{"id":"court_ctb_579_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":579,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2022-07-20","title":"| | Case 22-50073
Case 2:21-cv-01079-SMB
Doc 579-2
Filed 07/20/22
Document 52","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | | |\n| 1 | | |\n| 2 | | |\n| 3 | | |\n| 4 | | |\n| 5 | | |\n| 6 | IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | |\n| 7 | FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA | |\n| 8 | | |\n| 9 | Rong Zhang, et al., | No. CV-21-01079-PHX-SMB |\n| 10 | Plaintiffs, | ORDER |\n| 11 | v. | |\n| 12 | Voice of Guo Media Incorporated, et al., | |\n| 13 | Defendants. | |\n| 14 | | |\n| 15 | Pending before the Court are ROL Entities'1 Motion to Dismiss
(\"MTD\"), (Doc. | |\n| 16 | 36), and Media Entities'2 Partial Motion to Dismiss
(\"PMTD\"), (Doc. 38), which the Court | |\n| 17 | will consider simultaneously. The motions are fully briefed. (See Docs. 39; 40; 42; 43.) | |\n| 18 | After considering the briefing
and relevant caselaw, the Court will grant ROL Entities' | |\n| 19 | MTD, (Doc. 36), and grant in part and
deny
in part
Media Entities' PMDT, (Doc. 38.), for | |\n| 20 | reasons explained below. | |\n| 21 | I.
BACKGROUND | |\n| 22 | on whether the Defendants3
This case turns | perpetrated a fraudulent sale of |\n| 23 | 1 ROL Entities means Defendants Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. and Rule of Law
Society IV, Inc.
2 Media Entities means Defendants Wengui Guo and GTV Media Group, Inc. (\"GTV\"), as | |\n| 24 | | |\n| 25 | well as Defendant Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\"). | |\n| 26 | 3 Defendants include ROL Entities and Media Entities, as well as Defendants Voice of Guo
Media, Inc. (\"VOG\") and Sara Wei. Although the latter two have been served, (Doc. 33;
Doc. 31), they did not join in the instant motions to dismiss, (see
Docs. 36,
38), and the
Court has filed an entry of default against them, (Doc. 50), for their failure to respond to | |\n| 27 | | |\n| 28 | Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (\"FAC\"), (Doc. 30). | |\n| | | |\n\nsecurities against the Plaintiffs Rong Zhang, Xiaodan Wang, and Chong Shen Raphanella (collectively, \"Plaintiffs\"), who are allegedly investors in a new media platform proffered by the Defendants. (Doc. 30 ¶ 2.)\n\n3\n\n1\n\n2\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Defendant Wengui Guo is a Chinese billionaire with a multi-media empire; he currently resides in New York. (*Id.* ¶¶ 35–36.) Plaintiffs believe \"Guo owns, directs, and/or otherwise controls Saraca, GTV, VOG, and the ROL Entities.\" (*Id.* ¶ 30.)4 Defendants Saraca and GTV are Delaware corporations—allegedly founded by Guo located at the same New York address. (*Id.* ¶ 19.) GTV is a media company established as \"the only uncensored and independent bridge between China and the Western world.\" (*Id.* ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs believe Saraca, at Guo's direction, incorporated GTV as a \"whollyowned subsidiary.\" (*Id.* ¶ 38.) According to Plaintiffs, \"Saraca owns at least 90% of the equity of GTV.\" (*Id.* ¶ 20.) The ROL Entities are Delaware not-for-profit corporations founded and wholly owned and controlled by Guo. (*Id.* ¶¶ 26–27.) The ROL Entities together share the same New York mailing address and physical office. (Doc. 36 at 3.) Guo used his prominence and multi-media platforms to allegedly solicit investment in GTV. (Doc. 30 ¶ 40.)\n\n17 18 19 20 21 Plaintiffs allege that \"[a]t all relevant times, each of the Defendants was the agent, servant, employee, partner, or alter ego of the other Defendants, and the acts of each Defendant were in the scope of such relationship.\" (*Id.* ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs further allege that Guo \"exercised control and dominion over the other Defendants\" such that each Defendants' conduct was at Guo's behest. (*Id.* ¶ 34.)\n\n- 22 23 24 25 Plaintiffs allege that an individual could invest in GTV in one of two ways: (1) directly with a minimum investment of \\$100,000; or (2) indirectly through VOG. (*Id.* ¶ 47.) Both modes of investment necessitated a prior donation either directly to Guo or to the ancillary ROL Entities. (*Id*. ¶ 48.) After fulfilling the prior donation requirement,\n- 26\n\n27 28 4 Sara Wei is the President, Director, and Manager of VOG. (Doc. ¶ 20.) VOG is an Arizona corporation located in Scottsdale, Arizona. (*Id.* ¶ 15.) \"VOG was a vehicle through which smaller investors could purportedly partake in the GTV investment.\" (*Id.* ¶ 32.)\n\npotential investors completed a \"Limited Purpose Agency Agreement\" required by VOG. (*Id.* ¶ 57.) This agreement designated Wei as the investors' agent to purchase GTV securities. (*Id.* ¶ 58.) Following completion, \"Wei directed investors to wire the purchase amount to bank accounts controlled by Wei and/or VOG.\" (*Id.* ¶ 59.) However, according to the Plaintiffs, \"[n]o investor who purchased GTV common stock through VOG ever received GTV shares.\" (*Id.* ¶ 61.)\n\nPlaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, filed their Class Action FAC against the Defendants. (*Id.* at 2.) Plaintiffs' action seeks recovery of damages caused by Defendants' alleged violation of A.R.S. § 44-1991 and A.R.S. § 44-1998, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. (*Id.* at 30–42.)\n\n12\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n#### **II. DEFENDANT GUO'S BANKRUPTCY**\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 While the instant motions were pending, a Notice of Bankruptcy was filed alerting the Court that Defendant Guo submitted a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Doc. 45.) That filing operates as a stay of the continuation of any judicial action against Defendant Guo. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Therefore, the ruling on Media Entities' PMTD will be directed to, and considered only as it applies to, Defendants GTV and Saraca.\n\n19\n\n# **III. LEGAL STANDARDS**\n\n20\n\n# **A. Rule 12(b)(2)**\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. *Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc.*, 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiffs bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, *Ziegler v. Indian River Cty.*, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995), and \"need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts\" \"in the absence of an evidentiary hearing,\" *Sher v. Johnson*, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the complaint's uncontroverted allegations are accepted as true and\n\n- 3 -\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n\"conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff's] favor.\" *Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert*, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, \"the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits and other materials submitted on the motion.\" *SKAPA Holdings LLC v. Seitz*, No. CV-20-00611-PHX-DJH, 2021 WL 672091, at \\*2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2021), *aff'd*, No. 21-15298, 2022 WL 94716 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022) (quoting *Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix Int'l, LLC*, 198 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2016)).\n\n\"When no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the forum state.\" *Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp.*, 905 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018). Arizona exerts personal jurisdiction to the \"maximum extent permitted by the Arizona Constitution and the United States Constitution.\" Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); *see*, *e.g.*, *A. Uberti and C. v. Leonardo*, 892 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Ariz. 1995). Thus, analyzing personal jurisdiction under Arizona law and federal due process are identical. *Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.*, 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004).\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 To comport with due process, \"[a]lthough a nonresident's physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally must have certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\" *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This requirement ensures \"that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated' contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.\" *Id.* at 286 (quoting *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). \"Depending on the strength of those contacts, there are two forms that personal jurisdiction may take: general and specific.\" *Picot v. Weston*, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); *Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.*, 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997).\n\n27 28 \"When a plaintiff relies on specific jurisdiction, he must establish that jurisdiction is proper for 'each claim asserted against a defendant.'\" *Picot*, 780 F.3d at 1211 (quoting\n\n- 4 -\n\n| 1 | Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. | |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 2 | 2004)). \"In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be | |\n| 3 | an 'affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity | |\n| 4 | or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state.'\" Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior | |\n| 5 | Court of Cal., 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, | |\n| 6 | S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Without such a connection, \"specific jurisdiction | |\n| 7 | is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant's unconnected activities in the State.\" | |\n| 8 | Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1781.
\"Only contacts occurring prior to the event | |\n| 9 | causing the litigation may be considered by the Court.\" Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Trust, | |\n| 10 | Inc. v. NMTC, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 3d 931, 935 (D. Ariz. 2016) (citing Farmers Ins. Exchange | |\n| 11 | v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990)). | |\n| 12 | In analyzing specific jurisdiction, courts use the three-prong minimum contacts test | |\n| 13 | as a guide \"to determine whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the
forum to | |\n| 14 | warrant the court's exercise of jurisdiction[.]\" Freestream, 905 F.3d at 603.
The test | |\n| | | |\n| 15 | requires that: | |\n| 16 | (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or | |\n| 17 | consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of | |\n| 18 | conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and | |\n| 19 | protections of its laws; | |\n| 20 | (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's | |\n| 21 | forum-related activities; and | |\n| 22 | (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial | |\n| 23 | justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. | |\n| 24 | Id.
(citation omitted); see also Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. \"The plaintiff has the burden of | |\n| 25 | proving the first two prongs.\" Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211
(citation omitted). \"If the plaintiff | |\n| 26 | succeeds in satisfying [them], the burden then shifts to the defendant to 'present a | |\n| 27 | compelling
case'
that
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction
would
not
be
reasonable.\" | |\n\n\"compelling case\" that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable, it is presumed reasonable. *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 477. If a plaintiff fails to meet the first prong, the Court need not address the others. *Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Trust*, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 936.\n\n4\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n# **B. Rule 12(b)(6)**\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a \"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,\" so that the defendant has \"fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.\" *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) \"can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.\" *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is \"plausible on its face.\" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists if the pleader sets forth \"factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\" *Id.*\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Cousins v. Lockyer*, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and \"conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.\" *Pareto v. FDIC*, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence outside the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. *See United States v. Ritchie*, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). \"A court may, however, consider materials documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.\" *Id.* at 908.\n\n- 6 -\n\n# 2\n\n1\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n# **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\nIn its MTD, the ROL Entities move to dismiss the FAC on two grounds: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction because it has insufficient minimum contacts with the State of Arizona; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 36 at 4–15). The Media Entities PMTD contends that Plaintiffs' have failed to state a claim on both their breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation claims. (Doc. 38 at 1–2.) The Court will begin with the jurisdictional issues before addressing the alleged failure to state a claim.\n\n9 10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n# **A. Personal Jurisdiction**\n\nNeither side in this case alleges or argues that the Court has general jurisdiction over ROL Entities, nor could they. The ROL Entities have no ties to Arizona and are organized under the laws of Delaware, with their home office in New York. Therefore, the analysis will be confined to the issue of specific jurisdiction.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Under the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants \"either (1) 'purposefully availed' [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, or (2) 'purposefully directed' [its] activities toward the forum.\" *Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy*, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing *Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 802). This prong presents two distinct standards, with each to be applied under different circumstances. *Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 802; *see Ziegler*, 64 F.3d at 473 (explaining that courts apply the first prong differently to contract cases versus tort cases). In this Circuit, \"[a] purposeful direction analysis . . . is most often used in suits sounding in tort,\" *Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 802, as is the case here.\n\n- 24\n- 25 26\n\n27\n\n28\n\nPurposeful direction is evaluated under the three-part \"effects\" test outlined in *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U. S. 783 (1984). *See id.* at 803. That test requires that \"the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered at the forum state.\" *Id.* (quoting *Dole Food Co. v. Watts*, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002).\n\n- 7 -\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\nUnder the purposeful direction framework, Plaintiffs have not pled facts to support the Court's personal jurisdiction over the ROL Entities. There are no factual allegations that the ROL Entities took any action in or directed at Arizona. All that is alleged is that they accepted donations from Arizona. ROL Entities did not solicit the donations; Defendant Guo did.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 To overcome this deficiency, Plaintiffs argue that this Court should apply the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, which \"is based on the premise that a conspirator's acts in furtherance of a conspiracy are attributable to the other members of the conspiracy.\" *In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Litig.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1138 (D. Nev. 2009). \"Consequently, some courts attribute a conspirator's in-forum acts to his co-conspirators for personal jurisdiction purposes.\" *Id.* Although the Ninth Circuit has not expressly accepted or rejected the theory, it \"has noted that 'a great deal of doubt' surrounds the conspiracy theory's legitimacy.\" *Id.* (quoting *Chirila v. Conforte*, 47 F. App'x 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2002)). Indeed, many courts have concluded that this theory does not comport with the requirements of due process. *See id.* at 1138–89 n. 8 (collecting cases). This Court agrees and, therefore, declines to apply the theory here.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiffs also argue that this Court should exercise personal jurisdiction over ROL Entities because of the agency relationship between them and Defendant Guo. Under that theory, personal jurisdiction may be found over the principal based on the actions of the agent. *See Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co.*, 851 F.3d 1015, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2017). However, the Ninth Circuit has expressed doubt on whether an agency relationship theory of specific personal jurisdiction survives after the Supreme Court's ruling in *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). *See id.* at 1023–25 (\"[T]he *Daimler* Court's criticism of the [agency-personal-jurisdiction] standard found fault with the standard's own internal logic, and therefore applies with equal force regardless of whether the standard is used to establish general or specific jurisdiction.\"). Moreover, \"a fundamental tenet of an agency relationship is that the principal had the right to substantially control its agent's activities.\" *Winters v. Grand Caribbean Cruises Inc.*, No. CV-20-00168-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL\n\n- 8 -\n\n3709854, at \\*5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2021) (quoting *Williams*, 851 F.3d at 1025) (cleaned up).\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Here, Plaintiffs attempt to apply this theory in reverse by asking this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the *agent* based on the actions of the *principal*—over which the agent has no control. While the FAC may allege facts to support Guo's control over the ROL Entities, the reverse is not true. Because agents do not exercise control over principals, Plaintiffs' agency theory of specific personal jurisdiction fails. *See Williams*, 851 F.3d at 1025 (holding that there was no specific personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation for actions taken by a subsidiary because there was no allegation that the parent corporation \"had the right to control [the subsidiary's] activities in any manner at all.\")\n\n10 11 All of Plaintiffs' proffered theories on personal jurisdiction fail. Therefore, ROL Entities will be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.\n\n12\n\n1\n\n#### **B. Failure to State a Claim**\n\n13 14 15 The Court will not analyze ROL Entities' arguments under Rule 12(b)(6) because this Court lacks jurisdiction over them. Therefore, this analysis will be focused on the claims against Media Entities'.\n\n16\n\n#### i. Pleading Standard\n\n17 18 19 20 Media Entities have argued that in addition to Rule 8 pleading standards, Counts IV and VII must satisfy the higher pleading standard of Rule 9 because both claims sound in fraud. (Doc. 38 at 4–5.) Plaintiffs made no argument to the contrary, so the Court will apply the Rule 9 pleading standard.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rule 9(b) provides that \"[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.\" Furthermore, intent, knowledge, or other *mens rea* elements may be alleged generally. *Id.* Thus, \"[w]hile the elements of knowledge and intent may be averred generally; the factual circumstances of the fraud itself require particularized allegations.\" *Queen's Med. Ctr. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.*, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1158 (D. Haw. 2013) (citing *Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc.*, 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010)). \"To satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify 'the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged,' as well\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 as 'what is false or misleading about [the purported fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.'\" *Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.*, 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \"Rule 9(b) serves not only to give notice to defendants of the specific fraudulent conduct against which they must defend,\" *Bly-Magee v. California*, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001), but it also \"deter[s] the filing of complaints as a pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs,\" *In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig.*, 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting *Semegen v. Weidner*, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, to satisfy Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs must allege the time, place, and manner of each act of fraud and also specify each defendant's role in the fraud. *Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist.*, 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1991).\n\n11\n\n# ii. Controlling Law\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Media Entities assert that—although this suit is filed in the District of Arizona— New York also has a \"significant relationship to this dispute.\" (Doc. 38. at 5 n.1.) They point specifically to the fact that Sarca, GTV, and the ROL Entities are headquartered in New York.5 (*Id.*) As a result, Defendants advance arguments under both Arizona and New York law, without arguing which law controls Plaintiff's tort claims. (*See generally* Doc. 38.) Plaintiff responds with arguments under both Arizona and New York law, again failing to argue which is appropriate here. (*See generally* Doc. 40.)\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 \"Arizona courts apply the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts when determining the controlling law of multistate torts.\" *Labertew v. Chartis Prop. Cas. Co.*, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1039 (D. Ariz. 2019). That Restatement provides that \"[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.\" Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145(1). The Restatement explains that the \"[c]ontacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6\" include the following: \"(a) the place where the injury\n\n27\n\n28\n\n5 The also point to Guo's residence in New York, but the Court will not consider that fact in light of the stay on proceedings against Guo as a result of his bankruptcy filing.\n\noccurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.\" *Id.* at § 145(2). Importantly, \"[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.\" *Id.* at § 145(3); *see also Magellan Real Est. Inv. Tr. v. Losch*, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1156 (D. Ariz. 2000).\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Although the relationship between the parties was primarily online, the Court finds that it was centered in Arizona—which the Court finds to be highly important to the tort issues in this case. Plaintiffs are residents of California, Maryland, and Canada. (Doc. 30 ¶¶ 16–18.) Defendants are headquartered in New York and Arizona and are incorporated in Delaware, New York, and Arizona. (*Id.* at 8–9.) The relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants arose through online interactions, and Plaintiffs' payments were also made via digital means—PayPal, Livestream, or though wire transfer. (*Id.* at 25–29.) But the most significant portions of those payments were made, via wire transfer, to VOG—which is an Arizona Corporation. (*Id.* at 7, 25–29.) Furthermore, confirmations of those transfers were emailed to Defendant Wei, who was domiciled in Arizona and was the director, manager, and president of VOG. (*Id.* at 20, 25–29.) Thus, while the location of the injury is not clear, it is clear that an Arizona corporation and one of its agents were a significant cause of the alleged injury. Moreover, to the extent the relationship involving this many parties in this many locations can be said to be \"centered\" anywhere, the Court finds that it was centered in Arizona. Therefore, the Court finds that Arizona has the most significant relationship to this suit and will apply Arizona law.\n\n23\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n# iii. Breach of Fiduciary Duty\n\n24 25 26 Media Entities argue that the claim for breach of fiduciary duty should be dismissed because they owe no fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 38 at 5.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants owe a fiduciary duty as promoters of the corporation. (Doc. 40 at 3.)\n\n27 28 \"[I]n an action asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, 'like all tort actions, a plaintiff must allege and prove the existence of a duty owed, a breach of that duty, and\n\ndamages causally related to such breach.'\" *Surowiec v. Cap. Title Agency, Inc.*, 790 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (D. Ariz. 2011) (quoting *Smethers v. Campion*, 210 Ariz. 167, 108 P.3d 946, 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)). \"In Arizona the promoters of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to the stockholder investors.\" *Johnson v. Nychyk*, 517 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); *see also Facciola v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP*, 781 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924 (D. Ariz. 2011), *aff'd*, 593 F. App'x 723 (9th Cir. 2015).\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Here, Plaintiffs allege (1) that Saraca and GTV marketed the stock offerings to investors through videos on social media websites; 6 (2) that Saraca, along with Guo, created GTV and exercised control over VOG—the Arizona corporation through which plaintiffs paid money to buy GTV stock; and (3) that Saraca and GTV also solicited investors through many media platforms. (Doc. 40 at 4.) The Court finds Plaintiffs have alleged enough specific facts showing that a fiduciary duty existed to satisfy Rule 9's requirements. Moreover, whether Saraca and GTV were actually agents or promotors—or both—is generally a question of fact to be decided later. *See Facciola*, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (\"Whether and to what extent [the defendants] actually were agents [or] promoters and to what extent an imbalance of knowledge existed such that investors relied heavily on [the defendants] for advice are questions of fact.\").\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\nMedia Entities also argue that the claim must be dismissed based on Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead causation. (Doc. 38 at 9.) This argument holds no weight. It is clear from the FAC that Plaintiffs claim they were misinformed and enticed into investing in a non-existent stock offering, and—as a result—they lost their investment money. (Doc. 30 at 37–38.) Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded causation.\n\n- 23\n- 24\n- 25\n\n26\n\nTherefore, the Court will not dismiss this claim. iv. Negligent Misrepresentation\n\nMedia Entities argue that the FAC fails to set forth any duty owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 38 at 10.) In Arizona, the elements of negligent misrepresentation are as follows:\n\n27 28\n\n6 The Court is ignoring the allegations referencing Guo because of the bankruptcy.\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n(1) the defendant provided false information in a business transaction; (2) the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely on the incorrect information or knew that it reasonably would rely; (3) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the incorrect information; and (5) resulting damage.\n\n*KB Home Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co.*, 340 P.3d 405, 412 n.7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). In commercial transactions, there is a duty of care owed by the information supplier to the foreseeable user. *St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.*, 742 P.2d 808, 813–14 (Ariz. 1987). To establish that one is a foreseeable user, a plaintiff must show \"that the defendant provided the information for her benefit or knew that the information would be supplied to her.\" *Leist v. Acad. Mortg. Corp.*, No. CV-16-00314-PHX-DGC, 2016 WL 1593815, at \\*3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing *St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr.*, 742 P.2d at 813).\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 Here, it is undisputed that this was a commercial transaction, plaintiffs are foreseeable users, and Media Entities provided the information. (*See generally* Doc. 38.) Additionally, there is sufficient detail in the FAC to satisfy the Rule 9's pleading standards. The FAC outlines the many different locations through which each Defendant provided the information and during what time period. (Doc. 30 at 11–28.) Thus, this argument cannot serve as grounds for dismissal.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Media Entities also argue that \"portions\" of this claim should be dismissed because a promise of future conduct cannot support a claim of negligent misrepresentation. (Doc. 38 at 12–13 (citing *McAlister v. Citibank (Arizona), a Subsidiary of Citicorp*, 829 P.2d 1253, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)). Specifically, they argue that their statements about how the securities would be obtained through VOG and how investor funds would be used cannot support a claim for negligent misrepresentation. (*Id.*) Surprisingly, Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument. (*See generally* Doc. 40.)\n\n27 28 \"Failure to respond to an argument set forth in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver of the issue by the party opposing the motion and is an adequate basis for granting the\n\nmotion to dismiss.\" *Green v. Arizona Bd. of Regents*, No. CV-18-04665-PHX-SPL, 2020 WL 2512759, at \\*4 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2020) (collecting cases). The Court finds that Plaintiffs' failure to respond to Defendants' arguments—about promises of future conduct being inadequate to establish a negligent misrepresentation claim—to be a concession of the argument and, thereby, a ground to dismiss the claim. *See id.* However, the Court will only dismiss the \"portions\" of the claim that relate to this argument. (*See* Doc. 38 at 12– 13.)\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Therefore, the Court will dismiss the portions of Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim that rely on assertions about \"how the securities would be obtained through VOG\" and \"how investor funds would be used.\" (*See* Doc. 30 at ¶ 190(d) & (e).) But the Court will deny Media Entities' PMTD in all other respects. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants misrepresented \"(a) the true value of GTV; (b) the true nature of the GTV investment; (c) the relative risk of the GTV securities,\" (id.), will survive this order.\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n# **V. CONCLUSION**\n\nDated this 6th day of July, 2022.\n\n**IT IS ORDERED** granting ROL Entities' Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 36), and denying in part and granting in part Media Entities' Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 38), in accordance with this order.\n\n19\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n- 14 -","body_zh":"美国亚利桑那地区联邦地区法院\n\nRong Zhang（张荣）等人， 案号：CV-21-01079-PHX-SMB\n原告， 命令\n诉\nVoice of Guo Media Incorporated（郭媒体之声公司）等人，\n被告。\n\n目前待本院裁决的是 ROL Entities 1 的驳回动议（“MTD”）（Doc. 36）以及 Media Entities 2 的部分驳回动议（“PMTD”）（Doc. 38），本院将同时审理该等动议。该等动议的书面陈述已全部完成。（见 Docs. 39；40；42；43。）在审议书面陈述及相关判例法后，本院将准许 ROL Entities 的驳回动议（Doc. 36），并部分准许、部分驳回 Media Entities 的部分驳回动议（Doc. 38），理由如下所述。\n\n一、背景\n\n本案的关键在于，被告 3 是否对原告 Rong Zhang（张荣）、Xiaodan Wang（王晓丹）及 Chong Shen Raphanella（沈冲·拉法内拉）实施了欺诈性证券销售；该等原告合称“原告”，据称为被告所推介的新媒体平台的投资者。（Doc. 30 ¶ 2。）\n\n1 ROL Entities 指被告 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金会 III 公司）和 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（法治协会 IV 公司）。\n\n2 Media Entities 指被告 Wengui Guo（郭文贵）和 GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV 媒体集团公司，简称“GTV”），以及被告 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（Saraca 媒体集团公司，简称“Saraca”）。\n\n3 被告包括 ROL Entities 和 Media Entities，以及被告 Voice of Guo Media, Inc.（郭媒体之声公司，简称“VOG”）和 Sara Wei（魏莎）。尽管后二者已被送达（Doc. 33；Doc. 31），但其未加入本次驳回动议（见 Docs. 36、38），且因其未对原告的第一次修订起诉书（“FAC”）（Doc. 30）作出回应，本院已对其作出缺席登记（Doc. 50）。\n\n被告 Wengui Guo（郭文贵）是一名拥有多媒体帝国的中国亿万富翁；其目前居住在纽约。（同上 ¶¶ 35–36。）原告相信，“Guo 拥有、指挥及／或以其他方式控制 Saraca、GTV、VOG 及 ROL Entities。”（同上 ¶ 30。）4 被告 Saraca 和 GTV 是特拉华州公司——据称由 Guo 创立，且位于同一纽约地址。（同上 ¶ 19。）GTV 是一家媒体公司，成立宗旨是成为“中国与西方世界之间唯一未经审查且独立的桥梁。”（同上 ¶ 39。）原告相信，Saraca 在 Guo 的指示下将 GTV 注册成立为“全资子公司”。（同上 ¶ 38。）根据原告的说法，“Saraca 至少拥有 GTV 90%的股权。”（同上 ¶ 20。）ROL Entities 是由 Guo 创立、并由其全资拥有和控制的特拉华州非营利公司。（同上 ¶¶ 26–27。）ROL Entities 共同使用相同的纽约邮寄地址和实际办公地点。（Doc. 36 at 3。）Guo 据称利用其知名度和多媒体平台招揽对 GTV 的投资。（Doc. 30 ¶ 40。）\n\n原告主张，“在所有相关时期，各被告均为其他被告的代理人、受雇人、雇员、合伙人或另我，且各被告的行为均在该等关系的范围内。”（同上 ¶ 33。）原告进一步主张，Guo“对其他被告行使控制权和支配权”，以致各被告的行为均系依 Guo 的指示而为。（同上 ¶ 34。）\n\n原告主张，个人可通过两种方式之一投资 GTV：(1) 直接投资，最低投资额为 $100,000；或 (2) 通过 VOG 间接投资。（同上 ¶ 47。）两种投资方式均要求事先直接向 Guo 或向附属的 ROL Entities 进行捐赠。（同上 ¶ 48。）在满足事先捐赠要求后，潜在投资者须签署 VOG 要求的“有限目的代理协议”。（同上 ¶ 57。）该协议指定 Wei 为投资者购买 GTV 证券的代理人。（同上 ¶ 58。）协议签署后，“Wei 指示投资者将购买款项电汇至由 Wei 及／或 VOG 控制的银行账户。”（同上 ¶ 59。）然而，据原告称，“没有任何通过 VOG 购买 GTV 普通股的投资者曾收到 GTV 股份。”（同上 ¶ 61。）\n\n4 Sara Wei 是 VOG 的总裁、董事及经理。（Doc. ¶ 20。）VOG 是一家位于亚利桑那州斯科茨代尔的亚利桑那州公司。（同上 ¶ 15。）“VOG 是小额投资者据称可借以参与 GTV 投资的工具。”（同上 ¶ 32。）\n\n原告代表其本人及所有其他处境相同者，对被告提起集体诉讼第一次修订起诉书。（同上 at 2。）原告的诉讼请求追偿因被告被指违反 A.R.S. § 44-1991 和 A.R.S. § 44-1998、普通法欺诈、违反信义义务、协助和教唆违反信义义务、民事共谋、过失性虚假陈述及不当得利而造成的损害赔偿。（同上 at 30–42。）\n\n二、被告 Guo 的破产\n\n在本次动议待决期间，已提交破产通知，告知本院被告 Guo 已根据《破产法》第 11 章自愿提交救济申请。（Doc. 45。）该申请导致暂停继续针对被告 Guo 的任何司法诉讼。11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)。因此，对 Media Entities 部分驳回动议的裁定将仅针对、并仅在适用于被告 GTV 和 Saraca 的范围内予以审议。\n\n三、法律标准\n\nA. Rule 12(b)(2)\n\n根据 Rule 12(b)(2)，被告可因缺乏对人管辖权而提出动议驳回起诉书。Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)。原告负有确立对人管辖权的举证责任，Ziegler v. Indian River Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995)，且“在未举行证据听证的情况下”，“仅需初步证明管辖权事实”，Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990)（引文略）。在确定原告是否已初步证明本院对被告具有对人管辖权时，起诉书中未受反驳的指控应视为真实，且“当事人宣誓书中所载事实之间的冲突必须作有利于［原告］的解决。”Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)。此外，“法院可考虑诉状以外的证据，包括就该动议提交的宣誓书及其他材料。”SKAPA Holdings LLC v. Seitz, No. CV-20-00611-PHX-DJH, 2021 WL 672091, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-15298, 2022 WL 94716 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022)（引自 Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix Int’l, LLC, 198 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2016)）。\n\n“当不存在规范对人管辖权的联邦法时，地区法院适用法院地州的法律。”Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018)。亚利桑那州在“亚利桑那州宪法和美国宪法所允许的最大范围内”行使对人管辖权。Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); 见，例如，A. Uberti and C. v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Ariz. 1995)。因此，根据亚利桑那州法律和联邦正当程序分析对人管辖权是相同的。Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004)。\n\n为符合正当程序，“尽管不要求非居民实际在法院地域管辖范围内出现，但非居民通常必须具有某些最低限度的联系……以使维持该诉讼不违背传统的公平理念和实质正义。”Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014)（内部引号及引文略）。该项要求确保“被告因其自身与该州的联系而被传唤至该州法院，而非基于其与其他与该州有关联的人互动时所产生的‘随机、偶然或微弱’联系。”同上 at 286（引自 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)）。“根据该等联系的强度，对人管辖权可采取两种形式：一般管辖权和特定管辖权。”Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015)（引文略）；Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997)。\n\n“当原告依赖特定管辖权时，其必须确立对‘针对被告主张的每一项请求’均有适当管辖权。”Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211（引自 Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004)）。“为使法院对某项请求行使特定管辖权，必须存在‘法院地与基础争议之间的关联，主要是发生在法院地州内的［一项］活动或事件。’”Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)（引自 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)）。如无此种联系，“无论被告在该州开展的不相关活动的程度如何，均不存在特定管辖权。”Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1781。“本院仅可考虑发生在引发诉讼的事件之前的联系。”Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Trust, Inc. v. NMTC, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 3d 931, 935 (D. Ariz. 2016)（引自 Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990)）。\n\n在分析特定管辖权时，法院采用三要件最低联系测试作为指引，“以确定被告是否与法院地具有足以使法院行使管辖权的联系［。］”Freestream, 905 F.3d at 603。该测试要求：\n\n(1) 非居民被告必须有目的地将其活动指向法院地或其居民，或与其完成某项交易；或者实施某种行为，使其有目的地利用在法院地开展活动的特权，从而援引该地法律的利益和保护；\n\n(2) 该请求必须是因被告与法院地相关的活动而产生或与之有关；以及\n\n(3) 管辖权的行使必须符合公平理念和实质正义，即必须是合理的。\n\n同上（引文略）；另见 Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211。“原告负有证明前两个要件的责任。”Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211（引文略）。“如果原告成功满足［该等要件］，举证责任随后转移至被告，由其提出‘令人信服的理由’，证明行使管辖权将不合理。”\n\n如被告未能提出“令人信服的理由”证明行使管辖权不合理，则推定该管辖权行使合理。Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477。如原告未能满足第一个要件，本院无需审查其他要件。Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Trust, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 936。\n\nB. Rule 12(b)(6)\n\n为在因未能陈述可获救济的请求而提出的 Rule 12(b)(6) 驳回动议中得以维持，起诉书必须符合 Rule 8(a)(2) 的要求。Rule 8(a)(2) 要求“简明扼要地陈述请求，表明诉状提交人有权获得救济”，从而使被告“公平地知悉……请求为何以及其所依据的理由”。Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 根据 Rule 12(b)(6) 作出的驳回，“可以基于缺乏可认定的法律理论，或者在可认定的法律理论下未主张足够事实”。Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 提出可认定法律理论的起诉书，如载有足够的事实内容，并且在被视为真实时，陈述了表面上“可信”的救济请求，即可在驳回动议中得以维持。Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 若诉状提交人提出“使法院能够作出合理推论、即被告应对所指控的不当行为承担责任的事实内容”，则存在表面可信性。Id.\n\n在裁定 Rule 12(b)(6) 驳回动议时，充分陈述的事实指控应被视为真实，并按照最有利于非动议方的方式解释。Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 然而，以事实指控形式表述的法律结论并不享有真实性推定，“概括性的法律指控及无根据的推论不足以驳回驳回动议”。Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 法院在裁定 Rule 12(b)(6) 驳回动议时，通常不得考虑诉状以外的证据。See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “但是，法院可以考虑附于起诉书的重要文件、通过援引纳入起诉书的文件，或司法认知事项，而无需将驳回动议转为简易判决动议。”Id. at 908.\n\nIV. 讨论\n\n在其 MTD 中，ROL Entities（ROL实体）基于两项理由请求驳回 FAC： (1) 本院因其与 Arizona（亚利桑那州）的最低联系不足而缺乏对人管辖权；以及 (2) 原告未能陈述可获救济的请求。(Doc. 36 at 4–15). Media Entities（媒体实体）的 PMTD 主张，原告就其违反信义义务和过失性失实陈述两项请求均未能陈述可获救济的请求。(Doc. 38 at 1–2.) 本院将在处理所称未能陈述可获救济的请求之前，先处理管辖权问题。\n\nA. 对人管辖权\n\n本案双方均未主张或论证本院对 ROL 实体具有一般管辖权，且其亦无法如此主张或论证。ROL 实体与 Arizona 没有联系，且系依 Delaware（特拉华州）法律组织成立，其总部位于 New York（纽约州）。因此，分析将限于特定管辖权问题。\n\n根据特定管辖权检验的第一要件，原告必须证明被告“（1）‘有目的地利用’了在审理地开展活动的特权，或（2）‘有目的地将’其活动指向审理地”。Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). 该要件提出两项不同标准，每项标准适用于不同情形。Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802; see Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473（解释法院对合同案件与侵权案件适用第一要件的方式不同）。在本巡回区，“有目的指向分析……最常用于侵权性质的诉讼”，Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802，本案即属此种情形。\n\n有目的指向应依 Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 (1984) 所概述的三要件“效果”检验予以评估。See id. at 803. 该检验要求“被告据称必须（1）实施故意行为，（2）该行为明确指向审理地州，以及（3）造成被告明知可能在审理地州遭受的损害”。Id. (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002).\n\n根据有目的指向框架，原告并未陈述足以支持本院对 ROL 实体行使对人管辖权的事实。不存在任何事实指控表明 ROL 实体在 Arizona 采取了任何行动，或将任何行动指向 Arizona。所指控的仅是其接受了来自 Arizona 的捐款。ROL 实体并未招揽该等捐款；被告 Guo（郭）才是如此。\n\n为弥补这一缺陷，原告主张本院应适用对人管辖权的共谋理论，该理论“基于如下前提：共谋者为推进共谋所实施的行为可归属于共谋的其他成员”。In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1138 (D. Nev. 2009). “因此，一些法院为对人管辖权之目的，将共谋者在审理地内的行为归属于其共同共谋者。”Id. 尽管 Ninth Circuit（第九巡回上诉法院）尚未明确接受或否定该理论，但其“已指出，共谋理论的正当性存在‘极大疑问’”。Id. (quoting Chirila v. Conforte, 47 F. App'x 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2002)). 事实上，许多法院已认定该理论不符合正当程序要求。See id. at 1138–89 n. 8 (collecting cases). 本院同意该观点，因此拒绝在此适用该理论。\n\n原告还主张，由于 ROL 实体与被告 Guo 之间存在代理关系，本院应对 ROL 实体行使对人管辖权。根据该理论，可以基于代理人的行为认定对本人具有对人管辖权。See Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2017). 然而，第九巡回上诉法院对在 Supreme Court（联邦最高法院）作出 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) 裁决后，代理关系理论是否仍可作为特定对人管辖权的依据表示怀疑。See id. at 1023–25 (“[T]he Daimler Court's criticism of the [agency-personal-jurisdiction] standard found fault with the standard's own internal logic, and therefore applies with equal force regardless of whether the standard is used to establish general or specific jurisdiction.”). 此外，“代理关系的一项基本原则是，本人有权对其代理人的活动进行实质性控制”。Winters v. Grand Caribbean Cruises Inc., No. CV-20-00168-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL\n\n3709854, at \\*5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2021) (quoting Williams, 851 F.3d at 1025) (cleaned up).\n\n在此，原告试图反向适用该理论，请求本院基于本人行为对代理人行使管辖权，而代理人对该等行为并无控制权。尽管 FAC 可能指控了支持 Guo 对 ROL 实体具有控制权的事实，但反向情形并不成立。由于代理人不对本人行使控制权，原告关于特定对人管辖权的代理理论不能成立。See Williams, 851 F.3d at 1025（认定对于子公司所采取的行为，不存在针对母公司的特定对人管辖权，因为并无指控表明母公司“有权以任何方式控制[子公司]的活动。”）\n\n原告提出的所有关于对人管辖权的理论均不能成立。因此，ROL 实体将因缺乏对人管辖权而被驳回。\n\nB. 未能陈述可获救济的请求\n\n本院不会分析 ROL 实体根据 Rule 12(b)(6) 提出的论点，因为本院对其缺乏管辖权。因此，本分析将聚焦于针对媒体实体的请求。\n\ni. 陈述标准\n\n媒体实体主张，除 Rule 8 的陈述标准外，罪名项 IV 和 VII 还必须符合 Rule 9 的更高陈述标准，因为两项请求均属于欺诈性质。(Doc. 38 at 4–5.) 原告未提出相反论点，因此本院将适用 Rule 9 的陈述标准。\n\nRule 9(b) 规定：“在指控欺诈或错误时，当事人必须具体陈述构成欺诈或错误的情形。”此外，故意、知情或其他主观罪过要素可以概括地陈述。Id. 因此，“虽然知情和故意要素可以概括地声称；但欺诈本身的事实情形需要具体化的指控”。Queen's Med. Ctr. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1158 (D. Haw. 2013) (citing Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010)). “为满足 Rule 9(b)，诉状必须指明‘被指控不当行为的何人、何事、何时、何地及如何实施’，以及‘[据称欺诈性]陈述中何处虚假或具有误导性，以及其为何虚假’。”Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Rule 9(b) 不仅旨在使被告知悉其必须抗辩的具体欺诈行为，”Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001)，还“防止以发现未知不当行为为借口提交起诉书”。In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985)). 因此，为满足 Rule 9(b)，原告必须指控每一欺诈行为的时间、地点和方式，并具体说明每一被告在欺诈中的作用。Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1991).\n\nii. 适用法律\n\n媒体实体主张，尽管本诉讼在 District of Arizona（亚利桑那联邦地区法院）提起，New York 对该争议亦具有“重大关联”。(Doc. 38. at 5 n.1.) 其特别指出，Sarca（萨尔卡）、GTV（GTV）和 ROL 实体的总部均位于 New York。5 (Id.) 因此，被告依据 Arizona 和 New York 两地法律提出论点，但未主张何种法律支配原告的侵权请求。(See generally Doc. 38.) 原告亦依据 Arizona 和 New York 两地法律作出回应，再次未论证在此何者适用。(See generally Doc. 40.)\n\n“Arizona 法院在确定多州侵权行为的适用法律时，适用 Restatement (Second) of Conflicts（《第二次冲突法重述》）的原则。”Labertew v. Chartis Prop. Cas. Co., 363 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1039 (D. Ariz. 2019). 该《重述》规定，“当事人就侵权问题所享有的权利和承担的责任，应根据依 § 6 所述原则、就该问题而言与事件及当事人具有最重大关联的州的当地法予以确定”。Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145(1). 该《重述》解释，在适用 § 6 的原则时，“应当考虑的联系”包括以下各项：“(a) 损害发生地\n\n5 其还指出 Guo 居住于 New York，但鉴于 Guo 提交破产申请导致针对 Guo 的诉讼程序暂停，本院不会考虑该事实。\n\n发生地；(b) 造成损害的行为发生地；(c) 当事人的住所、居所、国籍、注册成立地及营业地；以及 (d) 当事人之间关系（如有）的中心地。”同上，第 § 145(2) 条。重要的是，“应根据这些联系对于特定争议事项的相对重要性对其进行评估。”同上，第 § 145(3) 条；另见 Magellan Real Est. Inv. Tr. v. Losch, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1156 (D. Ariz. 2000)。\n\n尽管当事人之间的关系主要在线上，但法院认定，该关系以亚利桑那州为中心——法院认为，这一点对于本案侵权争议具有极高重要性。原告为加利福尼亚州、马里兰州及加拿大居民。(Doc. 30 ¶¶ 16–18.) 被告总部设于纽约州和亚利桑那州，并在特拉华州、纽约州和亚利桑那州注册成立。(Id. at 8–9.) 原告与被告之间的关系源于线上互动，原告的付款亦通过数字方式进行——PayPal、Livestream，或通过电汇。(Id. at 25–29.) 但是，其中金额最重大的付款系通过电汇支付给 VOG，而 VOG 是一家亚利桑那州公司。(Id. at 7, 25–29.) 此外，该等转账的确认函通过电子邮件发送给被告 Wei，其住所位于亚利桑那州，并担任 VOG 的董事、经理和总裁。(Id. at 20, 25–29.) 因此，尽管损害发生地尚不明确，但显然一家亚利桑那州公司及其一名代理人是所主张损害的重要致因。此外，尽管涉及如此众多当事人且当事人分布于如此众多地点的关系未必能被称为以任何地点为“中心”，法院仍认定其以亚利桑那州为中心。因此，法院认定亚利桑那州与本案具有最重大关系，并将适用亚利桑那州法律。\n\niii. 违反信义义务\n\nMedia Entities 主张，违反信义义务的请求应予驳回，因为其对原告不负任何信义义务。(Doc. 38 at 5.) 原告主张，被告作为公司的发起人负有信义义务。(Doc. 40 at 3.)\n\n“在主张违反信义义务的诉讼中，‘与所有侵权诉讼一样，原告必须主张并证明存在一项应负义务、该义务遭到违反，以及与该违反具有因果关系的损害。’”Surowiec v. Cap. Title Agency, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (D. Ariz. 2011) (quoting Smethers v. Campion, 210 Ariz. 167, 108 P.3d 946, 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)). “在亚利桑那州，公司发起人与股票投资人之间具有信义关系。”Johnson v. Nychyk, 517 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); 另见 Facciola v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 781 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924 (D. Ariz. 2011), aff'd, 593 F. App'x 723 (9th Cir. 2015)。\n\n本案中，原告主张：(1) Saraca 和 GTV 通过社交媒体网站上的视频向投资者推销股票发行；6 (2) Saraca 与 Guo（郭文贵）共同设立 GTV，并对 VOG——原告通过其支付资金购买 GTV 股票的亚利桑那州公司——行使控制；以及 (3) Saraca 和 GTV 还通过众多媒体平台招揽投资者。(Doc. 40 at 4.) 法院认定，原告已主张足够具体的事实，表明存在信义义务，足以满足规则 9 的要求。此外，Saraca 和 GTV 实际上是否为代理人或发起人——或兼具两种身份——通常属于应在后续裁决的事实问题。见 Facciola, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 925（“[被告]实际上是否以及在何种程度上属于代理人[或]发起人，以及是否存在以及在何种程度上存在知识不平衡，以致投资者高度依赖[被告]提供建议，均属事实问题。”）。\n\nMedia Entities 还主张，由于原告未充分主张因果关系，该项请求必须予以驳回。(Doc. 38 at 9.) 该论点毫无分量。FAC 明确表明，原告主张其因被错误告知并诱使其投资于不存在的股票发行而损失了投资资金。(Doc. 30 at 37–38.) 因此，原告已充分主张因果关系。\n\n因此，法院不会驳回该项请求。iv. 过失性失实陈述\n\nMedia Entities 主张，FAC 未载明被告对原告负有的任何义务。(Doc. 38 at 10.) 在亚利桑那州，过失性失实陈述的构成要件如下：\n\n6 法院因破产事宜而不考虑涉及 Guo 的指控。\n\n(1) 被告在商业交易中提供虚假信息；(2) 被告意图使原告依赖错误信息，或知道原告将合理地依赖该信息；(3) 被告在获取或传达该信息时未尽合理注意义务；(4) 原告有正当理由依赖该错误信息；以及 (5) 因此产生的损害。\n\nKB Home Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 340 P.3d 405, 412 n.7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). 在商业交易中，信息提供者对可预见的使用者负有注意义务。St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 742 P.2d 808, 813–14 (Ariz. 1987). 为证明其属于可预见的使用者，原告必须证明“被告为其利益提供该信息，或者知道该信息将被提供给她。”Leist v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. CV-16-00314-PHX-DGC, 2016 WL 1593815, at \\*3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 742 P.2d at 813)。\n\n本案中，毫无争议的是，这是一项商业交易，原告是可预见的使用者，且 Media Entities 提供了该信息。(See generally Doc. 38.) 此外，FAC 中的细节足以满足规则 9 的起诉主张标准。FAC 概述了各被告提供该信息的众多不同地点及其发生的时间期间。(Doc. 30 at 11–28.) 因此，该论点不能构成驳回的理由。\n\nMedia Entities 还主张，该请求的“部分”内容应予驳回，因为对未来行为的承诺不能支持过失性失实陈述请求。(Doc. 38 at 12–13 (citing McAlister v. Citibank (Arizona), a Subsidiary of Citicorp, 829 P.2d 1253, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)). 具体而言，其主张，其关于将如何通过 VOG 获得证券以及将如何使用投资者资金的陈述，不能支持过失性失实陈述请求。(Id.) 令人意外的是，原告未对该论点作出回应。(See generally Doc. 40.)\n\n“未回应驳回动议中提出的论点，构成反对该动议一方对该争点的放弃，且是准许驳回动议的充分依据。”Green v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. CV-18-04665-PHX-SPL, 2020 WL 2512759, at \\*4 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2020) (collecting cases). 法院认定，原告未回应被告关于未来行为承诺不足以成立过失性失实陈述请求的论点，构成对该论点的承认，因而构成驳回该请求的理由。见同上。然而，法院仅驳回与该论点有关的该请求“部分”内容。(See Doc. 38 at 12–13.)\n\n因此，法院将驳回原告过失性失实陈述请求中依赖于“将如何通过 VOG 获得证券”和“将如何使用投资者资金”之主张的部分。(See Doc. 30 at ¶ 190(d) & (e).) 但法院将在其他所有方面驳回 Media Entities 的驳回动议。因此，原告关于被告对“(a) GTV 的真实价值；(b) GTV 投资的真实性质；(c) GTV 证券的相对风险”作出失实陈述的主张，(id.) 将在本裁定后继续存在。\n\nV. 结论\n\n日期：2022 年 7 月 6 日。\n\n兹命令：准许 ROL Entities 的驳回动议，(Doc. 36)，并依照本裁定部分驳回、部分准许 Media Entities 的驳回动议，(Doc. 38)。","key_entities":["GTV","Guo","Saraca","CIPA","Je"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":30,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":31,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":33,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":36,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":38,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":40,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":45,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":52,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5424,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-07-20 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-07-20","updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:02:57"}