{"id":"court_ctb_644_28","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":644,"sub_number":28,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2022-07-29","title":"![](_page_0_Picture_2.jpeg) ![](_page_0_Picture_5.jpeg)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"![](_page_0_Picture_2.jpeg)\n\n![](_page_0_Picture_5.jpeg)\n\n7/28/22, 12:50 PM How the state runs business in China | China | The Guardian Case 22-50073 Doc 644-28 Filed 07/29/22 Entered 07/29/22 13:36:15 Page 2 of\n\n13\n\nPhotograph: Andy Wong/AP Thu 25 Jul 2019 01.00 EDT\n\nreturned to being the\n\nultimate authority in\n\nby Richard [McGregor](http)\n\nbusiness as well as politics\n\n**W** hen Xi [Jinping](http) took power in 2012, he extolled the importance of the state economy at every turn, while all around him watched as China's high-speed economy was driven by private entrepreneurs. Since then, Xi has engineered an unmistakable shift in policy. At the time he took office, private firms were responsible for about 50% of all investment in China and about 75% of economic output. But as Nicholas Lardy, a US economist who has long studied the Chinese economy, concluded in a recent study, \"Since 2012, private, market-driven growth has given way to a resurgence of the role of the state.\"\n\nFrom the Mao era onwards, Chinese state firms have always had a predominant role in the economy, and the Communist party has always maintained direct control over state firms. For more than a decade, the party has also tried to ensure it played a role inside private businesses. But in his first term in office, Xi has overseen a sea change in how the party approaches the economy, dramatically strengthening the party's role in both government and private businesses.\n\nInternational governments have noted Xi's interventionist instincts with alarm. When US officials were pressed in early 2019 to provide evidence that [Huawei,](http) the Chinese telecommunications giant, had facilitated spying on the US and its allies, they pointed out that Beijing had already made their case for them: first with the party's systematic infiltration of private companies, and second with the introduction of a new national intelligence law in 2017. The law [states](http) that \"any organisation and citizen\" shall \"support and cooperate in national intelligence work\". The director of the US National Counterintelligence and Security Center, when asked about China's entrepreneurs, cited these two policies in asserting that \"Chinese company relationships with the Chinese government aren't like private sector company relationships with governments in the west\".\n\nhttp 2/13 Such shifts, under Xi, have gifted the US and EU an excuse to limit Chinese access to their markets, technology and companies. Australia has cited the same intelligence law to keep Huawei's 5G technology out of its future mobile networks. Gordon Sondland,\n\nDonald Trump's envoy to the European Union, gave such sentiment a hyperbolic spin to argue that Europe should do the same. \"We want to keep critical infrastructure in the western world out of Chinese malign influence,\" Sondland said. \"Someone from the [politburo](http) in Beijing picks up the phone and says, 'I wanna listen in on the following conversation, I wanna run a certain car off the road that's on the 5G network and kill the person that's in it' – there's nothing that company legally can do today in China to prevent the Chinese government from making that request successfully.\"\n\nUntil recently, such a statement would have been laughed out of court. No longer. Nor would Washington have contemplated the policy of \"decoupling\" the US and Chinese economies – shorthand for the administration's commitment, through taxes, tariffs and other punitive measures, to disentangle its companies and their technologies from China's supply chains.\n\nThe relationship between the party and private sector companies is, up to a point, flexible – certainly more so than with state companies. The party doesn't habitually micromanage their day-to-day operations. The firms are largely still in charge of their basic business decisions. But pressure from party committees to have a seat at the table when executives are making big calls on investment and the like means the \"lines have been dangerously blurred\", in the words of one [analyst](http). \"Chinese domestic laws and administrative guidelines, as well as unspoken regulations and internal party committees, make it quite difficult to distinguish between what is private and what is state-owned.\"\n\nThe answer to the question \"does the party control a company?\" is that it is impossible to tell. In the current environment, fewer foreign governments want to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt. If there was any question as to who was in charge of the economy and business, Xi's local and overseas critics alike only have to take the Chinese leader at his word, that in private enterprises, as with state-owned firms and every institution in China, the party is the ultimate authority.\n\n**I** n the early optimistic glow of Xi's ascension to the leadership, a number of western commentators talked up his appreciation of markets. After all, from 1985 to 2007, Xi had served in two provinces, Fujian and Zhejiang, which were thriving bastions of private enterprise. Starting in the 1980s, Fujian was an important gateway for investors from nearby Taiwan, while Zhejiang was home to a number of China's most famous private companies, such as [Jack](http) Ma's Alibaba. The arc of Xi's father's career, from revolutionary to reformer, reinforced this optimism about China's\n\n## 7/28/22, 12:50 PM How the state runs business in China | China | The Guardian Case 22-50073 Doc 644-28 Filed 07/29/22 Entered 07/29/22 13:36:15 Page 4 of 13\n\nnew leader. Lu Guanqiu, a businessman who owned and ran Wanxiang, a private car parts group, told Bloomberg: \"When Xi becomes general secretary, he'll be even more open and will pay even more attention to private enterprise and the people's livelihood. It is because he was in Zhejiang for five years.\"\n\nYet a deeper dig into Xi's past statements and writings on the economy reveals an official who has been a dogged supporter of party orthodoxy on the economy at every turn. Xi might have taken big risks in domestic and foreign policy, but on the economy he was not one for ideological experimentation. In the politburo, as vice-president from 2008 to 2013 and as the leader of the party school for most of the same period, there is little evidence of him straying from his core beliefs about the need to strengthen party control inside businesses.\n\n![](_page_3_Picture_3.jpeg)\n\nWorkers in Zhejiang watch a live broadcast of the Communist party congress as Xi Jinping prepares to take power, November 2012. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images\n\nhttp 4/13 When Xi arrived in Zhejiang in 2002, the province was already well on the way up the economic ladder. Xi headed a group of officials, known as the \"New Zhijiang Army\", who embraced the use of private investment to spread the risk in funding the province's signature infrastructure projects. In 2007, in a conversation with Washington's then ambassador to Beijing, Clark Randt Jr, recorded in US diplomatic cables and later released by WikiLeaks, Xi delivered a sophisticated, self-aware exposition on Zhejiang. He didn't pretend that there was any secret to the province's wealth other than local\n\nentrepreneurs, although he avoided using the language of the market in describing them. Xi did what every other official with responsibility for the economy did at the time: he simplified registration for private companies and helped them to access finance. When the party debated a law to protect private property, he supported it. \"With property protection in place, Chinese can gain even more wealth,\" Xi told Randt.\n\nBut Xi's support for mixing private and public ownership structures was purely pragmatic. It had value, he said in another forum, because it would \"improve the socialist market economic structure\". Xi's assessment is echoed by Michael Collins, one of the CIA's most senior officials for Asia. \"The fundamental end of the Communist party of China under Xi Jinping is all the more to control that society politically and economically,\" Collins [argued](http) earlier this year. \"The economy is being viewed, affected and controlled to achieve a political end.\"\n\nBy 2012, when Xi came to power, the landscape had changed substantially. China was initially knocked sideways by the global financial crisis in 2008, before swiftly navigating its way back to fast growth through a giant fiscal stimulus orchestrated by the government and delivered by the big state banks. The economy was also changing shape. From around 2010, after the fiscal splurge of the financial crisis, Chinese technocrats began to focus more intently on cutting debt and lifting consumption. That meant less focus on investment and exports and, if you listened to the entrepreneurs, a greater reliance on private business to generate growth.\n\n\"Chinese consumption is not driven by the government but by entrepreneurship, and the market,\" Jack Ma of Alibaba said in September 2015. \"In the past 20 years, the government was so strong. Now, they are getting weak. It's our opportunity; it's our show time, to see how the market economy, entrepreneurship, can develop real consumption.\"\n\nMa may have thought that the times suited him, and to a degree, they did. His business continued to soar. But Xi was all the time making sure that the party grew in tandem with the economy, in both the state and private sectors. In retrospect, Ma's comments look dangerously cocky.\n\n![](_page_4_Picture_6.jpeg)\n\ni spent much of his first term in power reining in the big state firms. Under his predecessor, Hu Jintao, many of the large state enterprises, big enough to be in the top 20 of the global Fortune 500, had grown into powerful empires and breeding grounds for serious corruption. In the words of analyst Wendy\n\n13\n\nLeutert, Xi \"faced the aftermath of a decade of rapid expansion and weak internal discipline in the state sector\".\n\nIn 2016, Xi chaired a national meeting that cleared the way for a more expansive role for the party in enterprise. In 2017, the measures were further extended, with the body overseeing big state companies directing them to write the party into their articles of association. In 2018, the securities regulator followed up by issuing a new corporate governance code requiring listed firms, at home and abroad, to include in their internal guidelines an expansive role for the party. Many Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong also wrote the party's role into their articles of association.\n\nIn some ways, codifying in public documents the party's role in managing companies was both an instance of rare transparency and part of an increasing trend of the party openly displaying its power. In the past, Chinese state-owned listed companies had customarily filed misleading prospectuses ahead of their stock exchange listings, omitting the party's pivotal role in the hiring and firing of senior executives. Similarly, company boards had long been legally and theoretically independent of the party, but not in practice. \"The same individual who is chairing a party committee meeting on a Monday might well be chairing a board meeting later in the week,\" notes a 2018 report on Chinese corporate governance.\n\n![](_page_5_Picture_5.jpeg)\n\nXi Jinping at 20th anniversary celebrations of Hong Kong's handover, June 2017. Photograph: Keith Tsuji/Getty Images\n\n## 7/28/22, 12:50 PM How the state runs business in China | China | The Guardian Case 22-50073 Doc 644-28 Filed 07/29/22 Entered 07/29/22 13:36:15 Page 7 of 13\n\nThere has always been an awkward fit between western notions of corporate governance and the party state's insistence on having a role in companies. \"It is rather like drawing a tiger with a cat as a model,\" said one Chinese commentator. But the direction of policy under Xi has been clear: the power that the party had over business decisions and personnel in state firms, once wielded behind the scenes, would not only be strengthened. The party's power would also be exercised explicitly.\n\nXi's shadow now looms increasingly large over private firms as well. In March 2012, a few months before taking over as general secretary, Xi delivered a speech in which he stressed the need to increase the number of party bodies inside private business. Around the same time, new details for \"party building\" in enterprises were released, calling \"for the party secretary to participate in and attend important executive-level meetings\".\n\nGet the Guardian's award-winning long reads sent direct to you every Saturday morning\n\n**Sign up** Enter your email address\n\nWe operate Google reCAPTCHA to protect our website and the Google [Privacy](http) Policy and\n\nThe party's efforts to place itself inside private companies have been, according to its own figures, very successful. One recent survey by the Central Organisation Department, the party's personnel body, found that 68% of China's private companies had party bodies by 2016, and 70% of foreign enterprises. Although these figures sound high, they don't match the targets the party has set for itself. In Xi's old stamping ground of Zhejiang, for example, officials set a target in August 2018 to have cells inside 95% of private businesses. There was a need, the survey said, to retain the revolutionary spirit inside the companies as their ownership was handed on to the next generation.\n\nAlthough the party is becoming more involved in private firms than ever, it wants to be part of business successes, not failures. It wants to sit alongside local and foreign entrepreneurs and share their wealth, not run their companies into the ground. Increasingly, it also wants to do more than supervise companies. It wants to be at the table when commercial decisions are made, not just manage staff. \"We should make money together,\" Lu Wei, then head of China's party office for internet security, told Paul Jacobs, CEO of Qualcomm, a US chip maker, in 2014. Lu's comments to some extent reflected Beijing's desire to acquire Qualcomm's technology, a sector in which China was weak. But the message was clear: the fat of the land should be shared with the state.\n\nhttp 7/13 he party's overarching aim, though, has remained consistent: to ensure that the private sector, and individual entrepreneurs, do not become rival players in the political system. The party wants economic growth, but not at the expense of tolerating any organised\n\n**T** alternative centres of power. During the 1990s, Chinese leaders watched in horror as the Soviet Union disintegrated and its assets were privatised. Having seen business threaten to take over the state in Russia, Beijing has been determined to make sure that the same disaster does not befall China.\n\nFor a reliable benchmark about the power of the party in China, you only need to listen to wealthy entrepreneurs hold forth on politics. These otherwise all-powerful CEOs go to abject lengths to praise the party. To take a few companies listed in a single [article](http) in the South China Morning Post, Richard Liu of e-commerce group JD.com predicted communism would be realised in his generation and all commercial entities would be nationalised. Xu Jiayin of Evergrande Group, one of China's largest property developers, said that everything the company possessed was given by the party and he was proud to be the party secretary of his company. Liang Wengen of Sany Heavy Industry, which builds earthmovers, went even further, saying his life belonged to the party. \"They act as if they are being chased by a bear,\" wrote Zhang Lin, a Beijing political commentator, in response to these comments. \"They are powerless to control the bear, so they are competing to outrun each other to escape the animal.\"\n\nJack Ma of Alibaba, the global face of Chinese entrepreneurship, has always managed to strike a quirkier and more independent stance than his fellow billionaires. \"Be in love with the government. But don't marry them,\" he [memorably](http) said at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2015. Ma's pithy aphorisms at home and abroad were mostly a plus for his business, but they had a downside. Ma's high profile made him vulnerable. Last year, one of Ma's former business partners told me, only half-joking, that if there was a presidential election in China tomorrow, Ma might win. That, he added, was a dangerous position to be in.\n\n![](_page_8_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\nJack Ma performing at 18th anniversary celebrations for the Alibaba Group in Hangzhou, China, September 2017. Photograph: VCG via Getty Images\n\nIn September 2018, Ma unexpectedly announced that he would step [down](http) from a dayto-day role in the company the following year. Ma said he wanted to focus on education and philanthropy. An equally plausible reason for his resignation, the former business partner said, was Ma's fear that his power and popularity had made him a target of the party. Ma has been in the party since the 1980s, although his membership was not declared until late 2018, after his retirement announcement, in an article in which the People's Daily newspaper complimented him for his contributions to reform.\n\nWhether or not some entrepreneurs were intent on taking him on, Xi pre-emptively took the fight to them. In 2017, his administration began a campaign to rein in swashbuckling business leaders, starting with some of the corporate chieftains who had become the standard-bearers for aggressive Chinese dealmaking overseas. Some business leaders were forced out of overheated commercial sectors such as real estate. Others were told to pull back from offshore forays, either because their high profile was an embarrassment for Beijing or because the government was trying to stop capital flight. Some, such as Wu Xiaohui, the chairman of Anbang Insurance Group, went the way that communist members who fall [foul](http) of the system often do, vanishing without explanation into the party's detention system. Only months earlier, Wu had been leading negotiations to spend \\$14bn on hotels in the US, but the deal collapsed. In May 2018, the\n\nauthorities announced Wu had been sentenced to 18 years in jail for fraud and embezzlement.\n\nMeanwhile, China's three dominant internet companies, Baidu (a search engine), Alibaba (e-commerce) and Tencent (messaging and gaming), known collectively as the BAT, have all felt the government's wrath. In 2018, Tencent lost \\$200bn in its market capitalisation after regulators stopped approving new online games, pushing the company out of the world's top 10 companies ranked by their share market valuation. The rapid growth of the BAT companies and their dominance of the internet in China has given them an outsized economic status. But their political value is just as important, as they have become indispensable to China's [surveillance](http) state. With the mountain of data they generate, the BAT trinity are in effect turning into a real-time, efficient and privately run intelligence platform. In that respect, they are seen as ideal private companies. They both drive economic growth and also buttress the political system.\n\n**F** oreign CEOs, too, have come under pressure to give the party a larger role in their firms. Again, this is a trend that began before Xi. Walmart, which famously won't allow unions in its US stores, has had party cells in its companies in China since at least 2006, and party-controlled unions even earlier. Under Xi, however, emboldened officials have pushed foreign firms harder to accommodate the party and give its representatives a role in business decisions.\n\nNow a wide range of foreign companies in China, from the cosmetics giant L'Oréal to Walt Disney and Dow Chemicals, all have party committees and display the hammer and sickle on their premises. In 2017, Reuters [published](http) an article that quoted executives from one European company saying that party representatives had demanded to be brought into the executive committee and have the business pay their expenses. Like Chinese entrepreneurs, foreign businessmen and women are trying to outrun \"the bear\", not always with success.\n\nBut the party's persistent efforts to colonise the private sector have stoked a backlash of their own. In late 2017, the EU business chamber in China formally complained about party organisations trying to extend their influence in their member companies, something they said would undermine the authority of their boards.\n\nYet the chamber's argument was met with indifference in China, at least in public utterances. \"When you are in Rome, do as the Romans do,\" said Chen Fengying, an expert at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a foreign policy 7/28/22, 12:50 PM How the state runs business in China | China | The Guardian thinktank. \"Foreign investors should respect local rules and regulations in China.\" On one level, Xi has been untroubled by the backlash over his treatment of entrepreneurs. From his point of view, the idea that the private sector is being overly politicised is upside-down. Business leaders should \"strengthen self-study, selfeducation and self-improvement,\" he said in 2016. \"They should not feel uncomfortable with this requirement. The Communist party has similar and stricter requirements on its leaders.\" Case 22-50073 Doc 644-28 Filed 07/29/22 Entered 07/29/22 13:36:15 Page 11 of 13\n\nLater, in 2018, when the economy started to slow and the trade war was ramping up, Xi was much more pragmatic and solicitous. In November, he invited a select group of entrepreneurs, including Tencent's Ma Huateng (also known as Pony Ma), for a meeting in the Great Hall of the [People.](htt) He wanted to reassure them that they were \"all part of our family\". At the same time, a surfeit of stories appeared in the official media urging banks to lend private firms more money.\n\nBut not all entrepreneurs were buying the new line. One businessman, Chen Tianyong, posted a lengthy rant on social media, which he titled \"An Entrepreneur's Farewell Admonition\", explaining why he had left China. \"China's economy is like a giant ship heading to the precipice,\" he wrote in a post that was later taken down. \"Without fundamental changes, it's inevitable that the ship will be wrecked and the passengers will die.\"\n\n*Adapted from Xi Jinping: The Backlash by Richard McGregor, published by Penguin Books and available at [guardianbookshop.co.uk](http)*\n\nFollow the Long Read on Twitter at [@gdnlongread](http), and sign up to the long read weekly email [here.](http)\n\n… we have a small favour to ask. Tens of millions have placed their trust in the Guardian's fearless journalism since we started publishing 200 years ago, turning to us in moments of crisis, uncertainty, solidarity and hope. More than 1.5 million supporters, from 180 countries, now power us financially – keeping us open to all, and fiercely independent.\n\nUnlike many others, the Guardian has no shareholders and no billionaire owner. Just the determination and passion to deliver high-impact global reporting, always free from commercial or political influence. Reporting like this is vital for democracy, for fairness and to demand better from the powerful.\n\nAnd we provide all this for free, for everyone to read. We do this because we believe in information equality. Greater numbers of people can keep track of the events shaping\n\nto take meaningful action. Millions can benefit from open access to quality, truthful news, regardless of their ability to pay for it.\n\nEvery contribution, however big or small, powers our journalism and sustains our future. **Support the Guardian from as little as \\$1 – it only takes a minute. If you can, please consider supporting us with a regular amount each month. Thank you.**\n\n![](_page_11_Figure_3.jpeg)\n\n# **More on this story**\n\n![](_page_11_Picture_5.jpeg)\n\nUkraine crisis poses dilemma for China but also opportunity\n\n22 Feb 2022\n\n![](_page_11_Picture_8.jpeg)\n\nXi and Putin urge Nato to rule out expansion as Ukraine tensions rise\n\n4 Feb 2022\n\n![](_page_11_Picture_11.jpeg)\n\nAsean leaders cite 1982UN treaty in South China Sea dispute\n\n27 Jun 2020","body_zh":"7/28/22, 12:50 PM 国家如何掌控中国商业 中国 《The Guardian（卫报）》 案件 22-50073 文件 644-28 提交于 07/29/22 录入于 07/29/22 13:36:15 第 2 页\n图片来源：Andy Wong（黄敬文）/AP（美联社） 2019年7月25日星期四 01:00 EDT\n\n重新成为商业与政治领域的最高权威\n作者：Richard McGregor（马利德）\n\n当 Xi Jinping（习近平）于2012年掌权时，他处处赞扬国有经济的重要性，而身边的所有人都看到中国的经济高速发展是由私营企业家推动的。自那时起，习近平策划了一场显而易见的政策转变。在他就职时，私营企业占中国全部投资的约50%，占经济产出的约75%。但正如长期研究中国经济的美国经济学家 Nicholas Lardy（尼古拉斯·拉迪）在最近的一项研究中所总结的那样：“自2012年以来，私营的、市场驱动的增长已经让位于国家角色的复兴。”\n\n从毛泽东时代起，中国国有企业就一直在经济中占据主导地位，而共产党也一直保持着对国有企业的直接控制。十多年来，党还试图确保其在私营企业内部发挥作用。但在他的第一个任期内，习近平主导了党对待经济方式的翻天覆地的变化，极大地强化了党在政府和私营企业中的角色。\n\n各国政府对习近平的干预主义本能表示警惕。当美国官员在2019年初被要求提供证据证明中国电信巨头 Huawei（华为）曾协助针对美国及其盟友开展间谍活动时，他们指出北京方面已经为他们提供了现成的论据：首先是党对私营企业的系统性渗透，其次是2017年出台的新《国家情报法》。该法律规定，“任何组织和公民”均应“支持、协助和配合国家情报工作”。当被问及中国的企业家时，US National Counterintelligence and Security Center（美国国家反情报与安全中心）主任援引了这两项政策，并断言“中国公司与中国政府的关系，不同于私营部门公司与西方政府的关系”。\n\nhttp 2/13 在习近平领导下的这些转变，为美国和欧盟限制中国进入其市场、获取技术和并购公司提供了借口。澳大利亚援引了同一部情报法，将华为的5G技术排除在其未来的移动网络之外。Donald Trump（唐纳德·特朗普）派驻European Union（欧洲联盟）的特使 Gordon Sondland（戈登·桑德兰）用夸张的说法表达了这种情绪，主张欧洲也应效仿。“我们希望西方世界的关键基础设施免受中国恶意影响，”桑德兰说。“来自北京 politburo（政治局）的人拿起电话说：‘我想窃听以下通话，我想把使用5G网络的一辆特定汽车撞出道路并杀死车里的人’——在当今的中国，该企业在法律上无法采取任何行动来阻止中国政府成功提出并实施该要求。”\n\n直到最近，这样的说法还会被认为荒谬至极而不予理会。但现在不再如此了。华盛顿以前也不会考虑美中经济“脱钩”的政策——这是本届政府致力于通过税收、关税和其他惩罚性措施，将其企业及其技术从中国供应链中剥离的代名词。\n\n党与私营部门企业之间的关系在一定程度上是灵活的——当然比与国有企业的关系更灵活。党通常不会事无巨细地干涉其日常运营。这些企业在很大程度上仍掌控着其基本的商业决策。但党支部要求在高管就投资等做出重大决策时拥有一席之地的压力，用一位分析师的话说，意味着“界限已被危险地模糊了”。“中国的国内法律和行政指导方针，以及不成文的规章和党内委员会，使得区分什么是私营、什么是国有变得相当困难。”\n\n对于“党是否控制一家公司？”这个问题的答案是：无法知晓。在当前的环境下，越来越少的外国政府愿意在疑点利益上信任北京。如果对谁掌管经济和商业存有任何疑问，习近平的海内外批评者都只需要听信这位中国领导人的原话，即在私营企业中，与在国有企业和中国的每一个机构一样，党就是最高权威。\n\n在习近平接任最高领导人初期的乐观氛围中，许多西方评论人士大肆宣扬他对市场的重视。毕竟，从1985年到2007年，习近平曾在福建和浙江这两个私营企业蓬勃发展的重镇任职。自1980年代起，福建就是邻近台湾投资者进入的重要门户，而浙江则是包括 Jack Ma（马云）的 Alibaba（阿里巴巴）在内的诸多中国最著名私营企业的所在地。习近平父亲从革命家到改革家的职业生涯轨迹，强化了对中国这位新领导人的乐观预期。Wanxiang（万向集团，一家私营汽车零部件集团）的所有者兼掌门人、商人 Lu Guanqiu（鲁冠球）对 Bloomberg（彭博社）表示：“当习近平成为总书记时，他会更加开放，更加关注民营企业和民生。这是因为他在浙江待了五年。”\n7/28/22, 12:50 PM 国家如何掌控中国商业 中国 《The Guardian（卫报）》 案件 22-50073 文件 644-28 提交于 07/29/22 录入于 07/29/22 13:36:15 第 4 页，共 13 页\n\n然而，对习近平过去关于经济的言论和著述进行更深入的研究后发现，他是一位在各个阶段都坚定支持党在经济上正统学说的官员。习近平在内政和外交政策上可能冒了很大的风险，但在经济方面，他并不是一个喜欢进行意识形态实验的人。在政治局任职期间，作为2008年至2013年的国家副主席以及同期大部分时间的中央党校校长，几乎没有证据表明他偏离了其核心信念，即必须强化党在企业内部的控制。\n\n2012年11月，在习近平准备掌权之际，浙江的工人们正在观看共产党代表大会的现场直播。图片来源：AFP（法新社）/Getty Images\n\nhttp 4/13 当习近平于2002年抵达浙江时，该省在经济阶梯上的攀升已经走上正轨。习近平领导了一批被称为“之江新军”的官员，他们支持利用民间投资来分担该省标志性基础设施项目的融资风险。2007年，在与当时的美国驻华大使 Clark Randt Jr（雷德）的谈话中（该谈话被记录在美国外交电报中，随后由 WikiLeaks（维基解密）公开），习近平对浙江做出了成熟而清醒的阐述。他并没有假装该省的财富除了当地企业家之外还有什么秘密，尽管他在描述他们时避免使用市场化的语言。习近平做了当时每一位负责经济的官员都会做的事情：他简化了私营公司的注册程序，并帮助他们获得融资。当党讨论一项保护私有财产的法律时，他表示支持。“有了财产保护，中国人可以获得更多的财富，”习近平对雷德说。\n\n但习近平对混合所有制结构的支持完全是务实的。他在另一个场合表示，这很有价值，因为这将“完善社会主义市场经济体制”。Michael Collins（迈克尔·柯林斯，CIA（中央情报局）负责亚洲事务的最资深官员之一）印证了习近平的这一判断。“在习近平领导下，中国共产党的根本目的越来越倾向于在政治和经济上控制这个社会，”柯林斯今年早些时候辩称。“经济正被审视、影响和控制，以达到政治目的。”\n\n到2012年习近平上台时，形势已发生重大变化。中国最初在2008年全球金融危机中受到重创，随后通过政府策划、大型国有银行实施的巨额财政刺激计划，迅速重回高速增长轨道。经济格局也在发生改变。从2010年左右开始，在经历了金融危机的财政大肆扩张之后，中国的技术官僚开始更加专注于减少债务和提振消费。这意味着对投资和出口的关注减少，并且如果听取企业家的意见，意味着更加依赖私营企业来推动增长。\n\n“中国的消费不是由政府驱动的，而是由企业家精神和市场驱动的，”阿里巴巴的马云在2015年9月表示。“在过去的20年里，政府非常强大。现在，他们正在变弱。这是我们的机会；这是我们展示的大好时机，看看市场经济和企业家精神如何能发展真正的消费。”\n\n马云可能认为时势造就了他，在某种程度上确实如此。他的业务继续飞速增长。但习近平一直在确保党与经济并驾齐驱地发展，无论是在国有部门还是私营部门。回想起来，马云的言论显得危险地狂妄自大。\n\n习近平在其第一个任期内花了大量时间整治大型国有企业。在他的前任 Hu Jintao（胡锦涛）任内，许多规模大到足以跻身全球财富500强前20名的大型国有企业，已经成长为强大的帝国，并成为严重腐败的温床。用分析师 Wendy Leutert（温迪·勒特）的话来说，习近平“面临着国有部门经历了十年的迅速扩张和内部纪律涣散之后的烂摊子”。\n\n2016年，习近平主持召开了一次全国性会议，为党在企业中发挥更广泛的作用扫清了道路。2017年，这些措施进一步扩大，负责监管大型国有企业的机构指示它们将党建工作写入公司章程。2018年，证券监管机构跟进发布了新的《上市公司治理准则》，要求境内外上市公司在其内部指引中纳入党发挥更大作用的条款。许多在香港上市的中国公司也将党的作用写入了公司章程。\n\n在某些方面，在公开文件中将党管理企业的作用法定化，既是罕见透明度的一个体现，也是党公开展示其权力的日益明显的趋势的一部分。过去，中国国有上市公司在证券交易所挂牌上市前习惯于提交具有误导性的招股说明书，隐瞒党在高级管理人员任免中的核心作用。同样，长期以来，公司董事会在法律和理论上独立于党，但在实践中并非如此。一份2018年关于中国公司治理的报告指出：“同一个周一主持党委会会议的人，很可能在同一周晚些时候主持董事会会议。”\n\n2017年6月，习近平在香港回归20周年庆祝活动上。图片来源：Keith Tsuji/Getty Images\n7/28/22, 12:50 PM 国家如何掌控中国商业 中国 《The Guardian（卫报）》 案件 22-50073 文件 644-28 提交于 07/29/22 录入于 07/29/22 13:36:15 第 7 页，共 13 页\n\n西方关于公司治理的概念与党国坚持在公司中发挥作用的要求之间，一直存在着尴尬的不契合。“这就像是以猫为原型画老虎，”一位中国评论员说。但习近平治下的政策方向一直很明确：党对国有企业商业决策和人事所拥有的权力（过去是在幕后行使的），不仅将得到加强，而且党的权力也将被明确公开地行使。\n\n习近平的阴影如今也越来越大程度地笼罩在私营企业头上。2012年3月，在就任总书记前几个月，习近平发表了一次讲话，其中他强调需要增加私营企业内部的党组织数量。大约在同一时间，企业“党建”的新细节对外公布，要求“党委书记参与并出席重要的行政管理层会议”。\n\n每周六上午直接接收《卫报》（The Guardian）获奖的长篇深度报道\n\n注册 输入您的电子邮箱地址\n\n我们运行 Google reCAPTCHA 来保护我们的网站，以及 Google 隐私政策和\n\n据党自身的数据，党将自身嵌入私营企业的努力非常成功。党的人事机构中央组织部（Central Organisation Department）近期的一项调查发现，截至2016年，中国68%的私营企业和70%的外资企业建立了党组织。尽管这些数字听起来很高，但并未达到党为自身设定的目标。例如，在习近平曾经的主政地浙江，官员们在2018年8月设定了一个目标，要在95%的私营企业内部设立党支部。调查称，随着企业所有权向下一代移交，有必要在企业内部保持革命精神。\n\n尽管党比以往任何时候都更加深入地介入私营企业，但它希望分享商业的成功，而不是承担失败。它希望与本土和外国企业家并肩而坐并分享他们的财富，而不是把他们的公司搞垮。渐渐地，它想要的也不仅仅是监督公司。它希望在做出商业决策时能在桌旁占有一席之地，而不仅仅是管理员工。“我们应该一起赚钱，”2014年，时任中国国家互联网信息办公室负责人的鲁炜对美国芯片制造商高通公司（Qualcomm）的首席执行官保罗·雅各布斯（Paul Jacobs）说。鲁炜的言论在一定程度上反映了北京获取高通技术的愿望——这是一个中国的薄弱领域。但信息很明确：国家的丰厚利益应当与国家共享。\n\nhttp 7/13 然而，党的核心目标始终如一：确保私营部门和个体企业家不会成为政治体系中的竞争对手。党希望经济增长，但绝不能以容忍任何有组织的\n\n替代权力中心为代价。在1990年代，中国领导人惊恐地目睹了苏联解体及其资产被私有化。在目睹了俄罗斯的商业势力威胁要接管国家之后，北京下定决心要确保同样的灾难不会降临在中国身上。\n\n要了解党在中国权力的可靠基准，你只需听听富有的企业家们大谈政治。这些在其他场合叱咤风云的首席执行官们极尽卑躬屈膝之能事来赞美党。仅以《南华早报》（South China Morning Post）单篇报道中列举的几家公司为例，电子商务集团京东（JD.com）的刘强东（Richard Liu）预测共产主义将在他这一代实现，所有商业实体都将国有化。中国最大的房地产开发商之一恒大集团（Evergrande Group）的许家印（Xu Jiayin）表示，公司拥有的一切都是党给的，他为担任自己公司的党委书记而感到自豪。制造推土设备的三一重工（Sany Heavy Industry）的梁稳根（Liang Wengen）甚至更进一步，称自己的生命属于党。针对这些言论，北京政治评论员张林写道：“他们表现得就像被熊追赶一样。他们无力控制熊，所以正在竞相跑过对方以逃离这只野兽。”\n\n作为中国创业精神的全球代表，阿里巴巴（Alibaba）的马云（Jack Ma）在同辈亿万富翁中始终展现出一种更为特立独行且独立的姿态。“跟政府谈恋爱，但不要结婚，”他在2015年达沃斯世界经济论坛（World Economic Forum in Davos）上发表了这句令人难忘的言论。马云在国内外精辟的警句多数对他的生意有利，但也有其负面影响。马云的高调让他变得脆弱。去年，马云的一位前商业伙伴半开玩笑地告诉我，如果明天中国举行总统选举，马云可能会赢。他补充道，处于这种位置是危险的。\n\n马云在2017年9月中国杭州举行的阿里巴巴集团18周年庆典上表演。摄影：VCG 经由 Getty Images\n\n2018年9月，马云出人意料地宣布他将于次年卸任公司日常管理职务。马云表示他希望专注于教育和慈善事业。那位前商业伙伴表示，他辞职的一个同样合理的理由是，马云担心自己的权力和知名度已经让他成为党的目标。马云自1980年代起就是党员，尽管他的党员身份直到2018年末、在他宣布退休之后，才在《人民日报》（People's Daily）赞扬他为改革做出贡献的一篇文章中公之于众。\n\n无论是否有一些企业家打算与他抗衡，习近平都先发制人地向他们发起了攻势。2017年，他的政府展开了一场遏制狂妄商界领袖的行动，首先针对的就是一些曾在中国激进海外交易中扮演领头羊角色的企业巨头。一些商界领袖被强制退出房地产等过热的商业领域。其他人则被要求从离岸并购中撤退，要么是因为他们的高调令北京感到尴尬，要么是因为政府正试图阻止资本外流。有些人，比如安邦保险集团（Anbang Insurance Group）董事长吴小晖（Wu Xiaohui），走上了体制内落马党员常见的道路：毫无解释地消失在党的羁押系统中。仅仅在几个月前，吴小晖还在牵头谈判斥资140亿美元收购美国酒店，但这笔交易破裂了。2018年5月，\n\n官方宣布吴小晖因诈骗和职务侵占被判处18年有期徒刑。\n\n与此同时，统称为 BAT 的中国三大主导性互联网公司——百度（Baidu，搜索引擎）、阿里巴巴（电子商务）和腾讯（Tencent，即时通讯与游戏）——都感受到了政府的怒火。2018年，在监管机构停止批准新网络游戏后，腾讯的市值蒸发了2000亿美元，将该公司挤出了全球市值排名前十的公司之列。BAT 公司的快速增长及其对中国互联网的垄断赋予了它们巨大的经济地位。但它们的政治价值同样重要，因为它们对中国的监控国家已变得不可或缺。凭借所产生的庞大数据，BAT 三位一体实际上正在转变为一个实时、高效且由私营部门运营的情报平台。在这方面，它们被视为理想的私营企业。它们既推动经济增长，又巩固政治体制。\n\n外国首席执行官们也面临着要求在公司内给予党更大角色的压力。同样，这也是在习近平之前就开始的趋势。以在美国门店不允许工会存在而闻名的沃尔玛（Walmart），至少从2006年起就在其中国公司内设立了党支部，而党控工会设立得更早。然而，在习近平治下，受到鼓舞的官员们更强硬地推动外资企业迁就党，并赋予其代表在商业决策中的发言权。\n\n如今在中国，从化妆品巨头欧莱雅（L'Oréal）到华特迪士尼（Walt Disney）和陶氏化学（Dow Chemicals），广泛的外资企业都设有党委，并在其办公场所展示锤子与镰刀标志。2017年，路透社（Reuters）发表了一篇文章，引用一家欧洲公司的高管称，党代表要求进入执行委员会，并由公司支付他们的开支。与中国企业家一样，外国商界男女也在努力跑赢“那只熊”，但并不总是成功。\n\n但是，党对私营部门持续不断的渗透与掌控也引发了其自身的反弹。2017年末，中国欧盟商会（EU business chamber in China）正式对党组织试图扩大在其会员企业中的影响力提出申诉，称这会损害其董事会的权威。\n\n然而，商会的观点在中国遭到冷遇，至少在公开表态中如此。“入乡随风，”外交政策智库中国现代国际关系研究院（China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations）专家陈凤英（Chen Fengying）表示。7/28/22, 12:50 PM 国家如何在中国运营企业 中国 卫报“外国投资者应当遵守中国的当地规则和法规。”在某种程度上，习近平并未受到对其对待企业家方式的反弹的困扰。在他看来，私营部门被过度政治化的观点是本末倒置的。2016年他表示，商界领袖应当“加强自我学习、自我教育、自我提升”。“他们不应对这一要求感到不适。共产党对其领导人有着类似且更严格的要求。”Case 22-50073 Doc 644-28 Filed 07/29/22 Entered 07/29/22 13:36:15 Page 11 of 13\n\n后来，在2018年经济开始放缓、贸易战不断升级之际，习近平变得更加务实和关切。11月，他邀请了包括腾讯的马化腾（Pony Ma）在内的精选企业家群体在人民大会堂（Great Hall of the People）开会。他希望向他们保证，他们“都是自己人”。与此同时，官方媒体上充斥着敦促银行向私营企业发放更多贷款的报道。\n\n但并非所有企业家都买账这一新口径。一位名为陈天庸（Chen Tianyong）的商人于社交媒体上发布了一篇题为《一个企业家的临别劝诫》的长篇控诉，解释了他离开中国的原因。“中国的经济就像一艘驶向悬崖的巨轮，”他在随后被删除的帖子中写道。“如果不发生根本性的改变，船毁人亡在所难免。”\n\n*改编自理查德·麦格雷戈（Richard McGregor）所著、企鹅图书（Penguin Books）出版的《习近平：反弹》（Xi Jinping: The Backlash），可在 guardianbookshop.co.uk 购买*\n\n在 Twitter 上关注 The Long Read：@gdnlongread，并在此处注册订阅每周长篇阅读电子邮件。\n\n……我们有一个小小的请求。自200年前创刊以来，数以千万计的读者在危机、不确定性、团结与希望的时刻寄望于我们，对《卫报》无所畏惧的新闻报道予以信任。如今，来自180个国家的150多万支持者为我们提供资金支持——使我们保持向所有人开放，并保持高度独立。\n\n与许多其他媒体不同，《卫报》没有股东，也没有亿万富翁所有者。只有提供具有高影响力的全球报道的决心与热情，始终不受商业或政治影响。这样的报道对民主、对公平以及向掌权者要求更好的作为至关重要。\n\n我们免费提供这一切，供所有人阅读。我们这样做是因为我们相信信息平等。更多的人可以追踪塑造世界的事件\n\n以采取有意义的行动。数百万人可以从公开获取优质、真实的新闻中受益，无论其是否有支付能力。\n\n每一笔贡献，无论大小，都在支持我们的新闻事业并维系我们的未来。支持《卫报》只需1美元起——仅需一分钟。如果可以，请考虑每月定期支持我们。谢谢。\n关于此事的更多内容\n\n乌克兰危机对中国构成两难但也带来机遇\n\n22 Feb 2022\n\n随着乌克兰局势紧张，习近平与普京敦促北约排除扩张\n\n4 Feb 2022\n\n东盟领导人在南海争端中引用1982年联合国条约\n\n27 Jun 2020","key_entities":["Je","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":3848,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-07-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-07-29","updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:49:27"}