈述，且因以下事实而受到削弱：尽管其自称为调查人员，却未对Guo的身份或忠诚关系进行任何调查，更遑论对后来被引入该交易的公司实体Eastern（东方公司）的身份和忠诚关系进行调查。Guo无疑表示过其反对CCP。他在审判中的证词中强烈主张了这一点。然而，根据证据，似乎且本院认定，吸引Wallop和Waller的是工作的性质：调查CCP高级成员涉嫌腐败的情况，而该调查由一名自称亿万富翁、愿每月支付其$750,000以进行该项研究的人资助。他们对资助人Guo的身份、其个人政治信念，以及其在中国内部派系斗争中支持哪一派的兴趣较小。\n\n7 Gertz（格茨）和L. Han（韩）亦就Guo作出过类似陈述，但他们并非作为Guo的代理人作出该等陈述，因此其陈述不得归属于Guo。\n\n第二，任何该等信赖均不合理。根据其证词，Wallop和Waller主要依赖——如其确实依赖了任何事项——Gertz和L. Han的担保。他们知道Gertz和L. Han持有与其自身相似的观点，知道Gertz和L. Han将Guo介绍给Strategic，也知道，既然Gertz和L. Han愿意与Guo交往并作出介绍，Wallop和Waller便只是推定他们也应当愿意与Guo交往。\n\n然而，Strategic现用以表明Guo并非真正反对中国现任领导层的大量信息，在Wallop和Waller与Guo举行首次会面之前以及在《协议》签署之前很久，已属公开记录。已有充分证据本应促使Strategic进行调查。其未进行任何调查，亦未要求Guo作出任何陈述，这削弱了其所主张对Guo陈述的任何信赖的合理性。甚至在与Guo首次会面之前，Strategic已收到信息称，“一些人怀疑[Guo]可能仅代表一场内部领导权斗争中的某一派别。”DX38；参见，例如，Trial Tr. at 58-59, 203。Waller还知悉有关报告称，Guo的财富源于其与CCP的关系，并且其离开中国后仍与CCP高级领导人保持密切联系。Trial Tr. at 203-04, 206。用Waller的话说，Guo曾“非常公开地”表示，他是通过CCP及秘密警察机构，即Ministry of State Security（国家安全部，“MSS”），并与MSS安全事务副负责人Ma Jian（马建，“Jian”）一道上升的。Id. at 205, 207。\n\n在此背景下，Strategic未调查Guo，而只是盲目信赖Gertz和L. Han为Guo担保这一事实，颇具说明意义。Id.；另见id. at 85-86, 88。然而，至彼时，Gertz已发表一篇日期为May 23, 2017的文章，称Guo与“包括政府部长和Politburo（政治局）成员在内的中国共产党高级领导人关系密切”，并“可接触Ministry of State Security (MSS)在海外及美国的行动”。DX43。该文章还报道，Guo的妻子和女儿获准前往美国探望他，但被要求在20天后返回中国，在那里她们可被用作对其施加政治压力的手段——而Strategic现称该信息是Guo与CCP关系的证据。截至October 9, 2017，Gertz已公开写道，“Guo称其与中国政府和安全系统内的支持者保持密切关系，并能够获得许多内部文件。”DX32。又于October 2017，Wall Street Journal（《华尔街日报》）刊登报道称——Waller知悉该报道——Guo曾在其纽约公寓会见四名来自中国MSS的官员。DX34。Strategic现正是依赖这些“密切关系”、与MSS的关系，以及Guo从CCP取得的财富，主张Guo暗中与CCP结盟。\n\nWallop作证称，她不知道Eastern或Guo将如何处理该研究，并认为Guo或许会“从两方面运作”。Trial Tr. at 89。然而，Wallop和Waller均未坚持要求Guo或Eastern就其反CCP，或仅将研究用于反CCP目的作出任何陈述。在审判中，作为推定成熟练的当事方，Strategic主张其未在《协议》中纳入一项陈述，是因其担忧保密性。然而，该解释受到以下证据的削弱：各方为对《协议》（包括其条款）保密而采取的措施，包括“任何地方都不存在已解密的电子副本”。Id. at 386。《协议》条款本身具有保密性，并被高度保密。若Guo的目标或其忠诚关系对Strategic具有重要性，各方本可在《协议》中纳入关于信息将如何使用或关于Guo目标的陈述。Strategic甚至未主张曾作出过该等陈述这一事实，颇具揭示性，因为这表明Strategic既未依赖任何关于Guo政治立场或忠诚关系的看法，且任何该等信赖亦不合理。Waller最终承认，尽管Eastern称其认为Guo的反CCP关系具有重要性，Strategic未纳入陈述的原因是其假定无须该陈述：“[这]只是我们双方都想要的事情，已是第二天性。”Id. at 386-87。\n\n最后，亦不存在明确且令人信服的证据证明Guo究竟是CCP的支持者还是反对者。Guo在审判中强烈主张其为CCP的反对者。但其他证人亦同样强烈地作证称，他们相信其为CCP的朋友。有证据表明他曾作出一贯敌视CCP的陈述。但审判中亦提出证据，表明他曾在其公寓内与CCP官员交谈，并在谈话中宣称其忠于中国国家主席Xi Jinping（习近平）及CCP。参见，例如，id. at 628-32, 716-21, 727-34, 736-50；DX114B。\n\n本院采信Waller部分证词。他陈述道：多年来，我与许多共产主义叛逃者共事，实际上自我在George Washington University（乔治·华盛顿大学）就读本科时起便如此，其中一些人曾是我的教授。多年来，我通过交谈，以及通过美国情报和反情报界许多人士的学习，了解到要明确辨别一个已与共产主义体制决裂的人——无论是苏联、中国还是其他体制——是否仍然保持忠诚，是非常困难的。\n\nTrial Tr. at 204.\n\nWaller继而陈述，许多叛逃者和异见人士“仍保持联系，因为他们有家人或其他关系；而如果他们确实是异见人士或真正的反对者，这些联系将具有价值，因为他们可以从这些联系中获取对美国有用的信息，以对他们自身的体制造成损害。”Id. at 204-05。因此，Waller承认，某人与CCP内部人士存在关系这一证据本身，并不必然表明该人是CCP的支持者。8\n\nStrategic关于Guo是CCP秘密支持者的证据，主要由中国异见人士群体另一成员Sasha Gong（龚莎莎，“Gong”）的证词、Guo本人的陈述以及间接证据构成。Guo强硬地作证称其真正反对CCP，而Eastern亦提出自身证据支持该主张。\n\nGong是一名记者和异见人士。Gong作证称，她自April 2017起至2018年间曾多次采访Guo。该等采访既有非公开采访，也有现场直播采访。在采访中，Guo向Gong声称，并且亦曾公开声称，其因支持1989 Tiananmen Square movement（1989年天安门广场运动）而被逮捕。但Guo还告诉Gong，在天安门事件后于香港停留一段时间后，他返回中国大陆，在那里从事房地产开发，结交许多高级朋友，并成为中国情报界的重要人物之一。Gong主张，Guo称其是仅有的三名无需预约即可拜访Hu Jintao（胡锦涛）的人员之一；Hu Jintao为CCP前任总书记，即Jinping主席的前任。他利用该渠道，与MSS副负责人Jian结盟，以对抗北京市前副市长。Guo告诉Gong，其与中国高级领导人保持联系，并认为Jinping主席是一位好领导人；Guo唯一的目标是针对CCP中的腐败人士。Strategic主张，该等陈述与其与CCP持续保持关系相一致。\n\nStrategic还主张，有证据表明，自Guo通过ACA（ACA）以异见人士身份发声以来，其一直从香港或中国大陆转移资金，且与Guo有关联的人士，例如Han和Wang（王），能够安心地从香港或中国向美国汇款，并通过向中国转移资金偿还对ACA所负的义务。其主张，若无CCP的配合，Guo不可能做到这一点。\n\n8 当被问及被揭露资助Strategic抗辩的Elliott Broidy（艾略特·布罗伊迪）是否与CCP有关联时，Waller亦作出了类似证词。Trial Tr. at 387-88；另见id. at 181\n\n最后，Strategic主张，Guo曾攻击Gong和Bob Fu（傅希秋，“Fu”）等异见人士。Strategic主张，Guo通过声称China Hawk（中国鹰派）群体成员和异见人士实际上受CCP控制，持续攻击该群体成员和异见人士，继续使该群体成员相互对立。\n\n该证据不足以证明Guo是CCP的支持者。\n\nGong证词的证明力——即她现在基于Guo与某些政治领导人的交往、其后来对她的骚扰，以及其被指作出的某些亲CCP陈述，而相信Guo是CCP支持者——因以下事实而受到削弱：即使在Guo向她作出该等陈述之后，以及在她知悉其与CCP成员所谓持续关系之后，她仍代表Guo致函美国政府，支持Guo的庇护申请，并主张其为CCP反对者。在信中，Gong写道，Guo曾质疑中国共产党领导人的合法性，与中国情报部门合作，并资助调查中国政府官员海外腐败行为的行动，所有这些均使其对美国政府具有价值。Id. at 794-98；DX123。\n\n就郭文贵（Guo）被指称的资金转移及其他间接证据而言，Strategic（Strategic公司）的论点均基于推测。其未就可从资金据称代表郭文贵从香港或中国大陆流向美国这一事实中得出的推论提供任何证据，无论是专家证据还是其他证据。事实上，Strategic的陈述\n\n因其未能或显然无法就可从郭文贵的人际关系中得出的推论提供任何专家证言而颇具说明意义。\n\n就针对中国异议人士的攻击而言，郭文贵作证称，他的攻击始终只是报复性的：“我从未对任何中国人发起过任何攻击。一直都是[]他们攻击我，然后我予以反击。”Trial Tr. at 747。“我从未攻击过。我一直是在进行反击的一方。”Id. at 748。他补充道：“我从未对任何人发起过任何攻击，只有在受到攻击、出于自然保护的情况下，我才会反击。而且，网上有数百万人或多达一百万人攻击我，……我也不可能对他们每一个人都进行反击。”Id. at 748.9 证据表明，郭文贵极具好斗性，中国异议人士群体的其他成员也是如此。该证据并未表明郭文贵站在这场政治斗争的哪一方。\n\n最后，有证据令人质疑Strategic是否甚至相信其受到了欺诈。Strategic在本案提交最初诉状时并未提出欺诈反诉。Dkt. No. 22。其在修订后的诉状中也未提出。Dkt. No. 47。其仅在从一名据称反对郭文贵、且有意削弱其关于敌视CCP（中国共产党）之主张的人士——名为Elliott Broidy（埃利奥特·布罗迪）的富有美国商人——获得诉讼资助后，才提出该项主张；该人士的可信度也受到质疑。See Dkt. Nos. 114, 127。Broidy曾因联邦罪行被定罪，后于2020获总统赦免。10 该证据\n\n9 当被问及是否曾指控Sasha Gong（萨莎·龚）为共产主义间谍时，郭文贵作证称：“是在她称我是间谍之后，我才予以反击。”Trial Tr. at 748。\n\n10 Eastern（东方公司）提出证据，证明Broidy本人是CCP的支持者，以此证明接受其诉讼资助的Strategic并不真正关心与其开展业务者的政治归属。See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 181:24-184:17。部分证据受到证据方面的质疑。本院无需解决这些证据方面的质疑，因为本院根据Wallop（沃洛普）和Waller（沃勒）的证言，确信他们并未实际或合理地依赖郭文贵的陈述。\n\n表明，欺诈主张并非基于Strategic所发现的任何证据，亦非基于Strategic确实认为其受到欺诈的任何真实看法，而是基于其认识到，在本案中或其他方面提出欺诈主张将具有策略价值。\nII. 法律结论\n\nEastern提出三项主张：确认合同违法并因违反公共政策而无效的确认判决、违约以及不当得利。Dkt. No. 93。Strategic提出两项关于违约及欺诈性失实陈述的反诉。Dkt. No. 127。\nA. Eastern的确认判决主张\n\n各方均主张对方违反了该协议，并称其有权获得损害赔偿。然而，在审理违约主张之前，本院必须审理Eastern确认判决主张中的论点：该协议因违反Virginia（弗吉尼亚州）的私人保安服务法规而无效且不可执行，因此，无论任何一方是否违反该协议，Eastern均有权获得其保证金的返还。本院认定，该协议所设想并据此实施的服务属于该法规所禁止的行为，因此该协议无效且不可执行。Eastern有权取回其保证金。\n1. Virginia私人保安服务法规\n\n根据Virginia法律，“违反法规订立的合同无效，且不得据此获得任何救济，除非从该法规中明显可见立法机关并无意使该合同无效且不可执行。”Massie v. Dudley, 3 S.E.2d 176, 180 (Va. 1939)（裁定原告在未取得经纪人执照的情况下，不能依据一份关于房地产佣金的明示合同获得赔偿）；see F. S. Bowen Elec. Co. v. Foley, 72 S.E.2d 388, 394 (Va. 1952)（违反法规，即禁止承包商“在其取得执照和登记之前从事经营，且被禁止的行为被称为违法，并且法规规定了对违反该等规定的处罚……即属非法，而非仅仅无效”）（省略内部引号和引文）。“Bowen和Massie隐含的含义是，未遵守特定法规的规定会使合同无效，”Am. Demolition & Design v. Pinkston, 96 Va. Cir. 142, 2017 WL 11452748, at \\*8 n.2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2017)；且“在本院依该原则宣布合同无效的情形中，原告无法获得本应向其支付的损害赔偿”，Beard v. Ragan, 51 Va. Cir. 229, 2000 WL 33258655, at \\*3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 2000)。根据Virginia法律，“许可法规背后的政策以及因不遵守规定而导致合同可撤销的基础”在于“保护公众免受缺乏经验、不诚信、不负责任和不称职的承包商之害……[在该等情形下]不允许未登记承包商执行合同，并非因交易性质所致，而是作为其未遵守登记法规的惩罚。”Butler v. Creative Design Builders, Inc., 24 Va. Cir. 362, 1991 WL 11015277, at \\*2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 7, 1991)（引述Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 102 S.E.2d 321, 324 (Va. Ct. App. 1958)）。实质上，法院判给损害赔偿，而该款项依法律或法规一方本无权收取，将损害该法规的政策。\n\nVirginia的“Private Security Services Statute（私人保安服务法规）”是一项许可法规，要求从事或订约提供某些私人调查工作的人员持有执照。该法规规定，任何人在未取得Department of Criminal Justice Services（刑事司法服务部）颁发的执照的情况下，“在Commonwealth [of Virginia]（弗吉尼亚州）从事私人保安服务业务或招揽私人保安业务”均属违法。Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-139(A)。该法规将“private security services business”定义为“从事提供，或承诺向他人依明示或默示合同提供……private investigators……的任何人。”Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138。继而，“private investigator”被定义为“从事以下调查业务或受雇进行以下调查以获取信息的任何\n\n个人：(i) 犯罪或民事侵权；(ii) 被盗财产的位置、处置或追回；(iii) 事故、火灾、对人身或财产造成的损害或伤害的原因；或(iv) 将在任何法院、委员会、官员或调查委员会面前使用的证据。”Id.\n\nStrategic首先主张，其订立该协议并未违反Private Security Services Statute，因为根据该协议实施的工作不属于该法规的适用范围。具体而言，其主张Strategic并未在Virginia提供私人调查员：由于Team 1（第一小组）和ASOG（ASOG）位于其他地点，Virginia并未进行实际调查，且没有证据表明Virginia存在目标对象。\n\n“法院始终致力于查明并贯彻立法机关的意图，该意图必须从所使用的文字中得出。”Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (Va. 2003)。因此，在解释法规时，“我们从文字的通常含义出发。”U.S. Dep't of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 377 F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004)；see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)（“业已确立的是，当法规文字清楚时，法院……唯一的职能就是依其条款执行该法规。”）（省略内部引号和引文）。“除非条款存在歧义，或者适用文字通常含义会导致荒谬结果，法院均适用法规的通常文字含义。”Boynton v. Kilgore, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (Va. 2006)（省略内部引文）。“如果文本可以‘以不止一种方式理解，或同时指涉两个或更多事项[，]或者文字难以理解、含义可疑、缺乏清晰性或确定性’，即存在歧义。”Id. at 926 n.8（引述Brown v. Lukhard, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Va. 1985)）。“‘荒谬结果’一语用于‘描述法律将造成内部不一致或以其他方式无法运作的情形。’”Id. at 926 n.9（引述Cook v.\n\nCommonwealth, 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Va. 2004)）。但即使“法规的字面文本产生的结果可以说有些反常”，法院“也不能仅仅因为我们能够设想一个更可取的版本，就自由地忽略明确无歧义的文字。”Sigmon Coal Co., Inc. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 308 (4th Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002)。\n\n根据法规的通常文字含义，Strategic的行为不仅在其“从事提供”私人调查员业务时可构成私人保安服务业务的行为，而且在其依合同“承诺提供”私人调查员时亦可构成该等行为。该法规的重点不限于保安服务的实际履行，或对犯罪或民事侵权的实际调查；其亦针对承诺提供该等服务的协议，无论该等服务实际上由协议一方履行，还是由该方转包的人员履行。See Ervin B. Davis & Co. v. Dep't of Crim. Just. Servs., 49 Va. Cir. 447 (1999), judgment entered, No. 160-97, 1999 WL 907550 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13, 1999)（“该法规并未提及在其适用之前，该企业必须从事的私人保安服务数量。”）。必须在Virginia发生的行为是“承诺提供”。该法规并不要求私人调查员，或其寻求取得的信息，也必须位于Virginia。\n\n该法规的互惠条款进一步证实：若私人保安服务企业在Virginia境内“承诺提供”私人调查员，即须取得执照。根据Section 9.1-140(10)，Virginia免除以下人员的执照要求：“在其取得执照或登记的州发起的调查期间进入Virginia的、来自其他州的持有执照或已登记的私人调查员，条件是该其他州向经Commonwealth许可和登记的私人调查员提供类似互惠待遇。”Va. Code Ann.\n\n§ 9.1-140(10)。该法条预见到，在Virginia（弗吉尼亚州）经营的私人安保服务企业可能需要其私人调查员，无论其系作为雇员还是独立承包人行事，进入其他州，因此该法条对进入弗吉尼亚州的州外调查员作出了规定。弗吉尼亚州允许州外私人调查员“在其取得执照或登记所在州发起的调查期间”进入弗吉尼亚州，并对该等州外调查员给予互惠待遇，这表明弗吉尼亚州立法机关至少部分关注调查“发起”于何处，而非调查可能延伸至何处。事实上，禁止未获执照者在弗吉尼亚州从事私人安保服务业务的规定，也将该禁令延伸至在弗吉尼亚州“承接”该等业务。\n\n暂且不论Strategic（Strategic）承诺提供的服务是否构成该法条所定义的“私人调查”这一第二个问题，Strategic的行为显然发生在弗吉尼亚州。Strategic在Wallop（Wallop）位于弗吉尼亚州的住所经营，并继续在该住所经营。Trial Tr. at 37。载明Strategic承诺提供服务的《协议》在Wallop位于弗吉尼亚州的住所签署。Trial Tr. at 69。此外，Strategic就《协议》所做的大部分工作均在弗吉尼亚州进行。Strategic在弗吉尼亚州从Team 1（第一组）收到Subject List（对象名单）及第一个USB驱动器。Trial Tr. at 319, 420。\n\n鉴于上述解读，本院要求双方就以下问题提交书面意见：在该法条可能被视为规制其辖区外商业的范围内，该法条是否违反《商业条款》。United States Constitution（美国宪法）第一条第8节第3款授权Congress（国会）“规制……各州之间的商业。”U.S. Const., Art. I § 8, cl. 3。《商业条款》包含一项消极层面，否定各州“无正当理由歧视或妨碍商业物品的州际流动的权力。”Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994)。法条的域外效力在其试图规制“完全发生在其辖区边界之外”的商业时，可能违反《商业条款》。Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 328 (1989)。但是，“关键问题”是“受规制交易在何处完成”，并且“在应对一项规制的实际效果是否控制州界之外行为这一问题时，巡回法院一直关注合同订立的地点。”Berman v. City of New York, 2012 WL 13041996, at \\*18 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012); see also Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 2009)（驳回原告对“[州]授权其在该州内从事受该州规制职业的方式”的质疑，理由是该等“主张并不涉及对货物、材料或其他商业物品州际流动施加的负担，且其所投诉之事项——[州]内的职业执业方式——并非受消极《商业条款》保护的事项”）。这是因为，“州仍保有制定法律以规制地方关切事项的剩余权力，即使该等事项在一定程度上影响州际商业，甚至在某种程度上对其加以规制。”Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (quoting S. Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945))。\n\n本案法条并不试图规制“完全发生在其辖区边界之外”的商业。弗吉尼亚州有利益规制并许可的不仅是在其辖区内采取调查行动之人，还包括在弗吉尼亚州向弗吉尼亚州人士提供该等服务者，无论服务实际在何处履行。该法条反映了该项利益。该法条规制在弗吉尼亚州的私人安保服务企业，其中“私人安保服务企业”被定义为通过默示或明示合同从事提供或承诺提供私人调查员的业务。因此，私人安保服务企业在弗吉尼亚州承诺提供私人调查员时，须受规制。该解读也与该整体法条的目的相一致，即建立一套地方许可与规制制度。“在本案中，弗吉尼亚州并非试图规制一项完全发生在该州境外的合同。涉案合同是在弗吉尼亚州境内订立的……[并且] [尽管]交易的某些要素可能发生在弗吉尼亚州境外，但这并不必然剥夺弗吉尼亚州规制该交易的利益。”Atl. Mach. & Equip., Inc. v. Tigercat Indus., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 657, 666 (E.D. Va. 2006)。\n\nStrategic其次主张，其承诺提供的服务不包括法条所列举类型的调查：“(i) 犯罪或民事侵权；(ii) 被盗财产的所在地、处置或追回；(iii) 事故、火灾、损害，或者对人身或财产造成伤害的原因；或(iv) 拟在任何法院、委员会、官员或调查委员会前使用的证据。”Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-139(A)。\n\n双方一致认为，关于该法条的判例甚少。一家解释该法条中“私人调查员”定义的弗吉尼亚州法院认为，一家公司因雇用“私人调查员”获取法条所列信息，而落入“私人安保服务企业”的定义之内。11 在Ervin B. Davis & Co.案中，该法院认为，“该公司从事的活动，如原告对被告质询书的答复以及公司广告（包括所提交的网站页面信息）所证明和描述的……符合私人安保服务企业的法定定义。”\n\n11 United States v. Commonwealth, 139 F.3d 984, 986 (4th Cir. 1998)所处理的问题是，Leslie Miller v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956)是否排除了将弗吉尼亚州的许可和登记要求适用于仅为FBI（联邦调查局）在其背景调查合同服务计划中工作的私人调查员；该案未处理本案争议的问题。\n\nprivate security services business。”1999 WL 33722350, at \\*2。然而，该法院未在其意见中说明那些具体活动为何以及如何落入第(i)至(iv)项。该法院确实指出，该公司的雇员曾实施监视调查，但未说明被如此监视的是何种信息。12 该法院最终认定，该公司因其作为理赔理算人的身份而适用许可要求的一项法定例外。See id。因此，该案未提供多少指导。解释其他州通过的类似法条的案件也未提供多少指导。13\n\n12 该法院还认定，公司中符合私人调查员资格的任何雇员，包括其业主，均须遵守登记要求。Ervin B. Davis & Co., 1999 WL 33722350, at \\*2。\n\n13 双方均同意，在试图确定“犯罪或民事侵权”的定义时，可比的私人调查员法条助益甚微。Strategic提交称，大多数要求许可的州通常将“私人调查”定义为包括试图获取有关“犯罪或民事侵权”的信息，但将该分项限于针对该州的犯罪或侵权，因此用处不大。See Dkt. No. 360 at 2 & n.2。其他州的法条并未作出该等限制，但设有兜底分项，更广泛地将私人调查定义为包括有关“任何人的身份、习惯、行为、业务、职业、诚实、诚信等”的信息。Id. at 2。Connecticut（康涅狄格州）的相应法条最接近弗吉尼亚州的法条，但双方未指出有关“犯罪或民事侵权”定义的判例法，且该法条还包含关于“进行监视活动”和“进行背景调查”的额外定义分项。Id.; see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-152u(4)。\n\n(Va. 1918))。此外，根据同类解释原则，当法条列举了某一特定类别的人或物，后接一般性词语时，一般性词语应被限制解释为与较不一般的特定词语相类似的含义。Sainani v. Belmont Glen Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 831 S.E.2d 662, 667 (Va. 2019) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 890 (Va. 1982))。\n\n适用上述解释原则，整体解读该法条，并将该法条第(i)至(iv)项的每一规定既分别解释，亦作为一个集体的一部分解释，本院认定，该等规定涵盖Strategic在《协议》中承诺提供的部分服务，因此Strategic因订立《协议》而违反该法条。《协议》不得执行。\n\n可从该法条若干术语中探知其含义。该法条仅涉及“业务”或“雇佣”。其不涉及作为志愿者行事，或为自己而非为他人工作的人员。第二，受规制的业务是提供“为获取信息而进行的调查”；附属于其他服务的研究不受规制。必须有人受合同委托进行“为获取信息而进行的调查”。第三，信息必须属于特定类型或具有特定性质。就类型而言，如某人从事业务或接受雇佣，以调查三类信息，则该人属于私人调查员：有关“犯罪或民事侵权”的信息、有关“被盗财产的所在地、处置或追回”的信息，以及有关“事故、火灾、损害，或者对人身或财产造成伤害的原因”的信息。就信息性质而言，如某人进行调查以获取“拟供任何法院、委员会、官员或调查委员会使用的证据”，则该人亦属于私人调查员。因此，第(iv)项涉及对任何主题事项的调查，但前提是其目标为获取符合“证据”资格的项目。\n\n本院驳回Strategic（战略公司）提出的主张，即只有当某人从事收集将在某种正式程序中使用的证据，或用于就特定犯罪起诉某人的过程时，该人方可成为私人调查员。该主张违反了这样一项原则：本院必须力求使法规中的每一个词均具有意义，而且州立法机关不会制定无意义或多余的文字。第（iv）项针对的是“证据”的收集。其特别聚焦于收集将作为证据供法院或官员使用的信息，包括收集将在刑事起诉中使用的证据。根据避免冗余原则，第（i）至（iii）项必须具有不同的含义。它们不能仅限于为正式程序收集证据。相反，依其措辞，这些规定针对的是调查的对象——如果某人拟有偿提供调查服务，则只要该调查属于第（i）至（iii）项所列三类情形之一，就必须取得许可。\n\n本院还驳回Strategic的主张，即一项调查若涉及“犯罪或民事不法行为”，调查员必须受聘调查“某一具体可被起诉的犯罪行为，而非不涉及任何特定受害人的一般性不当或令人憎恶的行为”。Strategic拟议事实认定及法律结论，第38页第3段。该解释毫无道理，并会将通常被理解为私人或公共调查活动的大量行为排除在法规之外。调查员开始调查时，并非罕见地不知道调查将通向何处。他或她可能起初怀疑调查对象从事了某种可能涉及数量不定的不同法律（事先均未具体指明）的行为，随后却发现可能违反另一法律的行为。没有理由认为，弗吉尼亚州立法机关意图保护这样的委托人：其起初怀疑调查对象从事了特定犯罪活动，并指示调查员循证调查；却拒绝保护这样的潜在委托人：其仅仅起初怀疑调查对象总体上是一名犯罪分子，并要求调查员运用其专门知识证实该怀疑。Strategic并不主张，以广泛范围开始的调查将不受弗吉尼亚州法规的保护。但这正是其主张所隐含的意思。调查员只需取得一项调查所有犯罪而非某一具体犯罪的委托，即可选择不受该法规约束，并剥夺委托人享有其保护的权利。\n\nStrategic关于调查必须涉及“特定受害人”的主张同样毫无说服力。联邦和州两级涉及“无受害人”犯罪的刑事法规不胜枚举。14 通常认为，无受害人犯罪包括公共腐败犯罪，在此类犯罪中，受害人并非可识别的个人，而是广大公众。15 Strategic没有提出任何理由说明，为何弗吉尼亚州立法机关会要求对有可识别受害人的犯罪进行调查须取得许可，却不要求对无受害人犯罪进行调查须取得许可。\n\n14 参见，例如，统一犯罪报告计划全国基于事件报告系统（2019）（报告称，2019年“危害社会罪”占所报告犯罪的15.8%）；Matthew K. Suess（马修·K. 苏斯），《自然状态中的惩罚：John Locke（约翰·洛克）与美利坚合众国的刑事惩罚》，7 Wash. U. Juris. Rev. 367, 384, 388 (2015)（“美国刑法典的扩张导致对无受害人犯罪的广泛起诉……与各州一致，大多数联邦囚犯因无受害人犯罪被定罪。”）\n\n15 参见，例如，Mat Tromme（马特·特罗姆），《在发展中国家打击腐败：资产追回如何符合依法治国原则》，29 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 165, 218 (2019)（“腐败通常被视为无受害人犯罪。”）。\n\n一旦正确理解该法规的范围，便显而易见，Strategic通过承接提供私人调查员服务而从事了私人安保服务业务。首先，协议本身反映出，Strategic受聘进行研究并编制报告，其目的在于“发现、制止和预防犯罪或对无辜者的其他伤害”。PX1。因此，其受聘通过调查员获取有关“犯罪或民事不法行为”的信息。协议要求Strategic为了“发现……犯罪”而进行研究，并不影响这一结论，id.；而法规将私人调查员界定为“……接受雇佣进行……调查以获取有关……犯罪或民事不法行为的信息”的人，Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138（着重号后加）。Strategic拟采用的“研究”方法属于调查所涉及的方法，而发现犯罪仅仅是从事收集犯罪调查信息这一活动的结果。Guo（郭文贵）及Eastern（东方公司）发现犯罪活动另有目的——推翻CCP（中国共产党）并提高郭文贵获得庇护的机会——也不影响这一结论。人们聘请私人调查员并非仅出于公共利益考量。他们有时会这样做，是因为刑事调查和刑事定罪将推进其私人利益。Strategic亦不因其承接调查十名对象笼统的“犯罪”，而非具体犯罪，便被排除在该法规适用范围之外。恰恰相反，庭审证据表明，郭文贵怀疑其要求调查的对象从事了腐败及其他公共不法行为，并委托Strategic查找有关该等腐败及公共不法行为的信息。\n\nStrategic从事弗吉尼亚州私人安保服务法规所规制的行为、但未取得该法规要求的许可这一结论，还因Strategic承诺交付的“报告”的性质及其编制该等报告将使用的方法而得到进一步支持。这些报告并不限于通过常规互联网搜索，或查阅报纸记者或图书作者可能使用的容易获得的公开信息所能收集的信息。为编制财务报告，Strategic须审阅机密且不易取得的信息，例如“报表、资本来源、资金流入和流出信息、银行收据、金融工具、金融产品、信用报表、贵金属转移、商品转移、加密货币兑换、股票及其他股权、企业所有权、不动产所有权、信托、大额支出、表明交易参与者的具体信息，以及[Eastern]所需的其他数据”。PX1，第1至2页。该等信息属于私人调查工作的内容，而非单纯研究。为进行追踪研究，Strategic须从事实施监视者所从事的活动，包括追踪陆路、空中或海上的私人或商业旅行，以及获取可远程访问的地理定位信息、视频和音频。参见同上。为进行社交媒体研究，Strategic须审阅私人调查员可获取的其他信息，例如犯罪数据库、性犯罪者和虐待儿童数据库、护照和身份证明文件以及社交媒体评论。参见同上。\n\n如Strategic所承认，该工作包括侵入中国政府服务器、获取伪造美国文件的证据、获取有关社会保障欺诈和税务欺诈的信息、查找某些离岸公司的所在地，以及获取有关CCP成员银行账户的信息。参见庭审记录，第308、314至317页。所有该等工作均应“基于行业最佳实践和标准，以提供类似服务的其他顶级公司为参照”完成，即以从事私人调查的其他主体为参照——这是唯一可以与Strategic所提供服务相比较的行业。PX1，第3页。\n\n因此，Strategic明白，郭文贵所寻求的部分服务涉及调查CCP成员实施的犯罪。Wallop（沃洛普）作证称，郭文贵希望“揭露与CCP成员有关的腐败……[包括]CCP成员实施的犯罪”，并获取“有关CCP成员窃取并非法带出中国的资金的信息”。庭审记录，第65页。Wallop在其证言录取中作证称，郭文贵希望Strategic“调查并获取”有关CCP“领导层内部大量腐败”的信息，例如“本会被非法带出境的资金、现金付款”。同上，第66页。郭文贵还寻求获取“有关被盗资产所在地、处置和追回的信息”，以及“人员或财产受损的原因”。同上，第40页。\n\nStrategic受雇后所实施的工作，进一步支持了Strategic从事由弗吉尼亚州法律界定的私人安保服务业务这一结论。Wallop承认，她至少有一次从事了监视活动。Waller（沃勒）雇用了私人调查员。这些调查员包括第一组，该组从事数据挖掘和研究，包括对暗网的研究；以及第二组，即ASOG，该组访问商业可用数据库，并接触联邦政府内部的联系人。见上文。Waller作证称，他告诉郭文贵，他和Wallop能够完成其所要求类型的工作。庭审记录，第191至192页。\n\n从其在私人安保服务业务这一法定定义中所处的同类事物来分析“私人调查员”的定义——该定义包括履行准执法职能的人员，例如安保人员、个人保护专家和电子安保雇员——Strategic承诺雇用且实际雇用的人员显然符合该定义。用Strategic自己的话说，其将部署“一种必须极其谨慎处理的极为敏感的能力”。PX2。Strategic的调查员从事的是执法人员所从事类型的活动。\n\nStrategic主张，其工作不构成私人调查，因为Eastern从未向执法机关报告或预约报告任何结果，Eastern在协议终止后也未与另一方签约从事该等研究。该主张的某些方面读起来仿佛Strategic试图从其自身的失败中获益。按照Strategic的主张，如果一家公司无法找到可向执法机关报告的犯罪信息，就意味着其不可能承接查找该等信息的工作，因此不需要取得许可。该主张将只要求优秀的私人调查员取得许可；不成功者永远无需取得许可。该结果显然与弗吉尼亚州立法机关的意图及该法规的条款不一致。然而，更重要的是，该法规所关注的是未获许可的企业提出承接提供私人安保服务，而非相对方实际如何使用所提供的信息。如果一家公司作为其业务的一部分承接调查该法规含义内的犯罪并同意这样做，则与其订约的一方最终是否决定将调查成果提交给执法机关无关。\n\n由于 Strategic 从事了属于弗吉尼亚州《私人安保服务法》适用范围内的工作，但未取得该法所要求的许可证，故该协议无效且不可执行。参见 Urban Protective Servs. v. Great Latin Restaurants, 2007 WL 1660374 (Virginia Circuit Court（弗吉尼亚巡回法院）Mar. 5, 2007)（指出先前裁定原告“不得订立合同从事私人安保服务，因为其未按《法典》要求取得许可证，且该合同依法属非法”）；另见 Massie, 3 S.E.2d at 181；Bacigalupo, 102 S.E.2d at 324-25。\n\nStrategic 主张，该协议不可能无效，因为 Strategic 并未“故意”违反该法规。其在审判中用了大量时间举证说明，Wallop（沃洛普）和 Waller（沃勒）并不认为需要许可证，且他们过去曾在未取得许可证的情况下进行调查，仿佛 Strategic 可因长期如此而取得不受监管地行动的权利。其援引 Massey 中的表述，该表述称：“凡许可法规属于警察监管，其目的在于保护公众，规定任何人未经许可从事某项业务即属非法，并对其违反行为施加处罚的，无证人员订立的合同即无效且不可执行。”Massie, 3 S.E.2d at 181（着重号为原文所加）。其主张，弗吉尼亚州仅根据 Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-147(B) 对“故意”的私人安保许可违法行为施加处罚，该等行为系明知或有意实施，参见 Correll v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 119, 124 (Va. 2005)，且由于任何许可错误均非故意，该协议不可能无效。即使假定 Strategic 并非明知或故意违反弗吉尼亚州法律，其仍无权保留 Eastern（伊斯特恩）的保证金。\n\n第 9.1-147–150 条规定了与违反该法规相关的处罚。Strategic 着重援引第 9.1-147(A) 条，其规定：“任何人实施下列行为均属非法：1. 未取得法规或规章所要求的必要许可证、认证或登记，即从事本条所许可、认证或登记的任何行业或职业……4. 违反任何规范本条所监管的私人安保服务企业或培训学校执业的法规或规章。”Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-147(A)。“任何被判定故意违反[本款]的人，构成一级轻罪。”Id. § 9.1-147(B)。\n\n但其他处罚条款——其中一项适用于本案——并不要求故意违法。第 9.1-148 条规定，任何被判定违反其规定的人，\n\n无论是否为故意违法，均构成二级轻罪。Id. § 9.1-148。第 9.1-149 条规定，任何被判定违反其规定的人，无论是否为故意违法，均构成一级轻罪。Id. § 9.1-149。\n\n与本案相关的还有第 9.1-150 条，其规定：“根据本条应由委员会许可、认证或登记的任何人，如违反任何法规或委员会规章且未受到刑事起诉，应受本条规定的金钱处罚。”Id. § 9.1-150。换言之，如 Strategic 在未取得弗吉尼亚州 Department of Criminal Justice Services（刑事司法服务部）所要求的许可证的情况下从事私人安保服务业务，从而违反第 9.1-139(A) 条，但其行为并非故意，则其可能根据第 9.1-150 条受到金钱处罚。如该违法行为系故意，Strategic 则可能根据第 9.1-147(A) 条受到刑事处罚。Massie 的裁判并不要求故意违法；法院仅要求法规对“违反行为”施加处罚。Massie, 3 S.E.2d at 181。因此，为使无证人员订立的合同无效且不可执行，并不要求对故意违法施加处罚，只要求存在某种类型的处罚。参见 id.\n\n本院无需处理 Strategic 的备选主张，即如果该协议属于第(iv)项，则其亦属于 Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-140(29) 规定的第(iv)项豁免，该条豁免任何从事“计算机或数字取证服务……为取得或提供用于证据目的的信息，或为在法院提供专家证言，而获取、审阅或分析数字或基于计算机的信息”的个人。Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-140(29)。本院的结论并非基于认定该协议旨在根据第(iv)项取得“将在任何法院、委员会、官员或调查委员会前使用的证据”信息，而是基于认定 Strategic 承诺提供人员进行调查，以根据第(i)项取得有关“犯罪”的信息。\n\n本院亦驳回 Strategic 的同等过错抗辩。16 Strategic 主张，即使该协议因违反公共政策而无效，在原告寻求实现的“目标”本身亦属非法的情况下，弗吉尼亚州法院不会提供衡平救济。Am.-LaFrance & Foamite Indus. v. Arlington Cty., 192 S.E. 758, 761 (Va. 1937)。其主张，该协议的目标属非法，因为 Eastern 拟将 Strategic 调查的结果与包括 ACA（ACA）和 Golden Spring（Golden Spring）在内的第三方分享，以换取价值。\n\n同等过错原则规定，如“合同非法，因其涉及不道德目的，或涉及受处罚的事项，且双方均明知而参与其中，则双方被视为处于同等过错地位，法院不会提供协助以免除任何一方其行为的后果，而会让其维持被发现时的状态。然而，如合同仅属无效，或基于不涉及道德败坏的交易，且仅违反有关其履行方式、方法或条件的某项法律规定，除无效外未规定其他处罚，则法院不会要求履行明示合同或默示合同。”Id. “同等过错原则与相关的不洁之手原则一样，‘禁止一方就其应承担责任、具有过错或因其不当行为而产生的不当行为所造成的损害获得赔偿。’”Concord Crossroads, LLC v. Human Cap. Res. and Concepts, Inc., 2020 WL 9367543, at \\*11 (Eastern District of Virginia（弗吉尼亚东区）Sept. 2, 2020)（引自 Ashmore for Wilson v. Dodds, 262 F. Supp. 3d 341, 353 (District of South Carolina（南卡罗来纳区）2017)）。该原则“基于如下原则：同意并参与非法行为的一方，不得就该行为的后果向其他参与者追偿。”Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 328, 329 (Va. 1998)；另见 Stith v. Thorne, 488 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 n. 6 (E.D. Va. 2007)（“同等过错原则代表如下原则：‘参与不当行为的原告不得获得因该不当行为产生的损害赔偿。’”）（引自 Black's Law Dictionary 806 (8th ed. 2004)）；另见 In re Bogdan, 414 F.3d 507, 514 (4th Cir. 2005))。\n\n16 Strategic 亦未在其答辩状中提出该项积极抗辩。参见 Dkt. No. 127。\n\n弗吉尼亚州《私人安保服务法》并不处罚从私人安保服务公司接收研究成果后，将该研究成果免费分享给第三方的一方。没有证据表明 Eastern 拟转售该信息，或其已订立合同这样做。本院已认定 ACA 的出资为赠与，而非出售的一部分。对分享该研究成果的唯一禁止来源于该协议，其中载有保密条款。参见 PX1（“双方同意，本合同的性质及与其相关的工作均属高度机密。”）。但即使 Eastern 曾与 ACA 或其他人分享该信息，该行为也将构成违反该协议，而其本身并不违法。简言之，本案中的不当行为是 Strategic 提供并同意向 Eastern 提供其无许可证无权提供的服务。并非 Eastern 接受该等服务。\n\n最后，本院驳回 Strategic 迟延提出的主张，即弗吉尼亚州《私人安保法》因范围过宽及模糊不清而违宪。该主张已被放弃。17 该主张亦无依据。如法规禁止或抑制大量受保护言论，则该法规范围过宽。“范围过宽的实质性，应通过考察受影响的受保护言论数量与该法规正当规制的未受保护言论数量之间的关系来确定。”Nitke v. Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (Southern District of New York（纽约南区）2003)。如法规“未能\n\n17 Strategic 首次在其审判后书状中提出该主张，而该问题亦非本院要求进行审判后书面陈述的问题。参见 Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1985)（地区法院审理在审判后书状中首次提出的主张属错误）；U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as trustee for Registered Holders of CD 2005-CD1 Com. Mortg. Tr., Com. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates v. 2150 Joshua's Path, LLC, 2020 WL 5417085, at \\*10 (Eastern District of New York（纽约东区）July 2, 2020)（“原告其余的主张——首次在其审判后书状中提出——本阶段将不予审理。”）。\n\n‘给予具有一般智力的人合理机会知悉何为被禁止的行为，以便其能够相应行事’，则该法规属模糊不清。”Id. at 608（引自 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)）。\n\nStrategic 主张，该法规范围过宽且模糊不清，因为其将规制其他类型的研究，而未向从事该等研究的当事人发出通知，包括“对手开展研究的政治候选人、受聘评估竞争者的商业顾问，以及为书籍和报告收集数据的作者或记者”。Dkt. No. 360 at 9。其援引 Gurley v. Mo. Bd. of Priv. Investigator Exam's, 361 S.W.3d 406, 411 (Mo. 2012)，其中原告以范围过宽为由质疑一项私人调查员许可法规，理由是该法规超出职业私人调查员的范围，并如原告所主张，要求“普通公民在从事各种受第一修正案保护的活动之前取得许可证”。Id. 具体而言，该法规规定，除非该人已获许可成为私人调查员，“任何人在[密苏里州]从事私人调查员业务”均属非法，其中“私人调查员业务”定义如下：\n\n[T]为取得与下列事项有关的信息而提供、进行或同意进行任何调查：\n\n(a) 针对美国或美国任何州或领地已经实施或威胁实施的犯罪或不法行为；\n\n(b) 任何人的身份、习惯、行为、业务、职业、诚实、正直、可信度、知识、可靠性、效率、忠诚度、活动、行踪、下落、隶属关系、交往关系、交易、行为、声誉或品格；\n\n(c) 丢失或被盗财产的位置、处置或追回；\n\n(d) 获取将在任何法院、委员会、官员或调查委员会前使用的证据；\n\n(e) 向公众出售个人身份识别信息；或\n\n(f) 对诽谤、损失、事故、人员或财产损害或伤害的原因或责任，或对生命或财产的保护。\n\nId. at 412。原告主张，该法规将大量受第一修正案保护的活动纳入其中，\n\n尤其指出第(9)(b)项，该项可能包括使用社交网站“查找一名前同学或寻找潜在恋爱伴侣”的人。Id.\n\n法院指出，“法定解释的首要规则是从所使用的语言中探究立法机关的意图，在可能的情况下使该意图得到实现，并按照词语的通常和普通含义加以理解。”据此，法院认定，“私人调查业务”定义中的“业务”一词限定了该定义所列与私人调查员相关活动的范围，并表明该法规所涵盖的是“仅由商业实体进行的调查”。Id. at 413（引自 S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee's Summit, 278 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. 2009)）。因此，法院裁定，该法规并非违宪地过于宽泛，因为其仅在所列活动“作为以营利为目的经营的商业企业的一部分，或者作为为谋生或获利而惯常从事的特定职业的一部分”进行时，才对其加以规制，并且“在如此解释时，[原告]所提出的任何假设性违宪适用情形均未获该法规授权”。Id.\n\n同样，Virginia's Private Security Services Statute（弗吉尼亚州私人安保服务法）提及“私人安保服务业务”，并将其定义为“从事提供或承诺提供……私人调查员服务业务的任何人”。Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138。私人调查员亦仅在商业企业的关联下予以定义。见同上（将“私人调查员”定义为“从事或接受雇佣以进行调查并获取信息的任何个人”）。因此，该法规并不涵盖进行社交媒体研究的普通公民。亦如本院前述裁定，该法规不涉及以志愿者身份行事或为自己工作的人员，从而消除了 Strategic（斯特拉蒂吉克）对于该法规将要求“为书籍和报告收集数据的作者或记者”或自行对竞争对手开展研究的政治候选人取得调查许可证的担忧。Dkt. No. 360 at 9。该法规显然也不涵盖受雇评估某一\n\n竞争对手业务的商业顾问——即 Strategic 在其一连串骇人假设中的第三种假设——但该顾问并不从事调查该法规所列具体信息的业务，或者该顾问并非受聘“以获取关于(i)犯罪或民事不法行为；(ii)被盗财产的所在地、处置或追回；(iii)事故、火灾、损害，或对人身或财产造成伤害的原因；或(iv)拟在任何法院、委员会、官员或调查委员会前使用的证据”的信息。Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-138。若此类信息在该顾问的工作过程中出现，则该研究将是该顾问其他工作的“附带”事项，因为该法规所关注的是无证企业提出承接私人安保服务，而非相对方对所提供信息的实际使用。见上文。事实上，根据弗吉尼亚州私人安保服务法中“私人调查员”一词所处的语境，并考虑 Strategic 已实施及同意实施的活动，这些活动的独特之处以及使其受到规制的原因在于：它们构成行为，尤其是通常由执法机关从事、但 Strategic 在此为商业获利而私下出售的行为。\n\nStrategic 其余援引的案例要么不适用，要么不支持其论点。见 Gray v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 248 A.3d 212, 217, 223 (Me. 2021)（驳回对要求专业调查员许可证申请人必须“证明具有良好道德品格”的质疑，理由是该要求并未禁止或限制言论，且基于原告将虚假信息作为事实陈述而拒绝其申请，“经过了严格限定，以服务于维持专业调查员许可标准这一重大政府利益；该等调查员负责研究和报告涉及人们生活中一些最具重大影响细节的事项”）；Castillo v. Ingram, 2015 WL 3559104, at *1 (D. Nev. June 5, 2015)（因原告缺乏实际损害，未处理要求在 Nevada（内华达州）从事私人调查员工作的个人取得州许可证的 Nevada 法规是否违反言论自由条款的问题）；K-Mart Corp. v. St. Louis Cty., 672 S.W.2d 127, 132-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)（要求私人调查员首先从警察总监处取得私人守望员许可证的条例并非过于宽泛或含糊，因为州有权规制警察权，且该“条例在依照通常理解和惯例衡量时，就被禁止的行为给出了足够明确的警示”）。\n\n2. 救济\n\n由于该协议无效，Eastern（伊斯特恩）有权获得金额为 $1 million 的返还。\n\n返还这一损害赔偿衡量标准“旨在使未违约方恢复至如同合同未曾订立前其所处的同等良好地位，而不试图就其后果性损害作出赔偿。”360Networks Corp. v. Geltzer (In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd.), 404 B.R. 335, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Daniel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 5723704, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2013)。\n\nVirginia（弗吉尼亚州）和 New York（纽约州）遵循 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment（《返还与不当得利重述（第三版）》），以确定一方是否可以追回其就非法且因而无效的合同所提供履行的价值。见，例如，T. Musgrove Constr. Co., Inc. v. Young, 840 S.E.2d 337, 342 (Va. 2020); Mazzei v. Money Store, 308 F.R.D. 92, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd, 829 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2016)。\n\n根据《返还与不当得利重述（第三版）》第 32 条：\n\n在因违法或其他公共政策理由而不可执行的协议下提供履行的人，可以依照下列规则向受领人取得返还：\n\n(1) 如返还是基础禁止性规定的政策所要求的，则无论是否为防止不当得利所必需，均应允许返还。\n\n(2) 如为防止不当得利所必需，且允许返还不会破坏或阻碍基础禁止性规定的政策，也应允许返还。若请求人获得当事人不可执行协议所规定的对待履行，则不存在不当得利。\n\n(3) 尽管被告以请求人为代价获得利益，如第(2)款项下的请求因请求人的不公平行为（§ 63）而被排除，则应拒绝返还。\n\nRestatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 32。\n\n在适用第 32(1) 条的情形下，本院无需进行传统的不当得利分析。Id. cmt. C。相反，根据第 32(1) 条，在因违反公共政策而无效的协议下提供履行的一方，在政策要求如此时，有权追回该履行的价值，而无须考虑该方是否据此获得任何利益。Id. § 32(1), Illustration 21。例如，客户向未获许可提供该等服务的承包商支付服务费用时，第 32(1) 条要求承包商返还客户支付的款项，而不论其是否向该客户提供了某种利益。Id. Illustration 21 规定：\n\n21. A 预先向 B 支付 $2000，用于一系列医疗治疗。在两次前往 B 的办公室后，A 得知 B 未获行医许可。A 拒绝履行该协议并要求返还其款项。根据 § 32(1) 的规则，A 有权向 B 追回 $2000。A 可能从 B 的服务中获得利益这一事实，与 A 的追回无关。\n\nId.; see also Illustration 4; Illustration 18。\n\n返还性损害赔偿可以包括，例如，返还被告未能履行的合同项下支付的定金。见 In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 404 B.R. at 342（说明返还性损害赔偿尤其适用于追回依据未由另一方履行的合同支付的定金或首付款）；\n\nGulati v. Coyne Int'l Enters. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 365, 371 (E.D. Va. 1992)（同理）；Busman v. Beeren & Barry Invs., LLC, 69 Va. Cir. 375, 379 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005)（同理）。\n\n在本案中，根据《返还与不当得利重述（第三版）》第 32(1) 条并与例示 21 一致，Eastern 有权追回其向 Strategic 支付的 $1 million 定金，而其是否从 Strategic 根据该协议尝试履行中获得任何利益无关紧要。\n\n该协议授权 Eastern“指示其他实体向[Strategic]付款，并且该等付款将被视为满意的报酬。”PX1 at 5。该 $1 million 定金由 ACA（ACA）支付。作为该 $1 million 定金的付款人，ACA 可能对 Eastern 享有要求获得该返还金额的请求权。然而，ACA 是 Eastern 应付款项的直接付款人这一事实，并不免除 Strategic 在本案中对 Eastern 所负的责任，也不允许 Strategic 保留该等款项。$1 million 的支付足以使 Strategic 免除其对 Eastern 或 ACA 任一方所负的任何返还责任。见 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 48（“如果第三人向被告作出一项付款，而就请求人与被告之间而言，请求人对此享有更优的法律或衡平权利，则请求人有权在防止不当得利所必需的范围内向被告取得返还。”）；另见 id. § 64 cmt. c & Illustration 3。\n\nB. 其余请求\n\n本院关于该协议无效以及 Strategic 无权保留 $1 million 定金、而必须将其返还 Eastern 的裁定，已处置本案。尽管如此，本院仍作为替代性理由处理双方其余请求。本院认定，即使该协议并未违反弗吉尼亚州私人安保服务法，Eastern 仍有权获得其定金中 $250,000 的返还。\n\n1. 违约\n\nStrategic 和 Eastern 各自主张对方实质性违反了该协议。Eastern 主张，Strategic 未能提供每周报告和每月报告，因而仅基于该理由即有权获得其定金的返还。Strategic 对其是否实质性违反该协议提出异议，并主张违反该协议的是 Eastern，因为 Eastern 未能支付于 February 16, 2019 到期的月费。\n\n根据弗吉尼亚州法律，违约请求的构成要件为：“(1)合同的存在；(2)原告已履行或提出履行合同；(3)被告未履行合同或违反协议；以及(4)因违约给原告造成的实际损害。”Car Pool LLC v. Hoke, 2012 WL 4854652, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2012)（引自 Filak v. George, 594 S.E.2d 610, 614 (Va. 2004)）；另见 Dodge v. CDW Gov't, Inc., 2009 WL 1605010, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2009)（作出相同表述）。同样，根据纽约州法律，违约请求的构成要件包括：“(1)协议的存在，(2)原告对合同的适当履行，(3)被告违约，以及(4)损害赔偿。”Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 162, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（引自 Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir. 1996)）；另见 Tessler v. NBC Universal, Inc., 2009 WL 866834, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Tessler v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 364 F. App'x 5 (4th Cir. 2010)（“[纽约州法律和弗吉尼亚州法律]均实质上要求构成具有法律可执行力合同的相同要件。”）。18\n\n18 Strategic（斯特拉提吉克）就违约之诉援引纽约州法律，而 Eastern（伊斯特恩）则同时援引纽约州和弗吉尼亚州法律。“在多元管辖权案件中审理的联邦法院适用州实体法。”Ellington Credit Fund（埃林顿信贷基金）, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 179-80（援引 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.（加斯佩里尼诉人文中心公司）, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)）。法院同时纳入了对纽约州和弗吉尼亚州法律的援引，但“[w]here both parties rely upon New York law in their briefs, the Court may assume the parties impliedly consent to the application of New York law.”Fort Prods., Inc v. Men's Med.\n\na. 当事人的主张\n\nEastern主张，Strategic未能在《协议》规定的期限内以每周报告的形式提供高质量信息，因而构成违约；且由于Strategic未提供任何利益，其有权获得金额为$1 million保证金的赔偿。其主张，最迟至2018年1月30日，Strategic因未能于1月23日及时交付第一份每周报告，以及于1月26日和1月30日交付载有“无用”信息的USB驱动器，已构成实质性违约。Strategic并不否认其未提供该报告，而是抗辩称，Eastern实质性阻碍了其履行，因此Strategic不能被认定为违约；即，其主张目的落空以及缺乏诚信与公平交易。其还主张，即使其违反了《协议》，该等违约也不构成实质性违约。此外，Strategic主张，Wang（王）和L. Han（韩某）指示Strategic继续工作，因此Eastern已丧失基于所称违约解除合同的权利。\n\nStrategic的反诉主张，Eastern首先因未支付于2018年2月16日到期的$750,000月付款而违反《协议》。19 其主张，Eastern随后又因未提前30日通知即送达解除函而再次违反《协议》。Eastern答辩称，Strategic的履行应先于Eastern支付$750,000，且由于不存在履行，其未付款并不构成违约。此外，Eastern主张，由于$1 million应按比例计入《协议》最后1 1/3个月期间已完成的工作，PX1，其并未未向Strategic支付$750,000，因为Strategic的账户中持有$1 million，可按比例分配。如果双方均构成违约，Eastern\n\nClinic, LLC, 2016 WL 797577, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2016)（援引 Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)（“双方当事人的书状均假定纽约州法律具有控制效力，而该等默示同意……足以确立法律选择。”）（省略内部引文标记和引注））。\n\n19 法院驳回Strategic关于Eastern因让ACA（美国公司）支付$1 million保证金而违反合同的主张。见上文。\n\n主张，其仍将获得其$1 million保证金，扣除Strategic所提供的任何有证据支持的利益；其称该利益为零，或最多为$338,709.68，即Strategic在其违约前已完成14天工作的价值。\n\n法院认定，Strategic交付“无用”的USB驱动器或未交付每周报告并不构成对《协议》的实质性违约，但其未能依《协议》于2018年2月16日交付第一份月度报告，构成违约。Eastern未能于2018年2月16日支付$750,000月费，也构成违约。因此，双方构成同时违约。故此，Eastern于2月16日后不久解除《协议》系在其权利范围内，Strategic无权要求Eastern履行或向其索赔。Eastern同样无权要求Strategic履行或向其索赔。\n\nb. Eastern的主张\n\nEastern主张，Strategic未能在《协议》第一个月内每周交付关于财务法证研究的进展报告、在该第一个月内每周交付当前追踪报告，以及在第一个月内每周交付社交媒体研究，因而违反《协议》。双方同意，Strategic从未交付《协议》所要求的任何财务法证历史研究、当前追踪研究或社交媒体研究。JSOAF ¶¶ 54-56。Strategic交付的两个USB驱动器毫无用处：第一个仅包含研究人员基于公开来源信息为熟悉相关对象所做的自身工作；第二个则是无法读取的原始材料，由拒绝提供实际信息的分包商交付。Strategic也从未提供任何月度报告。Eastern主张Strategic违反了《协议》。Strategic则主张，任何违约均非实质性违约，或系Eastern阻碍其履行所致。\n\n法院一如既往地从《协议》开始审查。参见，例如，Kelly v. Ammado Internet Servs., Ltd.（凯利诉阿马多互联网服务有限公司）, 2012 WL 4829341, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2012)（“为解释合同条款，\n\n弗吉尼亚州法院‘在文书本身的四角范围内考量合同的文字。’”）（引自 Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp.（马修斯诉PHH抵押贷款公司）, 724 S.E.2d 196, 201 (Va. 2012)）。《协议》并非清晰明确的范本。双方均提出了有力论据。法院认定，未在第一个月内交付每周报告或研究并不构成实质性违约。\n\n“实质性违约，是指未履行某项对合同至关重要的义务，以致该未履行挫败了合同的一项基本目的。”Horton v. Horton（霍顿诉霍顿）, 487 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Va. 1997)；参见 VFS Fin., Inc. v. Falcon Fifty LLC（VFS金融公司诉猎鹰五十有限责任公司）, 17 F. Supp. 3d 372, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（“如果违约‘触及双方协议的根本，且严重到挫败双方订立合同的目的’，则该违约为实质性违约。”）。\n\n从某些意义上说，本案《协议》类似于分期合同。Strategic应就Eastern指定的十名个人开展三个主题领域的研究，并以定期报告的形式交付该等研究成果：(i) 就财务法证历史研究而言，在第一个月每周交付报告，随后交付一份初步报告；(ii) 就当前追踪研究而言，每周交付报告，随后每月交付报告；以及(iii) 就社交媒体研究而言，每周交付报告，随后每月交付报告。Eastern要明确表明，未能在第一个月内每周交付每一份指定报告将构成实质性违约，“最有效的方式”本应是在《协议》中规定时间为关键条件。ADC Orange, Inc. v. Coyote Acres, Inc.（ADC橙色公司诉郊狼农场公司）, 857 N.E.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. 2006)。例如，在一方未按房地产购买合同付款的情况下，“[一方]迟延支付分期款是否构成实质性违约，取决于就该付款而言时间是否为关键条件。”同上（不动产购买合同）。无论Eastern在《协议》中或合同谈判期间表达何种意愿，其在本案中均未坚持加入时间为关键条件的条款。因此，其不能援引该项原则。\n\n然而，未明文规定“时间为关键条件”并不能决定Eastern主张的成败。这仅要求进行司法解释。尽管“合同规定明确履行期限时，时间通常为关键条件”，但在“情形表明存在相反意图”时则并非如此。Burgess Steel Prod. Corp. v. Mod. Telecomms., Inc.（伯吉斯钢铁制品公司诉现代电信公司）, 613 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (1st Dep't 1994)。“仅仅指定某事项应履行的日期，并不会当然产生[时间为关键条件]这一结果。”Ring 57 Corp. v. Litt（环57公司诉利特）, 280 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (2d Dep't 1967)。“何为合理的履行时间，取决于具体案件的事实和情形。”Zev v. Merman（泽夫诉默曼）, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988)。事实上，法院曾认定，“在不存在时间为关键条件之规定的情况下，原告必须明确无误地通知其不接受迟延付款。”Cmty. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Joseph（纽约社区国民银行及信托公司诉约瑟夫）, 504 N.Y.S.2d 185, 185 (2d Dep't 1986)。\n\n审查《协议》整体后，法院认定，Eastern须在第一个月每周就15条鱼的全部三个主题交付报告，并非《协议》的实质性条款；未交付该等每周报告亦未挫败《协议》的一项基本目的。法院首先注意到，《协议》旨在建立双方之间的长期关系。Eastern聘请Strategic在三年期间内开展研究，该关系仅可经提前30日通知解除。尽管《协议》赋予Eastern“可不时移除某些鱼”的权利，但Eastern未必会选择如此行事，Strategic也未必会认定“情形不允许有足够工作来研究某条鱼”。PX1 at 3。\n\n《协议》设想，Strategic可能在整个三年期间持续就某一特定对象开展研究。参见，例如，同上 at 2（指出，对于当前追踪研究，Eastern可指示在“最长六个月期间内”更频繁地报告）。在此情形下，不能认为未在《协议》最初数周内就一个或多个，甚至全部对象交付研究成果，会挫败或击败《协议》整体的目的。\n\n《协议》中的众多其他条款进一步强化了该结论。首先，《协议》对每周报告的时间安排及其应采取的形式，使用了较为模糊的表述；若每份报告的时间均为关键条件，人们本应预期使用明确无误且确定的措辞。财务法证研究应以“第一个月内每周……一份进展报告”的形式提供，但未规定具体交付日期或具体所需内容。同上。关于每周当前追踪研究和社交媒体研究的措辞同样笼统：其指的是“研究”而非报告，并规定该等研究应每周交付，但未设定确定日期。见同上。这与关于月度报告更为确定的措辞形成对比：第一个月内一份关于财务法证历史研究的“初步报告”，同上；“就每个对象……每月制作的当前追踪报告”，同上 at 3；以及“……每月制作的社交媒体报告”。事实上，每周报告甚至未被单独列为“交付成果”。见同上。\n\n此外，Eastern未向Strategic提供最终研究对象名单，且其仅须在《协议》签署时提供该名单，即首批每周报告到期前一周。见同上 at 1。因此，双方不可能在合理预期中认为，Strategic须在《协议》最初数周内就每一个对象交付可采取行动的信息。Strategic甚至无法确定研究对象究竟是谁，以及他们是否能够被研究。事实上，《协议》本身承认，“情形[可能]不允许有足够工作来研究某条鱼”。同上 at 3。\n\n此外，Strategic（战略公司）甚至无需在第一个月之后继续对Eastern（东部公司）指定的原15个对象中的五个对象进行调查，Eastern亦无权在后续数月中获得关于该等对象的报告。Strategic在第一个月须调查15个对象。其在之后的每个月仅须调查十个对象。在协议开始时，双方并不知道最初15个对象中哪些对象（如有）将构成其余调查期间的十个对象组。对于某一对象，如有关调查可能不会超过最初数周继续进行，则未能在最初数周内交付有关该对象的信息会致使协议目的落空，这是不可想象的。\n\n最后，在Eastern仍未收到应于February 13, 2018到期的第四份每周报告后，其并未警告Strategic其付款迟延、违反协议，或以其他方式表明协议中“时间至关重要”。即使该协议可被视为时间至关重要的合同，“一方当事人通过默许或未能依照时间至关重要条款勤勉地行使权利，即消除或放弃该条款作为合同明示条款或默示条款。”Lockheed Martin Transp. Sec. Sols. v. MTA Cap. Constr. Co., 2014 WL 12560686, at \\*22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (collecting cases); see Atateks Foreign Trade Ltd. v. Priv. Label Sourcing, LLC, 2009 WL 1803458, at \\*21 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009), aff'd, 402 F. App'x 623 (2d Cir. 2010) (“已放弃其获得及时履行之权利的一方当事人，如未先以清楚、明确且毫不含糊的通知告知其相对方时间至关重要，并在合理期间内重新设定履行期限，则其试图突然解除合同并不适当。”)（省略内部引号及引文）；另见Ring 57 Corp., 280 N.Y.S.2d at 332（“默许一系列迟延”即放弃对违约的主张）。\n\n基于上述理由，本院认定，未能交付协议第一个月的调查成果或每周报告，并不构成重大违约。\n\n对于月度报告，即应于第一个月到期的初步财务法证调查报告，以及被列为应交付成果、应按月制作的当前追踪和社交媒体报告，本院得出不同结论：未能制作该等月度报告构成重大违约。月度报告在协议框架内发挥重要作用。Eastern应当以月度报告为依据，指示Strategic应开展的工作。协议规定，“双方理解，[Eastern]可能不希望10条‘鱼’中的每一条均成为全部三类报告的对象，且每月报告工作职责的数量将有所不同。”PX1 at 3。对于第一个月而言尤其如此——该月的报告将决定15个对象中哪些十个对象成为未来报告的重点。没有该等报告，Eastern将无从确定Strategic在后续数月应聚焦于何人。而且，如无确定Strategic应调查何人的依据，协议的一项基本目的将无法实现。\n\n第一个月的月度报告亦在协议的核算条款中发挥重要作用。如前所述，该条款载明，在“March报告和付款完成后，……所有相关方将在进入下一季度之前开会回顾核算情况。”Id. at 4。此后，“鱼”的数量可能增加。Id.。双方亦可能决定重新协商其协议条款。双方本应在该March会议上讨论，其是否发现了“针对目标A以及目标A项下若干类别中任何类别所要求的适当信息”，以及“这样做是否合理，或者[他们]是否应停止并转向具有不同参数的另一目标，以及这是否运作正常。”Trial Tr. at 274。这是协议中规定的唯一一项回顾条款，而该回顾条款是协议的一项基本条款。它构成Strategic与Eastern之间妥协的基础：Strategic希望无论结果如何均获得月度预付费用，而Eastern希望按结果付款。然而，为使该核算机制正常运作，其不能仅以一个月报告的结果为基础——即使是最近一个月的结果。双方需要掌握某种趋势，并了解某一特定月份的结果是否反映出已发现信息的增加并可能表明需要开展额外工作，或者是否反映出在详尽工作之后已走入死胡同。因此，Strategic未能交付月度报告，挫败了协议的一项基本条款。\n\nc. Strategic的反诉请求\n\nStrategic的反诉请求主张，Eastern首先因未支付于February 16到期的\\$750,000月度付款而违反协议；Strategic认为，无论应交付成果为何，该付款均为协议所要求，且其需要该付款以资助第1团队的调查。20 Strategic还主张，Eastern在未提前30日通知的情况下发出终止函时，再次违反了协议。如以下所示，Strategic未能交付月度报告这一事实，并不意味着Eastern有权扣留\\$750,000付款。经分析事实和法律，正确结论是Eastern仍欠Strategic \\$750,000，且其违约将通过允许Strategic从其作为保证金持有的款项中扣留该金额而得到补救。同时，Strategic的违约确实使Eastern有权声明其将停止履行协议，且不支付下一期\\$750,000分期付款。\n\n20 本院驳回Strategic关于Eastern因让ACA支付\\$1 million保证金而违反合同的主张。见上文。\n\n本院驳回Eastern的解释，即其仅在交付报告后才有义务向Strategic付款，因而其在February中旬没有义务向Strategic支付\\$750,000。\n\nEastern的论点基于协议中标题为“Prices（价格）”的部分。该部分的相关内容载明：“每项应交付成果‘A’、‘B’和‘C’的价格均为每个对象每年\\$300,000，即每条‘鱼’每年合计\\$900,000。”PX1 at 3。其进一步载明，第一个月的定价“将包括最多15条‘鱼’，共计30份报告；在第二个月（February）开始时，以及（March）[原文如此]和本合同期限内，将减少至10条‘鱼’，共计30份报告。”Id. at 4。该部分包含如下段落：\n\n(A) 综合历史报告：每份报告（或相当于报告的成果）每年\\$300,000。\n\n(B) 追踪报告：每份报告（或相当于报告的成果）每年\\$300,000。\n\n(C) 社交媒体报告：每份报告（或相当于报告的成果）每年\\$300,000。\n\nId.\n\n然而，“Prices（价格）”部分还载明，“[每份报告价格的]解决方案无法提供可预测的预算或工作量”，“[为]确保在约定价格下实现可预测性的最大工作量，[Strategic]将把应交付成果计量为每年30个单位（10条‘鱼’x 每条3份报告[A+B+C] = 在任何特定时间30项工作/报告）”，以及“每年30个单位或应交付成果的定价保持为每年恒定\\$9,000,000，或12个月每月\\$750,000。”Id. at 3-4。\n\n双方对于该等措辞的含义存在分歧。Eastern主张，该措辞反映了双方达成的协议，即Eastern仅在报告交付时才按每份报告\\$300,000付款。Strategic回应称，该措辞规定了据以得出每月\\$750,000和\\$9,000,000的方法。本院认定，Strategic的论点更为有力。\n\n首先，本院有义务赋予协议的全部条款以意义和效力，并避免使任何条款成为冗余或无意义。见Goodman v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 7 F.3d 1123, 1127 (4th Cir. 1993)（“合同条款必须被解释为赋予合同每一部分以意义和效力，而非使合同的一部分无意义或沦为单纯冗余。”）；Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 2021 WL 508727, at \\*9 (W.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2021)（“如能够赋予合同中的任何词语或条款以合理含义，则该词语或条款不得被视为无意义，且推定当事人不会在合同中纳入不必要的词语。”）（引自TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., L.L.C., 557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Va. 2002)）；Berry v. Klinger, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Va. 1983)（“如合同各部分能够在不存在冲突的情况下合并解读，法院必须使合同的全部语言发生效力。”）。协议在数处载明，作为Strategic同意合同条款的对价，Eastern有义务每月向Strategic支付\\$750,000费用。该措辞毫不含糊：“付款应于每月月底以定期月度分期付款的形式支付，每期US\\$750,000。”PX1 at 5。\n\n第二，Strategic的解释是将协议作为整体解释以实现双方目的的最佳方式。见First Am. Bank of Va. v. J.S.C. Concrete Const., Inc., 523 S.E.2d 496, 501 (Va. 2000)（“如能够赋予合同中任何词语或条款以与合同其他部分一致的合理解释，法院不会将其视为无意义。”）。正如Strategic指出，协议预见到在某些情形下，其不会或无法每月交付三份报告。就财务法证报告而言，在三个月节点之后，Strategic仅有义务按月制作“更新报告”。最重要的是，如Strategic所强调，Eastern在协议期限内拥有不受限制的酌处权替换对象：如其认为有必要移除一个对象，其有权指定另一个应被调查的对象，因此“每月报告工作职责的数量将有所不同。”PX1 at 3。以一个对象替换另一个对象将导致报告迟延，并增加Strategic的成本。但Strategic愿意承担该等增加的成本以及协议赋予Eastern对于报告时间安排的酌处权，因为作为交换，Eastern将每月支付固定费用，以换取Strategic同意在全年期间提供约定数量的报告或相当于报告的成果。\n\n第三，反映出Strategic的义务是按年度而非按月计量，Eastern所援引的措辞本身即规定每项应交付成果的价格“按年”计算。并不存在每项应交付成果按月计算的价格。因此，若按字面适用Eastern自己对协议的理解，将导致甚至Eastern也未主张的结果——即（尽管有关于每月\\$750,000的措辞），Eastern唯一的义务是支付“每条‘鱼’每年\\$900,000。”Id.。\n\n与Eastern的主张相反，Strategic的解释确实使协议的每项条款均发生效力并具有意义。鉴于协议赋予Eastern在请求报告及其交付时间安排方面，以及就应调查对象方面的灵活性，有必要规定一种方法，以显示应付报告与应付金额之间的对应关系。如无该等条款，将不存在现成的\n\n用于确定在例如其替换了对象并对报告进行混搭的情况下，Eastern 是否收到了其应得的全部报告的方法。Eastern 所援引的措辞提供了该方法。Eastern 未能在到期日支付 \\$750,000，构成对《协议》的重大违约。参见，例如，Tandberg, Inc.（Tandberg公司）v. Advanced Media Design, Inc.（Advanced Media Design公司）, 2009 WL 4067717, at \\*4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 23, 2009)（“[其]未能及时付款构成重大违约，这一点已得到充分确立。”）（汇集案例）。\n\n最后，Eastern 主张 Strategic 应在最初几周交付高质量报告，如未交付，Eastern 即有权既宣告构成重大违约，又获得其保证金返还；该主张实质上虽非形式上，是试图通过牵强的合同解释，取得其通过合同谈判曾试图但未能取得的权利，即将付款以报告交付为条件，并剥夺 Strategic 的保证金价值。在合同谈判期间，Eastern 主张付款应以交付成果为依据，如报告未达到 Eastern 所期望的质量，其将能够获得保证金返还。Strategic 反对这些要求，并坚持其需要定期每月付款、\\$1 million 常续保证金，以及在合同可被终止前提前一个月通知的保障。Strategic 在着手该项目并作出建立研究网络所必要的投资之前，需要这些条款，而其事先并不知道能否成功研究任何或全部对象。《协议》允许 Eastern 随时以任何理由终止，但该终止须在一个月后才生效，以确保 Strategic 能够通过保证金收回其为开始研究所作的投资。Eastern 的主张实质上将颠倒这些条款，并挫败双方在订立合同时所表达的意图。如获采纳，该主张将允许 Eastern\n\n将付款以报告质量为条件，并收回其保证金，尽管存在 30-day 通知条款。\n\nStrategic 基于 Eastern 未依《协议》提供适当终止通知提出第二项独立请求；《协议》规定：“[任]一方均可经 30 days 书面通知终止合同。”PX1。Eastern 于 February 23, 2018 提交了一封函件，声明其终止合同，且此后未再付款。《协议》表明，终止仅在发出终止通知 30 days 后生效。然而，一方对合同构成重大违约时，另一方免除其未来义务。参见 New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc.（New Windsor 志愿救护队公司）v. Meyers（迈耶斯）, 442 F.3d 101, 117 (2d Cir. 2006)（“一方违反合同后，如该违约具有‘重大’性质，该违约可免除未违约方继续履行的义务。”）。鉴于 Strategic 的重大违约，Eastern 获准在不提前 30 days 通知的情况下终止《协议》，因此该反诉依据不能成立。\n\nd. 救济\n\n证据表明，Strategic 和 Eastern 均对《协议》构成重大违约，且在同一时间发生。Strategic 因未于 February 16, 2018 交付月度报告而违约。Eastern 因未于 February 16, 2018 支付 \\$750,000 分期款而违约。\n\n根据确立的法律原则，发生重大合同违约时，未违约方可以选择停止履行并请求损害赔偿。参见，例如，Lovink v. Guilford Mills, Inc.（Guilford Mills公司）, 878 F.2d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 1989)（“完全违约足以使合同终止，并就完全未履行请求损害赔偿。”）；The Est. of Mantle v. Rothgeb, 2007 WL 4548127, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2007)（“如原告确实重大违反《协议》，被告将有权终止合同并提起损害赔偿诉讼。”）。在此处不适用的情形不存在的情况下，未履行的一方不得自行请求损害赔偿。参见 Optima Media Grp. Ltd.（Optima Media集团有限公司）v. Bloomberg L.P.（彭博有限合伙企业）, 2021 WL 1941878, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2021)（“为就违约获得赔偿，一方必须首先证明其已实质履行该合同”）；Car Pool, 2012 WL 4854652, at \\*3（要求原告充分履行合同方可提出请求）。由此可见，在 Strategic 未能交付月度报告后，Eastern 有权发出终止通知，并指示 Strategic 不再为 Eastern 开展任何活动。Eastern 不对其有效终止《协议》后自二月中旬起提供的服务而于三月中旬到期的 \\$750,000 付款中的任何部分承担责任。还可推知，Eastern 未能支付作为自一月中旬至二月中旬聘用 Strategic 对价的 \\$750,000 后，Strategic 不再需要为 Eastern 从事调查服务。Eastern 的违约赋予 Strategic 当时立即选择停止为 Eastern 工作，并且不再代表 Eastern 产生额外费用的权利。\n\n这并不意味着 Eastern 或 Strategic 任一方有权获得合同损害赔偿。Eastern 未指出其因未收到首批月度报告而遭受的任何损害。此外，Eastern 因未提交付款并重大违反《协议》，无权获得损害赔偿。同时，Strategic 也无权就 Eastern 的违约获得损害赔偿。若 Strategic 已履行并交付月度报告（无论其质量如何），则其本有权就 Eastern 过早终止《协议》获得至少 \\$750,000 的损害赔偿——该金额代表 Eastern 发出终止通知后其有权获得付款的 30-day 期间应向其支付的款项（且该款项于 February 16 到期）。但其未于 February 16 履行，因此其不能主张未收到 \\$750,000。\n\n在“每一方均违反合同项下到期应付的义务……的情况下，任何一方均无权向另一方请求损害赔偿。”Buffardi v. Parillo, 563 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950 (3d Dep't 1990)（认定双方关于其因对方未履行而免除履行义务的主张“毫无根据”，因为“[任]一方均未从事妨碍或阻止另一方履行的那类行为，且由于两个条件均应在合理时间内得到履行，任何一方均无正当理由等待另一方先履行”）（省略内部引文）。\n\n对于 Eastern 是否有权追回其在《协议》开始时向 Strategic 支付的全额 \\$1 million 保证金，则应得出不同结论。Eastern 无权基于违约理论追回该款项。Eastern 不争议双方已同意，Strategic 可以将 \\$1 million 保证金抵扣《协议》最后 1 and 1/3 months 的款项。参见 PX1 at 5。如上所述，该约定对于 Strategic 同意提供调查服务至关重要——若 Eastern 未同意预付其义务款项，且未进一步同意 Strategic 可在《协议》有效期间保留该款项，最长为 1 and 1/3 months，Strategic 就不会投资于履行《协议》所必需的基础设施。本案《协议》有效期为一个月，即自 January 16, 2018 至 February 16, 2018。因此，若 Strategic 未违反 Virginia Private Security Services Statute（弗吉尼亚州私人安保服务法），Strategic 将有权保留其在《协议》有效期间所赚取的 \\$1 million 中的部分，即 \\$750,000。该金额及 Strategic 保留该金额的权利，并不取决于 Strategic\n\n交付报告——这正是 Eastern 所要求但在合同谈判中未能取得的合同条款。21\n\n21 \\$750,000 并不以 Strategic 交付服务为条件，这一点使 Eastern 对 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 234 cmt. e, f 的援引有所区别。\n\nEastern 有权基于违约理论获得 \\$250,000 的返还。这代表 Eastern 支付的 \\$1 million 保证金，减去 Strategic 根据《协议》应得且有权保留的 \\$750,000。“[如]一方有正当理由以其剩余履行义务已因另一方违约而解除为由拒绝履行，则违约方有权就其通过部分履行或信赖所给予的、超过其自身违约所造成损失的任何利益获得返还。”Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374 (1981)；另见 New Windsor, 442 F.3d at 118（“[在]某些情况下，违约并非故意且蓄意的原告，可以就其努力实际使未违约方获益的部分获得赔偿。”）。即使 Eastern 因未支付 February 16 到期的 \\$750,000 而违反《协议》，其仍有权就其给予 Strategic 的利益获得返还，该利益等于超过 Strategic 应得 \\$750,000 的金额，即 \\$250,000。然而，该数额已包含在 Eastern 基于 Virginia Private Security Services Statute 提出的请求中有权追回的 \\$1 million 之内。\n\n2. Eastern 的不当得利请求\n\nEastern 还提出不当得利请求。该请求并未为 Eastern 提供任何救济。\n\n不当得利的构成要件为：“(1) 原告向被告给予利益；(2) 被告知悉该利益的给予；以及 (3) 被告在使其不支付该利益价值而保留该利益显失公平的情形下，接受或保留该利益。”The Christian Broad. Network, Inc.（基督教广播网络公司）v. Busch, 2006 WL 2850624, at \\*7-8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2006)（汇集案例）；参见 Mandarin Trading Ltd.（Mandarin Trading有限公司）v. Wildenstein, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (N.Y. 2011)（同）。\n\n“当事人就特定事项订立有效且可执行的书面合同的，通常不得就源自该事项的事件依据不当得利理论获得追偿。”IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 907 N.E.2d 268, 274 (N.Y. 2009)（原告不得以不当得利请求追偿已支付的费用，因为该费用源自受委托函规管的服务）。当事人并不争议《协议》具有可执行性，也不争议《协议》要求支付$1 million保证金。无论其违约请求是否成功，Eastern（东部公司）均不得依据不当得利请求追偿该$1 million。见UETA Latinamerica, Inc. v. Zafir, 10 N.Y.S.3d 566, 568 (2d Dep't 2015)（不当得利请求“仅在不存在明示协议时适用，且其实际上根本不是合同，而是为防止一方不当得利而施加的衡平法义务”）；The Christian Broad. Network, 2006 WL 2850624, at *8（“不当得利请求产生于‘不存在合同关系’的情形。”）（引自Aerotek, Inc. v. Tyonek Native Corp., 2005 WL 3372872, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2005)）；另见Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)（“如果当事人之间存在有效、可执行的合同，则[原告]不得依据不当得利理论获得追偿。但是，如果不存在关于货物销售的有效合同，[原告]未能依据不当得利理论提出可获救济的请求，因为在不存在合同的情况下，[被告]通过销售商品所获得的利益并非以[原告]为代价。”）。\n\n3. Strategic（Strategic公司）的欺诈反诉\n\nStrategic主张，Eastern不得追偿$1 million保证金，因为该保证金由ACA（ACA）支付，且Strategic是Guo（郭）及Eastern欺诈行为的受害者。本院驳回这些主张。\n\n根据弗吉尼亚州法律，实际欺诈的构成要件为：“(1) 虚假陈述，(2) 关于重大事实，(3) 故意且明知作出，(4) 具有误导意图，(5) 被误导一方的信赖，以及(6) 被误导一方因此遭受的损害。”Winn v. Aleda Constr. Co., 315 S.E.2d 193, 195 (Va. 1984)。弗吉尼亚州法律下适用于欺诈的证明标准为“清楚且令人信服的证据”，该标准“高于单纯优势证据”。Sweely Holdings, LLC v. SunTrust Bank, 820 S.E.2d 596, 604 (Va. 2018); see Hitachi Credit Am. Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 1999).\n\n同样，根据纽约州法律，“欺诈诱导请求要求证明：(1) 被告作出陈述，(2) 该陈述涉及重大事实，(3) 该陈述为虚假，(4) 被告明知其虚假，(5) 该陈述旨在诱导另一方信赖该陈述，(6) 另一方有正当理由作出该信赖，(7) 在不知其虚假的情况下，(8) 因而受到损害。”Internet L. Libr., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 2005 WL 3370542, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2005), aff'd sub nom. ITIS Holdings Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt. LLC, 329 F. App'x 299 (2d Cir. 2009)。“[一项]欺诈请求的每一项要件均须以清楚且令人信服的证据证明，无论在简易判决阶段还是审判中均是如此。”Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 528 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 354 F. App'x 496 (2d Cir. 2009)\n\n要根据弗吉尼亚州和纽约州法律胜诉于欺诈请求，原告必须证明被告作出虚假陈述。Strategic在此未能做到。Strategic的请求基于如下主张：在Guo要求Strategic为Eastern提供调查服务时，Guo虚假陈述其反对中国共产党，并且他将把Strategic取得的研究成果用于在中国共产党内部制造不和并最终推翻该党的目的。因此，为证明其主张，Strategic本须证明Guo要么是中国共产党的支持者，要么至多对中国共产党漠不关心，或者Guo无意将该研究成果用于所述目的。\n\n证据未能证明Strategic的主张。尽管有证据表明Guo曾发表支持中国共产党的言论，并曾有某些行为表明其并不敌视中国政府（或者至少并不敌视其所有部分），Guo亦作证称其反对中国共产党，并有意以敌视中国政府的方式使用Strategic的研究成果。还有证据表明，Guo发表过与敌视中国共产党之人相一致的言论。审判中的证据不足以使本院决定Guo事实上是异见人士还是双重间谍。在对该问题没有确定答案、或者至少没有清楚答案的情况下，Strategic未能履行其就虚假陈述提供证明的举证责任。谁才是真正的Guo，将由他人确定。\n\n本院面前的证据亦未证明Strategic合理地或实际地信赖了Guo关于其政治立场以及其寻求该研究成果的目的的陈述。\n\n“在评估原告所称信赖是否合理时，[本院]考量交易的整体背景，包括其复杂程度和规模、当事人的成熟程度，以及双方之间任何协议的内容等因素。”Meisel v. Grunberg, 651 F. Supp. 2d 98, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)（引自Glidepath Holding B.V. v. Spherion Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 435, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)）。“在适用合理性检验时，法院必须确定原告是否鉴于其规模和成熟程度利用了其可获得的手段。”Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2016 WL 7374210, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016)（省略内部引号和引证）。“作出该判断时应考虑的因素可包括特定当事人此前的交易过程、交易中其他参与者的角色、调查所需的时间和费用、原告在订立交易前进行特定类型调查的可行性或实际可操作性、原告未进行调查所面临的可预见风险，以及负责任的行业惯例。”同上（省略内部引号和引证）。\n\n在合理信赖有关参与重大交易的重要信息的陈述之前，成熟的当事人“有义务对其所承担的风险进行独立评估，并有义务调查其商业交易的性质。”Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 228, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)；见同上（指出，当其未作勤勉询问时，“不得提出异议”）。“当参与重大交易的成熟商人能够获得关键信息却未利用该途径时，……法院尤其不愿受理关于正当信赖的请求。”Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., Inc., 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 2006)。“如果就事实事项作出虚假陈述，且双方均可同等获得获取知识的手段，而一方不利用这些手段，却认为适宜将自己托付给利益在于误导他的人，一般而言，法律将使其因自身不审慎的信任而留在其所处的位置。”Persaud Cos., Inc. v. IBCS Grp., Inc., 425 F. App'x 223, 226 (4th Cir. 2011)（引自Costello v. Larsen, 29 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1944)）。“简而言之，当事人不得主张其受到欺诈，而其困境是由其自身明显缺乏应有注意所致。”Rodas v. Manitaras, 552 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (1st Dep't 1990); accord Crigger, 443 F.3d at 235; see also Hitachi Credit, 166 F.3d at 629（“当原告仅作部分调查、完全有机会进行全面调查、并选择基于部分调查所获得的知识采取行动时，原告不得主张其信赖具有合理性和正当性。”）。\n\n同样，为在纽约州法律下的欺诈诉讼中证明实际信赖，“原告必须证明其相信该陈述为真，并基于该信念改变了其立场。”Hecht v. Components Int'l, Inc., 867 N.Y.S.2d 889, 895 (Sup. Ct. 2008)（引自CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. 1990)）。换言之，原告必须证明“被告的虚假陈述诱导原告参与所涉交易[。]”Laub v. Faessel, 745 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (1st Dep't 2002)。实际信赖要求证明“‘若非所称虚假陈述或遗漏，原告本不会参与该造成不利后果的证券交易。’”Basis PAC-Rim Opportunity Fund (Master) v. TCW Asset Mgmt. Co., 48 N.Y.S.3d 654, 656 (1st Dep't 2017)（引自Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005)）。\n\nStrategic是且自称为成熟实体。其业务包括调查个人，包括其背景及财务关系。其可获得的信息对Guo的政治立场和目标提出了疑问。在《协议》订立之前，Gertz（格茨）于May 23, 2017发表了一篇文章，描述Guo“与中国共产党高级领导人，包括政府部长和政治局成员，有密切联系”，指出Guo“可接触海外及美国境内的国家安全部行动”，并提到“Guo的妻子和女儿目前获中国当局准许前往纽约探望他，但须在20天后返回中国，在那里她们可被用作针对Guo的政治筹码。”Trial Tr. at 82; DX 43.\n\n尽管Strategic专注于“政治情报的研究和分析”、Wallop（沃洛普）与Gertz有30年交情，并且Gertz将她介绍给Guo，Wallop否认曾看过该文章。见，例如，Trial Tr. at 34; see also id. at 55-56。在另一篇日期为October 9, 2017的文章中，Gertz曾指出：“Guo称其与中国政府和安全系统内的支持者保持密切联系。”Trial Tr. at 84-85; DX32。因此，Guo曾向中国安全部队提供资金并与中国共产党高级成员保持关系，属于公众知悉的事项。如果Wallop和Waller（沃勒）担心该等关系与支持中国共产党、或者至少对其态度暧昧相一致，她们本可作进一步调查或询问。然而，她们没有这样做。见，例如，PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Dominion Energy Mgmt., Inc., 2018 WL 1768061, at *11 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2018)（“不合理信赖的例子包括：‘一方掌握足以引起合理谨慎之人怀疑的信息’的情形，或者‘一方信赖与其持有的书面陈述相矛盾的口头陈述’的情形。”）（省略引证）。\n\n如果 Guo（郭文贵）的效忠对象以及 Eastern（东方公司）委托该项研究的目的，如 Strategic（战略公司）所作证的那样，对其具有重要意义，则其本可以保护自身。例如，其本可以要求就 Guo 的忠诚对象作出陈述保证，或者至少在《协议》的鉴于条款中作出陈述。其未必需要担心，纳入此类陈述保证或陈述会损害《协议》的目的以及双方对保密性的共同愿望。陈述保证被纳入最具保密性的协议之中。此外，双方已经采取广泛措施维护保密性，包括在《协议》中设置保密条款、使用“全新笔记本电脑”传输研究数据，以及确保不存在任何未加密的《协议》电子版本。\n\n此外，尽管 Strategic 主张 Guo 不希望《协议》中出现对其本人的提及，Strategic 并非必须同意该请求。\n\n事实上，《协议》的结构以及 Strategic 负有义务向 Eastern 提供的交付成果本身，与合理信赖这一概念不一致。《协议》赋予 Eastern（及 Guo）单独决定 Strategic 研究议程的权力。Strategic 对调查对象没有发言权，也无权否决。《协议》规定，Eastern“将向[Strategic]提供进行研究所需的基础信息和希望重点关注的领域。”PX1。协议还规定，Eastern 可以“指示[Strategic]就本协议未具体规定的其他研究开展工作，并支付费用。”同上。Eastern 有权选择鱼。如果 Eastern 要求 Strategic 研究中国共产党的反对者，《协议》将要求 Strategic 这样做。Strategic 唯一可以不调查某一对象的情形是“情况不允许投入足够工作来研究某一条鱼。”同上。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，法院认定，Eastern 就其请求作出《协议》不可执行且无效的确认判决之诉获得胜诉，并且 Eastern 有权获得返还，即 Strategic 从未有权向 Eastern 收取的 \\$1 million。法院已审查其余论点和抗辩，均不能成立。\n\n各方被指示就拟议判决书的格式进行会商，并于 June 29, 2021 前向法院提交联合约定或判决书。\n\n特此裁定。\n\nNew York, New York　LEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J·利曼）\n\n日期：June 22, 2021　________________________________________\n\nUnited States District Judge（美国联邦地区法院法官）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 148 of 159\n证据附件 23\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 149 of 159\n\nMILES KWOK（郭文贵）　October 3, 2018\n\n原始文件 247294.TXT　Min-U-Script®，附词语索引\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 150 of 159\n\n1　纽约州最高法院（SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK）\n\n2　纽约县（COUNTY OF NEW YORK）\n3　------------------------------------------------x\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业），\n4　原告，\n5　-诉-\n6　KWOK HO WAN（郭文贵），又名 KWOK HO，又名 GWO WEN\n7　GUI，又名 GUO WENGUI，又名 GUO WEN-GUI，\n又名 WAN GUE HAOYUN，又名 MILES KWOK，\n8　又名 HAOYUN GUY，\n9　被告。\n10　Index No.: 652077/2017\n\n12　7 Times Square\n13　New York, New York\n14　October 3, 2018\n9:39 a.m.\n\n16　对 MILES KWOK 进行的庭前录像询问，\n17　于 Kristi Cruz（克里斯蒂·克鲁兹）——纽约州公证人——面前进行。\n18　Public of the State of New York.\n\n23　ELLEN GRAUER COURT REPORTING CO. LLC（艾伦·格劳尔法庭记录有限责任公司）\n24　126 East 56th Street, Fifth Floor\nNew York, New York 10022\n25　212-750-6434\n参考：\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 151 of 159\n\n1　出庭人员：\n\n3　O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（奥美律师事务所）\n4　原告代理律师\n5　Times Square Tower\n6　7 Times Square\n7　New York, New York 10036\n8　签字人：EDWARD MOSS, ESQ.（爱德华·莫斯，律师）\n9　STUART SARNOFF, ESQ.（斯图尔特·萨诺夫，律师）\n10　SARA N. PAHLAVAN, ESQ.（萨拉·N·帕拉万，律师）\n11　212.326.2000\n12　emoss@omm.com\n13　ssarnoff@omm.com\n14　spahlavan@omm.com\n\n17　HODGSON RUSS LLP（霍奇森·拉斯律师事务所）\n18　被告代理律师\n19　605 Third Avenue, Suite 2300\n20　New York, New York 10158\n21　签字人：MARK A. HARMON, ESQ.（马克·A·哈蒙，律师）\n22　JILLIAN MARIE SEARLES, ESQ.（吉莲·玛丽·瑟尔斯，律师）\n23　212.751.4300\n24　mharmon@hodgsonruss.com\n25　jsearles@hodgsonruss.com\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 152 of\n\n1　出庭人员：\n（续）\n\n3　另有在场者：\n4　ELIZABETH YAOYING JIANG（江瑶英），普通话口译员\n5　DAN MACOM（丹·马科姆），录像师\n6　KARIN MAISTRELLO（卡琳·迈斯特雷洛），Golden Spring（黄金泉）\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 153 of 159\n\n1　------------------- 索引 -------------------\n\n2　证人　询问人\n页码\n3　MILES KWOK　MOSS 律师\n\n6　指示：　页码\n17, 18, 19, 58, 59, 61,\n7　62, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73,\n8　78, 101, 102, 117, 118,\n9　126, 128, 129\n\n12　--------------- 文件请求 ---------------\n13　页码：\n129　证明与 Zhang Wei（张伟）就\n14　该酒店所达成协议的文件\n15　\n\n18　---------------- 证据附件 ----------------\n19　KWOK　说明\n供识别用\n20　证据附件 1　Genever Holdings LLC（Genever 控股有限责任公司）\n\n21　公司文件\n22　证据附件 2　来自 YouTube 的打印件\n\n23　证据附件 3　联邦起诉状\n\n24　证据附件 4　附有\n\n25　财务信息的信函\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 154 of 159\n\n1　KWOK\n\n2　针对其扣押动议的反对意见。Kwok 提交了一份日期为 May 16, 2018 的书面意见，其中第 15 页涉及该问题，内容如下：\n3　\n4　\n5　\n6　“然而，Frances，”即 PAX 的\n7　调查人员，“除其本人断言外，并未提供任何证据证明该等声音属于 Kwok\n8　及其关联人士，或证明 Kwok 或与其有关联的任何人上传了该录音，\n9　\n10　\n11　\n12　\n13　\n14　\n15　\n16　并将其表述为事实上由 Kwok 作出涉案陈述；且有充分理由质疑该音频的真实性，以及上传该音频并声称确系 Kwok 作出涉案陈述的个人或实体的动机。”\n17　现在我要播放该音频。\n18　（此时，播放一段音频/视频。）\n19　\n20　证人：\n我拒绝收听。\n21　我不会收听。\n22　问：\n抱歉，Kwok 先生，您是在捂住耳朵吗？\n23　\n24　答：\n这全都是共产党。这\n25　里的一切都是共产党。除非你证明这\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 155 of 159\n\n1　KWOK\n\n2　不是共产党，否则我就会收听。他们\n3　录制了超过一百万条虚假的税务音频、视频。除非你能证明\n4　这是真的，否则我不会听\n5　它。这与我有什么关系？除非\n6　你能证明这是我说的，\n7　这是我的话、我的音频、我的视频，否则我\n8　就会收听。\n9　问：\n您拒绝观看该视频吗？\n10　DI\nHARMON 律师：\n我基于相同理由提出异议，并指示证人不要回答\n11　\n12　\n13　该问题。\n14　答：\n如果你要播放那个，我会有自杀的感觉。这是\n15　共产党。非常简单。有若干\n16　地方的共产党内容已被联邦调查局证明为虚假。所以\n17　\n18　\n19　\n20　\n21　\n22　\n23　\n24　\n25　你想让我自杀吗？你到这里来是要杀我吗？我在此郑重声明，对于你将播放的所有超出范围、造成我精神痛苦的视频，我保留起诉的权利。我希望我的律师记载，我保留就对方针对我的人身攻击所享有的权利。\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 156 of 159\n\n1　KWOK\n\n2　我还希望要求以某人的真实性来证明这些文件的真实性。\n3　我希望请求对此进行调查。我\n4　\n5　说完了。\n6　问：\n那么，Kwok 先生，您不会回答\n7　任何关于该视频的问题吗？\n8　DI\nHARMON 律师：\n同样的异议。同样的\n9　指示。超出了我认为在证据开示中适宜询问的范围。\n10　\n11　答：\n我认为这是羞辱，这些是威胁，并将需要为这些行为承担责任。\n12　\n13　\n14　MOSS 律师：\n请记录在案，\n15　当 Kwok 先生要求我停止播放该视频时，\n16　我停止了播放\n17　该视频。我不会再播放它。\n18　我注意到 Harmon 律师已对该询问路线提出异议，并指示\n19　\n20　Kwok 先生不要回答任何关于\n21　该视频的问题。\n22　我有此项权利，对吗，\n23　Harmon 律师？\n24　HARMON 律师：\n抱歉？\n25　MOSS 律师：\n我说得对吗？您是\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 157 of 159\n\n1　KWOK\n\n2　指示——\n3　HARMON 律师：\n我以为您说的是“我有此项权利”，而不是“这是我的\n4　权利”之类的话。\n5　\n6　MOSS 律师：\n可以。我说得\n7　对，您正在指示证人——\n8　HARMON 律师：\n我正在指示\n9　证人不要回答问题，理由是我已在记录中说明的理由。\n10　\n11　\n12　问：\nGolden Spring New York Ltd.（纽约黄金泉有限公司）是什么？\n13　答：\n它是 Hong Kong Golden Spring（香港黄金泉），该公司已将业务扩展至纽约。\n14　\n15　问：\n“他们”是谁？\n16　答：\n香港黄金泉。\n17　问：\n谁拥有 Golden Spring New York？\n18　答：\n香港黄金泉拥有它。\n19　问：\n谁拥有香港黄金泉？\n20　答：\nGuo Qiang（郭强）。\n21　口译员：\nG-U-O，Q-I-A-N-G，\n22　按语音拼写。\n23　问：\nGuo Qiang 是您的家庭成员吗？\n24　\n25　答：\n是。\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 158 of 159\n\n1　KWOK\n\n2　问：　是什么关系？\n3　答：　我的儿子。\n4　问：　您在 Golden Spring Hong Kong（香港黄金泉）中是否拥有任何所有权权益？\n5　\n6　答：　没有。\n7　问：　Guo Qiang 是 Mileson 的同一个儿子，\n8　还是另一个儿子？\n9　答：　是同一个人。\n10　问：　您在 Golden Spring New York 中是否拥有任何所有权权益？\n11　\n12　答：　没有。\n13　问：　所以 Golden Spring 是由您儿子所有？\n14　\n15　答：　我儿子也代表家族拥有它。\n16　\n17　问：　您儿子是否代表您拥有它？\n18　\n19　答：　没有。\n20　问：　您儿子代表其他家庭成员拥有它？\n21　\n22　答：　是。\n23　问：　您儿子是否代表 Zhang Wei 拥有 Golden Spring？\n24　\n25　答：　是。\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 05/07/2021 07:59 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 785 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/07/2021 Case 22-50073 Doc 50-4 Filed 02/28/22 Entered 02/28/22 21:19:53 Page 159 of 159\n\n1　KWOK\n\n2　问：\n您的儿子是否为 Golden Spring 的唯一股东？\n3　\n4　HARMON 律师：\n对该问题的形式提出异议。\n5　\n6　答：\n我并不十分清楚。\n7　问：\n您知道 Golden Spring 的任何其他\n8　股东吗？\n9　HARMON 律师：\n对该问题的形式提出异议。\n10　\n11　答：\n我不清楚。我不知道。\n12　问：\nGolden Spring 是否有任何\n13　董事？\n14　HARMON 律师：\n对该问题的形式提出异议。\n15　\n16　答：\n我不清楚。\n17　MOSS 律师：\nMark，怎么了，您不喜欢我没有使用其中一个实体名称吗？\n18　\n19　\n20　HARMON 律师：\n我不知道是哪个\n21　实体——\n22　MOSS 律师：\n香港还是纽约？\n23　HARMON 律师：\n我不知道您指的是哪一个，\n24　还是两个都指。\n25　问：\nGolden Spring 的任何实体是否","key_entities":["Guo","Je","CCP","Kwok","CIPA","MSS","Chinese Communist Party","Horton","William Je"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":22,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":47,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":93,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":127,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":299,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":360,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":372,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":51399,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-02-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-02-28","updated_at":"2026-08-23 23:19:19"}