{"id":"court_ctb_622_1","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":622,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"EXHIBIT","filed_date":null,"title":"EXHIBIT 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES COMMERCIAL COURT (QBD)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **EXHIBIT 1**\n\n**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES COMMERCIAL COURT (QBD)**\n\n**Claim No. CL-2020-000345**\n\n**B E T W E E N:-**\n\n- **(1) KWOK HO WAN**\n- **(2) ACE DECADE HOLDINGS LIMITED**\n- **(3) DAWN STATE LIMITED**\n\n**Claimants**\n\n**- and -**\n\n**UBS AG**\n\n**Defendant**\n\n#### **PARTICULARS OF CLAIM**\n\n#### **PARTIES**\n\n- 1. The First Claimant (\"**Mr Kwok**\") is a high net worth individual resident since early 2015 in New York State, USA. Mr Kwok was formerly resident in the People's Republic of China (\"**PRC**\"), where he was known by his Mandarin language name, Guo Wengui. Mr Kwok is a political opponent of the PRC government, and by the time of the events giving rise to these claims he was already in a hostile relationship with the PRC authorities.\n- 2. The Second Claimant (\"**Ace Decade**\") is a private limited company incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with its registered address at P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands. Ace Decade was incorporated on 18 June 2014 and acquired by Mr Kwok on or around 10 November 2014 as part of the preparations for the (then) proposed acquisition of shares in the Chinese company, Haitong Securities Company Limited (\"**Haitong**\").\n- 3. The Third Claimant (\"**Dawn State**\") is also a private limited company incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with its registered address at P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands.\n- 4. Since 18 September 2015, Dawn State has been owned and controlled by Ace Decade. Prior to 18 September 2015, Dawn State was owned and controlled by the Chinese investment services provider, Haixia Capital Management Company Ltd (\"**Haixia**\"), through a vehicle called Haixia Capital Investment Fund (Fujian) Limited Partnership (\"**Haixia Fund**\") which was managed by Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co. Ltd (\"**Haixia Management**\"). Dawn State was the vehicle used for the acquisition of shares in Haitong in 2015 (as pleaded in more detail in the body of this Particulars of Claim (\"**PoC**\"), subject to a contractual right under which Ace Decade could acquire Dawn State after the Haitong share acquisition.\n- 5. The Defendant (\"**UBS**\"), is a company incorporated in Switzerland, with its registered office address at Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland. UBS conducts business globally, providing retail and investment banking, wealth management and other financial services. At all relevant times UBS conducted this business through both its Swiss headquarters and also branches located, inter alia, in Hong Kong (\"**UBS HK**\") and in London (\"**UBS London**\"), the latter being, by agreement of the parties, designated as the counterparty for all of the contracts relevant to the claims in this action, as pleaded further below. UBS London has at all times held permissions to provide regulated services from the Financial Conduct Authority (Reference Number 186958) and was authorised to act for and enter into contractual agreements as UBS.\n- 6. As pleaded at paragraphs [32](#page-8-0) to [57](#page-21-0) below, UBS entered into the contracts relevant to the subject matter of the Claimants' claims through UBS London. In the discussions and negotiations leading to those contracts, UBS was represented primarily by its employee Mr Stephen Wong (\"**Mr Wong**\"). Mr Wong was at that time a Managing Director in the Wealth Management Division of UBS, based at the offices of UBS HK. Mr Kwok was first introduced to Mr Wong in around 2006 or 2007.\n\n# **THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIMS**\n\n## **Background to the Haitong Investment**\n\n7. In or around Autumn 2013, Mr Kwok was approached by the CEO of Haitong, Mr Wang Kaiguo (\"**Mr Wang**\"), who was seeking to encourage Mr Kwok to make a substantial equity investment in Haitong. Haitong is a major Chinese securities firm, engaged in the provision of stocks and derivatives brokerage, as well as investment banking, asset management, private equity, alternative investments, and financial leasing services. Haitong is one of the largest and longest established financial services providers in the PRC. Haitong's shares are traded on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges (\"**SSE**\" and \"**HKEX**\" respectively). Haitong's shares trading on the HKEX are known as \"**H-Shares**.\" Following the approach from Mr Wang, Mr Kwok resolved to invest approximately US\\$3 billion in H-Shares in order to obtain a major stake in Haitong. This investment was to be made through the issue of new H-Shares by Haitong, and their allotment to companies controlled by Mr Kwok.\n\n# **Initial involvement of UBS**\n\n- 8. Following the discussions with Mr Wang, Mr Kwok communicated his intention to acquire a substantial stake in Haitong to Mr Hank Lo, a Hong Kong solicitor and partner in the firm Stevenson, Wong & Co (\"**Stevenson Wong**\"). Mr Kwok retained Stevenson Wong to advise him on the proposed acquisition.\n- <span id=\"page-3-0\"></span>9. Mr Lo had an established relationship with Mr Wong and UBS, the details of which are not known to Mr Kwok, and it was Mr Lo who first introduced Mr Kwok to Mr Wong in or around 2006-7. By the end of 2013, Mr Wong had cultivated a close personal relationship with Mr Kwok and had successfully induced Mr Kwok to consider and treat him as a trusted adviser and personal friend.\n- 10. At some point in the fourth quarter of 2013, Mr Lo informed Mr Wong of Mr Kwok's intention to acquire a stake in Haitong. The Claimants do not know when Mr Lo communicated this to Mr Wong. Mr Kwok was not aware that Mr Lo intended to inform Mr Wong or UBS until after the event, although Mr Kwok did not (after the event) object to him doing so.\n- <span id=\"page-3-2\"></span><span id=\"page-3-1\"></span>11. In or around December 2013, Mr Wong visited Mr Kwok at his residence in Hong Kong. He informed Mr Kwok that UBS had become aware that Haitong would be issuing new H-Shares (the \"**Placement Shares**\") and that UBS wished to participate as a placing agent. Mr Wong used his mobile telephone to open a call with senior UBS executives, who Mr Kwok understood were based in Switzerland. Mr Kwok cannot now recall the names of the individuals. Those senior UBS executives and Mr Wong told Mr Kwok (the following sub-paragraphs pleading only the gist of what they said):\n\t- (1) UBS wished to become a broker in the sale of the Placement Shares, and wanted Mr Kwok to introduce and commend UBS to Haitong for that role;\n\t- (2) If Mr Kwok assisted UBS in that way, UBS would assist and advise him in acquiring the shares for which it was made broker or placement agent in a way which was advantageous for Mr Kwok;\n\t- (3) Although they knew that Mr Kwok's intention was to acquire the shares for himself, UBS itself or investors with whom UBS had a relations themselves would be interested in\n\npurchasing the shares at a substantial uplift on the likely offer price if Mr Kwok was willing to on-sell them.\n\n- 12. Following this meeting, Mr Kwok resolved to work with UBS and to this end, at some time in early 2014, Mr Kwok told Mr Wang that he intended to invest in the new issue of H-Shares, and asked Mr Wang to include UBS as one of the placees of the Placement Shares.\n- <span id=\"page-4-1\"></span>13. In July or August 2014 Haitong resolved to issue the H-Shares via seven placees, one of which was UBS. Another company advising and assisting Mr Kwok on a separate acquisition of H-Shares, Macquarie Capital Securities Limited (\"**Macquarie**\"), was to be the placee in respect of three allocations of the Placement Shares. Together, UBS and Macquarie would place around 12% of Haitong's total issued shareholding.\n\n## **Mr Wong's initial advisory work**\n\n- <span id=\"page-4-0\"></span>14. Following this meeting, Mr Kwok entered into discussions with UBS (through Mr Wong) in relation to the structuring of his planned investment (the \"**Investment**\") in the Placement Shares for which UBS was the placing agent (the \"**UBS H-Shares**\"). In discussions in and around late March and April 2014, Mr Wong said that he would provide a plan for the \"*Haitong project*,\" including a proposed structure through which Mr Kwok could acquire the UBS H-Shares.\n- 15. As a securities company incorporated and operating in the PRC, Haitong was at all relevant times subject to regulation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the \"**CSRC**\"). The relevant PRC laws required the CSRC to give approval if any person acquired or actually controlled more than 5% shareholdings of the total issued capital of Haitong.\n- 16. It was discussed between Mr Kwok and Mr Wong that Mr Kwok intended to invest in excess of US\\$3 billion in total, which would considerably exceed this threshold and therefore require approval by the CSRC. The advice which Mr Kwok received from UBS included, in particular, devising a structure for the acquisition of the Placement Shares which would avoid the requirement for CSRC approval in a manner which complied with the relevant PRC laws.\n- <span id=\"page-4-2\"></span>17. In the course of these conversations:\n\t- (1) Mr Wong repeatedly told Mr Kwok that he, under the direction of UBS senior executives, would work to advance Mr Kwok's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares, in line with the commitment made in December 2013. From this period until the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, Mr Kwok frequently repeated and reaffirmed\n\nthe assertion that he and UBS were working in Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS;\n\n- (2) Mr Wong said that he and UBS would devise the structure for the acquisition in a way which was as advantageous as possible for Mr Kwok; and\n- (3) Mr Wong held himself and UBS out as having the experience and expertise to devise an advantageous structure for the acquisition for Mr Kwok and advising Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) with respect to investments in placements such as that for the Placement Shares, the structuring of the investments, and the financing thereof.\n- <span id=\"page-5-1\"></span>18. In or around June 2014, UBS, through Mr Wong, gave initial advice regarding the structure for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. This advice was given orally at meetings in Mr Kwok's office (49/F, Bank of China Tower, No. 1, Garden Road, Hong Kong) and his personal residence in Hong Kong. In summary (the following sub-paragraphs pleading only the gist of UBS' advice), Mr Wong advised Mr Kwok: (1) Not to purchase the UBS H-Shares through a company beneficially owned or controlled by him, as this would require CSRC approval; (2) Instead, to set up a structure (which would be arranged by UBS) under which the UBS H-Shares would be acquired by a company controlled by a third-party intermediary, which acquisition would not require CSRC approval; and (3) To make the investment on a leveraged basis, with acquisition finance from UBS.\n- <span id=\"page-5-0\"></span>19. Mr Kwok was initially reluctant to make a leveraged investment because he did not require bank finance in order to acquire the UBS H-Shares and had intended to make the acquisition using cash. However, Mr Wong advised him that:\n\t- (1) If UBS were to proceed with structuring the Investment it would have to be on the basis that the bank would provide margin finance for the purchase of the UBS H-Shares, as this would be how UBS would receive its profit from the transaction;\n\t- (2) It was anyway in Mr Kwok's best interests to make a leveraged investment, because it would enable him to obtain the desired number of shares without committing the full amount of his own capital;\n\t- (3) Any leveraged finance provided by UBS would in any event be upon the '*best possible terms*';\n\t- (4) The terms of any leveraged finance would be consistent with Mr Kwok's requirement that there should be no provisions requiring (i) the provision of additional collateral or (ii) the mandatory repayment of the loan (which were referred to compendiously by both Mr\n\nKwok and Mr Wong as \"**margin calls**\" without differentiation) as a result of short term price fluctuations of the Placement Shares;\n\n- (5) UBS would give Mr Kwok adequate time to meet any other margin calls, so that if Mr Kwok had (as in fact, he did) the ability to fund the whole of the acquisition without loan financing, UBS would not enforce against the security before additional funds could be provided by Mr Kwok;\n- (6) In illustrating the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of UBS H-Shares, Mr Wong repeatedly (during this period, and thereafter) referred to a previous high value leveraged transaction funded by UBS, under which it had provided funding for the acquisition of a much larger stake in the Chinese insurance company, Ping An (the \"**Ping An Deal**\"). The details of the information provided by Mr Wong in relation to the Ping An Deal between June 2014 and December 2014 are summarised at paragraph [42](#page-13-0) below.\n- <span id=\"page-6-0\"></span>20. To the best of Mr Kwok's recollection, this advice was first given in or around June 2014. However, these matters were the subject of repeated discussion between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in the summer and autumn of 2014, and thereafter. Mr Kwok cannot be certain as to what representations were made to him by UBS on each specific occasion, but recalls the effect of the advice as a whole.\n\n### **Further Structuring Advice**\n\n- <span id=\"page-6-1\"></span>21. From in or around July 2014 onwards, UBS continued to advise Mr Kwok and (from 10 November 2014) Ace Decade regarding the proposed structure and financing for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. In particular, Mr Wong went on further to advise Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) on the structuring of the acquisition, including further advising in relation to the requirement for approval by the CSRC of acquisitions of Haitong in excess of 5% of the company's share capital; and by advising that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade select Haixia as the intermediary for the Investment.\n- 22. In reliance on this advice, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade selected Haixia to act as intermediary for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, and ultimately appointed Haixia for that purpose under a Co-Investment Agreement dated 18 December 2014 (the \"**Co-Investment Agreement**\").\n- <span id=\"page-6-2\"></span>23. Although Mr Wong had told Mr Kwok and Ace Decade that Haixia was independent of UBS, it is in fact controlled by State Development and Investment Corporation (\"**SDIC**\"), which is a joint venture partner of UBS, with both co-owning an investment fund called \"**UBS SDIC**\".\n\nTo facilitate the investment in the Placement Shares, on 23 October 2014 Haixia caused the incorporation of Dawn State through its subsidiary Haixia Fund. Dawn State was at all relevant times until its transfer to Ace Decade managed by Mr Lu Bo (\"**Mr Lu**\"), a senior employee of Haixia who was previously employed by UBS SDIC.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-0\"></span>24. Ace Decade was acquired on 10 November 2014 by Mr Kwok for the purpose of acting as the said investment vehicle. On the same day, on the advice of Mr Wong, an employee of Mr Kwok, Ms Yu Yong (\"**Ms Yu**\") became its nominee shareholder and director.\n\n## **Preparation of the December Contracts**\n\n- 25. In or around late October and early November 2014, UBS (primarily through Mr Wong), Haixia (primarily through Mr Lu) and Ace Decade (primarily through Mr Kwok and Ms Yu) began making preparations to subscribe for the UBS H-Shares.\n- 26. On or around 13 November 2014 there was an initial conference call between Stevenson Wong and Norton Rose Fulbright (\"**Norton Rose**\"), the lawyers engaged by Haixia to act on the transaction, at which they agreed that Norton Rose would draft a Co-Investment Agreement between Haixia, Dawn State and Ace Decade in relation to the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares.\n- 27. On or around 14 November 2014, Ace Decade and Dawn State entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to which Dawn State was to provide services to Ace Decade in return for a non-refundable fee equal to 65 basis points of the total invested capital, subject to a minimum of US\\$5,000,000.\n- <span id=\"page-7-1\"></span>28. During this period, leading up to the agreement by Dawn State to subscribe for the UBS H-Shares, there were ongoing discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in relation to the structuring and financing of the acquisition. During those discussions Mr Wong repeated and elaborated on the representations pleaded at paragraph [19](#page-5-0) above. The Claimants plead further in relation to these representations at paragraphs [39](#page-12-0) to [40,](#page-13-1) [47](#page-15-0) and [78](#page-27-0) below.\n- 29. These preparations led to Ace Decade, Dawn State and UBS entering into a series of arrangements designed to allow Ace Decade to participate in the acquisition of UBS H-Shares through Dawn State (together, the \"**December Contracts**\"). The December Contracts were:\n\t- (1) A custody agreement between Dawn State and UBS dated 12 December 2014 (the \"**Custody Agreement**\");\n\t- (2) A Co-Investment Agreement between Ace Decade, Dawn State and Haixia dated 18 December 2014;\n- (3) A letter agreement between Haixia Management and Ace Decade dated 18 December 2014 (the \"**Letter Agreement**\");\n- (4) A financing letter entitled \"*Project Pipe – Financing Letter*\" between Dawn State and UBS London dated 19 December 2014 (the \"**Financing Letter**\").\n- 30. The Claimants plead further as to the entry into the December Contracts and their terms at paragraphs [32](#page-8-0) to [37](#page-10-0) below.\n- 31. These preparations also led to Dawn State entering into a subscription agreement with Haitong dated 19 December 2014 (the \"**Subscription Agreement**\"). The Claimants plead further in relation to the execution and terms of the Subscription Agreement at paragraph [44](#page-15-1) below.\n\n#### **The December Contracts**\n\n- <span id=\"page-8-0\"></span>32. On or around 12 December 2014, Dawn State and UBS London entered into the Custody Agreement in relation (among other things) to the custody of the UBS H-Shares. The Claimants will refer to the Custody Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the terms of the Custody Agreement, Dawn State agreed that all of the UBS H-Shares (once acquired) would be held with UBS London. The purpose and effect of the Custody Agreement was to ensure that the UBS H-Shares would be available for enforcement by UBS London of its rights under the (then) proposed facility agreement and security agreement to be entered into by Dawn State and UBS London in relation to the provision of finance for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. The Custody Agreement was governed by the law of England and Wales, and provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts in respect of any disputes.\n- <span id=\"page-8-1\"></span>33. On or around 18 December 2014, Ace Decade, Dawn State and Haixia entered into the Co-Investment Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Co-Investment Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, this agreement provided that:\n\t- (1) Pursuant to this agreement, Haixia agreed to extend to Ace Decade a right to participate in the share subscription in the Target Company (i.e. Haitong) (defined as \"*the Project*\"), upon receipt by Haixia of US\\$500 million (the \"**Monetary Contribution**\"). In addition, it was noted that it was contemplated that Dawn State would arrange for loan financing in an amount of US\\$750 million, which together with the Monetary Contribution constitutes the \"Co-Investment Amount\".\n\t- (2) At Clause 1.1, for Haixia Fund to receive a substantial fee for its role in the Project.\n- (3) At Clause 3, headed \"**Nature of the Right**\", that Ace Decade would have only a contractual right to participate in the Project, and no immediate proprietary interest in Dawn State or the UBS H-Shares which it acquired.\n- (4) At Clause 6.5:\n\n*\"In the event that the Project is not completed for any reasons, in consideration of Haixia Fund and the Company arranging for the Project and the loan financing(s) with commercial banks for the benefit of the Investor:*\n\n*(a) the Investor agrees that the Company and/ or Haixia Fund shall receive an arrangement fee of the higher amount of (i) 0.065% of the Co-investment Amount (i.e. US\\$1,250 million); and (ii) US\\$500,000 upon the Company entering into the share subscription agreement(s) in relation to the Project\"*\n\n- 34. Also, on or around 18 December 2014, Haixia Management and Ace Decade entered into the Letter Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Letter Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Among other things, the Letter Agreement provided as follows:\n\t- (1) Under the heading \"*Loan Financing*\":\n\n*\"[Ace Decade] acknowledges that [Dawn State] is arranging for loan financing(s) with commercial bank(s) at the request of and for the benefit of [Ace Decade] (the \"Financing\") pursuant to the relevant financing agreement of the Financing for the Project (the \"Financing Letter\").\"*\n\n*\"[Ace Decade] acknowledges that it has reviewed and agreed to the terms and conditions of the Financing as set out in the Financing Letter (including the term sheet), and further covenants and agrees with [Dawn State], Haixia Fund and Haixia Management that it shall be primarily and solely responsible for all the fees, costs, expenses and payments in connection with the Financing […]\"*\n\n- (2) Under the heading \"*Arrangements for the Transfer*\", that at any time after a two-month period after the completion of the Project or the lock-up period under the relevant subscription agreement to be entered into by Dawn State, whichever was longer, on receiving a request from Ace Decade, Haixia Management would procure the transfer of the UBS H-Shares to Ace Decade, or another entity nominated by Ace Decade.\n- 35. Although the Letter Agreement provided that Ace Decade had reviewed and agreed to the terms and conditions of the Financing as set out in the Financing Letter, the Financing Letter was not in fact fully executed until 20 December 2014. The Claimants plead further at paragraphs [36](#page-9-0) to [37](#page-10-0) below.\n- <span id=\"page-9-0\"></span>36. On or around 19 December 2014, Dawn State and UBS London entered into the Financing Letter. By the Financing Letter UBS London agreed to provide the full amount of the loan\n\nfinancing envisioned for the Investment (the \"**Facility**\"), subject to the subsequent completion of more comprehensive financing documentation, in an amount in HKD equal to the product of 60%, the number of shares, and the initial price, not exceeding US\\$750 million) as defined in the Term Sheet. The Claimants will refer to the Financing Letter at trial for its full terms and effect. Among other things, the Financing Letter provided as follows:\n\n(1) Under the heading \"**LTV Ratio**\"\n\n# *\"(c) Pre-utilisation margin*\n\n*[Dawn State] shall deliver such additional H.K. dollar cash to the Secured Account so as to ensure that on the date (the Utilisation Request Date) of the Utilisation Request… the LTV Ratio (calculated with reference to the Aggregate Share Value on the Utilisation Request Date and on a pro forma basis as if the relevant additional HK dollar cash has been delivered to the Secured Account on such date) is equal to or lower than the Initial LTV.\"*\n\n(2) Under the heading \"**Exclusivity**\"\n\n> *\"(b) the Borrower will, and will procure that its respective subsidiaries and affiliates will, ensure that no other debt financing shall be incurred, borrowed, syndicated, issued or privately placed in relation to or for the purposes of funding or refinancing any of the funding for or relating to the Acquisition…*\"\n\n- (3) Under the heading \"**Governing Law**\", that the Financing Letter and all associated documents (defined as the \"*Financing Commitment Documents*\") would be subject to English law and that the English Courts would have jurisdiction in respect of any dispute\n- <span id=\"page-10-0\"></span>37. The Financing Commitment Documents included an indicative termsheet for the Facility (the \"**Indicative Termsheet**\"). The Indicative Termsheet did not contain any legally binding commitment to borrow or lend on the terms indicated or any terms. The Indicative Termsheet provided that under the facility agreement to be agreed between the parties, UBS would be entitled in certain circumstances to demand mandatory prepayment or make margin calls in respect of the facility, as follows:\n\t- (1) Under the heading \"**Margining Terms**\":\n\n*\"LTV Call Trigger: 66.7%, subject to adjustment by the Lender in the event that the Initial LTV is adjusted as described under \"Initial LTV\" (above).*\n\n*Margin Call: If on any Scheduled Trading Day following the Utilisation Date the LTV is higher that the LTV Call Trigger, the Borrower shall deposit into the Secured Account an amount of HKD cash only so that the LTV is restored to the Initial LTV and shall comply with all obligations described under the \"Margin Payment Schedule\" below.*\n\n*…*\n\n*Margin Payment Schedule: Payments in respect of Margin Calls and Margin Releases shall be made by 5:00pm Hong Kong time on the Business Day (the \"Margin Payment Date\") immediately following the date of the Margin Call request or Margin Call Release, as applicable, provided such request is issued prior to 11:59pm (Hong Kong time)…\"*\n\n#### (2) Under the heading \"**Other Terms**\":\n\n*\"Full Mandatory Prepayment Events: The Lender, at its option, may terminate this Transaction if any of the following events occur after Utilisation Date:*\n\n- *(i) the Closing Price of the Reference Shares on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than 60% of the Initial Price;*\n- *(ii) the Closing Price of the Reference Shares on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than (a) 85% of the Closing Price on the previous Scheduled Trading Day; or (b) 75% of the Closing Price on any of the 5 immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Days;*\n\n*…*\n\n*…*\n\n*If the Lender gives notice that it is terminating the Transaction following the occurrence of a Full Mandatory Prepayment Event, the Borrower must repay the Facility Amount together with all other amounts due in connection with the Transaction (the \"Aggregate Prepayment Amount\") in accordance with the following payment schedule:*\n\n- *(i) 25% of the Aggregate Payment Amount on the Business Day immediately following such notice;*\n- *(ii) 25% of the Aggregate Payment Amount on the second Business Day following such notice; and*\n- *(iii) the remaining 50% of the Aggregate Prepayment Amount on the third Business Day following such notice.\"*\n\n*Makewhole: Upon (i) a Voluntary Prepayment on any date other than a Mutual Break Date or (ii) prepayment or termination in any other circumstances, including following a Full Mandatory Prepayment Event or an Event of Default, a Makewhole Amount is payable by the Borrower to the Lender.*\n\n*The Makewhole Amount is calculated as an amount equal to the Spread applied to the Facility Amount or the prepayment amount, as applicable, for the period from (and including) the date of prepayment or termination, as applicable, to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Maturity Date.\"*\n\n# **UBS's representations prior to execution of the December Contracts**\n\n<span id=\"page-11-0\"></span>38. During the course of the preparation of the December Contracts, in or around December 2014 and before 18 December 2014, Mr Kwok became aware that the terms of the proposed financing for the Investment from UBS included provisions for margin calls and mandatory prepayment (which, again, he referred to compendiously using the term \"margin calls\"). Mr Kwok cannot now recall whether he saw the Financing Letter and/or Indicative Termsheet, but his knowledge must in any event have come from a description of the terms by someone else and not from review of the documents, because he did not read English.\n\n- <span id=\"page-12-0\"></span>39. Mr Kwok objected to the inclusion of these terms, and raised this with Mr Wong. There was a discussion between them, which took place either in Mr Kwok's residence or his office in Hong Kong. The gist of what Mr Kwok said to Mr Wong was that that he was unhappy about these terms, and he wanted them taken out of any agreements with UBS. Mr Kwok said that he did not want UBS to be able to demand payments or repayment of the loan as a result of shortterm fluctuations in the price of the Haitong H-Shares. In response, Mr Wong made further representations and gave advice to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade on behalf of UBS, the effect of which was as follows:\n\t- (1) It was UBS's internal policy that where the bank was providing margin finance, it would have terms allowing it to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment), and these were standard terms for UBS financing agreements;\n\t- (2) Nonetheless, Mr Wong intended to go back to the bank and try to get the terms removed from the agreements or changed;\n\t- (3) Even if Mr Wong could not get the margin call provisions removed or changed, Mr Kwok (and therefore Ace Decade) should not be concerned about them as:\n\t\t- (a) Such terms would not be strictly relied upon or executed by UBS in this case, because UBS had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore, impliedly, to Dawn State as their intermediary) as highly valued customers not to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) if prices moved in the short term.\n\t\t- (b) If it were necessary for UBS to make a margin call (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) due to longer term price movements, UBS would work with Ace Decade to allow it to meet any demands and would allow a reasonable time for it to do so, including longer time periods for payment than those in the facility agreement if necessary, and would not sell any of the Shares as a result of any margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time to pay.\n\t- (4) Mr Wong again referred to the Ping An Deal as demonstrating the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of H-Shares. The details of the information provided by Mr Wong\n\nin relation to the Ping An Deal between June 2014 and December 2014 are summarised at paragraph [42](#page-13-0) below.\n\n- <span id=\"page-13-1\"></span>40. During the course of conversations and communications during this period (including in the conversations in which he gave the advice and made the representations pleaded in paragraph [39](#page-12-0) above), Mr Wong further repeated and reaffirmed the assertion that he and UBS were working to protect and advance Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon UBS and in particular Mr Wong. From the context in which these assurances were given, it is to be inferred that they were intended to encourage Mr Kwok and Ace Decade to accept and rely upon the advice and representations pleaded in paragraph [39](#page-12-0) above.\n- 41. As a result of these conversations with Mr Wong, Mr Kwok reasonably believed: (1) that Mr Wong would get the margin call and mandatory prepayment terms removed from the Financing Commitment Documents, and in any event from the eventual facility agreement; and (2) that in any event he need not be concerned about such provisions which would not be relied upon in accordance with their strict terms, but only in accordance with the approach and policy described by Mr Wong. Mr Kwok did not thereafter read the Financing Letter or Indicative Termsheet prior to 19 December 2014 nor was he briefed on their terms. As a result, Mr Kwok was not aware that the margin call and mandatory prepayment provisions were included in these documents until around March 2015, as detailed at paragraph [46](#page-15-2) below.\n\n### **The Ping An Representations**\n\n- <span id=\"page-13-0\"></span>42. As pleaded above, Mr Wong repeatedly referred to the Ping An Deal as an illustration of the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of H-Shares. Mr Wong also referred to the Ping An Deal as an illustration of UBS's expertise in structuring the acquisition of equities in companies incorporated in the PRC. Mr Kwok cannot recall every occasion on which the Ping An deal was discussed, but they included at least:\n\t- (1) The discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in the summer of 2014 pleaded at paragraphs [19](#page-5-0) and 27 above. These discussions were primarily between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok, but two of Mr Kwok's employees (Yang Ying and Lyu Tao) were each present on at least one occasion when Mr Wong made representations regarding the Ping An Deal during this period.\n\t- (2) The discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in or around December 2014, before 18 December 2014.\n- <span id=\"page-14-0\"></span>43. In the course of those conversations as a whole, Mr Wong (on behalf of UBS) represented the following matters regarding the Ping An Deal:\n\t- (1) The Ping An Deal involved the acquisition of shares in a PRC company, namely the insurance company Ping An Insurance.\n\t- (2) UBS had advised the buyers of the stake in Ping An (the \"**Ping An Stake**\") in relation to the structuring of the acquisition and the funding of that acquisition.\n\t- (3) UBS had provided loan funding for that acquisition. The value of the Ping An Stake and the loan financing provided by UBS were substantially larger than the value of the UBS H-Shares or the loan financing which UBS was proposing to provide for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares.\n\t- (4) Although the direct purchaser of the Ping An Stake was the Thai conglomerate, CP Group, CP Group was in fact acting as an intermediary for a Chinese businessman, the billionaire Xiao Jianhua (\"**Mr Xiao**\"). Mr Xiao was at that time the chairman of the Chinese conglomerate, the Tomorrow Group. UBS had advised the CP Group and Mr Xiao as to how to set up the intermediary structure for the acquisition. Like Mr Kwok, Mr Xiao was a very highly valued customer of UBS.\n\t- (5) Although the lending arrangements for the acquisition of the Ping An Stake included terms allowing UBS to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) on the basis of price fluctuations, and there had been price fluctuations, UBS had not strictly enforced those terms. Instead, UBS had worked with the shareholder and given the shareholder ample time within which either the value of the shares might recover, or the shareholder could arrange the payment of margin. UBS had offered temporary additional financing to make up any shortfall.\n\t- (6) As a result, there had never been a prospect that UBS would enforce against the Ping An shareholder's security, or that it would lose any of the Ping An shares which it had acquired.\n\t- (7) This was in accordance with UBS's policy for highly valued customers, which would also apply to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade, and UBS intended to give Mr Kwok and Ace Decade the same treatment as the Ping An shareholder in the event that it became entitled to a make a margin call (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment).\n\n# **The Subscription Agreement**\n\n- <span id=\"page-15-1\"></span>44. On or around 19 December 2014, Dawn State entered into a subscription agreement with Haitong (the \"**Subscription Agreement**\"), under which it agreed to purchase the UBS H-Shares (the \"**Subscription**\"), being 569,427,620 H-Shares, at a price of HK\\$15.62 per share, totalling HK\\$8,894,459,424.40 (the \"**Subscription Price**\"). The Subscription Agreement provided, among other things, that:\n\t- (1) Under Clause 2, the Subscription Price could be increased or reduced by up to HK\\$1.56 per share on the occurrence of certain conditions regarding an increase or decrease in the trading price of Haitong H-Shares during the period between the Subscription Agreement and Closing\n\t- (2) Closing of the sale and purchase of the UBS H-Shares was subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions set out in Clause 3.1 of the Subscription Agreement (the \"**Conditions**\").\n\t- (3) Under Clause 8.1, the Subscription Agreement could be terminated by either party if the Conditions had not been fulfilled on or before 30 June 2015.\n\n#### **UBS's Representations prior to execution of the Lending Documents**\n\n- <span id=\"page-15-3\"></span>45. In and around February and March 2015, the lending documents for UBS's financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares by Dawn State (the \"**Lending Documents**\") were prepared. Although Ace Decade was not a party to any of the Lending Documents (the details of which are pleaded below), drafts of the Lending Documents were provided to Stevenson Wong, the lawyers acting for Ace Decade.\n- <span id=\"page-15-2\"></span>46. In or around mid-March 2015, Mr Kwok was informed by Ms Yu that the draft agreements contained provisions allowing UBS to make margin calls and to require mandatory repayments in the event of short-term fluctuations in the value of the UBS H-Shares.\n- <span id=\"page-15-0\"></span>47. In conversations with Mr Wong in around mid-to-late March 2015, Mr Kwok said that he objected to these terms, and repeated that he did not want UBS to be able to demand payments or repayment of the loan as a result of short-term fluctuations in the price of the Haitong H-Shares. Mr Wong, on behalf of UBS: (1) Further repeated and reaffirmed the assertion that he and UBS were working in Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS; and (2) Restated the advice and representations particularised at paragraph [39](#page-12-0) above, which are repeated here as particulars of the gist of the advice given and representations made by UBS through Mr Wong in March 2015.\n\n<span id=\"page-16-0\"></span>48. Mr Kwok believed these assurances and relied on them, and therefore did not object to the negotiations between Dawn State and UBS on the Lending Documents continuing or make efforts to cause or procure Ace Decade's withdrawal from the Co-Investment Agreement or otherwise prevent the completion of the Investment.\n\n# **The Lending Documents**\n\n- 49. On 1 April 2015, Dawn State and UBS executed the Lending Documents for UBS's financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares by Dawn State.\n- 50. The \"**Facility Agreement**\" was made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. The Facility Agreement as agreed was a HK\\$5,336,675,654.64 term facility. The Claimants will refer to the Facility Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the terms of the Facility Agreement included the following provisions:\n\t- (1) Clause 1.1 (\"**Definitions**\"):\n\n*…*\n\n\"*\"***Initial LTV Ratio***\" means sixty per cent (60.00%) […]*\"\n\n\"*\"***LTV Ratio***\" means, on any Scheduled Trading Day, the loan to value ratio (expressed as a percentage) calculated by the following: A/B where: \"A\" means the aggregate amount in HK Dollars of the Loan outstanding less the Margin Call Balance; and \"B\" means the Market Value multiplies by the number of Shares subject to the Transaction Security.*\"\n\n\"*\"***Margin Call Trigger***\" means sixty-six point seven per cent (66.70%) […]*\"\n\n#### (2) Clause 7.7 (\"**Mandatory Prepayment**\"):\n\n- *\"(a) If the Lender determines that:*\n\t- *(i) the Market Value of a Share on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than sixty per cent (60%) of the Initial Price;*\n\t- *(ii) the Market Value of a Share on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than:*\n\t\t- *(A) eighty-five per cent (85%) of the Market Value of the Shares on the immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Day; or*\n\t\t- *(B) seventy-five per cent (75%) of the Market Value of the Shares on any of the five immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Days;*\n\n*Then (in each case) the Lender may, by notice to the Borrower, cancel the Facility and declare the outstanding Loan, together with accrued interest and all other amounts accrued under the Finance Documents, immediately due and payable, whereupon the Facility will be cancelled and all such outstanding amounts will become immediately due and payable in accordance with paragraph (b) below.*\n\n*(b) Any prepayment of the outstanding amounts referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be made in the following amounts and at the following times:*\n\n- *(i) on the Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, twenty-five per cent (25%) of such outstanding amounts;*\n- *(ii) on the second Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, twenty-five per cent (25%) of such outstanding amounts; and*\n- *(iii) on the third Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, fifty per cent (50%) of such outstanding amounts.*\n\n#### (3) Clause 18.1 (\"**Margin Call**\"):\n\n*\"If, on any Scheduled Trading Day, the Lender determines that the LTV Ratio is greater than the applicable Margin Call Trigger, the Borrower shall as soon as practicable, and in any case no later than 5:00 p.m. on the Business Day after the date of a Margin Call Notice from the Lender requiring it to do so, deposit or procure to be deposited into the Secured Account such additional HK Dollar amounts in cash, to be charged in favour of the Lender under the Security Agreement, to ensure that the LTV Ratio, after being recalculated by taking into account the additional cash deposited, is equal to or less than the applicable Initial LTV Ratio.\"*\n\n- (4) Clause 20 sets out 16 events or circumstances which constitute an \"**Event of Default**\", including: (a) (at Clause 20.1) failure to pay on the due date any amount payable pursuant to a Finance Document; and (b) (at clause 20.2) failure to comply with Clause 18.1.\n- (5) Clause 20.17 (\"**Acceleration**\"):\n\n*\"On and at any time after the occurrence of an Event of Default which is continuing the Lender may, by notice to the Borrower:*\n\n- *(a) cancel the Commitment whereupon they shall immediately be cancelled;*\n- *(b) declare that all or part of the Loan, together with accrued interest, and all other amounts accrued or outstanding under the Finance Documents be immediately due and payable, whereupon they shall become immediately due and payable;*\n- *(c) declare that all or part of the Loan be payable on demand, whereupon they shall immediately become payable on demand by the Lender; and/or*\n- *(d) exercise any or all of its rights, remedies, powers or discretions under the Finance Documents.\"*\n- (6) At Clause 32: \"*This Agreement, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this Agreement, are governed by English law*,\" and at Clause 33.1 (\"**Jurisdiction**\"), for the English Court to have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of or in connection with any Finance Document.\n- <span id=\"page-18-0\"></span>51. The \"**Security Agreement**\" was also made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. Under the Security Agreement Dawn State (the \"*Chargor*\") assigned first ranking security over its rights in or to certain assets, including in particular the UBS H-Shares to UBS. The Security Agreement further provided for the UBS H-Shares to be held by UBS London Branch, acting as Custodian, with the UBS H-Shares to be deposited into a charged account held with UBS on the terms of the Custody Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the Security Agreement included the following provisions:\n\t- (1) Under Clause 3.1 (\"**Assignment by way of security**\"), that Dawn State assigned to UBS all its present and future right, title and interest (including those against the Custodian) in or to (*inter alia*) the Custody Agreement, the UBS H-Shares and the account in which they were held (the \"*Secured Account*\").\n\t- (2) Clause 3.2 (\"**Fixed Charge**\"), that Dawn State charged in favour of UBS its rights over (*inter alia*) the Secured Account and the UBS-H-Shares.\n\t- (3) Under Clause 8 (\"**ENFORCEMENT**\"):\n\t\t- (a) Clause 8.1 (\"**When enforceable**\"):\n\n<span id=\"page-18-1\"></span>*\"The Charges shall be immediately enforceable on the occurrence of an Enforcement Event which is continuing, and the powers conferred by the LPA on mortgagees including the power of sale and other powers conferred by Section 101 of the LPA as varied and extended by this Deed shall be immediately exercisable.\"*\n\n(b) Clause 8.2 (\"**Power of Sale**\"):\n\n> *\"The statutory power of sale, of appointing a receiver and the other statutory powers conferred on mortgagees by Section 101 of the LPA as varied and extended by this Deed shall arise (and the Secured Obligations shall be deemed due and payable for that purpose) on the date of this Deed.\"*\n\n#### (4) Clause 9.3 (\"**Financial Collateral Arrangement**\"):\n\n- *\"(a) The Chargor and the Lender intend that this Deed constitutes a \"financial collateral arrangement\" (as defined in the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 (the \"Regulations\") and, as such, the Lender shall have the right:*\n\t- *(i) to use and dispose of any Charged Asset which constitutes \"financial collateral\" (as defined in the Regulations (\"Financial Collateral\")), in which case the Lender shall comply with the requirements of the Regulations as to obtaining \"equivalent financial collateral\" (as defined in the Regulations);*\n- *(ii) to set-off the value of any equivalent financial collateral against, or apply it in discharge of, any Secured Obligations in accordance with the Regulations; and*\n- *(iii) (at any time after the Charges become enforceable) to appropriate any Charged Asset which constitutes Financial Collateral in or towards satisfaction of the Secured Obligations in accordance with the Regulations.*\n- *(b) If the Lender is required to value any equivalent financial collateral for the purpose of paragraph (a)(ii) or (a)(iii) above, the value shall be:*\n\t- *(i) in the case of cash, its face value at the time of appropriation or set-off; and*\n\t- *(ii) in the case of financial instruments or other Financial Collateral, their market value at the time of appropriation, or set-off as determined (after appropriation) by the Lender by reference to a public index or other applicable generally recognised source or such other process as the Lender may select, including a valuation carried out by an independent investment bank, firm of accountants or other valuers appointed by the Lender.*\n\n*as converted, where necessary, into the currency in which the Secured Obligations are denominated at a market rate of exchange prevailing at the time of appropriation or set-off selected by the Lender.\"*\n\n#### (5) Clause 9.4 (\"**Sale of Charged Assets**\"):\n\n*\"The Chargor acknowledges and agrees that the Share Collateral or other Charged Assets may decline speedily in value and are of a type customarily sold on a recognised market and therefore upon the enforcement of the Charges the Lender is not required to send any notice of its intention to sell or otherwise dispose of any Share Collateral or any other Charged Assets. Following the occurrence of an Enforcement Event which is continuing, the Lender or any Delegate or any Receiver may, in its sole and absolute discretion, sell Share Collateral or other Charged Assets in a private sale in such manner and under such circumstances as the Lender or Delegate or Receiver may deem necessary or advisable (with the Lender having the right to purchase any or all of the Share Collateral or other Charged Assets to be sold). The Chargor acknowledges that such sale shall be deemed to have been made in a commercially reasonable manner, notwithstanding that any such sale may be for a price less than that which might have been obtained had such Share Collateral or other Charged Assets been otherwise privately or publicly sold.\"*\n\n- 52. The \"**Facility Agreement Side Letter**\" was also made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the terms of the Security Agreement included provision:\n\t- (1) For Dawn State to make a substantial additional payment in respect of any early repayment under the Facility Agreement, as follows:\n\n*\"On the date of any payment, repayment or prepayment of the Loan in whole or in part, the Borrower shall pay the applicable Make-Whole Amount…*\n\n*\"***Make-Whole Amount***\" means, in respect of the Loan to be repaid or prepaid, the amount of the spread that would have been applicable on the amount of the principal of the Loan repaid or prepaid for the period from the relevant date of repayment or prepayment up to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Final Repayment Date, had that amount so repaid or prepaid remained outstanding up to such Mutual Break Date or the Final Repayment Date, as the case may be.\"*\n\n- (2) And that \"*This Facility Agreement Side Letter, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.*\"\n- 53. Also on 1 April 2015, Dawn State provided UBS London (both in its capacity as lender under the Facility Agreement and as Custodian under the Custody Agreement) with a \"**Settlement Authorisation**.\" The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the Settlement Authorisation:\n\t- (1) Dawn State authorised UBS London (as lender) to instruct and/or authorise the Custodian (also UBS London) to apply the Monetary Contribution made by Dawn State and Facility Amount advanced by UBS London towards funding the Subscription in accordance with the Subscription Agreement, and to transfer the UBS H-Shares allocated pursuant to the Subscription Agreement to the secured account subject to the Custody Agreement.\n\t- (2) It was agreed that the \"*Settlement Authorisation, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.*\"\n- 54. The Settlement Authorisation was updated by a document entitled \"**Amended and Restated Settlement Authorisation**\" following the price uplift pleaded at paragraph [55](#page-20-0) below.\n\n## **The Price Uplift**\n\n<span id=\"page-20-0\"></span>55. On 8 May 2015, Haitong sent a letter to Dawn State and other investors in the new H-Shares announcing that each of the conditions precedent to completing the issuance and sale of the new H-Shares in Haitong had been met and that Closing was expected to take place on 15 May 2015, and that because the trading price of H-Shares over the preceding 30 days had surpassed the agreed threshold, pursuant to Clause 2.2 of the Subscription Agreement the subscription price for the H-Shares was to be increased by HKD 1.56 per share, giving a share price of HKD 17.18 per share.\n\n- 56. Dawn State and UBS London therefore entered into an \"*Amendment Agreement relating to the Facility Agreement*\" on 13 May 2015 (the \"**Amendment Agreement**\"). <sup>1</sup> The Claimants will refer to the Amendment Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the Amendment Agreement:\n\t- (1) At Clause 3.1, it was agreed to increase UBS's lending commitment to HK\\$6,011,236,393.92 and to increase in the initial LTV ratio to 61.45%, but the Margin Call Trigger remained 66.7%.\n\t- (2) At Clause 6.4, it was agreed that the \"*Amendment Agreement, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.*\"\n- <span id=\"page-21-0\"></span>57. Also on 13 May 2015, Dawn State and UBS London entered into a further security agreement, entitled \"**Second Security Agreement**,\" updating the Security Agreement so as to reflect the amendments made to the Facility Agreement by the Amendment Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Second Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. The relevant terms of the Second Security Agreement are identical to those pleaded at paragraph [51](#page-18-0) above, and those terms are repeated as particulars of the provisions of the Second Security Agreement.\n\n# **Completion**\n\n- 58. On 13 May 2015, Mr Kwok and Ms Yu authorised the final payment to Dawn State for the cash portion of the subscription price under the Subscription Agreement pursuant to Clause 4.1 of the Co-Investment Agreement. Pursuant to its obligations under the Facility Agreement, this sum was subsequently paid by Dawn State to UBS London as the Subsequent Borrower Contribution.\n- 59. Also on 13 May 2015 Dawn State made a Utilisation Request to UBS London, in accordance with clause 5 of the Facility Agreement, for the sum of HKD 6,011,236,393.82.\n- 60. Completion under the Subscription Agreement took place on 15 May 2015, and the UBS H-Shares were transferred to Dawn State. Upon its registration as shareholder, Dawn State immediately deposited the shares in the Secured Account with UBS London pursuant to clause 6.2(a) of the Second Security Agreement. UBS London therefore took assignment of the \"**Acquired H-Shares**\" by way of security in accordance with the terms of the Second Security Agreement pleaded at paragraphs [51](#page-18-0) and [57](#page-21-0) above.\n\n<sup>1</sup> Amendment Agreement dated 13 May 2015\n\n**Consequences of the Advice and Representations**\n\n- <span id=\"page-22-1\"></span>61. The particulars of the advice and representations of UBS pleaded at paragraphs [14](#page-4-0) to [20,](#page-6-0) [38](#page-11-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [45](#page-15-3) to [48](#page-16-0) are repeated. Mr Kwok and Ace Decade entered into (and did not withdraw from) the Co-Investment Agreement with Dawn State and caused and permitted Dawn State to enter into the Lending Documents with UBS on the basis of and in reasonable reliance upon the adequacy of that advice and/or accuracy of those representations.\n- <span id=\"page-22-2\"></span>62. In the absence of those representations:\n\t- (1) If UBS insisted on including the Margin Call and Mandatory Prepayment terms under the Facility Agreement, Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade would have acquired the UBS H-Shares without using loan financing from UBS;\n\t- (2) Alternatively, Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade would not have acquired the UBS H-Shares at all;\n\t- (3) Alternatively, if (contrary to the Claimants' case) Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have acquired the UBS H-Shares through Dawn State using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have ensured that Dawn State had sufficient funds available to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments immediately.\n- <span id=\"page-22-0\"></span>63. The terms of the loan documents are very disadvantageous to Dawn State, and advantageous to UBS London. In particular:\n\t- (1) The Facility Agreement made provision for UBS to have both (a) the right to demand mandatory prepayment pursuant to Clause 7.7 and (b) to make margin calls pursuant to Clause 18.1.\n\t- (2) Under Clause 7.7, UBS was entitled to demand full repayment of the loan because of a 15% single day reduction or a 25% reduction over five days in the value of the UBS H-Shares, irrespective of the absolute value of the Haitong H-Shares, the LTV ratio, or the extent or absence of risk of loss to UBS London as Lender.\n\t- (3) Haitong H-Shares were, as UBS knew (through at least Mr Wong as a result of the discussions in 2014 and 2015, and in any event as a matter of general market knowledge), prone to short term fluctuations in value, and there was therefore a material risk that the entitlement to seek prepayment under Clause 7.7 would be triggered during the term of the Facility Agreement, including in circumstances in which there was not (or not materially) a risk of loss for UBS.\n- (4) As UBS knew (at least through Mr Wong) or ought to have known:\n\t- (a) Dawn State was not the ultimate investor or the source of funds for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, and would not be the source of funds required to meet any margin call or demand for prepayment. This was a function of the structure for the investment which had been created on the advice of UBS, as pleaded at paragraphs [18](#page-5-1) above.\n\t- (b) The time periods allowed for mandatory prepayment pursuant to Clause 7.7 or payment of margin pursuant to Clause 18.1 of the Facility Agreement were not sufficient (or not reasonably likely to be sufficient) to allow the sums in question to be provided to Dawn State and by Dawn State to UBS. In particular, UBS had acknowledged on 19 December 2014, in a letter to Haixia, that it understood that Dawn State could not make payments within 24 hours of a demand being made.\n- (5) Accordingly, there was a substantial chance that there would be an Event of Default within Clause 20.1 and/or 20.2 of the Facility Agreement, and that UBS would become entitled to exercise remedies following on an Event of Default pursuant to Clause 20.17.\n- (6) Pursuant to the Facility Agreement Side Letter, in the event that UBS exercised its rights to demand prepayment of the loan, Dawn State had agreed to pay UBS the whole of the spread that would have been applicable on the amount of the principal of the Loan repaid or prepaid for the period from the relevant date of repayment or prepayment up to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Final Repayment Date. Such a clause, which is unusual in such arrangements compared to simple \"break costs\" provisions meant UBS would be financially advantaged by exercising its right to demand mandatory prepayment under Clause 7.7.\n\n#### **Enforcement by UBS London**\n\n<span id=\"page-23-0\"></span>64. Between around 1 and 6 July 2015, there was a substantial drop in the trading price of Haitong shares, including H-Shares. By letter sent on the evening of 6 July 2015, UBS London served a notice on Dawn State pursuant to which it purported to exercise an entitlement to demand prepayment of the Facility advanced under the Facility Agreement pursuant to Clause 7.7 thereof. In that notice, UBS purported to demand payment of: (1) 25% of the Loan, together with accrued interest and all other amounts accrued under the Finance Documents (the \"**Relevant Prepayment Amount**\"), being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm the following day; (2) 25% of the Relevant Prepayment Amount, being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm on the second day after the notice was served; and (3) 50% of the Relevant Prepayment Amount, being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm on the second day after the notice was served.\n\n- 65. During the morning of 7 July 2015, Ace Decade informed UBS that, while it would be able to meet the liability '*quickly*', it could not do so by 5pm that day. Mr Kwok also contacted Mr Wong by telephone to ask for additional time to secure sufficient funds in accordance with UBS's representations and advice particularised at paragraphs [14](#page-4-0) to [20,](#page-6-0) [38](#page-11-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [45](#page-15-3) to [48](#page-16-0) above. Mr Wong stated that no such time would be given, and that UBS London had resolved that the UBS H-Shares would be sold.\n- 66. Dawn State did not pay the sum demanded by 5 pm on 7 July 2015.\n- <span id=\"page-24-1\"></span>67. During the evening of 7 July 2015, UBS London issued a \"*Notice of Acceleration Event*\" to Dawn State (the '**Notice**').\n\t- (1) By paragraph 3 of this Notice UBS stated that all of the Loan (including the prepayment amount due today), together with accrued interest, and all other amounts accrued or outstanding under the Finance Documents were immediately due and payable.\n\t- (2) Also in paragraph 3, UBS gave notice of its right to exercise the power of sale pursuant to Clause 9.4 of \"*each Security Document*\" (i.e. the Security Agreement and Second Security Agreement).\n- <span id=\"page-24-0\"></span>68. By a further letter of 7 July 2015, UBS asserted that the sum payable totalled HKD 6,289,081,405.43 and comprised: (1) The loan principal (HKD 6,011,236,393.92); (2) Outstanding accrued interest (HKD 44,003,279.72); (3) 'Break costs' (HKD 1,873,883.54);and (4) The 'Make-Whole Amount' (HKD 231,967,848.24).\n\n# **Sale of the UBS H-Shares**\n\n- <span id=\"page-24-2\"></span>69. UBS London has provided limited information regarding how, if at all, it sold or purported to sell the UBS H-Shares. To the best of the Claimants' knowledge and belief:\n\t- (1) On or about 8 July 2015 UBS London formally transferred 200,000,000 of the UBS H-Shares (from a total of 569,427,620) to Segantii Capital Management Limited (\"**Segantii**\") in a block trade at an average price of HK\\$11.12 for a total of HK\\$2,224,000,000.\n\t- (2) On or about 10 July 2015, UBS itself purported to acquire absolutely 58,284,114 of the UBS H-Shares for a price which is not known to the Claimants. The Claimants also do not know whether, or if so when and at what price UBS sold those shares to a third party.\n- (3) The Claimants do not know the details of any other sales made by UBS pursuant to the power of sale under Clause 9.4 of the Security Agreements.\n- 70. A price of HK\\$11.12 represented an unusually deep discount to the trading price of Haitong H-Shares, which closed at HK\\$13.90 per share on 7 July 2015.\n- 71. On the morning of 8 July 2015, Haitong announced a suspension of trading for its H-Shares, pending the release of announcements in respect of:\n\n<span id=\"page-25-1\"></span><span id=\"page-25-0\"></span>*\"(1) a potential scheme of a repurchase of the shares of the Company which, if implemented, is subject to the shareholders' approval and (2) a potential purchase of the shares of the Company by the senior management and/or employees of the Company…\"*\n\n- 72. Accordingly, from the morning of 8 July it was generally known (including, it is to be inferred, by UBS) both that trading was suspended, and that there was at least likely to be a buy-back of Haitong's shares. On 9 July 2015, Haitong announced a buy-back of its own shares. On 10 July 2015, Haitong H-Shares recommenced trading. H-Shares opened at HK\\$14.24 and closed at HK\\$15.14.\n- <span id=\"page-25-2\"></span>73. On 10 July 2015, UBS sent Haixia and its lawyers an email attaching \"*a sheet detailing the application of the proceeds of Enforcement*\", although the calculation was stated to be \"*in draft form and …subject to full settlement of the trade.*\" This provided that the payment to Dawn State would be calculated by reference to: (1) \"*HK closing price as of 7 July 2015: HKD 13.90*\"; (2) \"*Block discount (%) 20.0%*\"; (3) \"*Block placement price: 11.12*\"; (4) \"*Number of Shares sold (shares): 569,427,620*\" i.e. all of Dawn State's shareholding. UBS did not, then or subsequently, provide details of the actual buyers of any shares, how many shares were sold to each buyer, the price at which each sale was effected, when the sale was effected, or the terms of the sale.\n\n# **Transfer of Dawn State's Shares**\n\n74. On 18 September 2015, the entire share capital of Dawn State was transferred by Haixia Fund to Ace Decade, in accordance with Ace Decade's rights under the Letter Agreement.\n\n# **ACE DECADE'S AND MR KWOK'S CLAIMS**\n\n75. Ace Decade's and Mr Kwok's claims pleaded in the following paragraphs are pleaded on the basis and assumption that these claims are governed by the law of England and Wales. If it is asserted on behalf of UBS and/or found by the Court that the governing law of the claims is the law of Hong Kong, the same claims are pursued in the alternative under the law of Hong Kong, and the facts and matters pleaded below are relied on as particularising Mr Kwok and Ace Decades causes of action under Hong Kong law.\n\n# **UBS' Duty of Care**\n\n- 76. UBS owed duties of care in tort to Ace Decade and to Mr Kwok, comprising (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) A duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to ensure that information provided to or statements of fact made to them or either of them were accurate.\n\t- (2) A duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and judgment in giving advice to them or either of them regarding (*inter alia*): (a) the structuring of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares; (b) the financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares; (c) the terms and effect of the Financing Documents; (d) the risks associated with those terms; (e) and/or UBS' intended and likely conduct in exercise of those rights.\n- 77. The facts and matters establishing the assumption of responsibility by UBS include at least the following:\n\t- (1) At all relevant times Mr Wong was an agent of UBS with authority to enter into make representations and give undertakings on behalf of UBS.\n\t- (2) As pleaded at paragraph [9](#page-3-0) above, Mr Kwok (as UBS knew, at least through Mr Wong) at all material times treated Mr Wong as a trusted adviser and personal friend, and relied on him as such.\n\t- (3) Paragraphs [11](#page-3-1) to [13](#page-4-1) above are repeated. As pleaded there, the background to the relationship between UBS and Mr Kwok and Ace Decade was an arrangement whereby Mr Kwok (at the request of UBS) assisted UBS to become the placement agent for the UBS H-Shares, and UBS offered in return to assist and advise him in acquiring the shares for which it was made placement agent on advantageous terms.\n\t- (4) Mr Wong repeatedly held himself and UBS out as acting to protect and advance Mr Kwok and Ace Decade's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares and the funding thereof, including in respect of all of: (a) the devising of the structure and funding plan for the investment; (b) the provision of information in respect of the structure, funding and merits of the investment; and (c) advising as to the structure, funding and merits of the investment. Paragraphs [17,](#page-4-2) [40](#page-13-1) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated.\n\t- (5) Mr Wong repeatedly asserted that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS. Paragraphs [17,](#page-4-2) [40](#page-13-1) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated.\n- (6) UBS (through Mr Wong) in fact provided information and gave advice to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade, in circumstances in which it knew and intended that they would rely on that information and advice. Paragraphs [18](#page-5-1) to [20,](#page-6-0) [21](#page-6-1) to [23,](#page-6-2) [24,](#page-7-0) [28,](#page-7-1) [39](#page-12-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated.\n- (7) As pleaded at paragraph [17,](#page-4-2) Mr Wong held himself and UBS out as having the experience and expertise to devise an advantageous structure for the acquisition for Mr Kwok and advising Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) with respect to investments in placements such as that for the Placement Shares, the structuring of the investments, and the financing thereof.\n- (8) In giving information and advice about the policies, intentions and/or likely conduct of UBS as the counterparty under the Lending Documents, Mr Wong and UBS addressed matters which were uniquely within UBS's knowledge, and which (as they knew) Mr Kwok and Ace Decade could not verify independently, and in respect of which Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have to rely on the matters communicated to them by UBS.\n\n# **Breach of duty**\n\n- <span id=\"page-27-2\"></span><span id=\"page-27-1\"></span><span id=\"page-27-0\"></span>78. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, made false and misleading representations to Ace Decade and/or Mr Kwok prior to the execution of the December Contracts and thereafter prior to the execution of the Lending Documents, as set out above. In particular:\n\t- (1) UBS stated that it had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) not to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment if prices moved in the short term. Paragraphs [39,](#page-12-0) [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [64](#page-23-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS (through the decision makers acting for UBS London and/or, insofar as relevant, UBS HK in relation to the entry into and enforcement of rights under the Lending Documents (the \"**Decision Makers**\")) did not have such a policy and/or did not intend to apply it to Mr Kwok, Ace Decade and/or Dawn State.\n\t- (2) UBS stated that it had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) if it were necessary for UBS to make a demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment, pursuant to which UBS would work with them to allow them to meet any demands and would allow a reasonable time for them to do so, including longer time periods for payment than those in the Facility\n\nAgreement if necessary, and would not sell any of the Shares as a result of any margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time to pay. Paragraphs [39,](#page-12-0) [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [64](#page-23-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not have such a policy and/or did not intend to apply it to Mr Kwok, Ace Decade and/or Dawn State.\n\n- <span id=\"page-28-0\"></span>(3) UBS stated that it intended to treat Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) in the manner in which it claimed to have treated the Ping An shareholder. Paragraphs [19,](#page-5-0) [39,](#page-12-0) [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [64](#page-23-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not have such an intention, but instead intended to exercise all and any rights conferred on them under the Lending Documents in accordance with their terms and/or in the manner most advantageous to UBS.\n- (4) UBS stated that it had in fact treated the Ping An shareholder in a manner which was in accordance with the supposed policies pleaded at sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) above, and that this evidenced the approach which UBS intended to take and would (or could be expected to) take under the Lending Documents. Paragraphs [19,](#page-5-0) [39,](#page-12-0) [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that:\n\t- (a) In conversations between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in or around the middle of July 2015, Mr Wong indicated that (contrary to his earlier representations) the Ping An shareholder had in fact been the subject of margin calls (i.e. to demands for payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) and had met those demands in accordance with the terms of the relevant Lending Documents. If that is true, it follows that UBS's earlier representations were false and misleading.\n\t- (b) Alternatively, if UBS did treat the Ping An shareholder in the manner pleaded at paragraphs [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) above, UBS's statements were false and misleading in that the treatment of the Ping An shareholder did not evidence the approach which UBS through its Decision Makers intended to take and would (or could be expected to) take under the Lending Documents.\n- (5) UBS stated that it intended to act and was acting in Mr Kwok and Ace Decade's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares and the funding thereof. Paragraphs [17,](#page-4-2) [40](#page-13-1) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading\n\nin that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [63](#page-22-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not intend to act in Mr Kwok or Ace Decade's best interest but instead intended to act in its own interests as Dawn State's contractual counterparty regardless of the consequences for Mr Kwok and Ace Decade.\n\n- <span id=\"page-29-0\"></span>(6) UBS stated that it was providing loan financing for Dawn State (and therefore, in practice, Ace Decade) on advantageous terms, or on \"*the best possible terms*.\" Paragraphs [11](#page-3-2) and [19](#page-5-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from the matters pleaded at paragraph [63](#page-22-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers intended to offer them financing which was advantageous to UBS and very disadvantageous to Dawn State, Ace Decade and Mr Kwok.\n- 79. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, was negligent in making those false representations in that, at the time of or before he made the representations, Mr Wong had:\n\n## PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) intended to act and/or was acting in Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade's best interests.\n- (2) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) would be offering Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade finance on advantageous terms and/or on the \"*best possible terms*\".\n- (3) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS had the policies pleaded at paragraph [78\\(1\\)](#page-27-1) and [78\\(2\\)](#page-27-2) above, and/or whether UBS London (through the relevant Decision Makers) in fact intended to apply those policies to Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) as pleaded at paragraph [78\\(3\\)](#page-28-0) t[o 78\\(6\\)](#page-29-0) above.\n- (4) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) in fact intended to treat Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade in the same way in which it claimed to have treated the Ping An shareholder.\n- (5) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS had in fact treated the Ping An shareholder in the manner pleaded at paragraphs [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) above.\n- (6) Failed to take additional or further reasonable steps to protect Mr Kwok and Ace Decade from suffering loss or damage as a result of the false or misleading representations made by UBS.\n- 80. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, gave negligent advice to Ace Decade and/or Mr Kwok, as set out above. As regards the content of the advice given by UBS:\n\t- (1) As pleaded at paragraph [19,](#page-5-0) UBS advised Mr Kwok and Ace Decade that it was in their best interests to make a leveraged investment using loan funding from UBS London, and that any leveraged finance provided by UBS would in any event be on the best possible terms.\n\t- (2) As pleaded at paragraphs [39](#page-12-0) and [47](#page-15-0) UBS advised Mr Kwok and Ace Decade:\n\t\t- (a) that they should not be concerned about the presence of margin call and mandatory prepayment provisions on the terms which appeared in the Facility Agreement; and, therefore\n\t\t- (b) That the loan documents were nonetheless commercially advantageous for Ace Decade. That advice was supported by reference to UBS's representations pleaded at paragraph [78.](#page-27-0)\n- 81. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, was negligent in giving that advice, in that:\n\n# PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) It was not (as must or ought to have been apparent to Mr Wong and UBS) in the interests of Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade to use loan funding from UBS London to make the Investment, and in any event to do so on the terms of the Lending Documents, including because:\n\t- (a) As Mr Kwok had explained to Mr Wong, he and Ace Decade did not require loan funding to make the investment, but could have done so out of their own resources; and\n\t- (b) The loan funding from UBS London (in particular, on the terms of the Lending Documents and in circumstances in which the representations pleaded at paragraph [78](#page-27-0) above were false) created a risk (and/or an excessive risk) that UBS would\n\nenforce against the UBS H-Shares in the event of a fluctuation in the value of those shares, causing loss to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade.\n\n- (2) UBS ought, taking reasonable care, to have advised Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that there was a substantial chance that UBS London would (contrary to the representations pleaded at paragraph [78\\)](#page-27-0) enforce its strict rights under Clauses 7.7 and 18 of the Facility Agreement in accordance with their terms, and that it would not proceed in accordance with the policies which were the subject of the representations pleaded at paragraph [78](#page-27-0) above. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, having made the representations pleaded at paragraph 98 above, UBS came under a duty to correct any misapprehension, misunderstanding or ill-informed basis on which Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade were operating.\n- (3) UBS ought, taking reasonable care, to have advised Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that there was a substantial chance that in the event of any fluctuation in the value of the UBS H-Shares, UBS London would enforce against the UBS H-Shares in accordance with the strict terms of the Financing and Security Agreements.\n- (4) UBS ought therefore, taking reasonable care, to have advised that making the Investment subject to the terms of the Lending Documents was not in accordance with Mr Kwok's (and therefore Ace Decade's) express wish that any leveraged investment should only be made on the basis that the provision of additional collateral or repayment of the loan should not be triggered by short term price fluctuations of the Placement Shares.\n- (5) The loan funding provided by UBS to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade was (as UBS must or ought to have known) not on advantageous terms (or *a fortiori* on the best possible terms), but was on very disadvantageous terms. Paragraph [63](#page-22-0) above is repeated.\n- (6) Given the actual policies and intentions of UBS London, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should (as UBS must or ought to have known) have been concerned about the presence of the mandatory prepayment and margin call terms under Clauses 7.7 and 18.1 of the Facility Agreement, and UBS ought to have advised that these terms posed a substantial risk to the outcome of the Investment.\n- (7) UBS failed to reasonable steps to protect the best interests of Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade by:\n\t- (a) Informing Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that the financing proposed UBS was not financing on advantageous terms or '*on the best possible terms*';\n- (b) Informing Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade of the risks associated with the terms of Clauses 7.7 and 18.1 of the Facility Agreement;\n- (i) Informing Mr Kwok and Ace Decade as soon as it became aware or suspected that any representation or any advice given to him was false, defective, misleading or incomplete.\n- (ii) Taking additional or further reasonable steps to protect Mr Kwok and Ace Decade from suffering loss or damage or otherwise protecting their interest.\n\n# **Ace Decade's claim**\n\n- 82. Ace Decade brings the primary claim arising from UBS's breaches of duty pleaded above.\n- 83. Ace Decade reasonably and foreseeably relied upon the representations and/or advice particularised above and the skill and judgment of UBS by (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) Entering into the Co-Investment Agreement as particularised at paragraph [33;](#page-8-1)\n\t- (2) Not withdrawing from the Co-Investment Agreement or otherwise preventing the completion of the Investment before the completion of the Subscription;\n\t- (3) Causing or permitting Dawn State to enter into the Financing Letter as particularised at paragraph [36](#page-9-0) above.\n\t- (4) Not preventing Dawn State from entering into the Lending Documents, and instead procuring that it acquired the UBS H-Shares without loan funding from UBS; and/or\n\t- (5) If (contrary to the Claimants' case) Dawn State would have acquired the UBS H-Shares using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, not ensuring that Dawn State had immediate access to sufficient funds to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments.\n\t- (6) The Claimants repeat paragraphs [61](#page-22-1) and [62](#page-22-2) above.\n- <span id=\"page-32-0\"></span>84. UBS's negligence has caused Ace Decade loss and damage. In particular (each further or in the alternative):\n\n### ACE DECADE'S PARTICULARS OF LOSS\n\n(1) Ace Decade has lost the entirety of its Monetary Contribution, being US\\$500 million, less the sum of HK\\$36,621,693.83, being approximately US\\$4.7 million at the prevailing exchange rate accounted for by UBS to Ace Decade after the sale of the Acquired Shares: US\\$495,300,000;\n\n- (2) If Ace Decade would have withdrawn from the Investment altogether after the execution of the Co-Investment Agreement (rather than making the investment through Dawn State but funding it from either Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade's own resources or alternative loan financing), Ace Decade has lost the entirety of its Monetary Contribution, being US\\$500 million, less the sum of HK\\$36,621,693.83, being approximately US\\$4.7 million at the prevailing exchange rate accounted for by UBS to Ace Decade after the sale of the Acquired Shares, and the fee of US\\$812,500 which would have been payable to Haixia Fund under Clause 6.5 of the Co-Investment Agreement: US\\$494,487,500;\n- (3) Losses representing returns which it would have achieved from investing in the UBS H-Shares, to be quantified on the basis of expert evidence.\n\n# **Mr Kwok's Claim**\n\n- 85. Mr Kwok's claim is only pursued in the alternative to that of Ace Decade, on the premise that UBS denies and successfully disputes that any of its wrongdoing pleaded above is actionable at the suit of Ace Decade.\n- 86. Mr Kwok also reasonably and foreseeably relied upon the representations and/or advice particularised above and the skill and judgment of UBS by (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) Causing or permitting Ace Decade to enter into the Co-Investment Agreement as particularised at paragraph [33;](#page-8-1)\n\t- (2) Not causing Ace Decade to withdraw from the Co-Investment Agreement or otherwise preventing the completion of the Investment before the completion of the Subscription;\n\t- (3) Causing or permitting Dawn State to enter into the Financing Letter as particularised at paragraph [36](#page-9-0) above.\n\t- (4) Not preventing Dawn State from entering into the Lending Documents, and instead procuring that it acquired the UBS H-Shares without loan funding from UBS; and/or\n\t- (5) If (contrary to the Claimants' case) Dawn State would have acquired the UBS H-Shares using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, not ensuring that Dawn State had immediate access to sufficient funds to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments.\n\t- (6) The Claimants repeat paragraphs [61](#page-22-1) and [62](#page-22-2) above.\n- <span id=\"page-33-0\"></span>87. UBS's negligence has caused Mr Kwok loss and damage, in the same measure as Ace Decade. Paragraph [84](#page-32-0) above is repeated *mutatis mutandis*.\n\n## **DAWN STATE'S CLAIM**\n\n#### **Sale of the Acquired H-Shares**\n\n- 88. On 7 July 2015, as a result of an Event of Default, UBS purported to give notice to Dawn State regarding its right to exercise a '*power of sale*' in relation to the Charged Assets (being the UBS H-Shares). Paragraph [67](#page-24-1) above is repeated. UBS London's contractual entitlement to sell the UBS H-Shares was found under Clauses 9.3(a)(i) and 9.4 of the Security Agreement.\n- 89. To the best of the Claimants' knowledge and belief, UBS did thereafter purport to exercise its power of sale and sold all of the UBS H-Shares. Save as pleaded at paragraph [69](#page-24-2) above, the Claimants do not know the details of the sales made pursuant to that purported entitlement.\n- 90. Paragraph [51](#page-18-0)[\\(3\\)](#page-18-1) above is repeated. In selling the UBS H-Shares, UBS was exercising a statutory '*power of sale*' under s.101 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (the \"**LPA**\") as preserved and modified by clause 8 of the Security Agreements, and was (and is) therefore subject to the duties and obligations imposed upon a mortgagee or chargee exercising such powers at law and in equity.\n- 91. In the premises, any purported sale(s) of the UBS H-Shares which caused or was/were designed to enable the Acquired Shares to be acquired absolutely by UBS were therefore invalid and of no effect. Any UBS H-Shares purportedly sold to UBS itself will have remained subject to Dawn State's rights and UBS's obligations under the terms of the Lending Documents.\n- <span id=\"page-34-0\"></span>92. Otherwise (and subject to any provable costs and liabilities of Dawn State were satisfied out of said proceeds or profits) UBS was and remains under an immediate duty to account to Dawn State: (1) for its dealings with the Acquired H-Shares mortgaged to it, charged in its favour or otherwise held by it as Custodian; and/or (2) for any proceeds of said Acquired H-Shares obtained by it as a result of the sales; and (3) for any profits made by it as a result of the sales particularised in paragraph [69](#page-24-2) above or other dealings as aforesaid;\n- <span id=\"page-34-1\"></span>93. Further or alternatively, the aforementioned proceeds and/or profits are held on statutory trusts pursuant to s.105 of the LPA, alternatively on constructive trust, for Dawn State.\n- <span id=\"page-34-2\"></span>94. Further or alternatively, UBS also owed a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care to obtain a proper price for the Acquired H-Shares when exercising its power of sale. Insofar as any purported sales of the UBS H-Shares were valid, the Claimants believe that UBS failed to act with reasonable skill in making the sales, by reason of the fact that it:\n\n#### PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) Failed or failed adequately to consider whether the discount applied to the H-Shares was an inappropriately large discount in the context of block sales on the HKEX;\n- (2) Failed or failed adequately to consider whether those shares could have been sold with a smaller discount;\n- (3) Failed or failed adequately to consider the effects of the suspension (or likely suspension) of trading in Haitong shares;\n- (4) Failed or failed adequately to consider the effects of the share buy-back by Haitong. Paragraphs [72](#page-25-0) and [72](#page-25-1) above are repeated;\n- (5) Failed to allow adequate time for the share buy-back to take effect; and\n- (6) Failed to take additional or further reasonable steps to ensure a proper price was obtained for the Acquired H-Shares.\n- <span id=\"page-35-0\"></span>95. As a result of UBS's negligence, Dawn State suffered loss comprising the difference between the price for which the shares were sold and the price that could reasonably have been obtained for those shares. The Claimants reserve the right to plead further on provision by UBS of particulars of the sales of the UBS H-Shares which it effected.\n\n# **Alternative claim in the event of appropriation by UBS**\n\n- 96. UBS did not, on 7 July 2015 or at any time subsequently, take any definitive steps to appropriate the Acquired H-Shares or alternatively to communicate such steps to UBS. As a result, UBS has at no time appropriated the Acquired H-Shares in accordance with clause 9.3(a)(ii) of the Security Agreement or Regulation 17 of the 2003 Regulations.\n- 97. If, contrary to the Claimants' case, UBS did purport to and did effectively appropriate the Acquired H-Shares pursuant to Regulation 17 of the 2003 Regulations, that appropriation could not have occurred prior to receipt of the notice from UBS to Dawn State of the exercise of the right of appropriation. No such notice was given prior to (if, contrary to the Claimants' case, such notice was ever given) 14 July 2015.\n- 98. In the event of exercise of a right of appropriation, UBS was at all times and remains under a duty to: (1) Value the UBS H-Shares in a commercially reasonable manner at the time of appropriation; and (2) Properly account for any amount by which that value exceeded Dawn State's liabilities to UBS under the Security Agreements.\n- 99. UBS's purported credit at a value of HK\\$11.12 per share (particularised at paragraph [73](#page-25-2) above) could not reflect the commercially reasonable value of the Acquired H-Shares on any relevant\n\ndate. In particular (but without limitation) that credit of HK\\$11.12 per share was purportedly calculated by applying a discount to the closing price on 7 July 2015, and not on any possible date of appropriation.\n\n<span id=\"page-36-2\"></span>100. UBS would therefore be under a duty to: (1) satisfy the court that the UBS H-Shares were valued in a commercially reasonable manner at the date of appropriation; and (2) insofar as it cannot do so, account to Dawn State for any amount by which the commercially reasonable value of the UBS H-Shares at the date of appropriation exceeded Dawn State's liabilities to UBS under the Security Agreements.\n\n# **RELIEF SOUGHT**\n\n- <span id=\"page-36-0\"></span>101. In the premises, Ace Decade is entitled to:\n\t- (1) Damages as pleaded at paragraph [84](#page-32-0) above, in the amount of at least US\\$495,300,000. This sum is equivalent to approximately £402,032,000 as at the date of this Claim based upon the XE.com mid-market rate.\n\t- (2) Simple interest on that sum pursuant to s.35A Senior Courts Act 1981 (\"**SCA 1981**\") at a rate of 8% per annum.\n- <span id=\"page-36-1\"></span>102. Alternatively to paragraph [101](#page-36-0) above, Mr Kwok is entitled to:\n\t- (1) Damages as pleaded at paragraph [87](#page-33-0) above in the amount of at least US\\$495,300,000. This sum is equivalent to approximately £402,032,000 as at the date of this Claim based upon the XE.com mid-market rate.\n\t- (2) Simple interest on that sum pursuant to SCA 1981 s.35A at a rate of 8% per annum.\n- 103. The amounts claimed at paragraphs [101](#page-36-0) and [102](#page-36-1) above are claimed in US Dollars (US\\$) as this is the currency in which the Claimant felt those losses.\n- 104. Further, or alternatively, in the premises Dawn State is entitled to:\n\t- (1) An order that UBS render an account in common form in relation to the Acquired H-Shares held by it as Custodian. Paragraph [92](#page-34-0) above is repeated.\n\t- (2) An order that UBS render an account of profits arising from the circumstances particularised in paragraph [92\\(](#page-34-0)3) above.\n\t- (3) A declaration that any of identifiable profits or proceeds referred to in paragraphs [92](#page-34-0) above are held on statutory, alternatively constructive, trusts for Dawn State. Paragraph [93](#page-34-1) above is repeated;\n- (4) Further or alternatively, damages or equitable compensation for the difference between the sum at which UBS sold the Acquired H-Shares and the value which could have been reasonably obtained for said shares. Paragraph [94](#page-34-2) and [95](#page-35-0) above are repeated.\n- (5) Alternatively, the difference between the amount accounted for by UBS to Dawn State and the commercially reasonable value of assets at the time of appropriation, which is claimed as a debt. Paragraph [100](#page-36-2) above is repeated.\n- (6) Further, Dawn State is entitled, under the court's equitable jurisdiction and/or SCA 1981 s.35A, to: (a) compound, alternatively simple, interest on the sums specified in subparagraphs (1) to (3) above; and (b) simple interest on the sums specified in paragraphs (4) and (5) above at a rate of 8%.\n\n# **AND the Claimants claim:**\n\n- (1) Damages as specified above\n- (2) Orders as specified above\n- (3) A declaration as specified above\n- (4) The difference between the sum accounted for by UBS and the commercially reasonable value of the H-Shares as a debt\n- (5) Interest as specified above\n- (6) Further and other relief\n- (7) Costs\n\n# **SA'AD HOSSAIN QC**\n\n### **SEBASTIAN ISAAC**\n\n### **MATTHEW HOYLE**\n\nI (the First Claimant) believe that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nName: Kwok Ho Wan\n\nDate: 23 September 2020\n\nThe Second Claimant believes that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nName: Yanping (Yvette) Wang\n\nDate: 23 September 2020\n\nThe Third Claimant believes that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nName: Yanping (Yvette) Wang\n\nDate: 23 September 2020","body_zh":"附件1\n\n英格兰和威尔士高等法院商务及财产法院商业法院（王座法庭部）\n\n案号：CL-2020-000345\n\n当事人：\n\n(1) KWOK HO WAN（郭文贵）\n(2) ACE DECADE HOLDINGS LIMITED（十年控股有限公司）\n(3) DAWN STATE LIMITED（晨州有限公司）\n\n原告\n\n与\n\nUBS AG（瑞银集团）\n\n被告\n起诉状\n当事人\n\n1. 第一原告郭先生（“郭先生”）为一名高净值人士，自2015年初起居住于美国纽约州。郭先生此前居住于中华人民共和国（“中国”），在中国以其普通话姓名郭文贵为人所知。郭先生是中国政府的政治反对者，且在引起本案诉求的事件发生时，他与中国当局已处于敌对关系。\n\n2. 第二原告十年控股（“Ace Decade”）是一家根据英属维尔京群岛法律注册成立的私人有限公司，其注册地址为P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands。十年控股于18 June 2014注册成立，并于10 November 2014前后由郭先生收购，作为当时拟议收购中国公司Haitong Securities Company Limited（海通证券股份有限公司，“海通”）股份的筹备工作之一部分。\n\n3. 第三原告晨州（“Dawn State”）亦是一家根据英属维尔京群岛法律注册成立的私人有限公司，其注册地址为P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands。\n\n4. 自18 September 2015起，晨州一直由十年控股拥有及控制。在18 September 2015之前，晨州由中国投资服务提供商Haixia Capital Management Company Ltd（海峡资本管理有限公司，“海峡资本”）通过名为Haixia Capital Investment Fund (Fujian) Limited Partnership（海峡资本投资基金（福建）有限合伙企业，“海峡基金”）的载体拥有及控制，该基金由Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co. Ltd（海峡汇富资产投资及基金管理有限公司，“海峡管理”）管理。晨州是2015年用于收购海通股份的载体（详见本起诉状正文中所述），但须受一项合同权利约束，据此十年控股可在收购海通股份后收购晨州。\n\n5. 被告瑞银（“UBS”）是一家在瑞士注册成立的公司，其注册办事处地址为Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland。瑞银在全球开展业务，提供零售及投资银行、财富管理及其他金融服务。在所有相关期间，瑞银通过其瑞士总部以及位于包括香港（“UBS HK”）和伦敦（“UBS London”）在内的分支机构开展该等业务；经双方当事人同意，后者被指定为本案诉求所涉全部合同的交易对手方，具体如下文进一步陈述。瑞银伦敦始终持有金融行为监管局（Financial Conduct Authority，参考编号186958）颁发的提供受监管服务的许可，并获授权以瑞银名义行事及订立合同协议。\n\n6. 如下文第[32]至[57]段所述，瑞银通过瑞银伦敦订立与原告诉求事项有关的合同。在导致订立该等合同的讨论及谈判中，瑞银主要由其雇员Stephen Wong（黄先生，“Mr Wong”）代表。黄先生当时为瑞银财富管理部董事总经理，常驻瑞银香港办事处。郭先生于2006年或2007年前后首次被介绍认识黄先生。\n\n引起该等诉求的事实\n海通投资背景\n\n7. 于2013年秋季前后，郭先生获海通首席执行官Wang Kaiguo（王开国先生，“Mr Wang”）接触，王先生试图鼓励郭先生对海通作出大额股权投资。海通是一家主要的中国证券公司，从事股票及衍生品经纪业务，以及投资银行、资产管理、私募股权、另类投资和融资租赁服务。海通是中国规模最大且历史最悠久的金融服务提供商之一。海通股份在上海证券交易所和香港证券交易所（分别为“SSE”和“HKEX”）交易。海通在香港交易所交易的股份称为“H股”。在王先生接触后，郭先生决定投资约US$3 billion于H股，以取得海通的重大持股。该项投资将通过海通发行新H股，并将该等股份配发给郭先生控制的公司而作出。\n\n瑞银的初步参与\n\n8. 在与王先生讨论后，郭先生将其拟收购海通重大持股的意向告知香港律师、Stevenson, Wong & Co（王泽长律师事务所，“Stevenson Wong”）合伙人Hank Lo（罗先生）。郭先生聘请王泽长律师事务所就拟议收购向其提供意见。\n\n9. 罗先生与黄先生及瑞银之间存在既有关系，其具体情况郭先生并不知悉；罗先生于2006年至2007年前后首次将郭先生介绍给黄先生。截至2013年底，黄先生已与郭先生建立密切的私人关系，并成功促使郭先生考虑并视其为可信赖的顾问及私人朋友。\n\n10. 于2013年第四季度的某一时间，罗先生告知黄先生郭先生拟收购海通持股。原告并不知悉罗先生何时向黄先生传达此事。郭先生直至事后才知悉罗先生拟向黄先生或瑞银告知此事，但郭先生在事后并未反对其如此行事。\n\n11. 于2013年12月前后，黄先生在郭先生香港住所拜访郭先生。他告知郭先生，瑞银已获悉海通将发行新H股（“配售股份”），并且瑞银希望作为配售代理参与其中。黄先生使用其手机接通了与瑞银高级管理人员的通话，郭先生理解该等人员位于瑞士。郭先生现已无法忆起该等人士的姓名。该等瑞银高级管理人员及黄先生向郭先生表示（以下子段仅陈述其所言要旨）：\n(1) 瑞银希望成为配售股份出售的经纪商，并希望郭先生为此角色向海通介绍及推荐瑞银；\n(2) 如郭先生以该方式协助瑞银，瑞银将协助及建议其以有利于郭先生的方式收购瑞银获委任为经纪商或配售代理的股份；\n(3) 尽管其知悉郭先生拟为自己收购股份，但如郭先生愿意转售股份，瑞银自身或与瑞银有关系的投资者将有兴趣以较可能的发售价格大幅溢价购买该等股份。\n\n12. 在该次会议后，郭先生决定与瑞银合作；为此，于2014年初的某一时间，郭先生告知王先生其拟投资新发行的H股，并要求王先生将瑞银列为配售股份的配售对象之一。\n\n13. 于2014年7月或8月，海通决定通过七名配售对象发行H股，其中之一为瑞银。另一家就另行收购H股向郭先生提供意见及协助的公司Macquarie Capital Securities Limited（麦格理资本证券有限公司，“Macquarie”），将就三批配售股份配额担任配售对象。瑞银与麦格理合计将配售海通已发行总股本约12%的股份。\n\n黄先生的初步顾问工作\n\n14. 在该次会议后，郭先生就瑞银担任配售代理的配售股份（“瑞银H股”）中其拟议投资（“投资”）的架构安排，与瑞银（通过黄先生）展开讨论。在2014年3月底及4月前后进行的讨论中，黄先生表示，他将就“海通项目”提供一项计划，包括一项郭先生可据以收购瑞银H股的拟议架构。\n\n15. 作为一家在中国注册成立并运营的证券公司，海通在所有相关期间均受China Securities Regulatory Commission（中国证券监督管理委员会，“CSRC”）监管。相关中国法律要求，如任何人士收购或实际控制海通已发行总股本超过5%的持股，须取得中国证监会批准。\n\n16. 郭先生与黄先生讨论过，郭先生拟投资总额超过US$3 billion，这将大幅超过该门槛，因而需要取得中国证监会批准。郭先生从瑞银获得的意见尤其包括，设计一项收购配售股份的架构，以在遵守相关中国法律的方式下避免取得中国证监会批准的要求。\n\n17. 在该等谈话过程中：\n(1) 黄先生一再向郭先生表示，其将在瑞银高级管理人员指示下，按照2013年12月作出的承诺，为促进郭先生就收购配售股份所享有的最佳利益而工作。自该期间起直至收购瑞银H股，郭先生经常重复及重申他与瑞银正为郭先生的利益而工作，以及郭先生应当信任并依赖黄先生及瑞银的陈述；\n(2) 黄先生表示，他与瑞银将以尽可能有利于郭先生的方式设计收购架构；及\n(3) 黄先生表明其本人及瑞银拥有为郭先生设计有利收购架构的经验和专业知识，并拥有就诸如配售股份的配售投资、该等投资的架构安排及其融资向郭先生（及其后向十年控股）提供意见的经验和专业知识。\n\n18. 于2014年6月前后，瑞银通过黄先生就收购瑞银H股的架构提供初步意见。该等意见在郭先生办公室（49/F, Bank of China Tower, No. 1, Garden Road, Hong Kong）及其香港私人住所举行的会议上口头作出。概言之（以下子段仅陈述瑞银意见的要旨），黄先生建议郭先生：(1) 不要通过由其实益拥有或控制的公司购买瑞银H股，因为这将需要中国证监会批准；(2) 改为建立一项由瑞银安排的架构，据此瑞银H股将由一家由第三方中介人控制的公司收购，而该项收购无需中国证监会批准；及(3) 在瑞银提供收购融资的情况下，以杠杆方式作出该项投资。\n\n19. 郭先生起初不愿作出杠杆投资，因为其收购瑞银H股并不需要银行融资，且原拟以现金完成收购。然而，黄先生向其建议：\n(1) 如瑞银继续为该项投资安排架构，则必须以银行将为购买瑞银H股提供保证金融资为基础，因为这将是瑞银从该交易取得利润的方式；\n(2) 无论如何，以杠杆方式投资亦符合郭先生的最佳利益，因为这将使其无需投入其自有资本的全部金额即可取得所需数量的股份；\n(3) 瑞银提供的任何杠杆融资无论如何均将按“最佳可能条件”提供；\n(4) 任何杠杆融资的条款将符合郭先生的要求，即不应存在任何规定，要求因配售股份短期价格波动而(i)提供额外担保物或(ii)强制偿还贷款的条款（郭先生与黄先生均将该等情形统称为“追加保证金通知”，未作区分）；\n\n（5）UBS（瑞银）将给予Kwok先生（郭文贵）足够时间以满足任何其他追加保证金要求，以便如果Kwok先生（事实上确实如此）有能力在不使用贷款融资的情况下为全部收购提供资金，UBS不会在Kwok先生能够提供额外资金之前对担保物实施执行；\n\n（6）为说明在UBS H股价值波动时，UBS将如何处理追加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求，Wong先生（黄先生）反复（在此期间及其后）提及一项先前由UBS提供资金的高价值杠杆交易；在该交易中，UBS曾为收购中国保险公司Ping An（平安）更大比例的股权提供资金（以下简称“Ping An Deal（平安交易）”）。下文第[42]段概述了Wong先生于2014年6月至2014年12月期间就Ping An Deal所提供信息的详情。\n\n20. 据Kwok先生所能回忆，该建议最初是在2014年6月或前后提出的。然而，在2014年夏季和秋季以及其后，该等事项均为Wong先生与Kwok先生反复讨论的主题。Kwok先生无法确定UBS在每一特定场合向其作出了何种陈述，但记得整体建议所产生的效果。\n\n进一步的结构安排建议\n\n21. 自2014年7月或前后起，UBS继续就拟议收购UBS H股的结构安排和融资向Kwok先生，并自2014年11月10日起向Ace Decade（艾斯十年）提供建议。特别是，Wong先生进一步就该收购的结构安排向Kwok先生（及其后向Ace Decade）提供建议，包括进一步就收购Haitong（海通）超过该公司股本5%须经CSRC（中国证券监督管理委员会）批准的要求提供建议；并建议Kwok先生和Ace Decade选择Haixia（海峡）作为该投资的中介方。\n\n22. 依赖该建议，Kwok先生和Ace Decade选择Haixia担任收购UBS H股的中介方，并最终根据日期为2014年12月18日的共同投资协议（以下简称“共同投资协议”）为此目的委任Haixia。\n\n23. 尽管Wong先生曾告知Kwok先生和Ace Decade，Haixia独立于UBS，但其事实上受State Development and Investment Corporation（国家开发投资公司，以下简称“SDIC”）控制；SDIC是UBS的合资伙伴，双方共同拥有一只名为“UBS SDIC（瑞银国投）”的投资基金。\n\n为便利对配售股份的投资，Haixia于2014年10月23日通过其子公司Haixia Fund（海峡基金）促成Dawn State（道恩州）的设立。在转让给Ace Decade之前的所有相关期间，Dawn State均由Lu Bo（陆波，以下简称“Lu先生”）管理；Lu先生是Haixia的高级雇员，先前受雇于UBS SDIC。\n\n24. Kwok先生于2014年11月10日收购Ace Decade，以使其担任所述投资工具。同日，根据Wong先生的建议，Kwok先生的一名雇员Yu Yong（于勇，以下简称“Yu女士”）成为其代名股东和董事。\n\n12月合同的准备\n\n25. 于2014年10月底及11月初或前后，UBS（主要通过Wong先生）、Haixia（主要通过Lu先生）和Ace Decade（主要通过Kwok先生和Yu女士）开始为认购UBS H股作准备。\n\n26. 于2014年11月13日或前后，Stevenson Wong（黄史蒂文森）与Norton Rose Fulbright（诺顿罗氏富布赖特律师事务所，以下简称“Norton Rose”）进行了首次电话会议；Norton Rose为Haixia就该交易聘请的律师。在该会议上，双方同意由Norton Rose起草一份关于收购UBS H股的共同投资协议，协议当事方为Haixia、Dawn State和Ace Decade。\n\n27. 于2014年11月14日或前后，Ace Decade与Dawn State订立一份谅解备忘录，据此，Dawn State将向Ace Decade提供服务，以换取相当于投资资本总额65个基点且不可退还的费用，但最低为US$5,000,000。\n\n28. 在此期间，即Dawn State同意认购UBS H股之前，Wong先生与Kwok先生持续就该收购的结构安排和融资进行讨论。在该等讨论中，Wong先生重复并详述了上文第[19]段所主张的陈述。原告在下文第[39]至[40]、[47]及[78]段进一步就该等陈述提出主张。\n\n29. 该等准备工作促成Ace Decade、Dawn State及UBS订立一系列安排，旨在使Ace Decade能够通过Dawn State参与收购UBS H股（统称“12月合同”）。12月合同包括：\n\n（1）Dawn State与UBS于2014年12月12日订立的一份托管协议（以下简称“托管协议”）；\n\n（2）Ace Decade、Dawn State与Haixia于2014年12月18日订立的一份共同投资协议；\n\n（3）Haixia Management（海峡管理）与Ace Decade于2014年12月18日订立的一份函件协议（以下简称“函件协议”）；\n\n（4）Dawn State与UBS London（瑞银伦敦）于2014年12月19日订立的一份题为“Project Pipe – Financing Letter”的融资函（以下简称“融资函”）。\n\n30. 原告在下文第[32]至[37]段进一步就订立12月合同及其条款提出主张。\n\n31. 该等准备工作亦促成Dawn State与Haitong于2014年12月19日订立一份认购协议（以下简称“认购协议”）。原告在下文第[44]段进一步就认购协议的签立及条款提出主张。\n\n12月合同\n\n32. 于2014年12月12日或前后，Dawn State与UBS London订立托管协议，其中涉及（除其他事项外）UBS H股的托管。原告将在审判中援引托管协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据托管协议的条款，Dawn State同意所有UBS H股（在收购后）将由UBS London持有。托管协议的目的和效力，是确保UBS H股可供UBS London执行其根据Dawn State与UBS London拟就为收购UBS H股提供融资而订立的（当时拟议的）融资协议和担保协议所享有的权利。托管协议受英格兰和威尔士法律管辖，并规定任何争议均由英格兰法院专属管辖。\n\n33. 于2014年12月18日或前后，Ace Decade、Dawn State和Haixia订立共同投资协议。原告将在审判中援引共同投资协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，该协议规定：\n\n（1）根据该协议，Haixia同意在收到US$500 million（以下简称“资金出资”）后，向Ace Decade提供参与认购目标公司（即Haitong）股份（定义为“该项目”）的权利。此外，协议指出，预期Dawn State将安排金额为US$750 million的贷款融资，该贷款融资与资金出资合称“共同投资金额”。\n\n（2）第1.1条规定，Haixia Fund就其在该项目中的角色收取一笔可观费用。\n\n（3）第3条题为“权利的性质”，规定Ace Decade仅享有参与该项目的合同权利，并不对Dawn State或其所收购的UBS H股享有即时的所有权权益。\n\n（4）第6.5条规定：\n\n“如该项目因任何原因未能完成，鉴于Haixia Fund及公司为投资者的利益安排该项目及与商业银行的贷款融资：\n\n（a）投资者同意，在公司订立与该项目有关的股份认购协议时，公司及/或Haixia Fund应收取以下两项中较高者作为安排费：(i) 共同投资金额（即US$1,250 million）的0.065%；及(ii) US$500,000。”\n\n34. 此外，于2014年12月18日或前后，Haixia Management与Ace Decade订立函件协议。原告将在审判中援引函件协议的完整条款及效力。除其他事项外，函件协议规定如下：\n\n（1）在“贷款融资”标题下：\n\n“Ace Decade确认，Dawn State正根据有关该项目融资的相关融资协议（以下简称‘融资函’），应Ace Decade的请求并为其利益与商业银行安排贷款融资（以下简称‘融资’）。”\n\n“Ace Decade确认，其已审阅并同意融资函（包括条款清单）中规定的融资条款和条件，并进一步向Dawn State、Haixia Fund及Haixia Management承诺并同意，其应主要且独自负责与融资有关的所有费用、成本、开支及付款[…]”\n\n（2）在“转让安排”标题下，规定在该项目完成后两个月期限届满后，或Dawn State将订立的相关认购协议项下锁定期届满后（以较长者为准）的任何时间，Haixia Management在收到Ace Decade的请求后，将促成将UBS H股转让给Ace Decade或Ace Decade指定的另一实体。\n\n35. 尽管函件协议规定Ace Decade已审阅并同意融资函中规定的融资条款和条件，但融资函事实上直至2014年12月20日才完全签立。原告在下文第[36]至[37]段进一步提出主张。\n\n36. 于2014年12月19日或前后，Dawn State与UBS London订立融资函。根据融资函，UBS London同意为该投资拟议的全部贷款融资（以下简称“融资额度”）提供资金，但须随后完成更为全面的融资文件；该融资额度为以HKD计、等于60%、股份数量及初始价格之乘积的金额，且不超过条款清单所定义的US$750 million。原告将在审判中援引融资函的完整条款及效力。除其他事项外，融资函规定如下：\n\n（1）在“LTV Ratio（贷款价值比）”标题下：\n\n“（c）提款前保证金\n\nDawn State应向担保账户交付额外的港元现金，以确保在提交提款请求之日（即提款请求日）……贷款价值比（参照提款请求日的股份总价值计算，并按形式上假定有关额外港元现金已于该日交付至担保账户的基础计算）等于或低于初始贷款价值比。”\n\n（2）在“排他性”标题下：\n\n“（b）借款人将，并将促使其各自的子公司和关联方，确保不会就收购事项，或为资助或再融资任何用于收购事项或与收购事项有关的资金，而产生、借入、银团安排、发行或私募任何其他债务融资……”\n\n（3）在“适用法律”标题下，融资函及所有相关文件（统称为“融资承诺文件”）将受英国法管辖，且英格兰法院（English Courts）对任何争议享有管辖权\n\n37. 融资承诺文件包括一份关于该融资额度的指示性条款清单（“指示性条款清单”）。指示性条款清单并未载有任何按所示条款或任何条款进行借款或放款的具有法律约束力的承诺。指示性条款清单规定，根据双方将达成的融资协议，瑞银（UBS）在某些情形下有权要求就该融资额度进行强制提前还款或发出追加保证金通知，具体如下：\n\n（1）在“保证金条款”标题下：\n\n“贷款价值比追加保证金触发点：66.7%，但如上文‘初始贷款价值比’项下所述的初始贷款价值比被调整，出借人有权相应调整。\n\n追加保证金通知：如在提款日后的任何预定交易日，贷款价值比高于贷款价值比追加保证金触发点，借款人应向担保账户存入仅以港币现金支付的金额，以使贷款价值比恢复至初始贷款价值比，并应遵守下文‘保证金支付时间表’项下所述的全部义务。\n\n……\n\n保证金支付时间表：追加保证金通知及保证金返还的付款，应于追加保证金通知请求或保证金返还（视情况而定）之日紧接后的营业日（“保证金付款日”）香港时间下午5:00前作出，但前提是该请求于香港时间晚上11:59前发出……”\n\n（2）在“其他条款”标题下：\n\n“完全强制提前还款事件：如提款日后发生下列任何事件，出借人可自行选择终止本交易：\n\n（i）任何预定交易日的参考股份收盘价低于初始价格的60%；\n\n（ii）任何预定交易日的参考股份收盘价低于：（a）前一预定交易日收盘价的85%；或（b）紧接此前5个预定交易日中任何一个预定交易日收盘价的75%；\n\n……\n\n……\n\n如出借人在发生完全强制提前还款事件后通知其将终止本交易，借款人必须依照下列付款时间表偿还融资额度金额连同与本交易有关的所有其他应付款项（“合计提前还款金额”）：\n\n（i）该通知紧接后的营业日支付合计付款金额的25%；\n\n（ii）该通知后第二个营业日支付合计付款金额的25%；以及\n\n（iii）该通知后第三个营业日支付剩余50%的合计提前还款金额。”\n\n“补足：在（i）非共同解除日的任何日期自愿提前还款，或（ii）在任何其他情形下提前还款或终止，包括在发生完全强制提前还款事件或违约事件后，借款人应向出借人支付补足金额。\n\n补足金额的计算方法为：在适用情况下，就融资额度金额或提前还款金额适用利差，自提前还款或终止之日（含该日）起至下一共同解除日；如无共同解除日，则至到期日。”\n\n瑞银在签署十二月合同前作出的陈述\n\n38. 在筹备十二月合同期间，于2014年12月前后且在18 December 2014之前，郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）得知，瑞银为该投资拟议提供的融资条款包括追加保证金通知和强制提前还款规定（其再次以“追加保证金通知”一词概括指称）。郭先生现无法记起其是否看过融资函和／或指示性条款清单，但无论如何，其所知必定来自他人对条款的说明，而非对文件的审阅，因为他不懂英语。\n\n39. 郭先生反对纳入这些条款，并向黄先生（Mr Wong）提出此事。二人曾进行讨论，地点在郭先生于香港的住所或办公室。郭先生向黄先生表达的大意是，他对这些条款感到不满，并希望将其从与瑞银达成的任何协议中删除。郭先生表示，他不希望瑞银因海通H股（Haitong H-Shares）价格的短期波动而能够要求付款或偿还贷款。作为回应，黄先生代表瑞银向郭先生和艾斯十年（Ace Decade）作出进一步陈述并提供建议，其效力如下：\n\n（1）瑞银的内部政策是，在银行提供保证金融资时，将设有允许其发出追加保证金通知的条款（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），而此类条款是瑞银融资协议的标准条款；\n\n（2）尽管如此，黄先生拟向银行再次提出，尝试将该等条款从协议中删除或修改；\n\n（3）即使黄先生不能使追加保证金通知条款被删除或修改，郭先生（因而艾斯十年）亦不应对此感到担忧，因为：\n\n（a）在本案中，瑞银不会严格援引或执行该等条款，因为瑞银有一项政策，适用于作为极受重视客户的艾斯十年和郭先生（因而默示亦适用于作为其居间方的晨州（Dawn State）），即如价格发生短期变动，不发出追加保证金通知（即不要求支付保证金或强制提前还款）。\n\n（b）如因较长期的价格变动而有必要由瑞银发出追加保证金通知（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），瑞银将与艾斯十年合作，使其能够满足任何要求，并将允许其有合理时间如此行事，包括在必要时给予长于融资协议所规定的付款期限，且不会因任何追加保证金通知而出售任何股份，除非给予艾斯十年充足的付款时间。\n\n（4）黄先生再次援引平安交易（Ping An Deal），以证明在H股价值波动时，瑞银将就追加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求采取的做法。黄先生于June 2014至December 2014期间就平安交易提供的信息详情，概述于下文第[42]段。\n\n40. 在此期间的谈话和通信中（包括其提供上文第[39]段所述建议及作出陈述的谈话中），黄先生进一步重复并重申，他和瑞银正努力保护和推进郭先生的利益，且郭先生和艾斯十年应当信任并依赖瑞银，尤其是黄先生。根据作出这些保证的语境，应推断其意图在于鼓励郭先生和艾斯十年接受并依赖上文第[39]段所述的建议和陈述。\n\n41. 由于与黄先生的这些谈话，郭先生合理地相信：（1）黄先生将使融资承诺文件中的追加保证金通知和强制提前还款条款被删除，并且无论如何将使该等条款从最终的融资协议中删除；以及（2）无论如何，他无需担忧此类规定，因为这些规定不会按照其严格条款被援引，而只会依照黄先生所述的做法和政策被援引。郭先生其后在19 December 2014之前未曾阅读融资函或指示性条款清单，亦未被告知其条款。因此，郭先生直至2015年3月前后才知悉这些文件中包括追加保证金通知和强制提前还款规定，详情载于下文第[46]段。\n\n平安陈述\n\n42. 如上所述，黄先生多次援引平安交易，作为在H股价值波动时瑞银将就追加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求采取的做法之例证。黄先生亦援引平安交易，作为瑞银在构建收购于中华人民共和国（PRC）注册成立公司的股权方面专业能力之例证。郭先生无法记起每一次讨论平安交易的场合，但至少包括：\n\n（1）于2014年夏季黄先生与郭先生之间、上文第[19]段及第27段所述的讨论。这些讨论主要在黄先生与郭先生之间进行，但在此期间黄先生就平安交易作出陈述时，郭先生的两名雇员杨英（Yang Ying）和吕涛（Lyu Tao）均至少有一次在场。\n\n（2）于2014年12月前后、在18 December 2014之前，黄先生与郭先生之间的讨论。\n\n43. 在整体而言的该等谈话过程中，黄先生（代表瑞银）就平安交易陈述了下列事项：\n\n（1）平安交易涉及收购一家中华人民共和国公司，即保险公司平安保险（Ping An Insurance）的股份。\n\n（2）瑞银曾就收购结构及该项收购的资金安排，向平安股权（“平安股权”）的买方提供建议。\n\n（3）瑞银曾为该项收购提供贷款融资。平安股权的价值及瑞银提供的贷款融资，均远大于瑞银H股的价值或瑞银拟为收购瑞银H股提供的贷款融资。\n\n（4）虽然平安股权的直接买方是泰国企业集团正大集团（CP Group），但正大集团实际上是作为中国商人、亿万富翁肖建华（Xiao Jianhua）（“肖先生”）的居间方行事。肖先生当时是中国企业集团明天集团（Tomorrow Group）的主席。瑞银曾就如何为该项收购设立居间结构，向正大集团和肖先生提供建议。与郭先生一样，肖先生是瑞银极受重视的客户。\n\n（5）虽然收购平安股权的借贷安排包括允许瑞银基于价格波动发出追加保证金通知的条款（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），并且确实发生过价格波动，但瑞银并未严格执行这些条款。相反，瑞银与股东合作，并给予股东充足时间，使股份价值得以回升，或使股东能够安排支付保证金。瑞银曾提出提供临时额外融资以弥补任何差额。\n\n（6）因此，从未出现瑞银将对平安股东的担保权益执行，或该股东将失去其所收购的任何平安股份的可能性。\n\n（7）此举符合瑞银对极受重视客户的政策，该政策亦将适用于郭先生和艾斯十年；如瑞银有权发出追加保证金通知（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），瑞银拟给予郭先生和艾斯十年与平安股东相同的待遇。\n\n认购协议\n\n44. 于2014年12月19日前后，Dawn State（多恩州）与Haitong（海通）订立了一份认购协议（以下简称“认购协议”），据此，Dawn State同意以每股HK\\$15.62的价格购买569,427,620股UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）（以下简称“认购”），总计HK\\$8,894,459,424.40（以下简称“认购价款”）。认购协议尤其规定：\n\n(1) 根据第2条，如在认购协议订立至交割期间，Haitong H-Shares（海通H股）的交易价格发生上涨或下跌的特定情形，认购价款可每股上调或下调最高HK\\$1.56；\n\n(2) UBS H-Shares的买卖交割须以满足认购协议第3.1条所列的若干条件（以下简称“条件”）为前提。\n\n(3) 根据第8.1条，如条件未于2015年6月30日或之前获得满足，任何一方均可终止认购协议。\n\nUBS在签署借贷文件前作出的陈述\n\n45. 于2015年2月及3月前后，UBS（瑞银）就为Dawn State收购UBS H-Shares提供融资而拟定的借贷文件（以下简称“借贷文件”）已准备就绪。尽管Ace Decade（艾斯十年）并非任何借贷文件的一方当事人（其详情载于下文），借贷文件草案被提供给代表Ace Decade行事的律师Stevenson Wong（史蒂文森·黄）。\n\n46. 于2015年3月中旬前后，Kwok先生（郭文贵）获Yu女士（余女士）告知，协议草案载有若干条款，允许UBS在UBS H-Shares价值出现短期波动时发出追加保证金通知，并要求强制偿还款项。\n\n47. 在2015年3月中旬至下旬前后与Wong先生的谈话中，Kwok先生表示其反对该等条款，并重申其不希望UBS因Haitong H-Shares价格的短期波动而能够要求付款或偿还贷款。Wong先生代表UBS：(1) 再次重复并确认其本人及UBS正在为Kwok先生的利益行事的说法，以及Kwok先生和Ace Decade应当信赖并依赖Wong先生和UBS；以及(2) 重述上文第[39]段所详列的意见和陈述，该等意见和陈述在此重复列明，作为UBS于2015年3月通过Wong先生所提供意见及作出陈述要旨的具体内容。\n\n48. Kwok先生相信并依赖该等保证，因此并未反对Dawn State与UBS继续就借贷文件进行谈判，亦未作出努力促使或促成Ace Decade退出共同投资协议，或以其他方式阻止该项投资完成。\n\n借贷文件\n\n49. 于2015年4月1日，Dawn State与UBS签署借贷文件，以由UBS为Dawn State收购UBS H-Shares提供融资。\n\n50. “Facility Agreement（融资协议）”由Dawn State和UBS London（瑞银伦敦）代表订立。经约定，该融资协议为HK\\$5,336,675,654.64的定期融资额度。原告将在审理中援引融资协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，融资协议的条款包括以下规定：\n\n(1) 第1.1条（“定义”）：\n\n“‘初始LTV比率’指百分之六十（60.00%）[…]”\n\n“‘LTV比率’指，于任何预定交易日，按以下方式计算的贷款价值比率（以百分比表示）：A/B，其中：‘A’指未偿还贷款的港元总额减去追加保证金余额；‘B’指市值乘以受交易担保约束的股份数目。”\n\n“‘追加保证金触发比率’指百分之六十六点七（66.70%）[…]”\n\n(2) 第7.7条（“强制提前还款”）：\n\n“(a) 如贷款人认定：\n\n(i) 于任何预定交易日，一股股份的市值低于初始价格的百分之六十（60%）；\n\n(ii) 于任何预定交易日，一股股份的市值低于：\n\n(A) 紧接前一个预定交易日股份市值的百分之八十五（85%）；或\n\n(B) 紧接前五个预定交易日中任何一个交易日股份市值的百分之七十五（75%）；\n\n则（在每种情况下），贷款人可通过向借款人发出通知，取消该融资额度，并宣布未偿还贷款连同应计利息及根据融资文件应计的所有其他款项立即到期应付；届时，该融资额度将被取消，且所有该等未偿还款项将根据下文第(b)款立即到期应付。\n\n(b) 上文第(a)款所述未偿还款项的任何提前还款，应按以下金额并在以下时间作出：\n\n(i) 于贷款人送达该等提前还款通知后紧接的营业日，支付该等未偿还款项的百分之二十五（25%）；\n\n(ii) 于贷款人送达该等提前还款通知后紧接的第二个营业日，支付该等未偿还款项的百分之二十五（25%）；以及\n\n(iii) 于贷款人送达该等提前还款通知后紧接的第三个营业日，支付该等未偿还款项的百分之五十（50%）。”\n\n(3) 第18.1条（“追加保证金通知”）：\n\n“如于任何预定交易日，贷款人认定LTV比率高于适用的追加保证金触发比率，借款人应在切实可行的情况下尽快，且无论如何不得迟于贷款人发出要求其如此办理的追加保证金通知之日后的营业日下午5:00，将额外港元现金存入或促使存入担保账户，并根据担保协议以贷款人为受益人就该等现金设定担保，以确保在计入所存入的额外现金后重新计算的LTV比率等于或低于适用的初始LTV比率。”\n\n(4) 第20条列明构成“违约事件”的16项事件或情形，包括：(a)（第20.1条）未能于到期日支付根据融资文件应付的任何款项；以及(b)（第20.2条）未能遵守第18.1条。\n\n(5) 第20.17条（“加速到期”）：\n\n“在持续发生违约事件时及其后任何时间，贷款人可通过向借款人发出通知：\n\n(a) 取消承诺额度，届时该等承诺额度应立即被取消；\n\n(b) 宣布全部或部分贷款，连同应计利息及根据融资文件应计或未偿还的所有其他款项，立即到期应付，届时其应立即到期应付；\n\n(c) 宣布全部或部分贷款应按要求支付，届时其应立即由贷款人要求支付；及／或\n\n(d) 行使其在融资文件项下的任何或全部权利、救济、权力或酌处权。”\n\n(6) 第32条规定：“本协议以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法管辖”，第33.1条（“管辖权”）则规定，由English Court（英格兰法院）对因任何融资文件产生或与任何融资文件有关的任何争议享有专属管辖权。\n\n51. “Security Agreement（担保协议）”亦由Dawn State和UBS London代表订立。根据担保协议，Dawn State（以下简称“设定担保人”）就其对若干资产享有的权利设定第一顺位担保权益予UBS，尤其包括UBS H-Shares。担保协议进一步规定，UBS H-Shares应由作为托管人的UBS London Branch（瑞银伦敦分行）持有，并应根据Custody Agreement（托管协议）的条款存入在UBS开立的已设定担保账户。原告将在审理中援引担保协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，担保协议包括以下规定：\n\n(1) 根据第3.1条（“以担保方式转让”），Dawn State向UBS转让其现有及未来对以下各项享有的全部权利、所有权及权益（包括对托管人的权利、所有权及权益）：尤其包括托管协议、UBS H-Shares及持有该等股份的账户（以下简称“担保账户”）。\n\n(2) 第3.2条（“固定押记”）规定，Dawn State就其对担保账户及UBS H-Shares等享有的权利，以UBS为受益人设定押记。\n\n(3) 根据第8条（“执行”）：\n\n(a) 第8.1条（“何时可执行”）：\n\n“于持续发生执行事件时，该等押记应立即可执行，LPA赋予抵押权人的权力，包括出售权，以及经本契据变更及扩展的LPA第101条赋予的其他权力，应立即可行使。”\n\n(b) 第8.2条（“出售权”）：\n\n“经本契据变更及扩展的LPA第101条赋予抵押权人的法定出售权、指定接管人的权力及其他法定权力，应自本契据之日起产生（并为此目的，担保债务应被视为到期应付）。”\n\n(4) 第9.3条（“金融担保安排”）：\n\n“(a) 设定担保人和贷款人拟使本契据构成‘金融担保安排’（定义见Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003（《2003年金融担保安排（第2号）条例》）（以下简称“条例”）），因此，贷款人有权：\n\n(i) 使用及处分构成‘金融担保物’（定义见条例（以下简称“金融担保物”））的任何已设定担保资产，在此情况下，贷款人应遵守条例关于取得‘等值金融担保物’（定义见条例）的规定；\n\n(ii) 根据条例，将任何等值金融担保物的价值抵销任何担保债务，或将其用于清偿任何担保债务；以及\n\n(iii) （在该等押记可执行后的任何时间）根据条例，将构成金融担保物的任何已设定担保资产拨归用于或部分用于清偿担保债务。\n\n(b) 如贷款人为上文第(a)(ii)或(a)(iii)款的目的而须对任何等值金融担保物进行估值，该价值应为：\n\n(i) 如属现金，为拨归或抵销时的面值；以及\n\n(ii) 如属金融工具或其他金融担保物，为拨归时的市值，或由贷款人在拨归后参照公开指数或其他适用且普遍认可的来源，或贷款人可选择的其他程序（包括由贷款人指定的独立投资银行、会计师事务所或其他估值师进行的估值）确定的抵销时市值。\n\n如有必要，应按贷款人选择的、于拨归或抵销时通行的市场汇率，兑换为担保债务计价的货币。”\n\n(5) 第9.4条（“已设定担保资产的出售”）：\n\n出质人确认并同意，股份担保物或其他设押资产可能迅速贬值，且属于通常在获认可市场出售的类型，因此，在执行担保权时，贷款人无须就其拟出售或以其他方式处置任何股份担保物或任何其他设押资产发出任何通知。在持续发生执行事件后，贷款人、任何授权代表或任何接管人可自行全权酌情决定，以贷款人、授权代表或接管人认为必要或适当的方式及在其认为必要或适当的情形下，通过私下出售方式出售股份担保物或其他设押资产（贷款人有权购买拟出售的任何或全部股份担保物或其他设押资产）。出质人确认，尽管任何该等出售的价格可能低于如以其他私下或公开方式出售该等股份担保物或其他设押资产本可取得的价格，该等出售仍应视为以商业上合理的方式作出。\n\n52. 《授信协议附函》（“Facility Agreement Side Letter”）亦代表 Dawn State（道恩州）和 UBS London（瑞银伦敦）订立。原告将在审判时援引《担保协议》（“Security Agreement”）的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，《担保协议》的条款包括以下规定：\n\n(1) Dawn State 就《授信协议》项下任何提前还款支付一笔大额额外款项，具体如下：\n\n“于全部或部分支付、偿还或提前偿还贷款的任何日期，借款人应支付适用的补足金额……”\n\n“补足金额”系指，就拟偿还或提前偿还的贷款而言，如该等已偿还或提前偿还的金额在适用情况下仍未偿还至下一共同提前终止日或最终还款日，则自相关偿还或提前偿还日期起至下一共同提前终止日，或如无共同提前终止日，则至最终还款日止期间内，本应适用于已偿还或提前偿还贷款本金金额的利差金额。”\n\n(2) 并且，“本《授信协议附函》以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的一切非合同义务，均受英国法管辖。”\n\n53. 同样于 1 April 2015，Dawn State 向 UBS London（既以《授信协议》项下贷款人的身份，亦以《托管协议》项下托管人的身份）提供了一份《交割授权书》（“Settlement Authorisation”）。原告将在审判时援引《担保协议》的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据《交割授权书》：\n\n(1) Dawn State 授权 UBS London（作为贷款人）指示及/或授权托管人（亦为 UBS London）将 Dawn State 作出的货币出资及 UBS London 提供的授信金额，用于按照《认购协议》为认购提供资金，并将根据《认购协议》配发的 UBS H股转入受《托管协议》约束的担保账户。\n\n(2) 双方同意，“《交割授权书》以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的一切非合同义务，均受英国法管辖。”\n\n54. 在下文第 [55] 段所述价格上调后，《交割授权书》由题为《经修订及重述的交割授权书》（“Amended and Restated Settlement Authorisation”）的文件更新。\n\n价格上调\n\n55. 于 8 May 2015，Haitong（海通）向 Dawn State 及新 H股的其他投资者发出函件，宣布完成海通新 H股发行及出售的各项先决条件均已满足，预计交割将于 15 May 2015 进行；并且，由于此前 30 日内 H股的交易价格已超过约定门槛，根据《认购协议》第 2.2 条，H股认购价格将每股上调 HKD 1.56，即每股价格为 HKD 17.18。\n\n56. 因此，Dawn State 与 UBS London 于 13 May 2015 订立了一份《有关授信协议的修订协议》（“Amendment Agreement”）。1 原告将在审判时援引《修订协议》的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据《修订协议》：\n\n(1) 根据第 3.1 条，双方同意将 UBS 的贷款承诺增加至 HK$6,011,236,393.92，并将初始贷款价值比率增加至 61.45%，但保证金追缴触发点仍为 66.7%。\n\n(2) 根据第 6.4 条，双方同意，“《修订协议》以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的一切非合同义务，均受英国法管辖。”\n\n57. 同样于 13 May 2015，Dawn State 与 UBS London 订立了另一份担保协议，题为《第二担保协议》（“Second Security Agreement”），以更新《担保协议》，从而反映《修订协议》对《授信协议》作出的修订。原告将在审判时援引《第二担保协议》的完整条款及效力。《第二担保协议》的相关条款与上文第 [51] 段所主张的条款相同，该等条款作为《第二担保协议》条文的细节再次列明。\n\n交割\n\n58. 于 13 May 2015，Kwok 先生（郭文贵）和 Yu 女士（俞女士）根据《共同投资协议》第 4.1 条，授权向 Dawn State 支付《认购协议》项下认购价格中现金部分的最终付款。根据其在《授信协议》项下的义务，该笔款项随后由 Dawn State 作为后续借款人出资支付给 UBS London。\n\n59. 同样于 13 May 2015，Dawn State 根据《授信协议》第 5 条，向 UBS London 提出了一项提款请求（“Utilisation Request”），金额为 HKD 6,011,236,393.82。\n\n60. 《认购协议》项下的交割于 15 May 2015 进行，UBS H股被转让给 Dawn State。Dawn State 登记为股东后，立即根据《第二担保协议》第 6.2(a) 条，将该等股份存入 UBS London 的担保账户。因此，UBS London 按照上文第 [51] 及 [57] 段所主张的《第二担保协议》条款，以担保方式受让“已收购H股”（“Acquired H-Shares”）。\n\n1 日期为 13 May 2015 的《修订协议》\n\n该等建议及陈述的后果\n\n61. 重申上文第 [14] 至 [20]、[38] 至 [43] 及 [45] 至 [48] 段所主张的 UBS 建议及陈述的细节。Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade（艾斯迪凯德）基于并合理依赖于该等建议的充分性及/或该等陈述的准确性，与 Dawn State 订立（且未退出）《共同投资协议》，并促使及允许 Dawn State 与 UBS 订立融资文件。\n\n62. 如无该等陈述：\n\n(1) 如 UBS 坚持在《授信协议》中纳入保证金追缴及强制提前还款条款，Kwok 先生及/或 Ace Decade 将不会使用 UBS 提供的贷款融资，而会收购 UBS H股；\n\n(2) 或者，Kwok 先生及/或 Ace Decade 根本不会收购 UBS H股；\n\n(3) 或者，如（与原告主张相反）Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade 会通过 Dawn State 使用 UBS 提供的贷款融资并按相同条款收购 UBS H股，Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade 将确保 Dawn State 有足够可用资金，以立即应对任何该等保证金追缴及/或还款。\n\n63. 贷款文件的条款对 Dawn State 极为不利，而对 UBS London 有利。特别是：\n\n(1) 《授信协议》规定 UBS 同时拥有：(a) 根据第 7.7 条要求强制提前还款的权利；及 (b) 根据第 18.1 条发出保证金追缴的权利。\n\n(2) 根据第 7.7 条，如 UBS H股价值单日下跌 15% 或五日内下跌 25%，UBS 有权要求全额偿还贷款，而不论海通 H股的绝对价值、贷款价值比率，或 UBS London 作为贷款人遭受损失的风险程度或是否存在该等风险。\n\n(3) 如 UBS 所知（至少因 Wong 先生（黄先生）参与 2014 年及 2015 年的讨论，且无论如何作为一般市场常识），海通 H股易于发生短期价值波动，因此，在《授信协议》期限内，根据第 7.7 条寻求提前还款的权利存在被触发的重大风险，包括 UBS 并无（或并无实质性）损失风险的情形。\n\n(4) 如 UBS 所知（至少通过 Wong 先生）或理应知悉：\n\n(a) Dawn State 并非 UBS H股收购的最终投资者或资金来源，亦不会成为满足任何保证金追缴或提前还款要求所需资金的来源。这是根据 UBS 的建议所设立投资架构的结果，如上文第 [18] 段所主张。\n\n(b) 根据第 7.7 条允许强制提前还款或根据《授信协议》第 18.1 条支付保证金的期限，并不足以（或不太可能足以）使相关款项提供给 Dawn State，并由 Dawn State 提供给 UBS。特别是，UBS 于 19 December 2014 在致 Haixia（海峡）的函件中确认，其理解 Dawn State 无法在提出要求后的 24 小时内付款。\n\n(5) 因此，根据《授信协议》第 20.1 条及/或第 20.2 条发生违约事件的可能性很大，且 UBS 将有权根据第 20.17 条行使违约事件发生后的救济措施。\n\n(6) 根据《授信协议附函》，如 UBS 行使其要求贷款提前还款的权利，Dawn State 已同意向 UBS 支付如下利差的全部金额：如已偿还或提前偿还的贷款本金在适用情况下仍未偿还至下一共同提前终止日或最终还款日，则自相关偿还或提前偿还日期起至下一共同提前终止日，或如无共同提前终止日，则至最终还款日止期间内本应适用于该等已偿还或提前偿还贷款本金金额的利差。与简单的“提前终止成本”条款相比，此类条款在该等安排中并不常见，这意味着 UBS 通过行使其根据第 7.7 条要求强制提前还款的权利，将在财务上获益。\n\nUBS London 的执行\n\n64. 约于 1 至 6 July 2015 期间，包括 H股在内的海通股份交易价格大幅下跌。UBS London 于 6 July 2015 晚间向 Dawn State 送达函件，据此其声称根据《授信协议》第 7.7 条行使要求提前偿还根据《授信协议》提供的授信额度的权利。在该通知中，UBS 声称要求支付：(1) 贷款的 25%，连同应计利息及融资文件项下应计的所有其他金额（“相关提前还款金额”），约为 US$200 million，须于翌日下午 5 时前支付；(2) 相关提前还款金额的 25%，约为 US$200 million，须于通知送达后第二日下午 5 时前支付；及 (3) 相关提前还款金额的 50%，约为 US$200 million，须于通知送达后第二日下午 5 时前支付。\n\n65. 2015年7月7日上午，Ace Decade（Ace Decade公司）通知UBS（瑞银），虽然其能够“迅速”履行该项债务，但无法在当日17时前履行。Kwok先生（郭文贵）还致电Wong先生（Mr Wong），请求根据上文第[14]至[20]、[38]至[43]及[45]至[48]段所详述的UBS陈述和建议，给予额外时间以筹集足够资金。Wong先生表示不会给予该等时间，并称UBS London（伦敦瑞银）已决定出售UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）。\n\n66. Dawn State（Dawn State公司）未在2015年7月7日17时前支付被要求支付的款项。\n\n67. 2015年7月7日晚间，UBS London向Dawn State发出一份“加速到期事件通知”（以下简称“通知”）。\n\n(1) UBS在该通知第3段中表示，全部贷款（包括今日到期的提前还款金额）、连同应计利息，以及根据融资文件产生或尚未支付的所有其他款项，均立即到期应付。\n\n(2) UBS还在第3段中通知其有权根据“每一份担保文件”（即《担保协议》和《第二担保协议》）第9.4条行使出售权。\n\n68. UBS在另一封日期为2015年7月7日的函件中主张，应付款项合计为HKD 6,289,081,405.43，包括：(1) 贷款本金（HKD 6,011,236,393.92）；(2) 未偿应计利息（HKD 44,003,279.72）；(3)“平仓成本”（HKD 1,873,883.54）；以及(4)“补足金额”（HKD 231,967,848.24）。\n\n出售UBS H-Shares\n\n69. UBS London就其如何出售或声称出售UBS H-Shares（如有）提供的信息有限。就原告所知及所信：\n\n(1) 于2015年7月8日或前后，UBS London以大宗交易方式，按平均每股HK$11.12的价格，正式向Segantii Capital Management Limited（“Segantii”）转让了200,000,000股UBS H-Shares（总计569,427,620股中的一部分），总价为HK$2,224,000,000。\n\n(2) 于2015年7月10日或前后，UBS自身声称以原告不知悉的价格绝对取得58,284,114股UBS H-Shares。原告亦不知道UBS是否及如是，于何时及以何价格将该等股份出售予第三方。\n\n(3) 原告不知道UBS根据《担保协议》第9.4条项下出售权所作出的任何其他出售的详情。\n\n70. HK$11.12的价格相对于海通H股的交易价格构成异常巨大的折让；海通H股于2015年7月7日收市价为每股HK$13.90。\n\n71. 2015年7月8日上午，Haitong（海通）宣布暂停其H股交易，等待发布有关下列事项的公告：\n\n“(1) 一项可能的本公司股份回购计划，如予实施，须经股东批准；及(2) 本公司高级管理人员和／或员工可能购买本公司股份……”\n\n72. 因此，自7月8日上午起，市场普遍知悉（并可推断UBS亦知悉）交易已暂停，且海通股份至少很可能会被回购。2015年7月9日，海通宣布回购其自身股份。2015年7月10日，海通H股恢复交易。H股开市价为HK$14.24，收市价为HK$15.14。\n\n73. 2015年7月10日，UBS向Haixia（海峡）及其律师发送电子邮件，附上“一份详列执行所得款项运用情况的表格”，但该计算被说明为“草稿形式，且……须待交易完全结算”。该表格载明，对Dawn State的付款将参照以下内容计算：(1)“截至2015年7月7日的香港收市价：HKD 13.90”；(2)“大宗交易折让（%）20.0%”；(3)“大宗配售价格：11.12”；(4)“已出售股份数量（股）：569,427,620”，即Dawn State所持全部股份。UBS当时或其后均未提供任何股份实际买方、向每一买方出售的股份数目、每项出售成交的价格、出售成交时间或出售条款的详情。\n\n转让Dawn State的股份\n\n74. 2015年9月18日，Haixia Fund（海峡基金）根据Ace Decade在《信函协议》项下的权利，将Dawn State的全部股本转让给Ace Decade。\n\nACE DECADE及KWOK先生的主张\n\n75. 下列各段所陈述的Ace Decade及Kwok先生的主张，均以该等主张受英格兰和威尔士法律管辖为基础和假设提出。如UBS代表主张和／或法院认定该等主张的管辖法律为香港法律，则同一主张亦根据香港法律作为替代主张提出，并依赖下文所陈述的事实和事项，以具体说明Kwok先生及Ace Decade在香港法律下的诉讼因由。\n\nUBS的注意义务\n\n76. UBS对Ace Decade及Kwok先生负有侵权法上的注意义务，包括以下各项义务（各项均为进一步或替代主张）：\n\n(1) 有义务采取合理谨慎和技能，确保向其二者或其中任何一方提供的信息或作出的事实陈述准确无误。\n\n(2) 有义务在就下列事项向其二者或其中任何一方提供建议时，采取合理谨慎、技能和判断力，其中包括：(a) 收购UBS H-Shares的结构安排；(b) 收购UBS H-Shares的融资；(c) 融资文件的条款及效力；(d) 与该等条款相关的风险；(e) 和／或UBS拟行使及可能行使该等权利的行为。\n\n77. 证明UBS承担责任的事实和事项至少包括以下各项：\n\n(1) 在所有相关时间，Wong先生均为UBS的代理人，有权代表UBS作出陈述及提供承诺。\n\n(2) 如上文第[9]段所述，Kwok先生在所有重要时间均将Wong先生视为值得信赖的顾问和个人朋友，并据此依赖于他；UBS至少通过Wong先生知悉该情况。\n\n(3) 重复上文第[11]至[13]段。如该等段落所述，UBS与Kwok先生及Ace Decade关系的背景，是一项安排：Kwok先生应UBS请求，协助UBS成为UBS H-Shares的配售代理；作为回报，UBS提出协助及建议其以有利条件收购其获任为配售代理的股份。\n\n(4) Wong先生多次表示，其本人及UBS正为保护和促进Kwok先生及Ace Decade在收购配售股份及为此提供资金方面的最佳利益而行事，包括以下所有事项：(a) 制定该项投资的结构和融资计划；(b) 提供有关该项投资结构、融资及优点的信息；以及(c) 就该项投资的结构、融资及优点提供建议。重复上文第[17]、[40]及[47]段。\n\n(5) Wong先生多次表示，Kwok先生及Ace Decade应信赖并依靠Wong先生及UBS。重复上文第[17]、[40]及[47]段。\n\n(6) UBS通过Wong先生，实际上向Kwok先生及Ace Decade提供了信息和建议，且其知悉并意图使二者依赖该等信息和建议。重复上文第[18]至[20]、[21]至[23]、[24]、[28]、[39]及[47]段。\n\n(7) 如第[17]段所述，Wong先生表示，其本人及UBS具备为Kwok先生设计有利收购结构的经验和专业知识，并具备就配售股份等配售投资、投资的结构安排及其融资向Kwok先生（其后亦向Ace Decade）提供建议的经验和专业知识。\n\n(8) 在就UBS作为贷款文件项下交易对手方的政策、意图和／或可能行为提供信息和建议时，Wong先生及UBS所涉及的事项属于UBS独有知悉范围，Kwok先生及Ace Decade无法独立核实该等事项，且Wong先生及UBS知悉Kwok先生及Ace Decade必须依赖UBS向其传达的事项。\n\n违反义务\n\n78. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，在签署十二月合同之前及其后在签署贷款文件之前，向Ace Decade和／或Kwok先生作出了虚假和误导性陈述，如上文所述。尤其是：\n\n(1) UBS表示，其有一项将适用于Ace Decade及Kwok先生（因而亦适用于作为其居间方的Dawn State）的政策，即如价格在短期内波动，其不会要求支付保证金或强制提前还款。重复上文第[39]、[43]及[47]段。该等陈述虚假且具有误导性，因为（如可从上文第[64]至[68]段所陈述的UBS实际行为推断），UBS并无该等政策，和／或无意将该等政策适用于Kwok先生、Ace Decade和／或Dawn State；上述情形系由代表UBS London行事的决策者和／或就订立及执行贷款文件项下权利而言相关的UBS HK（香港瑞银）的决策者（以下简称“决策者”）所作。\n\n(2) UBS表示，其有一项将适用于Ace Decade及Kwok先生（因而亦适用于作为其居间方的Dawn State）的政策，即如UBS有必要要求支付保证金或强制提前还款，UBS将与其合作，使其能够满足任何要求，并允许其有合理时间履行，包括在必要时给予长于《融资协议》所规定的付款期限；且UBS不会因任何追加保证金通知而出售任何股份，除非已给予Ace Decade充分的付款时间。重复上文第[39]、[43]及[47]段。该等陈述虚假且具有误导性，因为（如可从上文第[64]至[68]段所陈述的UBS实际行为推断），UBS通过其决策者并无该等政策，和／或无意将该等政策适用于Kwok先生、Ace Decade和／或Dawn State。\n\n（3）UBS（瑞银）称，其拟以其声称对待平安股东的方式对待Ace Decade（艾斯德凯德）及Kwok先生（郭先生）（因此亦对待作为其二者中介方的Dawn State（道恩州））。兹重述上文第[19]、[39]、[42]至[43]及[47]段。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，原因在于（可由上文第[64]至[68]段所主张的UBS实际行为推断），UBS经由其决策人员并无该等意图，而是拟根据《贷款文件》的条款及／或以最有利于UBS的方式行使《贷款文件》赋予其的所有及任何权利。\n\n（4）UBS称，其事实上已按照上文第（3）及（4）分项所主张的所谓政策对待平安股东，而这证明了UBS拟在《贷款文件》项下采取并将会（或可合理预期会）采取的做法。兹重述上文第[19]、[39]、[42]至[43]及[47]段。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，原因在于：\n\n（a）在2015年7月中旬或前后Wong先生（黄先生）与Kwok先生之间的谈话中，Wong先生表示（与其先前陈述相反），平安股东事实上曾收到追缴保证金通知（即要求缴纳保证金或强制提前还款的要求），且已根据相关《贷款文件》的条款满足该等要求。如属实，则UBS先前的陈述属虚假及误导性陈述。\n\n（b）或者，如UBS确如上文第[42]至[43]段所主张的方式对待平安股东，则UBS的陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，原因在于，对平安股东的该等对待并不能证明UBS经由其决策人员拟在《贷款文件》项下采取并将会（或可合理预期会）采取的做法。\n\n（5）UBS称，就收购配售股份及为此提供资金而言，其拟为且正在为Kwok先生及Ace Decade的最佳利益行事。兹重述上文第[17]、[40]及[47]段。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，原因在于（可由上文第[63]至[68]段所主张的UBS实际行为推断），UBS经由其决策人员并不拟为Kwok先生或Ace Decade的最佳利益行事，而是拟作为Dawn State的合同相对方，为其自身利益行事，而不顾对Kwok先生及Ace Decade造成的后果。\n\n（6）UBS称，其正以有利条款或以“最优惠条款”向Dawn State（因此实际上向Ace Decade）提供贷款融资。兹重述上文第[11]及[19]段。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，原因在于（可由上文第[63]段所主张的事项推断），UBS经由其决策人员拟向其提供对UBS有利、但对Dawn State、Ace Decade及Kwok先生极为不利的融资。\n\n79. UBS由Wong先生作为UBS代理人、在其授权的职务及权限范围内行事时作出该等虚假陈述，构成过失，原因在于，在其作出该等陈述时或之前，Wong先生已：\n\n过失具体事项\n\n（1）未采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS，尤其是UBS London（瑞银伦敦）（经由相关决策人员），是否拟为及／或正在为Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的最佳利益行事。\n\n（2）未采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS，尤其是UBS London（经由相关决策人员），是否将向Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade提供有利条款及／或“最优惠条款”的融资。\n\n（3）未采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS是否具有上文第[78(1)]及[78(2)]段所主张的政策，及／或确定UBS London（经由相关决策人员）是否事实上拟将该等政策适用于Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade（因此亦适用于作为其二者中介方的Dawn State），如上文第[78(3)]至[78(6)]段所主张。\n\n（4）未采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS，尤其是UBS London（经由相关决策人员），是否事实上拟以其声称对待平安股东的相同方式对待Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade。\n\n（5）未采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS是否事实上以上文第[42]至[43]段所主张的方式对待平安股东。\n\n（6）未采取额外或进一步的合理措施，以保护Kwok先生及Ace Decade免于因UBS作出的虚假或误导性陈述而遭受损失或损害。\n\n80. UBS由Wong先生作为UBS代理人、在其授权的职务及权限范围内行事时，向Ace Decade及／或Kwok先生提供了如上所述的过失意见。就UBS所提供意见的内容而言：\n\n（1）如第[19]段所主张，UBS向Kwok先生及Ace Decade建议，使用UBS London提供的贷款资金进行杠杆投资符合其最佳利益，且UBS提供的任何杠杆融资在任何情况下均将按最优惠条款提供。\n\n（2）如第[39]及[47]段所主张，UBS向Kwok先生及Ace Decade建议：\n\n（a）其不应担忧《融资协议》中所载条款中的追缴保证金及强制提前还款规定；并且，因此\n\n（b）该等贷款文件对Ace Decade而言仍具有商业上的有利性。该意见援引UBS在第[78]段所主张的陈述作为支持。\n\n81. UBS由Wong先生作为UBS代理人、在其授权的职务及权限范围内行事时提供该意见，构成过失，原因在于：\n\n过失具体事项\n\n（1）使用UBS London的贷款资金进行该项投资，并且无论如何按《贷款文件》的条款进行该项投资，不符合Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的利益（这对Wong先生及UBS而言必定或应当显而易见），包括因为：\n\n（a）正如Kwok先生已向Wong先生解释，其与Ace Decade无需贷款资金即可进行该项投资，而可利用其自身资源进行投资；以及\n\n（b）UBS London提供的贷款资金（特别是在《贷款文件》的条款下，且在上文第[78]段所主张的陈述属虚假的情况下）造成一种风险（及／或过度风险），即一旦该等股份价值发生波动，UBS将对UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）行使执行权，从而使Kwok先生及Ace Decade遭受损失。\n\n（2）UBS本应在采取合理谨慎措施后向Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade建议，UBS London很有可能会（与第[78]段所主张的陈述相反）严格按照其条款行使《融资协议》第7.7条及第18条项下的严格权利，并且不会按照作为上文第[78]段所主张陈述对象的政策行事。在不影响前述一般性的情况下，UBS作出上文第98段所主张的陈述后，负有纠正Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade据以行事的任何误解、误会或信息不足基础的义务。\n\n（3）UBS本应在采取合理谨慎措施后向Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade建议，如UBS H-Shares价值发生任何波动，UBS London很有可能会按照《融资及担保协议》的严格条款对UBS H-Shares行使执行权。\n\n（4）因此，UBS本应在采取合理谨慎措施后建议，依照《贷款文件》的条款进行该项投资，不符合Kwok先生（因而亦不符合Ace Decade）的明确意愿，即任何杠杆投资仅应在以下基础上进行：不得因配售股份的短期价格波动而触发提供额外担保物或偿还贷款。\n\n（5）UBS向Kwok先生及Ace Decade提供的贷款资金并非（UBS必定或应当知道）有利条款（更遑论最优惠条款）的融资，而是按极为不利的条款提供的融资。兹重述上文第[63]段。\n\n（6）鉴于UBS London的实际政策及意图，Kwok先生及Ace Decade本应（UBS必定或应当知道）担忧《融资协议》第7.7条及第18.1条项下的强制提前还款及追缴保证金条款，UBS本应建议该等条款对该项投资的结果构成重大风险。\n\n（7）UBS未采取合理措施，以通过以下方式保护Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的最佳利益：\n\n（a）告知Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade，UBS拟议的融资并非按有利条款或“最优惠条款”提供的融资；\n\n（b）告知Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade与《融资协议》第7.7条及第18.1条条款有关的风险；\n\n（i）一旦知悉或怀疑向其作出的任何陈述或提供的任何意见属虚假、有瑕疵、误导性或不完整，即尽快告知Kwok先生及Ace Decade。\n\n（ii）采取额外或进一步的合理措施，以保护Kwok先生及Ace Decade免于遭受损失或损害，或以其他方式保护其利益。\n\nAce Decade的请求\n\n82. Ace Decade提出因UBS违反上文所主张义务而产生的主要请求。\n\n83. Ace Decade通过以下方式（各项均为进一步或替代性主张），合理且可预见地依赖了上文具体列明的陈述及／或意见，以及UBS的技能和判断：\n\n（1）按第[33]段所具体列明的内容订立《共同投资协议》；\n\n（2）在认购完成前，未退出《共同投资协议》或以其他方式阻止该项投资完成；\n\n（3）促使或允许Dawn State按上文第[36]段所具体列明的内容订立《融资函》；\n\n（4）未阻止Dawn State订立《贷款文件》，而是促使其在未使用UBS贷款资金的情况下取得UBS H-Shares；及／或\n\n（5）如（与原告方的主张相反）Dawn State会使用UBS的贷款融资并按相同条款取得UBS H-Shares，未确保Dawn State可即时获得足够资金，以满足任何该等追缴保证金要求及／或还款。\n\n（6）原告方兹重述上文第[61]及[62]段。\n\n84. UBS的过失已致Ace Decade遭受损失及损害。尤其是（各项均为进一步或替代性主张）：\n\nAce Decade的损失具体事项\n\n（1）Ace Decade已损失其全部货币出资，即US\\$500 million，减去UBS在出售所收购股份后向Ace Decade结算的HK\\$36,621,693.83，按当时汇率约为US\\$4.7 million：US\\$495,300,000；\n\n（2）如Ace Decade在签署《共同投资协议》后会完全退出该项投资（而非通过Dawn State进行投资，但资金来自Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade自身资源或替代贷款融资），Ace Decade已损失其全部货币出资，即US\\$500 million，减去UBS在出售所收购股份后向Ace Decade结算的HK\\$36,621,693.83，按当时汇率约为US\\$4.7 million，以及根据《共同投资协议》第6.5条本应向Haixia Fund（海峡基金）支付的US\\$812,500费用：US\\$494,487,500；\n\n（3）其投资于UBS H-Shares本可取得的回报所代表的损失，金额将以专家证据为基础确定。\n\nKwok先生的请求\n\n85. 郭先生（Mr Kwok）的主张仅作为 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）主张的替代性主张而提出，前提是 UBS（瑞银）否认并成功抗辩其上述任何被指称的不当行为可由 Ace Decade 提起诉讼。\n\n86. 郭先生还以合理且可预见的方式依赖上述具体陈述和／或建议，以及 UBS 的技能和判断，具体如下（各项均为进一步或替代性事项）：\n\n(1) 促使或允许 Ace Decade 按照第[33]段所具体说明订立 Co-Investment Agreement（共同投资协议）；\n\n(2) 未促使 Ace Decade 退出共同投资协议，或未以其他方式阻止该项投资在认购完成前完成；\n\n(3) 促使或允许 Dawn State（道恩州）按照上文第[36]段所具体说明订立 Financing Letter（融资函）；\n\n(4) 未阻止 Dawn State 订立 Lending Documents（贷款文件），反而促使其在未获得 UBS 贷款资金的情况下取得 UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）；和／或\n\n(5) 如（与原告的主张相反）Dawn State 本会使用 UBS 提供的贷款融资并按相同条款取得 UBS H-Shares，未确保 Dawn State 可立即取得足够资金以应付任何该等追加保证金要求和／或还款。\n\n(6) 原告重复援引上文第[61]及[62]段。\n\n87. UBS 的过失致使郭先生遭受损失和损害，其数额与 Ace Decade 相同。上文第[84]段经作必要变更后重复援引。\n\nDAWN STATE 的主张\n\n出售所取得的H股\n\n88. 2015年7月7日，因发生违约事件，UBS 声称已向 Dawn State 发出通知，告知其有权就 Charged Assets（已设押资产）（即 UBS H-Shares）行使“出售权”。上文第[67]段予以重复援引。UBS London（瑞银伦敦）出售 UBS H-Shares 的合同权利载于 Security Agreement（担保协议）第9.3(a)(i)及9.4条。\n\n89. 据原告所知及所信，其后 UBS 声称行使其出售权，并出售了全部 UBS H-Shares。除上文第[69]段所述外，原告并不知悉根据该项声称权利进行出售的详情。\n\n90. 上文第[51](3)段予以重复援引。在出售 UBS H-Shares 时，UBS 正行使经担保协议第8条保留及修订的《Law of Property Act 1925》（“LPA”）s.101 规定的法定“出售权”，因此当时及现在均受法律和衡平法上对行使该等权力的抵押权人或担保权人施加的责任及义务所约束。\n\n91. 据此，任何导致或旨在使 UBS 绝对取得所取得股份的 UBS H-Shares 声称出售，均属无效且不发生效力。任何声称出售予 UBS 本身的 UBS H-Shares，仍将受 Dawn State 的权利以及 UBS 在贷款文件条款下的义务所约束。\n\n92. 否则（但以从上述收益或利润中清偿 Dawn State 可证明的成本及负债为前提），UBS 当时及现在均负有立即向 Dawn State 交账的义务：(1) 就其对已抵押予其、为其设定担保，或由其以 Custodian（保管人）身份持有的所取得H股的处置；和／或 (2) 就其因出售而取得的上述所取得H股的任何收益；以及 (3) 就其因上文第[69]段所具体说明的出售或上述其他处置而取得的任何利润；\n\n93. 进一步或作为替代，上述收益和／或利润根据 LPA s.105 为 Dawn State 设立法定信托，或作为替代，为 Dawn State 设立推定信托。\n\n94. 进一步或作为替代，UBS 在行使其出售权时，还负有以合理技能及谨慎为所取得H股取得适当价格的义务。在任何声称出售 UBS H-Shares 的行为有效的范围内，原告认为 UBS 在进行出售时未以合理技能行事，理由如下：\n\n过失详情\n\n(1) 未考虑或未充分考虑，就在 HKEX（香港交易所）进行的大宗交易而言，对H股施加的折价是否过高；\n\n(2) 未考虑或未充分考虑，该等股份是否可按较小折价出售；\n\n(3) 未考虑或未充分考虑海通（Haitong）股份暂停交易（或可能暂停交易）的影响；\n\n(4) 未考虑或未充分考虑海通进行股份回购的影响。上文第[72]及[72]段予以重复援引；\n\n(5) 未给予股份回购产生效力的充分时间；以及\n\n(6) 未采取额外或进一步的合理措施，以确保为所取得H股取得适当价格。\n\n95. 由于 UBS 的过失，Dawn State 遭受损失，该损失包括股份实际出售价格与该等股份本可合理取得的价格之间的差额。原告保留在 UBS 提供其所实施的 UBS H-Shares 出售详情后进一步主张的权利。\n\n如 UBS 取得所取得H股时提出的替代性主张\n\n96. UBS 于2015年7月7日或其后任何时间，均未采取任何确定步骤以取得所取得H股，或作为替代，将该等步骤通知 UBS。因此，UBS 从未按照担保协议第9.3(a)(ii)条或 2003 Regulations（2003年条例）Regulation 17 取得所取得H股。\n\n97. 如与原告的主张相反，UBS 确曾声称并有效地根据 2003 Regulations Regulation 17 取得所取得H股，则该等取得不可能发生于 UBS 向 Dawn State 发出行使取得权通知之前。如与原告的主张相反，该等通知曾经发出，则在2015年7月14日之前并未发出该等通知。\n\n98. 如行使取得权，UBS 在任何时候均负有且现在仍负有以下义务：(1) 于取得时以商业上合理的方式对 UBS H-Shares 估值；及 (2) 就该价值超出 Dawn State 在担保协议下对 UBS 所负债务的任何数额作出适当交账。\n\n99. UBS 声称按每股 HK\\$11.12 记入的价值（上文第[73]段已具体说明），不可能反映所取得H股于任何相关日期的商业上合理价值。尤其是（但不限于），该每股 HK\\$11.12 的记账价值声称是通过对2015年7月7日的收市价施加折价计算得出，而非于任何可能的取得日期计算得出。\n\n100. 因此，UBS 应负有以下义务：(1) 令法院信纳，UBS H-Shares 已于取得日期以商业上合理的方式估值；及 (2) 如其不能如此证明，则就 UBS H-Shares 于取得日期的商业上合理价值超出 Dawn State 在担保协议下对 UBS 所负债务的任何数额，向 Dawn State 交账。\n\n请求的救济\n\n101. 据此，Ace Decade 有权获得：\n\n(1) 上文第[84]段所主张的损害赔偿，金额至少为 US\\$495,300,000。按 XE.com 中间市场汇率，该金额于本诉状日期相当于约 £402,032,000。\n\n(2) 根据 s.35A Senior Courts Act 1981（“SCA 1981”），按年利率8%计算的该金额单利。\n\n102. 作为上文第[101]段的替代，郭先生有权获得：\n\n(1) 上文第[87]段所主张的损害赔偿，金额至少为 US\\$495,300,000。按 XE.com 中间市场汇率，该金额于本诉状日期相当于约 £402,032,000。\n\n(2) 根据 SCA 1981 s.35A，按年利率8%计算的该金额单利。\n\n103. 上文第[101]及[102]段所主张的金额以美元（US\\$）提出，因为这是原告遭受该等损失所使用的货币。\n\n104. 此外，或作为替代，据此 Dawn State 有权获得：\n\n(1) 命令 UBS 就其作为保管人持有的所取得H股进行普通形式的交账。上文第[92]段予以重复援引。\n\n(2) 命令 UBS 就上文第[92](3)段所具体说明情形产生的利润进行交账。\n\n(3) 宣告上文第[92]段所述任何可识别利润或收益，为 Dawn State 以法定信托或作为替代以推定信托持有。上文第[93]段予以重复援引；\n\n(4) 此外或作为替代，就 UBS 出售所取得H股的金额与上述股份本可合理取得的价值之间的差额，判给损害赔偿或衡平法补偿。上文第[94]及[95]段予以重复援引。\n\n(5) 作为替代，UBS 向 Dawn State 交账的金额与取得时资产的商业上合理价值之间的差额，并作为债务提出主张。上文第[100]段予以重复援引。\n\n(6) 此外，Dawn State 根据法院的衡平法管辖权和／或 SCA 1981 s.35A，有权获得：(a) 对上文第(1)至(3)项所列金额按复利或作为替代按单利计算的利息；及 (b) 对上文第(4)及(5)项所列金额按8%利率计算的单利。\n\n以及原告请求：\n\n(1) 上述损害赔偿\n\n(2) 上述命令\n\n(3) 上述宣告\n\n(4) UBS 所交账金额与H股商业上合理价值之间作为债务主张的差额\n\n(5) 上述利息\n\n(6) 进一步及其他救济\n\n(7) 诉讼费用\n\nSA'AD HOSSAIN QC（萨阿德·侯赛因御用大律师）\n\nSEBASTIAN ISAAC（塞巴斯蒂安·艾萨克）\n\nMATTHEW HOYLE（马修·霍伊尔）\n\n本人（第一原告）相信本起诉状中陈述的事实属实。本人明白，任何人在并无诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促使作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签名：\n\n姓名：Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）\n\n日期：23 September 2020\n\n第二原告相信本起诉状中陈述的事实属实。本人明白，任何人在并无诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促使作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签名：\n\n姓名：Yanping (Yvette) Wang（王雁平）\n\n日期：23 September 2020\n\n第三原告相信本起诉状中陈述的事实属实。本人明白，任何人在并无诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促使作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签名：\n\n姓名：Yanping (Yvette) Wang（王雁平）\n\n日期：23 September 2020","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CIPA","Guo"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":15341,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:44:08"}