{"id":"court_ctb_580_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":580,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2022-07-21","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT **UPDATED** DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT **7/20/22** BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 1 of 119\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT **UPDATED** DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT **7/20/22** BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073(JAM) \\* HO WAN KWOK, \\* Bridgeport, Connecticut \\* May 25, 2022 Debtor. \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING APPOINTMENT OF AN EXAMINER, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE; MOTION TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JOINDER TO U.S. TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE APPEARANCES: For the Debtor: BENNETT S. SILVERBERG, ESQ. JEFFREY L. JONAS, ESQ. Brown Rudnick, LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 For the Creditor, Pacific PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Alliance Asia Opportunity LAURA ARONSSON, ESQ. Fund L.P.: O'Melveny & Myers LLP Times Square Tower 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 PATRICK M. BIRNEY, ESQ. Robinson & Cole LLP 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service. **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. 4 Research Drive, Suite 402 Shelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992**\n\nAPPEARANCES Cont'd: For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For the Official Committee IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ. of Unsecured Creditors: Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For Rui Ma, Zheng Wu and KRISTIN MAYHEW, ESQ. Weican Meng, Creditors: McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter 30 Jeliff Lane Southport, CT 06890 CAROLLYNN H.G. CALLARI, ESQ. Law firm of Callari Partners One Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10020\n\n1\n\n (Proceedings commenced at 10:05 A.m.) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case no. 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. If we could have appearances for the record starting with the debtor's counsel, please? MR. JONAS: Good morning, Your Honor. Jeff Jonas from Brown Rudnick. With me is Ben Silverberg, and Bill Baldiga is sitting behind me for the debtor this morning. Thank you. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. FRIEDMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter Friedman from O'Melveny & Myers, joined by Laura Aronsson on behalf of Pacific Alliance Group. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. BIRNEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Patrick Birney, also on behalf of PAX. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. GOLDMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Irve Goldman, Pullman and Comley, representing the creditors committee. THE COURT: Good morning. MS. CLAIBORN: Good morning, Your Honor. Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. THE COURT: Good morning.\n\n MS. MAYHEW: Good morning, Your Honor. Kristin Mayhew, McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, on behalf of creditors Rui Ma, Zheng Wu, and Weican Meng. And also with me is Carollynn Callari of Callari Partners. THE COURT: Good morning to both of you. Is there anyone else whose appearances we need to take this morning? Okay. All right. As we all know, this is the hearing today on a motion the dismiss, or in the alternative, for the appointment of a trustee. At our last hearing, heading up to today's hearing, I was told that all the parties have agreed. And you've confirmed this in your papers, that you consent to a finding that cause exists under 1112(b) to do something, to either dismiss the case, convert the case, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. I have looked at your list of witnesses and exhibits, and I have looked at your position papers with regard to dismissal, conversion, or the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. I don't know if there's anything further the parties want to inform the Court about before we start with evidence? Mr. Jonas? Mr. Friedman? MR. FRIEDMAN: No, Your Honor. I think Ms. Aronsson is going to address what we submit in terms of evidence. I believe Ms. Aronsson and\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n counsel for the committee have agreed on what will be admissible, and we've withdrawn some things, so I think I would turn it over to Ms. Aronsson, and then Mr. Goldman to walk through what they've -- each party wants admitted. And then I would ask leave to argue after that's concluded. THE COURT: Certainly. Okay. Ms. Aronsson, did you want to start, please? Do you want to proceed? MS. ARONSSON: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Before you proceed for one second, I have to ask the courtroom deputy, do we need any kind of issue on technology. You're going to -- are you going to introduce exhibits? MS. ARONSSON: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. MS. ARONSSON: Planning on offering -- THE COURT: Do I need to have this camera on, then, for that? THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: [Courtroom Deputy speaking] THE COURT: It's on, but do I need to have it actually -- this turned on and open? THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: [Courtroom Deputy speaking] THE COURT: Because I can't see anything here, so I assume, unfortunately, I have to have this open. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: [Courtroom Deputy\n\n speaking]. THE COURT: No, but she will be. So I don't want to, you know, stop the process. MS. ARONSSON: Your Honor, I'm not sure we need to open any evidence right now. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So then we'll take -- when you're ready to do that, will you let me know so I can make sure our technology people -- I'm not doing something wrong, because I probably will be, but I'll try not to. Okay? MS. ARONSSON: Will do. THE COURT: All right. So, Attorney Aronsson, go right ahead. You may proceed. MS. ARONSSON: Thank you, Your Honor. PAX is offering into evidence the exhibits filed on the docket numbered PAX 1 through PAX 31, except for PAX 7, PAX 8, and PAX 30. THE COURT: 7, 8, and 30 are not being admitted? MS. ARONSSON: That's correct. THE COURT: Does anyone have -- have you talked about whether anyone has any oppositions to the introduction of these exhibits? MS. ARONSSON: So we met and conferred with Mr. Goldman yesterday, and I understand our withdrawal represents our good faith meet and confer. I understand\n\n there might be one disagreement left -- THE COURT: Okay. MS. ARONSSON: -- based on our conversation this morning. MR. GOLDMAN: Yes. That's correct, Your Honor. We just -- I think I would expect brief argument on a set of -- a series of transcripts that they seek to introduce from the New York action. So that isolates the dispute. THE COURT: Okay. Now with regard to the -- so does anyone else wish to be heard on the admission of the exhibits? No one? Okay. So, Attorney Aronsson, you are introducing these exhibits in full, correct? MS. ARONSSON: That's correct. THE COURT: All right. Now, I think I may have said this in prior hearings. I have no problem with you moving for the admission in full of these exhibits. That doesn't mean I'm going to read every page of them, and so, you know, during this time, you may want to point me to certain things. But in any event, I've said this. This is something I say to all, counsel. This is not unique to this case. I have no problem and appreciate when the parties work cooperatively with regard to the admission of exhibits, but I'm not -- I just want everyone to know, that does not mean I'm going to read every page. Okay?\n\n MS. ARONSSON: Understood. THE COURT: Okay. Go right ahead. MS. ARONSSON: Would you like to hear argument on the -- THE COURT: Possibly. MS. ARONSSON: Okay. THE COURT: Hold on for one second. So I'm going to then announce on the record that Exhibit -- PAX Exhibit 1 through 31, with the exception of Exhibits -- PAX Exhibits 7, 8, and 30, are admitted as full exhibits. MR. GOLDMAN: May I make a qualification? THE COURT: Yes. MR. GOLDMAN: There are exhibits -- the exhibits that are in question that are in challenge are Exhibits 18 through 22. Those are the hearing transcripts that they're seeking to introduce from hearings in New York Supreme Court. So we -- you know, we would -- Your Honor would need to resolve -- THE COURT: All right. So what's your objection to those -- MR. GOLDMAN: Well, the objection is, they're pure hearsay. Just because they are from a court proceeding does not make them public records. THE COURT: Why are they hearsay? MR. GOLDMAN: Well, they're out-of-court\n\n statements. THE COURT: They're not statements. They're a record of a hearing, right? MR. GOLDMAN: Well, they're certainly statements in the record, made by various parties -- THE COURT: Right. MR. GOLDMAN: -- that counsel and -- THE COURT: And their weight will be given whatever I think is appropriate. But it's a transcript. Are you -- if you're objecting to the transcript itself, somehow saying it's not official or authenticated -- MR. GOLDMAN: No. No. THE COURT: -- then that's a different objection. MR. GOLDMAN: It's not my objection. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GOLDMAN: My objection is, they're clearly hearsay because they are out-of-court statements being submitted for the truth of what's asserted in the statements, and they are not -- they don't come within the public records exception. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I'm sorry, Your Honor. THE COURT: Hold on a second, Attorney Goldman. You can't hear? THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I can't hear Attorney Goldman.\n\n THE COURT: We can't hear you very well. MR. GOLDMAN: I'm sorry. They are clearly out-of- court statements submitted for the truth of the matters asserted. THE COURT: Aren't they -- aren't they -- they're admissions of parties. They are the debtor and PAX at a hearing. MR. GOLDMAN: Well -- THE COURT: And they're being admitted for -- what -- anyway. Go ahead, Attorney Goldman. You keep going, but I'm not sure I'm convinced yet. MR. GOLDMAN: Okay. You know, to the extent they're seeking to introduce statements by -- from the debtor, the debtor is not opposing -- THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I'm sorry, Your Honor. THE COURT: Hold on a second. We still can't hear you? THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yeah. I'm being told it would be better if Attorney Goldman could come to the lectern. THE COURT: There's something -- they're not picking you up, Attorney Goldman. MR. GOLDMAN: Can I go up there? THE COURT: Yes, please. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: The microphone does not\n\n have a light on it. THE COURT: It's not working for whatever reason, that microphone. MR. GOLDMAN: Okay. Okay. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Something is wrong because -- THE COURT: Okay. All right. Yes, if you could come forward? MR. GOLDMAN: Yeah. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. GOLDMAN: Sure. Is this better, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. Now I -- I believe, right? Everyone can hear Attorney Goldman? MR. GOLDMAN: Yep. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes. MR. GOLDMAN: So to the extent they want to introduce statements from the debtor's counsel, I don't think the debtor was actually present at any of these hearings. Counsel was present. So the debtor is not an opposing party here. The debtor consents to the relief requested, so in order to be non-hearsay of a party opponent, the statement has to be offered -- it has to be a statement of the opposing party. The only opposing party here is the committee. So it doesn't work as non-hearsay of\n\n a party opponent. The public record exception does not cover court hearing transcripts. It states -- THE COURT: Why? MR. GOLDMAN: -- a record or statement of a public office, if it sets out the office's activities, a matter observed while under a legal duty to report. In a civil case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation. A court hearing from another court simply doesn't fit within the elements of the public records exception. It's designed to admit into evidence reports of agencies of the state and federal government, or departments. THE COURT: So you're saying a transcript of any hearing ever held that is certified can never be admitted into evidence because every single transcript will be hearsay? MR. GOLDMAN: It's out of -- it's an out-of-court statement. It doesn't come within the public records exception, or any other exception that I am aware of, except to the -- THE COURT: So what's the point of a record, then? MR. GOLDMAN: -- except to the extent that the Court is making factual findings or conclusions of law. THE COURT: Well, maybe the judge did that in\n\n those -- during those hearings. MR. GOLDMAN: Well, then, you know, Your Honor -- THE COURT: I think he did, didn't he? MR. GOLDMAN: Well, they -- there are 300 pages of transcripts that -- THE COURT: I understand. MR. GOLDMAN: So I don't know what -- THE COURT: I'm not going to read all of them, but I know that -- MR. GOLDMAN: I don't know what -- THE COURT: -- there are -- there, in those transcripts, I believe I've seen prior in this case, findings by the court about the veracity of testimony, of certain witnesses, about the judge's findings, about the ownership of the boat. Things of those nature, which that was his finding. Those were his findings. MR. GOLDMAN: I concede that that would be admissible. I'm talking about, you know, they're seeking to admit the entire -- THE COURT: And as I said already, I'm not going to read the entire transcript. I -- if counsel wants me to focus on something in the transcript, I will do so. And then you could have the opportunity to object at that time if it's hearsay. But I'm not sure I'm persuaded at this point.\n\n I'll let you -- you know, I'll let you make that argument again if and when counsel points to specific portions of that transcript that she -- that they are asking me to look at. And if you, at that time, want to renew your hearsay objection, then you can renew that and then I'll rule accordingly. MR. GOLDMAN: Yeah. Just so Your Honor is -- so I'm clear, I don't have a problem if there are factual findings made, or conclusions of law made by the Court. It just -- I don't think observations of a court in a transcript would come within the public records exception. That's what I'm saying. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. MR. GOLDMAN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Counsel, go ahead. MS. ARONSSON: Thank you. So just to clarify, in our conversations with Mr. Goldman yesterday, we do intend to use -- to offer these transcripts for Justice Ostrager's findings contained -- not any testimony about -- of witness that might fall within hearsay. So I think we're in agreement on that front. THE COURT: All right. So what I'm going to do, then, is I'm going to at this time -- again, we'll have to clarify the record. At this point, PAX Exhibits 1 through 6, 9 through 17, and 23 through 29, and 31 are admitted as\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n| 1  | full exhibits.<br>18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 still remain possibly |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2  | subject to objection to the creditor's committee, which the    |\n| 3  | Court will rule on when and if you direct me to some           |\n| 4  | specific portions of the transcript.<br>Okay?                  |\n| 5  | MS. ARONSSON:<br>Thank you, Your Honor.                        |\n| 6  | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>Thank you.                              |\n| 7  | (PAX Exhibit Nos. 1-6, 9-17, 23-29, and 31 admitted in         |\n| 8  | full)                                                          |\n| 9  | THE COURT:<br>Go ahead, Attorney Goldman.                      |\n| 10 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yes.<br>If it -- Your Honor, for the           |\n| 11 | committee, we would offer into evidence our Exhibits 1         |\n| 12 | through 14, and I believe there aren't any objections to       |\n| 13 | that to be --                                                  |\n| 14 | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>There are no objections to that,              |\n| 15 | Your Honor.<br>It's Peter Friedman.<br>And we actually also    |\n| 16 | endorse the committee's suggestion that the Court take         |\n| 17 | judicial notice of the record of this case.<br>I think that    |\n| 18 | was a point that I think both the U.S. Trustee and committee   |\n| 19 | counsel made, and we think that that's a fair point to make,   |\n| 20 | and that the full record of these cases should be taken        |\n| 21 | judicial notice of.                                            |\n| 22 | THE COURT:<br>The -- okay.<br>Thank you.<br>Attorney           |\n| 23 | Goldman, I haven't done a cross-reference, but are any of      |\n| 24 | your exhibits the same as PAX's exhibits?                      |\n| 25 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>I believe there is one, the debtor's           |\n|    |                                                                |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 16 of 119\n\n|    | 16                                                           |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | declaration.<br>I think we both have that.<br>That's our --  |\n| 2  | THE COURT:<br>Your Exhibit 2?                                |\n| 3  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yes.                                         |\n| 4  | THE COURT:<br>All right.<br>Hold on a second.<br>And         |\n| 5  | PAX's Exhibit 2.<br>It's the same number, right?             |\n| 6  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yes.                                         |\n| 7  | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>All right.<br>So you're asking        |\n| 8  | the Court, Attorney Goldman, to admit as full exhibits, the  |\n| 9  | unsecured creditor's committee Exhibits 1 through 14.<br>Is  |\n| 10 | that correct?                                                |\n| 11 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yes, Your Honor.                             |\n| 12 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>Anyone else wish to be heard on       |\n| 13 | the admission of -- Creditor's Committee Exhibits 1 through  |\n| 14 | 14?                                                          |\n| 15 | Okay.<br>Then those exhibits are all admitted as             |\n| 16 | full exhibits.<br>And I say to you, Attorney Goldman, as I   |\n| 17 | said to Attorney Aronsson, I'm not going to read every one   |\n| 18 | of those pages.<br>If there are specific things in those     |\n| 19 | exhibits you want me to focus on, you'll need to focus me on |\n| 20 | those.<br>Okay?                                              |\n| 21 | I mean, it's possible I can read them all, but I'm           |\n| 22 | not bound to read them all.<br>Okay?                         |\n| 23 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>No, understood, Your Honor.<br>I will        |\n| 24 | --                                                           |\n| 25 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.                                          |\n|    |                                                              |\n\n MR. GOLDMAN: I will do that. THE COURT: Okay. (Creditor's Committee Exhibit Nos. 1-14 admitted in full) THE COURT: All right. The creditors', Rui Ma and Zheng Wu and Wiecan Meng joinder, so you have nothing further with regard to your -- any exhibits you're standing with the committee, correct? MS. MAYHEW: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And the office of the U.S. Trustee, I think the same is -- well, I think your statement said, Attorney Claiborn, but you should definitely correct me if I'm wrong, that you reserve the right to question about any exhibit and question any witness, but that you weren't introducing any evidence yourself. The office was not introducing any evidence, correct? MS. CLAIBORN: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Attorney Jonas, I think the same is true of you, except that you basically asked for judicial notice of everything filed in the case, and then any exhibit identified or offered by another party, and any exhibit necessary for rebuttal after impeachment, correct? MR. JONAS: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So you're all set then as Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 17 of 119\n\n|    | 18                                                          |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | well.                                                       |\n| 2  | MR. JONAS:<br>Yes, Your Honor.                              |\n| 3  | THE COURT:<br>For now.                                      |\n| 4  | MR. JONAS:<br>Yes, Your Honor.                              |\n| 5  | THE COURT:<br>Understanding your --                         |\n| 6  | MR. JONAS:<br>Thank you.                                    |\n| 7  | THE COURT:<br>-- your parameters.                           |\n| 8  | MR. JONAS:<br>Thank you, Your Honor.                        |\n| 9  | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>Thank you.                           |\n| 10 | I just need one second, please.                             |\n| 11 | (Pause)                                                     |\n| 12 | THE COURT:<br>Now we had another party file --              |\n| 13 | actually, I don't think they filed anything with regard to  |\n| 14 | the list of witnesses and exhibits, so I think they just    |\n| 15 | filed a statement; another creditor that basically joined   |\n| 16 | the committee's -- yeah, they didn't file anything with     |\n| 17 | listed witnesses and exhibits.                              |\n| 18 | So, Attorney Aronsson, you can go right ahead.              |\n| 19 | You may proceed.                                            |\n| 20 | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>Your Honor, it's Peter Friedman.           |\n| 21 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>Attorney Friedman.                   |\n| 22 | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>I'm going to --                            |\n| 23 | THE COURT:<br>Go ahead.                                     |\n| 24 | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>So, Your Honor, it's Peter Friedman        |\n| 25 | from O'Melveny and Myers on behalf of PAX, and I'm going to |\n|    |                                                             |\n\n argue in favor of dismissal of the case. THE COURT: Okay. MR. FRIEDMAN: This case was filed in bad faith, specifically for the purpose of evading a contempt judgment that I know the Court has heard about a lot and we'll get back to. I believe in effect, in the UCC Exhibit 2, our Exhibit 2, Mr. Kwok's declaration in Paragraphs 3 and 24, he basically acknowledged that -- and in our view, contempt is the alpha of this case, and it should be the omega, because that was the purpose of this case, to evade that, and that's not a proper purpose for filing a bankruptcy. In his consent, the debtor refers to PAX's unrestrained legal warfare against him as being the reason he consents. I think this is ironic, given that, as we point out at Docket No. 50, it was Kwok who stated his intention to start an all-out war with PAX immediately before the bankruptcy. Next thing you know, Kwok files this case on the night before having to face enforcement of Justice Ostrager's contempt sanction. And so what kind of case do we get at that point? A case with no scheduled assets, no business, no employees, no executory contracts to assume, no income, other than a few checks from COVID stimulus. No real bankruptcy purpose, no change in the way Mr. Kwok lives his life. Just one more venue to access, and I think that leads to the conclusion\n\n that there's really double-barreled bad faith here to avoid a contempt judgment first, and relitigation of PAX's claims, which neither of which is a proper bankruptcy purpose, and the remedy for that should fit the motivations for filing this.\n\n Your Honor, I want to start by going back to taking the full breadth of Mr. Kwok's gamesmanship in terms of how -- of his efforts to frustrate PAX. And all of this comes from PAX Exhibit 23 at -- starting at Paragraph 2.\n\n PAX loaned Mr. Kwok's company \\$30,000 in 2008. Kwok personally guaranteed that loan. PAX and Kwok renegotiated the loan in 2011 to consolidate the remaining debt. And again, Kwok executed a personal guarantee.\n\n In April 2013, Kwok agreed to settle his debt by transferring PAX the title to certain apartments in Beijing. That settlement hinged on satisfaction of certain conditions precedent, including delivery of clean title. PAX extended the deadline for that settlement on many occasions, with a final deadline set for June 30, 2015.\n\n Kwok never filled -- fulfilled his conditions precedent. So Kwok gets sued by PAX in April of 2017 for breach of contract. A suit, by the way, totally unrelated to any other suit brought by any other plaintiff. No common nucleus of facts among the claim holders versus PAX. And I use the term claim holder specifically, because I don't\n\n think that these people are -- that a vast majority of people who have asserted proofs of claim are actually creditors. They hold claims, which is different than being a creditor. They don't have judgments. On September 15th, 2020, PAX wins summary judgment for its breach of contract case. The first warning shot that PAX was going to try to -- that was going to be so badly frustrated is when Genever New York filed for bankruptcy in SDNY shortly after that, part of Mr. Kwok's pattern of trying to frustrate Kwok. Shortly after that, the New York court restrains the Lady May and other -- and the Sherry Netherland. Exhibit 23, Docket 183.3, October 15th, Justice Ostrager order. The final judgment is entered in February 2021, a year before the bankruptcy case. At that point, the court enters a judgment of \\$116 million with the statutory interest rate in New York, making it grow to \\$127 million by the date of Mr. Kwok's filings. Then there are all of the antics that go on as PAX work -- PAX works to collect its judgment. As I noted, Justice Ostrager had to seek to -- expressly found, and this is Exhibit -- PAX 18 at page 21. At the October -- at an October 15th hearing, and if Mr. -- you know, if counsel for the committee wishes to object, I just highlight that this\n\n one of the things from the hearing transcript that we believe should be in evidence. The Court believes, as reflected in the September 15th, 2020 order, that Mr. Kwok has attempted to mislead the Court. The court believes that Mr. Kwok as the plaintiff -- is, as the plaintiff contends, playing a shell game. This is going to come to an end. We're not going to have any more shell games. Kwok is -- PAX is forced, as a result of these ongoing shell games, to move for contempt multiple times in the New York State action. On March 16th, 2021, as referenced in PAX Exhibit 24, the Court notes, it's clear there's been an intolerable amount of gamesmanship, dismembering, and deceit in proceedings before this Court. Court goes on to say that rather than catalog the many shell games defendant has engaged in, the Court grants the motion for contempt to the following extent. For every day the yacht is outside the jurisdiction of this Court after May 15th, 2021, defendant will be fined -- Kwok will be fined \\$500,000. This doesn't force Mr. Kwok to file bankruptcy, he just continues to thumb his nose, this time not just to the judgment, but an order of a state court. At a July 2021 hearing -- this is PAX Exhibit 21 -\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n - the Court notes that the Court issued an order directing the boat not be removed from the territorial waters of the United States. That order was disregarded by Mr. Kwok *and/or* entities that he controls. That is contempt of court. THE COURT: What page are you on, on Exhibit 21 there, counsel? MR. FRIEDMAN: 16 to 17. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. FRIEDMAN: And going further on Page 19, the Court talks about his -- Justice Ostrager talks about his defiance, Kwok's definance of court orders. Kwok appeals the fine. The first department affirms and directs the trial court to hold further evidentiary hearings. In the final evidentiary hearing, as this Court notes, that just -- that precipitated the bankruptcy, the Court talks about the 1,180 docket entries. This is in PAX 25. Almost all of which involve defendant's efforts to avoid and deceive. Talks about the -- PAX encountering difficulties through assets in a maze of corporate entities. And finally, as the Court notes, and I know this Court has heard it before, but if billionaire litigants can simultaneously seek to use the court process in New York and elsewhere, while knowingly and intentionally violating court\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n orders, there is no rule of law. Mr. Kwok attempted to appeal that, sought an emergency stay of the orders, didn't get it. Justice Ostrager noted in his opinion -- an order, that there would be other consequences. I think we -- from what we know in testimony, what this Court has heard and I think what can be inferred, Mr. Kwok was obviously, not really worried about the money point. He was worried about going to jail for being in defiance of a court order, and that's what motivated him to file for bankruptcy. So what happens when the bankruptcy is filed? I think what the Court can observe from Mr. Kwok's declarations, from the debtor's response to examiner motions, from the debtor's motion to -- opposition to PAX's motion to lift the stay, from the debtor's effort to remove PAX's litigation from state court to federal court. All of them point to one thing. This case was then -- was commenced for the improper purpose of relitigation the PAX issue, right?\n\n You saw it in declarations that Mr. Kwok maintained that the PAX litigation was founded on forgery, right? That there was something improper about the judgment that had been obtained. There were efforts -- you know, that's in Docket No. 83 at Paragraph 12. Mr. Kwok argues, you know, that the personal guarantee somehow was a forgery.\n\n He talks about, I think, wanting to have a reevaluation of what's really his property, which is nothing more than an obvious effort to get the Court to relitigate Justice Ostrager's contempt order.\n\n The idea of removing one case -- one case was attempted to be removed, and it's the case that makes no -- the least sense to remove. It's one on which the central issues were already on appeal, but what other purpose would there have been, other than to try to relitigate, and the cases we cite note that that is not a proper purpose for filing a bankruptcy case.\n\n I would note, Your Honor, that the only other case that has even been referenced in these proceedings is the claim of creditor Rui Ma, which there is no effort to remove that here. To the contrary, I believe there was actually a consent stipulation filed to let that case move forward to be adjudicated back in New York State court system.\n\n So I think the Court can draw the inference from everything it's seen. The real purpose of this case was targeted at frustrating PAX and getting a second or third bite at the apple, specifically with respect to PAX.\n\n Your Honor, a moment about PAX, and the Court, I think has observed how unusual this case is given the lack of assets, given the lack of operating business, given the lack of a, you know, ongoing income, business, et cetera.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 26 of 119\n\n And the nature of this case being so honestly focused on fees for professionals and budgets for professionals as opposed to a traditional meaningful restructuring in any way, is that you have PAX that has a claim that is over 1,300 times larger than the next judgment claim. The second largest actual, I guess theoretically undisputed claim are claims of insiders, which I think the Court can, you know, not pay much attention to in this context.\n\n So given the size of our claim, we want to sort of focus on the aggressive role PAX played, and I think it's really important that it did, in dealing with what happened after this case was filed.\n\n The debtor comes in. The debtor files a plan. I think a plan that was dead on arrival. Seeks to borrow money, \\$8 million. And PAX opposed that. Other people didn't. Other people thought that maybe there was, you know, a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. We said from the beginning that the DIP was a sham and the rug definitely got pulled out from under people when Golden Spring decided it wasn't going to fund the case anymore.\n\n But just the -- you know, the very nature of trying to pursue a debtor in possession financing, not for the benefit of anybody other than professionals, or to run an investigation, never made sense to us, and nothing about this case ever made sense to us. We thought that the status\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n quo, where creditors were entitled to pursue their rights under state law was really the appropriate mechanism for dealing with this kind of debtor.\n\n And we think the cases support that. For example, in *Sapphire Development Company v. McKay*, from the District of Connecticut, the debtor had no business, employees, and was being funded by an affiliate of the debtor's principle that had a history -- and there had been a history of state court judgments, finding the principle had diverted assets, misled courts, et cetera. And the court dismissed the case and specifically noted that unsecured creditors could go after anybody they wanted to in the state court, just like claim holders here can, and that that was an appropriate exercise of discretion. I want to emphasize, the Court does have a wider decree -- you know, the cases make very clear, this Court has tremendous discretion in deciding what to do today.\n\n The size of PAX's claim, I think is important as we cited in the *Acme Cake Company* case from 495 BR 212, that it's appropriate to dismiss a case where a single creditor with a sufficiently large claim takes the position that dismissal is the best outcome. Dismissal is in the best interest of creditors because the -- and the state is not affected by the probable result that the largest creditor will execute its judgment and reach the debtor's assets\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nbefore other unsecured creditors.\n\n So there's nothing wrong with PAX asserting the fact that it is the largest creditor and it perceives this is the correct outcome. Again, all we're doing here is returning the status quo. Whether we'll be able to exercise on our judgment or not, I can't say, but I think returning to the status quo is appropriate.\n\n *OptInRealBig.com*, 345 BR 277, from Colorado. The court granted a motion to dismiss where value recoverable for creditors as a whole could be greater outside of bankruptcy, which we think would be the case here, certainly for PAX, as I'll get into later. The Chapter 7 would impose tremendous costs on PAX if it could even be funded.\n\n But the court held there that a creditor -- and here, I would analogize who the court was talking about -- to the claim holders who have contingent unliquidated claims, or even the ones who have very small claims, should not be permitted to prolong or sustain a case merely to take advantage of benefits bankruptcy offers to creditors, and that a case could never be dismissed under the bankruptcy code if I think as our opponent suggests, if guaranteeing the bankruptcy code's priority scheme was a precondition of dismissal.\n\n So if you could only dismiss cases where it was 100 percent certainty that anybody who was at least\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n theoretically similarly situated, you could never dismiss a case. We don't think that any case law stands for that, and we think actually to the contrary, cases like *OptInRealBig* and *Acme Cake Company* say the contrary.\n\n Your Honor, I think in the *Regional Evangelical Alliance of Church's* bankruptcy from Kansas, you know, the court noted that notwithstanding the presence of other creditors, where bankruptcy was essentially an attempt to thwart a creditor's recovery in state court litigation, would be appropriate to let people seek the remedy to which they're entitled to under applicable non-bankruptcy law, without having to litigate the bankruptcy roadblocks that could be erected otherwise.\n\n Your Honor, I think we also cited in our opposition to -- I'm sorry. In our reply brief in support, three cases, *Wally Findlay*, which notes that it's an impermissible use to relitigate bankruptcy cases and where a debtor has taken that position, it is appropriate to dismiss a case. And the *Bridge to Life* case from the Eastern District of New York, a case is dismissed because the debtor was attempting to, you know, inject non-bankruptcy laws issued into a Chapter 11 case. In the *D&G Construction: Dean Gonzalez* case, the court held the use of bankruptcy process as a platform to delay the lawful exercise of state law rights and attack final orders of other courts, warrants\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n dismissal. Your Honor, there are like, you know, some of those cases are not extensively reasoned. I understand. I think that's true of some of the other cases on the other side, and I'm going to get to their cases, but I think that there's a through line, that there's nothing to prevent -- there's no reason to prevent -- not to return to the status quo and let people use whatever state court rights they have in a case like this. And let me say what this case is not. This is not a mass tort case. This is not a case where you can say, okay, a debtor did something bad five years ago, and sure some people were hurt before others, but we know -- we know that there will be people who get -- who necessarily are going to get verdicts in the future in their favor because of doctrines like offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, and we can even come up with a matrix that says, okay, if you had mesothelioma and you're 45, you'll get X. If you suffered from an opioids injury, you will get Y. Everybody here has very, very different kinds of claims. So there's -- you know, to the extent that there's a race to the courthouse kind of issue, that's just what state law permits people to do, and PAX has been very, very,\n\nvery, diligent and vigilant, and that's not improper.\n\nI want to talk about the cases that were cited by\n\n the other sides, and the first I think -- and there are a couple of through lines that come through them I think that show pretty meaningful differences. I think that -- you know, the first is obviously the *Julian* case. I think there were obviously powerful reasons for dismissal. I think, you know, severely differentiating factors are the debtor's conduct throughout that case.\n\n Here, this case has been mercifully short, and I think I probably understand this much less well than you do or Mr. Birney does or Mr. Goldman does, but I think that there were some sui generis facts as related to the debtor's counsel there that, you know, it was probably a pretty good thing that the court maintained supervision over that case ultimately. But I don't -- you know, I think the ultimate outcomes for creditor -- for creditors were not great, and I think whether or not that was an appropriate exercise of discretion there, I don't think informs this case.\n\n The *SWJ Management* case from District of Connecticut was one where creditors overwhelmingly sought conversion. And I want to make clear, as the *Acme Cake Company* says, you're not supposed to count noses. You're supposed to really count dollars, because imagine if 100 and -- you know, PAX has \\$260 million in judgments. Imagine if PAX had, you know, sliced it's loan up to \\$261 million affiliate funds and each filed their own creditor claims.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 32 of 119\n\n And each could be running in here and say, 261 creditors favor dismissal. I don't think it's a counting of noses. I think it's a counting of dollars, and PAX's -- you know, the value of PAX's dollars are really what's important. *Premier Golf Properties* is a case heavily relied upon. That's 564 BR 710. The Court uses an interesting word there in deciding whether dismissal or conversion is right. It says the operative question -- it actually says the operative question of the case was whether the uncertain value of the underlying asset, which was a golf course, could be maximized through a going concern bankruptcy sale or foreclosure. That is nothing like this case. The court relied on the fact that the debtor maintained an operating business, had 60 employees, and \\$300,000 a month of revenue. And the dismissal of the case would have resulted in foreclosure and the financial and employment losses that brings. I might be out of a job if you dismiss this case, Your Honor, but I don't think anybody else is going to be. I think that, you know, *Premier Golf Properties* is very, very, very different. *1121 Pier Village, Team Systems International, West Hampton Coach Works, Speer, Babayoff*, all involve situations where no non-debtor party advocated for dismissal over conversion. And in most cases, dismissal wasn't even discussed unless the debtor preferred that option.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n The court in *Team Systems,* which is a very thoughtful opinion by Judge Goldblatt, who is near the Delaware bench, specifically noted on multiple occasions that all participating creditors and the U.S. Trustee argue that conversion is better for creditors and the estate than dismissal. Under that circumstance, of course it wasn't an abuse of discretion for Judge Goldblatt to conclude that dismissal wouldn't make sense and conversion did. That's just simply not the situation here.\n\n *Fleetstar* is heavily relied upon by the Rui Ma creditors. I think it involves a very, very different situation. That was an effort to have a structured dismissal, which I think is, if not entire verboten, deeply problematic under *Jevic*. This is not a structured dismissal. No one is asking the Court to say, well, you can dismiss the case and get releases if you give some people something and other people nothing, and you know, tough luck.\n\n This is a clean dismissal request. There are some efforts to have people pay fees. I think we've always said, we don't have problems if other people get paid fees. We're not going to insist our own fees get paid, but this is really not a structured dismissal kind of case at all.\n\n The court explained in *Fleetstar*, even if the debtor's proposed dismissal scheme could pass a practicality\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n test, and the court had some real concerns about the way the structured dismissal was intended to take place, it must be denied because it seeks to alter parties' rights without their consent and lacks many of the code's most important safeguards.\n\n Here, we're asking to go back to a status quo. Nobody is losing a right they have. You know, the debtor's prepetition creditors aren't being asked to sacrifice anything. We simply seek a return to status quo.\n\n The committee also cites to the *Capra* case. *Capra* is an interesting matter. I actually think if you sort of give some deep thought to *Capra*, it helps us rather than hurts us. The big factor in *Capra* the court said a bunch of times, was the egregious misconduct that favored conversion, because the debtor had come to the judge's court and sought bankruptcy protection. And what did he do? He failed to -- you know, he -- it's really what he -- some of what he didn't do. He didn't participate meaningfully on the bankruptcy process, and you know, this case hasn't progressed that long, but there certainly have been MORs filed and the debtor has made retention applications. Didn't find -- you know, we don't think what he did made sense, but he did participate in this process. But the key issue there is, the debtor sold both a\n\nBentley and a Rolls Royce while in bankruptcy without\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n complying with Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. That's one of the -- like, on the list of really bad things to do, that's a really bad thing to do. Right? You can't simultaneously say, I want to go into bankruptcy, but then not abide by one of the most important protections. Obviously, it wasn't ordinary course. He wasn't an auto dealership. He was an individual. And so he violates 363, and the court, on numerous times, talk about how bad that is, and goes on to say, I think like the gestalt of that case is, the court didn't want to permit dismissal because the debtor wouldn't basically face any consequences for what he did. And so I think the way to think about that case is, if you do something bad before a judge, the judge is going to retain supervision over you. So send this case back to Justice Ostrager. Right? The really bad things that Kwok did were in front of Justice Ostrager. So I think if -- if *Capra* -- you know, the teaching of *Capra* is, when people do bad things, judges have the right to supervise them. The really bad things done here were done in front of Justice Ostrager. So when this case gets dismissed, you know, we're going to continue to pursue our rights in front of Justice Ostrager, and he can -- he can hold Mr. Kwok accountable for his conduct. Your Honor, the *Rolick* case is cited. It's a very short opinion. I think one way to look at *Rolick* is the\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 36 of 119\n\n people who have the largest claim should be paid attention to. The other critical differentiation is that *Rolick*, which went for conversion over dismissal, is about a group of creditors that had received prepetition judgment liens who were seeking to dismiss the case to avoid potential avoidance actions against them. It's just not a factor here. We don't have any -- there's no preference claim that could be asserted against us because we haven't received debtor property.\n\n Your Honor, I just want to take a minute to discuss a couple of other cases that are cited. *Steve and Barry's*, which is also, I think colloquially known as *Steve and Barry's*, that's *BH S & B Holdings LLC* case. Committee cites that to say that, you know, if you have an administrative lien in a solvent case, that should weigh in the favor of conversion.\n\n A, I think the Court was focused on that because of cause. B, that case had been running for years. There was inventory to deal with, there were, you know, liquidated stores. And C, I think if you read the opinion there's no suggestion that anybody even wanted conversion. So I guess the could have -- you know, had to evaluate whether it was appropriate, but nobody wanted it, much less the largest creditor.\n\nYou know, *Mitan v. Duval*, you know, it's a Sixth\n\n Circuit case. There, the largest creditor didn't favor dismissal, only the debtor did. Those creditors were -- and so, you know, the court wanted to appoint a Chapter 7 trustee in order to conduct investigations. Here, we think every creditor can go forth and do whatever discovery is important and they believe is necessary.\n\n A few other things I wanted to just note about the cases, Your Honor. Your Honor, one other point about the *Capra* case, which is heavily relied upon, is that the parties favoring dismissal, you know, were secured creditors, and the court noted those two creditors are being treated favorably by the debtor and can reasonably expect to keep receiving favorable treatment if the case is dismissed.\n\n I don't know what's going to happen between us and the debtor in the future. And the debtor says in his pleadings, they intend on paying creditors. I don't know if that will happen. I assume we'll have to litigate more. I don't know, but there's certainly no -- you know, there's no history of favorable treatment by the parties who are supporting dismissal here. Far from it. We are, to put it lightly, somewhat uncomfortable bedfellows with Kwok in supporting this motion. So I think that's another differentiation point.\n\n Your Honor, I want to make a few points about Exhibit 27, which are the -- you know, the -- it's our --\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n it's the summary of other litigation. THE COURT: And that's been admitted as a full exhibit with no objections, so go right ahead. I'm just making a note -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Okay. THE COURT: -- about that exhibit, because we still have to -- we still at some point are going to have to address the transcript exhibits. But go right ahead. MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, you know, that talks about the claims that were listed on Schedule F. Now, there -- let me first say, there have been some proofs of claim that have been filed, and I suspect that we might hear, well, if a proof of claim is filed, it's automatically treated as valid until there are an objection. I think the Court can note, in part from the Exhibit 27, but generally, that that -- it's sort of true that there's been no objection, but all those cases are in active litigation, and so it's a little -- it's not quite right to say that the proof of claim is prima facie valid until there's no -- until there's an objection, when you know that those claims have been actively contested in litigation over the years. In any event, one of the things I think is really important about these claim -- litigation claims is, there's one liquidated claim for I think 300 and maybe \\$96,000. As you go through the chart, there's \\$35,648,868 of claims that\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 39 of 119\n\n have been dismissed. There are \\$37 million in claims that have been idle for two plus years. Or thereabout. I don't want to -- I think it's two plus years. It's certainly -- and you can tell, it's a substantial amount of time.\n\n And so, you know, you're really talking a much smaller potential pool of claims. There's no evidence that any of them have trial dates or had trial dates set, and, you know, we just don't know much about when any of those claims will be heard, and its, we submit, appropriate for the Court to take into account both the qualitative difference, which is we have a judgment and these are all potential future claims that don't have a common nucleus of facts as it relates to our claim.\n\n And additionally, Your Honor, I would -- you know, a few other points to note. Many of the claims are -- at least eight of the claims, as far as we can identify involve securities violations, which you know, subject to either subordination or disallowance, but you know, I just note that as an issue. And I think what that leads to is both that PAX's views, I think are entitled to a substantial amount of weight here. But also, looking at those claims and noting how many of them are defamation claims, and the Rui Ma claim, which is obviously a personal injury type claim, go to point out some of the reasons why this case is spectacularly unsuited to bankruptcy.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n This Court, I don't think, is necessarily the right forum to have to oversee a dozen plus personal -- defamation claims that have no factual relationship in common, that have advanced to some stage in the state court. If the stay is going to be lifted to let them all be liquidated, that defeats the purpose of a centralization of forum, or a singular -- single fact finder.\n\n There are frankly open questions, as we've cited, as to whether under 28 USC 157(b)(5), this Court can even hear them, or whether those claims have to be heard in the district court. The Connecticut court has, in *Ice Cream Liquidation*, has taken a broader injury of personal injury tort claims that includes any injury which is an invasion of personal rights. I don't think the Court has to reach a conclusion on any of those, it's not before it, but I think I'm trying to give the Court a taste of why it's problematic and doesn't really serve core bankruptcy functions to have those claims liquidated when there are other options like letting people go back to state court.\n\n Obviously, in Chapter 7 -- and to be clear, Your Honor, I understand there's a broader view. We cited the *Gawker Media* case, because I think it's always incumbent on us to recognize when there are cases that say something different than the view we have. But I do think District of Connecticut's *Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.* case is a helpful\n\n one to think about in this context. You know, Your Honor, then you get to what's going to happen with all those cases. Plaintiffs are still going to have -- if they're here. Plaintiffs are still going to have the costs -- THE COURT: What's going to happen with those cases if the case -- if this case is converted? Is that your -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yes. Keep going. MR. FRIEDMAN: So a trustee is going to have to defend them. I don't know what the trustee's -- the trustee can't just say, okay, everybody, you know, I'm going to allow your claims. That's obviously deeply prejudicial to creditors with valid claims. Trustee is going to have to get paid to do that somehow. I don't know -- you know, I'll get to that in a moment. But that requires real cash on the barrel head, not -- you know, not necessarily a creed of litigation funding or contingency fees, right? That's going to be somebody who has to really dig into the merits of each of those cases. It may impose a burden on PAX to have to do the same as a party in interest, as the Court knows. Any creditor, particularly in a 7 can object to the claim of any other creditor. You know, if you don't have a trustee that's\n\n|    | 42                                                             |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | really able to defend, that burden will unfairly fall on       |\n| 2  | PAX.<br>You may also have the debtor participating in the case |\n| 3  | at that aspect.<br>I think it -- you know, you really get      |\n| 4  | something that's not well suited to the bankruptcy court,      |\n| 5  | but is appropriate to let these people go -- you know, these   |\n| 6  | claimants go back to their state court remedies and continue   |\n| 7  | to pursue whatever cases they've already brought to this       |\n| 8  | point.                                                         |\n| 9  | THE COURT:<br>Well, in addition to your argument               |\n| 10 | about 157(b)(5), what about 157 -- 28 USC 157(b)(2)(B),        |\n| 11 | which says that personal injury claims and wrongful death      |\n| 12 | claims cannot be estimated --                                  |\n| 13 | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>Yes.                                          |\n| 14 | THE COURT:<br>-- or liquidated --                              |\n| 15 | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>Yes, Your Honor.<br>Against the               |\n| 16 | compendium.                                                    |\n| 17 | THE COURT:<br>-- for purposes of distribution in a             |\n| 18 | case under Title 11?                                           |\n| 19 | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>That is the parallel point that I             |\n| 20 | anticipated that somebody might argue, oh, well you can        |\n| 21 | estimate these, and, you know, people's distributions won't    |\n| 22 | be held up for ever.<br>But again, you're then going outside   |\n| 23 | of this Court to have that done and, you know, you're          |\n| 24 | imposing a substantial burden on the federal court system in   |\n| 25 | Connecticut, when these could be dealt with in the state       |\n\n court system. Your Honor, I think -- so I think that -- that's a pretty critical point.\n\n So then we get to, you know, the other features of what this case looks like, absent -- given its current posture. There's no funding for this case, and we were always concerned that there was never going to be the kind of funding that you'd need for this case. Right? The only funding was to conduct an investigation, which was, we said from the beginning, was a bridge to nowhere, because what you -- if you were going to do anything, what you needed was a kind of action. And we -- you know, the kinds of actions we were taking outside of bankruptcy court, and that were helpful.\n\n You have here a debtor with no liquid assets, and protracted future disputes. We know that there's a lawsuit, an adversary proceeding initiated in this court already about setting aside what rights Mr. Kwok has, whether somebody else has rights to the yacht.\n\n We know that there is extensive litigation over the Sherry Netherland apartment, which would require a debtor -- the debtor -- the Chapter 7 trustee to participate in a New York bankruptcy. Just to deal with plan issues, et cetera, not even just to get the asset, but objecting to other people's claims that that case is valid that also has British Virgin Island components. You have to pay counsel\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n in the British Virgin Islands, and there's no money for that. Right? There would also be litigation presumably, because this is a 7, that you would have fights over discharging claims. You know, a trustee would have to deal with that, or individual creditors would have to pick up the burden. And then, you know -- so what do you wind up with? You wind up with a situation that there are no available funds for a trustee. There's no property you can liquidate in short order. There's a couple suits and a dog, but that's it. There's stuff people could go after, but how do you go after that? Well, you could have litigation funding. We haven't seen any evidence of litigation funding available. I think it would come at a steep cost. That cost would be borne largely by PAX, would eat into whatever recoveries PAX was able to obtain. You know -- THE COURT: Any recoveries any creditor is able to retain. MR. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor, and I think that would disproportionately fall on us, as would a contingency counsel. This Court can take, you know, notice from her own experience, contingency counsel is expensive. We know that the committee, prior to dismissal, not only -- you know, the dismissal hearing, filed motions to retain\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n fraud examiners and asset tracers, right? All of which would be, you know, expensive if people are going to take those on the come. I don't even know if they would. Usually, those kind of people I think submit hourly rates, but there's nothing to pay them. And you know, I think there are certainly cases -- you know, the *Babayoff* case the committee cites, that dismissal is preferred where there are insufficient funds and a trustee would simply add more costs and burden to the estate. THE COURT: What case was that, counsel? MR. FRIEDMAN: The *Babayoff*, 445 BR 640 -- 64 at Page 82. THE COURT: I just don't recognize that name. The other cases that you cited, I recognize, but it's in the committee's brief, you're saying? MR. FRIEDMAN: I believe so. And that cites in turn, *Midwest Properties of Shawano*. And so, you know, look, we think a trustee would add substantial burdens expense wise, and I'm not sure what -- you know, what the benefit is because in particular, we know state law remedies can be pursued, or can pursue veil piercing if appropriate. People can pursue state law fraudulent transfer claims on their own if they want to. People can seek restraining orders. PAX certainly did. And\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n there's nothing preventing people from using what state law remedies they have.\n\n You know, the Rui Ma creditor group says that Non PAX creditors will not receive equality in distributions if the case is dismissed. I don't know if that's true or not. I don't -- maybe they'll settle their claims. I don't know. Right? There's no guarantees what anybody will get outside of a bankruptcy, but parties should be able to pursue Kwok to their heart's content to recover what they want to.\n\n If there's no there there -- and this is just a sort of a frolic and detour -- if there is a there there, nobody's put a cap on how much there might be. There could well be, potentially, plenty for other people. We don't -- you know, concededly, we don't know, but PAX, I think in particular, given the size of its claim and the effort it's taken so far, shouldn't have been -- shouldn't be prejudiced by this filing, and I don't think other creditors should be permitted to essentially take advantage of a debtor's bad faith filing.\n\n The other parties sort of say, you know, there is a gamesmanship aspect to Kwok's quality -- Kwok's behavior here, and he shouldn't be rewarded for that. I don't think he is being rewarded. If this case is dismissed, he's gotten no real benefit from this case other than avoiding a couple of months in front of Justice Ostrager, which he's\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n going to have to go right back to. He hasn't gotten a benefit. The only people who have gotten benefits are people who don't have liquidated claims who are stretching PAX out, which has already been stretched out for almost 14 years. I don't think that's equity or fairness, and I don't think that's in the interest of the \\$261 million of creditor claims that PAX has.\n\n You know, we think it's actually the other parties, the other claim holders, pushing for remaining in bankruptcy that are advocating for unequal treatment. They basically want to use the bankruptcy as a collection device, something that the *In Re: Murray* case says, you know, bankruptcy shouldn't be used as a debt collection remedy that's more potent -- a debt collection remedy that's more potent in bankruptcy than the equivalent right under non- bankruptcy law is not something that we should be doing. The court denounced a creditor's use of bankruptcy as a debt collection remedy more potent than the equivalent right under state -- under non-bankruptcy law.\n\n It would be other people jumping to the front of the line, given where they stand now, to force PAX to share recoveries while imposing millions of dollars in unnecessary costs.\n\n I would note that the debtor makes the point that other creditors are basically hijacking a Chapter 11 case\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 48 of 119\n\n for a pseudo involuntary. I suspect that they amplify it. It would otherwise be unavailable to them as an avenue for relief. I will defer to the committee to further develop that argument. I think it has merit, Your Honor.\n\n Your Honor, the committee cites, and I think we note that there are factors that *Collier* talks about. Courts are sort of -- some courts really rely on them, some courts just notice them in passing. I think what I've discussed today really goes over those factors. You know, whether creditors receive preferential payments is a factor. Now there's certainly no reason to believe that PAX received any preferential payment. Would there be a loss of rights granted in the case if it were dismissed rather than converted?\n\n The Rui Ma group suggests that the rights to the \\$37 million escrow would be lost upon dismissal, but the order expressly contemplated what would happen if there is dismissal. That wasn't a mystery. Creditors -- you know, the creditors didn't have any particular right to that, and it was expressly bargained for, what might happen in the context of dismissal. So I don't think anybody is losing a right that they otherwise would have had.\n\n Whether the debtor would simply file a further case upon dismissal. I mean, I guess Kwok could try, having consented to this one and, you know, I don't think that\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n weighs in favor. The ability of a trustee to reach assets for the benefit of creditors. I think, you know, maybe, but the trustee doesn't have any money to support its efforts right now. What's deemed low hanging fruit -- first of all, it was Kwok that -- you know, it was PAX that built the tree, but more importantly, there's still a lot of wood to chop to get there on that tree. And even assuming if funding was available, it would do so at a great cost to creditors, including, I think, specifically PAX. You know, maximizing the estate's value as an economic enterprise, you know, who really knows what the economic enterprise value of this is. We know it -- I think that mostly comes up in the context of cases like the *Premier Golf* one, where there -- liquidation causes a clear loss -- a crushing loss of value and jobs. Whether the remaining issues would be resolved outside the bankruptcy forum, I think the Court might have already had a colloquy on that issue, and I think the debtor in Rui Ma, for example, we've already said, hey, you've got a case, go back and try to get it dealt with somewhere else. Whether the debtor is engaged in misconduct. I think here the debtor's misconduct is almost entirely prebankruptcy. There are some things around the edges that we obviously -- you know, we don't love about the way the\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 50 of 119\n\n debtors conducted the case, but I think they fall within the bounds of bad ideas, not corruption. And you know, I don't think creditors need a Chapter 7 case to protect their interest. People have their state law remedies fully available to them. And then, you know, other factors, single asset plan already confirmed, environmental concerns, I think as we learned from the DIP when we went over the proposed order, there are no circular concerns in this case. There's no environmental issues. This isn't a *Midlantic* type of situation. So, Your Honor, those are the reasons we believe dismissal is appropriate, that the case laws support PAX's rationale, and the cases relied upon by other parties really don't get them where they need to be in order for this Court to exercise discretion to convert rather than dismiss. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Attorney Jonas? MR. JONAS: Good morning, Your Honor. Jeff Jonas, Brown Rudnick on behalf of the debtor, Miles Kwok. Before addressing dismissal of the Chapter 11 case particularly, or alternatives, I think it's important to just step back for a minute and review how we got here, to put it in context, because I do think it's important for the Court today to put things in context and focus on the facts,\n\n|    | 51                                                            |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | not the many unsupported allegations, innuendo and argument   |\n| 2  | that will be made, have been made, and will be made by        |\n| 3  | lawyers, so you won't hear any rhetoric or vitriol from me    |\n| 4  | this morning.                                                 |\n| 5  | In this case, you've heard live testimony from two            |\n| 6  | witnesses, Craig Jalbert of Verdolino & Lowey, and from       |\n| 7  | Miles Kwok, the debtor.                                       |\n| 8  | As Mr. Kwok testified, and as set forth in the                |\n| 9  | declaration he filed, he's an outspoken critic of the         |\n| 10 | Chinese Communist Party or CCP.<br>Hundreds of millions of    |\n| 11 | people watch his broadcasts in connection with his criticism  |\n| 12 | of the CCP.<br>He and family members were jailed and tortured |\n| 13 | in China.<br>He endured watching his brother being shot and   |\n| 14 | killed.<br>He continues to be pursued and persecuted by the   |\n| 15 | CCP.                                                          |\n| 16 | This is not fantastical make believe.<br>Senior U.S.          |\n| 17 | Government officials and business leaders have been           |\n| 18 | criminally charged and pled guilty, including with acting as  |\n| 19 | foreign agents for the CCP in connection with illegally       |\n| 20 | seeking to have Mr. Kwok deported to China so he could be     |\n| 21 | jailed or killed.<br>These persons include Elliot Broidy and  |\n| 22 | George Higginbotham.                                          |\n| 23 | Your Honor, last week -- I think we mentioned this            |\n| 24 | in our papers, but to make sure you're aware -- last week,    |\n| 25 | the Department of Justice filed suit against Steve Wynn, a    |\n|    |                                                               |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 51 of 119\n\n billionaire fund-raiser and former finance chair for the Republican National Committee, based on his acting as an unregistered Chinese agent in seeking Mr. Kwok's extradition. The Justice Department references President Xi Jinping, Chinese -- China's supreme leader -- raising the U.S. returning Mr. Kwok to China directly with then President Trump. Mr. Wynn, in an effort to gain support from the Chinese government for his casinos in Macao, had contact with senior officials on the National Security Counsel at the White House, the White House Chief of Staff, and then President Trump seeking to have Mr. Kwok placed on the no- fly list, to have Mr. Kwok's U.S. visa not renewed, and have Mr. Kwok returned to China, again likely to face jail or death. Mr. Kwok believes that some, if not all, of the creditor -- the alleged creditor claims against him are part of the CCP's continuing effort to discredit and silence him. Against that backdrop, Mr. Kwok perseveres. Although he has little to no assets and income, he is supported by the largesse of his family. While his alleged creditors may not like this, there's nothing illegal, improper or wrong about this. In February, facing a New York State Court\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 53 of 119\n\n judgment and order, which he could not pay, Mr. Kwok filed this bankruptcy case. As he testified, and as set forth in his declaration, he hoped Chapter 11 would help him reach a fair and equitable resolution of alleged creditor claims. His bankruptcy filing and the administration of this case since it has -- since it was filed, has been nothing but in good faith and completely transparent. There is no evidence to the contrary. I think even Mr. Friedman admitted substantially that. While there may be allegations that Mr. Kwok owns certain assets, whether that be a yacht or a New York City apartment, these allegations remain unproven and undetermined. Since filing this case, Mr. Kwok has filed complete and accurate schedules and statement of affairs. He sat for almost two full days of 341 meetings. He came before the Court and provided live testimony. He arranged and assisted with the return of the yacht, subject of the New York State Court order, the return of which is presently secured by \\$37 million in cash. He obtained \\$9 million of DIP financing which would have been unsecured and subordinated and included a million dollar gift to the estate. And he filed a plan of reorganization. The hope was that bankruptcy would afford a forum and opportunity to have a dialog with creditors and alleged\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 54 of 119\n\n creditors in order to reach a consensual resolution, the exact purpose and point of bankruptcy. This bankruptcy filing was not in bad faith and there has been no bad faith since it has been filed. So, Your Honor, turning to dismissal, cause for dismissal under Bankruptcy Code Section 1112(b)(1), exists, specifically 1121(b)(4)(A), provides that cause includes substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. That is the only existing cause that exists. If you do look at -- I appreciate it's not absolutely exhaustive, but if you look at 1112(b)(4) -- and obviously I've referred to (A) as the cause we think is relevant in this case -- if you look at (B), we don't think any of the other causes are applicable, Your Honor. (B) gross mismanagement of the estate, I've addressed that; (C) failure to maintain appropriate insurance; (D) unauthorized use of cash collateral; (E) failure to comply with an order of the Court; (F) unexcused failure to satisfy timely any filing or reporting requirement; (G) failure to attend the meeting of creditors; (H) failure timely to provide information or\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n attend meetings requested by the United States Trustee; (I) failure timely to pay taxes; (J) failure to file a disclosure statement; (K) failure to pay any fees or charges under certain -- chapter 123 of title 28; (L) revocation of an order of confirmation; (M) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan; (N) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan; (O) termination of a confirmed plan; And lastly, (P) failure of the debtor to pay any domestic support obligations. So, Your Honor, as I've mentioned, we believe that there is cause. The relevant and applicable cause is 1121(b)(4)(A). THE COURT: May I just ask you a question on that? MR. JONAS: Certainly, Your Honor. THE COURT: I understand -- I understand your recitation of the list, and I understand that you assert that only (4) applies, but are you -- are you contesting the case law that interprets cause includes mean -- does not mean that the list -- it can only fit into the list? MR. JONAS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.\n\n MR. JONAS: Not at all. THE COURT: That's all I'm asking. MR. JONAS: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. MR. JONAS: And I think I mentioned, Your Honor, that our view is it's -- I appreciate it's not exhaustive. THE COURT: I thought you said that -- MR. JONAS: Yeah. THE COURT: -- but I just wanted to make sure for the record. MR. JONAS: No. No. No. Absolutely, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. JONAS: But I do think there's a reason that there's specified items there -- THE COURT: I understand. MR. JONAS: -- and I thought it was important to review that. THE COURT: No. I think that's helpful. Thank you. MR. JONAS: You're welcome. Your Honor, as for dismissal versus conversion or appointment of a trustee, while a debtor's preference is not dispositive, it should be given some weight. Here, the debtor and its largest creditor support dismissal. Eleven-twelve (b)(1) provides for the Court to\n\n|    | 57                                                           |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | examine which of dismissal, conversion or appointment of a   |\n| 2  | trustee is in the best interest of creditors and the estate. |\n| 3  | In SWJ Management, 551 B.R. 93, 2015 case from the           |\n| 4  | district court here in Connecticut, it was described -- this |\n| 5  | analysis was described as whether dismissal would,           |\n| 6  | quote/unquote, \"Prejudice creditors.\"                        |\n| 7  | In the Hull case, 339 B.R. 304, 2006 case from the           |\n| 8  | -- a bankruptcy court case from the Eastern District of New  |\n| 9  | York, the Court addressed what -- in this context what is    |\n| 10 | prejudice to creditors.                                      |\n| 11 | And it said, quote, \"Creditors are not generally             |\n| 12 | prejudiced by dismissal since they will no longer be stayed  |\n| 13 | from resorting to the state courts to enforce and realize    |\n| 14 | upon their claims.<br>That is, it is the reasonable pre      |\n| 15 | petition legal expectations and entitlements of a debtor's   |\n| 16 | creditors that should be considered in the context of a      |\n| 17 | debtor's timely motion to dismiss, not the loss of an        |\n| 18 | opportunity to receive a distribution through the bankruptcy |\n| 19 | process.\"                                                    |\n| 20 | THE COURT:<br>Could you just tell me that case               |\n| 21 | again, Counsel.                                              |\n| 22 | MR. JONAS:<br>Certainly.                                     |\n| 23 | THE COURT:<br>I'm sorry.                                     |\n| 24 | MR. JONAS:<br>It's the Hull case.<br>H-U --                  |\n| 25 | THE COURT:<br>Hull, H-U-L-L?                                 |\n|    |                                                              |\n\n MR. JONAS: Yes. And it's 339 B.R. 304. It's a 2006 case, Eastern District of New York. A bankruptcy court case. THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. MR. JONAS: Yes. THE COURT: I just didn't hear what you had said at the beginning. I apologize. MR. JONAS: Of course, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'll just, for the record, state we don't believe that 1112(b)(2), which would arguably prohibit conversion or dismissal, is applicable for a number of reasons. We don't believe there are unusual circumstances establishing that conversion or dismissal is not in the best interest of creditors and the estate. Another requirement there, which we don't believe is applicable, is that we don't think there's a reasonable likelihood that a plan will be confirmed with a reasonable period of time, which is another requirement to -- under 1112(b)(2). And 1112(b)(2) is not applicable if the grounds for conversion are dismissal is 1112(b)(4)(A), which, again, I'm taking you through our position that the loss or diminution and the no reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation under 1112(b)(4)(A) is the basis for dismissal.\n\n Your Honor, I won't further review PAX's allegations of bad faith. I think I've addressed those. I mean, they -- again, just briefly, they've referred I believe in an unsupported manner to -- to misrepresentations in the schedules, to a, quote/unquote, \"Bogus DIP loan,\" to the debtor, quote/unquote, \"Pulling the plug on the case.\" I don't think any of those are what happened here. I can tell you the debtor came into this court -- as I mentioned earlier -- with the hope that ultimately there would be a reorganization. That didn't happen. But nevertheless I think Mr. Friedman said it, he may not have liked it, but he didn't really take issue with the fact that there was bad faith in the case since the case has commenced. And lastly, Your Honor, I'll say, as to the -- somehow the bankruptcy filing being improper because the debtor didn't have an ongoing business, I think you said it best in the *Lucarelli* case, Your Honor, 517 B.R. 42, where you said or we've heard quoted, \"The plain language of the bankruptcy code permits individual debtors not engaged in business to file for relief under Chapter 11.\" THE COURT: I think I cited from the supreme court though for that. MR. JONAS: You cited a number of cases, Your Honor.\n\n THE COURT: I think it was the -- MR. JONAS: I'm giving you credit for it. THE COURT: I think it was the supreme court. MR. JONAS: I think you're right. Your Honor, I just -- I do think it should be noted briefly that the alleged claims of the creditors committee members that are here today are, in fact, unliquidated and disputed. Those claims as -- again, Mr. Friedman went through this and I'm not repeating a lot of what I might otherwise have said because I think Mr. Friedman covered it -- those claims would be -- would need to be litigated. Continuation of this bankruptcy case in any form will be in the context of an administratively insolvent case with no funding to support what likely could be years of litigation. Your Honor, in closing, Mr. Kwok has asked me to thank you and your staff for the time and the consideration you've given this case. Although it may not have been as successful as he would have liked, it has, at least in part, restored his confidence in the judicial system. And that said, Your Honor, respectfully, it is time to move on. This bankruptcy case should be dismissed. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you, Attorney Jonas. Attorney Goldman.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 61 of 119\n\n MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning. Irve Goldman representing the creditors committee. Your Honor, I'd like to start with the observation that whether or not this case was filed in bad faith or other cause exists, as we've stipulated, the question before the Court -- the question before the Court -- is not whether the case was filed in bad faith, but is whether conversion, dismissal, or the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is in the best interests of creditors. So whether the case was filed in bad faith or other cause exists does not change the standard of what is in the best interests of creditors in this case. And although it would be quite ironic that if the debtor's own bad faith is used to justify a dismissal of this case, it would allow him to avoid the scrutiny of the Chapter 7 process, which would entail a thorough investigation of what PAX claims were his hidden assets, that they were on the cusp of reaching before this case was filed, and he will be rewarded because what will be left will be various creditors that are scattered about in different courts that will be left to their own devices to chase down whatever assets this debtor has after PAX gets done with them as the only judgment creditor in this case. So they certainly do need the protection of the Chapter 11 -- 7 process.\n\n In terms of what the standard is under 1112, I'd like to start with the plain language of the statute, which the Supreme Court in the Second Circuit have repeatedly instructed lower courts to focus on in interpreting the bankruptcy code. Section 1112(b)(1) provides that once cause is established, the Court is required to convert or dismiss a case, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, unless the Court determines that the appointment of a Chapter 7 trustee or an examiner is in the best interest of creditors and the estate. THE COURT: I think you mean a Chapter 11 trustee, but that's fine. MR. GOLDMAN: Yes. Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's fine. I understand. I understood what you meant. MR. GOLDMAN: What PAX -- the way PAX wants the Court to read that statute is as the best interest of creditors according to the amount -- amounts of their claims. Of course it simply doesn't say that. And I'd like to emphasize that in considering the best interest, the statute uses the plural, creditors, so that the interest of the entire creditor body as a whole have to be considered, not just the interests of a single creditor that has a large claim, and that prior to\n\n bankruptcy was on the cusp of reaching -- where all creditors in this case seem to agree are the debtor's known assets right now, and that is the Lady May and the debtor's interest in the Sherry-Netherland apartment. And the term in determining the creditor body, the Court can take judicial notice of the proofs of claim that were on file right now as well as the debtor's schedule F. The proofs of claim, as of today, even though there is no bar date, total \\$71 million, and in some cases are based on allegations of grievous personal harm. For example, the claim of Rui Ma, which is close to the trial stage in the New York Supreme Court, alleges claims of sexual assault, false imprisonment, and intentional affliction of emotion distress over a period of several years. The claim of Bob Fu, based on an action in federal court in Texas, is based on allegations that the debtor promoted acts of violence against Dr. Fu, indeed, encouraged his, quote, \"Comrades,\" end quote, to kill Dr. Fu, and incited harassing protests in front of his house for weeks. The claim of Bruno Wu and Yang Lan is based on a New York Supreme Court action alleging that the debtor used his pervasive social media accounts to personally attack them by claiming, among other things, that Yang Lan had extramarital affairs and used sexual favors to obtain her\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 64 of 119\n\n prominent cultural status in China and was, quote, \"Full of sexually transmitted diseases,\" end quote. Accused Bruno Wu on repeated occasions of attempted murder and bribery and has threatened violence on social media against both of those creditors.\n\n To say that these aren't actual creditors that are deserving of the same consideration of their interests, as PAX is, really an offense to those creditors.\n\n And as I mentioned, the proof of claim deadline has not even been set. It is likely based on what was listed on schedule F that we will receive a flood of additional claims so that that \\$71 million will certainly escalate.\n\n Getting back to the plain meaning of the statute, in determining the creditors whose interests must be taken into account, under Section 1112(b)(1), I would refer the Court to Section 101(10A) of the bankruptcy code which defines creditor as, quote, \"An entity that has a claim against the debtor,\" end quote, as of the petition date.\n\n And the definition of claim under Section 101(5A), which defines a claim to include a right to payment whether or not it is reduced to judgment unliquidated or disputed.\n\n So PAX's contention that these creditors aren't actual creditors is contrary to the plain language of the bankruptcy code, because a creditor is one who holds a claim\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n and a claim could be undisputed, unliquidated and contingent. So there are creditors, actual creditors, here. And how could a creditors committee been even appointed by the U.S. Trustee if these weren't actual creditors? And what creditors are they supposed to be representing if there are no other actual creditors? PAX certainly didn't object to the retention of committee professionals based on the fact that there were no actual creditors to defend. So under a plain statutory analysis, creditors such as those who have filed proofs of claim in this case, but have not yet received judgments, are just as much creditors of this estate as is PAX for purposes of evaluating the best interest test under Section 1112(b). If anything, the interests of those creditors who allege grievous personal harm are entitled to equal, if not greater, consideration under the best interest test than is PAX whose actual money judgment -- which is attached to Mr. Friedman's declaration on the motion to dismiss as exhibit 1 -- is in the principal amount of just \\$46 million. They have \\$70 million of interest at their contractual rate of 15 percent and a \\$134 million contempt fine is not in compensation of any pecuniary loss. The test that many courts, indeed, most, have applied in determining what is in the best interest of\n\n creditors under Section 1112(b)(1), is the course of action that provides the best chance for the largest number of creditors to be paid the largest amount of money in the shortest period of time.\n\n Here, that is either conversion or the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. Because in the event of a dismissal, the largest number of creditors will suffer at the hands of one single judgment creditor who will be paid the largest amount of money, in the event of dismissal, while all the other creditors will remain mired in litigation with the debtor.\n\n As for the boat, we know that under Judge Ostrager's February 9th, 2022 decision and order, which is our exhibit 1, the debtor has already been found by clear and convincing evidence to beneficially own and control the boat. That's at page 4 of his decision.\n\n When the boat is back, PAX will simply levy on that beneficial interest and ultimately receive a distribution when it is liquidated.\n\n As for the Sherry-Netherland apartment -- of course they're poised to do that on the day of dismissal as they have that proceeding before Judge Ostrager.\n\n As for the Sherry-Netherland apartment, they're equally poised to realize on that asset in the event of dismissal.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n In the debtor's declaration, which is UCC exhibit 2, he acknowledges owning 100 percent of the membership interest in Genever Holdings Corp., which is the sole member of the title holder of the Sherry-Netherland apartment, Genever Holdings, LLC. Genever Holdings, LLC is a debtor under Chapter 11 in the Southern District of New York and the debtor claims his interests are held in trust or his son's company, Bravo Luck. That's at his declaration at paragraph 33(B). By order entered on October 8th, 2021, which is UCC exhibit 3, Judge Garrity approved a settlement agreement between Genever Holdings, PAX and Bravo Luck. That settlement agreement, which will appear at UCC exhibit 4, marked ECF 131-1, which is dated September 24th, 2021, granted PAX relief from the automatic stay to continue to prosecute the New York Supreme Court action. That's at paragraph 7(A) of the settlement agreement, page 7 of 12 of the settlement agreement. Since PAX had already received its money judgment on February 3rd, 2021, the only thing left to try in the New York Supreme Court action are PAX's veil-piercing claims against the Genever entities. And they are found in count 2 of its first amended complaint, which is UCC exhibit 10. It's page 17 of the complaint.\n\nIn addition, PAX is the beneficiary of an order\n\n requiring Mr. Kwok to turn over his 100 percent ownership interest in Genever -- the Genever -- 100 percent owner of Genever Holdings to PAX. That's UCC exhibit 6. The order was entered on September 22nd, 2021. And PAX had filed a motion for contempt in a New York dated January 7th, 2022 for Kwok's failure to turn the shares over. That I believe is exhibit 7 of our exhibits.\n\n It's expected that that motion will be refiled or resumed on dismissal.\n\n PAX has similar veil-piercing type claims relief pending in the courts of the British Virgin Islands. UCC exhibit 11 is PAX's amended statement of claim in that court. In that amended claim, they allege, among other things, that Mr. Kwok used \\$70 million of his own assets to transfer to Bravo Luck -- that's paragraph 29 of exhibit 11 -- that the declaration of trust that Mr. Kwok claims to have with Bravo Luck was a fraud, quote, \"Devised to hold his shares in Genever BVI in trust for Bravo Bravo.\"\n\n Bravo Luck was a fraud -- excuse me -- it was a fraud, quote, \"Devised for the sole purpose of concealing an asset of Mr. Kwok from his creditors.\" That the trust document should be set aside as a, quote, \"Document intended to defraud creditors of Mr. Kwok.\" Creditors, plural. That's paragraph 35. And that Mr. Kwok is the beneficial owner of Bravo Luck and his son is his mere nominee.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n Under the settlement agreement that Judge Garrity approved, the parties, that is, PAX and Bravo Luck, were also permitted to proceed with the British Virgin Island litigation. So they are very poised to also realize on the Sherry-Netherland apartment based on those claims that will be resolved in the British Virgin Islands or in the New York State Court. In terms of what's happening with the apartment in the Genever Holdings case, Melanie Cyganowski was appointed the sales officer to market and sell the property. That's at UCC exhibit 8. And Sotheby's was approved as the broker for the property, UCC exhibit 9, and the property is currently listed on Sotheby's website for \\$38,500,000. So they are -- PAX is very well positioned to realized on the assets on dismissal ahead of other creditors, who, again, will be left with litigating against Mr. Kwok, and thereafter getting judgments, chasing down whatever assets are left. The additional potential assets we contend would be -- potential assets to recover in a Chapter 7 -- are two Greenwich properties that are owned by Greenwich Land, LLC. UCC exhibits 13 and 14. The properties are described in those exhibits. In paragraph 17, in Mr. Kwok's declaration, he\n\n claims his Greenwich residence, quote, \"Is owned by my wife through Greenwich Land, LLC.\" That remains to be seen whether that's another one of his concealed assets. Which of course could be investigated in a Chapter 7, which we were in the process of trying to investigate when the debtor filed his consent to dismissal on May 11th. I'd like to turn now to PAX's argument that the touchstone of what is in the best interest of the estate is the preference of creditors, and that the best interest of creditors must reflect PAX's view as the single largest creditor. The touchstone of the best interest of creditors test is not what the creditors prefer. It is the course of action that provides the best hope of recovery for the largest number of creditors, and not the course that will afford the most recovery for the most vocal or the largest creditor. Preliminarily, the case authority that PAX cites for that proposition that a single creditor can -- with a large enough claim can suffice for purposes of the best interest test is completely in opposite I think to this case and otherwise doesn't support PAX's theory. In the *Acme Cake* case, which is the case it's relying on, not a single creditor or even the creditors committee itself objected to a dismissal of the case.\n\n It was counsel for the creditors committee that had objected to dismissal on the basis that it should not be granted because administrative expenses, including its fees, were not being paid, and a dismissal would violate the priority scheme of the bankruptcy code by allowing the creditor requesting dismissal to be paid ahead of administrative claimants.\n\n Of course here that is not what the argument is. The creditors committee who represents the interests of all unsecured creditors is objecting to dismissal. We are not making this argument, although I do believe the case should be, if Your Honor was inclined to dismiss, it should be conditioned on payment over the fees.\n\n The reason we are objecting is because dismissal is not in the best interest of creditors, and that simply was not an argument that was made in the *Acme Cake* case. And in fact --\n\n THE COURT: Can I just ask you a question about that?\n\nMR. GOLDMAN: Yes.\n\n THE COURT: You just said that -- obviously I understand that the committee's position is dismissal is not appropriate but conversion or appointment of trustee is, but you also just said that if the Court was to dismiss you'd want it to be conditioned on the payment of the committee's\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n| 1  | fees.<br>And I just want to understand how that would work |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2  | from your perspective?                                     |\n| 3  | How would a court condition dismissal on payment           |\n| 4  | of fees in an estate where there's no money?               |\n| 5  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>If Mr. Kwok wants a dismissal of the       |\n| 6  | case so that he does not have to go through the Chapter 7  |\n| 7  | process and face potential 523 non-dischargeability claims |\n| 8  | as well as 727 denial of discharge claims, as well as the  |\n| 9  | process of hunting down his hidden assets and collecting   |\n| 10 | them, then just as he found the money to put up to secure  |\n| 11 | the return of the boat, and just as he found the money to  |\n| 12 | propose to fund the case with an \\$8 million DIP loan, he  |\n| 13 | will find the money if the Court conditions dismissal on   |\n| 14 | payment of the fees.                                       |\n| 15 | THE COURT:<br>Have you -- I haven't seen -- but I          |\n| 16 | may have missed this, okay, so just understand -- have you |\n| 17 | cited any cases that support the authority of the Court to |\n| 18 | do that, to do what you're suggesting?                     |\n| 19 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>There's no direct case that I found,       |\n| 20 | Your Honor.                                                |\n| 21 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>Okay.<br>I'm just asking the        |\n| 22 | question --                                                |\n| 23 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>No.                                        |\n| 24 | THE COURT:<br>-- and so I make sure that I've read         |\n| 25 | your papers properly.                                      |\n|    |                                                            |\n\n Go ahead. I'm sorry. I just wanted to ask that when you brought that up. MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Another critical distinguishing feature of *Acme Cake* case is that in that case the Court found that converting the case or appointing a Chapter 11 trustee, quote, \"Would result in the unsecured creditors receiving little distribution, if any.\" And that certainly cannot be -- cannot be said here. They did make the -- they actually quoted a decision in a California bankruptcy case -- from a California bankruptcy case -- in saying that, quote, \"It is not necessary that the interest of every creditor actually favor conversion. There is no specific numerosity requirement inherent in section 1112(b). The interest of a single creditor with a large enough claim will suffice.\" That is a direct quote from a case called *In re Staff Investment*, a California bankruptcy case 146 B.R. 256. If you take a look at that case, it's completely distinguishable from this case. The single largest unsecured creditor in that case held a deficiency claim of \\$600,000 on a mortgage against the single asset of the estate. That was the deficiency component of the claim. It totaled 95 percent of all unsecured creditors. And there were only other unsecured claims totaling \\$21,000.\n\n So this single quote from a California bankruptcy case, which really is dicta because no one was making the argument that, you know, the dismissing -- the creditor wanted dismissal would run away with all the assets ahead of the other creditors is really much too thin a read upon which to overcome the overwhelming authority that holds that the best interest of creditors under 1112(b) is supposed to consider the interests of the entire creditor body, not a single creditor's parochial interest.\n\n And that means considering whether creditors as a whole will do better in Chapter 7. And that certainly is the case here based on how posed PAX is to recover on what I would call the low-hanging fruit of assets that now exist, that we know at least there are legitimate and very weighty claims to for the estate.\n\n PAX is so emboldened by the amount and status of its claim that it proclaims that, quote, \"Given the size of Pax's already adjudicated judgments, PAX is entitled to recover first.\" That's at its memorandum of Y at 4. This turns the fundamental policy of equality of distribution among creditors on its head and instead adopts the every creditor for itself rule that exists outside of bankruptcy. But that's not the standard for the best interest\n\nof the creditors.\n\nWe are in a bankruptcy case. And inherent in that\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n|    | 75                                                             |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | standard is considering what will serve the equality -- what   |\n| 2  | will serve the overriding bankruptcy policy of equality of     |\n| 3  | distribution.                                                  |\n| 4  | Finally, comparing the committee's preference for              |\n| 5  | conversion to an involuntary bankruptcy because the debtor     |\n| 6  | wants a dismissal is a red herring.                            |\n| 7  | First, courts have held that a debtor's preference             |\n| 8  | for dismissal is irrelevant under 1112(b) unless it happens    |\n| 9  | to coincide with the creditors' interests.                     |\n| 10 | And section 1112(b)(1) mentions only the best                  |\n| 11 | interests of creditors and the estate and does not mention     |\n| 12 | the interests of the debtor, such as is mentioned in section   |\n| 13 | 305 of the bankruptcy code.<br>So the omission of the debtor's |\n| 14 | interest is intentional in 1112(b)(1).                         |\n| 15 | Second, the conversion of the case here is                     |\n| 16 | authorized, specifically authorized, under section             |\n| 17 | 1112(b)(1) if it is in the best interest of creditors.<br>This |\n| 18 | standard has nothing to do with the commencement of an         |\n| 19 | involuntary petition under section 303.<br>They are two        |\n| 20 | completely different standards under entirely different        |\n| 21 | situations, so you cannot analogize what is specifically       |\n| 22 | authorized under 1112(b) with the commencement of an           |\n| 23 | involuntary bankruptcy.                                        |\n| 24 | The final additional points I'd like to make is                |\n| 25 | that this debtor should not be able to escape the scrutiny     |\n\n of the Chapter 7 process with the prospect of a denial of discharge, particularly under section 727(a)(2), which will provide or which provides grounds for denial of discharge if there is a concealment of assets within the one year of bankruptcy. And there are many cases that hold that even though an asset might have been transferred outside the one- year period, if the debtor continues to conceal that interest into the one-year period, that concealment will serve as a ground for denial of discharge under section 727(a)(2). If the Court does decide to dismiss the case without conditioning dismissal on the payment of professional fees of the committee, the committee would like to reserve the right to seek a motion to review and disgorge fees of the retainer that was paid to debtor's counsel in the amount of a million dollars. So I would leave the Court with that, with that request. I would like to respond briefly to some points that both Mr. Friedman and Mr. Jonas made at various times during their arguments, and then I'll sit down. Mr. Friedman mentioned the *Sapphire* case in support of dismissal. If Your Honor looks at that case, there were very few unsecured creditors in that case. And, in addition, they had other sources of recovery in the form\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 77 of 119\n\n of a guarantor and other joint -- and/or other joint obligors. We obviously do not have that here. Mr. Friedman stated that all they were really doing here was returning to the status quo. But returning to the status quo means that they will be first in line to realize on all the assets, and that's why these creditors need the protection of a Chapter 7 case. Mr. Friedman called into question the personal injury tort claims that exist in this estate. What would happen in a Chapter 7 case is that a trustee would first look and seek to recover assets of the estate. And once that process is concluded, a trustee would then turn to the process of reviewing claims and objecting to them if necessary. So you would first have a marshaling of assets to determine what assets exist. Then there would be a review of the claims. Which is the trustee's duty to do under section 704(5). The trustee wouldn't be retaining special counsel to review those claims, so there would be no costs associated with that review. And parties can object to those claims if the claims are thought better off to be resolved in other courts. A relief from stay could be granted, and the\n\nIt would have no impact on the bankruptcy process itself.\n\ndebtor, if the debtor so wished, could defend those claims.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 78 of 119\n\n It would simply be a process of liquidating those claims in other courts, which is commonly done. If a claim, for example, is on the verge of trial or close to trial, it's not uncommon for the creditor to seek relief from stay in order to liquidate the claim in another court and then come back to the bankruptcy court with the amount of their claim. So that is -- that is a routine process in Chapter 11 -- Chapter 7 cases. As far as funding to litigate the assets that we know do exist, the boat and the apartment, we -- I'm confident that a trustee could get litigation funding. Now, yes, there's no evidence that litigation funding is available today, but this debtor just filed its consent to dismissal on May 11th. You cannot possibly expect the committee or a trustee to chase down litigation funding in a matter of a couple of weeks, which is -- which is all we've had, and present evidence that there's some, you know, binding commitment to provide litigation funding to a party that doesn't even exist yet because the funding would have to be provided to either a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 trustee. So I think, you know, a trustee should be given an opportunity to do that or to retain special counsel to at least take the litigation on a contingency-fee basis. And, yes, that will involve collecting a percentage of any\n\n recovery, but that's the -- that's common in Chapter 7 cases, and it's a negotiable fee. Yes, the boat is worth a lot of money and that will come out of the recovery if special counsel does take it on a contingency-fee basis, but that is no basis to conclude that the best interests of every other single creditor, other than PAX, would be served by that process, because they would be served by that process. The only creditor that would not be served would be PAX. In terms of using bankruptcy as a debt collection device, I mean, bankruptcy is a collective proceeding where a debtor files for bankruptcy and surrenders his non-exempt assets to creditors in exchange for seeking a discharge. That is what bankruptcy is all about, so it very much is a collective proceeding that is used to marshal and liquidate the assets of the estate for the benefit of all creditors equally, and that I submit is what the Court should do here. And that's all I have, Your Honor, unless you have any questions. THE COURT: I don't have any other questions. Thank you. Attorney Claiborn, do you wish to be heard? I'm sorry. Go ahead, Attorney Callari. She can come up first. And then Attorney Claiborn can if you'd like to be\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n heard after. MS. CALLARI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Carollynn Callari on behalf of certain of the creditors. Your Honor, I'm just really here to support what Attorney Goldman stated. I think he did a really good job. It makes my job easier. But I do want to highlight a couple of points. One, just to go to debtor's comments before we get to the actual issue, they tell a very nice story, but they don't complete the story when they give the backdrop that, you know, there's news articles about him, people being investigated for wanting to have him sent back to China. That's not disputed. What's disputed in the back story is why? And he is wanted back in China to face allegations of corruption, rape, kidnaping and bribery. That's why he doesn't want to go back there. So I just wanted to clarify that. With respect to what's really before the Court, it really is, what is in the best interests of the creditors and the estate. And we hear a lot of different stories, but really, when you look at that specific issue, first, on the claims, 101 speaks for itself on the definition of creditors and claims. We have a lot of creditors here. A lot of claims here.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 81 of 119\n\n|    | 81                                                              |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | The case here is not like the claims -- cases                   |\n| 2  | cited by PAX, Your Honor.<br>In those cases, when you're        |\n| 3  | dealing with a large creditor, if you look at them, often       |\n| 4  | it's a secured creditor having 95 to 98 percent of the          |\n| 5  | claims, in a -- you know, in a deficiency type of claim.        |\n| 6  | Here, if you break it down, Your Honor, PAX's                   |\n| 7  | original claim -- let's bring the Court back -- is \\$46         |\n| 8  | million.<br>My client, Rui Ma's claim, is asserted at 20        |\n| 9  | million.<br>Not much of a difference.<br>They just got a        |\n| 10 | judgment first.<br>She shouldn't be prejudiced by that.         |\n| 11 | If you look at the schedule claims, the debtor's                |\n| 12 | scheduled -- although he disputes virtually every claim --      |\n| 13 | he scheduled over approximately \\$120 million in claims.<br>And |\n| 14 | then he also lists dozens of other creditors in unknown         |\n| 15 | amounts.                                                        |\n| 16 | So if you take PAX's 46 million, he's by far --                 |\n| 17 | they are by far not a very large creditor compared to           |\n| 18 | others.<br>If you add in the interest, it's 116 million.<br>One |\n| 19 | hundred and sixteen million versus the scheduled -- even        |\n| 20 | though disputed, just because it's disputed doesn't make it     |\n| 21 | a bonafide dispute -- but having said that, 125 to 116          |\n| 22 | million.<br>We're about 50/50.<br>It's only when you add in all |\n| 23 | the contempt charges that their claim really balloons to        |\n| 24 | over 250 million.                                               |\n| 25 | So, first of all, the size that they keep trying                |\n|    |                                                                 |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 82 of 119\n\n to say that they are this large creditor that should have a say and run this case is just not the same as those other cases that they cite. And we are creditors even if we're not liquidated at this time, Your Honor. Second, PAX can't have it both ways when they say Your Honor there's no assets in this case. It should be dismissed. What kind of case is it? There's no creditors, no assets, no operation. This is an individual Chapter 11. We know there's no operations. But I don't think any creditor sitting on this side of the table genuinely thinks there are no assets in this case even though they only listed *de minimis* assets on their schedules. And that's why we are here. This case, as Mr. Goldman said, is to marshal those assets. And how could it be more efficient than for one fiduciary to marshal the assets for all creditors, rather than each creditor, dozens of them, having to go and undertake what admittedly PAX's counsel has had undertaken for years. But each of us having to undertake veil-piercing and all of these other, you know, litigations and loops we have to go through to get those assets when one fiduciary could marshal the assets. That is a purpose of bankruptcy. That's an appropriate purpose. And that's why it should be converted to a 7 to allow that to happen.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n As far as funding, what Mr. Goldman alluded to is the issue we would have in the two weeks that we've had to try to find the initial funding is we don't have a counter- party yet. You need to have the Chapter 7 trustee or the Chapter 11 trustee be the counter-party to a funding. And if you just look at the facts here, when you have a low- hanging fruit of a yacht, this is ripe for a contingency type of arrangement. So I don't think the fact that we don't have evidence here today of actual commitment for funding should prevent Your Honor from acknowledging and inferring that funding could be available to a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 trustee in this situation. And I know that Mr. Friedman's a much better negotiator than his papers when he's talking about a 20 to 30 percent contingency fee in this case. I think you could do milestones -- which is the conversations I've been having -- which is you have a certain percentage for the yacht. And if it takes longer, the percentage goes up. And then once you get the yacht, maybe that's your funding. Maybe you don't need to have\n\n So there's ways to have the Chapter 11 -- or in our case we even say a Chapter 7 trustee -- to fund these cases. And we think that the Chapter -- a Chapter 7 should\n\nmore. You know. You can use those proceeds.\n\n|    | 84                                                           |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | be given a chance for a fiduciary to look at this, try to    |\n| 2  | marshal all the assets for all the benefit of all the        |\n| 3  | creditors.                                                   |\n| 4  | If in a short period of time it couldn't have                |\n| 5  | funding, there's -- without prejudice to having it dismissed |\n| 6  | then.                                                        |\n| 7  | But to say that our clients should all be                    |\n| 8  | prejudiced by the fact that the case should be dismissed now |\n| 9  | and basically reward the debtor -- he got what he wanted --  |\n| 10 | he filed this go get a breathing spell -- he got a short     |\n| 11 | breathing spell -- and now he doesn't want to have to face   |\n| 12 | all of the burdens of a Chapter -- of a bankruptcy and he    |\n| 13 | shouldn't be rewarded with that.                             |\n| 14 | We should be able to have an investigation, which            |\n| 15 | can be funded, and allow all the creditors to share equally  |\n| 16 | in the distributions, Your Honor, because we are real        |\n| 17 | creditors.                                                   |\n| 18 | If, however, Your Honor, by the way finds that she           |\n| 19 | cannot condition dismissal to make sure that parties are not |\n| 20 | further prejudiced by the egregious conduct of this debtor,  |\n| 21 | I think that weighs even more in favor of conversion.<br>I   |\n| 22 | think Your Honor probably can condition it.<br>But if she    |\n| 23 | couldn't, it weighs more in favor of a conversion to 7       |\n| 24 | rather than dismissal.                                       |\n| 25 | Creditors have expended a significant amount of              |\n|    |                                                              |\n\n|    | 85                                                             |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | time and expense in this case.<br>And now for it to be pulled  |\n| 2  | out -- the rug pulled out from under us because they pulled    |\n| 3  | the funding, that is very inequitable -- as well as the        |\n| 4  | administrative fees, they should be paid if this case is       |\n| 5  | dismissed -- and we would ask Your Honor to retain             |\n| 6  | jurisdiction regardless to deal with certain issues as far     |\n| 7  | as -- as Mr. Goldman said -- with respect to retainers and     |\n| 8  | things of that nature if Your Honor does dismiss it.           |\n| 9  | But we do think that conversion to a 7 is viable               |\n| 10 | and it is the -- in the best interest of all the creditors     |\n| 11 | to do that, Your Honor.                                        |\n| 12 | And we don't think it's prejudicial to PAX                     |\n| 13 | because, frankly, if they wanted a say in who the trustee is   |\n| 14 | appointed, they can I think under 702.<br>They can see who the |\n| 15 | -- you know, have a say in --                                  |\n| 16 | THE COURT:<br>They can all elect the trustee, right.           |\n| 17 | MS. CALLARI:<br>Yeah.                                          |\n| 18 | THE COURT:<br>But I have a question or two you.                |\n| 19 | MS. CALLARI:<br>Yes.<br>Please.                                |\n| 20 | THE COURT:<br>So assume that I agree with you and I            |\n| 21 | convert this case to a Chapter 7, how is your claim -- your    |\n| 22 | clients' claims going to be liquidated?<br>Because the trustee |\n| 23 | can't do it.                                                   |\n| 24 | MS. CALLARI:<br>Correct, Your Honor.                           |\n| 25 | THE COURT:<br>So then your claim has to still be               |\n|    |                                                                |\n\n tried outside this court in the New York Court as do the other personal injury claim claimants' claims. MS. CALLARI: Yeah. So certainly with respect to Rui Ma, Your Honor, has that proposed order -- Your Honor has had that proposed order and we presumed you were waiting until after this to lift the stay in order to have her proceed in state court. So, yes, for certainly Rui Ma we would anticipate that that would be litigated back in state court. THE COURT: So what's a trustee going to do with that claim? I'm trying to -- MS. CALLARI: No. I understand. THE COURT: I'm trying to -- what is a Chapter 7 trustee going to do with that claim? A Chapter 7 trustee has to wait -- MS. CALLARI: Yeah. THE COURT: -- until that claim is liquidated, right? And then depending upon what you do, which is completely your clients' rights under applicable non- bankruptcy law, there's a trial, whatever the decision is is the decision. Somebody may appeal it. Somebody may not. But let's be honest, it's likely there will be an appeal, so that case could go on for years before that claim is liquidated, correct?\n\n MS. CALLARI: It could. THE COURT: Yeah. MS. CALLARI: And it also could be liquidated pretty promptly. THE COURT: Okay. MS. CALLARI: We don't know. So -- THE COURT: But not in this court. MS. CALLARI: No. Her claim would have to be liquidated in the state court. Or generally personally injury claims, Your Honor -- I do think that when you have personal injury claims sometimes a bankruptcy court can set forth a mediation process and -- THE COURT: Not in a -- not under 28 U.S.C. -- MS. CALLARI: Correct. You can estimate -- THE COURT: -- 157(b)(2)(B) in a Chapter 7 case where the claims are contingent and unliquidated. The statute is very clear that it's not a core proceeding. And so one of the problems that we have in this case is that those are the types of claims that the trustee is going to be met with, right? MS. CALLARI: Correct. THE COURT: So what's -- so my questions is, so what's the trustee supposed to do? MS. CALLARI: The trustee -- THE COURT: Keep the case open for years until --\n\n|    | 88                                                            |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | and then investigate with no funds?                           |\n| 2  | I mean, I hear what you're saying about a funding             |\n| 3  | issue, but why couldn't the committee have funding funders    |\n| 4  | right now?                                                    |\n| 5  | They could have the -- the committee could have               |\n| 6  | litigation funding.<br>Why couldn't they?                     |\n| 7  | MS. CALLARI:<br>They couldn't at this point, because          |\n| 8  | within the last two weeks, to try to get that when you knew   |\n| 9  | your were facing a dismissal and the committee would be       |\n| 10 | disbanded, was not practical.                                 |\n| 11 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>But the dismissal -- I                 |\n| 12 | understand what you're saying about the debtor's position on  |\n| 13 | dismissal.<br>But PAX's position on dismissal has been clear  |\n| 14 | for some time.<br>In fact, they agreed to extend the hearing  |\n| 15 | period out because the code required that a hearing be --     |\n| 16 | happened within 30 days and it didn't.                        |\n| 17 | You know, all I'm saying to you is a Chapter 7                |\n| 18 | case, the Chapter 7 trustee, what's the Chapter 7 trustee     |\n| 19 | got to work with?                                             |\n| 20 | MS. CALLARI:<br>So there's two things.                        |\n| 21 | One, on your point about the committee, until two             |\n| 22 | weeks ago, the committee had funding from the debtor.<br>They |\n| 23 | pulled the funding so we didn't need to go see --             |\n| 24 | THE COURT:<br>Well, they didn't have funding.<br>It           |\n| 25 | hadn't been approved yet.<br>Okay?                            |\n|    |                                                               |\n\n MS. CALLARI: This is true. THE COURT: So no one had funding. MS. CALLARI: But we anticipated there would be some sort of funding, so we -- THE COURT: I understand that. MS. CALLARI: Right. THE COURT: But it hadn't been approved yet. And that's how the process works, right? MS. CALLARI: Yes. THE COURT: Just how -- we have to remember how the process works. So they didn't have funding. There was no funding that was authorized by the Court. The Court took that funding under advisement. And then the debtor decided -- or I shouldn't say the debtor -- the funder, the loan -- the lender decided to withdraw its funding commitment and the debtor withdrew the motion for the DIP financing. So I understand every thing you're saying, but there's a process the Court has to follow, right? I mean, we talk about litigation funding, contingent special counsel. Just because people say that can happen doesn't mean it will happen. The Court still has to approve those applications. And if those applications aren't approved, then there isn't going to be this plan to\n\n go down the way that people have, you know, suggested. The problem is there's a lot of different concerns when -- if and when this case converts to a Chapter 7 as opposed to staying -- staying a Chapter 11. So, again, the Court can deny dismissal, could deny conversion, could deny the appointment of a trustee. That's what I'd have to find. Attorney Goldman is correct. And the issue is what are we going to do? And I think I said that I think a week or so ago when you all stipulated that cause exists. Okay. Great. That's very helpful to the Court. And I appreciate that everybody's stipulating that cause exists, but I have to do one of those things, right? So I have to figure out what is the best thing to do in this case. And the concerns about conversion are many. Handing this to a Chapter 7 trustee to do what? What's the Chapter 7 trustee going to do? The Chapter 7 trustee has no available assets to do anything. You're talking about possibly getting a litigation funding source. Okay. But that has to be approved and it might not be approved. And there has to be a plan. And if the plan -- I don't mean a plan of reorganization, that's not what I mean.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 91 of 119\n\n I mean -- I don't mean the word plan as used in the bankruptcy code -- there has to be a way to accomplish what you're trying to accomplish. And a Chapter 7 trustee won't have anything to work with. MS. CALLARI: Thank you, Your Honor. Either a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 trustee, Your Honor, we believe will have funding. I know it's not here. But to the point was, is that even though Your Honor had not approved it yet, the committee did not have a need to go look for funding before May 11th. That was the first part. We believed there was funding. THE COURT: That's fair. MS. CALLARI: And now a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 trustee, we are asserting, would be able to receive the necessary funding to go after, for instance, the yacht. It shouldn't take that much to proceed with that litigation. And if that actually goes the way we think it will, there would be ample funding for this case. THE COURT: Well, how is a Chapter 7 trustee going to go after the yacht? Explain that to me. MS. CALLARI: It can't marshal -- it can marshal assets the way it does in any other case. THE COURT: But right now there's no finding in this court that the debtor owns the yacht, so how's a\n\n Chapter 7 trustee going to marshal the yacht? MS. CALLARI: Eleven or a -- Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 would have to have a finding made first. THE COURT: Well, right now, there's an order for relief from stay -- MS. CALLARI: Right. THE COURT: -- governing what happens with the yacht, right? MS. CALLARI: Yes. THE COURT: Which is the yacht has to come back into the jurisdiction. And then, if it does in a timely manner, then the \\$37 million goes back to the party that posted the money and then the yacht's there. Where? Either in Connecticut or New York depending upon how things are developed. So how's a Chapter 7 trustee going to marshal the yacht? MS. CALLARI: Just like you would in a Chapter 11. You -- THE COURT: But the debtor doesn't own the yacht in this court. There's been no findings. So he'd have to start some cause of action, wouldn't he? MS. CALLARI: Right. Yes. THE COURT: So who's going to pay to do that? MS. CALLARI: That's where the funding comes in.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 92 of 119\n\n THE COURT: And who's -- who's going to defend to do that? And then when the trustee does that, then PAX is going to object and say it's already -- it's already been determined in the New York State Court. So you can't undo the judgment of the New York State Court judge. You can't -- you can't do that. There's going to be collateral estoppel effects, right? 9 There hasn't been an appeal. There's all kinds of issues here, right? So, as I said, my issue with -- there's -- I have issues with every path. Okay? But with regard to the Chapter 7, I don't know what a Chapter 7 trustee is supposed to do or can do. The Chapter 7 trustee could come here and say they're going to do 18 things, but if they don't have the right to do those things or a funding source to do those things, then there's no point in converting the case to a Chapter 7. MS. CALLARI: Yeah. And we -- THE COURT: There's no point. MS. CALLARI: And we believe that the Chapter 7 trustee would -- and, again -- or a Chapter 11 trustee -- but either way -- would have the ability to have funding sufficient to have this court adjudicate that it is property of the estate, and that's what we would expect them to do,\n\n and do the marshaling first before they deal with actually adjudicating the claims. Which the other litigations are generally going to be stayed, so that reduces costs. People talk about costs -- THE COURT: Well, I don't agree with that. You don't want yours stayed, right? And other claimants may come in and seek relief from a stay too -- MS. CALLARI: They may. THE COURT: -- and want their claims adjudicated outside of this court. And so what I'm saying to you is -- I'm just trying to understand -- your client in particular has what is -- apparently no ruling has been made, but what is a personal injury tort claim that under the United States code Congress decided this court can't decide. Okay. And *Stern* supports that, right? And even *Wellness* supports that because no one is consenting to this court adjudicating that claim. Okay? So the -- it can't be adjudicated here. MS. CALLARI: Correct. THE COURT: So all the other claims that we talked about -- and I don't -- I don't have the figures in front of me right now -- but the claims other than PAX's claims I\n\n| 1  | believe -- and you should all correct me -- but more than      |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2  | half of them are personal injury tort claims.<br>And if        |\n| 3  | they're personal injury tort claims, they cannot be --         |\n| 4  | estimate -- the statute says -- and I think I can recite it    |\n| 5  | -- liquidated or estimated for purposes of distribution in a   |\n| 6  | case under title 11.                                           |\n| 7  | All Congress decided that a bankruptcy court could             |\n| 8  | do as a court proceeding is estimate claims in connection      |\n| 9  | with a plan in a Chapter 11, 12 or 13 case.<br>But it says you |\n| 10 | cannot -- a bankruptcy court cannot liquidate or estimate      |\n| 11 | personal contingent and unliquidated personal injury tort      |\n| 12 | claims and wrongful death claims for purposes of               |\n| 13 | distribution in a case under title 11.                         |\n| 14 | So a trustee can't do that.                                    |\n| 15 | MS. CALLARI:<br>Right.                                         |\n| 16 | THE COURT:<br>I mean, the Chapter 7 trustee can't do           |\n| 17 | that.<br>He/she's hands are already tied from the start.       |\n| 18 | So then they have to -- then they're going to try              |\n| 19 | to find assets that -- the debtor's going to fight that.<br>I  |\n| 20 | mean, look at what's going on for the last 15 years or how     |\n| 21 | many years it's been.                                          |\n| 22 | If you do think the debtor's not going to fight                |\n| 23 | the attempt to have the boat be deemed an asset of the         |\n| 24 | estate, I mean, of course they're going to fight it.<br>And    |\n| 25 | then anything else you do.                                     |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n And then -- so how much money is there going to be to fund this Chapter 7 estate on claims that are at this point -- at this point -- I'm not saying couldn't change -- but at this point they're speculative, right? So the concern is that a Chapter 7 trustee, from the Court's view of this case at this point, I don't know how the Chapter 7 trustee can carry out the duties that are required under the code under the facts and circumstances of this case. MS. CALLARI: Thank you, Your Honor. We do think the funding is -- could be available and we do think that the trustee could marshal the assets while the claims are being litigated and then brought back here to be distributed, the alternative of having it dismissed, and basically having PAX be able to grab it all and each individual creditor have to then adjudicate individually to go after each -- after each asset. We don't think that's in the best interest of creditors. But I understand Your Honor's concern. But we do think a conversion or a Chapter 11 is certainly better than a dismissal for the creditors, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that. And I'm just asking you the questions -- MS. CALLARI: Yeah. I appreciate that. THE COURT: -- specifically because of your\n\n clients' claims. MS. CALLARI: I appreciate that. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Attorney Claiborn? MS. CLAIBORN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. CLAIBORN: This case has now devolved to a simple, but difficult place. Cause has been found under section 1112(b) and it's now the Court's difficult and heavy duty and burden to make a choice. The debtor has admitted that the relief available under 1112(b)(2) is no longer in play, so that puts the choices for a form of relief to the three that we've discussed briefly today, dismissal, conversion, or a Chapter 11 trustee. And each of them admittedly has its own challenges and impact on the constituencies of this case. The U.S. Trustee has no preference for which form of relief the Court should choose. And with respect to the relief of an examiner that was requested in the U.S. Trustee's motion at ECF 102, that relief, provided the Court makes an immediate decision as to dismissal, conversion, or a Chapter 11 trustee, will become moot.\n\n I want to make clear to the Court, Your Honor, that is the U.S. Trustee's job to point out that in this particular case, and consistent with all Chapter 11 cases, that should the Court determine a Chapter 11 trustee is the most appropriate relief, that such a trustee should have the powers and the rights bestowed by the code in section 1106, and that there is no authority to limit them or prescribe them or control them.\n\n If the Court determines today that dismissal is the most appropriate relief, then this case should be dismissed immediately and not conditioned on any event, and nor should the dismissal be in conjunction with any event.\n\n Fee applications for retained professionals can be filed and determined after dismissal.\n\n And in the end, Your Honor, I think the most important point -- and it's a hard one -- is that this case needs a swift decision. But the Court has before it the facts that would enable the Court to make a choice. And in the end, in urging a swift decision, I want to point out delay negatively affects the creditors and does reward the debtor. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Friedman?\n\n MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I just want to make some brief rebuttal points.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n The first is that counsel for the committee and others argue that the debtor would be rewarded by having this case go away. It's just not true. People are going to get the debtor's assets one way or the other. The second point -- to the extent they exist. The second point is I didn't fully -- I think there was reference to the fact that Chapter 7 could be useful because maybe the -- Mr. Kwok wouldn't get discharges. Of course, outside of bankruptcy, he doesn't get a discharge either. Another point I wanted to make, Your Honor, I'd ask you to look at exhibit 27 we filed because -- THE COURT: Of your own exhibits? Of PAX exhibits? MR. FRIEDMAN: Exhibit 27. PAX exhibit 27. THE COURT: Okay. Give me one second, please, and I will try to get there. MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. THE COURT: You'll have to give me a minute. Do you know what page of the document it starts on? It's document 404. Do you know what page exhibit 27 starts on, because it's 1500 pages. MR. FRIEDMAN: My apologies. THE COURT: Oh, 1,149. MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 100 of\n\n|    | 100                                                            |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | THE COURT:<br>There you go.                                    |\n| 2  | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>That's amazing.                               |\n| 3  | THE COURT:<br>Staff that is --                                 |\n| 4  | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>That's amazing.                               |\n| 5  | THE COURT:<br>That is amazing.                                 |\n| 6  | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>That's amazing.<br>Thank you.                 |\n| 7  | THE COURT:<br>That is amazing.                                 |\n| 8  | MR. FRIEDMAN:<br>Your Honor, this is our summary of            |\n| 9  | claims.                                                        |\n| 10 | And one of the reasons that Mr. -- counsel for the             |\n| 11 | committee, Mr. Goldman, in his thoughtful argument said that   |\n| 12 | the Sapphire case could be distinguished is because there      |\n| 13 | people had other -- other people that they could pursue.       |\n| 14 | And I just wanted to observe that when you look at             |\n| 15 | our summary of cases, which is in evidence, many of the        |\n| 16 | defendants -- I'm sorry -- many of the plaintiffs also have    |\n| 17 | other parties that they can go after.                          |\n| 18 | If you look on page 2, the last claim, the Keyi                |\n| 19 | Zilkie claim is against GTV, Saraca and Mr. Guo, Miles Gwok.   |\n| 20 | On the next page, the Zheng Xu Dong case is against GTV,       |\n| 21 | Saraca and Wayne Guo.<br>The next case is against Voice of Guo |\n| 22 | and Miles Guo.<br>And on and on.                               |\n| 23 | And in particular, Your Honor, I would note -- and             |\n| 24 | like the Rui Ma allegations, I said it before, earlier in      |\n| 25 | this case, I'm not diminishing at all what happened to her.    |\n|    |                                                                |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 101 of\n\n I would say, if you look at the Rui Ma case, it's not just against Mr. Kwok. My understanding is that Golden Spring New York is also a defendant in that case. We know that Golden Spring New York had at least \\$8 million to fund a DIP. So there is a co-defendant that can be pursued in that case even if Mr. Kwok doesn't have money. So I just note that there are other pockets of potential availability -- available recoveries, not just Mr. Kwok. Your Honor, there are -- also in Rui Ma's counsel's arguments -- I didn't count them, but there are a lot of if's and could be's about funding -- there's no evidence. You know, people were regrettably, you know, taken in by the debtor's offer of finance or arrangement of potential financing -- which we opposed from the outset -- and here we are in a case that we thought never should have been filed that didn't have -- that still doesn't have funding. Counsel tried to argue that we're only owed \\$46 million when we have judgments for more than \\$260 million. And while it's true I guess that I don't get to call people -- not creditors -- people don't get to also say that PAX isn't owed \\$261 million because it is. The last point I would make, Your Honor, is simply\n\n|    | 119                                                          |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | 102                                                          |\n| 1  | that we stand by our citations in the cases that we cited -- |\n| 2  | that we filed on Friday and that we referenced today that    |\n| 3  | stand for two propositions:                                  |\n| 4  | Fundamentally, it's not necessary that the                   |\n| 5  | interest of every creditor actually favor conversion.<br>And |\n| 6  | the interest of a single creditor can matter.                |\n| 7  | Where that line is drawn -- let's say, you know,             |\n| 8  | one person had 99 percent of the claim, one person had 1,    |\n| 9  | there's no hard and fast rule.                               |\n| 10 | But I think the Court can clearly take into                  |\n| 11 | account from Acme, from Staff, which cited the Goodrich      |\n| 12 | Lines cases, is that the Court's discretion -- which is      |\n| 13 | substantial in this case -- can take into account the        |\n| 14 | disparity in claims and what people are entitled to.         |\n| 15 | And, again, I think, you know, we cited a variety            |\n| 16 | of cases that do stand for the proposition that it's okay to |\n| 17 | dismiss a case even if one creditor will potentially wind up |\n| 18 | with a better result.                                        |\n| 19 | I can't predict the future.                                  |\n| 20 | I will say that, with respect to the apartment in            |\n| 21 | the Sherry-Netherland, there is an enormous wood -- amount   |\n| 22 | of wood to chop with respect to PAX having to take on, you   |\n| 23 | know, to continue its undertakings to demonstrate that that  |\n| 24 | trust agreement is bogus.<br>It's not right there for the    |\n| 25 | picking.<br>We have work to do.                              |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 102 of\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 103 of\n\n And, you know, we don't know what will happen with other creditors. Perhaps other creditors will come to arrangements with Mr. Kwok. We have to take that risk. And so, for those reasons, and the practical reasons that we've identified as to why we believe this case is not well suited to a Chapter 7 conversion, we, you know, we believe that dismissal is the right option. I do -- I will say we agree with the U.S. Trustee that if the Court were to conclude that the right path is a Chapter 11 trustee, obviously we strongly support dismissal, but there should be no fetters on any power that a trustee has. And with that, Your Honor, I have nothing further. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Jonas? MR. JONAS: Your Honor, Jeff Jonas, Brown Rudnick, for the debtor. I will be brief. And I'll say I do stand on my previous argument supporting dismissal for cause under 1112(b)(1) and (4)(A). I would note in that regard interestingly no one opposing dismissal addressed the arguments I made earlier with respect to the standard being prejudice to creditors and that prejudice is determined by looking at whether any of their -- those creditors' pre-petition legal expectations are prejudiced, which in this case they are not.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 104 of\n\n I really rise, Your Honor, only to make the record clear that the debtor does refute and refutes the many disparaging comments that have been made about him. Lawyers here have made many bald, unsupported statements which are not evidence. And they've come in different forms and flavors, Your Honor. For example, there was a reference to Greenwich Land owning -- in connection with possibly having certain, quote/unquote, \"Hidden assets.\" Nothing's been proven, Your Honor. Nothing's been demonstrated. Just the bald allegation which might as well be that certain neighbors and friends and other family members have assets that are allegedly hidden assets. Secondly, Your Honor -- and these are just by way of some quick examples I noted while presentations were being made -- Ms. Callari referred to certain charges that exist in China. Again, no evidence, just the bald statement. It's not evidence. It shouldn't be given any worth or any voracity at all. Third, litigation funding. There is zero evidence. It is utter and complete speculation and conjecture. There's no evidence before the Court. I'll add my own speculation that the committee -- and probably Ms. Callari -- have been running around feverishly over the last few weeks looking for some\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 105 of\n\n|    | 119                                                          |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | 105                                                          |\n| 1  | financing so they could come before the Court and present    |\n| 2  | some evidence.<br>They have none.<br>So from that I'll infer |\n| 3  | that none exists.                                            |\n| 4  | But nevertheless, I don't want to pile on my own             |\n| 5  | speculation.<br>I'll just leave it that there is no evidence |\n| 6  | at all before the Court in that regard.                      |\n| 7  | So all of the Court's concerns are -- at least our           |\n| 8  | concerns -- and I think Mr. -- as expressed by other parties |\n| 9  | that there won't be funding, that's the only evidence that   |\n| 10 | there is.                                                    |\n| 11 | Again, Your Honor, we would urge dismissal.<br>Thank         |\n| 12 | you, Your Honor.                                             |\n| 13 | THE COURT:<br>Thank you.                                     |\n| 14 | Mr. Goldman?                                                 |\n| 15 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yes.<br>Thank you, Your Honor.<br>Just a     |\n| 16 | few brief points, Your Honor.                                |\n| 17 | On this idea of all these claims constituting                |\n| 18 | personal injury or wrongful death claims, which obviously    |\n| 19 | under section 128 U.S.C 157 --                               |\n| 20 | THE COURT:<br>(b)(2)(B).                                     |\n| 21 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Thank you.                                   |\n| 22 | -- the Court doesn't have jurisdiction.<br>It has to         |\n| 23 | be tried in a district court, unless of course relief from   |\n| 24 | --                                                           |\n| 25 | THE COURT:<br>That's not -- that's not the trial.            |\n|    |                                                              |\n\n|    | 119                                                            |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | 106                                                            |\n| 1  | The trial section is (b)(5).<br>(b)(2)(B) talks about the      |\n| 2  | estimation or liquidation of contingent --                     |\n| 3  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Correct.                                       |\n| 4  | THE COURT:<br>-- and disputed personal injury                  |\n| 5  | claims.<br>That's different from --                            |\n| 6  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Correct.                                       |\n| 7  | THE COURT:<br>-- the trial issue under (b)(5).                 |\n| 8  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>You're quite correct.                          |\n| 9  | So there can't be estimated as well under 502(c)               |\n| 10 | except under Chapter 11.                                       |\n| 11 | THE COURT:<br>Or 12 or 13 in a context of a plan.              |\n| 12 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Or 12 or 13.<br>But certainly that             |\n| 13 | doesn't prevent them from being liquidated upon relief from    |\n| 14 | stay in their court of origin.                                 |\n| 15 | And certainly the debtor could defend, especially              |\n| 16 | since they are potentially non-dischargeable under section     |\n| 17 | 523(a)(6) as willful and malicious injury.<br>So certainly the |\n| 18 | debtor would have an interest in doing that.                   |\n| 19 | I would also point out that I don't think it's a               |\n| 20 | given that all of these claims, for example, the claims        |\n| 21 | based on defamation, would constitute personal injury tort     |\n| 22 | claims of the type that you can't estimate were of the type    |\n| 23 | that under -- you mentioned (c) --                             |\n| 24 | THE COURT:<br>(b)(2)(B).                                       |\n| 25 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>-- (b)(2)(B), but also (b)(5) --               |\n|    |                                                                |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 106 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 107 of\n\n|    | 107                                                         |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | THE COURT:<br>(b)(5) --                                     |\n| 2  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yeah.                                       |\n| 3  | THE COURT:<br>-- is where it says the district --           |\n| 4  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yeah.                                       |\n| 5  | THE COURT:<br>-- court has to try those claims.             |\n| 6  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Exactly.                                    |\n| 7  | THE COURT:<br>Right.                                        |\n| 8  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>I don't think it's a given that the         |\n| 9  | defamation claims are of the type of claim that fit --      |\n| 10 | THE COURT:<br>There is all kinds of case law about          |\n| 11 | that.                                                       |\n| 12 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Yes.                                        |\n| 13 | THE COURT:<br>And I agree with you.                         |\n| 14 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>So there is a division of authority.        |\n| 15 | And of course the one Gawker Media goes the other way.      |\n| 16 | So I don't think, unless Your Honor has a                   |\n| 17 | definitive opinion on that, you can conclude that, hey, all |\n| 18 | of these can't be estimated or that, you know, you don't    |\n| 19 | have jurisdiction to preside over a claims objection.       |\n| 20 | You know, as far as how a Chapter 7 trustee would           |\n| 21 | marshal the yacht, here's how I would envision it.          |\n| 22 | There is a pending adversary proceeding right now           |\n| 23 | that squarely presents the issue of whether this yacht is   |\n| 24 | property of the estate or not.<br>A Chapter 7 trustee could |\n| 25 | certainly replace, or it would be proper to replace the     |\n|    |                                                             |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 108 of\n\n|    | 108                                                            |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | debtor, or substitute himself as a party in that adversary     |\n| 2  | proceeding and get special counsel.                            |\n| 3  | I am very confident that we could find special                 |\n| 4  | counsel that would take this on some sort of contingency       |\n| 5  | fee, which would be negotiable.                                |\n| 6  | The trustee would then move to make a dispositive              |\n| 7  | motion based on the preclusive effect of Judge Ostrager's      |\n| 8  | findings, which we believe do have preclusive effect.<br>Your  |\n| 9  | Honor would then decide whether that does have actual          |\n| 10 | preclusive effect to make the boat property of the estate.     |\n| 11 | That is not an elaborate proceeding and it really -- I would   |\n| 12 | suggest -- has a substantial likelihood of getting done.       |\n| 13 | And if that does happen, we don't even need the                |\n| 14 | litigation funding.                                            |\n| 15 | So that's the -- that is the lowest hanging fruit.             |\n| 16 | I think, Your Honor, there are a couple options                |\n| 17 | that Your Honor could consider here.                           |\n| 18 | Since we've only had a couple of weeks to, for                 |\n| 19 | example, look for litigation funding and no time to look for   |\n| 20 | any contingency counsel, you could convert the case with the   |\n| 21 | idea that we would be given time to locate the funding.<br>And |\n| 22 | if during that time period nothing could be located or we      |\n| 23 | can't locate special counsel, the case could then be           |\n| 24 | dismissed.                                                     |\n| 25 | And I didn't really mention the third option,                  |\n|    |                                                                |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 109 of\n\n|    | 109                                                          |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | which is the Chapter 11 trustee option, which would allow    |\n| 2  | some of these claims to get estimated.                       |\n| 3  | You know, the committee is not adverse to the idea           |\n| 4  | of negotiating an equitable division of whatever assets the  |\n| 5  | debtor has with PAX.<br>We are not unmindful of the efforts  |\n| 6  | that PAX has made in chasing this debtor and getting its     |\n| 7  | judgment.<br>And I think the committee would -- let me just  |\n| 8  | say -- be reasonable in negotiating a plan with PAX that     |\n| 9  | gives some recognition to their pre-petition efforts.        |\n| 10 | And certainly a creditors' plan of reorganization            |\n| 11 | is achievable in this case.<br>All it has to provide is the  |\n| 12 | marshaling of the assets.<br>We would even -- maybe PAX's    |\n| 13 | counsel wants to be the special counsel.<br>We would have no |\n| 14 | problem with that.<br>And the debtor would not retain any    |\n| 15 | interests in property.                                       |\n| 16 | So a Chapter 11 trustee, where the creditors have            |\n| 17 | an ability to negotiate a plan, I think is also a viable     |\n| 18 | option here.<br>So I would --                                |\n| 19 | THE COURT:<br>Well, you're the first one that said           |\n| 20 | that.                                                        |\n| 21 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Well, I do think as opposed --               |\n| 22 | THE COURT:<br>And so no one else has said that.<br>So        |\n| 23 | if you're --                                                 |\n| 24 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>No.                                          |\n| 25 | THE COURT:<br>So if you're thinking that that's a            |\n|    |                                                              |\n\n|    | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 580<br>Filed 07/21/22<br>Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19<br>Page 110 of<br>119 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | 110                                                                                           |\n| 1  | possibility, then --                                                                          |\n| 2  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>I would --                                                                    |\n| 3  | THE COURT:<br>-- are you asking that you have an                                              |\n| 4  | opportunity to talk to parties about that?<br>Is that what                                    |\n| 5  | you're asking?                                                                                |\n| 6  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Well, I would love the opportunity                                            |\n| 7  | to talk to parties about that, except that I'm not sure the                                   |\n| 8  | discussions would be productive.<br>Because I think -- I think                                |\n| 9  | PAX would prefer Your Honor to rule first on whether                                          |\n| 10 | dismissal --                                                                                  |\n| 11 | THE COURT:<br>Well, I have to rule by the way under                                           |\n| 12 | the code, so I don't have a choice unless you all decide                                      |\n| 13 | something different.<br>I have a -- I have a -- I have no                                     |\n| 14 | choice.<br>Once the hearing starts, right, don't I have to                                    |\n| 15 | rule -- I don't have it in front of me, but I'm sure PAX                                      |\n| 16 | knows -- I think I have to rule in 15 days or something like                                  |\n| 17 | that, don't I?<br>At the conclusion of the hearing.                                           |\n| 18 | I don't have a lot -- as I said, I don't know, two                                            |\n| 19 | months ago -- there isn't a big window of opportunity in                                      |\n| 20 | this case.<br>I tried to make that -- maybe I didn't do a very                                |\n| 21 | good job -- but I tried to make that very clear to all                                        |\n| 22 | parties that this is not a case where the Court has                                           |\n| 23 | discretion.                                                                                   |\n| 24 | Congress made the changes to the code, right?                                                 |\n| 25 | That's what -- I have no choice.<br>I have no                                                 |\n|    |                                                                                               |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 111 of\n\n|    | 111                                                                |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | discretion.<br>I don't.<br>Yeah.<br>It says here, Attorney Goldman |\n| 2  | -- I know you probably know this too -- after the -- the           |\n| 3  | Court shall commence the hearing on the motion under 30 days       |\n| 4  | unless the movant consents to a specific time frame, which         |\n| 5  | the movant did, which is today, right?                             |\n| 6  | And then decide the -- and shall -- no discretion,                 |\n| 7  | right -- and shall decide the motion not later than 15 days        |\n| 8  | after the commencement of such hearing.                            |\n| 9  | So I am where I am, right?                                         |\n| 10 | There's not a lot I can do unless you all have                     |\n| 11 | some other plan.<br>I don't think you're going to have another     |\n| 12 | plan today.                                                        |\n| 13 | I'm not going to write a decision between today                    |\n| 14 | and tomorrow.<br>That's not going to -- I mean, I just can't.      |\n| 15 | I have other hearings.<br>We have other things.<br>But I have to   |\n| 16 | decide within 15 days of today.                                    |\n| 17 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Understood, Your Honor.                            |\n| 18 | I think what -- what I think is going to obstruct                  |\n| 19 | or not provide for conducive discussions about a Chapter 11        |\n| 20 | trustee is the fact that PAX would rather Your Honor just          |\n| 21 | rule on dismissal.<br>And so I'm not -- I don't think I'm          |\n| 22 | going to be able to engage them in a discussion until that         |\n| 23 | ruling comes down.                                                 |\n| 24 | What Your Honor could do though, in ruling on this                 |\n| 25 | motion, is to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee and provide an          |\n|    |                                                                    |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 112 of\n\n opportunity for a period of time for -- without prejudice -- to revisiting that order depending on what happens within the first 30 days of the case or so. In other words, you could still meet your statutory obligations and come back to this issue within a defined period of time to determine whether the case should be dismissed based on what we are able to accomplish when a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed and that would still satisfy the statutory obligation of ruling. THE COURT: I hope the -- MR. GOLDMAN: But it keeps options open is the point I'm making. THE COURT: I understand your point. MR. GOLDMAN: That's all. That's all I have, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Does anyone else wish to be heard? (No audible response.) THE COURT: Okay. As I just noted for the record, I have to rule on this decision -- Oh, is there something else you'd like to add? Oh, yes. We have to finish the exhibits, right? The exhibits. The transcripts. Attorney Goldman, there were some references made to some of the transcripts by Attorney Friedman.\n\n|    | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 580<br>Filed 07/21/22<br>Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19<br>Page 113 of<br>119 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | 113                                                                                           |\n| 1  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>No.<br>No objection.                                                          |\n| 2  | THE COURT:<br>No objection.                                                                   |\n| 3  | All right.<br>So then all of PAX's exhibits are                                               |\n| 4  | admitted in full except for 7, 8 and 31.<br>Was that the other                                |\n| 5  | one?                                                                                          |\n| 6  | MS. ARONSSON:<br>That's right.<br>Thanks, Your Honor.                                         |\n| 7  | And I have some references if it would aid the Court for the                                  |\n| 8  | transcripts.                                                                                  |\n| 9  | THE COURT:<br>Yes.<br>Please.<br>Go ahead.                                                    |\n| 10 | MS. ARONSSON:<br>For PAX 18, we would direct the                                              |\n| 11 | Court to pages 21 to 28.<br>For PAX 20, we direct the Court to                                |\n| 12 | pages 8 to 19.<br>And for PAX 21, we direct the Court to pages                                |\n| 13 | 11 to 20.                                                                                     |\n| 14 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>Thank you.                                                             |\n| 15 | MS. ARONSSON:<br>Thank you.                                                                   |\n| 16 | THE COURT:<br>Attorney Goldman?                                                               |\n| 17 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>May I make one further point, Your                                            |\n| 18 | Honor?                                                                                        |\n| 19 | THE COURT:<br>Yes.<br>They can't hear you though.                                             |\n| 20 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Okay.                                                                         |\n| 21 | THE COURT:<br>Speak into the --                                                               |\n| 22 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Okay.                                                                         |\n| 23 | THE COURT:<br>You can speak right next to you to                                              |\n| 24 | Attorney Aronsson.                                                                            |\n| 25 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Okay.<br>I know this may not be a                                             |\n|    |                                                                                               |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 114 of\n\n|    | 114                                                            |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | specific factor under 1112(b), but Your Honor knows from the   |\n| 2  | litigation budget that was filed in connection with the DIP    |\n| 3  | motion, at the end of April, we had incurred almost \\$200,000  |\n| 4  | in fees.<br>That number has obviously escalated.               |\n| 5  | It just would be I think a travesty to the process             |\n| 6  | that a committee is appointed, they retain counsel on the      |\n| 7  | reliance of the process moving forward -- we did our job for   |\n| 8  | the committee -- and now to just dismiss the case with all     |\n| 9  | those fees being unpaid I think is a disservice to the         |\n| 10 | process.                                                       |\n| 11 | THE COURT:<br>I understand.<br>Thank you.                      |\n| 12 | Does anyone else wish to be heard?                             |\n| 13 | (No audible response.)                                         |\n| 14 | THE COURT:<br>All right.<br>So that the record is              |\n| 15 | clear, on April 6th, 2022, the creditor, Pacific Alliance      |\n| 16 | Asia Opportunity Fund, LP, filed a motion to dismiss the       |\n| 17 | case for cause, or in the alternative, a partial joinder to    |\n| 18 | the U.S. Trustee's motion for an order directing the           |\n| 19 | appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.                           |\n| 20 | We have had several hearings in the case at which              |\n| 21 | we've talked about the motion to dismiss.<br>And we also had a |\n| 22 | status conference to talk about the motion to dismiss and      |\n| 23 | that status conference was held on April 13, 2022.             |\n| 24 | Following the status conference, and as part of                |\n| 25 | the discussions had at the status conference, the hearing on   |\n|    |                                                                |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 115 of\n\n|    | 119                                                          |  |  |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n|    | 115                                                          |  |  |\n| 1  | the motion to dismiss was scheduled to be held today, May    |  |  |\n| 2  | 25th, 2022, with the consent of the movant, PAX.             |  |  |\n| 3  | And we also scheduled a hearing for tomorrow                 |  |  |\n| 4  | anticipating that we'd have more evidence that might need to |  |  |\n| 5  | be submitted to the Court in connection with the motion to   |  |  |\n| 6  | dismiss.                                                     |  |  |\n| 7  | At a recent hearing, prior to the hearing on the             |  |  |\n| 8  | motion to dismiss, the debtor confirmed through counsel that |  |  |\n| 9  | they were not objecting to the motion to dismiss and         |  |  |\n| 10 | consenting to the fact that cause exists under 1112 to       |  |  |\n| 11 | dismiss the case.                                            |  |  |\n| 12 | Every other party that has filed a document or a             |  |  |\n| 13 | pleading regarding the motion to dismiss has consented to    |  |  |\n| 14 | the fact that cause exists.                                  |  |  |\n| 15 | So this court has to make no finding that cause              |  |  |\n| 16 | exists.                                                      |  |  |\n| 17 | The court only has to make findings with regard to           |  |  |\n| 18 | what the cause is and what the ultimate relief will be.      |  |  |\n| 19 | And I've stated this on the record before, but I             |  |  |\n| 20 | will state it again, that the Court will either dismiss the  |  |  |\n| 21 | case, convert the case, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, in  |  |  |\n| 22 | accordance with the applicable provisions of 1112(b) of the  |  |  |\n| 23 | code.                                                        |  |  |\n| 24 | I have stated for the record today the exhibits              |  |  |\n| 25 | that have been admitted in full in this hearing that have    |  |  |\n|    |                                                              |  |  |\n\n|    | 119                                                            |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | 116                                                            |\n| 1  | been submitted by PAX and the official committee of            |\n| 2  | unsecured creditors.<br>No other party has submitted evidence, |\n| 3  | but has joined in those -- in that evidence, which is fine     |\n| 4  | with the Court.                                                |\n| 5  | I have reviewed the position papers that were                  |\n| 6  | filed by all of the parties on Friday, the 20th, regarding     |\n| 7  | those respective positions with regard to the motion to        |\n| 8  | dismiss.                                                       |\n| 9  | And of course have heard all of the parties today              |\n| 10 | make their arguments with regard to the motion to dismiss.     |\n| 11 | As I also indicated, I'm bound by the statute to               |\n| 12 | rule on this motion within 15 days of the commencement of      |\n| 13 | the hearing.                                                   |\n| 14 | The hearing is concluded today there being no                  |\n| 15 | further evidence to be submitted or arguments to be made so,   |\n| 16 | therefore, the clock starts to run as far as a decision on     |\n| 17 | this motion to dismiss.                                        |\n| 18 | I have -- I appreciate all of the arguments that               |\n| 19 | have been made by all of the parties.<br>They have been        |\n| 20 | thoughtful and thorough.<br>And you have made your points      |\n| 21 | well.                                                          |\n| 22 | But I do have to make the determination as to                  |\n| 23 | which way this case will proceed and I will do so.<br>And      |\n| 24 | obviously I will do so within 15 days of today.                |\n| 25 | Although I suppose under the Federal Rules of                  |\n|    |                                                                |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 116 of\n\n|    | 119                                                           |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | 117                                                           |\n| 1  | Civil Procedure you don't count today, under 9006, at rule    |\n| 2  | 6, you don't count the day -- today -- so I think that's      |\n| 3  | correct honestly.                                             |\n| 4  | But in any event, if you have any other concerns              |\n| 5  | or questions regarding the motion to dismiss, I am generally  |\n| 6  | available for a conference.<br>But in the meantime, I'm going |\n| 7  | to be ruling on the motion to dismiss.                        |\n| 8  | Okay.<br>Does anyone have any further questions?              |\n| 9  | (No audible response.)                                        |\n| 10 | THE COURT:<br>All right.<br>Well, I appreciate the            |\n| 11 | efforts of all the parties.                                   |\n| 12 | I'm taking the motion to dismiss under advisement             |\n| 13 | and I will rule accordingly.                                  |\n| 14 | And this is the last matter on today's calendar,              |\n| 15 | so court is adjourned.                                        |\n| 16 | (Proceedings adjourned at 12:51 p.m.)                         |\n| 17 |                                                               |\n| 18 |                                                               |\n| 19 |                                                               |\n| 20 |                                                               |\n| 21 |                                                               |\n| 22 |                                                               |\n| 23 |                                                               |\n| 24 |                                                               |\n|    |                                                               |\n|    |                                                               |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 117 of\n\n| 1  |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|\n| 2  | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and          |  |  |  |  |\n| 3  | certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that |  |  |  |  |\n| 4  | the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official     |  |  |  |  |\n| 5  | electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above  |  |  |  |  |\n| 6  | entitled matter.                                            |  |  |  |  |\n| 7  |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 8  |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 9  | April 21, 2022                                              |  |  |  |  |\n| 10 | Christine Fiore, CERT-410                                   |  |  |  |  |\n| 11 | Transcriber                                                 |  |  |  |  |\n| 12 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 13 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 14 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 15 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 16 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 17 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 18 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 19 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 20 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 21 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 22 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 23 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 24 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n| 25 |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n|    |                                                             |  |  |  |  |\n\n|    | 119                            |       |\n|----|--------------------------------|-------|\n|    |                                | 119   |\n| 1  | INDEX                          |       |\n| 2  | PAX EXHIBITS:                  | Rec'd |\n| 3  | 1-6, 9-17, 23-29, 31           | 8     |\n| 4  |                                |       |\n| 5  | CREDITOR'S COMMITTEE EXHIBITS: |       |\n| 6  | 1-14                           | 16    |\n| 7  |                                |       |\n| 8  |                                |       |\n| 9  |                                |       |\n| 10 |                                |       |\n| 11 |                                |       |\n| 12 |                                |       |\n| 13 |                                |       |\n| 14 |                                |       |\n| 15 |                                |       |\n| 16 |                                |       |\n| 17 |                                |       |\n| 18 |                                |       |\n| 19 |                                |       |\n| 20 |                                |       |\n| 21 |                                |       |\n| 22 |                                |       |\n| 23 |                                |       |\n| 24 |                                |       |\n| 25 |                                |       |\n|    |                                |       |","body_zh":"案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交于 07/21/22 录入于 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 1 页，共 119 页\n\n美国破产法院\n康涅狄格区\n布里奇波特分庭\n\n关于                                            案号 22-50073(JAM)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）                             康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n                                                 2022年5月25日\n债务人。\n\n关于命令指定审查员的动议之庭审记录，或作为替代方案，关于命令指定第11章受托人的动议；驳回第11章案件的动议，或作为替代方案，部分加入美国受托人提出的关于命令指定第11章受托人的动议\n\n审判长：尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）美国破产法官\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表债务人：\nBENNETT S. SILVERBERG, ESQ.（本内特·S·西尔弗伯格，律师）\nJEFFREY L. JONAS, ESQ.（杰弗里·L·乔纳斯，律师）\nBrown Rudnick, LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n代表债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）：\nPETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ.（彼得·弗里德曼，律师）\nLAURA ARONSSON, ESQ.（劳拉·阿伦松，律师）\nO'Melveny & Myers LLP（欧麦律师事务所）\nTimes Square Tower\n7 Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\nPATRICK M. BIRNEY, ESQ.（帕特里克·M·伯尼，律师）\nRobinson & Cole LLP（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n庭审程序由电子录音记录，庭审记录由速记服务机构制作。\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录及速记服务公司）\n4 Research Drive, Suite 402\nShelton, Connecticut 06484\n(203)929-9992\n\n出庭人员（续）：\n\n代表美国受托人：\nHOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ.（霍利·L·克莱伯恩，律师）\nOffice of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）\nThe Giaimo Federal Building\n150 Court Street, Room 302\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n代表无担保债权人官方委员会：\nIRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ.（欧文·戈德曼，律师）\nPullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）\n850 Main Street\nBridgeport, CT 06601\n\n代表债权人 Rui Ma（马锐）、Zheng Wu（吴征）及 Weican Meng（孟伟灿）：\nKRISTIN MAYHEW, ESQ.（克里斯汀·梅休，律师）\nMcElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter（麦克尔罗伊、多伊奇、马尔瓦尼与卡彭特律师事务所）\n30 Jeliff Lane\nSouthport, CT 06890\n\nCAROLLYNN H.G. CALLARI, ESQ.（卡罗琳·H.G.·卡拉里，律师）\nLaw firm of Callari Partners（卡拉里合伙人律师事务所）\nOne Rockefeller Plaza\nNew York, NY 10020\n\n（庭审于上午10:05开始。）\n\n法庭书记员：案件编号 22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n法庭：好的。早上好。请先由债务人的律师为记录而出庭说明，好吗？\n\nJONAS 律师：早上好，法官阁下。我是来自 Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）的 Jeff Jonas（杰弗里·乔纳斯）。与我一同出席的是 Ben Silverberg（本·西尔弗伯格），Bill Baldiga（比尔·巴尔迪加）今天上午坐在我身后，代表债务人。谢谢。\n\n法庭：早上好。\n\nFRIEDMAN 律师：早上好，法官阁下。我是来自 O'Melveny & Myers（欧麦律师事务所）的 Peter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼），Laura Aronsson（劳拉·阿伦松）与我一同代表 Pacific Alliance Group（太平洋联盟集团）出席。\n\n法庭：早上好。\n\nBIRNEY 律师：早上好，法官阁下。我是 Patrick Birney（帕特里克·伯尼），同样代表 PAX。\n\n法庭：早上好。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：早上好，法官阁下。我是 Pullman and Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）的 Irve Goldman（欧文·戈德曼），代表债权人委员会。\n\n法庭：早上好。\n\nCLAIBORN 女士：早上好，法官阁下。我是代表美国受托人的 Holley Claiborn（霍利·克莱伯恩）。\n\n法庭：早上好。\n\nMAYHEW 女士：早上好，法官阁下。我是 McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter（麦克尔罗伊、多伊奇、马尔瓦尼与卡彭特律师事务所）的 Kristin Mayhew（克里斯汀·梅休），代表债权人 Rui Ma（马锐）、Zheng Wu（吴征）及 Weican Meng（孟伟灿）。此外，与我一同出席的是 Callari Partners（卡拉里合伙人律师事务所）的 Carollynn Callari（卡罗琳·卡拉里）。\n\n法庭：两位早上好。今天上午是否还有其他人的出庭说明需要记录？好的。好。正如我们都知道的，今天是就驳回动议，或作为替代方案指定受托人的动议举行听证。在上次听证会上，为今天的听证做准备时，我获悉所有当事人均已同意。而且你们已在书面文件中确认，你们同意认定根据 1112(b)，存在理由采取某项措施，即驳回案件、转换案件，或指定第11章受托人。我已查看你们的证人和证物清单，也已查看你们就驳回、转换或指定第11章受托人所提交的立场文件。在我们开始举证前，我不知道当事人是否还有任何事项希望告知法庭？Jonas 律师？Friedman 律师？\n\nFRIEDMAN 律师：没有，法官阁下。我认为 Aronsson 女士将就我们作为证据提交的内容发言。我相信 Aronsson 女士和委员会的律师已就哪些材料可被采纳达成一致，我们也撤回了一些材料，因此，我认为应交由 Aronsson 女士，然后由 Goldman 律师说明——各方希望采纳哪些材料。之后，我请求许可在该事项结束后进行辩论。\n\n法庭：当然可以。好的。Aronsson 女士，您想先开始吗？您想继续吗？\n\nARONSSON 女士：当然。谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：在您继续之前，请稍等一下，我必须询问法庭书记员，我们是否需要处理任何技术问题。您将——您要提交证物吗？\n\nARONSSON 女士：是的。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nARONSSON 女士：计划提交——\n\n法庭：那么，为此我是否需要打开这台摄像机？\n\n法庭书记员：[法庭书记员发言]\n\n法庭：它已经打开了，但我是否需要实际——把这个打开并展开？\n\n法庭书记员：[法庭书记员发言]\n\n法庭：因为我在这里什么都看不到，所以我想，遗憾的是，我必须把它打开。\n\n法庭书记员：[法庭书记员发言]。\n\n法庭：不，但她会这样做。因此，我不想，您知道，中断程序。\n\nARONSSON 女士：法官阁下，我不确定我们现在是否需要打开任何证据材料。\n\n法庭：好的。好。那么，当您准备这样做时，您能否告诉我，以便我确保我们的技术人员——我没有做错什么，因为我大概会做错，但我会尽量不做错。好吗？\n\nARONSSON 女士：会的。\n\n法庭：好。那么，Aronsson 律师，请继续。您可以开始。\n\nARONSSON 女士：谢谢您，法官阁下。PAX 正在作为证据提交案卷中编号为 PAX 1 至 PAX 31 的证物，但 PAX 7、PAX 8 和 PAX 30 除外。\n\n法庭：7、8 和 30 不予采纳？\n\nARONSSON 女士：正确。\n\n法庭：是否有人——你们是否讨论过是否有人反对提交这些证物？\n\nARONSSON 女士：因此，我们昨天与 Goldman 律师进行了会谈和协商，我理解，我们的撤回体现了我们善意的会谈和协商。我理解可能还剩下一项分歧——\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nARONSSON 女士：——根据我们今天上午的谈话。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：是的。正确，法官阁下。我们只是——我认为我预计会就他们寻求从纽约诉讼中提交的一组——一系列庭审记录进行简短辩论。因此，这就限定了争议。\n\n法庭：好的。那么关于——是否还有其他人希望就采纳这些证物发表意见？没有人？好的。那么，Aronsson 律师，您是完整提交这些证物，正确吗？\n\nARONSSON 女士：正确。\n\n法庭：好。那么，我想我可能在之前的听证中说过这一点。对于你们申请完整采纳这些证物，我没有异议。这并不意味着我会阅读其中每一页，因此，您知道，在这段时间内，你们可能希望向我指出某些内容。但无论如何，我已经说过这一点。这是我对所有律师所说的。这并非本案特有。对于当事人就采纳证物进行合作，我没有异议并且表示赞赏，但我并不——我只是希望每个人都知道，这并不意味着我会阅读每一页。好吗？\n\nARONSSON 女士：明白。\n\n法庭：好的。请继续。\n\nARONSSON 女士：您想听取关于——的辩论吗？\n\n法庭：可能。\n\nARONSSON 女士：好的。\n\n法庭：请稍等一下。那么，我现在将在记录中宣布，证物——PAX 证物 1 至 31，PAX 证物 7、8 和 30 除外，均作为完整证物予以采纳。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：我可以作一项限定吗？\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：有一些证物——受到质疑和争议的证物是证物 18 至 22。它们是他们寻求从纽约州最高法院听证中提交的庭审记录。因此，我们——您知道，我们将——法官阁下需要解决——\n\n法庭：好。那么，您对那些材料的异议是什么——\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：嗯，异议是，它们纯属传闻证据。仅仅因为它们来自法院程序，并不使其成为公共记录。\n\n法庭：它们为什么是传闻证据？\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：嗯，它们是庭外陈述。\n\n法庭：它们不是陈述。它们是听证记录，对吗？\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：嗯，它们当然是记录中由各方作出的陈述——\n\n法庭：对。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：——包括律师和——\n\n法庭：而其证明力将取决于我认为适当的程度。但它是一份庭审记录。您是否——如果您反对的是庭审记录本身，认为其不正式或未经认证——\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：不是。不是。\n\n法庭：——那么那就是不同的异议。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：那不是我的异议。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：我的异议是，它们显然是传闻证据，因为它们是为证明陈述中所主张事项真实而提交的庭外陈述，并且它们不——不属于公共记录例外。\n\n法庭书记员：抱歉，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：请稍等，Goldman 律师。您听不到吗？\n\n法庭书记员：我听不到 Goldman 律师。\n\n法庭：我们听不太清您说话。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：抱歉。它们显然是为证明所主张事项真实而提交的庭外陈述。\n\n法庭：难道它们不是——难道它们不是——它们是当事人的自认。它们是在一次听证中由债务人和 PAX 作出的。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：嗯——\n\n法庭：而且它们被采纳是为了——什么——无论如何。请继续，Goldman 律师。您继续说，但我还不确定我已被说服。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：好的。您知道，就其寻求提交债务人所作陈述而言，债务人并未反对——\n\n法庭书记员：抱歉，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：请稍等。我们仍然听不到您说话吗？\n\n法庭书记员：是的。有人告诉我，如果 Goldman 律师能到讲台前会更好。\n\n法庭：有些问题——设备没有收录到您的声音，Goldman 律师。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：我可以到那里去吗？\n\n法庭：可以，请。\n\n法庭书记员：麦克风的指示灯没有亮。\n\n法庭：无论出于何种原因，那个麦克风没有工作。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：好的。好的。\n\n法庭书记员：有些地方不对，因为——\n\n法庭：好的。好。是的，如果您能走到前面来？\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：好。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：当然。现在这样更好吗，法官阁下？\n\n法庭：是的。现在我——我相信，对吗？每个人都能听到 Goldman 律师吗？\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：能。\n\n法庭：好的。请继续。\n\n法庭书记员：是的。\n\nGOLDMAN 律师：因此，就他们希望提交债务人律师所作陈述而言，我认为债务人实际上并未出席其中任何一次听证。出席的是律师。因此，债务人并不是本案的对方当事人。债务人同意所请求的救济，因此，为构成对方当事人陈述而不属于传闻证据，该陈述必须被提出——必须是对方当事人的陈述。本案唯一的对方当事人是委员会。因此，这并不构成对方当事人陈述而不属于传闻证据。\n\n对方当事人。公共记录例外不涵盖法庭听证笔录。其规定——法庭：为什么？高盛律师：——公共机关的记录或陈述，如果其载明该机关的活动、在负有法定报告义务时观察到的事项；在民事案件中，依法授权的调查所得出的事实认定。另一法院的庭审记录根本不符合公共记录例外的要件。该例外旨在准许州政府和联邦政府机关或部门的报告作为证据。法庭：那么你的意思是，任何曾经举行的听证会的经认证笔录都永远不能作为证据采纳，因为每一份笔录都将构成传闻证据？高盛律师：它是庭外——它是庭外陈述。它不属于公共记录例外，也不属于我所知的任何其他例外，除非——法庭：那么记录的意义何在？高盛律师：——除非该法庭作出了事实认定或法律结论。法庭：嗯，也许法官在那些——在那些听证中作出了此类认定。高盛律师：嗯，那么，法官阁下——法庭：我认为他作出了，不是吗？高盛律师：嗯，它们——有 300 页笔录——法庭：我明白。高盛律师：所以我不知道——法庭：我不会通读所有这些笔录，但我知道——高盛律师：我不知道——法庭：——那些笔录中，我相信我此前在本案中见过法院对证言真实性、某些证人的证言、法官的认定以及船舶所有权所作出的认定。诸如此类的事项，那是他的认定。那些是他的认定。高盛律师：我承认那将可以采纳。我所说的是，他们寻求采纳整份——法庭：而且正如我已经说过的，我不会阅读整份笔录。如果律师希望我关注笔录中的某些内容，我会这样做。届时，如果那是传闻证据，你将有机会提出异议。但目前我不确定我是否被说服。\n\n我会让你——你知道，我会允许你在律师指出该笔录中她——他们要求我审阅的具体部分时，再次提出该论点。如果届时你想重申你的传闻证据异议，那么你可以重申，我将据此作出裁决。高盛律师：是的。只是为了让我明确法官阁下的意思，如果法院作出了事实认定或法律结论，我没有异议。只是——我认为笔录中法院的观察意见不属于公共记录例外。这就是我的意思。法庭：好的。好。谢谢。高盛律师：好的。谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：律师，请继续。阿伦松女士：谢谢。为澄清起见，在我们昨天与高盛先生的谈话中，我们确实打算使用——提交这些笔录，以证明奥斯特拉格法官（Justice Ostrager）所载的认定——而非任何可能构成传闻证据的证人证言。因此，我认为我们在这一点上意见一致。法庭：好的。那么，我现在将——同样，我们必须澄清记录。截至目前，PAX 证物 1 至 6、9 至 17、23 至 29 以及 31，作为完整证物予以采纳。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与速记服务公司）\n\n1　完整证物。\n18、19、20、21 和 22 仍可能\n\n2　受到债权人委员会异议的约束，法院将在你向我指明\n3　笔录的某些具体部分时（如有）作出裁决。\n4　好吗？\n5　阿伦松女士：\n谢谢，法官阁下。\n6　法庭：\n好的。\n谢谢。\n7　（PAX 证物编号 1-6、9-17、23-29 及 31 全部采纳）\n8　法庭：\n请继续，高盛律师。\n9　高盛律师：\n是的。\n如果——法官阁下，代表\n10　委员会，我们拟提交委员会证物 1\n11　至 14 作为证据，我相信对此没有异议——\n12\n13　弗里德曼律师：\n对此没有异议，\n14　法官阁下。我是彼得·弗里德曼（Peter Friedman）。而且我们实际上也\n15　支持委员会的建议，即法院对本案记录\n16　进行司法认知。我认为这是美国受托人（U.S. Trustee）和委员会\n17　律师都提出的一点，我们认为提出这一点是恰当的，\n18　并且应对这些案件的完整记录\n19　进行司法认知。\n20\n21　法庭：\n——好的。谢谢。高盛\n22　律师，我尚未进行交叉比对，但你们的任何\n23　证物是否与 PAX 的证物相同？\n24　高盛律师：\n我相信有一份，即债务人的\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与速记服务公司）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 16 of 119\n1　声明。我想我们双方都有。这是我们的——\n2　法庭：\n你方证物 2？\n3　高盛律师：\n是。\n4　法庭：\n好的。请稍等。\n还有\n5　PAX 的证物 2。编号相同，对吗？\n6　高盛律师：\n是。\n7　法庭：\n好的。好。那么，高盛律师，\n8　你请求法院将无担保债权人委员会\n9　证物 1 至 14 作为完整证物予以采纳。\n10　对吗？\n11　高盛律师：\n是的，法官阁下。\n12　法庭：\n好的。还有其他人希望就债权人委员会\n13　证物 1 至\n14　14 的采纳发表意见吗？\n15　好的。那么这些证物均作为\n16　完整证物予以采纳。我对你说，高盛律师，正如我\n17　对阿伦松律师所说，我不会阅读其中每一页。\n18　如果这些证物中有你希望我关注的具体事项，\n19　你需要向我指出那些事项。\n20　好吗？\n21　我的意思是，我可能会阅读它们全部，但我\n22　没有义务阅读它们全部。好吗？\n23　高盛律师：\n不，明白，法官阁下。我将\n24　——\n25　法庭：\n好的。\n\n高盛律师：我会这样做。法庭：好的。（债权人委员会证物编号 1-14 全部采纳）法庭：好的。债权人睿·马（Rui Ma）、郑武（Zheng Wu）和魏灿·孟（Wiecan Meng）的加入申请，所以就你方——任何证物而言，你没有进一步事项，并且与委员会立场一致，对吗？梅休女士：正确，法官阁下。法庭：好的。谢谢。美国受托人办公室（Office of the U.S. Trustee）方面，我认为情况也是如此——嗯，我认为你的陈述说的是，克莱伯恩律师（Attorney Claiborn），但如果我错了，你当然应当纠正我：你保留就任何证物提问及询问任何证人的权利，但你自己并不提交任何证据。该办公室不提交任何证据，对吗？克莱伯恩女士：正确，法官阁下。法庭：好的。谢谢。乔纳斯律师（Attorney Jonas），我认为你也是如此，只是你基本上请求对本案提交的所有文件，以及另一方当事人标识或提交的任何证物，还有在弹劾之后为反驳所必需的任何证物，进行司法认知，对吗？乔纳斯律师：正确，法官阁下。法庭：好的。那么你们也都准备就绪了。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 17 of 119\n1　也是如此。\n2　乔纳斯律师：\n是的，法官阁下。\n3　法庭：\n暂时如此。\n4　乔纳斯律师：\n是的，法官阁下。\n5　法庭：\n理解你方的——\n6　乔纳斯律师：\n谢谢。\n7　法庭：\n——你方的界限。\n8　乔纳斯律师：\n谢谢，法官阁下。\n9　法庭：\n好的。谢谢。\n10　请给我一秒钟。\n11　（暂停）\n12　法庭：\n现在，还有另一方当事人提交了——\n13　实际上，我认为他们没有就证人和证物清单提交任何文件，\n14　所以我认为他们只是提交了一份陈述；另一名债权人基本上\n15　加入了委员会的——是的，他们没有提交列明\n16　证人和证物的任何文件。\n17　所以，阿伦松律师，你可以直接继续。\n18　你可以进行。\n19　弗里德曼律师：\n法官阁下，我是彼得·弗里德曼。\n20　法庭：\n好的。弗里德曼律师。\n21　弗里德曼律师：\n我将要——\n22　法庭：\n请继续。\n23　弗里德曼律师：\n那么，法官阁下，我是代表 PAX、来自奥梅尔文尼与迈尔斯律师事务所（O'Melveny and Myers）的彼得·弗里德曼，我将\n\n主张驳回本案。法庭：好的。弗里德曼律师：本案系出于恶意提交，具体目的在于规避藐视法庭判决，我知道法院已经多次听取过有关该判决的情况，我们还会回到这一点。我认为，实际上，在 UCC 证物 2、即我们的证物 2 中，郭先生（Mr. Kwok）的声明第 3 和第 24 段，他基本承认——并且我们认为，藐视法庭是本案的开端，也应当是终结，因为本案的目的就是规避该判决，而这并非提交破产申请的正当目的。在其同意书中，债务人称 PAX 对其不受约束的法律战是他同意的原因。鉴于正如我们在 Docket No. 50 中指出的那样，正是在破产前，郭表示其意图对 PAX 发动全面战争，我认为这颇具讽刺意味。随后，郭在必须面对执行奥斯特拉格法官藐视法庭制裁的前一晚提交了本案。那么，我们在那一点得到的是何种案件？一个没有列明资产、没有业务、没有雇员、没有待承继的待履行合同、没有收入——除少数 COVID 刺激款支票外——的案件。没有真正的破产目的，没有改变郭先生的生活方式。只是又一个可利用的审理场所，我认为这导致如下结论：这里确实存在双重恶意，首先是规避藐视法庭判决，其次是重新诉讼 PAX 的请求权，而这两者均非正当的破产目的，相应救济应当与提交本案的动机相适应。\n\n法官阁下，我想先回顾郭先生为阻挠 PAX 所作努力中的全部投机取巧行为。而这一切均来自 PAX 证物 23，自第 2 段开始。\n\nPAX 于 2008 年向郭先生的公司出借 \\$30,000。郭为该借款提供个人担保。PAX 与郭于 2011 年重新协商该借款，以合并剩余债务。郭再次签署了个人担保。\n\n2013 年 4 月，郭同意通过向 PAX 转让位于北京的某些公寓的所有权，来清偿其债务。该和解以满足若干先决条件为前提，包括交付无瑕疵产权。PAX 多次延长该和解的期限，最终期限定为 June 30, 2015。\n\n郭从未履行其先决条件。因此，PAX 于 2017 年 4 月以违约为由起诉郭。顺便说一下，该诉讼与任何其他原告提起的任何其他诉讼完全无关。针对 PAX 的各请求权人之间不存在共同的事实核心。我特意使用“请求权人”一词，因为我不认为这些人——绝大多数提交债权申报的人——实际上是债权人。他们持有请求权，这与作为债权人不同。他们没有判决。September 15th, 2020，PAX 在其违约案件中赢得简易判决。PAX 将会遭受严重阻挠的第一次警示，是此后不久 Genever New York 在 SDNY 提交破产申请，这是郭先生试图阻挠 PAX 的模式的一部分。此后不久，纽约法院对 Lady May 及其他——以及 Sherry Netherland 采取限制措施。证物 23，Docket 183.3，October 15th，奥斯特拉格法官命令。终局判决于 February 2021 作出，早于破产案件一年。彼时，法院作出 \\$116 million 的判决，并按纽约法定利率计息，到郭先生提交申请之日增至 \\$127 million。随后，在 PAX 试图收取其判决款时，发生了各种花招。正如我所指出的，奥斯特拉格法官必须寻求——明确认定，而这是证物——PAX 18 第 21 页。在 October 15th 的一次听证中，如果——你知道，如果委员会律师希望提出异议，我仅强调这一点。\n\n我们认为应作为证据提交的听证会记录内容之一。正如2020年9月15日命令所反映的，本院认为，Kwok先生曾试图误导本院。本院认为，Kwok先生作为原告——正如原告所主张的——是在玩弄障眼法。这种情况将告终结。我们不会再容许任何障眼法。由于这些持续的障眼法，PAX被迫在纽约州诉讼中多次提出藐视法庭动议。正如PAX证据24所载，本院于2021年3月16日指出，显然，在本院面前的诉讼程序中，存在数量令人无法容忍的策略性操作、掩饰和欺瞒。法院继而表示，与其逐一列举被告所采取的众多障眼法，法院准许藐视法庭动议，具体如下：自2021年5月15日后，游艇每在本院管辖范围外停留一日，被告将被处以罚款——Kwok将被处以\\$500,000罚款。这并不会迫使Kwok先生申请破产；他只是继续藐视，这一次不仅藐视判决书，也藐视州法院的命令。在2021年7月的一次听证会上——这是PAX证据21——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与誊写服务公司）\n\n法院指出，法院曾发布命令，指示不得将该船移出美国领海。Kwok先生和/或其控制的实体无视该命令。此举构成藐视法庭。法庭：律师，证据21中你指的是哪一页？FRIEDMAN先生：第16至17页。法庭：谢谢。FRIEDMAN先生：再看第19页，法院谈到他的——Ostrager法官（奥斯特雷格法官）谈到他的抗拒，即Kwok对法院命令的抗拒。Kwok对该罚款提出上诉。第一上诉部门维持原判，并指示一审法院举行进一步证据听证会。在最终证据听证会上，正如本院所指出的，那正是——那促成了破产，法院谈到了1,180项案卷登记。这载于PAX 25。其中几乎全部涉及被告试图规避和欺瞒。还谈到——PAX因资产置于错综复杂的公司实体迷宫中而遭遇困难。最后，正如法院所指出的，我知道本院此前也听过这一点，但如果亿万富翁诉讼当事人能够一边试图利用纽约及其他地区的法院程序，一边明知且故意违反法院\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与誊写服务公司）\n\n命令，便不存在法治。Kwok先生曾试图对此提出上诉，并申请对该等命令作出紧急中止执行，但未获准。Ostrager法官在其意见——一项命令中指出，还将产生其他后果。我认为，我们——根据我们从证词中所知、本院所听到的内容，以及我认为可以推断出的内容，Kwok先生显然并不真正担心金钱问题。他担心因抗拒法院命令而入狱，而这正是促使他申请破产的原因。那么，申请破产后发生了什么？我认为，本院可从Kwok先生的声明、债务人对审查员动议的答复、债务人对PAX解除中止执行动议的反对、债务人试图将PAX的诉讼从州法院移送至联邦法院的行为中观察到。这些都指向一件事。本案随后——是为不当目的而提起，即重新审理PAX争议，对吗？\n\n你们在声明中看到，Kwok先生坚持认为PAX诉讼以伪造为基础，对吗？即已取得的判决书存在不当之处。曾有一些努力——你们知道，这载于案卷编号83第12段。Kwok先生主张，你们知道，个人担保不知为何属于伪造。\n\n他谈到，我认为，他希望重新评估究竟哪些财产属于他，而这无非是显然企图让本院重新审理Ostrager法官的藐视法庭命令。\n\n移送一个案件的想法——曾试图移送一个案件，而这恰恰是最没有理由移送的案件。该案的核心争议已经在上诉中，但除此之外还能有什么目的，而不是试图重新审理？我们援引的判例指出，这并非申请破产案件的正当目的。\n\n法官阁下，我想就PAX说几句；本院，我认为，已观察到本案多么不同寻常，因为缺乏资产，缺乏经营业务，缺乏——你们知道——持续性收入、业务等。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与誊写服务公司）\n案号22-50073 文件580 于07/21/22提交 于07/21/22 08:38:19录入 第26页，共119页\n\n本案的性质如此坦率地集中于专业人士的费用和专业人士的预算，而非任何意义上的传统实质性重组，即PAX的债权金额超过下一项判决债权的1,300倍。第二大实际——我想理论上无争议的——债权是内部人士的债权，我认为本院在此情境下无需过多关注。\n\n因此，鉴于我方债权的规模，我们希望着重说明PAX所发挥的积极作用；我认为，在处理本案立案后发生的情况时，其发挥该作用确实极为重要。\n\n债务人出现。债务人提交了一项计划。我认为那是一项一开始就注定失败的计划。其寻求借款\\$8 million。PAX对此提出反对。其他人没有。其他人认为或许——你们知道——彩虹尽头有一罐金子。我们从一开始就表示，DIP是一场骗局；当Golden Spring（黄金泉）决定不再为本案提供资金时，人们确实猝不及防。\n\n但是，仅仅是——你们知道——试图推进债务人占有融资，而并非为了任何人的利益，只是为了专业人士，或者为了开展调查，这对我们从来没有意义；本案没有任何方面曾对我们有意义。我们认为，维持现状——债权人有权根据州法追求其权利——才是处理此类债务人的真正适当机制。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与誊写服务公司）\n\n而且我们认为判例支持这一点。例如，在康涅狄格联邦地区法院的Sapphire Development Company v. McKay（蓝宝石开发公司诉麦凯案）中，债务人没有业务、没有雇员，并由债务人主要负责人的关联方提供资金；该负责人曾有历史——并且曾有州法院判决认定该负责人转移资产、误导法院等等。法院驳回了该案，并特别指出，无担保债权人可如本案债权人一样，在州法院向其希望追索的任何人进行追索，而这属于适当行使自由裁量权。我想强调，本院拥有更广泛的裁量权——你们知道，判例非常明确，本院在决定今日应如何处理时拥有极大的自由裁量权。\n\nPAX债权的规模，我认为很重要；正如我们在495 BR 212的Acme Cake Company（阿克米蛋糕公司）案中所援引的，当一名债权金额足够大的单一债权人主张驳回案件是最佳结果时，驳回案件是适当的。驳回符合债权人的最佳利益，因为——而且州并不受以下可能结果的影响，即最大债权人将在其他无担保债权人之前执行其判决并取得债务人的资产。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与誊写服务公司）\n\n因此，PAX主张其为最大债权人，并认为这是正确结果，并无不当。再次强调，我们在此所做的只是恢复现状。我们是否能够执行我方判决，我无法断言，但我认为恢复现状是适当的。\n\n科罗拉多州的OptInRealBig.com, 345 BR 277。该法院准许了驳回动议，理由是在破产程序外，债权人整体可收回的价值可能更大；我们认为本案也将如此，当然对PAX而言如此，正如我稍后将谈到的。第7章程序即使能够获得资金，也会给PAX带来巨大的成本。\n\n但该法院认为，一名债权人——在这里，我会将法院所谈论的对象类比于持有或有、未清算债权的债权人，甚至持有非常小额债权的债权人——不应仅为利用破产为债权人提供的利益，而获准拖延或维持一个案件；而且，如果正如对方所主张的那样，保障《破产法》规定的优先顺位是驳回案件的先决条件，则案件绝不可能依据《破产法》被驳回。\n\n因此，如果只有在百分之百确定任何至少\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与誊写服务公司）\n\n理论上处境相同的人都能获得同等对待时才能驳回案件，那么案件永远不可能被驳回。我们不认为任何判例支持这一点；事实上，我们认为恰恰相反，诸如OptInRealBig和Acme Cake Company的判例表明相反结论。\n\n法官阁下，我认为，在堪萨斯州Regional Evangelical Alliance of Church（地区福音教会联盟）的破产案中，你们知道，法院指出，尽管存在其他债权人，但如果破产实质上是企图阻挠一名债权人在州法院诉讼中的追偿，则适宜让人们寻求其根据适用的非破产法有权获得的救济，而无需诉讼因其他情况可能设置的破产障碍。\n\n法官阁下，我认为我们还在对——抱歉，在支持意见书的答复状中援引了三个案例，即Wally Findlay（沃利·芬德利）案，该案指出，为重新审理破产案件而使用破产程序是不被允许的；当债务人采取该立场时，驳回案件是适当的。以及纽约东区的Bridge to Life（生命之桥）案，该案被驳回是因为债务人试图——你们知道——将非破产法争议引入第11章案件。在D&G Construction: Dean Gonzalez（D&G建筑公司：迪恩·冈萨雷斯）案中，法院认为，将破产程序用作拖延合法行使州法权利并攻击其他法院终局命令的平台，足以支持\n\n驳回。法官阁下，这些案件中有一些，您知道，理由阐述得并不充分。我理解。我认为对方的一些其他案件也是如此，我会谈到他们的案件；但我认为，其中有一条贯穿始终的主线，即没有任何理由阻止——没有理由阻止——恢复现状，并让人们在此类案件中行使其所拥有的任何州法院权利。我还要说明本案不是什么。本案不是大规模侵权案件。本案不是这样一种案件：你可以说，好吧，债务人五年前做了坏事，当然有些人比其他人先受到损害，但我们知道——我们知道——将来必然会有人因进攻性非互惠争点排除等原则而获得对其有利的裁决；我们甚至可以制定一个矩阵，说，好吧，如果你患有间皮瘤并且45岁，你将获得X。如果你遭受阿片类药物伤害，你将获得Y。这里每个人的请求权类型都极其不同。因此，您知道，就所谓争相诉诸法院的问题而言，这正是州法允许人们做的，而PAX一直极其、极其勤勉且警惕，这并无不当。\n\n我想谈谈对方援引的案件。首先，我认为——这些案件中有几条贯穿始终的主线，我认为它们显示出相当有意义的差异。我认为——您知道，首先显然是Julian案。我认为显然存在支持驳回的有力理由。我认为，您知道，该案中债务人在整个案件过程中的行为是显著区别因素。\n\n在本案中，本案幸而持续时间很短；我想，我对本案的理解可能远不如您、Birney先生或Goldman先生，但我认为，与该案中债务人律师有关的一些独特事实意味着，您知道，最终由法院维持对该案的监督可能确实是件好事。但我不认为——您知道，债权人——债权人的最终结果并不好；并且我认为，无论那是否是对裁量权的适当行使，都不能为本案提供指引。\n\nDistrict of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）的SWJ Management案中，债权人绝大多数请求转换程序。我想澄清的是，正如Acme Cake Company（阿克米蛋糕公司）案所述，你不应当按人头计数。你确实应当按金额计算，因为设想一下，如果有100个——您知道，PAX拥有$260 million判决。设想PAX将其贷款拆分为$261 million的关联方基金，而每个基金各自提交债权申报。\n\n而每个基金都可以来到这里说，261名债权人赞成驳回。我认为这不是按人头计数。我认为这是按金额计算，而PAX的——您知道，PAX资金的价值才是真正重要的。Premier Golf Properties案被大量援引。该案为564 BR 710。法院在决定驳回还是转换程序适当时使用了一个有意思的词。该院称，关键问题——其实际上称，该案的关键问题是，标的资产即一个高尔夫球场的不确定价值，能否通过作为持续经营企业的破产出售或止赎而实现最大化。这与本案毫无相似之处。法院依赖的事实是，债务人维持着一家经营中的企业，有60名雇员，并且每月收入$300,000。驳回该案将导致止赎及由此带来的财务和就业损失。如果您驳回本案，法官阁下，我可能会失业，但我认为其他任何人都不会。我认为，您知道，Premier Golf Properties案极其、极其、极其不同。*1121 Pier Village、Team Systems International、West Hampton Coach Works、Speer、Babayoff*均涉及没有任何非债务人一方主张驳回优于转换程序的情形。而且在大多数案件中，除非债务人偏好该选择，否则根本没有讨论驳回。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷庭审记录与转录服务公司）\n\nTeam Systems案的法院，该案是Goldblatt法官作出的一份非常周详的意见书，Goldblatt法官临近Delaware bench（特拉华法官席），特别多次指出，所有参与的债权人及U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）均主张，转换程序比驳回更有利于债权人及破产财团。在这种情形下，Goldblatt法官认定驳回没有意义而转换程序有意义，当然并非滥用裁量权。这完全不是本案的情形。\n\nFleetstar案被Rui Ma债权人大量援引。我认为该案涉及的情形极其不同。那是试图实施一项结构化驳回；我认为，根据Jevic案，即便不能说完全被禁止，也存在严重问题。本案不是结构化驳回。没有人请求法院说，好吧，如果你给一些人一些东西而其他人什么也不给，那么你可以驳回案件并获得免责；而且，您知道，只能自认倒霉。\n\n这是一项单纯的驳回请求。有一些要求他人支付费用的努力。我认为我们一直都说，如果其他人获得费用支付，我们没有异议。我们不会坚持要求支付我们自己的费用，但本案根本不是结构化驳回类型的案件。\n\nFleetstar案的法院解释说，即使债务人提出的驳回方案能够通过可行性测试，而且法院对结构化驳回拟如何实施存有真正的担忧，该方案仍必须被否决，因为其试图在未经当事人同意的情况下改变当事人的权利，并且缺乏《法典》中许多最重要的保障措施。\n\n在这里，我们请求恢复现状。没有人正在失去其拥有的权利。您知道，并未要求债务人的破产申请前债权人牺牲任何东西。我们只是寻求恢复现状。\n\n委员会还援引Capra案。Capra案是一个有意思的事项。我实际上认为，如果你对Capra案作一些深入思考，它有助于我们而不是损害我们。Capra案中，法院多次称支持转换程序的重大因素是严重不当行为，因为债务人来到法官面前寻求破产保护。而他做了什么？他未能——您知道，他——实际上是他有些事情没有做。他没有实质性参与破产程序；而且，您知道，本案进展时间不长，但确实已经提交MORs，并且债务人已提出聘任申请。没有发现——您知道，我们不认为他所做的事情合理，但他确实参与了这一程序。但该案的关键问题是，债务人在破产期间出售了一辆Bentley（宾利）和一辆Rolls Royce（劳斯莱斯），却没有遵守《破产法典》第363条。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷庭审记录与转录服务公司）\n\n这是——在真正糟糕的行为清单上，这是极其糟糕的行为。对吧？你不能一面说我想进入破产程序，却又不遵守最重要的保障措施之一。显然，这不是日常经营行为。他不是汽车经销商。他是个人。因此，他违反了第363条；法院多次谈到这有多糟糕，并继续说明，我认为该案的大致要旨是，法院不想允许驳回，因为债务人基本上不会因其所作所为面临任何后果。因此，我认为应当如此理解该案：如果你在法官面前做了坏事，法官将保留对你的监督。因此，将本案送回Ostrager法官。对吧？Kwok（郭文贵）所做的真正糟糕的事情是在Ostrager法官面前发生的。因此，我认为，如果——如果Capra案——您知道，Capra案的教导是，当人们做坏事时，法官有权监督他们。本案中真正糟糕的行为是在Ostrager法官面前实施的。因此，本案被驳回后，您知道，我们将继续在Ostrager法官面前主张我们的权利，而他可以——他可以就Kwok先生的行为追究其责任。法官阁下，援引了Rolick案。这是一份非常简短的意见书。我认为理解Rolick案的一种方式是，\n\n拥有最大债权的人应当受到重视。另一项关键区别是，Rolick案支持转换程序而非驳回，其涉及一组在破产申请前获得判决留置权的债权人；他们寻求驳回案件，以避免可能针对他们提出的撤销诉讼。这根本不是本案的因素。我们没有任何——无法对我们主张优先受偿请求权，因为我们没有收到债务人财产。\n\n法官阁下，我只想花一点时间讨论援引的另外几个案件。Steve and Barry's案，我认为该案通常也被称为Steve and Barry's，即BH S & B Holdings LLC案。委员会援引该案称，您知道，如果在一个有偿付能力的案件中存在行政留置权，这应当支持转换程序。\n\n第一，我认为法院因理由而着眼于该点。第二，该案已持续数年。有存货需要处理，有——您知道，清算的门店。第三，我认为如果你阅读该意见书，没有任何迹象表明有人甚至想要转换程序。因此，我猜法院可以——您知道，必须评估这是否适当，但没有人想要，遑论最大债权人。\n\n您知道，Mitan v. Duval案，您知道，这是第六巡回法院的案件。在该案中，最大债权人并不赞成驳回，只有债务人赞成。那些债权人——因此，您知道，法院希望指定一名Chapter 7 trustee（第7章受托人）以进行调查。在这里，我们认为每一位债权人都可以继续进行其认为重要且必要的任何取证。\n\n法官阁下，我还想就这些案件指出几件事。法官阁下，关于被大量援引的Capra案，还有一点是，您知道，赞成驳回的当事人是有担保债权人；法院指出，债务人正在给予那两名债权人优待，并且他们可以合理预期，如果案件被驳回，他们将继续获得优待。\n\n我不知道我们与债务人将来会发生什么。债务人在其书面陈述中称，他们打算偿付债权人。我不知道这是否会发生。我假定我们将不得不进行更多诉讼。我不知道，但确实不存在——您知道，支持本项动议驳回的一方此前没有获得优待的历史。远非如此。说得轻一点，我们与Kwok一起支持本项动议，是有些令人不安的同床者。因此，我认为这又是一个区别点。\n\n法官阁下，我想就Exhibit 27提出几点，该证据是——您知道，那个——它是我们的——\n\n这是其他诉讼的摘要。法庭：该文件已作为完整证物准予提交，无人提出异议，所以请继续。我只是作个记录——弗里德曼先生：好的。法庭：——关于该证物，因为我们仍然必须——在某个时候仍然必须处理笔录证物。但请继续。弗里德曼先生：法官阁下，您知道，其中谈到了附表 F 上列明的债权。现在——让我先说，已经提交了一些债权证明，我想我们可能会听到这样的说法：如果提交了债权证明，在有人提出异议之前，它会自动被视为有效。我认为，法院可以注意到，部分依据证物 27，但总体而言，这——在无人提出异议这一点上算是正确的，但所有这些案件均处于积极诉讼中，因此——当您知道这些债权多年来一直在诉讼中受到积极争议时，说债权证明在无人——在有人提出异议之前表面上有效，并不十分准确。无论如何，我认为这些债权——诉讼债权有一点确实很重要，即有一项已确定数额的债权，我想是 300 以及可能 $96,000。当您查看该图表时，有 $35,648,868 的债权已被驳回。有 $37 million 的债权已搁置两年多。或者大约如此。我不想——我认为是两年多。这当然——而且您可以看出，这是一段相当长的时间。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 580 于 07/21/22 提交 于 07/21/22 08:38:19 录入 第 39 页，共 119 页\n\n已被驳回。有 $37 million 的债权已搁置两年多。或者大约如此。我不想——我认为是两年多。这当然——而且您可以看出，这是一段相当长的时间。\n\n因此，您知道，您实际上谈论的是一个规模小得多的潜在债权池。没有证据表明其中任何一项已有审判日期或曾确定审判日期，而且，您知道，我们对何时会审理其中任何一项债权知之甚少；我们提交认为，法院适宜同时考虑质的差异，即我们拥有一份判决书，而这些都是潜在的未来债权，就与我方债权相关而言，它们并不具有共同的事实核心。\n\n此外，法官阁下，我还要——您知道，指出另外几点。许多债权——至少我们所能识别出的八项债权涉及证券违法行为，您知道，这些债权可能被劣后受偿或不予认可，但我只是将此作为一个问题指出。我认为，这既意味着 PAX（PAX）的观点在此应当获得相当大的重视，也意味着，审视这些债权并注意到其中有多少是诽谤债权，以及 Rui Ma（马睿）债权——这显然属于人身损害类型的债权——可以说明本案极不适合破产程序的一些原因。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与庭审速记服务公司）\n\n我认为，本院未必是适当的审理场所，来监督十余项彼此没有共同事实关联、且已在州法院推进至某一阶段的人身——诽谤债权。如果解除自动停止以使它们全部确定数额，这就违背了集中审理场所或单一——单一事实裁判者的目的。\n\n坦率地说，正如我们所援引的，就 28 USC 157(b)(5) 而言，本院是否甚至可以审理这些债权，或者这些债权是否必须由地区法院审理，尚存未决问题。District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）在 Ice Cream Liquidation（冰淇淋清算案）中，对人身侵权债权采取了较宽泛的解释，即包括任何构成对人身权利侵害的损害。我认为法院不必就其中任何问题作出结论，因为这些问题目前并不在法院面前；但我试图让法院了解，为何在尚有诸如允许当事人回到州法院等其他选择的情况下，将这些债权确定数额会带来问题，也确实无法服务于破产程序的核心功能。\n\n显然，在 Chapter 7 中——并且需要明确的是，法官阁下，我理解存在一种较宽泛的观点。我们援引了 Gawker Media（高客传媒）案，因为我认为，当存在与我们所持观点不同的案例时，我们始终有义务予以承认。但我确实认为 District of Connecticut 的 Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.（冰淇淋清算公司）案是在此语境下值得参考的有帮助的案例。\n\n您知道，法官阁下，接下来就会谈到所有这些案件将会如何处理。如果他们在这里，原告仍将不得不承担——法庭：如果案件——如果本案被转换程序，这些案件将会如何处理？这是您的——弗里德曼先生：是的，法官阁下。法庭：是。继续。弗里德曼先生：那么受托人将必须为其抗辩。我不知道受托人将会——受托人不能只是说，好吧，各位，您知道，我将认可你们的债权。这显然会严重损害拥有有效债权的债权人的利益。受托人必须以某种方式获得报酬来做这件事。我不知道——您知道，我稍后会谈到这一点。但这需要实实在在的现金支付，而不是——您知道，不一定是诉讼融资或风险代理费的承诺，对吧？这将需要有人真正深入审查这些案件中每一件的实体问题。作为利害关系方，这可能迫使 PAX 也必须做同样的事，正如法院所知。任何债权人，尤其是在 Chapter 7 中，均可对任何其他债权人的债权提出异议。您知道，如果没有一名真正能够进行抗辩的受托人，该负担将不公平地落在 PAX 身上。\n\n债务人也可能在该方面参与本案。\n\n我认为——您知道，您最终得到的确实是某种不太适合破产法院处理的情形；相反，适宜让这些人——您知道，这些债权人回到他们的州法院救济途径，并继续追诉他们截至目前已经提起的任何案件。\n\n法庭：那么，除您关于 157(b)(5) 的论点之外，28 USC 157(b)(2)(B) 又如何？该条规定，人身损害债权和非正常死亡债权不得被估算——\n\n弗里德曼先生：是。\n\n法庭：——或确定数额——\n\n弗里德曼先生：是的，法官阁下。针对该汇编。\n\n法庭：——用于在 Title 11 项下案件中进行分配？\n\n弗里德曼先生：这正是与我预期有人可能会提出的论点相对应的一点，即，“哦，那么你们可以估算这些债权”，这样，您知道，人们的分配就不会永远被拖延。但同样地，您随后仍要到本院之外去完成这件事，而且，您知道，当这些问题本可由州法院系统处理时，您却给康涅狄格州联邦法院系统施加了沉重负担。法官阁下，我认为——所以我认为——这是一个相当关键的问题。\n\n那么，我们接下来谈谈，在其当前程序状态下，本案的其他特征。本案没有资金，我们一直担心，永远不会有本案所需的那种资金。对吧？唯一的资金是用于进行调查，而我们从一开始就说，这是一座通向虚无的桥梁，因为如果您要采取任何行动，您所需要的是某种诉讼行动。而且我们——您知道，我们在破产法院之外所采取的那些行动，是有帮助的。\n\n在这里，您面对的是一名没有流动资产且未来争议旷日持久的债务人。我们知道，已经在本院提起了一宗诉讼，即一项对抗性程序，涉及撤销郭文贵先生所享有的权利，以及是否有他人对该游艇享有权利。\n\n我们知道，围绕 Sherry Netherland（雪莉·尼德兰）公寓存在广泛诉讼，这将要求债务人——债务人——Chapter 7 受托人参与纽约的一宗破产程序。仅为处理计划问题等事项，而不仅仅是取得该资产，还要对他人的债权提出异议；该案件涉及英属维尔京群岛方面的因素。您必须支付英属维尔京群岛律师的费用，而这没有资金。对吧？推定还会有诉讼，因为这是 Chapter 7，您将会围绕债权的免除发生争议。您知道，受托人必须处理这些问题，或者个别债权人必须承担该负担。那么，您知道——所以您最终得到什么？您最终处于这样一种情形：没有可供受托人使用的资金。没有能够在短期内变现的财产。有几宗诉讼和一条狗，但仅此而已。确实有一些东西人们可以追索，但要如何追索？嗯，您可以有诉讼融资。我们没有看到任何可用诉讼融资的证据。我认为它将付出高昂代价。该成本将主要由 PAX 承担，并会侵蚀 PAX 所能获得的任何追偿。您知道——法庭：任何债权人能够保留的任何追偿。弗里德曼先生：绝对如此，法官阁下，而且我认为这将不成比例地落在我们身上，风险代理律师也是如此。本院可以依据法官自身的经验予以注意，风险代理律师费用昂贵。我们知道，委员会在驳回之前——也就是驳回听证会之前——不仅仅是，您知道，提交了聘用欺诈审查人员和资产追踪人员的动议，对吧？如果人们要以事后收取报酬的方式承担这些工作，所有这些都会很昂贵。我甚至不知道他们是否会这么做。通常，我认为这类人员按小时收费，但没有任何钱可以支付给他们。而且，您知道，确实存在一些案例——委员会所援引的 Babayoff（巴巴约夫）案——认为在资金不足且受托人只会给破产财产增加更多成本和负担的情形下，应优先驳回案件。法庭：律师，是哪一个案件？弗里德曼先生：Babayoff，445 BR 640 -- 64，第 82 页。法庭：我只是不认识这个名称。您援引的其他案例我认识，但您是说它在委员会的书状中？弗里德曼先生：我相信是的。它进而援引了 Midwest Properties of Shawano（沙瓦诺中西部地产）案。因此，您知道，坦白说，我们认为受托人会在费用方面增加重大负担，而且我不确定——您知道，这有什么益处，因为尤其是，我们知道可以追诉州法救济，或者在适当时可以主张刺破公司面纱。人们如愿意，可以自行追诉州法上的欺诈性转让债权。人们可以申请限制令。PAX 确实这样做了。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与庭审速记服务公司）\n\n而且，没有任何因素阻止人们使用其所享有的州法救济。\n\n您知道，Rui Ma 债权人团体称，如果本案被驳回，非 PAX 债权人将无法在分配中获得平等对待。我不知道这是否属实。我不知道——或许他们会和解其债权。我不知道。对吧？在破产程序之外，任何人能获得什么并无保证，但当事人应能够尽其所愿追诉郭文贵，以收回他们想要收回的东西。\n\n如果实际上并无任何可供追索之物——这只是一个题外话——如果确有可供追索之物，也没有人对可能存在的数额设置上限。很可能潜在地存在足够多的财产供其他人受偿。我们——您知道，诚然，我们不知道，但我认为，尤其考虑到 PAX 债权的数额及其迄今所付出的努力，PAX 不应当——不应当因本次提交而受到损害，而且我认为不应允许其他债权人实质上利用债务人的恶意提交。\n\n其他当事人大致称，您知道，郭文贵的品质——郭文贵在此的行为具有策略操弄的一面，他不应因此获得奖励。我认为他并未获得奖励。如果本案被驳回，除避免在奥斯特拉格法官面前经历几个月以外，他未从本案获得任何实际利益，而他\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n将不得不回到原来的状态。他没有获得任何利益。唯一获得利益的人，是那些没有确定债权、却在拖延 PAX（PAX）的人，而 PAX 已经被拖延了将近 14 年。我认为这既不公平也不公正，而且不符合 PAX 所拥有的 \\$261 million 债权的利益。\n\n你知道，我们认为，实际上是其他当事人、其他债权持有人推动继续留在破产程序中，才是在主张不平等对待。他们基本上想把破产程序用作催收工具；正如 In Re: Murray（Murray案）所称，破产不应被用作一种更有力的债务催收救济——在破产程序中比非破产法下的同等权利更有力的债务催收救济，不是我们应当采取的做法。该法院谴责债权人将破产程序用作比州法——比非破产法下同等权利更有力的债务催收救济。\n\n鉴于他们目前的地位，这将使其他人插队在前，迫使 PAX 分享追偿所得，同时施加数百万美元不必要的费用。\n\n我注意到，债务人指出，其他债权人基本上是在劫持 Chapter 11（第11章）案件。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 48 of 119\n\n以实现一种伪自愿破产。我怀疑他们在夸大这一点。否则，这将不是他们可获得的救济途径。我将留待委员会进一步阐述该论点。我认为该论点有依据，法官阁下。\n\n法官阁下，委员会援引了，而且我认为我们也注意到，Collier（科利尔）讨论了一些因素。法院有点——有些法院确实依赖这些因素，有些法院只是顺带提及。我认为我今天所讨论的内容确实涵盖了这些因素。你知道，债权人是否收到优先付款是一个因素。现在，当然没有理由相信 PAX 收到了任何优先付款。如果案件被驳回而非转换，是否会丧失本案所赋予的权利？\n\nRui Ma（马蕊）集团认为，若案件被驳回，对 \\$37 million 托管款的权利将会丧失，但该命令明确设想了如发生驳回将会如何处理。这并不是什么未知之事。债权人——你知道，债权人并无对其享有任何特定权利，而且就驳回情形下可能发生的事情，已作出明确协商。因此，我不认为任何人失去了其本应拥有的权利。\n\n债务人是否会在驳回后仅仅再提起一个案件。我的意思是，我想 Kwok（郭文贵）可以尝试，既然他已同意本案，而且，你知道，我不认为这\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n支持这一点。受托人为债权人利益取得资产的能力。我认为，你知道，也许如此，但受托人目前没有资金支持其工作。所谓唾手可得的成果——首先，是 Kwok——你知道，是 PAX 种下了这棵树；但更重要的是，要到达那棵树上的成果，仍有很多工作要做。即使假定资金可用，也将以债权人承担巨大成本为代价，我认为其中尤其包括 PAX。你知道，最大化财产作为经济企业的价值——你知道，谁真正知道其经济企业价值是多少。我们知道——我认为这主要出现在诸如 Premier Golf（普瑞米尔高尔夫）案这类案件中，在那里，清算会造成明显的损失——对价值和就业造成毁灭性损失。剩余问题是否会在破产法院外得到解决，我认为法院可能已经就该问题进行了讨论；而且我认为，例如，债务人和 Rui Ma，我们已经说过，嘿，你们已有一个案件，回去并尝试在别处处理。债务人是否存在不当行为。我认为，此处债务人的不当行为几乎完全发生在破产申请前。围绕案件边缘存在一些事情，显然我们——你知道，我们并不喜欢债务人处理本案的方式，但我认为它们属于不明智做法的范围，而非腐败。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 50 of 119\n\n而且，你知道，我不认为债权人需要一个 Chapter 7（第7章）案件来保护其利益。人们完全可以使用其州法救济。然后，你知道，其他因素，单一资产计划已经确认、环境方面的担忧，我认为正如我们在审阅拟议命令时从 DIP（债务人占有融资）中了解到的，本案不存在循环方面的担忧。不存在环境问题。这不是 Midlantic（米德兰提克）类型的情形。因此，法官阁下，这些就是我们认为驳回适当的理由，判例法支持 PAX 的理由，而其他当事人所依赖的案件实际上并未使他们达到为使本法院行使裁量权转换而非驳回所需的程度。谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：谢谢。Jonas 律师？JONAS 先生：早上好，法官阁下。我是 Jeff Jonas（杰夫·乔纳斯），Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所），代表债务人 Miles Kwok（郭文贵）。在尤其讨论驳回 Chapter 11（第11章）案件或其他替代方案之前，我认为重要的是先退一步，回顾我们如何走到这里，以便将其置于背景中，因为我确实认为，法院今天应当将事情置于背景中，并聚焦于事实，而不是律师将会提出、已经提出并将会提出的众多未经支持的指控、影射和论证，因此今天上午您不会从我这里听到任何花言巧语或恶意言辞。\n\n在本案中，您已经听取了两名证人的现场证言，即 Verdolino & Lowey（弗尔多利诺和洛伊）的 Craig Jalbert（克雷格·贾尔伯特）以及债务人 Miles Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n正如 Kwok 先生所作证以及他所提交的声明中所述，他是 Chinese Communist Party 或 CCP（中国共产党）的直言不讳的批评者。数亿人观看他与批评 CCP 有关的直播。他及其家人在中国被监禁和折磨。他亲眼目睹其兄弟遭枪击身亡。他持续受到 CCP 的追捕和迫害。\n\n这并非荒诞的虚构。包括曾作为 CCP 外国代理人行事、非法试图使 Kwok 先生被驱逐至中国以便其遭监禁或杀害在内，美国政府高级官员和商界领袖已被刑事起诉并认罪答辩。这些人包括 Elliot Broidy（埃利奥特·布罗迪）和 George Higginbotham（乔治·希金博瑟姆）。\n\n法官阁下，上周——我认为我们在书面材料中提到过此事，但为确保您知悉——上周，Department of Justice（司法部）基于 Steve Wynn（史蒂夫·永利）作为未登记的中国代理人、寻求引渡 Kwok 先生一事，对其提起诉讼。司法部提及 President Xi Jinping（习近平主席）、中国——中国的最高领导人——直接向当时的 President Trump（特朗普总统）提出美国将 Kwok 先生送回中国一事。Wynn 先生为争取中国政府支持其在 Macao（澳门）的赌场，与 White House（白宫）National Security Counsel（国家安全委员会）的高级官员、White House Chief of Staff（白宫办公厅主任）以及当时的 Trump 总统接触，请求将 Kwok 先生列入禁飞名单、不续签 Kwok 先生的美国签证，并将 Kwok 先生送回中国，再次使其很可能面临监禁或死亡。Kwok 先生相信，对其提出的部分（即使不是全部）债权人——所谓债权人债权，是 CCP 持续努力诋毁和封杀他的组成部分。在此背景下，Kwok 先生坚持不懈。尽管他几乎没有资产和收入，但其受到家人的慷慨资助。尽管其所谓债权人可能不喜欢这一点，但这并无任何违法、不当或错误之处。今年二月，面对一项其无力支付的 New York State Court（纽约州法院）判决书和命令，Kwok 先生提起本破产案件。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 53 of 119\n\n正如其所作证以及其声明中所述，他希望 Chapter 11（第11章）能够帮助他就所谓债权人债权达成公平、公正的解决。自提出以来，他的破产申请及本案的管理始终完全出于善意且完全透明。没有相反证据。我认为甚至 Friedman 先生也基本承认了这一点。尽管可能存在指控称 Kwok 先生拥有某些资产，无论是游艇还是纽约市公寓，这些指控仍未经证实和认定。自提起本案以来，Kwok 先生已提交完整、准确的资产负债表及财务状况声明。他参加了近两个完整工作日的 341 会议。他出庭提供现场证言。他安排并协助返还作为纽约州法院命令标的的游艇，该游艇的返还目前由 \\$37 million 现金担保。他获得 \\$9 million 的 DIP 融资，该融资本应为无担保且次级债务，并包括向财产提供的 \\$1 million 赠与。他还提交了一项重整计划。其希望是，破产程序能够提供一个场所和机会，以便与债权人及所谓债权人进行对话，从而达成合意解决，这正是破产程序的确切目的和要点。本破产申请并非出于恶意，自提出以来亦不存在恶意。因此，法官阁下，转向驳回问题，根据 Bankruptcy Code（破产法典）Section 1112(b)(1)，存在驳回事由；具体而言，1121(b)(4)(A)规定，事由包括财产发生重大或持续损失或减损，以及不存在合理的重整可能性。这是唯一存在的事由。如果您确实查看——我理解这并非绝对穷尽——但如果您查看 1112(b)(4)——显然，我已将 (A) 称为我们认为与本案相关的事由——如果您查看 (B)，我们认为其他事由均不适用，法官阁下。(B) 对财产的严重管理不善，我已就此作出说明；(C) 未能维持适当保险；(D) 未经授权使用现金担保物；(E) 未能遵守法院命令；(F) 无正当理由未能及时满足任何提交或报告要求；(G) 未能参加债权人会议；(H) 未能及时提供信息或\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n出席 United States Trustee（美国受托人）要求的会议；（I）未及时缴纳税款；（J）未提交披露声明；（K）未支付第 28 编第 123 章规定的任何费用或收费；（L）确认命令被撤销；（M）无法实现已确认计划的实质性完成；（N）债务人就已确认计划构成重大违约；（O）已确认计划终止；以及最后，（P）债务人未支付任何家庭扶养义务。因此，法官阁下，如我所述，我们认为存在事由。相关且适用的事由是 1121(b)(4)(A)。法庭：我可以就此问您一个问题吗？JONAS 律师（乔纳斯）：当然可以，法官阁下。法庭：我理解——我理解您对该清单的陈述，也理解您主张仅（4）项适用，但您是否——您是否在质疑将“事由包括”解释为并不意味着只能符合该清单中所列情形的判例法？JONAS 律师：不，法官阁下。法庭：好的。\n\nJONAS 律师：完全不是。法庭：这就是我想问的。JONAS 律师：是。法庭：好的。JONAS 律师：而且我想我已提到过，法官阁下，我们的观点是——我承认该清单并非穷尽。法庭：我以为您说过——JONAS 律师：是。法庭：——但我只是想为记录起见确认一下。JONAS 律师：不。不。不。绝对不是，法官阁下。法庭：好的。JONAS 律师：但我确实认为，那里列明具体项目是有原因的——法庭：我明白。JONAS 律师：——而且我认为审阅这些项目很重要。法庭：不，我认为这很有帮助。谢谢。JONAS 律师：不客气。法官阁下，关于驳回与转换或指定受托人之间的取舍，尽管债务人的偏好并非决定性因素，仍应给予一定权重。在本案中，债务人及其最大债权人均支持驳回。1112(b)(1) 规定，法庭应审查驳回、转换或指定受托人中的何者最符合债权人和破产财产的最佳利益。Connecticut（康涅狄格州）联邦地区法院在 SWJ Management（SWJ 管理公司）案，551 B.R. 93，2015 年一案中，将此项分析表述为是否驳回将会，引用原文，“损害债权人”。\n\n在 Hull（赫尔）案，339 B.R. 304，纽约东区（Eastern District of New York）破产法院 2006 年的一案中，法庭处理了在此情境下何为对债权人的损害。\n\n该案指出，引用原文：“债权人通常不会因驳回而受到损害，因为他们将不再被禁止诉诸州法院以执行并实现其债权。也就是说，在债务人及时提出驳回动议的情境下，应当考虑的是债务人债权人在申请破产前合理的法律预期和权利，而不是丧失通过破产程序获得分配的机会。”\n\n法庭：律师，您能再告诉我一次那个案件吗？\n\nJONAS 律师：当然可以。\n\n法庭：抱歉。\n\nJONAS 律师：是 Hull 案。H-U——\n\n法庭：Hull，H-U-L-L？\n\nJONAS 律师：是。引注为 339 B.R. 304。这是纽约东区 2006 年的一案，是一宗破产法院案件。法庭：谢谢。谢谢。JONAS 律师：是。法庭：我刚才没有听到您开头说的内容。抱歉。JONAS 律师：当然，法官阁下。法官阁下，为记录起见，我只想说明，我们认为 1112(b)(2) 不适用；该条可能禁止转换或驳回，理由有数项。我们不认为存在证明转换或驳回不符合债权人和破产财产最佳利益的异常情形。该条的另一项要求——我们认为亦不适用——是我们不认为在合理期间内存在计划将获确认的合理可能性，这也是 1112(b)(2) 项下的另一项要求。如果转换或驳回的事由是 1112(b)(4)(A)，则 1112(b)(2) 不适用；再次说明，我正在向您阐述我们的立场，即 1112(b)(4)(A) 项下的损失或减损以及不存在合理的恢复经营可能性，构成驳回的依据。\n\n法官阁下，我不会进一步审阅 PAX（PAX 公司）关于恶意的指控。我认为我已对此作出回应。我的意思是，他们——再次简要而言——我认为，他们以缺乏依据的方式提及了附表中的失实陈述、所谓“虚假的 DIP 贷款”，以及债务人所谓“终止本案”。我不认为其中任何一项是本案实际发生的情况。我可以告诉您，债务人来到本法庭——如我先前提到——是希望最终能够重组。这并未发生。但尽管如此，我认为 Friedman 先生（弗里德曼先生）说过这一点；他或许不喜欢这一点，但他实际上并未对自本案开始以来本案中存在恶意这一事实提出异议。最后，法官阁下，关于因为债务人没有持续经营的业务而使破产申请不当这一说法，我认为您在 Lucarelli（卢卡雷利）案，517 B.R. 42，中说得最好；您曾说过，或者我们曾听到引述：“《破产法典》的明确文字允许未从事经营活动的个人债务人根据 Chapter 11 申请救济。”法庭：不过，我想我为此引用的是最高法院。JONAS 律师：您引用了数个案件，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：我想那是——JONAS 律师：我把这归功于您。法庭：我想那是最高法院。JONAS 律师：我想您是对的。法官阁下，我只是——我确实认为，应当简要指出，今日到庭的债权人委员会成员所主张的债权，事实上均未清算且存在争议。正如——再次说明，Friedman 先生已经谈过此事，我不会重复许多原本可能会说的话，因为我认为 Friedman 先生已涵盖这些内容——这些债权将会——将需要通过诉讼解决。无论以何种形式继续本破产案件，均将在一个行政上无力偿债、没有资金支持可能持续数年的诉讼的案件情境下进行。法官阁下，最后，Kwok 先生（郭文贵先生）请我感谢您和您的工作人员为本案付出的时间和给予的考虑。尽管本案可能未如他所希望的那样成功，但至少在一定程度上恢复了他对司法制度的信心。话虽如此，法官阁下，谨此陈述，现在是继续前行的时候了。本破产案件应予驳回。谢谢。法庭：谢谢您，Jonas 律师。Goldman 律师。\n\n案件 22-50073，文件 580，于 07/21/22 提交，于 07/21/22 08:38:19 录入，第 61 页，共 119 页\n\nGOLDMAN 律师（戈德曼律师）：谢谢，法官阁下。早上好。我是 Irve Goldman（欧文·戈德曼），代表债权人委员会。法官阁下，我想首先指出，无论本案是否因恶意而提出申请，或者是否存在其他事由，正如我们已约定的，法庭面前的问题——法庭面前的问题——并非本案是否因恶意而提出申请，而是转换、驳回，或指定 Chapter 11 受托人是否最符合债权人的最佳利益。因此，本案是否因恶意而提出申请或是否存在其他事由，并不改变本案中何为最符合债权人最佳利益的标准。而且，如果债务人自身的恶意被用于证明驳回本案具有正当性，这将颇具讽刺意味，因为这将使他得以逃避 Chapter 7 程序的审查；该程序将对 PAX 声称属于其隐藏资产的财产进行彻底调查，PAX 在本案提出申请前已接近取得该等财产。而他将因此获得回报，因为在 PAX 作为本案唯一已获判决债权人处理完该等资产后，剩下的将是分散在不同法院的各债权人，只能自行追索该债务人拥有的任何资产。因此，他们确实需要 Chapter 7 程序的保护。\n\n就 1112 项下的标准而言，我想从法条的明确文字开始；最高法院和第二巡回区已反复指示下级法院，在解释《破产法典》时应当着重于此。第 1112(b)(1) 条规定，一旦确定存在事由，法庭必须转换或驳回案件，以最符合债权人和破产财产最佳利益者为准，除非法庭认定指定 Chapter 7 受托人或审查员最符合债权人和破产财产的最佳利益。法庭：我想您的意思是 Chapter 11 受托人，不过没关系。GOLDMAN 律师：是。是。谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：没关系。我明白。我理解您的意思。GOLDMAN 律师：PAX——PAX 希望法庭解读该法条的方式，是按照债权人债权金额——数额来判断何为债权人的最佳利益。当然，法条根本没有如此规定。我想强调的是，在考量最佳利益时，法条使用的是复数形式，即“债权人”，因此必须考虑全体债权人整体的利益，而不能只考虑一名持有大额债权、并且在破产申请提出前已接近取得——本案所有债权人似乎都同意这是债务人目前已知资产——的单一债权人的利益。\n\n即 Lady May（“五月夫人”号）以及债务人在 Sherry-Netherland（雪梨-内德兰）公寓中的权益。在确定债权人整体时，法庭可以对目前已提交的债权证明以及债务人的附表 F 予以司法认知。截至今日，尽管尚未设定申报截止日期，债权证明总额为 $71 million，其中有些以严重人身损害的指控为基础。例如，Rui Ma（马蕊）的债权，其在 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）的案件已接近审判阶段，主张在数年期间遭受性侵害、非法监禁及故意造成精神痛苦的债权。Bob Fu（傅希秋）的债权，基于在 Texas（得克萨斯州）联邦法院提起的诉讼，所依据的指控是债务人煽动针对 Fu 博士的暴力行为，确实曾鼓励其所谓“同志们”杀害 Fu 博士，并煽动在其住所前持续数周的骚扰性抗议。Bruno Wu（吴征）和 Yang Lan（杨澜）的债权，基于在纽约州最高法院提起的诉讼，该诉讼指称债务人利用其广泛的社交媒体账户对他们进行人身攻击，声称杨澜曾有婚外情，并通过性好处获得其在中国的显赫文化地位。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 记录与誊写服务公司）\n案件 22-50073，文件 580，于 07/21/22 提交，于 07/21/22 08:38:19 录入，第 64 页，共 119 页\n\n并且所谓“满身性传播疾病”；又多次指控 Bruno Wu 曾企图谋杀和行贿，并在社交媒体上威胁对该两名债权人实施暴力。\n\n称这些人并非实际债权人、不应如 PAX 一样获得对其利益的同等考量，实在是对这些债权人的冒犯。\n\n如我所述，债权证明的申报截止日期甚至尚未确定。根据附表 F 所列内容，我们很可能会收到大量额外债权，因此该 $71 million 必将增加。\n\n回到法条的通常含义，在确定根据第 1112(b)(1) 条必须纳入考量其利益的债权人时，我请法庭参阅《破产法典》第 101(10A) 条，该条将债权人定义为，截至破产申请日，引用原文，“对债务人享有债权的实体”。\n\n以及第 101(5A) 条对债权的定义，该条将债权界定为包括获得付款的权利，无论该权利是否已化为判决、未经清算或存在争议。\n\n因此，PAX（PAX公司）关于这些债权人并非实际债权人的主张，与《破产法》的明文规定相悖，因为债权人是持有债权请求的人。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 报告与誊录服务公司）\n\n而债权请求可以是无争议、未确定数额且附条件的。因此，此处存在债权人，即实际债权人。如果这些并非实际债权人，美国受托人又怎么可能任命债权人委员会？如果不存在其他实际债权人，他们本应代表哪些债权人？PAX当然没有以不存在实际债权人可供维护为由，反对聘任委员会专业人士。因此，根据法条的通常解释，在本案中提交了债权证明但尚未获得判决的债权人，在根据Section 1112(b)评估最佳利益检验时，与PAX一样都是本破产财产的债权人。即便有区别，那些主张遭受严重人身损害的债权人的利益，在最佳利益检验中也应获得与PAX同等、甚至更大的考量；PAX的实际金钱判决——作为exhibit 1附于弗里德曼先生（Mr. Friedman）就驳回动议所作的声明——本金仅为\\$46 million。他们按合同约定的15 percent利率享有\\$70 million利息，而\\$134 million的藐视法庭罚款并非对任何金钱损失的赔偿。许多法院，事实上是大多数法院，在确定根据Section 1112(b)(1)何者最符合债权人最佳利益时所适用的检验标准，是何种行动方案能使最大数量的债权人在最短时间内获得最大金额的偿付。\n\n在此，答案是转换程序或任命第11章受托人。因为如予驳回，最大数量的债权人将受制于一名单一判决债权人；该债权人将在案件被驳回时获得最大金额的支付，而其他所有债权人仍将陷于与债务人的诉讼之中。\n\n至于该船，我们知道，根据奥斯特拉格法官（Judge Ostrager）于February 9th, 2022作出的决定和命令，即我们的exhibit 1，已根据明确且令人信服的证据认定债务人实益拥有并控制该船。这载于其决定第4页。\n\n该船返还后，PAX将仅对该实益权益实施扣押，并最终在其变现时获得分配。\n\n至于Sherry-Netherland apartment（Sherry-Netherland公寓）——当然，他们已准备在案件被驳回当日采取该行动，因为他们正在奥斯特拉格法官面前进行该程序。\n\n至于Sherry-Netherland公寓，如案件被驳回，他们同样已准备实现该资产的价值。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 报告与誊录服务公司）\n\n在债务人的声明中，即UCC exhibit 2，他承认拥有Genever Holdings Corp.（Genever Holdings公司）100 percent的成员权益；该公司是Sherry-Netherland公寓产权持有人Genever Holdings, LLC（Genever Holdings有限责任公司）的唯一成员。Genever Holdings, LLC是在Southern District of New York（纽约南区）依据第11章进行破产程序的债务人，债务人声称其权益由信托或其儿子的公司Bravo Luck（Bravo Luck公司）持有。这载于其声明paragraph 33(B)。根据October 8th, 2021录入的命令，即UCC exhibit 3，加里蒂法官（Judge Garrity）批准了Genever Holdings、PAX和Bravo Luck之间的和解协议。该和解协议将作为UCC exhibit 4提交，标记为ECF 131-1，日期为September 24th, 2021；该协议准许PAX解除自动停止，以继续推进纽约州最高法院诉讼。这载于和解协议paragraph 7(A)，和解协议第7页，共12页。鉴于PAX已于February 3rd, 2021获得其金钱判决，纽约州最高法院诉讼中唯一尚待审理的事项是PAX针对Genever实体的揭开公司面纱请求。该等请求载于其第一次修订起诉状的count 2，即UCC exhibit 10，位于起诉状第17页。\n\n此外，PAX还是一项命令的受益人，该命令\n\n要求郭先生（Mr. Kwok）将其在Genever中的100 percent所有权权益——即Genever Holdings的100 percent所有人——转让给PAX。这是UCC exhibit 6。该命令于September 22nd, 2021录入。PAX还于January 7th, 2022在纽约提出藐视法庭动议，理由是郭未移交该等股份。我相信那是我们证据中的exhibit 7。\n\n预计该动议将在案件被驳回后重新提出或恢复审理。\n\nPAX在英属维尔京群岛（British Virgin Islands）的法院中还存在类似的揭开公司面纱类型请求。UCC exhibit 11是PAX向该法院提交的修订后诉状。在该修订诉状中，他们尤其主张，郭先生使用其自身资产中的\\$70 million转移给Bravo Luck——见exhibit 11的paragraph 29——郭先生声称与Bravo Luck订立的信托声明是一项欺诈，原话是：“旨在为Bravo Bravo以信托方式持有其在Genever BVI中的股份。”\n\nBravo Luck是一项欺诈——抱歉——它是一项欺诈，原话是：“其唯一目的在于向郭先生的债权人隐瞒郭先生的一项资产。”该信托文件应被撤销，因为它是一份“意图欺诈郭先生债权人的文件”。债权人，复数。见paragraph 35。并且，郭先生是Bravo Luck的实益所有人，其儿子只是其名义持有人。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 报告与誊录服务公司）\n\n根据加里蒂法官批准的和解协议，各方，即PAX和Bravo Luck，亦获准继续进行英属维尔京群岛诉讼。因此，他们也已充分准备基于将在英属维尔京群岛或纽约州法院解决的该等请求，实现Sherry-Netherland公寓的价值。关于Genever Holdings案件中该公寓的情况，梅拉妮·西加诺夫斯基（Melanie Cyganowski）被任命为销售官员，以营销和出售该房产。这载于UCC exhibit 8。苏富比（Sotheby's）获批准担任该房产的经纪人，见UCC exhibit 9；该房产目前在苏富比网站上以\\$38,500,000挂牌出售。因此，PAX在案件被驳回后处于极为有利的位置，可先于其他债权人实现资产价值；其他债权人则仍将不得不与郭先生进行诉讼，随后获得判决，并追查尚余的任何资产。我们主张可在第7章程序中追回的额外潜在资产，是由Greenwich Land, LLC（Greenwich Land有限责任公司）拥有的两处格林尼治房产。UCC exhibits 13和14。该等房产在这些证据中有所描述。在郭先生声明的paragraph 17中，他称其格林尼治住所“由我的妻子通过Greenwich Land, LLC拥有”。这是否又是其隐藏资产之一，尚待查明。当然，这可在第7章程序中调查；而在债务人于May 11th提交其同意驳回申请时，我们正试图进行该项调查。现在我想转向PAX的论点，即何者最符合破产财产最佳利益的核心标准是债权人的偏好，而债权人的最佳利益必须反映PAX作为最大单一债权人的观点。债权人最佳利益检验的核心标准并非债权人偏好什么，而是何种行动方案能为最大数量债权人提供最佳追偿希望，而不是何种方案能为最积极发声或最大的债权人提供最多追偿。初步而言，PAX援引以支持其主张的判例——即一名债权人只要其债权数额足够大，即可满足最佳利益检验——我认为完全与本案相反，而且并不支持PAX的理论。在Acme Cake案，即其所依赖的案件中，没有任何一名债权人，甚至债权人委员会本身，都反对驳回该案。\n\n是债权人委员会的律师以如下理由反对驳回：因行政费用，包括其费用，尚未支付，不应准许驳回；且驳回将违反《破产法》的优先顺序安排，因为这会允许请求驳回的债权人先于行政债权申请人获得支付。\n\n当然，本案的论点并非如此。代表所有无担保债权人利益的债权人委员会反对驳回。我们并未提出该论点，尽管我确实认为，如果法庭倾向于驳回案件，则应以支付费用为条件。\n\n我们反对的理由是，驳回不符合债权人的最佳利益，而这根本不是Acme Cake案中提出的论点。事实上——\n\n法庭：我能就此问您一个问题吗？\n\n高盛先生（MR. GOLDMAN）：可以。\n\n法庭：您刚才说——显然，我理解委员会的立场是驳回并不适当，而转换程序或任命受托人才适当；但您刚才也说，如果法庭驳回，您希望以支付委员会费用为条件。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 报告与誊录服务公司）\n\n1　费用。\n\n我只是想了解，从您的角度看，这将如何运作？\n\n法庭如何能在破产财产没有资金的情况下，以支付费用为条件驳回案件？\n\n高盛先生：如果郭先生希望驳回本案，\n\n以便他不必经历第7章程序，\n\n并面对潜在的523不可免责请求，\n\n以及727拒绝免责请求，并面对\n\n追查其隐藏资产并予以收回的程序，\n\n那么，正如他找到资金以提供担保\n\n确保该船返还，正如他找到资金以\n\n提议通过\\$8 million DIP loan为本案提供资金，\n\n如果法庭以支付费用为条件\n\n驳回案件，他就会找到资金。\n\n法庭：您是否——我没有看到——但我\n\n可能遗漏了这一点，好吗，所以我只是想了解——您是否\n\n援引过任何支持法庭有权\n\n这样做、作出您所建议行为的判例？\n\n高盛先生：我没有找到直接相关的判例，\n\n法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。好的。我只是提出这个\n\n问题——\n\n高盛先生：没有。\n\n法庭：——以便确保我已\n\n正确阅读了您的书面材料。\n\n请继续。抱歉，您提到这一点时我只是想问一下。高盛先生：谢谢，法官阁下。Acme Cake案的另一项关键区别在于，该案中法庭认定，转换该案程序或任命第11章受托人，“将导致无担保债权人获得极少分配，甚至根本得不到分配。”而本案当然不能——不能作出这样的认定。他们确实——他们实际上引用了一项加利福尼亚破产案件的裁决——一项加利福尼亚破产案件的裁决——称：“并非每一位债权人的利益实际上都必须支持转换程序。Section 1112(b)并无固有的特定人数要求。一名债权数额足够大的债权人的利益即可满足要求。”这是对名为In re Staff Investment的案件的直接引文，该案是一宗加利福尼亚破产案件，146 B.R. 256。如果您查阅该案，它与本案完全不同。该案中最大的一名无担保债权人，就针对破产财产唯一资产的抵押权持有\\$600,000的差额债权。那是该债权的差额部分。它占所有无担保债权的95 percent。而其他无担保债权合计仅为\\$21,000。\n\n因此，这段引自加利福尼亚州破产案件的单一引文，实际上只是附带意见，因为当时没有人提出这样的论点：即，主张驳回的债权人会在其他债权人之前卷走全部资产；这实在过于单薄，无法推翻压倒性多数的权威观点，即根据 1112(b)，债权人的最佳利益应当考量全体债权人群体的利益，而不是单一债权人的狭隘利益。\n\n这意味着要考虑，全体债权人在 Chapter 7（第7章）程序中是否会获得更好的结果。基于 PAX 对现有的、我称之为容易取得的资产的追偿准备情况，此处显然正是如此；我们至少知道，破产财产对这些资产享有合法且极为重要的请求权。\n\nPAX 对其债权的数额及地位如此有恃无恐，以至于其宣称，原话是：“鉴于 PAX 已经裁定的判决数额，PAX 有权优先受偿。”该表述见其 Y 号备忘录第 4 页。这颠倒了债权人之间平等分配这一基本政策，转而采纳破产程序之外存在的各债权人各自为战的规则。但这并非债权人最佳利益的标准。\n\n我们是在一宗破产案件中。该标准所固有的是考量何者将实现平等——何者将实现平等分配这一首要破产政策。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n最后，将委员会因债务人希望驳回案件而倾向于转换程序，与非自愿破产相比较，是转移焦点。\n\n第一，法院认为，除非债务人对驳回的偏好恰好与债权人的利益一致，否则该偏好在 1112(b) 下并无相关性。\n\n而且，section 1112(b)(1) 仅提及债权人及破产财产的最佳利益，并未提及债务人的利益；债务人的利益则如同在 bankruptcy code 的 section 305 中所提及的那样。\n\n因此，1112(b)(1) 中未列入债务人利益是有意为之。\n\n第二，如果符合债权人的最佳利益，本案的转换程序受到 section 1112(b)(1) 的授权，且是明确授权。\n\n该标准与根据 section 303 提交非自愿破产申请毫无关系。二者是在完全不同情形下适用的两项完全不同的标准，因此，不能将 1112(b) 明确授权的事项类比于启动非自愿破产。\n\n我想提出的最后几点是，该债务人不应当能够逃避 Chapter 7（第7章）程序的审查，以及可能被拒绝免责的前景，特别是根据 section 727(a)(2)；如果在破产前一年内存在隐匿资产，该条规定构成拒绝免责的理由。许多案件认为，即使一项资产可能是在一年期限之外转移的，如果债务人持续将该权益隐匿至该一年期间内，该隐匿行为仍将构成根据 section 727(a)(2) 拒绝免责的理由。\n\n如果法院决定驳回本案，而未以支付委员会专业费用作为驳回条件，委员会希望保留申请动议以审查并追缴已支付给债务人律师、金额为一百万美元的预付费用的权利。因此，我仅向法院提出该项请求。我想简要回应 Friedman（弗里德曼）先生和 Jonas（乔纳斯）先生在其陈述过程中不同时候提出的若干观点，然后我就结束。Friedman 先生援引 Sapphire（蓝宝石）案支持驳回。如果法官阁下查看该案，该案中的无担保债权人极少。此外，他们还可从保证人以及其他共同——和/或其他共同债务人处获得追偿。本案显然并非如此。Friedman 先生称，他们在这里实际所做的一切只是恢复原状。但是，恢复原状意味着他们将排在第一位，对全部资产实现追偿，这正是这些债权人需要 Chapter 7（第7章）案件保护的原因。Friedman 先生质疑本破产财产中存在的人身伤害侵权请求权。在 Chapter 7（第7章）案件中，将发生的情况是，受托人首先会审查并寻求追回破产财产的资产。一旦该程序完成，受托人随后将审查债权，并在必要时对其提出异议。因此，首先会归集资产，以确定存在哪些资产。随后将审查债权。这是受托人根据 section 704(5) 所负的职责。受托人不会聘请特别律师来审查这些债权，因此该审查不会产生任何相关费用。如果各方认为这些债权更适合在其他法院解决，则可以对这些债权提出异议。可以准予解除自动中止，并且\n\n这对破产程序本身不会产生任何影响。\n\n债务人如愿意，可以对这些债权进行抗辩。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 77 of 119\n\n这仅仅是在其他法院将这些债权确定数额的程序，而这很常见。例如，如果一项债权即将开庭审理或接近开庭审理，债权人为在另一法院确定该债权数额而申请解除自动中止，随后带着其债权数额回到破产法院，并不罕见。因此，这在 Chapter 11（第11章）——Chapter 7（第7章）案件中是常规程序。至于为就我们已知确实存在的资产，即该船舶和公寓，提起诉讼而提供的资金，我相信受托人能够获得诉讼融资。是的，目前没有证据表明诉讼融资可以取得，但该债务人直到 May 11th 才提交其同意驳回的文件。你们不可能期待委员会或受托人在短短数周内寻求诉讼融资——这就是我们所拥有的全部时间——并提交证据证明存在某项具有约束力的承诺，向一个甚至尚不存在的当事人提供诉讼融资，因为该融资必须提供给 Chapter 7（第7章）或 Chapter 11（第11章）受托人。因此，我认为，应给予受托人机会这样做，或者聘请特别律师，至少以风险代理收费方式承办该诉讼。是的，这将涉及从任何\n\n追偿款中收取一定比例，但这——这在 Chapter 7（第7章）案件中很常见，并且费用是可以协商的。是的，该船价值很高，如果特别律师以风险代理收费方式承办，该费用将从追偿款中支付，但这并非得出如下结论的依据：除 PAX 外每一位其他债权人的最佳利益将不会通过该程序得到维护，因为他们的利益将通过该程序得到维护。唯一不会因此受益的债权人将是 PAX。至于将破产作为债务追收工具，我的意思是，破产是一项集体程序，债务人申请破产，并将其非豁免资产交给债权人，以换取寻求免责。这就是破产的全部意义，因此它确实是一项集体程序，用于归集和变现破产财产的资产，以平等地惠及全体债权人；我谨称，这正是法院在此应当采取的做法。法官阁下，除非您有任何问题，否则我就这些。\n\n法庭：我没有其他问题。谢谢。Claiborn（克莱伯恩）律师，您希望发言吗？抱歉。请继续，Callari（卡拉里）律师。她可以先上来。然后，如果您希望之后发言，Claiborn 律师可以发言。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nCallari 女士：下午好，法官阁下。Carollynn Callari（卡罗琳·卡拉里）代表部分债权人出庭。法官阁下，我确实只是来支持 Goldman（戈德曼）律师所说的话。我认为他做得非常好。这使我的工作更轻松。但我确实想强调几点。第一，在讨论实际争点之前，先谈债务人的陈述；他们讲述了一个很好的故事，但在交代背景时没有讲完整，即，有新闻报道他，有人被调查，原因是希望将他遣送回中国。这一点没有争议。背景中有争议的是：为什么？他在中国被要求返回，以面对腐败、强奸、绑架和贿赂的指控。这就是他不想回去的原因。因此，我只是想澄清这一点。就法院真正面临的问题而言，确实是，什么符合债权人和破产财产的最佳利益。我们听到了许多不同的说法，但实际上，当您审视该具体问题时，首先，就债权而言，101 对债权人和债权的定义不言自明。这里有许多债权人。这里有许多债权。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 81 of 119\n\n本案并不像 PAX 援引的那些债权——案件，法官阁下。在那些案件中，当涉及一名大额债权人时，如果您查看这些案件，通常是一名有担保债权人持有 95 至 98 percent 的债权，属于一类——您知道的——不足额债权。\n\n法官阁下，本案如果分解来看，PAX 最初的债权——让我们提醒法院——是 \\$46 million。我的委托人 Rui Ma（马蕊）的债权主张为 20 million。差别不大。他们只是先获得了判决。她不应因此受到不利影响。\n\n如果您查看附表中的债权，债务人列明——尽管他对几乎每一项债权均有争议——约 \\$120 million 以上的债权。然后，他还列出数十名其他债权人，金额不明。\n\n因此，如果以 PAX 的 46 million 来看，与其他债权人相比，他绝非——他们绝非一名非常大的债权人。如果加上利息，就是 116 million。116 million 对比附表所列的——即使存在争议，仅仅因为存在争议并不意味着它是善意争议——不过话虽如此，125 million 对 116 million。大约是 50/50。只有加上所有藐视法庭指控后，他们的债权才真正膨胀至超过 250 million。\n\n因此，首先，他们不断试图声称自己是应当有发言权并主导本案的大额债权人，这与他们援引的其他案件并不相同。即使我们的债权目前尚未确定数额，我们也是债权人，法官阁下。\n\n第二，PAX 不能在其对法官阁下所言中两面兼得，即本案没有资产，应予驳回。这是什么样的案件？没有债权人，没有资产，没有经营业务。这是一宗个人 Chapter 11（第11章）案件。我们知道没有经营业务。但我认为，坐在桌子这一侧的任何债权人都不真诚地认为本案没有资产，尽管他们在附表中仅列出微不足道的资产。这就是我们在这里的原因。正如 Goldman 先生所说，本案是为了归集这些资产。由一名受托人为全体债权人归集资产，怎会不比每一名债权人——数十名债权人——均必须自行进行 PAX 律师承认已进行了多年的工作更有效率？我们每一个人都必须进行刺破公司面纱以及所有这些其他的、我们必须经历的诉讼和周折，来取得这些资产，而一名受托人可以归集这些资产。这是破产的目的。这是适当的目的。这就是本案应当转换为 Chapter 7（第7章）以使其得以实现的原因。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与誊写服务公司）\n\n至于资金问题，Goldman先生（戈德曼）所提及的是，我们在这两周内试图寻找初始资金时遇到的问题在于，我们尚无交易相对方。要获得资金，必须由第7章受托人或第11章受托人作为交易相对方。如果只看本案事实，当有一艘唾手可得的游艇时，这非常适合采用风险代理类型的安排。因此，我认为，我们今天没有实际资金承诺的证据这一事实，不应妨碍法官阁下确认并推断，在这种情况下，第7章或第11章受托人可能获得资金。而且我知道，Friedman先生（弗里德曼）在谈论本案20%至30%的风险代理费时，其谈判能力远胜于其书面材料。我认为可以设置里程碑——这正是我一直在进行的讨论——即就游艇设定一定比例。如果耗时更长，该比例就上升。然后，一旦取得游艇，也许那就是你们的资金。也许你们不需要再有\n\n因此，存在为第11章——或者在本案中我们甚至主张第7章——受托人提供资金以处理这些案件的方法。我们认为，第7章——第7章受托人应当\n\n更多。你知道。你们可以使用那些收益。\n1　应当有机会让一名受托人审查此事，尝试\n2　为所有债权人的共同利益归集全部资产。\n3　\n4　如果在短期内无法获得\n5　资金，则不妨碍届时将其驳回。\n6　\n7　但是，说我们的客户应当因案件现在应被驳回这一事实而\n8　受到不利影响，并且基本上奖励债务人——他得到了他想要的——\n9　\n10　他提起本案是为了获得喘息之机——他获得了短暂的\n11　喘息之机——而现在他不想面对\n12　破产——即破产案件的全部负担，他\n13　不应因此得到奖励。\n14　我们应当能够进行一项调查，该调查\n15　可以获得资金，并允许所有债权人平等分享\n16　分配，法官阁下，因为我们是真正的\n17　债权人。\n18　但是，法官阁下，如果您认为您\n19　不能对驳回附加条件以确保各方不会因该债务人的恶劣行为\n20　而进一步受到不利影响，\n21　我认为这更有利于转换。\n我\n22　认为法官阁下或许可以附加条件。但是，如果她\n23　不能，这更有利于转换为第7章\n24　而非驳回。\n25　债权人在本案中已投入大量\n1　时间和费用。如今却要因为他们撤回\n2　资金，而把我们脚下的地毯抽走，\n3　这极不公平——行政费用也是如此，\n4　如果本案被驳回，这些费用应当得到支付——我们请求法官阁下\n5　无论如何保留管辖权，以处理某些有关\n6　事项——正如Goldman先生所说——涉及预付聘金及\n7　诸如此类的事项，如果法官阁下确实将本案驳回。\n8　\n9　但我们确实认为，转换为第7章是可行的，\n10　并且这样做符合全体债权人的\n11　最大利益，法官阁下。\n12　而且我们不认为这会对PAX（PAX）造成不利影响，\n13　因为坦率地说，如果他们希望对任命何人为受托人\n14　发表意见，我认为他们可以根据702条这样做。他们可以了解谁\n15　——你知道，可以发表意见——\n16　法庭：他们都可以选举受托人，对吗。\n17　Callari女士（卡拉里）：是。\n18　法庭：但我有一两个问题要问你。\n19　Callari女士：是。请问。\n20　法庭：那么假设我同意你，并且我将\n21　本案转换为第7章，你的债权——你客户的债权\n22　将如何确定数额？因为受托人\n23　不能这样做。\n24　Callari女士：正确，法官阁下。\n25　法庭：那么你们的债权仍须\n\n在纽约法院审理，如同其他人身伤害债权申请人的债权一样。Callari女士：是。因此，当然，就Rui Ma（马蕊）而言，法官阁下，您已有那份拟议命令——我们推定您是在等待本次程序结束后解除自动中止，以便她能在州法院继续进行。因此，是的，当然，就马蕊而言，我们预计该事项将回到州法院诉讼。法庭：那么受托人要如何处理该债权？我试图——Callari女士：不，我理解。法庭：我试图——第7章受托人要如何处理该债权？第7章受托人必须等待——Callari女士：是。法庭：——直至该债权确定数额，对吗？然后，取决于你们如何处理，这完全是你们客户根据适用的非破产法享有的权利，将进行审判，无论裁决为何即为何。有人可能上诉，也有人可能不上诉。但坦率地说，很可能会有上诉，因此在该债权确定数额之前，该案件可能持续数年，正确吗？\n\nCallari女士：有可能。法庭：是。Callari女士：而且也可能相当迅速地确定数额。法庭：好的。Callari女士：我们不知道。所以——法庭：但不在本法庭。Callari女士：不。她的债权必须在州法院确定数额。或者一般而言，人身伤害债权，法官阁下——我确实认为，当存在人身伤害债权时，破产法院有时可以制定调解程序，并且——法庭：不在——不根据28 U.S.C.——Callari女士：正确。你们可以估定——法庭：——在第7章案件中，根据28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B)，当债权属于附条件且未确定数额时。该法条非常明确，这不是核心程序。因此，本案的一个问题是，这些正是受托人将要面对的债权类型，对吗？Callari女士：正确。法庭：那么——所以我的问题是，受托人应当怎么做？Callari女士：受托人——法庭：让案件维持数年不结，直到——\n1　然后在没有资金的情况下进行调查？\n2　我的意思是，我听到你关于资金\n3　问题所说的，但为什么委员会现在不能有\n4　资金提供者？\n5　他们可以——委员会可以获得\n6　诉讼资金。为什么不能？\n7　Callari女士：他们在此时无法做到，因为\n8　在过去两周内，在你们知道\n9　面临驳回且委员会将被解散的情况下尝试获得该等资金，\n10　并不现实。\n11　法庭：好的。但是，驳回——我\n12　理解你所说的债务人关于\n13　驳回的立场。但PAX关于驳回的立场\n14　早已明确。事实上，他们同意延长听证\n15　期限，因为法典要求听证应在\n16　30日内举行，而实际上没有。\n17　你知道，我只是想对你说，第7章\n18　案件中，第7章受托人，第7章受托人\n19　有什么可用来开展工作？\n20　Callari女士：所以有两点。\n21　第一，关于您对委员会的观点，直到两\n22　周前，委员会一直由债务人提供资金。他们\n23　撤回了资金，所以我们不需要去寻求——\n24　法庭：嗯，他们没有资金。\n它\n25　尚未获批准。好的？\n\nCallari女士：这是事实。法庭：所以没有人有资金。Callari女士：但我们预计会有某种资金，因此我们——法庭：我理解。Callari女士：是。法庭：但它尚未获批准。这就是程序的运作方式，对吗？Callari女士：是。法庭：只是——我们必须记住程序如何运作。因此，他们没有资金。没有任何经法庭授权的资金。法庭对该融资申请保留裁定。随后债务人决定——或者我不应说债务人——出资人、贷款——出借人决定撤回其资金承诺，而债务人撤回了DIP融资动议。因此，我理解你所说的一切，但法庭必须遵循程序，对吗？我的意思是，我们谈论诉讼资金、风险代理特别律师。仅因人们说这可以发生，并不意味着它一定会发生。法庭仍须批准那些申请。若那些申请未获批准，那么人们所建议的这项安排就不会\n\n按人们所建议的方式进行。问题在于，如果本案转换为第7章而不是继续——继续作为第11章，则存在许多不同的顾虑。因此，再次说明，法庭可以拒绝驳回，可以拒绝转换，也可以拒绝任命受托人。这正是我必须作出的认定。Goldman律师是正确的。问题是我们要怎么做？我想我大约一周前曾说过，当你们所有人约定理由存在时。好的。很好。这对法庭很有帮助。我感谢各方均约定理由存在，但我必须采取其中一项行动，对吗？因此，我必须确定本案中最好的做法是什么。对转换的顾虑很多。把这交给第7章受托人做什么？第7章受托人要做什么？第7章受托人没有任何可用资产去做任何事情。你们在谈论可能获得诉讼资金来源。好的。但这必须获批准，而且可能不会获批准。还必须有一个方案。如果该方案——我并非指重整计划，这不是我的意思。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 91 of 119\n\n我的意思是——我并非指破产法典中所用的“计划”一词——必须有办法实现你们试图实现的目标。而第7章受托人将没有任何可供开展工作的资源。Callari女士：谢谢，法官阁下。无论是第11章还是第7章受托人，法官阁下，我们相信都会有资金。我知道现在没有。但关键在于，即使法官阁下当时尚未批准，委员会在5月11日之前没有必要去寻找资金。这是第一点。我们相信会有资金。法庭：这很公平。Callari女士：而现在，我们主张，第11章或第7章受托人将能够获得必要资金，例如，去追索游艇。推进该诉讼不应需要那么多资金。如果该事项确实按我们认为的方式发展，本案将有充足资金。法庭：那么，第7章受托人将如何去追索游艇？请向我解释。Callari女士：它可以归集——可以像在任何其他案件中一样归集资产。法庭：但目前本法庭尚未作出债务人拥有该游艇的认定，那么第7章受托人如何\n\n归集该游艇？Callari女士：第11章或——第11章或第7章必须先获得一项认定。法庭：嗯，目前已有一项解除自动中止的命令——Callari女士：是。法庭：——该命令规定了游艇的处理方式，对吗？Callari女士：是。法庭：即游艇必须回到本管辖区。然后，如果其及时返回，则$37 million将返还给交付该笔款项的一方，而游艇则在那里。在哪里？取决于事态如何发展，在Connecticut（康涅狄格州）或New York（纽约州）。那么，第7章受托人将如何归集游艇？Callari女士：就像你们在第11章中所做的一样。你们——法庭：但债务人在本法庭中并不拥有游艇。尚未作出任何认定。因此，他必须提起某项诉因，对吗？Callari女士：是。正确。法庭：那么由谁支付这样做的费用？Callari女士：这就是资金发挥作用之处。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 580 Filed 07/21/22 Entered 07/21/22 08:38:19 Page 92 of 119\n\n法庭：那么谁——谁将提出抗辩来做这件事？然后，当受托人这样做时，PAX 将会提出异议并称，这已经——已经由纽约州法院确定了。因此，你不能推翻纽约州法院法官的判决书。你不能——你不能这样做。将会产生争议排除的效力，对吗？尚未提起上诉。这里存在各种各样的问题，对吗？所以，正如我所说，我的问题是——这里存在——我对每一种路径都有问题。明白吗？但是，关于 Chapter 7，我不知道 Chapter 7 受托人应当做什么或者能够做什么。Chapter 7 受托人可以到这里来，说他们将做 18 件事，但如果他们没有权利做那些事，或者没有资金来源来做那些事，那么将案件转换为 Chapter 7 就没有意义。CALLARI 女士（卡拉里女士）：是的。而且我们——法庭：没有意义。CALLARI 女士：而且我们认为，Chapter 7 受托人将会——再次说明——或者 Chapter 11 受托人——但无论哪一种——都将有能力获得足够的资金，使本院裁定该财产属于破产财产，并且我们预期他们会这样做，\n\n并且在实际裁定各项债权之前，先行归集资产。其他诉讼通常将会被中止，因此这会降低成本。人们谈论成本——法庭：嗯，我不同意这一点。你们不希望你们的案件被中止，对吗？其他债权人也可能到庭申请解除中止——CALLARI 女士：他们可能会。法庭：——并且希望其债权在本院之外得到裁定。因此，我要对你说的是——我只是想理解——特别是你当事人的债权，显然尚未作出裁定，但这是一项人身伤害侵权债权，而《美国法典》规定国会决定本院不能裁定该债权。明白吗？Stern 案支持这一点，对吗？Wellness 案也支持这一点，因为没有人同意由本院裁定该债权。明白吗？因此，该债权不能在此裁定。CALLARI 女士：正确。法庭：因此，我们谈到的所有其他债权——我——我现在手头没有数字——但除 PAX 债权之外的债权，我相信——各位应当纠正我——其中超过一半是人身伤害侵权债权。如果它们是人身伤害侵权债权，它们就不能——进行估算——法条规定——我想我可以复述它——为 Title 11 案件中的分配目的而进行清算或估算。国会只决定，破产法院作为诉讼程序，在 Chapter 11、12 或 13 案件中可以就计划相关债权进行估算。但法条规定，你不能——破产法院不能为 Title 11 案件中的分配目的，对人身偶发且未清算的人身伤害侵权债权和非正常死亡债权进行清算或估算。因此，受托人不能这样做。CALLARI 女士：对。法庭：我的意思是，Chapter 7 受托人不能这样做。他/她从一开始就已受到束缚。因此，他们必须——然后他们将试图寻找资产，而债务人将会抗争。我的意思是，看看过去 15 年间或者不知多少年间发生的情况。如果你认为债务人不会反对将该船只认定为破产财产的尝试，我的意思是，他们当然会反对。然后，无论你做任何其他事情也是如此。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与转录服务公司）\n\n然后——那么将会有多少钱可用于为这个 Chapter 7 破产财产提供资金，以处理目前——目前——我并不是说不能改变——但目前仍属推测性的债权，对吗？因此，法院的担忧是，根据本院目前对本案的看法，我不知道在本案的事实和情形下，Chapter 7 受托人如何能够履行法典所要求的职责。CALLARI 女士：谢谢您，法官阁下。我们确实认为，资金——可能可以获得，而且我们确实认为，受托人可以在债权诉讼进行期间归集资产，然后将其带回本院进行分配；另一种选择是驳回案件，实质上让 PAX 能够取得全部资产，并且让每一名个别债权人随后必须逐一裁定，以追索每一项——每一项资产。我们认为这不符合债权人的最佳利益。但我理解法官阁下的担忧。不过，我们确实认为，对于债权人而言，转换案件或 Chapter 11 显然优于驳回案件，法官阁下。谢谢。法庭：好的。我感谢这一点。我只是在问你这些问题——CALLARI 女士：是的。我感谢这一点。法庭：——特别是因为你\n\n当事人的债权。CALLARI 女士：我感谢这一点。谢谢您，法官阁下。法庭：好的。谢谢。Claiborn 律师（克莱伯恩律师）？CLAIBORN 女士：下午好，法官阁下。Holley Claiborn（霍莉·克莱伯恩）代表 U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）。法庭：下午好。CLAIBORN 女士：本案现在已演变到一个简单但困难的阶段。根据 section 1112(b)，已认定存在事由，现在轮到本院承担困难而重大的职责和负担，作出选择。债务人已承认，根据 1112(b)(2) 可获得的救济已不再适用，因此，可供选择的救济形式限于我们今天简要讨论的三种：驳回、转换，或者指定 Chapter 11 受托人。诚然，它们各自都对本案的相关群体带来挑战和影响。美国受托人对于本院应选择何种救济形式没有偏好。至于美国受托人在 ECF 102 的动议中请求指定审查员这一救济，只要本院立即就驳回、转换或指定 Chapter 11 受托人作出决定，该项救济将失去实际意义。\n\n我想向本院明确说明，法官阁下，美国受托人的职责是指出，在本案中，并且与所有 Chapter 11 案件一致，若本院认定指定 Chapter 11 受托人是最适当的救济，则该受托人应拥有法典在 section 1106 中赋予的权力和权利，且没有授权可以限制、规定或控制这些权力和权利。\n\n如果本院今日认定驳回是最适当的救济，则本案应立即驳回，且不应以任何事件为条件，驳回也不应与任何事件相结合。\n\n受聘专业人员的费用申请可以在驳回后提交并裁定。\n\n最后，法官阁下，我认为最重要的一点——也是困难的一点——是本案需要迅速作出决定。但本院面前已有足以使本院作出选择的事实。最后，在敦促迅速作出决定时，我想指出，拖延会不利地影响债权人，并确实会使债务人获益。谢谢您，法官阁下。法庭：谢谢。Friedman 先生（弗里德曼先生）？\n\nFRIEDMAN 先生：法官阁下，我只想提出几点简短的反驳意见。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与转录服务公司）\n\n第一点是，委员会的律师和其他人主张，如果本案消失，债务人将因此获益。这并不属实。无论以何种方式，人们都会取得债务人的资产。第二点——在这些资产存在的范围内。第二点是，我没有完全——我认为有人提到，Chapter 7 可能有用，因为也许——Kwok 先生（郭文贵）不会获得免责。当然，在破产程序之外，他也不会获得免责。法官阁下，我想提出的另一点是，我请您查看我们提交的 exhibit 27，因为——法庭：你们自己的证物？PAX 的证物？FRIEDMAN 先生：exhibit 27。PAX exhibit 27。法庭：好的。请给我一秒钟，我会尽量找到它。FRIEDMAN 先生：谢谢。法庭：你得给我一分钟。你知道它从该文书的哪一页开始吗？这是 document 404。你知道 exhibit 27 从哪一页开始吗，因为它有 1500 页。FRIEDMAN 先生：抱歉。法庭：哦，1,149。FRIEDMAN 先生：谢谢。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 于 07/21/22 提交，于 07/21/22 08:38:19 登记，第 100 页\n\n法庭：找到了。FRIEDMAN 先生：太惊人了。法庭：工作人员真是——FRIEDMAN 先生：太惊人了。法庭：确实惊人。FRIEDMAN 先生：太惊人了。谢谢。法庭：确实惊人。FRIEDMAN 先生：法官阁下，这是我们的债权汇总。委员会的律师 Goldman 先生（戈德曼先生）在其周到的论述中表示，Sapphire 案可以区分的原因之一是，该案中的人有其他——其他人可以追索。我只是想指出，当您查看我们的案件汇总——其已作为证据提交——时，许多被告——抱歉——许多原告也有其他当事人可以追索。如果您看第 2 页，最后一项债权，Keyi Zilkie（凯伊·齐尔基）债权是针对 GTV、Saraca 和 Guo 先生（郭文贵）、Miles Kwok（郭文贵）提出的。下一页，Zheng Xu Dong（郑旭东）案件是针对 GTV、Saraca 和 Wayne Guo（郭文贵）提出的。下一案件是针对 Voice of Guo（郭之声）和 Miles Guo（郭文贵）提出的。诸如此类。特别是，法官阁下，我要指出——就像 Rui Ma（马蕊）的指控一样，我此前在本案早期说过，我丝毫没有贬低发生在她身上的事情。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 于 07/21/22 提交，于 07/21/22 08:38:19 登记，第 101 页\n\n我要说的是，如果您看 Rui Ma 案，该案并非仅针对 Kwok 先生。我了解到，Golden Spring New York（纽约金泉）也是该案的被告。我们知道，Golden Spring New York 至少有 $8 million 可用于为 DIP 提供资金。因此，即使 Kwok 先生没有资金，该案中仍有可以追索的共同被告。因此，我只是指出，存在其他潜在可得的资金来源——可获得的赔偿，不仅仅是 Kwok 先生。法官阁下，在 Rui Ma 律师的论述中——我没有计算，但关于资金有很多“如果”和“可能”——没有证据。您知道，令人遗憾的是，人们被债务人提出的融资或潜在融资安排所蒙蔽——我们从一开始就反对该安排——而我们现在处于一个我们认为根本不应提交、没有——且至今仍没有资金的案件中。律师试图主张我们仅被欠 $46 million，而我们的判决书金额超过 $260 million。尽管我想确实如此，我无权称人们为——非债权人——人们也不能说 PAX 没有被欠 $261 million，因为确实如此。法官阁下，我最后要提出的一点只是\n\n我们坚持我们在周五提交并于今日援引的案件中的引证——这些案件支持两项命题：从根本上说，并非每一位债权人的利益实际上都必须有利于转换。而单一债权人的利益也可能具有重要意义。界线划在何处——假设一人拥有99 percent的债权，另一人拥有1——并无硬性规则。但我认为，法院显然可以根据Acme和Staff——后者援引了Goodrich Lines案件——考虑到，本案中法院的裁量权——该裁量权相当广泛——可以考虑债权数额的差异以及人们有权获得的利益。\n\n而且，再次说明，我认为，我们援引了各种确实支持如下命题的案件：即使一名债权人最终可能获得较好的结果，驳回案件也是可以的。\n\n我无法预测未来。\n\n我想说，就Sherry-Netherland公寓而言，PAX必须承担大量工作，以继续其证明该信托协议系虚假的努力。这并非唾手可得。我们还有工作要做。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 102 页，共\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 103 页，共\n\n而且，我们不知道其他债权人会发生什么。也许其他债权人会与Kwok先生（郭文贵）达成安排。我们必须承担该风险。因此，基于这些理由，以及我们已指出的实际理由，即为何我们认为本案不适宜转换为Chapter 7，我们认为驳回是正确的选择。我确实——我想说，我们同意U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）的意见，即如果法院认定正确路径是指定Chapter 11受托人，显然我们强烈支持驳回，但不应对受托人拥有的任何权力施加限制。就这些，法官阁下，我没有进一步意见。\n\n法庭：谢谢。Jonas先生？\n\nJonas先生：法官阁下，Jeff Jonas（杰夫·乔纳斯），Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所），代表债务人。我会简短陈述。我想说，我坚持先前所作的论证，即根据1112(b)(1)和(4)(A)，支持因正当理由驳回。我注意到，在这方面，有趣的是，没有任何反对驳回的人回应我先前就标准所作的论证，即该标准是对债权人的不利影响，而该不利影响通过审视这些债权人的破产申请前法律预期是否受到损害来确定；在本案中，其并未受到损害。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 104 页，共\n\n法官阁下，我起身发言仅是为了明确记录：债务人确实反驳并反驳了针对他的诸多贬损性评论。此处律师作出了许多毫无根据、缺乏支持的陈述，这些并非证据。法官阁下，它们以不同形式和说法出现。例如，有人提及Greenwich Land（格林尼治地产）拥有——与可能拥有某些所谓“Hidden assets”有关。法官阁下，没有任何事情得到证明。没有任何事情得到证实。只是毫无根据的指控，这与声称某些邻居、朋友和其他家庭成员拥有据称隐藏资产没有区别。第二，法官阁下——这些仅是我在陈述过程中注意到的一些简要例子——Callari女士提到中国存在某些指控。再次说明，没有证据，只有毫无根据的陈述。这不是证据。不应赋予其任何价值或可信性。第三，诉讼融资。完全没有证据。这是彻头彻尾的猜测和臆测。法院面前没有证据。我再补充我自己的猜测：委员会——以及可能还有Callari女士——在过去数周一直焦急地四处寻找某种\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 105 页，共\n\n融资，以便他们能够到法院面前提交某些证据。他们没有任何证据。因此，我由此推断不存在此类证据。不过，我不想再堆砌我自己的猜测。我只想指出，法院面前在这方面根本没有任何证据。\n\n因此，法院的所有担忧——至少是我们的担忧——以及我认为其他当事人所表达的担忧，即不会有融资，这是仅有的证据。\n\n再次，法官阁下，我们敦促驳回。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\nGoldman先生？\n\nGoldman先生：是的。谢谢，法官阁下。仅作几点简要说明，法官阁下。\n\n关于所有这些债权均构成人身伤害或非正常死亡债权这一观点，显然，根据128 U.S.C 157——\n\n法庭：(b)(2)(B)。\n\nGoldman先生：谢谢。\n\n——法院没有管辖权。除非当然获得对——的救济，否则必须在地区法院审理。\n\n法庭：那不是——那不是审理。审理条款是(b)(5)。(b)(2)(B)谈的是对或有——的估算或确定数额。\n\nGoldman先生：正确。\n\n法庭：——及有争议的人身伤害债权。这不同于——\n\nGoldman先生：正确。\n\n法庭：——(b)(5)项下的审理问题。\n\nGoldman先生：您完全正确。因此，除非在Chapter 11下，也不能根据502(c)进行估算。\n\n法庭：或者在计划情境下根据12或13。\n\nGoldman先生：或者12或13。但当然，这并不妨碍其在原审法院获得解除自动中止后被确定数额。并且债务人当然可以提出抗辩，特别是鉴于这些债权可能根据523(a)(6)作为故意和恶意损害而不可免责。因此，债务人当然会有利益这样做。\n\n我还要指出，我不认为当然可以认定所有这些债权——例如基于诽谤的债权——均构成不能估算的那类人身伤害侵权债权，或者属于根据——您提到(c)——\n\n法庭：(b)(2)(B)。\n\nGoldman先生：——(b)(2)(B)，以及(b)(5)——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 106 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 107 页，共\n\n法庭：(b)(5)——\n\nGoldman先生：是。\n\n法庭：——其中规定地区——\n\nGoldman先生：是。\n\n法庭：——法院必须审理这些债权。\n\nGoldman先生：完全正确。\n\n法庭：对。\n\nGoldman先生：我不认为当然可以认定诽谤债权属于符合——的那类债权。\n\n法庭：对此有各种判例法。\n\nGoldman先生：是。\n\n法庭：我同意你的看法。\n\nGoldman先生：因此，存在不同的司法观点。当然，Gawker Media（高客传媒）那一案持相反观点。因此，我不认为，除非法官阁下对此有明确意见，您可以得出结论说，嘿，所有这些债权都不能估算，或者您对主持债权异议没有管辖权。\n\n至于Chapter 7受托人将如何归集该游艇，以下是我的设想。目前有一项待决对立程序，直接提出了该游艇是否属于破产财产这一问题。Chapter 7受托人当然可以替代债务人，或者在该对立程序中以自己替代债务人作为当事人，并聘请特别律师。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 108 页，共\n\n我非常确信，我们可以找到愿意以某种可协商的风险代理费方式承办此事的特别律师。\n\n随后，受托人将基于Ostrager法官（奥斯特拉格法官）裁定认定的排除效力提出终局性动议，我们认为该认定确有排除效力。然后，法官阁下将决定其是否确实具有将该船认定为破产财产的实际排除效力。这并非复杂程序，而且我确实——我建议——其完成的可能性很大。\n\n如果确实如此，我们甚至不需要诉讼融资。\n\n因此，这是——这就是最容易取得的成果。\n\n法官阁下，我认为您可以考虑几种选择。\n\n例如，由于我们只有几周时间寻找诉讼融资，且没有时间寻找任何风险代理律师，您可以转换本案，并认为我们将获得时间寻找融资。如果在该期间内找不到融资，或者我们无法找到特别律师，届时可驳回本案。\n\n我实际上并未提及第三种选择，\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 109 页，共\n\n即Chapter 11受托人的选择，这将允许对其中一些债权进行估算。\n\n委员会并不反对与PAX协商公平分配债务人所拥有的任何资产这一想法。我们并未忽视PAX为追索该债务人并取得其判决书所作的努力。而且我认为委员会会——让我这样说——在与PAX协商一项计划时保持合理，给予其破产申请前努力一定认可。\n\n而且，本案可以制定债权人重整计划。其只需规定对资产的归集。我们甚至——也许PAX的律师希望担任特别律师。我们对此没有任何问题。债务人不会保留任何财产权益。\n\n因此，由Chapter 11受托人负责、债权人有能力协商一项计划，我认为也是此处可行的选择。因此，我会——\n\n法庭：嗯，你是第一个这样说的人。\n\nGoldman先生：嗯，我确实认为，相较于——\n\n法庭：因此没有其他人这样说。所以如果你——\n\nGoldman先生：没有。\n\n法庭：所以如果你认为这是一种\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 580\n提交 07/21/22\n录入 07/21/22 08:38:19\n\n可能性，那么——\n\nGoldman先生：我会——\n\n法庭：——你是否请求有机会就此与各方交谈？这是你的请求吗？\n\nGoldman先生：嗯，我很希望有机会就此与各方交谈，只是我不确定讨论会有成效。因为我认为——我认为PAX会希望法官阁下首先就驳回是否——作出裁定。\n\n法庭：嗯，顺便说一下，我必须根据法典作出裁定，所以除非你们大家决定不同的方案，否则我没有选择。我有——我有——我没有选择。一旦听证开始，对吧，我是否必须作出裁定——我手头没有相关条文，但我确信PAX知道——我认为我必须在15 days或类似期限内作出裁定，对吗？在听证结束时。\n\n正如我所说，我没有很多——我不知道，两个月前——本案不存在很大的机会窗口。我试图向所有当事人说明这一点——也许我做得不太好——但我试图非常明确地说明，本案不是法院拥有裁量权的案件。\n\n国会修改了法典，对吧？这就是——我没有选择。我没有\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交 07/21/22 录入 07/21/22 08:38:19 第 111 页，共\n\n酌处权。\n\n我没有。\n\n是的。\n\n这里写着，Goldman 律师（Goldman）——我知道您可能也知道这一点——在……之后，法院应在30日内开始就该动议举行听证，除非动议提出人同意特定的期限，而动议提出人确实同意了，也就是今天，对吧？\n\n然后作出……并且应当——没有酌处权，对吧——并且应在该听证开始后不迟于15日裁决该动议。\n\n所以，我目前就是这个情况，对吧？\n\n除非各位另有其他方案，否则我没有多少可以做的。\n\n我认为各位今天不会有其他方案。\n\n我不会在今天和明天之间写出一份裁决。\n\n那不会……我的意思是，我确实做不到。\n\n我还有其他听证会。\n\n我们还有其他事情。\n\n但我必须在今天起15日内作出裁决。\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n明白，法官阁下。\n\n我认为——我认为将会妨碍关于第11章受托人的讨论，或者无法促成有利于此类讨论的条件的，是PAX宁愿法官阁下直接就驳回作出裁定这一事实。\n\n因此，在该裁定作出之前，我认为我将无法让他们参与讨论。\n\n不过，法官阁下在就该动议作出裁定时可以任命一名第11章受托人，并提供一段期间，使得——在不损害权利的前提下——可视案件最初30日左右内发生的情况重新审视该命令。换言之，法官阁下仍可履行法定职责，并在一个明确界定的期间内重新审视该问题，以根据我们在任命第11章受托人后能够完成的事项，确定案件是否应被驳回；这仍将满足作出裁定的法定义务。\n\n法院：\n\n我希望——\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n但我想表达的是，这保留了各种选择。\n\n法院：\n\n我明白您的意思。\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n仅此而已。我没有其他要说的了，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n\n好的。谢谢。还有人希望发言吗？\n\n（无可听见的回应。）\n\n法院：\n\n好的。如我刚才为记录所述，我必须就这项决定作出裁定——哦，您还有其他要补充的吗？哦，是的。我们必须完成证物事宜，对吧？证物。笔录。Goldman律师，Friedman律师（Friedman）曾提及部分笔录。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交于 07/21/22 登记于 07/21/22 08:38:19\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n没有。\n\n不反对。\n\n法院：\n\n无异议。\n\n好的。\n\n那么，除第7、8及31号外，PAX的所有证物均全部准予采纳。是另一个吗？\n\nARONSSON女士（阿伦松）：\n\n是的。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n如果有助于法院，我有一些关于笔录的引述。\n\n法院：\n\n好的。\n\n请。\n\n继续。\n\nARONSSON女士：\n\n关于PAX 18，我们请法院查阅第21至28页。关于PAX 20，我们请法院查阅第8至19页。关于PAX 21，我们请法院查阅第11至20页。\n\n法院：\n\n好的。谢谢。\n\nARONSSON女士：\n\n谢谢。\n\n法院：\n\nGoldman律师？\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n法官阁下，我可以再说明一点吗？\n\n法院：\n\n可以。但他们听不见您。\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n好的。\n\n法院：\n\n请对着——\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n好的。\n\n法院：\n\n您可以就近对着Aronsson律师说。\n\nGOLDMAN先生：\n\n好的。我知道这可能不是1112(b)项下的具体因素，但法官阁下从与DIP动议相关提交的诉讼预算中知道，截至4月底，我们已产生近$200,000的费用。\n\n该数额显然已经增加。\n\n我认为，如果任命了一个委员会，他们依赖程序将继续推进而聘请了律师——我们为该委员会履行了职责——而现在仅仅驳回案件，致使所有这些费用均未获支付，我认为这有损于该程序。\n\n法院：\n\n我明白。谢谢。\n\n还有人希望发言吗？\n\n（无可听见的回应。）\n\n法院：\n\n好的。为使记录清楚，2022年4月6日，债权人Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, LP（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）提交了一项以事由为由驳回案件的动议，或作为备选，请求部分加入美国受托人就命令任命一名第11章受托人提出的动议。\n\n本案已举行数次听证会，我们在会上讨论了驳回动议。\n\n我们还举行了一次状态会议以讨论驳回动议，该状态会议于2022年4月13日举行。\n\n在状态会议之后，并作为状态会议中所进行讨论的一部分，经动议提出人PAX同意，驳回动议的听证安排于今日，即2022年5月25日举行。\n\n我们还安排了明日举行听证，预期可能会有更多与驳回动议有关的证据需要提交给法院。\n\n在驳回动议听证会之前最近举行的一次听证会上，债务人通过其律师确认，其不反对驳回动议，并同意根据1112条存在驳回案件的事由。\n\n所有其他就驳回动议提交文件或书状的当事人，均同意存在事由这一事实。\n\n因此，本院无需认定存在事由。\n\n本院仅须就该事由为何以及最终救济为何作出认定。\n\n我此前已在记录中说明过，但我将再次说明，法院将依照《法典》1112(b)条的适用规定，驳回案件、转换案件或任命一名第11章受托人。\n\n我今天已在记录中说明了本次听证中由PAX和无担保债权人官方委员会提交并获全部采纳的证物。\n\n没有其他当事人提交证据，但均加入了该等证据，这对法院而言可以接受。\n\n我已审阅了所有当事人于20日星期五就其各自关于驳回动议的立场提交的立场文件。\n\n当然，我今天也已听取所有当事人就驳回动议提出的论点。\n\n如我所述，法律规定我必须在听证开始后15日内就该动议作出裁定。\n\n鉴于没有进一步证据需要提交，也没有进一步论点需要提出，听证今日结束，因此，就该驳回动议作出裁定的期限自今日开始计算。\n\n我……感谢所有当事人提出的全部论点。\n\n这些论点审慎且周详。\n\n各位已充分阐述了各自观点。\n\n但我确实必须决定本案将以何种方式继续进行，我将作出该决定。\n\n显然，我将在今日起15日内作出该决定。\n\n虽然我想，根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》，不计算今天，根据9006条第6则，不计算当天——即今天——所以我坦白认为这是正确的。\n\n但无论如何，如果各位对驳回动议还有任何其他关切或问题，我通常可以参加会议。\n\n但与此同时，我将就驳回动议作出裁定。\n\n好的。\n\n还有人有任何进一步问题吗？\n\n（无可听见的回应。）\n\n法院：\n\n好的。我感谢所有当事人的努力。\n\n我将驳回动议留待审议，并将据此作出裁定。\n\n这是今日日程中的最后一项事项，因此现在休庭。\n\n（程序于下午12:51休庭。）\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 580 提交于 07/21/22 登记于 07/21/22 08:38:19\n\n本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），经法院批准的记录员及经认证的电子记录员和笔录员，证明上述内容系根据上述案件程序的官方电子录音制作的正确笔录。\n\nApril 21, 2022\n\nChristine Fiore, CERT-410\n\n笔录员\n\n目录\n\nPAX证物：　收讫\n\n1-6、9-17、23-29、31　8\n\n债权人委员会证物：\n\n1-14　16","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CIPA","CCP","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","GTV","Saraca","Miles Guo","Murray","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":102,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":404,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":28653,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-07-21 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-07-21","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:22:14"}