{"id":"court_ctb_621_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":621,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re : Chapter 11","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nDebtor.<sup>1</sup>\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\nHo Wan Kwok, : Case No. 22-50073\n\n:\n\n:\n\n: :\n\n## **OBJECTION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS TO THE DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER APPOINTING LUC A. DESPINS AS CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE**\n\nThe Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") of the estate of the Debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), hereby submits this Objection to the Debtor's Motion for Relief from Order Appointing Luc A. Despins as Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Rule 60(b) Motion\"). In support of the Objection, the Committee respectfully represents as follows:\n\n1. The Committee agrees with and adopts by reference the arguments made against the Rule 60(b) Motion by the Chapter 11 Trustee, Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\") in the Objection of Chapter 11 Trustee to Debtor's Motion for Relief from Order Appointing Luc A. Despins as Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee Objection\"), and as more fully set forth below, submits further grounds for the denial of the Rule 60(b) Motion.\n\n2. The Debtor's Rule 60(b) Motion proceeds from the fundamentally mistaken view that the representation by Paul Hastings LLP (\"Paul Hastings\"), the Trustee's law firm, of businesses the Debtor claims are owned by the Chinese government, disqualifies the Trustee from being a \"disinterested person\" under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(d). This view, in turn, relies on the\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtor is known by the following names: Guo Wengui; Miles Guo; Miles Kwok; and Ho Wan Kwok.\n\nmistaken premise that the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party is a party in interest in this case such as to have required disclosure of Paul Hastings' \"connections with the Chinese government\" (Rule 60(b) Motion ¶34), and that these \"connections\" disable the Trustee with an \"interest [that is] materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders ….\" (Rule 60(b) Motion ¶35).\n\n3. But the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party is simply not a party in interest in this case. To be a party in interest under the Bankruptcy Code, one \"must have a financial or legal stake in the outcome of the particular matter.\" *In re Old Carco, LLCI,*  500 B.R. 683, 691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing *In re Teligent, Inc.*, 640 F.3d 53, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2011)). *See also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.*, 101 B.R. 844, 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (party requesting party in interest status \"must either be a creditor of a debtor to invoke the court's jurisdiction or be able to assert an equitable claim against the estate\"). The Debtor has not listed the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party as a creditor in his schedules and has cited no financial or legal stake they might claim to have in this chapter 11 case. And the fact that this case has been pending for over five months without hearing from them simply confirms they have no interest in it.\n\n4. As for the Debtor's claim that the Trustee has a \"materially adverse interest,\" as defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14), a \"materially adverse\" interest must be an interest that is adverse to the \"interests of the estate or … any class of creditors or equity security holders,\" and must exist on account of, or \"by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other reason.\"\n\n5. Preliminarily, it is readily apparent that irrespective of any animus or vendetta the Chinese government may be proven to have against the Debtor, Paul Hastings' representation of\n\n2\n\nbusinesses in China – even if that is considered to equate with representation of the Chinese government itself – does not in the slightest degree give the Trustee a materially adverse interest to \"any class of creditors or … equity security holders,\" inasmuch as the Debtor is not a creditor or an \"equity security holder\" in this case.<sup>2</sup>\n\n6. Moreover, the general rule in bankruptcy cases is that a debtor has no standing to object to matters of case administration unless he or she can establish a reasonable prospect of a surplus. *See Barnard v. Citibank, N.A.*, (*In re Lynch*), Case No. 15-74795-AST, Adv. Pro. No. 19-08119-AST, 2021 WL 1536392, at \\*4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2021) (citing *In re Licata*, 659 F. App'x 704, 706 (2d Cir. 2016)). Here, the Debtor's scheduled liabilities are far in excess of the nominal assets he claims to have and thus, he cannot establish standing to object to the approval of the Trustee's appointment.\n\n7. Two additional points on the issue of disinterestedness unequivocally establish that the Trustee does not fail the disinterestedness test by virtue of Paul Hastings' representation of Chinese businesses in unrelated matters. As stated by the Collier's treatise, \"an interest is disqualifying only if it arises from the person's interest on his or her own behalf, not when it arises in a representative capacity,\" and \"a person that may represent an interest that is potentially adverse to the estate does not necessarily fail to be disinterested, because the focus of\n\n<sup>2</sup> \"Equity security\" is defined as\n\n**<sup>(</sup>A)** share in a corporation, whether or not transferable or denominated \"stock\", or similar security;\n\n **<sup>(</sup>B)** interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership; or\n\n **<sup>(</sup>C)** warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to purchase, sell, or subscribe to a share, security, or interest of a kind specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph.\n\n<sup>11</sup> U.S.C. § 101(16). In turn, \"equity security holder,\" is defined as the \"holder of an equity security.\" 11 U.S.C. § 101(17).\n\nthe disinterested definition is on … whether the person 'has' an interest materially adverse to the estate.\" 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1104.02[7][a], at 1104-27 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2022).\n\n8. No claim has been made that the Trustee himself represents the Chinese government or businesses that are owned by the Chinese government; the Debtor's complaint is that his law firm does. Thus, the Trustee holds no interest on his own behalf that can be questioned as giving rise to a lack of disinterestedness.\n\n9. Moreover, the adverse interest the Debtor claims is held by Paul Hastings by virtue of its representation of businesses in China depends upon the speculative premise that the Chinese government will, in the future, attempt to influence how the Trustee will administer this case through some form of pressure they will exert upon Paul Hastings. Even accepting the notion that there is an adverse interest simply by virtue of Paul Hastings' presence in China and representation of businesses there – a position with which the Committee does not agree – it is at most a \"potential\" adversity that will likely never come to be. As Collier's expresses it, representation of an interest that is only \"potentially adverse to the estate\" is not disqualifying.\n\n10. The Debtor also contends that Paul Hastings' past representation of entities related to the ultimate parent company of PAX in unrelated matters disqualifies the Trustee based on a lack of disinterestedness. The Debtor is mistaken.\n\n11. In the related context of retention of professionals under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (requiring disinterestedness and no interest adverse to the estate), the Second Circuit has made it clear that because section 327(a) is phrased in the present tense, a professional must be disqualified under that section \"only if it presently hold[s] or represent[s] an interest adverse to the estate, notwithstanding any interests it may have held or represented in the past.\" *Bank*\n\n4\n\n*Brussels Lambert v. Coan* (*In re AroChem Corp.*), 176 F.3d 610, 623 (2d Cir. 1999).<sup>3</sup> More particularly, past representation of a creditor of the estate will not serve as a basis for disqualifying a professional under section 327(a), a rule that is further supported by 11 U.S.C. § 327(c), which condones even concurrent representation of a creditor and the estate unless it is shown that there is an actual conflict of interest by the dual representation. *In re Diva Jewelry Design, Inc.*, 367 B.R. 463, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). *See also In re Ampal-American Israel Corp.*, 554 B.R. 604, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (past representation of creditor by trustee's proposed counsel not disqualifying).\n\n12. Here, we have the more attenuated situation in which Paul Hastings has in the past represented, not PAX, but entities that are related to the ultimate parent of PAX in matters that are completely unrelated to this case. Such representation does not in any way affect the Trustee's disinterested status.\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Committee respectfully requests that the Court deny the Rule 60(b) Motion and grant such other or further relief as it may deem just, equitable and proper.\n\n<sup>3</sup> As it is here, \"[t]he disinterested\" requirement, looking to the nonexistence of interests that are 'materially adverse' to the estate or any class of creditors, is subsumed … within the requirements of section 327(a) itself, requiring the absence of interests adverse to the estate.\" *In re Diva Jewelry Design, Inc.*, 367 B.R. 463, 470 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). Indeed, as noted there, \"by adding a requirement that an adverse interest be 'materially adverse,' \"section 101(14) imposes a requirement that is more forgiving of adverse interests than is section 327(a),\" *i.e.,* by only making \"*materially* adverse\" interests disqualifying under the definition of disinterestedness. *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\nDated: Bridgeport, Connecticut July 27, 2022\n\n## **OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK**\n\nBy: */s/Irve J. Goldman*  Irve J. Goldman Jonathan A. Kaplan Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, 8th Floor PO Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 (203) 330-2213 igoldman@pullcom.com\n\nIts Attorneys\n\n## **CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE**\n\nI, Irve J. Goldman, herby certify that on the 27th day of July, 2022, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to the Debtor's Motion for Relief from Order Appointing Luc A. Despins as Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Rule 60(b) Motion\") was filed with the Court and served all parties that have filed a notice of appearance and request for notice electronically via the Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system (\"CM/ECF\n\nBy: */s/Irve J. Goldman*","body_zh":"美国破产法院 康涅狄格区 布里奇波特分部\n\n关于 ：第 11 章\n\n债务人。1\n\n__________________________________________________\n\n__________________________________________________:\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），: 案号 22-50073\n\n官方无担保债权人委员会对债务人请求免除任命 Luc A. Despins 为第 11 章受托人之裁定的动议的异议\n\n债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）破产财产的官方无担保债权人委员会（以下简称“委员会”），特此针对债务人请求免除任命 Luc A. Despins 为第 11 章受托人之裁定的动议（以下简称“第 60(b) 条动议”）提出本异议。为支持本异议，委员会谨陈述如下：\n\n1. 委员会同意并援引第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（以下简称“受托人”）在《第 11 章受托人对债务人请求免除任命 Luc A. Despins 为第 11 章受托人之裁定的动议的异议》（以下简称“受托人异议”）中针对第 60(b) 条动议所提出的论点，并如下文所详述，提出驳回第 60(b) 条动议的进一步理由。\n\n2. 债务人的第 60(b) 条动议源于一个根本错误的观点，即受托人所在的律师事务所 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所，以下简称“Paul Hastings”）代理了债务人所称由中国政府拥有的企业，从而使受托人丧失了根据 11 U.S.C. § 1104(d) 成为“利害关系不相关人”的资格。该观点反过来又依赖于一个\n\n1 债务人以下列姓名/名称为人所知：Guo Wengui（郭文贵）；Miles Guo；Miles Kwok；以及 Ho Wan Kwok。\n\n错误的前提，即中国政府或中国共产党是本案的利害关系方，以至于本应披露 Paul Hastings 的“与中国政府的关联”（第 60(b) 条动议第 34 段），且这些“关联”使受托人带有“实质上不利于破产财产或任何类别的债权人或权益证券持有人的利益……”（第 60(b) 条动议第 35 段）。\n\n3. 但中国政府或中国共产党根本不是本案的利害关系方。要成为《破产法典》下的利害关系方，必须“在该特定事项的结果中拥有财务或法律利益”。In re Old Carco, LLCI, 500 B.R. 683, 691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)（援引 In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2011)）。另见 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)（请求利害关系方地位的一方“必须要么是债务人的债权人以援引法院管辖权，要么能够对破产财产主张衡平法上的权利请求”）。债务人在其财产清单中并未将中国政府或中国共产党列为债权人，也未指出他们在本第 11 章案件中可能主张拥有的任何财务或法律利益。而且本案已审理超过五个月却未收到他们的任何消息，这一事实直接证实了他们在此案中毫无利益。\n\n4. 至于债务人声称受托人存在 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) 所定义的“实质不利利益”，“实质不利”利益必须是对“破产财产或……任何类别的债权人或权益证券持有人的利益”不利的利益，并且必须“由于与债务人的任何直接或间接关系、联系或在债务人处的利益，或出于任何其他原因”而存在。\n\n5. 首先，显而易见的是，无论中国政府被证明对债务人怀有何种敌意或报复，Paul Hastings 在中国代理企业——即使这被认为等同于代理中国政府本身——也丝毫不会使受托人对“任何类别的债权人或……权益证券持有人”产生实质不利利益，因为债务人在本案中既不是债权人，也不是“权益证券持有人”。2\n\n6. 此外，破产案件的一般规则是，债务人无权对案件管理事项提出异议，除非其能够证明存在合理的前景产生剩余财产。见 Barnard v. Citibank, N.A., (In re Lynch), 案号 15-74795-AST, 附随诉讼案号 19-08119-AST, 2021 WL 1536392, 第 *4 页 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2021年4月15日)（援引 In re Licata, 659 F. App'x 704, 706 (2d Cir. 2016)）。在本案中，债务人列入财产清单的负债远远超过其声称拥有的名义资产，因此，他无法确立对批准受托人任命提出异议的主体资格。\n\n7. 关于利害关系不相关性问题的另外两点明确确立了受托人并不会因 Paul Hastings 在无关事项中代理中国企业而无法通过利害关系不相关性审查。正如《科利尔破产论》（Collier's）专著所述，“唯有当一项利益源于该人代表其自身利益时，该利益才具有剥夺资格的效力，而当其产生于代理身份时则不然”，并且“可能代表对破产财产潜在不利利益的人并不必然无法成为利害关系不相关人，因为利害关系不相关定义的焦点在于……该人是否‘拥有’对破产财产实质不利的利益。”7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1104.02[7][a], 第 1104-27 页 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer 编, 第 16 版 2022)。\n\n2 “权益证券”定义为\n\n(A) 公司股份，无论是否可转让或是否被称为“股票”，或类似的证券；\n\n(B) 有限合伙中有限合伙人的权益；或\n\n(C) 购买、出售或认购本款(A)项或(B)项所指定种类的股份、证券或权益的认股权证或权利（转换权除外）。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(16)。相应地，“权益证券持有人”被定义为“权益证券的持有者”。11 U.S.C. § 101(17)。\n\n8. 没有任何人主张受托人本人代理了中国政府或中国政府拥有的企业；债务人的控诉在于他的律师事务所进行了此类代理。因此，受托人并未代表其自身持有任何可被质疑为导致缺乏利害关系不相关性的利益。\n\n9. 此外，债务人声称 Paul Hastings 凭借其在中国的企业代理而持有的不利利益，依赖于一个投机性的前提，即中国政府将来会试图通过对 Paul Hastings 施加某种形式的压力来影响受托人如何管理本案。即使接受仅仅因为 Paul Hastings 在中国的存在和代理那里的企业就存在不利利益这一观点——委员会并不赞同这一立场——这充其量也只是一种可能永远不会发生的“潜在”不利。正如《科利尔破产论》所述，代理仅仅“对破产财产潜在不利”的利益并不具有剥夺资格的效力。\n\n10. 债务人还主张，Paul Hastings 过去在无关事项中代理与 PAX 的最终母公司相关的实体，构成基于缺乏利害关系不相关性而剥夺受托人资格的理由。债务人此言差矣。\n\n11. 在根据 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) 聘用专业人士（要求具有利害关系不相关性且不存在对破产财产不利的利益）的相关背景下，第二巡回法院已明确表示，由于第 327(a) 条采用现在时表述，专业人士在该条下被剥夺资格的前提是“仅当其目前持有或代表对破产财产不利的利益，无论其过去可能持有或代表过何种利益。”Bank Brussels Lambert v. Coan (In re AroChem Corp.), 176 F.3d 610, 623 (2d Cir. 1999)。3 更具体而言，过去代理破产财产的某一债权人，不能作为根据第 327(a) 条剥夺专业人士资格的依据，这一规则得到了 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) 的进一步支持，该条款甚至允许同时代理债权人和破产财产，除非证明双重代理存在实际的利益冲突。In re Diva Jewelry Design, Inc., 367 B.R. 463, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)。另见 In re Ampal-American Israel Corp., 554 B.R. 604, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)（受托人拟聘律师过去对债权人的代理不具剥夺资格效力）。\n\n12. 在本案中，情况更为间接弱化，Paul Hastings 过去代理的并非 PAX，而是在与本案完全无关的事项中代理了与 PAX 最终母公司相关的实体。此类代理丝毫不会影响受托人的利害关系不相关地位。\n\n综上所述，委员会谨请求法院驳回第 60(b) 条动议，并给予法院认为公正、衡平且适当的其他或进一步救济。\n\n3 正如本案所述，“‘利害关系不相关’的要求，旨在要求不存在对破产财产或任何类别的债权人‘实质不利’的利益，这……已被第 327(a) 条本身所包含的要求（即要求不存在对破产财产不利的利益）所囊括。”In re Diva Jewelry Design, Inc., 367 B.R. 463, 470 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)。确实，正如该案所指出的，“通过增加不利利益必须是‘实质不利’的要求，‘第 101(14) 条所施加的要求比第 327(a) 条对不利利益更为宽容’，即在利害关系不相关的定义下，仅有‘实质不利’的利益才具有剥夺资格的效力。”同上（强调为原文所加）。\n\n日期：康涅狄格州布里奇波特 2022年7月27日\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）官方无担保债权人委员会\n\n签署人：/s/Irve J. Goldman  Irve J. Goldman Jonathan A. Kaplan Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, 8th Floor PO Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 (203) 330-2213 igoldman@pullcom.com\n\n其代理律师\n送达证明\n\n我，Irve J. Goldman，特此证明于 2022年7月27日，上述《对债务人请求免除任命 Luc A. Despins 为第 11 章受托人之裁定的动议的异议》（以下简称“第 60(b) 条动议”）的真实正确副本已向法院提交，并通过法院的 CM/ECF 电子归档系统（“CM/ECF\n\n签署人：/s/Irve J. Goldman","key_entities":["Je","Paul Hastings","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Chinese Communist Party","Guo","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":1688,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 12:57:43"}