{"id":"court_ctb_644_21","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":644,"sub_number":21,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2022-07-29","title":"![](_page_0_Picture_2.jpeg) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES COMMERCIAL CO","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"Case 22-50073 Doc 644-21 Filed 07/29/22 Entered 07/29/22 13:36:15 Page 1 of 39\n\n![](_page_0_Picture_2.jpeg)\n\nIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES COMMERCIAL COURT (QBD)\n\nClaim No. CL-2020-000345\n\nBETWEEN:-\n\n(1) KWOK HO WAN\n\n(2) ACE DECADE HOLDINGS LIMITED\n\nDAWN STATE LIMITED (3)\n\nClaimants\n\n- and -\n\nUBS AG\n\nDefendant\n\n#### PARTICULARS OF CLAIM\n\n#### PARTIES\n\n- 1. The First Claimant (\"Mr Kwok\") is a high net worth individual resident since early 2015 in New York State, USA. Mr Kwok was formerly resident in the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\"), where he was known by his Mandarin language name, Guo Wengui. Mr Kwok is a political opponent of the PRC government, and by the time of the events giving rise to these claims he was already in a hostile relationship with the PRC authorities.\n- 2. The Second Claimant (\"Ace Decade\") is a private limited company incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with its registered address at P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands. Ace Decade was incorporated on 18 June 2014 and acquired by Mr Kwok on or around 10 November 2014 as part of the preparations for the (then) proposed acquisition of shares in the Chinese company, Haitong Securities Company Limited (\"Haitong\").\n- 3. The Third Claimant (\"Dawn State\") is also a private limited company incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with its registered address at P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands.\n\n### Case-&&&&&&===================================================================================================================================================================\n\n- 4. Since 18 September 2015, Dawn State has been owned and controlled by Ace Decade. Prior to 18 September 2015, Dawn State was owned and controlled by the Chinese investment services provider, Haixia Capital Management Company Ltd (\"Haixia\"), through a vehicle called Haixia Capital Investment Fund (Fujian) Limited Partnership (\"Haixia Fund\") which was managed by Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co. Ltd (\"Haixia Management\"). Dawn State was the vehicle used for the acquisition of shares in Haitong in 2015 (as pleaded in more detail in the body of this Particulars of Claim (\"PoC\"), subject to a contractual right under which Ace Decade could acquire Dawn State after the Haitong share acquisition.\n- 5. The Defendant (\"UBS\"), is a company incorporated in Switzerland, with its registered office address at Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland. UBS conducts business globally, providing retail and investment banking, wealth management and other financial services. At all relevant times UBS conducted this business through both its Swiss headquarters and also branches located, inter alia, in Hong Kong (\"UBS HK\") and in London (\"UBS London\"), the latter being, by agreement of the parties, designated as the counterparty for all of the contracts relevant to the claims in this action, as pleaded further below. UBS London has at all times held permissions to provide regulated services from the Financial Conduct Authority (Reference Number 186958) and was authorised to act for and enter into contractual agreements as UBS.\n- 6. matter of the Claimants' claims through UBS London. In the discussions and negotiations leading to those contracts, UBS was represented primarily by its employee Mr Stephen Wong (\"Mr Wong\"). Mr Wong was at that time a Managing Director in the Wealth Management Division of UBS, based at the offices of UBS HK. Mr Kwok was first introduced to Mr Wong in around 2006 or 2007.\n\n#### THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIMS\n\n#### Background to the Haitong Investment\n\n7. In or around Autumn 2013, Mr Kwok was approached by the CEO of Haitong, Mr Wang Kaiguo (\"Mr Wang\"), who was seeking to encourage Mr Kwok to make a substantial equity investment in Haitong. Haitong is a major Chinese securities firm, engaged in the provision of stocks and derivatives brokerage, as well as investment banking, asset management, private equity, alternative investments, and financial leasing services. Haitong is one of the largest and longest established financial services providers in the PRC. Haitong's shares are traded on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges (\"SSE\" and \"HKEX\" respectively). Haitong's shares trading on the HKEX are known as \"H-Shares.\" Following the approach from Mr\n\n### Case 33 22800973 DB664227\n\nWang, Mr Kwok resolved to invest approximately US\\$3 billion in H-Shares in order to obtain a major stake in Haitong. This investment was to be made through the issue of new H-Shares by Haitong, and their allotment to companies controlled by Mr Kwok.\n\n#### Initial involvement of UBS\n\n- 8. Following the discussions with Mr Wang, Mr Kwok communicated his intention to acquire a substantial stake in Haitong to Mr Hank Lo, a Hong Kong solicitor and partner in the firm Stevenson, Wong & Co (\"Stevenson Wong\"). Mr Kwok retained Stevenson Wong to advise him on the proposed acquisition.\n- 9. Mr Lo had an established relationship with Mr Wong and UBS, the details of which are not known to Mr Kwok, and it was Mr Lo who first introduced Mr Kwok to Mr Wong in or around 2006-7. By the end of 2013, Mr Wong had cultivated a close personal relationship with Mr Kwok and had successfully induced Mr Kwok to consider and treat him as a trusted adviser and personal friend.\n- 10. At some point in the fourth quarter of 2013, Mr Lo informed Mr Wong of Mr Kwok's intention to acquire a stake in Haitong. The Claimants do not know when Mr Lo communicated this to Mr Wong. Mr Kwok was not aware that Mr Lo intended to inform Mr Wong or UBS until after the event, although Mr Kwok did not (after the event) object to him doing so.\n- 11. In or around December 2013, Mr Wong visited Mr Kwok at his residence in Hong Kong. He informed Mr Kwok that UBS had become aware that Haitong would be issuing new H-Shares (the \"Placement Shares\") and that UBS wished to participate as a placing agent. Mr Wong used his mobile telephone to open a call with senior UBS executives, who Mr Kwok understood were based in Switzerland. Mr Kwok cannot now recall the names of the individuals. Those senior UBS executives and Mr Wong told Mr Kwok (the following sub-paragraphs pleading only the gist of what they said):\n\t- (1) UBS wished to become a broker in the sale of the Placement Shares, and wanted Mr Kwok to introduce and commend UBS to Haitong for that role;\n\t- (2) If Mr Kwok assisted UBS in that way, UBS would assist and advise him in acquiring the shares for which it was made broker or placement agent in a way which was advantageous for Mr Kwok;\n\t- (3) Although they knew that Mr Kwok's intention was to acquire the shares for himself, UBS itself or investors with whom UBS had a relations themselves would be interested in\n\npurchasing the shares at a substantial uplift on the likely offer price if Mr Kwok was willing to on-sell them.\n\n- 12. Following this meeting, Mr Kwok resolved to work with UBS and to this end, at some time in early 2014, Mr Kwok told Mr Wang that he intended to invest in the new issue of H-Shares, and asked Mr Wang to include UBS as one of the placees of the Placement Shares.\n- 13. In July or August 2014 Haitong resolved to issue the H-Shares via seven placees, one of which was UBS. Another company advising and assisting Mr Kwok on a separate acquisition of H-Shares, Macquarie Capital Securities Limited (\"Macquarie\"), was to be the placee in respect of three allocations of the Placement Shares. Together, UBS and Macquarie would place around 12% of Haitong's total issued shareholding.\n\n#### Mr Wong's initial advisory work\n\n- 14. Following this meeting, Mr Kwok entered into discussions with UBS (through Mr Wong) in relation to the structuring of his planned investment\") in the Placement Shares for which UBS was the placing agent (the \"UBS H-Shares\"). In discussions in and around late March and April 2014, Mr Wong said that he would provide a plan for the \"Haitong project,\" including a proposed structure through which Mr Kwok could acquire the UBS H-Shares.\n- 15. As a securities company incorporated and operating in the PRC, Haitong was at all relevant times subject to regulation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the \"CSRC\"). The relevant PRC laws required the CSRC to give approval if any person acquired or actually controlled more than 5% shareholdings of the total issued capital of Haitong.\n- 16. It was discussed between Mr Kwok and Mr Wong that Mr Kwok intended to invest in excess of US\\$3 billion in total, which would considerably exceed this threshold and therefore require approval by the CSRC. The advice which Mr Kwok received from UBS included, in particular, devising a structure for the acquisition of the Placement Shares which would avoid the requirement for CSRC approval in a manner which complied with the relevant PRC laws.\n- 17. In the course of these conversations:\n\t- (1) > Mr Wong repeatedly told Mr Kwok that he, under the direction of UBS senior executives, would work to advance Mr Kwok's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares, in line with the commitment made in December 2013. From this period until the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, Mr Kwok frequently repeated and reaffirmed\n\n### Case222-229767799664224 Eilert9777922 Eriester12722223-14380 Page Page Page Sol\n\nthe assertion that he and UBS were working in Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS;\n\n- (2) Mr Wong said that he and UBS would devise the structure for the acquisition in a way which was as advantageous as possible for Mr Kwok; and\n- (3) Mr Wong held himself and UBS out as having the experience and expertise to devise an advantageous structure for the acquisition for Mr Kwok and advising Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) with respect to investments in placements such as that for the Placement Shares, the structuring of the investments, and the financing thereof.\n- 18. In or around June 2014, UBS, through Mr Wong, gave initial advice regarding the structure for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. This advice was given orally at meetings in Mr Kwok's office (49/F, Bank of China Tower, No. 1, Garden Road, Hong Kong) and his personal residence in Hong Kong. In summary (the following sub-paragraphs pleading only the gist of UBS' advice), Mr Wong advised Mr Kwok: (1) Not to purchase the UBS H-Shares through a company beneficially owned or controlled by him, as this would require CSRC approval; (2) Instead, to set up a structure (which would be arranged by UBS) under which the UBS H-Shares would be acquired by a company controlled by a third-party intermediary, which acquisition would not require CSRC approval; and (3) To make the investment on a leveraged basis, with acquisition finance from UBS.\n- 19. Mr Kwok was initially reluctant to make a leveraged investment because he did not require bank finance in order to acquire the UBS H-Shares and had intended to make the acquisition using cash. However, Mr Wong advised him that:\n\t- (1) If UBS were to proceed with structuring the Investment it would have to be on the basis that the bank would provide margin finance for the purchase of the UBS H-Shares, as this would be how UBS would receive its profit from the transaction;\n\t- (2) I was anyway in Mr Kwok's best interests to make a leveraged investment, because it would enable him to obtain the desired number of shares without committing the full amount of his own capital;\n\t- (3) Any leveraged finance provided by UBS would in any event be upon the 'best passible term's\n\t- (4) The terms of any leveraged finance would be consistent with Mr Kwok's requirement that there should be no provisions requiring (i) the provision of additional collateral or (ii) the mandatory repayment of the loan (which were referred to compendiously by both Mr\n\n### Cases & & Poly & Ported & 2 = 1 = 16 & 0 P = 2 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 2 = 1 = 2 = 1 = 2 = 1 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2 = 2\n\nKwok and Mr Wong as \"margin calls\" without differentiation) as a result of short term price fluctuations of the Placement Shares;\n\n- (5) UBS would give Mr Kwok adequate time to meet any other margin calls, so that if Mr Kwok had (as in fact, he did) the ability to fund the whole of the acquisition without loan financing, UBS would not enforce against the security before additional funds could be provided by Mr Kwok;\n- (6) In illustrating the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of UBS H-Shares, Mr Wong repeatedly (during this period, and thereafter) referred to a previous high value leveraged transaction funded by UBS, under which it had provided funding for the acquisition of a much larger stake in the Chinese insurance company, Ping An (the \"Ping An Deal\"). The details of the information provided by Mr Wong in relation to the Ping An Deal between June 2014 and December 2014 are summarised at paragraph 42 below.\n- 20. To the best of Mr Kwok's recollection, this advice was first given in or around June 2014. However, these matters were the subject of repeated discussion between Mr. Wong and Mr Kwok in the summer and autumn of 2014, and thereafter. Mr Kwok cannot be certain as to what representations were made to him by UBS on each specific occasion, but recalls the effect of the advice as a whole.\n\n#### Further Structuring Advice\n\n- 21. From in or around July 2014 onwards, UBS continued to advise Mr Kwok and (from 10 November 2014) Ace Decade regarding the proposed structure and financing for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. In particular, Mr Wong went on further to advise Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) on the structuring of the acquisition, including further advising in relation to the requirement for approval by the CSRC of acquisitions of Haitong in excess of 5% of the company's share capital; and by advising that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade select Haixia as the intermediary for the Investment.\n- 22. In reliance on this advice, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade selected Haixia to act as intermediary for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, and ultimately appointed Haixia for that purpose under a Co-Investment Agreement dated 18 December 2014 (the \"Co-Investment Agreement\").\n- 23. Although Mr Wong had told Mr Kwok and Ace Decade that Haixia was independent of UBS, it is in fact controlled by State Development and Investment Corporation (\"SDIC\"), which is a joint venture partner of UBS, with both co-owning an investment fund called \"UBS SDIC\".\n\nTo facilitate the investment in the Placement Shares, on 23 October 2014 Haixia caused the incorporation of Dawn State through its subsidiary Haixia Fund. Dawn State was at all relevant times until its transfer to Ace Decade managed by Mr Lu Bo (\"Mr Lu\"), a senior employee of Haixia who was previously employed by UBS SDIC.\n\n24. Ace Decade was acquired on 10 November 2014 by Mr Kwok for the purpose of acting as the said investment vehicle. On the same day, on the advice of Mr Wong, an employee of Mr Kwok, Ms Yu Yong (\"Ms Yu\") became its nominee shareholder and director.\n\n#### Preparation of the December Contracts\n\n- 25. In or around late October and early November 2014, UBS (primarily through Mr Wong), Haixia (primarily through Mr Lu) and Ace Decade (primarily through Mr Kwok and Ms Yu) began making preparations to subscribe for the UBS H-Shares.\n- 26. On or around 13 November 2014 there was an initial conference call between Stevenson Wong and Norton Rose Fulbright (\"Norton Rose\"), the lawyers engaged by Haixia to act on the transaction, at which they agreed that Norton Rose would draft a Co-Investment Agreement between Haixia, Dawn State and Ace Decade in relation to the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares.\n- 27. On or around 14 November 2014, Ace Decade and Dawn State entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to which Dawn State was to provide services to Ace Decade in return for a non-refundable fee equal to 65 basis points of the total invested capital, subject to a minimum of US\\$5,000,000.\n- 28. During this period, leading up to the agreement by Dawn State to subscribe for the UBS H-Shares, there were ongoing discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in relation to the structuring and financing of the acquisition. During those discussions Mr Wong repeated and elaborated on the representations pleaded at paragraph 19 above. The Claimants plead further in relation to these representations at paragraphs 39 to 40, 47 and 78 below.\n- 29. These preparations led to Ace Decade, Dawn State and UBS entering into a series of arrangements designed to allow Ace Decade to participate in the acquisition of UBS H-Shares through Dawn State (together, the \"December Contracts\"). The December Contracts were:\n\t- (1) A custody agreement between Dawn State and UBS dated 12 December 2014 (the \"Custody Agreement\");\n\t- (2) A Co-Investment Agreement between Ace Decade, Dawn State and Haixia dated 18 December 2014;\n- (3) A letter agreement between Haixia Management and Ace Decade dated 18 December 2014 (the \"Letter Agreement\");\n- (4) A financing letter entitled \"Project Pipe Financing Latter\" between Dawn State and UBS London dated 19 December 2014 (the \"Financing Letter\").\n- 30. The Claimants plead further as to the entry into the December Contracts and their terms at paragraphs 32 to 37 below.\n- 31. These preparations also led to Dawn State entering into a subscription agreement with Haitong dated 19 December 2014 (the \"Subscription Agreement\"). The Claimants plead further in relation to the execution and terms of the Subscription Agreement at paragraph 44 below.\n\n#### The December Contracts\n\n- 32. On or around 12 December 2014, Dawn State and UBS London entered into the Custody Agreement in relation (among other things) to the custody of the UBS H-Shares. The Claimants will refer to the Custody Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the terms of the Custody Agreement, Dawn State agreed that all of the UBS H-Shares (once acquired) would be held with UBS London. The purpose and effect of the Custody Agreement was to ensure that the UBS H-Shares would be available for enforcement by UBS London of its rights under the (then) proposed facility agreement and security agreement to be entered into by Dawn State and UBS London in relation to the provision of finance for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. The Custody Agreement was governed by the law of England and Wales, and provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts in respect of any disputes.\n- 33. On or around 18 December 2014, Ace Decade, Dawn State and Haixia entered into the Co-Investment Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Co-Investment at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, this agreement provided that:\n\t- (1) Pursuant to this agreement, Haixia agreed to extend to Ace Decade a right to participate in the share subscription in the Target Company (i.e. Haitong) (defined as \"the Project\"), upon receipt by Haixia of US\\$500 million (the \"Monetaty Contribution\"). In addition, it was noted that it was contemplated that Dawn State would arrange for loan financing in an amount of US\\$750 million, which together with the Monetary Contribution constitutes the \"Co-Investment Amount\".\n\t- (2) At Clause 1.1, for Haixia Fund to receive a substantial fee for its role in the Project.\n- (3) At Clause 3, headed \"Nature of the Right\", that Ace Decade would have only a contractual right to participate in the Project, and no immediate proprietary interest in Dawn State or the UBS H-Shares which it acquired.\n- (4) At Clause 6.5:\n\n\"In the event that the Project is not completed for any reasons, in consideration of Haisia Fund and the Company arranging for the Project and the loan financing(s) with commercial banks for the benefit of the Investor:\n\n(a) the Investor agrees that the Company and/ or Haisia Fund shall receive an arrangement fee of the higher amount of (i) 0.065% of the Co-investment Amount (i.e. US\\$1,250 million); and (ii) US\\$500,000 upon the Company entering into the share subscription agreement(s) in relation to the Project\"\n\n- 34. Also, on or around 18 December 2014, Haixia Management and Ace Decade entered into the Letter Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Letter Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Among other things, the Letter Agreement provided as follows:\n\t- (1) Under the heading \"Loan Financing\":\n\n\"[Ace Decade] acknowledges that [Dawn State] is arranging for loan financing(s) with commercial bank(s) at the request of and for the benefit of [Ave Decade] (the \"Financing\") pursuant to the relevant financing agreement of the Financing for the Project (the \"Financing Letter\"). \"\n\n\"[Ace Decade] acknowledges that it has reviewed and agreed to the terms and conditions of the Financing as set out in the Financing Letter (including the term sheet), and further covenants and agrees with [Dawn State], Haixia Fund and Haixia Management that it shall be primarily and solely responsible for all the fees, costs, expenses and payments in connection with the Financing [ ... ] \"\n\n- (2) Under the heading \"Arrangements for the Transfer\", that at any time after a two-month period after the completion of the Project or the lock-up period under the relevant subscription agreement to be entered into by Dawn State, whichever was longer, on receiving a request from Ace Decade, Haixia Management would procure the transfer of the UBS H-Shares to Ace Decade, or another entity nominated by Ace Decade.\n- 35. Although the Letter Agreement provided that Ace Decade had reviewed and agreed to the terms and conditions of the Financing as set out in the Financing Letter, the Financing Letter was not in fact fully executed until 20 December 2014. The Claimants plead further at paragraphs 36 to 37 below.\n- 36. On or around 19 December 2014, Dawn State and UBS London entered into the Financing Letter. By the Financing Letter UBS London agreed to provide the full amount of the loan\n\nfinancing envisioned for the Investment (the \"Facility\"), subject to the subsequent completion of more comprehensive financing documentation, in an amount in HKD equal to the product of 60%, the number of shares, and the initial price, not exceeding US\\$750 million) as defined in the Term Sheet. The Claimants will refer to the Financing Letter at trial for its full terms and effect. Among other things, the Financing Letter provided as follows:\n\n(1) Under the heading \"LTV Ratio\"\n\n#### \"(c) Pre-utilisation margin\n\n[Dawn State] shall deliver such additional H.K. dollar cash to the Secured Account so as to ensure that on the date (the Utilisation Request Date) of the Utilisation Request. .. the LIV Ratio (calculated with reference to the Aggregate Share Value on the Utilisation Request Date and on a pro forma basis as if the relevant additional HK dollar cash has been delivered to the Secured Account on such date) is equal to or lower than the Initial LTV.\"\n\n(2) Under the heading \"Exclusivity\"\n\n\"(b) the Borrower will, and will procure that its respective subsidiaries and affiliates will, ensure that no other debt financing shall be incurred, borrowed, syndicated, issued or privately placed in relation to or for the purposes of funding or refinancing any of the funding for or relating to the Acquisition ... \"\n\n- (3) Under the heading \"Governing Law\", that the Financing Letter and all associated documents (defined as the \"Finaning Commitment Documents\") would be subject to English law and that the English Courts would have jurisdiction in respect of any dispute\n- 37. The Financing Commitment Documents included an indicative termsheet for the Facility (the \"Indicative Termsheet\"). The Indicative Termsheet did not contain any legally binding commitment to borrow or lend on the terms indicated or any terms. The Indicative Termsheet provided that under the facility agreement to be agreed between the parties, UBS would be entitled in certain circumstances to demand mandatory prepayment or make margin calls in respect of the facility, as follows:\n\t- (1) Under the heading \"Margining Terms\":\n\n\"LIV Call Trigger: 66.7%, subject to adjustment by the Lender in the event that the Initial LTV is adjusted as described under \"Initial LTV\" (above).\n\nMargin Call: If on any Scheduled Trading Day following the Utilisation Date the LTV is higher that the LTV Call Trigger, the Borrower shall deposit into the Secured .Account an amount of HKD cash only so that the LTV is restored to the Initial LTV and shall comply with all obligations described under the \"Margin Payment Schedule\" below.\n\nMargin Payment Schedule: Payments in respect of Margin Calls and Margin Releases shall be made by 5:00pm Hong Kong time on the Business Day (the \"Margin Payment Date'') immediately following the date of the Margin Call request or Margin Call Release, as applicable, provided such request is issued prior to 11:59pm (Hong Kong time) . . . \"\n\n#### (2) Under the heading \"Other Terms\":\n\n\"Full Mandatory Prepayment Events: The Lender, at its option, may terminate this Transaction if any of the following events occur after Utilisation Date:\n\n- the Closing Price of the Reference Shares on any Scheduled Trading Day is less (i) than 60% of the Initial Price;\n- (ii) than (a) 85% of the Closing Price on the previous Scheduled Trading Day; or (b) 75% of the Closing Price on any of the 5 immediately preceding Scheduled I rading Days;\n-\n\nIf the Lender gives notice that it is terminating the Transaction following the occurrence of a Full Mandatory Prepayment Event, the Borrower must repay the Facility Amount together with all other amounts due in connection with the Transaction (the \"Aggregate Prepayment Amount'') in accordance with the following payment schedule:\n\n- (i) 25% of the Aggregate Payment Amount on the Business Day immediately following such notice;\n- (ii) 25% of the Aggregate Payment Amount on the second Business Day following such notice; and\n- the remaining 50% of the Aggregate Prepayment Amount on the third (iii) Business Day following such notice.\"\n-\n\nMakewhole: Upon (i) a V oluntary Prepayment on any date other than a Mutual Break Date or (ii) prepayment or termination in any other circumstances, including following a Full Mandatory Prepayment Event or an Event of Default, a Makewhole Amount is payable by the Borrower to the Lender.\n\nThe Makewhole Amount is calculated as an amount equal to the Spread applied to the Facility Amount or the prepayment amount, as applicable, for the period from (and including) the date of prepayment or termination, as applicable, to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Maturity Date.\"\n\n#### UBS's tepresentations prior to execution of the December Contracts\n\n38. During the course of the preparation of the December Contracts, in or around December 2014 and before 18 December 2014, Mr Kwok became aware that the terms of the proposed financing for the Investment from UBS included provisions for margin calls and mandatory prepayment (which, again, he referred to compendiously using the term \"margin calls\"). Mr Kwok cannot now recall whether he saw the Financing Letter and/or Indicative Termsheet, but his knowledge must in any event have come from a description of the terms by someone else and not from review of the documents, because he did not read English.\n\n- 39. Mr Kwok objected to the inclusion of these terms, and raised this with Mr Wong. There was a discussion between them, which took place either in Mr Kwok's residence or his office in Hong Kong. The gist of what Mr Kwok said to Mr Wong was that that he was unhappy about these terms, and he wanted them taken out of any agreements with UBS. Mr Kwok said that he did not want UBS to be able to demand payments or repayment of the loan as a result of shortterm fluctuations in the price of the Haitong H-Shares. In response, Mr Wong made further representations and gave advice to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade on behalf of UBS, the effect of which was as follows:\n\t- (1) It was UBS's internal policy that where the bank was providing margin finance, it would have terms allowing it to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment), and these were standard terms for UBS financing agreements;\n\t- (2) Nonetheless, Mr Wong intended to go back to the bank and try to get the terms removed from the agreements or changed;\n\t- (3) Even if Mr Wong could not get the margin call provisions removed or changed, Mr Kwok (and therefore Ace Decade) should not be concerned about them as:\n\t\t- (a) Such terms would not be strictly relied upon or executed by UBS in this case, because UBS had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore, impliedly, to Dawn State as their intermediary) as highly valued customers not to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) if prices moved in the short term.\n\t\t- (b) If it were necessary for UBS to make a margin call (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) due to longer term price movements, UBS would work with Ace Decade to allow it to meet any demands and would allow a reasonable time for it to do so, including longer time periods for payment than those in the facility agreement if necessary, and would not sell any of the Shares as a result of any margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time to pay.\n\t- (4) Mr Wong again referred to the Ping An Deal as demonstrating the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of H-Shares. The details of the information provided by Mr Wong\n\nin relation to the Ping An Deal between June 2014 and December 2014 are summarised at paragraph 42 below.\n\n- 40. During the course of conversations and communications during this period (including in the conversations in which he gave the advice and made the representations pleaded in paragraph 39 above), Mr Wong further repeated and reaffirmed the assertion that he and UBS were working to protect and advance Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon UBS and in particular Mr Wong. From the context in which these assurances were given, it is to be inferred that they were intended to encourage Mr Kwok and Ace Decade to accept and rely upon the advice and representations pleaded in paragraph 39 above.\n- 41. As a result of these conversations with Mr Wong, Mr Kwok reasonably believed: (1) that Mr Wong would get the margin call and mandatory prepayment terms removed from the Financing Commitment Documents, and in any event from the eventual facility agreement; and (2) that in any event he need not be concerned about such provisions which would not be relied upon in accordance with their strict terms, but only in accordance with the approach and policy described by Mr Wong. Mr Kwok did not thereafter read the Financing Letter or Indicative Termsheet prior to 19 December 2014 nor was he briefed on their terms. As a result, Mr Kwok was not aware that the margin call and mandatory prepayment provisions were included in these documents until around March 2015, as detailed at paragraph 46 below.\n\n#### The Ping An Representations\n\n- 42. As pleaded above, Mr Wong repeatedly referred to the Ping An Deal as an illustration of the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of H-Shares. Mr Wong also referred to the Ping An Deal as an illustration of UBS's expertise in structuring the acquisition of equities in companies incorporated in the PRC. Mr Kwok cannot recall every occasion on which the Ping An deal was discussed, but they included at least:\n\t- (1) The discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in the summer of 2014 pleaded at paragraphs 19 and 27 above. These discussions were primarily between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok, but two of Mr Kwok's employees (Yang Ying and Lyu Tao) were each present on at least one occasion when Mr Wong made representations regarding the Ping An Deal during this period.\n\t- (2) The discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in or around December 2014, before 18 December 2014.\n- 43. In the course of those conversations as a whole, Mr Wong (on behalf of UBS) represented the following matters regarding the Ping An Deal:\n\t- (1) The Ping An Deal involved the acquisition of shares in a PRC company, namely the insurance company Ping An Insurance.\n\t- (2) UBS had advised the buyers of the stake in Ping An (the \"Ping An Stake\") in relation to the structuring of the acquisition and the funding of that acquisition.\n\t- (3) UBS had provided loan funding for that acquisition. The value of the Ping An Stake and the loan financing provided by UBS were substantially larger than the value of the UBS H-Shares or the loan financing which UBS was proposing to provide for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares.\n\t- (4) Although the direct purchaser of the Ping An Stake was the Thai conglomerate, CP Group, CP Group was in fact acting as an intermediary for a Chinese businessman, the billionaire Xiao Jianhua (\"Mr Xiao\"). Mr Xiao was at that time the chairman of the Chinese conglomerate, the Tomorrow Group. UBS had advised the CP Group and Mr Xiao as to how to set up the intermediary structure for the acquisition. Like Mr Kwok, Mr Xiao was a very highly valued customer of UBS.\n\t- (5) Although the lending arrangements for the acquisition of the Ping An Stake included terms allowing UBS to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) on the basis of price fluctuations, and there had been price fluctuations, UBS had not strictly enforced those terms. Instead, UBS had worked with the shareholder and given the shareholder ample time within which either the value of the shares might recover, or the shareholder could arrange the payment of margin. UBS had offered temporary additional financing to make up any shortfall.\n\t- (6) As a result, there had never been a prospect that UBS would enforce against the Ping An shareholder's security, or that it would lose any of the Ping An shares which it had acquired.\n\t- (7) This was in accordance with UBS's policy for highly valued customers, which would also apply to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade, and UBS intended to give Mr Kwok and Ace Decade the same treatment as the Ping An shareholder in the event that it became entitled to a make a margin call (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment).\n\n#### The Subscription Agreement\n\n- 44. On or around 19 December 2014, Dawn State entered into a subscription agreement with Haitong (the \"Subscription Agreement\"), under which it agreed to purchase the UBS H-Shares (the \"Subscription\"), being 569,427,620 H-Shares, at a price of HK\\$15.62 per share, totalling HK\\$8,894,459,424.40 (the \"Subscription Price\"). The Subscription Agreement provided, among other things, that:\n\t- (1) Under Clause 2, the Subscription Price could be increased or reduced by up to HK\\$1.56 per share on the occurrence of certain conditions regarding an increase or decrease in the trading price of Haitong H-Shares during the period between the Subscription Agreement and Closing\n\t- (2) Closing of the sale and purchase of the UBS H-Shares was subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions set out in Clause 3.1 of the Subscription Agreement (the \"Conditions\").\n\t- (3) Under Clause 8.1, the Subscription Agreement could be terminated by either party if the Conditions had not been fulfilled on or before 30 June 2015.\n\n#### UBS's Representations prior to execution of the Lending Documents\n\n- 45. In and around February and March 2015, the lending documents for UBS's financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares by Dawn State (the \"Lending Documents\") were prepared. Although Ace Decade was not a party to any of the Lending Documents (the details of which are pleaded below), drafts of the Lending Documents were provided to Stevenson Wong, the lawyers acting for Ace Decade.\n- 46. In or around mid-March 2015, Mr Kwok was informed by Ms Yu that the draft agreements contained provisions allowing UBS to make margin calls and to require mandatory repayments in the event of short-term fluctuations in the value of the UBS H-Shares\n- 47. In conversations with Mr Wong in around mid-to-late March 2015, Mr Kwok said that he objected to these terms, and repeated that he did not want UBS to be able to demand payments or repayment of the loan as a result of short-term fluctuations in the price of the Haitong H-Shares. Mr Wong, on behalf of UBS: (1) Further repeated and reaffirmed the assertion that he and UBS were working in Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS; and (2) Restated the advice and representations particularised at paragraph 39 above, which are repeated here as particulars of the gist of the advice given and representations made by UBS through Mr Wong in March 2015.\n\n#### The Lending Documents\n\n- 49. On 1 April 2015, Dawn State and UBS executed the Lending Documents for UBS's financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares by Dawn State.\n- 50. The \"Facility Agreement\" was made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. The Facility Agreement as agreed was a HK\\$5,336,675,654.64 term facility. The Claimants will refer to the Facility Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the Facility Agreement included the following provisions:\n\t- (1) Clause 1.1 (\"Definitions\"):\n\n\" \"Initial LTV Ratio\" means sixty per cent (60.00%) [ . . ]\"\n\n« \"LTV Ratio\" means, on any Scheduled Trading Day, the loan to value ratio (expressed as a percentage) calculated by the following: A/B where: \"A\" means the aggregate amount in HK Dollars of the Loan outstanding less the Margin Call Balance; and \"B\" means the Market V alue multiplies by the number of Shares subject to the Transaction Security.\"\n\n\" \"Margin Call Trigger\" means sixty-six point seven per cent (66.70%) [ . . ]\"\n\n### (2) Clause 7.7 (\"Mandatory Prepayment\"):\n\n- \"(a) If the Lender determines that:\n\t- (i) the Market Value of a Share on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than sixty per cent (60%) of the Initial Price;\n\t- (ii) the Market V alue of a Share on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than:\n\t\t- (A) immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Day; or\n\t\t- (B) of the five immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Days;\n\nThen (in each case) the Lender may, by notice to the Borrower, cancel the Facility and declare the outstanding Loan, together with accrued interest and all other amounts averued under the Finance Documents, immediately due and payable, whereupon the Facility will be cancelled and all such outstanding amounts will become immediately due and payable in accordance with paragraph (b) below.\n\n(b) shall be made in the following amounts and at the following times:\n\n- Case 222599730790066422-1 Filmed 07/24/22233333333333333333333800\n\t- (i) on the Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, twenty-five per cent (25%) of such outstanding amounts;\n\t- (ii) on the second Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, twenty-five per cent (25%) of such outstanding amounts; and\n\t- (iii) on the third Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, fifty per cent (50%) of such outstanding amounts.\n\n#### (3) Clause 18.1 (\"Margin Call\"):\n\n\"If, on any Scheduled Trading Day, the Lender determines that the LTV Ratio is greater than the applicable Margin Call Trigger, the Borrower shall as soon as practicable, and in any case no later than 5:00 p.m. on the Business Day after the date of a Margin Call Notice from the Lender requiring it to do so, deposit or procure to be deposited into the Secured Acount such additional HK Dollar amounts in cash, to be charged in favour of the Lender under the Security Agreement, to ensure that the LIV Ratio, after being recalculated by taking into account the additional cash deposited, is equal to or less than the applicable Initial LIV Ratio.\"\n\n- (4) Clause 20 sets out 16 events or circumstances which constitute an \"Event of Default\", including: (a) (at Clause 20.1) failure to pay on the due date any amount payable pursuant to a Finance Document; and (b) (at clause 20.2) failure to comply with Clause 18.1.\n- (5) Clause 20.17 (\"Acceleration\"):\n\n\"On and at any time after the occurrence of an Event of Default which is continuing the Lender may, by notice to the Borrower:\n\n- (a) = cancel the Commitment whereupon they shall immediately be cancelled;\n- (b) amounts accrued or outstanding under the Finance Documents be immediately due and payable, whereupon they shall become immediately due and payable;\n- (c) declare that all or part of the Loan be payable on demand, whereupon they shall immediately become payable on demand by the Lender; and/ or\n- (d) Documents.\"\n- (6) At Clause 32: \"This Agreement, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this Agreement, are governed by English law,\" and at Clause 33.1 (\"Jurisdiction\"), for the English Court to have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of or in connection with any Finance Document.\n\n## Case-22362307906848241 Filed 87129923922 Enterest A24223.4338115289879968\n\n- 51. I The \"Security Agreement\" was also made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. Under the Security Agreement Dawn State (the \"Chargor\") assigned first ranking security over its rights in or to certain assets, including in particular the UBS H-Shares to UBS. The Security Agreement further provided for the UBS H-Shares to be held by UBS London Branch, acting as Custodian, with the UBS H-Shares to be deposited into a charged account held with UBS on the terms of the Custody Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the Security Agreement included the following provisions:\n\t- (1) Under Clause 3.1 (\"Assignment by way of security\"), that Dawn State assigned to UBS all its present and future right, title and interest (including those against the Custodian) in or to (inter alia) the Custody Agreement, the UBS H-Shares and the account in which they were held (the \"Secured Account\").\n\t- (2) Clause 3.2 (\"Fixed Charge\"), that Dawn State charged in favour of UBS its rights over (inter alia) the Secured Account and the UBS-H-Shares.\n\t- (3) Under Clause 8 (\"ENFORCEMENT\"):\n\t\t- (a) Clause 8.1 (\"When enforceable\"):\n\n\"The Charges shall be immediately enforceable on the occurrence of an Enforcement Event which is continuing, and the powers conferred by the LPA on mortgagees including the power of sale and other powers conferred by Section 101 of the LPA as varied and extended by this Deed shall be immediately exercisable.\"\n\n(b) Clause 8.2 (\"Power of Sale\"):\n\n\"The statutory power of sale, of appointing a receiver and the other statutory powers conferred on mortgagees by Section 101 of the LPA as varied and extended by this Deed shall arise (and the Secured Obligations shall be deemed due and payable for that purpose) on the date of this Deed.\"\n\n#### (4) Clause 9.3 (\"Financial Collateral Arrangement\"):\n\n- \"(a) The Chargor and the Lender intend that this Deed constitutes a \"financial collateral arrangement\" (as defined in the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 (the \"Regulations\") and, as such, the Lender shall have the right:\n\t- (i) collateral\" (as defined in the Regulations (\"Financial Collateral\")), in which case the Lender shall comply with the requirements of the Regulations as to obtaining \"equivalent financial collateral\" (as defined in the Regulations);\n- (ii) it in discharge of, any Secured Obligations in accordance with the Regulations; and\n- (izi) (at any time after the Charges become enforceable) to appropriate any Charged Asset which constitutes Financial Collateral in or towards satisfaction of the Secured Obligations in accordance with the Regulations.\n- (b) of paragraph (a)(ii) or (a)(iii) above, the value shall be:\n\t- (i) in the case of cash, its face value at the time of appropriation or set-off; and\n\t- (ii) market value at the time of appropriation, or set-off as determined (after appropriation) by the Lender by reference to a public index or other applicable generally recognised source or such other process as the Lender may select, including a valuation carried out by an independent investment bank, firm of accountants or other valuers appointed by the Lender.\n\nas converted, where necessary, into the currency in which the Secured Obligations are denominated at a market rate of exchange prevailing at the time of appropriation or set-off selected by the Lender.\"\n\n#### (5) Clause 9.4 (\"Sale of Charged Assets\"):\n\n'The Chargor acknowledges and agrees that the Share Collateral or other Charged Assets may decline speedily in value and are of a type customarily sold on a recognised market and therefore upon the enforcement of the Charges the Lender is not required to send any notice of its intention to sell or otherwise dispose of any Share Collateral or any other Charged Assets. Following the occurrence of an Enforcement Event which is continuing, the Lender or any Delegate or any Receiver may, in its sole and absolute discretion, sell Share Collateral or other Charged Assets in a private sale in such manner and under such circumstances as the Lender or Delegate or Receiver may deem necessary or advisable (with the Lender having the right to purchase any or all of the Share Collateral or other Charged Assets to be sold). The Chargor acknowledges that such sale shall be deemed to have been made in a commercially reasonable manner, notwithstanding that any such sale may be for a price less than that which have been obtained had such Share Collateral or other Charged Assets been otherwise privately or publicly sold.\"\n\n- 52. The \"Facility Agreement Side Letter\" was also made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the terms of the Security Agreement included provision:\n\t- (1) For Dawn State to make a substantial additional payment in respect of any early repayment under the Facility Agreement, as follows:\n\n\"On the date of any payment, repayment or prepayment of the Loan in whole or in part, the Borrower shall pay the applicable Make-Whole Amount. . .\n\n\"Make-Whole Amount\" means, in respect of the Loan to be repaid or prepaid, the amount of the spread that would have been applicable on the amount of the principal of the Loan repaid or prepaid for the period from the relevant date of repayment or prepayment up to the next oveurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Final Repayment Date, had that amount so repaid or prepaid remained outstanding up to such Mutual Break Date or the Final Repayment Date, as the case may be.\"\n\n- (2) And that \"This Facility Agreenent Side Letter, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.\"\n- 53. Also on 1 April 2015, Dawn State provided UBS London (both in its capacity as lender under the Facility Agreement and as Custodian under the Custody Agreement) with a \"Settlement Authorisation.\" The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the Settlement Authorisation:\n\t- (1) Dawn State authorised UBS London (as lender) to instruct and/or authorise the Custodian (also UBS London) to apply the Monetary Contribution made by Dawn State and Facility Amount advanced by UBS London towards funding the Subscription in accordance with the Subscription Agreement, and to transfer the UBS H-Shares allocated pursuant to the Subscription Agreement to the secured account subject to the Custody Agreement.\n\t- (2) It was agreed that the \"Settlement Authorisation, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.\"\n- 54. I The Settlement Authorisation was updated by a document entitled \"Amended and Restated Settlement Authorisation\" following the price uplift pleaded at paragraph 55 below.\n\n### The Price Uplift\n\n55. On 8 May 2015, Haitong sent a letter to Dawn State and other investors in the new H-Shares announcing that each of the conditions precedent to completing the issuance and sale of the new H-Shares in Haitong had been met and that Closing was expected to take place on 15 May 2015, and that because the trading price of H-Shares over the preceding 30 days had surpassed the agreed threshold, pursuant to Clause 2.2 of the Subscription Agreement the subscription price for the H-Shares was to be increased by HKD 1.56 per share, giving a share price of HKD 17.18 per share.\n\n- 56. Dawn State and UBS London therefore entered into an \"Amendment Arreement relating to the Facility Agreement' on 13 May 2015 (the \"Amendment Agreement\").1 The Claimants will refer to the Amendment Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the Amendment Agreement:\n\t- (1) At Clause 3.1, it was agreed to increase UBS's lending commitment to HK\\$6,011,236,393.92 and to increase in the initial LTV ratio to 61.45%, but the Margin Call Trigger remained 66.7%.\n\t- (2) arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.\"\n- 57. Also on 13 May 2015, Dawn State and UBS London entered into a further security agreement, entitled \"Second Security Agreement,\" updating the Security Agreement so as to reflect the amendments made to the Facility Agreement by the Amendment Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Second Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. The relevant terms of the Second Security Agreement are identical to those pleaded at paragraph 51 above, and those terms are repeated as particulars of the provisions of the Second Security Agreement.\n\n#### Completion\n\n- 58. On 13 May 2015, Mr Kwok and Ms Yu authorised the final payment to Dawn State for the cash portion of the subscription price under the Subscription Agreement pursuant to Clause 4.1 of the Co-Investment Agreement. Pursuant to its obligations under the Facility Agreement, this sum was subsequently paid by Dawn State to UBS London as the Subsequent Borrower Contribution.\n- 59. Also on 13 May 2015 Dawn State made a Utilisation Request to UBS London, in accordance with clause 5 of the Facility Agreement, for the sum of HKD 6,011,236,393.82.\n- 60. Completion under the Subscription Agreement took place on 15 May 2015, and the UBS H-Shares were transferred to Dawn State. Upon its registration as shareholder, Dawn State immediately deposited the shares in the Secured Account with UBS London pursuant to clause 6.2(a) of the Second Security Agreement. UBS London therefore took assignment of the \"Acquired H-Shares\" by way of security in accordance with the terms of the Second Security Agreement pleaded at paragraphs 51 and 57 above.\n\n<sup>1</sup> Amendment Agreement dated 13 May 2015\n\n### Consequences of the Advice and Representations\n\n- 61. The particulars of the advice and representations of UBS pleaded at paragraphs 14 to 20, 38 to 43 and 45 to 48 are repeated. Mr Kwok and Ace Decade entered into (and did not withdraw from) the Co-Investment Agreement with Dawn State and caused and permitted Dawn State to enter into the Lending Documents with UBS on the basis of and in reasonable reliance upon the adequacy of that advice and/or accuracy of those representations.\n- 62. In the absence of those representations:\n\t- (1) I If UBS insisted on including the Margin Call and Mandatory Prepayment terms under the Facility Agreement, Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade would have acquired the UBS H-Shares without using loan financing from UBS;\n\t- (2) Alternatively, Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade would not have acquired the UBS H-Shares at all;\n\t- (3) Alternatively, if (contrary to the Claimants' case) Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have acquired the UBS H-Shares through Dawn State using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have ensured that Dawn State had sufficient funds available to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments immediately.\n- 63. The terms of the loan documents are very disadvantageous to Dawn State, and advantageous to UBS London. In particular:\n\t- (1) The Facility Agreement made provision for UBS to have both (a) the right to demand mandatory prepayment pursuant to Clause 7.7 and (b) to make margin calls pursuant to Clause 18.1.\n\t- (2) Under Clause 7.7, UBS was entitled to demand full repayment of the loan because of a 15% single day reduction or a 25% reduction over five days in the value of the UBS H-Shares, irrespective of the absolute value of the Haitong H-Shares, the LTV ratio, or the extent or absence of risk of loss to UBS London as Lender.\n\t- (3) Haitong H-Shares were, as UBS knew (through at least Mr Wong as a result of the discussions in 2014 and 2015, and in any event as a matter of general market knowledge), prone to short term fluctuations in value, and there was therefore a material risk that the entitlement to seek prepayment under Clause 7.7 would be triggered during the term of the Facility Agreement, including in circumstances in which there was not (or not materially) a risk of loss for UBS.\n- (4) As UBS knew (at least through Mr Wong) or ought to have known:\n\t- (a) Dawn State was not the ultimate investor or the source of funds for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, and would not be the source of funds required to meet any margin call or demand for prepayment. This was a function of the structure for the investment which had been created on the advice of UBS, as pleaded at paragraphs 18 above.\n\t- (b) The time periods allowed for mandatory prepayment pursuant to Clause 7.7 or payment of margin pursuant to Clause 18.1 of the Facility Agreement were not sufficient (or not reasonably likely to be sufficient) to allow the sums in question to be provided to Dawn State and by Dawn State to UBS. In particular, UBS had acknowledged on 19 December 2014, in a letter to Haixia, that it understood that Dawn State could not make payments within 24 hours of a demand being made.\n- (5) Accordingly, there was a substantial chance that there would be an Event of Default within Clause 20.1 and/or 20.2 of the Facility Agreement, and that UBS would become entitled to exercise remedies following on an Event of Default pursuant to Clause 20.17.\n- (6) Pursuant to the Facility Agreement Side Letter, in the event that UBS exercised its rights to demand prepayment of the loan, Dawn State had agreed to pay UBS the whole of the spread that would have been applicable on the amount of the principal of the Loan repaid or prepaid for the period from the relevant date of repayment or prepayment up to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Final Repayment Date. Such a clause, which is unusual in such arrangements compared to simple \"break costs\" provisions meant UBS would be financially advantaged by exercising its right to demand mandatory prepayment under Clause 7.7.\n\n#### Enforcement by UBS London\n\n64. Between around 1 and 6 July 2015, there was a substantial drop in the trading price of Haitong shares, including H-Shares. By letter sent on the evening of 6 July 2015, UBS London served a notice on Dawn State pursuant to which it purported to exercise an entitlement to demand prepayment of the Facility advanced under the Facility Agreement pursuant to Clause 7.7 thereof. In that notice, UBS purported to demand payment of: (1) 25% of the Loan, together with accrued interest and all other amounts accrued under the Finance Documents (the \"Relevant Prepayment Amount\"), being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm the following day; (2) 25% of the Relevant Prepayment Amount, being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm on the second day after the notice was served; and (3) 50% of the Relevant\n\nPrepayment Amount, being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm on the second day after the notice was served.\n\n- 65. D During the morning of 7 July 2015, Ace Decade informed UBS that, while it would be able to meet the liability 'quickly', it could not do so by 5pm that day. Mr Kwok also contacted Mr Wong by telephone to ask for additional time to secure sufficient funds in accordance with UBS's representations and advice particularised at paragraphs 14 to 20, 38 to 43 and 45 to 48 above. Mr Wong stated that no such time would be given, and that UBS London had resolved that the UBS H-Shares would be sold.\n- 66. Dawn State did not pay the sum demanded by 5 pm on 7 July 2015.\n- 67. During the evening of 7 July 2015, UBS London issued a \"Notice of Acceleration Even\" to Davin State (the 'Notice').\n\t- (1) By paragraph 3 of this Notice UBS stated that all of the Loan (including the prepayment amount due today), together with accrued interest, and all other amounts accrued or outstanding under the Finance Documents were immediately due and payable.\n\t- (2) Also in paragraph 3, UBS gave notice of its right to exercise the power of sale pursuant to Clause 9.4 of \"each Searity Document\" (i.e. the Security Agreement and Second Security Agreement).\n- 68. By a further letter of 7 July 2015, UBS asserted that the sum payable totalled HKD 6,289,081,405.43 and comprised: (1) The loan principal (HKD 6,011,236,393.92); (2) Outstanding accrued interest (HKD 44,003,279.72); (3) Break costs' (HKD 1,873,883.54);and (4) The 'Make-Whole Amount' (HKD 231,967,848.24).\n\n### Sale of the UBS H-Shares\n\n- 69. UBS London has provided limited information regarding how, if at all, it sold or purported to sell the UBS H-Shares. To the best of the Claimants' knowledge and belief:\n\t- (1) On or about 8 July 2015 UBS London formally transferred 200,000,000 of the UBS H-Shares (from a total of 569,427,620) to Segantii Capital Management Limited (\"Segantii\") in a block trade at an average price of HK\\$11.12 for a total of HK\\$2,224,000,000.\n\t- (2) On or about 10 July 2015, UBS itself purported to acquire absolutely 58,284,114 of the UBS H-Shares for a price which is not known to the Claimants. The Claimants also do not know whether, or if so when and at what price UBS sold those shares to a third party.\n\n(3) The Claimants do not know the details of any other sales made by UBS pursuant to the power of sale under Clause 9.4 of the Security Agreements.\n\nEntered 97278/223.33.38.15 Page 26 of\n\n- 70. A price of HK\\$11.12 represented an unusually deep discount to the trading price of Haitong H-Shares, which closed at HK\\$13.90 per share on 7 July 2015.\n- 71. On the morning of 8 July 2015, Haitong announced a suspension of trading for its H-Shares, pending the release of announcements in respect of:\n\n\"(1) a potential scheme of a repurchase of the shares of the Company which, if implemented, is subject to the shareholders' approval and (2) a potential purchase of the shares of the Company by the senior management and/ or employees of the Company . . . \"\n\n- 72. Accordingly, from the morning of 8 July it was generally known (including, it is to be inferred, by UBS) both that trading was suspended, and that there was at least likely to be a buy-back of Haitong's shares. On 9 July 2015, Haitong announced a buy-back of its own shares. On 10 July 2015, Haitong H-Shares recommenced trading. H-Shares opened at HK\\$14.24 and closed at HK\\$15.14.\n- 73. of the proveds of Enforcement\", although the calculation was stated to be \"in draft form and … subject to full settlement of the trade.\" This provided that the payment to Dawn State would be calculated by reference to: (1) \"HK closing price as of 7 July 2015: HKD 13.90\"; (2) \"Block discount (%) 20.0%\"; (3) \"Block placement price: 11.12\"; (4) \"Number of Shares sold (shares): 569,427,620\" i.e. all of Dawn State's shareholding. UBS did not, then or subsequently, provide details of the actual buyers of any shares, how many shares were sold to each buyer, the price at which each sale was effected, when the sale was effected, or the terms of the sale.\n\n#### Transfer of Dawn State's Shares\n\n74. On 18 September 2015, the entire share capital of Dawn State was transferred by Haixia Fund to Ace Decade, in accordance with Ace Decade's rights under the Letter Agreement.\n\n#### ACE DECADE'S AND MR KWOK'S CLAIMS\n\n75. Ace Decade's and Mr Kwok's claims pleaded in the following paragraphs are pleaded on the basis and assumption that these claims are governed by the law of England and Wales. If it is asserted on behalf of UBS and/or found by the Court that the governing law of the claims is the law of Hong Kong, the same claims are pursued in the alternative under the law of Hong Kong, and the facts and matters pleaded below are relied on as particularising Mr Kwok and Ace Decades causes of action under Hong Kong law.\n\n#### UBS' Duty of Care\n\n- 76. UBS owed duties of care in tort to Ace Decade and to Mr Kwok, comprising (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) A duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to ensure that information provided to or statements of fact made to them or either of them were accurate.\n\t- (2) A duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and judgment in giving advice to them or either of them regarding (inter alia): (a) the structuring of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares; (b) the financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares; (c) the terms and effect of the Financing Documents; (d) the risks associated with those terms; (e) and/or UBS' intended and likely conduct in exercise of those rights.\n- 77. The facts and matters establishing the assumption of responsibility by UBS include at least the following:\n\t- (1) At all relevant times Mr Wong was an agent of UBS with authority to enter into make representations and give undertakings on behalf of UBS.\n\t- (2) As pleaded at paragraph 9 above, Mr Kwok (as UBS knew, at least through Mr Wong) at all material times treated Mr Wong as a trusted adviser and personal friend, and relied on him as such.\n\t- (3) Paragraphs 11 to 13 above are repeated. As pleaded there, the background to the relationship between UBS and Mr Kwok and Ace Decade was an arrangement whereby Mr Kwok (at the request of UBS) assisted UBS to become the placement agent for the UBS H-Shares, and UBS offered in return to assist and advise him in acquiring the shares for which it was made placement agent on advantageous terms.\n\t- (4) Mr Wong repeatedly held himself and UBS out as acting to protect and advance Mr Kwok and Ace Decade's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares and the funding thereof, including in respect of all of: (a) the devising of the structure and funding plan for the investment; (b) the provision of information in respect of the structure, funding and merits of the investment; and (c) advising as to the structure, funding and merits of the investment. Paragraphs 17, 40 and 47 above are repeated.\n\t- (5) Mr Wong repeatedly asserted that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS. Paragraphs 17, 40 and 47 above are repeated.\n\n# Case22599330790684622-1 Filled876992992999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999900\n\n- (6) UBS (through Mr Wong) in fact provided information and gave advice to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade, in circumstances in which it knew and intended that they would rely on that information and advice. Paragraphs 18 to 20, 21 to 23, 24, 28, 39 and 47 above are repeated.\n- (7) and expertise to devise an advantageous structure for the acquisition for Mr Kwok and advising Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) with respect to investments in placements such as that for the Placement Shares, the structuring of the investments, and the financing thereof.\n- (8) I In giving information and advice about the policies, intentions and/or likely conduct of UBS as the counterparty under the Lending Documents, Mr Wong and UBS addressed matters which were uniquely within UBS's knowledge, and which (as they knew) Mr Kwok and Ace Decade could not verify independently, and in respect of which Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have to rely on the matters communicated to them by UBS.\n\n#### Breach of duty\n\n- 78. JUBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, made false and misleading representations to Ace Decade and/or Mr Kwok prior to the execution of the December Contracts and thereafter prior to the execution of the Lending Documents, as set out above. In particular:\n\t- (1) UBS stated that it had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) not to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment if prices moved in the short term. Paragraphs 39, 43 and 47 above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs 64 to 68 above) UBS (through the decision makers acting for UBS London and/or, insofar as relevant, UBS HK in relation to the entry into and enforcement of rights under the Lending Documents (the \"Decision Makets'')) did not have such a policy and/or did not intend to apply it to Mr Kwok, Ace Decade and/or Dawn State.\n\t- (2) UBS stated that it had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) if it were necessary for UBS to make a demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment, pursuant to which UBS would work with them to allow them to meet any demands and would allow a reasonable time for them to do so, including longer time periods for payment than those in the Facility\n\nAgreement if necessary, and would not sell any of the Shares as a result of any margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time to pay. Paragraphs 39, 43 and 47 above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs 64 to 68 above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not have such a policy and/or did not intend to apply it to Mr Kwok, Ace Decade and/or Dawn State.\n\n- (3) UBS stated that it intended to treat Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) in the manner in which it claimed to have treated the Ping An shareholder. Paragraphs 19, 39, 42 to 43 and 47 above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs 64 to 68 above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not have such an intention, but instead intended to exercise all and any rights conferred on them under the Lending Documents in accordance with their terms and/or in the manner most advantageous to UBS.\n- (4) UBS stated that it had in fact treated the Ping An shareholder in a manner which was in accordance with the supposed policies pleaded at sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) above, and that this evidenced the approach which UBS intended to take and would (or could be expected to) take under the Lending Documents. Paragraphs 19, 39, 42 to 43 and 47 above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that:\n\t- (a) In conversations between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in or around the middle of July 2015, Mr Wong indicated that (contrary to his earlier representations) the Ping An shareholder had in fact been the subject of margin calls (i.e. to demands for payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) and had met those demands in accordance with the terms of the relevant Lending Documents. If that is true, it follows that UBS's earlier representations were false and misleading.\n\t- (b) Alternatively, if UBS did treat the Ping An shareholder in the manner pleaded at paragraphs 42 to 43 above, UBS's statements were false and misleading in that the treatment of the Ping An shareholder did not evidence the approach which UBS through its Decision Makers intended to take and would (or could be expected to) take under the Lending Documents.\n- (5) UBS stated that it intended to act and was acting in Mr Kwok and Ace Decade's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares and the funding thereof. Paragraphs 17, 40 and 47 above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading\n\nin that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs 63 to 68 above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not intend to act in Mr Kwok or Ace Decade's best interest but instead intended to act in its own interests as Dawn State's contractual counterparty regardless of the consequences for Mr Kwok and Ace Decade.\n\n- (6) UBS stated that it was providing loan financing for Dawn State (and therefore, in practice, Ace Decade) on advantageous terms, or on \"the best possible terms.\" Paragraphs 11 and 19 above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from the matters pleaded at paragraph 63 above) UBS through its Decision Makers intended to offer them financing which was advantageous to UBS and very disadvantageous to Dawn State, Ace Decade and Mr Kwok.\n- 79. JUBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, was negligent in making those false representations in that, at the time of or before he made the representations, Mr Wong had:\n\n#### PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) intended to act and/or was acting in Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade's best interests.\n- (2) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) would be offering Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade finance on advantageous terms and/or on the \"best possible terms\".\n- (3) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS had the policies pleaded at paragraph 78(1) and 78(2) above, and/or whether UBS London (through the relevant Decision Makers) in fact intended to apply those policies to Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) as pleaded at paragraph 78(3) to 78(6) above.\n- (4) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) in fact intended to treat Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade in the same way in which it claimed to have treated the Ping An shareholder.\n- (5) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS had in fact treated the Ping An shareholder in the manner pleaded at paragraphs 42 to 43 above.\n\n- Case &&&&&&&&&&=1 Film&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&\n\t- (6) Failed to take additional or further reasonable steps to protect Mr Kwok and Ace Decade from suffering loss or damage as a result of the false or misleading representations made by UBS.\n\t- 80. JUBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, gave negligent advice to Ace Decade and/or Mr Kwok, as set out above. As regards the content of the advice given by UBS:\n\t\t- (1) As pleaded at paragraph 19, UBS advised Mr Kwok and Ace Decade that it was in their best interests to make a leveraged investment using loan funding from UBS London, and that any leveraged finance provided by UBS would in any event be on the best possible terms.\n\t\t- (2) As pleaded at paragraphs 39 and 47 UBS advised Mr Kwok and Ace Decade:\n\t\t\t- (a) prepayment provisions on the terms which appeared in the Facility Agreement; and, therefore\n\t\t\t- (b) That the loan documents were nonetheless commercially advantageous for Ace Decade. That advice was supported by reference to UBS's representations pleaded at paragraph 78.\n\t- 81. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, was negligent in giving that advice, in that:\n\n#### PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) It was not (as must or ought to have been apparent to Mr Wong and UBS) in the interests of Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade to use loan funding from UBS London to make the Investment, and in any event to do so on the terms of the Lending Documents, including hecause.\n\t- (a) As Mr Kwok had explained to Mr Wong, he and Ace Decade did not require loan funding to make the investment, but could have done so out of their own resources; and\n\t- (b) The loan funding from UBS London (in particular, on the terms of the Lending Documents and in circumstances in which the representations pleaded at paragraph 78 above were false) created a risk (and/or an excessive risk) that UBS would\n\nenforce against the UBS H-Shares in the event of a fluctuation in the value of those shares, causing loss to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade.\n\n- (2) | UBS ought, taking reasonable care, to have advised Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that there was a substantial chance that UBS London would (contrary to the representations pleaded at paragraph 78) enforce its strict rights under Clauses 7.7 and 18 of the Facility Agreement in accordance with their terms, and that it would not proceed in accordance with the policies which were the subject of the representations pleaded at paragraph 78 above. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, having made the representations pleaded at paragraph 98 above, UBS came under a duty to correct any misapprehension, misunderstanding or ill-informed basis on which Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade were operating.\n- (3) UBS ought, taking reasonable care, to have advised Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that there was a substantial chance that in the event of any fluctuation in the value of the UBS H-Shares, UBS London would enforce against the UBS H-Shares in accordance with the strict terms of the Financing and Security Agreements.\n- (4) UBS ought therefore, taking reasonable care, to have advised that making the Investment subject to the terms of the Lending Documents was not in accordance with Mr Kwok's (and therefore Ace Decade's) express wish that any leveraged investment should only be made on the basis that the provision of additional collateral or repayment of the loan should not be triggered by short term price fluctuations of the Placement Shares.\n- (5) The loan funding provided by UBS to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade was (as UBS must or ought to have known) not on advantageous terms (or a fortiori on the best possible terms), but was on very disadvantageous terms. Paragraph 63 above is repeated.\n- (6) Given the actual policies and intentions of UBS London, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should (as UBS must or ought to have known) have been concerned about the presence of the mandatory prepayment and margin call terms under Clauses 7.7 and 18.1 of the Facility Agreement, and UBS ought to have advised that these terms posed a substantial risk to the outcome of the Investment.\n- (7) UBS failed to reasonable steps to protect the best interests of Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade by:\n\t- (a) Informing Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that the financing proposed UBS was not financing on advantageous terms or 'on the best possible terms';\n- (b) Informing Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade of the risks associated with the terms of Clauses 7.7 and 18.1 of the Facility Agreement;\n- (i) Informing Mr Kwok and Ace Decade as soon as it became aware or suspected that any representation or any advice given to him was false, defective, misleading or incomplete.\n- (ii) Taking additional or further reasonable steps to protect Mr Kwok and Ace Decade from suffering loss or damage or otherwise protecting their interest.\n\n#### Ace Decade's claim\n\n- 82. Ace Decade brings the primary claim arising from UBS's breaches of duty pleaded above.\n- 83. Ace Decade reasonably and foreseably relied upon the representations and/or advice particularised above and the skill and judgment of UBS by (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) Entering into the Co-Investment Agreement as particularised at paragraph 33;\n\t- (2) Not withdrawing from the Co-Investment Agreement or otherwise preventing the completion of the Investment before the completion of the Subscription;\n\t- (3) Causing or permitting Dawn State to enter into the Financing Letter as particularised at paragraph 36 above.\n\t- (4) Not preventing Dawn State from entering into the Lending Documents, and instead procuring that it acquired the UBS H-Shares without loan funding from UBS; and/or\n\t- (5) If (contrary to the Claimants' case) Dawn State would have acquired the UBS H-Shares using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, not ensuring that Dawn State had immediate access to sufficient funds to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments.\n\t- (6) The Claimants repeat paragraphs 61 and 62 above.\n- 84. I UBS's negligence has caused Ace Decade loss and damage. In particular (each further or in the alternative):\n\n### ACE DECADE'S PARTICULARS OF LOSS\n\n(1) the sum of HK\\$36,621,693.83, being approximately US\\$4.7 million at the prevailing exchange rate accounted for by UBS to Ace Decade after the sale of the Acquired Shares: US\\$495,300,000;\n\nCase&&&&&&&&&&&&&&=1 Fille&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&\n\n- (2) If Ace Decade would have withdrawn from the Investment altogether after the execution of the Co-Investment Agreement (rather than making the investment through Dawn State but funding it from either Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade's own resources or alternative loan financing), Ace Decade has lost the entirety of its Monetary Contribution, being US\\$500 million, less the sum of HK\\$36,621,693.83, being approximately US\\$4.7 million at the prevailing exchange rate accounted for by UBS to Ace Decade after the sale of the Acquired Shares, and the fee of US\\$812,500 which would have been payable to Haixia Fund under Clause 6.5 of the Co-Investment Agreement: US\\$494,487,500;\n- (3) Losses representing returns which it would have achieved from investing in the UBS H-Shares, to be quantified on the basis of expert evidence.\n\n#### Mr Kwok's Claim\n\n- 85. Mr Kwok's claim is only pursued in the alternative to that of Ace Decade, on the premise that UBS denies and successfully disputes that any of its wrongdoing pleaded above is actionable at the suit of Ace Decade.\n- 86. Mr Kwok also reasonably and foreseeably relied upon the representations and/or advice particularised above and the skill and judgment of UBS by (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) Causing or permitting Ace Decade to enter into the Co-Investment Agreement as particularised at paragraph 33;\n\t- (2) Not causing Ace Decade to withdraw from the Co-Investment or otherwise preventing the completion of the Investment before the completion of the Subscription;\n\t- (3) Causing or permitting Dawn State to enter into the Financing Letter as particularised at paragraph 36 above.\n\t- (4) Not preventing Dawn State from entering into the Lending Documents, and instead procuring that it acquired the UBS H-Shares without loan funding from UBS; and/or\n\t- (5) If (contrary to the Claimants' case) Dawn State would have acquired the UBS H-Shares using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, not ensuring that Dawn State had immediate access to sufficient funds to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments.\n\t- (6) The Claimants repeat paragraphs 61 and 62 above.\n- 87. HUBS's negligence has caused Mr Kwok loss and damage, in the same measure as Ace Decade. Paragraph 84 above is repeated mutatis mutandis.\n\n#### DAWN STATE'S CLAIM\n\n#### Sale of the Acquired H-Shares\n\n- 88. On 7 July 2015, as a result of an Event of Default, UBS purported to give notice to Dawn State regarding its right to exercise a 'power of sale' in relation to the Charged Assets (being the UBS H-Shares). Paragraph 67 above is repeated. UBS London's contractual entitlement to sell the UBS H-Shares was found under Clauses 9.3(a)(i) and 9.4 of the Security Agreement.\n- 89. To the best of the Claimants' knowledge and belief, UBS did thereafter purport to exercise its power of sale and sold all of the UBS FI-Shares. Save as pleaded at paragraph 69 above, the Claimants do not know the details of the sales made pursuant to that purported entitlement.\n- 90. Paragraph 51(3) above is repeated. In selling the UBS H-Shares, UBS was exercising a statutory 'power of sale' under s.101 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (the \"LPA\") as preserved and modified by clause 8 of the Security Agreements, and was (and is) therefore subject to the duties and obligations imposed upon a mortgagee or chargee exercising such powers at law and in equity.\n- 91. In the premises, any purported sale(s) of the UBS H-Shares which caused or was/were designed to enable the Acquired Shares to be acquired absolutely by UBS were therefore invalid and of no effect. Any UBS H-Shares purportedly sold to UBS itself will have remained subject to Dawn State's rights and UBS's obligations under the terms of the Lending Documents.\n- 92. Otherwise (and subject to any provable costs and liabilities of Dawn State were satisfied out of said proceeds or profits) UBS was and remains under an immediate duty to account to Dawn State: (1) for its dealings with the Acquired H-Shares mortgaged to it, charged in its favour or otherwise held by it as Custodian; and/or (2) for any proceeds of said Acquired H-Shares obtained by it as a result of the sales; and (3) for any profits made by it as a result of the sales particularised in paragraph 69 above or other dealings as aforesaid;\n- 93. Further or alternatively, the aforementioned proceeds and/or profits are held on statutory trusts pursuant to s.105 of the LPA, alternatively on constructive trust, for Dawn State.\n- 94. Further or alternatively, UBS also owed a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care to obtain a proper price for the Acquired H-Shares when exercising its power of sale. Insofar as any purported sales of the UBS H-Shares were valid, the Claimants believe that UBS failed to act with reasonable skill in making the sales, by reason of the fact that it:\n\n#### PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) Failed or failed adequately to consider whether the discount applied to the H-Shares was an inappropriately large discount in the context of block sales on the HKEX;\n- (2) Failed or failed adequately to consider whether those shares could have been sold with a smaller discount:\n- (3) Failed or failed adequately to consider the effects of the suspension (or likely suspension) of trading in Haitong shares;\n- (4) Failed or failed adequately to consider the effects of the share buy-back by Haitong. Paragraphs 72 and 72 above are repeated;\n- (5) Failed to allow adequate time for the share buy-back to take effect; and\n- (6) Failed to take additional or further reasonable steps to ensure a proper price was obtained for the Acquired H-Shares.\n- 95. As a result of UBS's negligence, Dawn State suffered loss comprising the difference between the price for which the shares were sold and the price that could reasonably have been obtained for those shares. The Claimants reserve the right to plead further on provision by UBS of particulars of the sales of the UBS H-Shares which it effected.\n\n#### Alternative claim in the event of appropriation by UBS\n\n- 96. UBS did not, on 7 July 2015 or at any time subsequently, take any definitive steps to appropriate the Acquired H-Shares or alternatively to communicate such steps to UBS. As a result, UBS has at no time appropriated the Acquired H-Shares in accordance with clause 9.3(a)(ii) of the Security Agreement or Regulation 17 of the 2003 Regulations.\n- 97. If, contrary to the Claimants' case, UBS did purport to and did effectively appropriate the Acquired H-Shares pursuant to Regulation 17 of the 2003 Regulations, that appropriation could not have occurred prior to receipt of the notice from UBS to Dawn State of the exercise of the right of appropriation. No such notice was given prior to (if, contrary to the Claimants' case, such notice was ever given) 14 July 2015.\n- 98. In the event of exercise of a right of appropriation, UBS was at all times and remains under a duty to: (1) Value the UBS H-Shares in a commercially reasonable manner at the time of appropriation; and (2) Properly account for any amount by which that value exceeded Dawn State's liabilities to UBS under the Security Agreements.\n- 99. UBS's purported credit at a value of HK\\$11.12 per share (particularised at paragraph 73 above) could not reflect the commercially reasonable value of the Acquired H-Shares on any relevant\n\ndate. In particular (but without limitation) that credit of HK\\$11.12 per share was purportedly calculated by applying a discount to the closing price on 7 July 2015, and not on any possible date of appropriation.\n\n100. UBS would therefore be under a duty to: (1) satisfy the court that the UBS H-Shares were valued in a commercially reasonable manner at the date of appropriation; and (2) insofar as it cannot do so, account to Dawn State for any amount by which the commercially reasonable value of the UBS H-Shares at the date of appropriation exceeded Dawn State's liabilities to UBS under the Security Agreements.\n\n### RELIEF SOUGHT\n\n- 101. In the premises, Ace Decade is entitled to:\n\t- (1) Damages as pleaded at paragraph 84 above, in the amount of at least US\\$495,300,000. This sum is equivalent to approximately £402,032,000 as at the date of this Claim based upon the XE.com mid-market rate.\n\t- (2) Simple interest on that sum pursuant to s.35A Senior Courts Act 1981 (\"SCA 1981\") at a rate of 8% per annum.\n- 102. Alternatively to paragraph 101 above, Mr Kwok is entitled to:\n\t- (1) Damages as pleaded at paragraph 87 above in the amount of at least US\\$495,300,000. This sum is equivalent to approximately £402,032,000 as at the date of this Claim based upon the XE.com mid-market rate.\n\t- (2) Simple interest on that sum pursuant to SCA 1981 s.35A at a rate of 8% per annum.\n- 103. The amounts claimed at paragraphs 101 and 102 above are claimed in US Dollars (US\\$) as this is the currency in which the Claimant felt those losses.\n- 104. Further, or alternatively, in the premises Dawn State is entitled to:\n\t- (1) An order that UBS render an account in common form in relation to the Acquired H-Shares held by it as Custodian. Paragraph 92 above is repeated.\n\t- (2) An order that UBS render an account of profits arising from the circumstances particularised in paragraph 92(3) above.\n\t- (3) A declaration that any of identifiable profits or proceeds referred to in paragraphs 92 above are held on statutory, alternatively constructive, trusts for Dawn State. Paragraph 93 above is repeated;\n\nCase&&&&&&&&&&&&=1 Fille&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&\n\n- (4) Further or alternatively, damages or equitable compensation for the difference between the sum at which UBS sold the Acquired H-Shares and the value which could have been reasonably obtained for said shares. Paragraph 94 and 95 above are repeated.\n- (5) Alternatively, the difference between the amount accounted for by UBS to Dawn State and the commercially reasonable value of assets at the time of appropriation, which is claimed as a debt. Paragraph 100 above is repeated.\n- (6) Further, Dawn State is entitled, under the court's equitable jurisdiction and/or SCA 1981 s.35A, to: (a) compound, alternatively simple, interest on the sums specified in subparagraphs (1) to (3) above; and (b) simple interest on the sums specified in paragraphs (4) and (5) above at a rate of 8%.\n\n#### AND the Claimants claim:\n\n- (1) Damages as specified above\n- (2) Orders as specified above\n- (3) A declaration as specified above\n- (4) The difference between the sum accounted for by UBS and the commercially reasonable value of the H-Shares as a debt\n- (5) Interest as specified above\n- (6) Further and other relief\n- (7) Costs\n\n#### SA'AD HOSSAIN QC\n\n#### SEBASTIAN ISAAC\n\n#### MATTHEW HOYLE\n\nI (the First Claimant) believe that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\n![](_page_38_Picture_0.jpeg)\n\nName: Kwok Ho Wan\n\nDate: 23 September 2020\n\nThe Second Claimant believes that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nName: Yanping (Yvette) Wang\n\nDate: 23 September 2020\n\nThe Third Claimant believes that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nYanping (Yvette) Wang Name:\n\n23 September 2020 Date:","body_zh":"案件 22-50073 文书 644-21 于 07/29/22 提交 于 07/29/22 13:36:15 登记 第 1 页，共 39 页\n\n英格兰和威尔士高等法院商务及财产法院商事法院（王座部）\nIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES COMMERCIAL COURT (QBD)\n\n案号：CL-2020-000345\n\n当事人如下：\n\n（1）KWOK HO WAN（郭文贵）\n\n（2）ACE DECADE HOLDINGS LIMITED（艾斯年代控股有限公司）\n\n（3）DAWN STATE LIMITED（道恩州有限公司）\n\n原告\n\n— 与 —\n\nUBS AG（瑞银集团）\n\n被告\n\n诉状详情\n\n当事人\n\n1. 第一原告（“郭先生”）是一名自 2015 年初以来居住于美国纽约州的高净值人士。郭先生此前居住于中华人民共和国（“中国”），在该国他以其普通话姓名郭文贵为人所知。郭先生是中国政府的政治反对者，在引发本案诉请的事件发生时，他与中国当局已处于敌对关系。\n\n2. 第二原告（“Ace Decade”）是一家根据英属维尔京群岛法律注册成立的私人有限公司，其注册地址为 P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands。Ace Decade 于 18 June 2014 注册成立，并于 10 November 2014 前后由郭先生收购，作为当时拟议收购中国公司 Haitong Securities Company Limited（海通证券股份有限公司，以下简称“Haitong”）股份的筹备工作之一。\n\n3. 第三原告（“Dawn State”）亦是一家根据英属维尔京群岛法律注册成立的私人有限公司，其注册地址为 P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands。\n\n4. 自 18 September 2015 起，Dawn State 由 Ace Decade 拥有并控制。在 18 September 2015 之前，Dawn State 由中国投资服务提供商 Haixia Capital Management Company Ltd（海峡资本管理有限公司，以下简称“Haixia”）通过名为 Haixia Capital Investment Fund (Fujian) Limited Partnership（海峡资本投资基金（福建）有限合伙企业，以下简称“Haixia Fund”）的载体拥有并控制；该基金由 Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co. Ltd（海峡汇富资产投资及基金管理有限公司，以下简称“Haixia Management”）管理。Dawn State 是 2015 年用于收购 Haitong 股份的载体（如本诉状详情（“PoC”）正文所作更详细陈述），但受一项合同权利约束，据此 Ace Decade 可在收购 Haitong 股份后收购 Dawn State。\n\n5. 被告（“UBS”）是一家在瑞士注册成立的公司，其注册地址为 Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland。UBS 在全球开展业务，提供零售及投资银行、财富管理及其他金融服务。在所有相关期间，UBS 均通过其瑞士总部以及包括位于香港的分行（“UBS HK”）和位于伦敦的分行（“UBS London”）开展该业务；经双方协议，后者被指定为与本案诉请相关的所有合同的交易对手方，详如下文所述。UBS London 一直持有英国金融行为监管局（Financial Conduct Authority，参考编号 186958）授予的提供受监管服务的许可，并获授权以 UBS 名义行事及订立合同协议。\n\n6. 原告就其诉请所涉事项通过 UBS London 与 UBS 订立合同。在促成该等合同的讨论和谈判中，UBS 主要由其雇员 Stephen Wong（黄先生）代表。黄先生当时任 UBS 财富管理部董事总经理，工作地点位于 UBS HK 的办公室。郭先生约于 2006 年或 2007 年首次被介绍给黄先生。\n\n引发本案诉请的事实\n\n海通投资的背景\n\n7. 约于 2013 年秋季，郭先生受到 Haitong 首席执行官 Wang Kaiguo（王开国先生，以下简称“王先生”）的接洽；王先生试图鼓励郭先生对 Haitong 作出大额股权投资。Haitong 是一家主要的中国证券公司，从事股票及衍生品经纪业务，以及投资银行、资产管理、私募股权、另类投资和融资租赁服务。Haitong 是中国规模最大、成立时间最久的金融服务提供商之一。Haitong 的股份在上海证券交易所及香港联合交易所（分别称为“SSE”和“HKEX”）交易。Haitong 在 HKEX 交易的股份称为“H 股”。在王先生接洽后，郭先生决定投资约 US$3 billion 购买 H 股，以取得 Haitong 的主要股权。该投资将通过 Haitong 发行新 H 股并将其配发给郭先生控制的公司来进行。\n\nUBS 的初步参与\n\n8. 在与王先生讨论后，郭先生向香港律师、Stevenson, Wong & Co（史蒂文森、黄律师事务所，以下简称“Stevenson Wong”）合伙人 Hank Lo（罗先生）告知其拟收购 Haitong 大额股权的意向。郭先生聘请 Stevenson Wong 就拟议收购向其提供意见。\n\n9. 罗先生与黄先生及 UBS 有既存关系，其具体情况郭先生并不知悉；约于 2006-7 年，正是罗先生首次将郭先生介绍给黄先生。截至 2013 年底，黄先生已与郭先生建立密切的私人关系，并成功诱使郭先生考虑并将其视为可信赖的顾问和私人朋友。\n\n10. 在 2013 年第四季度的某个时候，罗先生向黄先生告知郭先生拟收购 Haitong 股权的意向。原告并不知道罗先生何时将此事告知黄先生。郭先生直到事后才知悉罗先生打算将此事告知黄先生或 UBS，尽管郭先生在事后并未反对其如此行事。\n\n11. 约于 2013 年 12 月，黄先生前往郭先生在香港的住所探访。他告知郭先生，UBS 已得知 Haitong 将发行新 H 股（“配售股份”），且 UBS 希望作为配售代理人参与其中。黄先生使用其移动电话接通了与 UBS 高级管理人员的通话，郭先生理解该等人员位于瑞士。郭先生现已无法回忆这些人的姓名。该等 UBS 高级管理人员和黄先生向郭先生表示（以下各子段仅陈述其所言要旨）：\n\n（1）UBS 希望成为配售股份销售的经纪人，并希望郭先生向 Haitong 引荐并推荐 UBS 担任该角色；\n\n（2）如郭先生以该方式协助 UBS，UBS 将协助并就郭先生以对其有利的方式收购其作为经纪人或配售代理人的股份向其提供意见；\n\n（3）尽管他们知道郭先生拟为自己收购该等股份，如郭先生愿意转售该等股份，UBS 本身或与 UBS 有关系的投资者将有兴趣以较可能发行价格大幅溢价的价格购买该等股份。\n\n12. 在该次会面后，郭先生决定与 UBS 合作；为此，2014 年初某时，郭先生告知王先生其拟投资新发行的 H 股，并要求王先生将 UBS 列为配售股份的配售对象之一。\n\n13. 于 2014 年 7 月或 8 月，Haitong 决定通过七名配售对象发行 H 股，其中之一为 UBS。另一家就另一项 H 股收购向郭先生提供建议和协助的公司 Macquarie Capital Securities Limited（麦格理资本证券有限公司，以下简称“Macquarie”），将就配售股份的三项配额担任配售对象。UBS 与 Macquarie 合计将配售 Haitong 已发行股份总数的约 12%。\n\n黄先生的初步顾问工作\n\n14. 在该次会面后，郭先生就 UBS 担任配售代理人的拟议配售股份投资（“UBS H 股”）的结构安排，与 UBS（通过黄先生）进行讨论。在 2014 年 3 月底和 4 月前后进行的讨论中，黄先生表示，他将就“Haitong 项目”提供方案，包括郭先生可借以收购 UBS H 股的拟议结构。\n\n15. 作为一家在中国注册成立并经营的证券公司，Haitong 在所有相关期间均受中国证券监督管理委员会（“CSRC”）监管。相关中国法律要求，如任何人取得或实际控制 Haitong 已发行股本总额超过 5% 的股权，须获得 CSRC 批准。\n\n16. 郭先生与黄先生讨论了郭先生拟投资总额超过 US$3 billion 的事项，该金额将显著超过该门槛，因而需要获得 CSRC 批准。郭先生从 UBS 获得的建议尤其包括：设计一种收购配售股份的结构，以在符合相关中国法律的方式下避免 CSRC 批准的要求。\n\n17. 在这些谈话过程中：\n\n（1）黄先生一再向郭先生表示，在 UBS 高级管理人员的指示下，他将依照 2013 年 12 月作出的承诺，为推进郭先生就收购配售股份而言的最大利益而努力。自该期间起直至收购 UBS H 股，郭先生经常重复并重申，他与 UBS 正在为郭先生的利益而工作，且郭先生应信赖并依靠黄先生和 UBS；\n\n（2）Wong先生表示，他与UBS（瑞银）将以对Kwok先生尽可能有利的方式设计该项收购的架构；以及\n\n（3）Wong先生表示其本人及UBS具备为Kwok先生设计有利收购架构的经验和专业知识，并就配售股份等配售中的投资、投资架构设计及其融资事宜向Kwok先生（以及随后向Ace Decade（艾斯十年））提供建议。\n\n18. 于2014年6月前后，UBS通过Wong先生就收购UBS H股的架构提供了初步建议。该等建议在Kwok先生的办公室（香港花园道1号中国银行大厦49楼）及其在香港的私人住所举行的会议上以口头形式作出。概而言之（以下分项仅陈述UBS建议的要旨），Wong先生建议Kwok先生：（1）不要通过由其实益拥有或控制的公司购买UBS H股，因为这将需要获得CSRC（中国证券监督管理委员会）的批准；（2）改为设立一种架构（由UBS安排），据此，UBS H股将由一家受第三方中介机构控制的公司收购，而该等收购无需获得CSRC批准；以及（3）以杠杆方式进行投资，并由UBS提供收购融资。\n\n19. Kwok先生起初不愿进行杠杆投资，因为其无需银行融资即可收购UBS H股，且原本打算以现金完成该项收购。然而，Wong先生向其建议：\n\n（1）如UBS继续为该项投资设计架构，则必须以该银行将为购买UBS H股提供保证金融资为基础，因为这将是UBS从该交易中获取利润的方式；\n\n（2）无论如何，进行杠杆投资符合Kwok先生的最佳利益，因为这将使其无需投入全部自有资本即可获得所需数量的股份；\n\n（3）UBS提供的任何杠杆融资，在任何情况下均将按照“最佳可能条件”提供；\n\n（4）任何杠杆融资的条款将符合Kwok先生的要求，即不得因配售股份短期价格波动而规定：（i）提供额外担保物，或（ii）强制偿还贷款（Kwok先生和Wong先生均笼统地将上述两项、不加区分地称为“追加保证金通知”）；\n\n（5）UBS将给予Kwok先生充足时间以满足任何其他追加保证金通知，因此，如Kwok先生具备（事实上其确实具备）在无需贷款融资的情况下为全部收购提供资金的能力，UBS不会在Kwok先生能够提供额外资金之前对担保物采取执行措施；\n\n（6）为说明UBS在UBS H股价值波动时将如何处理额外担保物或偿还贷款的请求，Wong先生反复（在该期间及其后）提及一项由UBS出资的、先前高价值杠杆交易；在该交易中，UBS为收购中国保险公司Ping An（平安）的远大于本案的股权提供了资金（“平安交易”）。Wong先生于2014年6月至2014年12月期间就平安交易提供的信息详情，概述于下文第42段。\n\n20. 据Kwok先生尽其记忆所及，该等建议首次于2014年6月前后作出。然而，该等事项于2014年夏季和秋季以及其后，均为Wong先生与Kwok先生反复讨论的主题。Kwok先生无法确定UBS在每一具体场合向其作出了何种陈述，但记得整体建议所产生的效果。\n\n进一步的架构设计建议\n\n21. 自2014年7月前后起，UBS继续就拟议的收购UBS H股架构及融资向Kwok先生及（自2014年11月10日起）Ace Decade提供建议。特别是，Wong先生进一步就收购架构向Kwok先生（以及随后向Ace Decade）提供建议，包括进一步就收购Haitong（海通）超过该公司股本5%须获得CSRC批准的要求提供建议；并建议Kwok先生和Ace Decade选择Haixia（海峡）作为该项投资的中介机构。\n\n22. Kwok先生和Ace Decade依赖该等建议，选择Haixia作为收购UBS H股的中介机构，并最终根据日期为2014年12月18日的《共同投资协议》（“《共同投资协议》”）为该目的委任Haixia。\n\n23. 虽然Wong先生曾告知Kwok先生和Ace Decade，Haixia独立于UBS，但事实上，Haixia受State Development and Investment Corporation（国家开发投资公司，“SDIC”）控制；SDIC是UBS的合资伙伴，双方共同拥有一只名为“UBS SDIC”的投资基金。\n\n为便利对配售股份的投资，Haixia于2014年10月23日通过其子公司Haixia Fund（海峡基金）促成Dawn State（晨州）成立。在转让给Ace Decade之前的所有相关期间，Dawn State均由Lu Bo先生（“Lu先生”）管理；Lu先生为Haixia的高级雇员，此前受雇于UBS SDIC。\n\n24. Ace Decade于2014年11月10日由Kwok先生收购，以作为所述投资载体。于同日，根据Wong先生的建议，Kwok先生的一名雇员Yu Yong女士（“Yu女士”）成为其名义股东及董事。\n\n12月合同的准备工作\n\n25. 于2014年10月底和11月初前后，UBS（主要通过Wong先生）、Haixia（主要通过Lu先生）及Ace Decade（主要通过Kwok先生和Yu女士）开始为认购UBS H股作准备。\n\n26. 于2014年11月13日前后，Stevenson Wong（黄史蒂文森）与Norton Rose Fulbright（诺顿罗氏富布赖特律师事务所，“Norton Rose”）之间举行了首次电话会议；Norton Rose由Haixia聘请，就该交易提供法律服务。会上，各方同意Norton Rose将起草一份由Haixia、Dawn State及Ace Decade订立、有关收购UBS H股的《共同投资协议》。\n\n27. 于2014年11月14日前后，Ace Decade与Dawn State订立一份《谅解备忘录》，据此，Dawn State将向Ace Decade提供服务，以换取相当于投资资本总额65个基点的不可退还费用，但最低为US$5,000,000。\n\n28. 在此期间，即Dawn State同意认购UBS H股之前，Wong先生与Kwok先生就收购架构及融资持续进行讨论。在该等讨论中，Wong先生重复并详述了上文第19段所陈述的陈述。原告就该等陈述进一步陈述于下文第39至40段、第47段及第78段。\n\n29. 该等准备工作促成Ace Decade、Dawn State及UBS订立一系列安排，旨在使Ace Decade能够通过Dawn State参与收购UBS H股（合称“12月合同”）。12月合同包括：\n\n（1）Dawn State与UBS于2014年12月12日订立的托管协议（“《托管协议》”）；\n\n（2）Ace Decade、Dawn State及Haixia于2014年12月18日订立的《共同投资协议》；\n\n（3）Haixia Management（海峡管理公司）与Ace Decade于2014年12月18日订立的函件协议（“《函件协议》”）；\n\n（4）Dawn State与UBS London（瑞银伦敦）于2014年12月19日订立、题为“Project Pipe Financing Letter”的融资函（“《融资函》”）。\n\n30. 原告就订立12月合同及其条款进一步陈述于下文第32至37段。\n\n31. 该等准备工作亦促成Dawn State与Haitong订立日期为2014年12月19日的认购协议（“《认购协议》”）。原告就签署《认购协议》及其条款进一步陈述于下文第44段。\n\n12月合同\n\n32. 于2014年12月12日前后，Dawn State与UBS London订立《托管协议》，其中涉及（除其他事项外）对UBS H股的托管。原告将在审判中援引《托管协议》的完整条款及效力。在不影响上述内容的前提下，根据《托管协议》的条款，Dawn State同意所有UBS H股（一经收购）均由UBS London持有。《托管协议》的目的及效力，是确保UBS H股可供UBS London执行其根据当时拟由Dawn State与UBS London就提供收购UBS H股融资而订立的融资协议及担保协议所享有的权利。《托管协议》受英格兰和威尔士法律管辖，并规定就任何争议由英格兰法院专属管辖。\n\n33. 于2014年12月18日前后，Ace Decade、Dawn State及Haixia订立《共同投资协议》。原告将在审判中援引《共同投资协议》的完整条款及效力。在不影响上述内容的前提下，该协议规定：\n\n（1）根据该协议，Haixia同意在收到US$500 million（“货币出资”）后，授予Ace Decade参与认购目标公司（即Haitong）股份（定义为“项目”）的权利。此外，协议指出，预期Dawn State将安排金额为US$750 million的贷款融资；该金额连同货币出资构成“共同投资金额”。\n\n（2）根据第1.1条，Haixia Fund将因其在该项目中的角色收取一笔可观费用。\n\n（3）根据题为“权利的性质”的第3条，Ace Decade仅享有参与该项目的合同权利，并不对Dawn State或其所收购的UBS H股享有即时所有权权益。\n\n（4）根据第6.5条：\n\n“如因任何原因该项目未完成，鉴于Haixia Fund及公司为投资者的利益安排该项目及与商业银行的贷款融资：\n\n(a) 投资者同意，公司及/或Haixia Fund应于公司订立与该项目有关的股份认购协议时，收取以下两者中较高者作为安排费：(i) 共同投资金额（即US$1,250 million）的0.065%；以及(ii) US$500,000。”\n\n34. 此外，于2014年12月18日前后，Haixia Management与Ace Decade订立《函件协议》。原告将在审判中援引《函件协议》的完整条款及效力。除其他事项外，《函件协议》规定如下：\n\n（1）在“贷款融资”标题下：\n\n“[Ace Decade]确认，[Dawn State]正应[Ace Decade]的请求并为其利益，根据项目融资的有关融资协议（“《融资函》”），与商业银行安排贷款融资（“融资”）。”\n\n“[Ace Decade]确认其已审阅并同意《融资函》（包括条款清单）中所载融资的条款和条件，并进一步向[Dawn State]、Haixia Fund及Haixia Management承诺并同意，其应主要且独自负责与融资有关的一切费用、成本、开支及付款[……]”\n\n- (2) 在“转让安排”标题下：在项目完成后两个月届满后，或Dawn State根据拟订立的相关认购协议所适用的锁定期届满后（以较长者为准）的任何时间，在收到Ace Decade的请求后，Haixia Management将促成将UBS H股转让给Ace Decade或Ace Decade指定的另一实体。\n- 35. 尽管《协议函》规定，Ace Decade已审阅并同意《融资函》中载明的融资条款及条件，但《融资函》实际上直至20 December 2014才获得完整签署。原告在下文第36至37段进一步主张。\n- 36. 于19 December 2014前后，Dawn State与UBS London（瑞银伦敦）订立《融资函》。根据《融资函》，UBS London同意提供为该投资所设想的全部贷款融资金额（“融资额度”），但须随后完成更为全面的融资文件；该金额以港元计，为60%、股份数目及初始价格三者之乘积，且不超过US\\$750 million），其定义见《条款清单》。原告将在审判中援引《融资函》，以说明其全部条款及效力。除其他事项外，《融资函》规定如下：\n\n(1) 在“LTV比率”标题下：\n“(c) 提款前保证金\n\n[Dawn State]应向担保账户交付额外的港元现金，以确保在提款请求之日（即提款请求日）……LIV比率（参照提款请求日的股份总价值计算，并按备考基础计算，犹如相关额外港元现金已于该日交付至担保账户）等于或低于初始LTV。”\n\n(2) 在“排他性”标题下：\n\n“(b) 借款人将，并将促使其各附属公司及关联方，确保不会就任何用于或涉及收购的资金，或为其提供资金或再融资，而产生、借入、银团筹组、发行或私募任何其他债务融资……”\n\n- (3) 在“准据法”标题下：《融资函》及所有相关文件（定义为“融资承诺文件”）将受英国法管辖，英国法院将对任何争议具有管辖权。\n- 37. 融资承诺文件包括一份有关融资额度的指示性条款清单（“指示性条款清单”）。指示性条款清单并未载有按所示条款或任何条款进行借款或放款的任何具有法律约束力的承诺。指示性条款清单规定，根据双方将达成一致的融资协议，UBS在某些情况下有权要求就该融资额度进行强制提前还款或追加保证金，具体如下：\n\n- (1) 在“保证金条款”标题下：\n\n“LIV追缴触发点：66.7%，但如上文‘初始LTV’项下所述初始LTV经调整，则须由贷款人作出相应调整。\n\n追加保证金：如在提款日后任何预定交易日，LTV高于LTV追缴触发点，借款人应仅向担保账户存入足额港元现金，以使LTV恢复至初始LTV，并应遵守下文‘保证金付款安排’项下所述的一切义务。\n\n保证金付款安排：就追加保证金及保证金返还作出的付款，应于紧接追加保证金请求或追加保证金返还（视情况而定）之日后的营业日（“保证金付款日”）香港时间下午5:00前作出，前提是该请求于香港时间晚上11:59前发出……”\n\n(2) 在“其他条款”标题下：\n\n“完全强制提前还款事件：如在提款日后发生下列任何事件，贷款人可自行选择终止本交易：\n\n- 参考股份在任何预定交易日的收盘价低于(i)初始价格的60%；\n- (ii)(a)前一预定交易日收盘价的85%；或(b)紧接此前5个预定交易日中任何一个预定交易日收盘价的75%；\n-\n\n如贷款人通知其在完全强制提前还款事件发生后终止本交易，借款人必须按照下列付款安排，偿还融资额度金额连同与本交易有关的所有其他应付款项（“提前还款总额”）：\n\n- (i) 于该通知后紧接的营业日支付付款总额的25%；\n- (ii) 于该通知后的第二个营业日支付付款总额的25%；以及\n- (iii) 于该通知后的第三个营业日支付提前还款总额的其余50%。”\n-\n\n补足：在(i)非共同终止日的任何日期自愿提前还款，或(ii)在任何其他情况下提前还款或终止（包括在完全强制提前还款事件或违约事件发生后）时，借款人应向贷款人支付补足金额。\n\n补足金额按下列期间适用的利差计算：自提前还款或终止之日（视情况而定）起（含该日），至下一共同终止日，或如无该日，则至到期日止；该利差适用于融资额度金额或提前还款金额（视情况而定）。”\nUBS在签署十二月合同前作出的陈述\n\n38. 在筹备十二月合同的过程中，于2014年12月前后及18 December 2014之前，Kwok先生（郭文贵）知悉，UBS就该投资拟提供融资的条款包括关于追加保证金及强制提前还款的规定（其再次以“追加保证金”一词概括指称）。Kwok先生现无法回忆其是否看过《融资函》和/或《指示性条款清单》，但无论如何，其知悉该等事项必定来自他人对条款的描述，而非对文件的审阅，因为其不懂英语。\n\n- 39. Kwok先生反对纳入这些条款，并向Wong先生提出此事。二人曾进行讨论，地点为Kwok先生在香港的住所或办公室。Kwok先生向Wong先生所表达内容的要旨是：他对这些条款感到不满，并希望将其从与UBS签订的任何协议中删除。Kwok先生表示，他不希望UBS因Haitong H股价格的短期波动而能够要求付款或偿还贷款。作为回应，Wong先生代表UBS向Kwok先生及Ace Decade作出进一步陈述并提供建议，其效力如下：\n\n- (1) UBS的内部政策是，在银行提供保证金融资的情况下，其将设有允许其追加保证金的条款（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），且该等条款是UBS融资协议的标准条款；\n- (2) 尽管如此，Wong先生拟回去与银行协商，并尝试从协议中删除该等条款或对其作出修改；\n- (3) 即使Wong先生无法删除或修改追加保证金条款，Kwok先生（因而Ace Decade）亦不应对此有所顾虑，因为：\n\n- (a) 在本案中，UBS不会严格援引或执行该等条款，因为UBS有一项适用于Ace Decade及Kwok先生（因而默示适用于作为其居间方的Dawn State）的政策，即对于其高度重视的客户，如价格出现短期波动，不会追加保证金（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款）。\n- (b) 如因较长期的价格变动而有必要由UBS追加保证金（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），UBS将与Ace Decade合作，使其能够满足任何要求，并将给予其合理时间为此作出安排；如有必要，包括给予长于融资协议所规定的付款期限，且不会因任何追加保证金而在未给予Ace Decade足够付款时间的情况下出售任何股份。\n\n- (4) Wong先生再次援引Ping An交易，以表明UBS在H股价值波动时将就增加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求所采取的做法。Wong先生于2014年6月至2014年12月期间就Ping An交易提供的信息详情，概述于下文第42段。\n\n- 40. 在该期间的谈话及沟通中（包括其提供建议及作出上文第39段所主张陈述的谈话中），Wong先生进一步重复并重申，其本人及UBS正致力于保护和促进Kwok先生的利益，并且Kwok先生及Ace Decade应信任及依赖UBS，尤其是Wong先生。根据作出该等保证的语境，可推断其意图是鼓励Kwok先生及Ace Decade接受并依赖上文第39段所主张的建议及陈述。\n- 41. 由于与Wong先生的这些谈话，Kwok先生合理地相信：(1) Wong先生将从融资承诺文件中，并且无论如何将从最终融资协议中，删除追加保证金及强制提前还款条款；以及(2) 无论如何，他无需担心该等条款，因为该等条款不会依照其严格条款予以援引，而只会依照Wong先生所述的做法及政策予以援引。此后至19 December 2014之前，Kwok先生未阅读《融资函》或《指示性条款清单》，亦未获告知其条款。因此，直至2015年3月前后，如下文第46段所详述，Kwok先生并不知悉这些文件中包含追加保证金及强制提前还款条款。\nPing An陈述\n\n42. 如上所述，Wong先生（黄先生）多次提及平安交易（Ping An Deal），以说明在H股价值波动时，UBS（瑞银集团）将如何处理追加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求。Wong先生还提及平安交易，以说明瑞银在安排收购于中华人民共和国（PRC）注册成立公司的股权方面的专长。Kwok先生（郭文贵）无法回忆每次讨论平安交易的场合，但至少包括：\n\n(1) 上文第19段和第27段所述Wong先生与Kwok先生于2014年夏季进行的讨论。这些讨论主要在Wong先生与Kwok先生之间进行，但在此期间Wong先生就平安交易作出陈述时，Kwok先生的两名雇员Yang Ying（杨英）和Lyu Tao（吕涛）各自在至少一次场合在场。\n\n(2) Wong先生与Kwok先生于2014年12月前后、2014年12月18日之前进行的讨论。\n\n43. 在上述整体谈话过程中，Wong先生（代表瑞银）就平安交易陈述了以下事项：\n\n(1) 平安交易涉及收购一家中国公司的股份，即保险公司Ping An Insurance（平安保险）。\n\n(2) 瑞银曾就收购结构安排及该收购的资金筹措，为平安股权（“Ping An Stake”）的买方提供建议。\n\n(3) 瑞银曾为该收购提供贷款融资。平安股权的价值及瑞银提供的贷款融资，均远大于瑞银H股的价值或瑞银拟为收购瑞银H股提供的贷款融资。\n\n(4) 虽然平安股权的直接买方是泰国企业集团CP Group（正大集团），但CP Group实际上是代表一名中国商人、亿万富翁Xiao Jianhua（肖建华）（“Xiao先生”）充当中介。Xiao先生当时为中国企业集团Tomorrow Group（明天集团）的董事长。瑞银曾就如何设立该收购的中介架构向CP Group和Xiao先生提供建议。与Kwok先生一样，Xiao先生也是瑞银极其重视的客户。\n\n(5) 虽然平安股权收购的贷款安排包含允许瑞银基于价格波动作出追缴保证金要求（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款）的条款，且确曾发生价格波动，但瑞银并未严格执行该等条款。相反，瑞银与股东合作，并给予股东充足时间，使股份价值得以恢复，或使股东能够安排支付保证金。瑞银曾提供临时额外融资以弥补任何差额。\n\n(6) 因此，从未出现瑞银会对平安股东的担保物执行权利，或其会失去其已收购的任何平安股份的可能性。\n\n(7) 这符合瑞银针对极其重视的客户所采取的政策，该政策亦将适用于Kwok先生和Ace Decade（艾斯十年），并且在瑞银有权作出追缴保证金要求（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款）时，瑞银拟给予Kwok先生和Ace Decade与平安股东相同的待遇。\n\n认购协议\n\n44. 于2014年12月19日前后，Dawn State（黎明州）与Haitong（海通）订立认购协议（“Subscription Agreement”），据此其同意以每股HK\\$15.62的价格购买569,427,620股瑞银H股（“Subscription”），总额为HK\\$8,894,459,424.40（“Subscription Price”）。认购协议尤其规定：\n\n(1) 根据第2条，在认购协议与交割之间的期间内，如发生有关海通H股交易价格上涨或下跌的某些情况，认购价格可每股上调或下调最多HK\\$1.56。\n\n(2) 瑞银H股买卖的交割，须满足认购协议第3.1条规定的若干条件（“Conditions”）。\n\n(3) 根据第8.1条，如条件未于2015年6月30日或之前得到满足，任何一方均可终止认购协议。\n\n签署贷款文件前瑞银作出的陈述\n\n45. 于2015年2月和3月前后，拟备了关于瑞银为Dawn State收购瑞银H股提供融资的贷款文件（“Lending Documents”）。尽管Ace Decade并非任何贷款文件的一方（其详情如下文所述），但贷款文件草案已提供给代表Ace Decade的律师Stevenson Wong（黄史蒂文森）。\n\n46. 于2015年3月中旬前后，Kwok先生获Yu女士（余女士）告知，该等协议草案载有允许瑞银在瑞银H股价值出现短期波动时作出追缴保证金要求及要求强制还款的条款。\n\n47. 在2015年3月中旬至下旬前后与Wong先生的谈话中，Kwok先生表示反对该等条款，并重申其不希望瑞银能够因海通H股价格的短期波动而要求付款或偿还贷款。Wong先生代表瑞银：(1) 进一步重复并重申其与瑞银正在为Kwok先生的利益行事，以及Kwok先生和Ace Decade应当信赖并依赖Wong先生和瑞银的主张；及(2) 重述上文第39段所详述的建议和陈述，现将其重复列为2015年3月瑞银通过Wong先生所给予建议及作出陈述要旨的详情。\n\n贷款文件\n\n49. 于2015年4月1日，Dawn State与瑞银签署贷款文件，内容为瑞银就Dawn State收购瑞银H股提供融资。\n\n50. “Facility Agreement（融资协议）”由Dawn State和UBS London（瑞银伦敦）代表订立。经约定的融资协议为一项HK\\$5,336,675,654.64的定期融资。原告将在审理中援引融资协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，融资协议包括以下条款：\n\n(1) 第1.1条（“Definitions（定义）”）：\n\n“‘Initial LTV Ratio’是指百分之六十（60.00%）[ . . ]”\n\n“‘LTV Ratio’是指，在任何预定交易日，按下列方式计算的贷款价值比率（以百分比表示）：A/B，其中：‘A’是指以港元计的未偿还贷款总额减去追缴保证金余额；及‘B’是指市场价值乘以受交易担保约束的股份数量。”\n\n“‘Margin Call Trigger’是指百分之六十六点七（66.70%）[ . . ]”\n\n(2) 第7.7条（“Mandatory Prepayment（强制提前还款）”）：\n\n“(a) 如贷款人确定：\n\n(i) 于任何预定交易日，一股股份的市场价值低于初始价格的百分之六十（60%）；\n\n(ii) 于任何预定交易日，一股股份的市场价值低于：\n\n(A) 紧接前一预定交易日；或\n\n(B) 紧接前五个预定交易日；\n\n则（于每一情形），贷款人可通过向借款人发出通知，取消融资并宣布未偿还贷款连同应计利息及根据融资文件应计的所有其他款项立即到期应付，届时融资将被取消，且所有该等未偿还款项将依照下文(b)款立即到期应付。\n\n(b) 应按下列金额及于下列时间作出：\n\n案卷222599730790066422-1，记录于07/24/22233333333333333333333800\n\n(i) 于贷款人发出该等提前还款通知后的紧接下一个营业日，支付该等未偿还款项的百分之二十五（25%）；\n\n(ii) 于贷款人发出该等提前还款通知后的第二个营业日，支付该等未偿还款项的百分之二十五（25%）；及\n\n(iii) 于贷款人发出该等提前还款通知后的第三个营业日，支付该等未偿还款项的百分之五十（50%）。”\n\n(3) 第18.1条（“Margin Call（追缴保证金）”）：\n\n“如在任何预定交易日，贷款人确定LTV Ratio高于适用的Margin Call Trigger，借款人应在切实可行情况下尽快，并且无论如何不得迟于贷款人发出要求其如此办理的追缴保证金通知之日后的营业日下午5:00，将额外的港元现金款项存入或促使存入担保账户，以根据担保协议为贷款人设定担保，确保在计及所存入额外现金后重新计算的LTV Ratio等于或低于适用的初始LTV Ratio。”\n\n(4) 第20条列出构成“Event of Default（违约事件）”的16项事件或情形，包括：(a)（第20.1条）未在到期日支付根据任何融资文件应付的任何款项；以及(b)（第20.2条）未遵守第18.1条。\n\n(5) 第20.17条（“Acceleration（加速到期）”）：\n\n“在持续发生违约事件时及其后的任何时间，贷款人可通过向借款人发出通知：\n\n(a) 取消承诺，届时该等承诺应立即取消；\n\n(b) 宣布根据融资文件应计或未偿还的款项立即到期应付，届时其应立即到期应付；\n\n(c) 宣布贷款的全部或部分应按要求偿付，届时借款人应立即应贷款人要求偿付；及/或\n\n(d) 文件。”\n\n(6) 第32条规定：“本协议以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法管辖”；第33.1条（“Jurisdiction（管辖权）”）规定，英国法院对因任何融资文件产生或与其有关的任何争议享有专属管辖权。\n\n案卷22362307906848241，提交于87129923922，Enterest A24223.4338115289879968\n\n51. “Security Agreement（担保协议）”亦由Dawn State和瑞银伦敦代表订立。根据担保协议，Dawn State（“Chargor（设押人）”）向瑞银转让其对若干资产的第一顺位担保权益，尤其包括瑞银H股。担保协议还规定，瑞银H股由作为托管人的瑞银伦敦分行持有，并依照Custody Agreement（托管协议）的条款，将瑞银H股存入在瑞银开立的已设押账户。原告将在审理中援引担保协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，担保协议包括以下条款：\n\n(1) 根据第3.1条（“Assignment by way of security（以担保方式转让）”），Dawn State向瑞银转让其在下列各项中或与其有关的一切现有及未来权利、所有权和权益（包括针对托管人的权利、所有权和权益）：尤其包括托管协议、瑞银H股及持有该等股份的账户（“Secured Account（担保账户）”）。\n\n(2) 第3.2条（“Fixed Charge（固定押记）”）规定，Dawn State就其对下列各项的权利设定以瑞银为受益人的押记：尤其包括担保账户和瑞银H股。\n\n(3) 根据第8条（“ENFORCEMENT（执行）”）：\n\n(a) 第8.1条（“When enforceable（何时可执行）”）：\n\n“在持续发生执行事件时，押记应立即可执行，并且LPA赋予抵押权人（包括出售权）的权力以及经本契据修改和扩展的LPA第101条赋予的其他权力，应立即可以行使。”\n\n(b) 第8.2条（“Power of Sale（出售权）”）：\n\n“经本契据修改和扩展的LPA第101条赋予抵押权人的法定出售权、委任接管人的权力及其他法定权力，应自本契据之日起产生（为此目的，担保债务应视为到期应付）。”\n\n(4) 第9.3条（“Financial Collateral Arrangement（金融担保安排）”）：\n\n（一）设保人和贷款人拟使本契据构成《2003年金融担保安排（第2号）条例》（以下简称“《条例》”）所界定的“金融担保安排”，因此，贷款人有权：\n\n（i）使用构成《条例》所界定的“金融担保品”的任何已设押资产，在此情况下，贷款人应遵守《条例》中关于取得“等值金融担保品”（定义见《条例》）的要求；\n\n（ii）按照《条例》以其抵销任何担保债务，或以其清偿任何担保债务；以及\n\n（iii）在担保权益可执行后的任何时间，按照《条例》将构成金融担保品的任何已设押资产据为己有，以全部或部分清偿担保债务。\n\n（二）就上文第（一）（ii）或（一）（iii）项而言，其价值应为：\n\n（i）就现金而言，为其在据为己有或抵销时的面值；以及\n\n（ii）就其他资产而言，为据为己有或抵销时的市场价值，该价值由贷款人在据为己有后参照公开指数或其他适用且普遍认可的来源，或贷款人可选择的其他程序确定，包括由贷款人指定的独立投资银行、会计师事务所或其他估值机构进行的估值。\n\n必要时，按贷款人选定的、在据为己有或抵销时通行的市场汇率，折算为担保债务计价的货币。”\n\n（5）第9.4条（“已设押资产的出售”）：\n\n“设保人确认并同意，股份担保品或其他已设押资产可能迅速贬值，且属于通常在认可市场上出售的类型，因此，在执行担保权益时，贷款人无须就其拟出售或以其他方式处分任何股份担保品或任何其他已设押资产发出任何通知。在持续发生执行事件后，贷款人、任何受托人或任何接管人可自行并绝对酌情决定，以贷款人、受托人或接管人认为必要或适宜的方式及在其认为必要或适宜的情形下私下出售股份担保品或其他已设押资产（贷款人有权购买拟出售的任何或全部股份担保品或其他已设押资产）。设保人确认，该等出售应视为以商业上合理的方式作出，即使任何该等出售的价格低于如以其他私下或公开方式出售该等股份担保品或其他已设押资产本可取得的价格。”\n\n52.“融资协议附函”亦代表Dawn State（Dawn State）和UBS London（UBS London）订立。原告将在审判中援引担保协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，担保协议的条款包括以下规定：\n\n（1）Dawn State须就融资协议项下的任何提前还款作出一笔数额可观的额外付款，具体如下：\n\n“在全部或部分支付、偿还或提前偿还贷款的任何日期，借款人应支付适用的全额补偿金额。……\n\n“全额补偿金额”就拟偿还或提前偿还的贷款而言，指以下利差金额：如已偿还或提前偿还的该笔贷款本金在相关偿还或提前偿还日期至下一次发生的共同中断日，或如无共同中断日则至最终还款日期期间，仍未偿还，则该利差本应适用于已偿还或提前偿还的该笔贷款本金；视情况而定，直至该共同中断日或最终还款日期。”\n\n（2）并且，“本融资协议附函，以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法律管辖。”\n\n53.同于2015年4月1日，Dawn State向UBS London（其既以融资协议项下贷款人的身份，亦以托管协议项下托管人的身份）提供了一份“结算授权书”。原告将在审判中援引担保协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据该结算授权书：\n\n（1）Dawn State授权UBS London（作为贷款人）指示及／或授权托管人（同为UBS London）将Dawn State作出的货币出资和UBS London预付的融资金额，用于根据认购协议为认购提供资金，并将根据认购协议配发的UBS H股转入受托管协议约束的担保账户。\n\n（2）双方同意，“结算授权书，以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法律管辖。”\n\n54.在下文第55段所述价格上调后，结算授权书经一份题为“经修订及重述的结算授权书”的文件更新。\n\n价格上调\n\n55.2015年5月8日，Haitong（海通）向Dawn State及新H股的其他投资者发函，宣布完成海通新H股发行及出售的各项先决条件均已满足，且预计交割将于2015年5月15日进行；并宣布，由于此前30日内H股的交易价格已超过约定门槛，根据认购协议第2.2条，H股认购价应每股上调HKD 1.56，至每股HKD 17.18。\n\n56.因此，Dawn State和UBS London于2015年5月13日订立了一份“关于融资协议的修订协议”（以下简称“修订协议”）。1 原告将在审判中援引修订协议的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据修订协议：\n\n（1）第3.1条约定，将UBS的贷款承诺增加至HK$6,011,236,393.92，并将初始LTV比率提高至61.45%，但追加保证金触发点仍为66.7%。\n\n（2）因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法律管辖。”\n\n57.同于2015年5月13日，Dawn State和UBS London订立了另一份担保协议，题为“第二担保协议”，以更新担保协议，从而反映修订协议对融资协议作出的修订。原告将在审判中援引第二担保协议的完整条款及效力。第二担保协议的相关条款与上文第51段所陈述的条款相同，该等条款被重复陈述为第二担保协议条款的具体内容。\n\n交割\n\n58.2015年5月13日，Kwok先生（郭文贵）和Yu女士（俞女士）根据共同投资协议第4.1条，授权向Dawn State支付认购协议项下认购价现金部分的最终付款。根据其在融资协议项下的义务，Dawn State随后将该款项作为后续借款人出资支付给UBS London。\n\n59.同于2015年5月13日，Dawn State根据融资协议第5条，向UBS London提出金额为HKD 6,011,236,393.82的提款请求。\n\n60.认购协议项下的交割于2015年5月15日完成，UBS H股被转让给Dawn State。在登记为股东后，Dawn State立即根据第二担保协议第6.2(a)条，将该等股份存入UBS London的担保账户。因此，UBS London根据上文第51及57段所陈述的第二担保协议条款，以担保方式受让“已取得H股”。\n\n1 2015年5月13日的修订协议\n\n该等建议及陈述的后果\n\n61.上文第14至20段、第38至43段及第45至48段所陈述的UBS建议及陈述的具体内容在此重复援引。Kwok先生和Ace Decade（Ace Decade）基于该等建议的充分性及／或该等陈述的准确性，并在对其作出合理信赖的基础上，与Dawn State订立共同投资协议（且未退出该协议），并促使及允许Dawn State与UBS订立贷款文件。\n\n62.如无该等陈述：\n\n（1）如UBS坚持在融资协议中纳入追加保证金及强制提前还款条款，Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade本会在不使用UBS贷款融资的情况下取得UBS H股；\n\n（2）或者，Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade根本不会取得UBS H股；\n\n（3）或者，如Kwok先生和Ace Decade会如原告主张相反地所称，通过Dawn State使用UBS贷款融资并按相同条款取得UBS H股，Kwok先生和Ace Decade本会确保Dawn State有足够可用资金，以立即满足任何该等追加保证金要求及／或还款要求。\n\n63.贷款文件的条款对Dawn State极为不利，而对UBS London有利。尤其是：\n\n（1）融资协议规定，UBS同时享有：（a）根据第7.7条要求强制提前还款的权利；以及（b）根据第18.1条提出追加保证金要求的权利。\n\n（2）根据第7.7条，若UBS H股价值单日下跌15%，或五日内下跌25%，无论海通H股的绝对价值、LTV比率，或作为贷款人的UBS London面临损失的风险程度或是否存在该等风险如何，UBS均有权要求全额偿还贷款。\n\n（3）如UBS所知（至少Wong先生（Wong先生）因2014年和2015年的讨论而知悉，且无论如何，此亦属一般市场常识），海通H股易于出现短期价值波动，因此，在融资协议期限内，根据第7.7条要求提前还款的权利存在被触发的实质性风险，包括在UBS不存在损失风险或不存在实质性损失风险的情形下。\n\n（4）如UBS所知（至少通过Wong先生）或本应知悉：\n\n（a）Dawn State并非UBS H股收购的最终投资者或资金来源，亦不会成为满足任何追加保证金要求或提前还款要求所需资金的来源。这是UBS所建议设立的投资结构所致，详见上文第18段所述。\n\n（b）根据第7.7条进行强制提前还款或根据融资协议第18.1条支付保证金所允许的期限，不足以（或不大可能足以）使有关款项得以提供给Dawn State，并由Dawn State提供给UBS。尤其是，UBS于2014年12月19日在致Haixia（海峡）的一封信中确认，其明白Dawn State无法在提出要求后24小时内付款。\n\n（5）因此，存在重大可能性，即融资协议第20.1条及／或第20.2条所指的违约事件将会发生，且UBS将有权根据第20.17条行使违约事件发生后可采取的救济。\n\n（6）根据融资协议附函，如UBS行使其要求提前偿还贷款的权利，Dawn State同意向UBS支付以下全部利差：如已偿还或提前偿还的贷款本金在相关偿还或提前偿还日期至下一次发生的共同中断日，或如无共同中断日则至最终还款日期期间，仍未偿还，则该利差本应适用于已偿还或提前偿还的贷款本金。与简单的“中断成本”条款相比，此类条款在该等安排中并不常见，其意味着UBS会因行使其根据第7.7条要求强制提前还款的权利而在财务上获益。\n\nUBS London的执行 നടപട\n\n64. 2015年7月1日至6日左右期间，包括H股在内的海通（Haitong）股份交易价格大幅下跌。UBS London（瑞银伦敦）于2015年7月6日晚间向Dawn State（道恩州）发函送达通知，声称其根据《融资协议》第7.7条行使权利，要求提前偿还根据《融资协议》提供的融资款项。在该通知中，UBS声称要求支付：(1) 贷款的25%，连同应计利息及根据《融资文件》应计的所有其他款项（“相关提前还款金额”），约为US\\$200 million，于次日下午5时前支付；(2) 相关提前还款金额的25%，约为US\\$200 million，于通知送达后第二日下午5时前支付；及(3) 相关提前还款金额的50%，约为US\\$200 million，于通知送达后第二日下午5时前支付。\n\n65. 2015年7月7日上午，Ace Decade（艾斯十年）告知UBS，尽管其能够“迅速”履行该项债务，但无法在当日下午5时前履行。Kwok先生（郭文贵）亦通过电话联系Wong先生（黄先生），要求按照上文第14至20、38至43及45至48段所详述的UBS陈述及建议，给予额外时间以筹集足够资金。Wong先生表示不会给予该等时间，并称UBS London已决定出售UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）。\n\n66. Dawn State未于2015年7月7日下午5时前支付被要求支付的款项。\n\n67. 2015年7月7日晚间，UBS London向Dawn State发出一份“加速到期通知”（“该通知”）。\n\n（1）UBS在该通知第3段中表示，全部贷款（包括于当日到期的提前还款金额）、连同应计利息以及根据《融资文件》应计或未偿的所有其他款项，均立即到期应付。\n\n（2）UBS亦在第3段中通知其有权根据每一份“担保文件”（即《担保协议》及《第二担保协议》）第9.4条行使出售权。\n\n68. UBS于2015年7月7日另函声称，应付款项总额为HKD 6,289,081,405.43，包括：(1) 贷款本金（HKD 6,011,236,393.92）；(2) 未偿应计利息（HKD 44,003,279.72）；(3) 平仓成本（HKD 1,873,883.54）；及(4) “补足金额”（HKD 231,967,848.24）。\n\nUBS H-Shares的出售\n\n69. UBS London就其如何出售或声称出售UBS H-Shares（如有）提供的信息有限。据原告所知及所信：\n\n（1）2015年7月8日或前后，UBS London以大宗交易方式，按平均价格HK\\$11.12，正式向Segantii Capital Management Limited（森根提资本管理有限公司）（“Segantii”）转让200,000,000股UBS H-Shares（总数为569,427,620股），总价为HK\\$2,224,000,000。\n\n（2）2015年7月10日或前后，UBS自身声称以原告不知悉的价格绝对取得58,284,114股UBS H-Shares。原告亦不知悉UBS是否将该等股份出售给第三方，如有，则于何时及以何价格出售。\n\n（3）原告不知悉UBS根据《担保协议》第9.4条规定的出售权所进行的任何其他出售的详情。\n\n录入 97278/223.33.38.15 第26页，共\n\n70. HK\\$11.12的价格相对于海通H股的交易价格构成异常大幅的折让；海通H股于2015年7月7日收市时每股为HK\\$13.90。\n\n71. 2015年7月8日上午，海通宣布暂停其H股交易，等待发布有关下列事项的公告：\n\n“(1) 对本公司股份进行潜在回购的计划，如予实施，须经股东批准；及(2) 本公司高级管理层及/或雇员对本公司股份进行潜在购买……”。\n\n72. 因此，自7月8日上午起，交易暂停以及海通股份至少很可能进行回购，均已为公众所知（包括可推断UBS亦已知悉）。2015年7月9日，海通宣布回购其自身股份。2015年7月10日，海通H股恢复交易。H股以HK\\$14.24开盘，并以HK\\$15.14收市。\n\n73. 执行所得款项的计算，尽管该计算被说明为“草案形式，并且……须待交易完全结算”。该计算规定，向Dawn State支付的款项将参照以下各项计算：(1) “截至2015年7月7日的香港收市价：HKD 13.90”；(2) “大宗交易折让（%）20.0%”；(3) “大宗配售价格：11.12”；(4) “已售股份数量（股）：569,427,620”，即Dawn State的全部持股。UBS当时或其后均未提供任何股份实际买方的详情、向每一买方出售的股份数目、每宗出售成交的价格、出售完成的时间或出售条款。\n\nDawn State股份的转让\n\n74. 2015年9月18日，Haixia Fund（海峡基金）依照Ace Decade根据《函件协议》享有的权利，将Dawn State的全部股本转让予Ace Decade。\n\nACE DECADE及KWOK先生的请求\n\n75. 下列段落中提出的Ace Decade及Kwok先生的请求，系基于并假定该等请求受英格兰和威尔士法律管辖而提出。如UBS代表声称及/或法院认定该等请求的准据法为香港法律，则该等相同请求亦作为替代性主张根据香港法律提出，并援引下文所陈述的事实及事项，作为详述Kwok先生及Ace Decade根据香港法律提出诉讼理由的依据。\n\nUBS的注意义务\n\n76. UBS对Ace Decade及Kwok先生负有侵权法上的注意义务，包括（各项进一步或作为替代）：\n\n（1）以合理注意和技能确保向其二者或其中任何一人提供的信息或作出的事实陈述准确无误的义务。\n\n（2）就下列事项向其二者或其中任何一人提供建议时，运用合理注意、技能及判断的义务，其中包括：(a) 对UBS H-Shares收购的架构安排；(b) 对UBS H-Shares收购的融资；(c) 《融资文件》的条款及效力；(d) 与该等条款相关的风险；(e) 及/或UBS拟议及可能在行使该等权利时采取的行为。\n\n77. 构成UBS承担责任的事实及事项至少包括以下各项：\n\n（1）在所有相关期间内，Wong先生均为UBS的代理人，有权代表UBS作出陈述及给予承诺。\n\n（2）如上文第9段所述，Kwok先生（如UBS所知，至少通过Wong先生所知）在所有重要期间均将Wong先生视为可信赖的顾问及私人朋友，并以该等身份依赖其意见。\n\n（3）重述上文第11至13段。如其中所述，UBS与Kwok先生及Ace Decade之间关系的背景，是一项安排：Kwok先生应UBS要求协助UBS成为UBS H-Shares的配售代理，而UBS作为回报，提出协助及建议其以优惠条件收购UBS获委任为配售代理的股份。\n\n（4）Wong先生反复表示其本人及UBS在有关配售股份收购及其融资事宜上，均为保障和促进Kwok先生及Ace Decade的最佳利益而行事，包括就以下全部事项：(a) 制定该项投资的架构及融资计划；(b) 提供有关该项投资架构、融资及优点的信息；及(c) 就该项投资的架构、融资及优点提供建议。重述上文第17、40及47段。\n\n（5）Wong先生反复声称，Kwok先生及Ace Decade应当信赖并依靠Wong先生及UBS。重述上文第17、40及47段。\n\n案号22599330790684622-1 已提交876992992999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999900\n\n（6）UBS（通过Wong先生）事实上向Kwok先生及Ace Decade提供信息并给予建议，且UBS知悉并意图使其依赖该等信息及建议。重述上文第18至20、21至23、24、28、39及47段。\n\n（7）具备为Kwok先生制定有利收购架构的技能和专业知识，并就如配售股份配售等配售投资、该等投资的架构安排及其融资，向Kwok先生（及其后向Ace Decade）提供建议。\n\n（8）在就UBS作为《贷款文件》项下相对方的政策、意图及/或可能行为提供信息及建议时，Wong先生及UBS所涉及的事项均为UBS独有知悉，且Kwok先生及Ace Decade无法独立核实（如其所知），并且Kwok先生及Ace Decade必须依赖UBS向其传达的事项。\n\n违反义务\n\n78. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权范围及职权过程中行事，在签署《十二月合同》前以及此后签署《贷款文件》前，向Ace Decade及/或Kwok先生作出了如上所述的虚假及误导性陈述。尤其是：\n\n（1）UBS称，其有一项将适用于Ace Decade及Kwok先生（并因而适用于作为其二者中间人的Dawn State）的政策，即如价格在短期内变动，不会要求支付保证金或强制提前还款。重述上文第39、43及47段。该等陈述为虚假及误导性陈述，因为（如可从上文第64至68段所陈述的UBS实际行为推断），UBS（通过代表UBS London及/或在与《贷款文件》项下权利的订立及执行有关的范围内代表UBS HK（瑞银香港）行事的决策者（“决策者”））并无该等政策，及/或无意将其适用于Kwok先生、Ace Decade及/或Dawn State。\n\n（2）UBS称，如有必要要求Ace Decade及Kwok先生（并因而要求作为其二者中间人的Dawn State）支付保证金或强制提前还款，其有一项将适用于其二者的政策，据此UBS将与其合作，使其能够满足任何要求，并将允许其有合理时间如此行事，包括在必要时给予较《融资协议》所规定更长的付款期限，且不会在未给予Ace Decade充足付款时间的情况下，因任何追加保证金通知而出售任何股份。重述上文第39、43及47段。该等陈述为虚假及误导性陈述，因为（如可从上文第64至68段所陈述的UBS实际行为推断），UBS通过其决策者并无该等政策，及/或无意将其适用于Kwok先生、Ace Decade及/或Dawn State。\n\n（3）UBS（瑞银）表示，其拟以其声称对待平安股东的方式对待 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）及 Kwok先生（郭文贵）（并因此对待作为其二者中介方的 Dawn State（黎明州））。上述第19、39、42至43及47段在此重述。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，因为（正如可从上述第64至68段所陈述的UBS实际行为中推断）UBS通过其决策人员并无该等意图，而是意图按照借贷文件的条款及／或以对UBS最有利的方式，行使借贷文件赋予其的所有及任何权利。\n\n（4）UBS表示，其事实上曾按照上述第（3）及（4）子段所陈述的所谓政策对待平安股东，而此证明了UBS拟在借贷文件项下采取并将会（或可合理预期会）采取的做法。上述第19、39、42至43及47段在此重述。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，因为：\n\n（a）在2015年7月中旬前后Wong先生（Wong先生）与Kwok先生之间的谈话中，Wong先生表示，（与其先前的陈述相反）平安股东事实上曾被提出追加保证金要求（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），且该股东已按照相关借贷文件的条款满足该等要求。如属实，则UBS先前的陈述即属虚假及误导性陈述。\n\n（b）或者，如UBS确实以上述第42至43段所陈述的方式对待平安股东，则UBS的陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，因为对平安股东的处理并未证明UBS通过其决策人员拟在借贷文件项下采取并将会（或可合理预期会）采取的做法。\n\n（5）UBS表示，其就收购配售股份及其融资事宜，拟并正在以Kwok先生及Ace Decade的最佳利益行事。上述第17、40及47段在此重述。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，因为（正如可从上述第63至68段所陈述的UBS实际行为中推断）UBS通过其决策人员并无意以Kwok先生或Ace Decade的最佳利益行事，而是意图作为Dawn State的合同相对方，为其自身利益行事，而不论对Kwok先生及Ace Decade造成何种后果。\n\n（6）UBS表示，其正向Dawn State（并因此在实际操作中向Ace Decade）提供条件优惠的贷款融资，或以“最优惠条款”提供贷款融资。上述第11及19段在此重述。该等陈述属虚假及误导性陈述，因为（正如可从上述第63段所陈述的事项中推断）UBS通过其决策人员意图向其提供对UBS有利、但对Dawn State、Ace Decade及Kwok先生极为不利的融资。\n\n79. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，在作出该等虚假陈述时存在过失，因为在作出该等陈述时或此前，Wong先生：\n\n过失细节\n\n（1）未能采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS，尤其是UBS London（瑞银伦敦）（通过相关决策人员），是否拟以及／或正在以Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的最佳利益行事。\n\n（2）未能采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS，尤其是UBS London（通过相关决策人员），是否将向Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade提供条件优惠及／或以“最优惠条款”提供的融资。\n\n（3）未能采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS是否具有上述第78(1)及78(2)段所陈述的政策，及／或UBS London（通过相关决策人员）是否事实上拟将该等政策适用于Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade（并因此适用于作为其二者中介方的Dawn State），如上述第78(3)至78(6)段所陈述。\n\n（4）未能采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS，尤其是UBS London（通过相关决策人员），是否事实上拟以其声称对待平安股东的相同方式对待Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade。\n\n（5）未能采取合理谨慎措施，以确定UBS是否事实上以上述第42至43段所陈述的方式对待平安股东。\n\n（6）未能采取额外或进一步的合理措施，以保护Kwok先生及Ace Decade免因UBS作出的虚假或误导性陈述而蒙受损失或损害。\n\n80. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，向Ace Decade及／或Kwok先生提供了如上所述的过失性建议。就UBS所提供建议的内容而言：\n\n（1）如第19段所陈述，UBS建议Kwok先生及Ace Decade，使用来自UBS London的贷款融资进行杠杆投资符合其最佳利益，并且UBS提供的任何杠杆融资在任何情况下均将以最优惠条款提供。\n\n（2）如第39及47段所陈述，UBS建议Kwok先生及Ace Decade：\n\n（a）采用融资协议中所载条款的提前还款条款；并因此\n\n（b）贷款文件尽管如此对Ace Decade具有商业上的优势。该建议以UBS在第78段所陈述的陈述为依据。\n\n81. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，在提供该等建议时存在过失，因为：\n\n过失细节\n\n（1）对Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade而言，使用UBS London的贷款融资进行该项投资并不符合其利益（正如Wong先生及UBS必定或应当已知悉），且无论如何，以借贷文件的条款进行该项投资亦不符合其利益，原因包括：\n\n（a）如Kwok先生已向Wong先生说明，其本人及Ace Decade并不需要贷款融资进行该项投资，而可动用其自有资源进行投资；以及\n\n（b）来自UBS London的贷款融资（尤其是在借贷文件的条款下，且在上述第78段所陈述的陈述属虚假陈述的情况下）造成一种风险（及／或过度风险），即UBS将在UBS H股价值波动时对UBS H股采取执行措施，从而使Kwok先生及Ace Decade蒙受损失。\n\n（2）UBS本应采取合理谨慎措施，建议Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade，UBS London很有可能（与第78段所陈述的陈述相反）按照融资协议第7.7条及第18条的条款行使其严格权利，并且不会依照上述第78段所陈述的政策行事。在不影响上述一般性的前提下，UBS作出上述第98段所陈述的陈述后，即负有义务纠正Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade所依据的任何误解、误会或信息不足的基础。\n\n（3）UBS本应采取合理谨慎措施，建议Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade，在UBS H股价值发生任何波动时，UBS London很有可能将按照融资及担保协议的严格条款对UBS H股采取执行措施。\n\n（4）因此，UBS本应采取合理谨慎措施，建议以借贷文件条款为条件进行该项投资，并不符合Kwok先生（并因此Ace Decade）的明确意愿，即任何杠杆投资仅应在以下基础上作出：不应因配售股份的短期价格波动而触发提供额外抵押品或偿还贷款。\n\n（5）UBS向Kwok先生及Ace Decade提供的贷款融资并非（如UBS必定或应当已知悉）以条件优惠的条款（更遑论以最优惠条款）提供，而是以极为不利的条款提供。上述第63段在此重述。\n\n（6）鉴于UBS London的实际政策及意图，Kwok先生及Ace Decade本应（如UBS必定或应当已知悉）对融资协议第7.7条及第18.1条中的强制提前还款及追加保证金条款有所担忧，而UBS本应建议该等条款对该项投资的结果构成重大风险。\n\n（7）UBS未能采取合理措施，以通过以下方式保护Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的最佳利益：\n\n（a）告知Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade，UBS所提议的融资并非条件优惠的融资，亦非“以最优惠条款”提供的融资；\n\n（b）告知Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade与融资协议第7.7条及第18.1条条款相关的风险；\n\n（i）一旦知悉或怀疑向Kwok先生作出的任何陈述或任何建议属虚假、有缺陷、误导性或不完整，即尽快告知Kwok先生及Ace Decade。\n\n（ii）采取额外或进一步的合理措施，以保护Kwok先生及Ace Decade免受损失或损害，或以其他方式保护其利益。\n\nAce Decade的请求\n\n82. Ace Decade提出因上述所陈述的UBS违反义务所产生的主要请求。\n\n83. Ace Decade合理且可预见地依赖上述具体陈述的陈述及／或建议，以及UBS的技能和判断，而采取下列各项行为（各项均为进一步或备选依据）：\n\n（1）按第33段所具体陈述，订立共同投资协议；\n\n（2）未在认购完成前退出共同投资协议，或以其他方式阻止该项投资完成；\n\n（3）促使或允许Dawn State按上述第36段所具体陈述订立融资函。\n\n（4）未阻止Dawn State订立借贷文件，反而促使其在未使用UBS贷款融资的情况下收购UBS H股；及／或\n\n（5）如（与原告的主张相反）Dawn State会使用UBS的贷款融资并以相同条款收购UBS H股，未确保Dawn State可立即取得足够资金以满足任何该等追加保证金要求及／或还款。\n\n（6）原告在此重述上述第61及62段。\n\n84. 如UBS的过失已使Ace Decade遭受损失及损害。尤其是（各项均为进一步或备选依据）：\n\nACE DECADE的损失细节\n\n（1）HK\\$36,621,693.83，即在当时汇率下约为US\\$4.7 million，为UBS在出售已收购股份后向Ace Decade结算的款项：US\\$495,300,000；\n\n（2）如Ace Decade在签署共同投资协议后会完全退出该项投资（而非通过Dawn State进行投资，但由Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade自身资源或替代贷款融资提供资金），Ace Decade已损失其全部货币出资，即US\\$500 million，减去HK\\$36,621,693.83，即UBS在出售已收购股份后向Ace Decade结算的、按当时汇率约为US\\$4.7 million的款项，以及根据共同投资协议第6.5条本应支付给Haixia Fund（海峡基金）的US\\$812,500费用：US\\$494,487,500；\n\n（3）其本可通过投资UBS H股取得的收益所构成的损失，金额将依据专家证据予以量化。\n\nKwok先生的请求\n\n- 85. Mr Kwok（郭文贵）提出的请求仅作为 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）请求的备位请求，其前提是 UBS（瑞银）否认并成功抗辩其上述任何被主张的不当行为可由 Ace Decade 提起诉讼。\n\n- 86. Mr Kwok 亦以合理且可预见的方式信赖上述详述的陈述和/或建议，以及 UBS 的技能与判断，具体方式为（分别、进一步或备位地）：\n\t- (1) 促使或准许 Ace Decade 按第33段所详述订立共同投资协议；\n\t- (2) 未促使 Ace Decade 退出共同投资，或未在认购完成前以其他方式阻止投资完成；\n\t- (3) 促使或准许 Dawn State（道恩州）按上文第36段所详述订立融资函。\n\t- (4) 未阻止 Dawn State 订立贷款文件，反而促使其在未获得 UBS 贷款融资的情况下收购 UBS H股；及/或\n\t- (5) 如（与原告的主张相反）Dawn State 本会使用 UBS 的贷款融资并按相同条款收购 UBS H股，未确保 Dawn State 可立即获得足够资金以应付任何该等追加保证金要求和/或偿还款项。\n\t- (6) 原告重述上文第61及62段。\n\n- 87. HUBS 的过失致使 Mr Kwok 遭受损失和损害，其数额与 Ace Decade 相同。上文第84段经必要变更后重述。\n\nDAWN STATE 的请求\n\n已收购 H股的出售\n\n- 88. 于 7 July 2015，因发生违约事件，UBS 声称向 Dawn State 发出通知，告知其有权就已设押资产（即 UBS H股）行使“出售权”。上文第67段重述。UBS London（瑞银伦敦）出售 UBS H股的合同权利载于担保协议第9.3(a)(i)及9.4条。\n\n- 89. 据原告所知及所信，UBS 此后声称行使其出售权，并出售了全部 UBS FI-Shares。除上文第69段所述外，原告不知道根据该声称权利进行的出售详情。\n\n- 90. 上文第51(3)段重述。在出售 UBS H股时，UBS 正行使经担保协议第8条保留及修改的《1925年财产法》（“LPA”）第101条规定的法定“出售权”，因此过去及现在均须遵守法律和衡平法对行使该等权力的抵押权人或担保权人施加的职责及义务。\n\n- 91. 在此情况下，任何导致或旨在使 UBS 绝对取得已收购股份的、声称进行的 UBS H股出售，均属无效且不产生效力。任何声称出售给 UBS 本身的 UBS H股，仍应受 Dawn State 根据贷款文件享有的权利及 UBS 所承担义务的约束。\n\n- 92. 否则（并以 Dawn State 任何可证明的成本及负债已从所述收益或利润中获得清偿为限），UBS 过去及现在均负有立即向 Dawn State 作出交代的义务：(1) 就其处理已抵押给其、为其利益设定担保或由其以托管人身份持有的已收购 H股；及/或 (2) 就其因出售所述已收购 H股而取得的任何收益；及 (3) 就其因上文第69段所详述的出售或如上所述其他处理而取得的任何利润；\n\n- 93. 进一步或备位地，上述收益和/或利润根据 LPA 第105条为 Dawn State 设立法定信托而持有，备位地，为 Dawn State 设立推定信托而持有。\n\n- 94. 进一步或备位地，UBS 在行使其出售权时，亦负有以合理技能和谨慎为已收购 H股取得适当价格的义务。就任何声称进行的 UBS H股出售属有效的范围而言，原告相信 UBS 因以下原因未以合理技能进行出售：\n\n过失详情\n\n- (1) 未考虑或未充分考虑，就香港交易所的大宗出售而言，适用于 H股的折让是否不适当地过大；\n\n- (2) 未考虑或未充分考虑该等股份是否可以较小折让出售：\n\n- (3) 未考虑或未充分考虑海通股份暂停交易（或可能暂停交易）的影响；\n\n- (4) 未考虑或未充分考虑海通股份回购的影响。上文第72及72段重述；\n\n- (5) 未给予股份回购生效的充分时间；及\n\n- (6) 未采取额外或进一步合理措施，以确保为已收购 H股取得适当价格。\n\n- 95. 因 UBS 的过失，Dawn State 遭受损失，该损失包括股份实际出售价格与可合理取得的该等股份价格之间的差额。原告保留在 UBS 提供其所实施的 UBS H股出售详情后进一步主张的权利。\n\nUBS 取得已收购 H股所有权情况下的备位请求\n\n- 96. UBS 于 7 July 2015 或其后任何时间，均未采取任何决定性步骤以取得已收购 H股的所有权，或备位地，未将该等步骤告知 UBS。因此，UBS 从未按照担保协议第9.3(a)(ii)条或《2003年条例》第17条取得已收购 H股的所有权。\n\n- 97. 如与原告的主张相反，UBS 确曾声称并有效地根据《2003年条例》第17条取得已收购 H股的所有权，则该等取得不可能发生于 UBS 向 Dawn State 发出行使取得权通知之前。于 14 July 2015 之前，并未发出该等通知（如与原告的主张相反，该等通知曾经发出）。\n\n- 98. 如行使取得权，UBS 在任何时候均负有并仍负有以下义务：(1) 于取得时以商业上合理的方式对 UBS H股进行估值；及 (2) 就该价值超出 Dawn State 根据担保协议对 UBS 所负债务的任何金额作出适当交代。\n\n- 99. UBS 声称按每股 HK\\$11.12 计入的价值（上文第73段详述）不可能反映已收购 H股在任何相关日期的商业上合理价值。尤其是（但不限于），该每股 HK\\$11.12 的计入价值声称是通过对 7 July 2015 的收市价而非任何可能的取得日期的价格适用折让计算得出。\n\n100. 因此，UBS 负有以下义务：(1) 使法院信纳 UBS H股在取得日系以商业上合理方式估值；及 (2) 如其无法做到，则就取得日 UBS H股的商业上合理价值超出 Dawn State 根据担保协议对 UBS 所负债务的任何金额，向 Dawn State 作出交代。\n\n所请求的救济\n\n- 101. 在此情况下，Ace Decade 有权获得：\n\t- (1) 如上文第84段所主张的损害赔偿，金额至少为 US\\$495,300,000。按 XE.com 中间市场汇率计算，该金额于本诉状日期相当于约 £402,032,000。\n\t- (2) 根据《1981年高级法院法》（“SCA 1981”）第35A条，就该金额按年利率 8% 计付单利。\n\n- 102. 作为上文第101段的备位请求，Mr Kwok 有权获得：\n\t- (1) 如上文第87段所主张的损害赔偿，金额至少为 US\\$495,300,000。按 XE.com 中间市场汇率计算，该金额于本诉状日期相当于约 £402,032,000。\n\t- (2) 根据 SCA 1981 第35A条，就该金额按年利率 8% 计付单利。\n\n- 103. 上文第101及102段所请求的金额以美元（US\\$）提出，因为这是原告遭受该等损失所使用的货币。\n\n- 104. 进一步或备位地，在此情况下，Dawn State 有权获得：\n\t- (1) 命令 UBS 就其作为托管人持有的已收购 H股作出普通形式账目。上文第92段重述。\n\t- (2) 命令 UBS 就上文第92(3)段详述情形产生的利润作出利润账目。\n\t- (3) 声明上文第92段所述任何可识别的利润或收益，为 Dawn State 根据法定信托或备位地推定信托而持有。上文第93段重述；\n\n\t- (4) 进一步或备位地，就 UBS 出售已收购 H股所得金额与所述股份可合理取得价值之间的差额，判给损害赔偿或衡平法补偿。上文第94及95段重述。\n\t- (5) 备位地，UBS 向 Dawn State 作出交代的金额与取得时资产的商业上合理价值之间的差额，该差额作为债务请求。上文第100段重述。\n\t- (6) 此外，Dawn State 根据法院的衡平法管辖权和/或 SCA 1981 第35A条，有权获得：(a) 就上文第(1)至(3)项所列金额计付复利，备位地计付单利；及 (b) 就上文第(4)及(5)项所列金额按 8% 的利率计付单利。\n\n并且原告请求：\n\n- (1) 如上所述的损害赔偿\n\n- (2) 如上所述的命令\n\n- (3) 如上所述的声明\n\n- (4) UBS 作出交代的金额与 H股商业上合理价值之间的差额，作为债务\n\n- (5) 如上所述的利息\n\n- (6) 进一步及其他救济\n\n- (7) 诉讼费用\n\nSA'AD HOSSAIN QC（御用大律师）\n\nSEBASTIAN ISAAC\n\nMATTHEW HOYLE\n\n本人（第一原告）相信本起诉详情中陈述的事实真实无误。本人明白，任何人在没有诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促使作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签名：\n\n姓名：Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）\n\n日期：23 September 2020\n\n第二原告相信本起诉详情中陈述的事实真实无误。本人明白，任何人在没有诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促使作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签名：\n\n姓名：Yanping (Yvette) Wang（王雁平）\n\n日期：23 September 2020\n\n第三原告相信本起诉详情中陈述的事实真实无误。本人明白，任何人在没有诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促使作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签名：\n\n姓名：Yanping (Yvette) Wang（王雁平）\n\n日期：23 September 2020","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CIPA","Guo"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":15169,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-07-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-07-29","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:35:59"}