{"id":"court_ctb_761_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":761,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"811522, 12:59 \\$6, 22-50073 | Doc 76 x 2014 with 88 (47.12.2017) 16:47 x Revember 20115","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"811522, 12:59 \\$6, 22-50073 | Doc 76 x 2014 with 88 (47.12.2017) 16:47 x Revember 20115\n\n[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]\n\n![](_page_1_Picture_2.jpeg)\n\n# England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions\n\nYou are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Avonwick Holdings Ltd & Anor v Shlosberg [2016] EWCA Civ 1138 (18 November 2016) URL: htt Cite as: [2016] WLR(D) 616, [2017] BPIR 1, [2017] 2 WLR 1075, [2016] EWCA Civ 1138\n\n[New search] [Printable RTF version] [View ICLR summary: [2016] WLR(D) 616] [Buy ICLR report: [2017] 2 WLR 1075] [Help]\n\nNeutral Citation Number: [2016] EWCA Civ 1138\n\nCase No: A2/2015/2154 & 2156\n\nIN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION, BANKRUPTCY COURT MR JUSTICE ARNOLD 4387 OF 2014\n\n> Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL 18/11/2016\n\nBefore:\n\nSIR TERENCE ETHERTON, MR LADY JUSTICE GLOSTER and LADY JUSTICE SHARP\n\nBetween: AVONWICK HOLDINGS LIMITED\n\nJEREMY MARK WILLMONT AND EMMA SAYERS (AS THE JOINT TRUSTEES OF MIKHAIL SHLOSBERG)\n\nAppellants\n\n- and -\n\n#### MIKHAIL SHLOSBERG\n\nRespondent\n\n#### 8/15/22, 12:59 PM 22-50073 Doc 76 July 2017/2017 12:27 July 2017/2019 10:00 PM 15\n\nTom Smith QC and Henry Phillips (instructed by Dechert LLP) for the Appellants Philip Marshall QC and James Mather (instructed by Enyo Law LLP) for the Respondent Hearing dates: 25 & 26/10/2016\n\n#### HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT\n\nCrown Copyright ©\n\n#### See also: [2016] EWHC 1001 (Ch)\n\n#### Sir Terence Etherton, MR\n\n- 1. This appeal arises out of the bankruptcy of the respondent Mikhail Shlosberg. The second appellants, Jeremy Willmont and Emma Sayers, are his trustees in bankruptcy (\"the Trustees\"). The first appellant, Avonwick Holdings Limited (\"Avonwick\"), is his largest creditor.\n- 2. The appeal is from an order of Mr Justice Arnold dated 5 May 2016, which was made on the application of Mr Shlosberg. The respondents to the application were Avonwick, the Trustees and Dechert LLP (\"Dechert\"), who were the solicitors for both Avonwick and the Trustees. The order of Mr Justice Arnold directed that Dechert cease to act for Avonwick in respect of any matter relating to Mr Shlosberg or his affairs.\n- 3. The basis of the order was that Dechert had possessed, seen and reviewed a large quantity of documents, some of which were subject to Mr Shlosberg's legal professional privilege (\"privilege\"), and which the Trustees wished Avonwick to deploy in proceedings by Avonwick, Webinvest Limited (\"Webinvest\") and the liquidators of Webinvest in proceedings against Mr Shlosberg, Castle Investment Fund Limited (\"Castle\"), and the three other defendants for conspiracy (\"the conspiracy proceedings\").\n- 4. Dechert has not appealed the Judge's injunction but has appealed the Judge's order for costs.\n- 5. The application and this appeal raise, among other things, the issues whether privilege attaching to information and documents of a bankrupt are property which vests in the trustees in bankruptcy and what use may be made of such information and documents by the trustees.\n\n#### The background\n\n- 6. As that short introduction indicates, the factual background is complicated. For a full account, reference should be made to the comprehensive judgment of Mr Justice Arnold at [2016] EWHC 1001 (Ch). The following is a highly simplified account sufficient to understand the issues on this appeal. I have gratefully taken it from the Judge's account.\n- 7. Mr Shlosberg is a Russian businessman domiciled in England. He is the beneficial owner of Webinvest. His family are the beneficiaries of a discretionary trust which owns Castle.\n- 8. In 2010 Mr Shlosberg had an investment project relating to Vimetco NV (\"Vimetco\"), a Dutch company which operated aluminium plants. Vimetco's parent company, Vi (\"Vi Holding\"), was owned or controlled by Vitaliy Machitski. UD\\$200 million was required for the Vimetco project. That amount was funded as follows.\n- 9. Avonwick loaned US\\$100 million to Webinvest pursuant a loan agreement signed on 23 April 2010 (\"the Avonwick loan\"). Mr Shlosberg guaranteed Webinvest's obligations under the Avonwick loan pursuant to a deed of guarantee of the same date (\"the Guarantee\"). A further US\\$100 million was loaned by Castle to Webinvest.\n\n#### 8115122, 1249666 22-50073 Doc 76273wickFileshg8288666262674884666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666\n\n- 10. Webinvest loaned US\\$200 million (\"the Globoid loan\") to Mr Machitski's company Globoid Finance Establishment (\"Globoid\"), which was incorporated in Liechtenstein.\n- 11. Globoid did not repay the Globoid loan on the due date. In turn, Webinvest failed to repay the Avonwick loan.\n- 12. On 15 May 2013 Webinvest commenced an arbitration against Globoid for the recovery of the Globoid loan and interest (\"the Globoid arbitration\"). The Globoid arbitration was subsequently settled through a series of agreements, and in particular agreements dated 23 and 24 June 2014 (\"the Settlement Agreements\"). On 16 January 2015 Globoid was placed in liquidation.\n- 13. Avonwick commenced proceedings for repayment of the outstanding sums due under the Avonwick loan and the Guarantee (\"the Avonwick proceedings\"). Avonwick was represented in those proceedings by Dechert. Webinvest and Mr Shlosberg were represented by Fladgate LLP (\"Fladgate\").\n- 14. Pursuant to an order for specific disclosure in the Avonwick proceedings, documents relating to the Settlement Agreements were provided to Avonwick by Webinvest and Mr Shlosberg.\n- 15. Judgment was given for Avonwick in the Avonwick proceedings by Sales J on 6 November 2014 for payment by Webinvest and Mr Shlosberg of US\\$195,159,649.03 and interest at a daily rate of US\\$42,774.72.\n- 16. In the course of a subsequent judgment in the Avonwick proceedings, Sales J observed that, even though the documents disclosed in relation to the Settlement Agreements were obscure and incomplete, it seemed that the effective proceeds of a settlement of the Webinvest claim against Globoid in the sum of US\\$172 million had been transferred to Castle, and not to Webinvest (the relevant contractual rights against Globoid), in circumstances where Castle proposed to pay on to Webinvest only half that amount to make it available to recovery by Avonwick; and that, on one interpretation of the documents, none of that sum would be available to Webinvest (and hence for Avonwick), leaving Avonwick with nothing against which to execute the judgment that it had obtained.\n- 17. Neither Webinvest nor Mr Shlosberg has paid any sum in respect of the judgment obtained by Avonwick. On Avonwick's petition, a bankruptcy order was made against Mr Shlosberg on 14 January 2015. A winding up order was made against Webinvest on 27 February 2015. The Trustees were appointed on 20 January 2015. Mr Willmont and Michael Finch (\"the Liquidators\") were appointed as joint liquidators of Webinvest on 24 March 2015. Mr Shlosberg's remains an undischarged bankrupt.\n- 18. The principal creditor of both Mr Shlosberg and Webinvest is Avonwick. In the case of Mr Shlosberg's insolvency, Avonwick's judgment represents at least 95 per cent, if not more, of the debts owed by Mr Shlosberg's estate.\n- 19. Avonwick commenced the conspiracy proceedings against Castle on 19 November 2014. In due course Webinvest and the Liquidators were joined as claimants. Also in due course, Vi Holding, Globoid, Mr Machitski and Mr Shlosberg were added as defendants. It is alleged in the conspiracy proceedings that the Settlement Agreements were part of a scheme put in place to render Webinvest judgment proof in the face of the very substantial claims asserted against it by Avonwick. Avonwick believes that the Settlement Agreements were part of an unlawful conspiracy between Mr Shlosberg, on the one hand, and Mr Machitski/Globoid/Vi Holding, on the other hand, to ensure that the value of Webinvest's main asset would not be available to satisfy Avonwick's claims against Webinvest, but would instead be diverted to Mr Shlosberg or companies owned or controlled by him.\n- 20. Shortly after their appointment the Trustees retained Dechert as their solicitors. Shortly after their appointment the Liquidators also retained Dechert as their solicitors. The responsible partner of Dechert, Adam Silver, confirmed in evidence before the Judge that no information barrier had been put in place\n\n#### 815/22, 12:08 PM 22-50073 Doc 76 Andrewick Hall 4 May shatter 1984 MB 2007 Poly 10 S\n\nwithin Dechert between those advising Avonwick and those advising the Trustees and the Liquidators. On the contrary, Mr Silver had personally led the Dechert teams advising all three sets of clients.\n\n21. Fladgate has provided the Trustees with three CDs containing copies of a large quantity of documents (\"the Fladgate CDs\"). The evidence is that the contents of the Fladgate CDs relate to the following three matters: (a) litigation in the county court regarding an attack on Mr Shlosberg's cat; (b) statutory demands issued by Avonwick against Mr Shlosberg and Webinvest and subsequent applications to restrain Avonwick from petitioning for Mr Shlosberg's bankruptcy and the winding up of Webinvest; and (c) the Avonwick proceedings. We are not concerned on this appeal with the documents in category (a). Some of the documents in categories (b) and (c) (\"the Documents\") are subject to the joint privilege of Mr Shlosberg and Webinvest. The Fladgate CDs were passed by the Trustees to Dechert, as the Trustees' solicitors, to review. The Trustees wish to permit Avonwick to make use of the Documents or some of them for the purposes of its claims in the conspiracy proceedings if that would be helpful to sustain those claims.\n\n#### The application and the judgment of Mr Justice Arnold\n\n- 22. On 4 December 2015 Mr Shlosberg issued an application against Avonwick, Dechert and the Trustees for an order directing that Dechert cease to act as solicitors for Avonwick and the Trustees. As the Judge explained in his judgment, the application was primarily made in respect of Dechert's position as solicitors for Avonwick, and only secondarily in respect of Dechert's position as solicitors for the Trustees.\n- 23. The Judge handed down a substantial, comprehensive and careful judgment on 5 May 2016. With no disrespect to the Judge, it is necessary only to give the following very brief summary of the judgment sufficient to understand the discussion and my conclusions below.\n- 24. The Judge said (at para. [66]) that the argument of the respondents to the application was that privilege in the Documents had been transferred the Trustees. The Judge reviewed in detail a number of authorities in this jurisdiction, as well as in Canada, Australia and Ireland, and made observations on various commentaries relied upon by the respondents to the application.\n- 25. He said that IA 1986 s.311(1) shows that, in enacting IA 1986, the legislature addressed its mind to the question of privilege. He observed that the sub-section did not provide that the bankrupt's privilege should pass to the trustee but it does appear to be implicit that the trustee can use information contained in documents which he has taken possession of pursuant to section 311(1), including privileged documents, in the discharge of his statutory functions. The Judge observed, however, that there is a difference between using information contained in privileged documents otherwise than for the purpose of proceedings and using it for the purpose of proceedings.\n- 26. The Judge then turned to four particular arguments deployed by the respondents to the application.\n- 27. The Judge rejected (at para. [114]) the first argument of the respondents to the application that, because the Documents had vested in the Trustees as part of Mr Shlosberg's estate pursuant to IA s.306(1), the Trustees had also acquired the benefit of the privilege. He said that, even if the Trustees had acquired title to the Documents, as to which he said it was not necessary for him to reach a conclusion, as a matter of principle the right to exercise privilege cannot depend on ownership of the paper on which the privileged information is recorded.\n- 28. The Judge then rejected (at paras. [121] and [125]) the second argument of the respondents to the application that the benefit of the privilege vested in the Trustees because privilege is itself either property within IA 1986 s. 436(1) or a power over, or in respect of, property within IA 1986 s.283(4).\n- 29. The Judge said (at para. [128]) that, if it was necessary to do so, he would hold that privilege is peculiarly personal to the bankrupt and so excluded from IA 1986 s.283(1) and (4).\n\n#### 811522, 12:49668 22-50073 Doc 762, 2007 - 14:44 1624 - 5 55 35 - 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15\n\n- 30. The Judge then addressed the third argument, which was directed at the category (a) material relating to the county court proceedings concerning Mr Shlosberg's cat. On that issue, he found in favour of the respondents to the application.\n- 31. The fourth argument of the respondents to the application was the Documents (viz. those in categories (b) and (c)) had resulted in a judgment against Mr Shlosberg prior to the date of the bankruptcy, and the judgment was an \"obligation\" within the definition of \"property\" in IA 1986 s.436(1) and hence property which vested in the Trustees. The Judge rejected that argument at para. [141].\n- 32. The Judge said (at para. [144]) that, having regard to his conclusion with respect to privilege, it was unnecessary to give separate consideration to Mr Shlosberg's claim to confidentiality.\n- 33. The Judge then turned to the question of remedy. He set out (in para. [145]) the various safeguards which the respondents to the application had put in place to protect Mr Shlosberg's confidential information. Mr Shlosberg's contention was that in a situation where a large quantity of documents which were subject to privilege to which he was entitled, albeit jointly with Webinvest /the Liquidators, were not only in the possession of, but had also been reviewed in detail by the solicitors acting for an adverse party in litigation, namely Avonwick, the appropriate remedy was for Dechert to be ordered to cease acting for Avonwick. The contention of the respondents to the application was that Mr Shlosberg would be adequately protected by the safeguards which had been put in place; in the alternative, Mr Shlosberg would be adequately protected by an injunction restraining misuse of the information in question.\n- 34. Having reviewed a number of authorities, and set out eleven factors relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion in the present case, the Judge concluded (at para. [160]) that an injunction should be granted requiring Dechert to cease acting for Avonwick. He said that he did not consider that Mr Shlosberg's rights in respect of the privileged information would be adequately protected by granting an injunction restraining Dechert from using the privileged information unless a strict information barrier were created within Dechert and an entirely new team was assigned to act for Avonwick.\n- 35. The Judge granted permission to appeal the order \"on the ground that legal professional privilege devolved from Mr Shlosberg to the [Trustees]\".\n\n#### The appeal\n\n- 36. Avonwick and the Trustees appeal on five grounds. The first is that the Judge was wrong in law in concluding that the statutory regime in bankruptcy did not have the effect of vesting in the Trustees Mr Shlosberg's right to privilege in respect of the Documents (save in respect of materials relating to matters \"peculiarly personal\" to Mr Shlosberg). The second is that the Judge was wrong in law in concluding that a trustee in bankruptcy has no power to waive privilege over documents or information obtained from a bankrupt pursuant to his statutory powers. The third is that the Judge was wrong in law in rejecting the alternative argument that the effect of the High Court judgment obtained by Avonwick against Mr Shlosberg was that the Documents related to a liability of Mr Shlosberg which, on his bankruptcy, became a liability of the estate and so constituted property within the meaning of IA 1986 s.436. The fourth ground was that the Judge was wrong as a matter of law in failing to analyse the scope of Mr Shlosberg's right of confidentiality against the Trustees. The fifth ground was that the Judge was wrong to grant an injunction.\n- 37. There is an issue between the parties as to whether the fourth ground falls within the Judge's permission to appeal. It is clear that all or part of the fifth ground does not fall within the scope of that permission. Insofar as Avonwick and the Trustees require permission to appeal, I would grant such permission notwithstanding that the application for such permission is technically out of time. The arguments which Avonwick wishes to advance in respect of both confidentiality and remedy were advanced before the Judge, were contained in the Grounds of Appeal, and are addressed in Avonwick's skeleton arguments on this appeal.\n\n#### 815/22, 12:49 PM 22-50073 DOC 762 Julie Filming 8/24/16/28 16/2016 Rotember 2018/7 0/15\n\n- 38. Mr Shlosberg has issued a respondent's notice to uphold the Judge's order on an additional ground. It is not necessary to set that out here.\n- 39. Dechert and Avonwick have issued a separate appellant's notice in relation to the Judge's order for costs, in particular insofar as he made an order for costs against Dechert alone rather than against both Dechert and Avonwick. Permission to appeal is required for this appeal. For the reasons given below, I would refuse permission to appeal.\n\n#### Discussion\n\nThe competing policies\n\n- 40. The issue at the heart of this application and appeal concerns the inter-relationship between two public interest policies: the public interest that the trustees of a bankrupt are able to get in, realise and distribute the bankrupt's estate in accordance with statutory scheme in IA 1986, and the public interest that a person is able to consult their lawyer in confidence in the knowledge that what is told to the lawyer will never be revealed without their consent.\n- 41. It is not necessary to say much more about the first of those policies. It is an obviously vital factor in the economic prosperity and general welfare of the nation that creditors are duly paid and that, when an individual or company becomes insolvent, their assets are got in, realised and distributed among the creditors. IA 1986 s.305(2) provides, in precisely those terms, that \"[t]he function of the [bankruptcy] trustee is to get in, realise and distribute the bankrupt's estate in accordance with the following provisions of this Chapter\".\n- 42. It is also important that the bankrupt assists the trustee in the discharge of that function, and there are many statutory provisions to secure such co-operation. They include, in section 312, an obligation to deliver up to the trustee possession of any property, books, papers or other records of which the bankrupt has possession or control and of which the trustee is required to take possession, and, in section 333, an obligation to the give to the trustee such information as to attend to attend to the trustee at such times and do all such other things as the trustee may for the purpose of carrying out that statutory function reasonably require.\n- 43. Turning to privilege, there was no criticism by either side before us of the Judge's description of it (in para. [62]) as a right to resist the compulsory disclosure of information, and in particular documents which contain legal advice or were created for the dominant purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with actual or contemplated litigation. It is, therefore, a negative right.\n- 44. The history of the principle was examined in detail by Lord Taylor CJ in R v Derby Magistrates' Court ex p. B [1996] 1 AC 487. In his speech, with which all the other members of the appellate committee of the House of Lords agreed, Lord Taylor (at p. 507D) described privilege as a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests, and (at p. 507H) he acknowledged it is a fundamental human right protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.\n- 45. In that case a person accused of murder wished to obtain from solicitors instructions from, and advice given to, a person who had previously been charged with the crime and who had originally admitted to the police that he was solely responsible for the murder but had later retracted that statement and was subsequently acquitted. It was held by the House of Lords, reversing the decisions below, that the accused was not entitled to a witness summons for the production of that documentation and that the High Court should be directed to quash the decisions of a stipendiary magistrate and a justice of the peace who had issued summonses for the production of such documentation. Lord Taylor said (at p. 508H-409A) that no exception should be made to the absolute nature of privilege, once established.\n- 46. In R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2002] UKHL 21, [2003] 1 AC 563, Lord Hoffmann, with whom the other members of the appellate committee of the House of Lords\n\n#### 815/22, 12:00 PM 22-50073 Doc 76 July 2017/2019 14:24 PM 12 22 Porto Revents 2011 15\n\nagreed, said (at para. [7]) that it was common ground that legal professional privilege is a fundamental human right long established in the common law and a necessary corollary of the right of any person to obtain skilled advice about the law. He said that such advice cannot be effectively obtained unless the client is able to put all the facts before the adviser without fear that they may afterwards be disclosed and used to his prejudice.\n\n- 47. Lord Hoffmann said (at para. [8]) that the courts will ordinarily construe general words in a statute as not having been intended to override fundamental human rights, even though capable of having that effect if read literally, and that an intention to override such rights must be expressly stated or appear by necessary implication. He referred (at para. [39]) to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that privilege can be invaded only in exceptional circumstances.\n- 48. Lord Hobhouse elaborated on the proper approach to statutory interpretation when considering whether documents are required to be delivered up notwithstanding they are covered by legal professional privilege. He quoted the following passage from the speech of Lord Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, at 131 as succinctly stating the principle of statutory construction:\n\n\"Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights ... The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.\"\n\n49. Having stated that the principle applies to the right to claim privilege, Lord Hobhouse explained as follows (in para. [45]) what amounts to a necessary implication in this context:\n\n\"A necessary implication is not the same as a reasonable implication as was pointed out by Lord Hutton in B (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 AC 428, 481. A necessary implication is one which necessarily follows from the express provisions of the statute construed in their context. It distinguishes between what it would have been sensible or reasonable for Parliament to have included or what Parliament would, if it had thought about it, probably have included and what it is clear that the express language of the statute shows that the statute must have included. A necessary implication is a matter of express language and logic not interpretation.\"\n\n50. The Judge said (at para. [67]) that he did not consider that the principles stated by the House of Lords in the Morgan Grenfell case are directly applicable in the present case. I infer (from para. [66]) that was because he took the view the case is about whether privilege in the Documents has been transferred to the Trustees rather than about its abrogation. I do not agree with that analysis. From Mr Shlosberg's perspective, the only question is whether or not the effect of the statutory bankruptcy code is that he has involuntarily been deprived of his fundamental right to assert his privilege in the information contained in the Documents. I see no reason why the principles in the Derby Magistrates case, the Simms case and the Morgan Grenfell case should not apply in answering that question.\n\n#### Privilege as property\n\n51. Mr Smith's overarching point on the substantive part of the appeal is that the Judge addressed the wrong question: instead of asking whether the benefit of the right of privilege vested in the Trustees, he should have asked whether the Documents were subject to confidentiality in the hands of the Trustees. Avonwick\n\n#### 815/22, 12:49 PM 22-50073 Doc 76 Junie Filest (22) 27/2 July 2017/2019 Reverne 2006/06/2016 9 of 15\n\naccepts that they were subject to confidentiality but contends that the proposed deployment of them in the conspiracy proceedings is nevertheless permissible.\n\n- 52. Avonwick's case is built on the provisions of IA 1986. It contends that the Documents and any privilege attaching to the information contained in them are property forming part of Mr Shlosberg's estate which vested in the Trustees on their appointment pursuant to IA 1986 ss.283 and 306. It contends, in the alternative, that it is a necessary implication of section 311 that the Trustees are entitled to use the documents and the privilege for the purpose of their functions and powers, which include taking steps that would potentially reduce the claims on the estate -- as would be the case if Avonwick succeeded in recovering damages in the conspiracy proceedings from all or any of the defendants to those proceedings, other than Mr Shlosberg. That is because any such award of damages to Avonwick in the conspiracy proceedings would to the same extent reduce Avonwick's claim as a creditor of Mr Shlosberg's estate.\n- 53. I do not accept that the privilege was property which vested in the Trustees. It has been assumed, for the purpose of the application before the Judge and this appeal, that the Documents belonged to Mr Shlosberg and so would have vested in the Trustees under IA 1986 s. 306. I consider it clear, however, that for the following reasons privilege attaching to the information contained in the Documents was not property forming part of Mr Shlosberg's estate which vested in the Trustees.\n- 54. Property which forms part of a bankrupt's estate for that purpose is defined in IA. 1986 ss. 283 and 436. The definition in section 436(1) is as follows:\n\n\"property\" includes money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property wherever situated and also obligations and every description of interest, whether present or future or vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, property;\n\n- 55. In Bristol Airport plc v Powdrill [1990] 1 Ch 744, at 759D, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C, with whom the other judges of the court agreed, said that \"[i]t is hard to think of a wider definition of property\n- 56. By virtue of section 382(4) the property of the bankrupt which vests in the bankruptcy trustees also includes:\n\n\"any power exercisable by [the bankrupt] over or in respect of property except in so far as the power is exercisable over or in respect of property not for the time being comprised in the bankrupt's estate\".\n\n- 57. Avonwick contends that privilege is an interest arising out of, or incidental to, the Documents within the definition of \"property\" in section 436(1).\n- 58. Mr Smith submitted, in the alternative, that the privilege formed part of Mr Shlosberg's estate which vested in the Trustees because it was a power exercisable by him over or in respect of the Documents, namely the right to refuse to disclose them, and so fell within the plain meaning of IA 1986 s. 283(4). He contended that the Judge was wrong to reject that argument (in para. [125] of the judgment) on the ground that privilege is not a power which would assist the Trustees to realise the value of the Documents or to distribute the proceeds. Mr Smith argued, again, that this was an impermissible gloss on the statutory provision, and, that, in any event, the right to deploy or waive the privilege would assist the Trustees to get in the property comprised in Mr Shlosberg's estate.\n- 59. Reference was made before the Judge and on this appeal to Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553 and to the application of the so-called Crescent Farm principle in Re Konigsberg [1989] 1 WLR 1257. In the Crescent Farm case the plaintiffs, as purchasers, and the first defendants, as sub-purchasers, were parties to a conveyance of land which provided that the purchasers had the option of re-purchasing if, within the following 20 years, the first defendants wanted to sell the land or any part of it. Within that period the first defendants contracted to sell, and then conveyed, the land to the second defendants without any release from the option. In the course of the proceedings for\n\n### 8115122, 12:49ASE 22-50073 DOC 7QAries Editory shienter Ports (ARAF) Production Ports 10 of\n\ndamages for, among other things, breach of contract and conspiracy, the plaintiffs issued a summons for disclosure from the second defendants of instructions to counsel by the first defendants and the opinion of counsel, which had been sent by the first defendants to the second defendants. Goff J, citing Minet v Morgan (1873) 8 Ch.App 361, a number of other cases in which Minet was also cited and Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed), said (at p. 562) that it was clearly established that privilege of a predecessor in title enures for the benefit of his successor. He said that the second defendants had received the documents as successors in title. Goff J held that the second defendants' claim for privilege should be upheld and the plaintiffs' summons dismissed.\n\n- 60. In Re Konigsberg the trustee in bankruptcy sought a declaration that the transfer of the matrimonial home from the joint ownership of the bankrupt and his wife's sole name was a voluntary settlement within section 42 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 and void as against him. The wife claimed that the transfer was a sale. She sought to exclude affidavit evidence of the solicitor instructed jointly on the sale of the matrimonial home which went to the question whether the transaction was a gift or sale. Peter Gibson J refused the wife's application on two grounds. The first was that the wife, by referring in an affidavit to correspondence with the solicitor and by exhibiting a letter from the solicitor, had waived privilege. The second ground was that the trustee in bankruptcy was a successor in title to the bankrupt in respect of all the assets of the bankrupt divisible among his creditors, including the right to property transferred by a settlement voidable under section 42, and, following the Crescent Farm case, succeeded to and was entitled to assert the privilege of the bankrupt as a successor in title. It appears (from page 1267B) that counsel for the wife accepted that the relevant privilege of the bankrupt had devolved on the trustee. Peter Gibson J held that, the privilege being a joint privilege of the bankrupt and the trustee having stepped into the shoes of the bankrupt, the usual rule applied that one joint holder of the privilege (the wife) could not maintain it against the other joint holder (the trustee).\n- 61. Mr Smith did not, in oral argument, pursue the third ground of appeal concerning the meaning and application in the present case of the word \"obligations\" in the definition of \"property\" in IA 1986 s.436(1).\n- 62. In support of his argument that the LLP does not fall within the definition of property in sections 436(1) and 283(4), Mr Marshall referred to Deloitte & Touche Inc v Bennett Jones Verchere (2002) 206 DLR (444) 280, a Canadian decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, and R v Dunwoody [2004] QCA 413, an Australian decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. In Deloitte & Touche, in which the court considered similar Australian statutory provisions to the definition of \"property\" in IA 1986 s. 436(1) and to the treatment of a power over or in respect of property in IA 1986 s.283(4), all three judges of the Court considered that privilege, and the right to waive it, are not property or a power attaching to property divisible among creditors but a personal right. In Dunwoody McMurdo P said (at para. [25]) that privilege is essentially a concept personal to the bankrupt and not property, and can only be removed by statute where there are the clearest words or by necessary implication.\n- 63. I consider it is clear that, on the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of IA 1986, privilege is not property of a bankrupt which automatically vests in the trustee in bankruptcy. Following the Morgan Grenfell case and the Simms case, the bankrupt can only be deprived of privilege if IA 1986 expressly so provides or it is a necessary implication of the express language of its provisions. The only provisions relied upon by the Trustees in the present case on this aspect are the definition of \"property\" in section 436(1) and the treatment of a \"power over or in respect of property\" in section 382(4), in conjunction with the general provisions in sections 283 and 306 for the automatic vesting in the trustee of the bankrupt's property comprised in his estate. All those provisions are in general terms. They do not expressly treat privilege as property of the bankrupt which automatically transfers from the bankrupt to the trustee. Nor is that a necessary implication of the provisions.\n- 64. It is not necessary to consider the Canadian and Australian cases since we are concerned with the interpretation of our own domestic legislation in the form of IA 1986. Neither Re Rae nor Re Hemming assist since they did not concern privilege. Neither the Crescent Farm case nor Re Konigsberg stand in the\n\n### 8/15/2/12:16ABE 22-50073 | DOC 7Qierrex FillBHBSKA KRZZ ShERBERER 148:14BitBember2008 11 01\n\nway of my conclusion. The Crescent Farm case was not an insolvency case. Nor was the Minet case which was cited as precedent in the Crescent Farm case. They turn on their particular facts. In Re Konigsberg it was conceded by counsel that the privilege had devolved on the trustee in bankruptcy. More to the point, Re Konigsberg predates the Derby Magistrates case, the Simms case and the Morgan Grenfell case, which set out the proper approach, and so, unsurprisingly, Peter Gibson J did not apply the principles in those cases. It is not correct on the point presently under consideration.\n\nIA 1986 s.311\n\n65. IA s.311(1) provides that:\n\n\"The trustee shall take possession of all books, papers and other records which relate to the bankrupt's estate or affairs and which belong to him or are in his possession or under his control (including any which would be privileged from disclosure in any proceedings).\"\n\n- 66. The words in parenthesis were not in the equivalent provision of the predecessor legislation, section 48(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1914.\n- 67. Avonwick accepts that documents taken into the possession of the trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to section 311(1), are subject to a duty of confidentiality on the part of the trustee. It contends, however, that, by virtue of the express terms of section 311(1) or by necessary implication, information contained in documents obtained from the bankrupt which are subject to privilege can be used by the trustee for the purposes of the trustee's statutory duty and ancillary powers, including deployment in proceedings with third parties which would amount to a waiver of the privilege.\n- 68. Avonwick's contention is that the words in parenthesis in section 311(1) show that Parliament directly addressed the issue of privileged documents held by the bankrupt and, since the trustee is under an obligation to take possession of them, must have intended that such documents can be used by the trustee for the trustee's statutory purposes. Peter Gibson J made a similar observation in Re Konigsberg (at page 1267F), as did Pumfrey J in Surface Technology plc v Young [2002] FSR 25 at para. [25].\n- 69. The submission has a practical attraction. Indeed, Mr Marshall accepted that the trustee can use privileged documentation and the information contained in it for the statutory purpose of getting in and realising the bankrupt's estate. He submitted, and the Judge concluded, however, that the trustee can only use such documentation and information in a way that would not amount to a waiver of privilege. I agree.\n- 70. The applicable principles are, once again, those stated in the Derby Magistrates case, the Simms case and the Morgan Grenfell case, keeping in focus the status of privilege as a fundamental right. The express terms of section 311(1) describe the duty of the trustee to take possession of the documents mentioned there. It says nothing about their use by the trustee. It is necessarily implicit in section 311(1), however, that the trustee is to take possession of the documents for the overriding function of getting in, realising and distributing the bankrupt's estate. It follows that the trustee must, at the least, be entitled to look at the documents to obtain information relevant to those matters. That is, of itself, a valuable advantage in the fulfilment of the trustee's statutory function.\n- 71. It is not, however, necessarily implicit that trustee can waive the bankrupt's legal professional privilege in taking steps against third parties for the benefit of the bankrupt's estate, desirable as that might be from the point of view of the creditors. Echoing the words of Lord Hobhouse in the Morgan Grenfell case quoted above, the fact that it would have been sensible or reasonable for Parliament to have included such a power does not mean that it is necessarily implicit having regard to the express language of the statute.\n- 72. The absence of any such implication is supported by the background showing the genesis of the words in parenthesis in section 311(1) - \"(including any which would be privileged from disclosure in any proceedings)\". Paragraphs 908 to 911 of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork published in 1982 (Cmnd 8558) (\"the Cork Report\") addressed the\n\n## 8/15/22, 12:59:56 22-50073 Doc 792-7972 Eilengen 2018/16/16 11:31:18:18 Preventer 22 of\n\nproblem of legal professional privilege in the context of the trustee in bankruptcy wishing to obtain information from a solicitor who acted for the debtor prior to the insolvency and who has information likely to be useful in getting in the property of the debtor and administering the bankrupt's estate.\n\n- 73. Having observed that the position as regards the ambit of privilege was not clear, the Cork Report stated (in para. 910) that the critical area for the trustee is the investigation of the debtor prior to the insolvency and particularly of payments of money or transfers of property which were made by the debtor and have reduced the estate available for the creditors; and that the trustee seeks to establish not merely the facts as to the payment or transfer itself, but all the surrounding circumstances bearing on the debtor's knowledge and intentions.\n- 74. The Cork Report stated (at para. 911) that it was inconsistent with the debtor's obligation to aid in the realisation of his property and the distribution of the proceeds among his creditor to advance a claim to privilege \"in order to withhold relevant information from his trustee\". It said that the majority of the committee considered that on a private examination the debtor should not enjoy privilege in relation to questions fairly and properly put and relevant to the maximisation of the estate available to creditors. The entire discussion in the Cork Report on this topic, therefore, was around the disclosure of information to the trustee. It did not touch on the subsequent deployments and information against third parties in a way that would waive the privilege.\n- 75. Lord Lucas of Chilworth, the Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, made it clear in the debate on the Insolvency Bill in the House of Lords in committee on 7 February 1985 that the wording of the clause which in due course became section 311(1) was intended to give effect to the recommendation of the majority in paragraph 911 of the Cork Report.\n- 76. Further, it is relevant on this aspect of the appeal, and works against Avonwick's submission on section 311(1), that the sub-section is not limited to documents which belong to the bankrupt. It extends to documents belonging to others but which are in the bankrupt's possession or under his control. It has not been suggested that the words in parenthesis in section 311(1) do not apply to such third party documents. There can be no argument, however, that section 311(1) necessarily implies that the trustee could deploy those documents in a way which would waive the privilege of those third parties.\n- 77. The following cases were cited by Mr Smith in support of Avonwick's interpretation of section 311(1) as impliedly authorising the trustee to deploy privileged documents and information against third parties in a way that would waive the privilege. I do not consider that any of them assist Avonwick's case.\n- 78. In Re Esal (Commodities) Ltd (No 2) [1990] BCC 708 Millett J granted leave for a member of the committee of inspection of a company in liquidation to use documents against a bank in proceedings by him for (among other things) participation by the bank in fraudulent trading by the company. The documents had been obtained by the liquidators pursuant to section 268 of the Companies Act 1948 or the threat of proceedings under that section, and had been supplied by the liquidators to the applicant in his capacity as a member of the committee of inspection. Proceedings had also been commenced by the liquidators against the bank for participation by the bank in fraudulent trading by the company but the court was informed that there was a significant prospect that the proceedings brought by the liquidators would be settled. Millett J considered that the applicant's action was parasitic on the liquidators' proceedings but he was not persuaded that it was strictly within the purposes of section 268. He observed (at page 724C) that it was true that, if the applicant's action succeeded, it would pro tanto reduce a proof in the liquidation but that was not the applicant's purpose and the benefit to the liquidation was purely incidental. He nevertheless gave leave in the light of a number of factors, including that the subject matter of the applicant's action was closely related to the liquidation and that the material was already potentially in the public domain as a result of the pleadings having been served by the liquidators on the bank.\n- 79. In Re a Company [1993] BCC 734 Harman J authorised administrative receivers of a company to use documents received by them for the pursuit of claims against a director of the company and a former solicitor for the company and the director. Harman J said (at page 735B):\n\n### 8/15/22, 12:59 Se 22-50073 | Doc 762 Forex Fillerided & King ShEACA ASS HE Notember 2017 11\n\n\"The further dealings in this convoluted matter raise serious questions about the propriety of some of the activities that have gone on and, prima facie, point to attempts to avoid payment of debts when due. In those circumstances the duty of confidence imposed upon those who obtain information by the use of sec. 236 of the 1986 Act can, if the court is satisfied that either it is for the purposes of the office which the office-holders who seek to disclose the information hold, or is otherwise justified by the balance of considerations of how justice is properly to be attained, be waived by the court. That I base upon the decision of Millett J in Re Esal (Commodities) Ltd (No. 2) [1990] BCC 708 ...\"\n\n- 80. I cannot see that either of those cases is of any relevance in resolving the present application and appeal. They concern documents obtained by administrative receivers and liquidators, who are agents of the company. A trustee in bankruptcy is not an agent of the bankrupt. More to the point, there was no consideration in those cases of the particular issue of documents and information subject to privilege and the principles that should apply to their deployment.\n- 81. In Sutton v GE Capital Commercial Finance Limited [2004] EWCA Civ 315 the Court of Appeal held that privileged documents, which had been obtained by administrative receivers and were passed by them to the solicitors for another company, which wished to use them in proceedings to enforce a guarantee, had not resulted in the waiver of the company in administrative receivership to confidence and privilege. That was because the disclosure of the documents to the solicitors was outside the powers of the administrative receivers. Again, I cannot see that this case is of any relevance or assistance. The case concerned administrative receivers and not a trustee in bankruptcy, and there was no need for the court to consider the special status of privileged material because it concluded that the administrative receivers had acted outside their power in any event.\n- 82. In Re Cook [1999] BPIR 881 Stanley Burnton QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, confirmed that the bankruptcy trustee had power to authorise a solicitor, who had formerly acted for the bankrupt, to provide to the Serious Fraud Office information concerning the bankrupt's affairs, thereby waiving the bankrupt's privilege. Through no fault of the deputy judge, neither the reasoning nor the decision in that case was correct. The deputy judge, not unreasonably relying on Re Konigsberg, said (at page 884) that the power and the right to waive privilege in relation to the estate and affairs of a bankrupt pass to his or her trustee in the same way that his or her assets and the right to possession of the books, papers and other records of the bankrupt relating to his or her estate and affairs pass to the trustee under section 311. For the reasons I have given, however, the relevant principles are contained, not in Re Konigsberg, but in the Derby Magistrates case, the Simms case and the Morgan Grenfell case. Privilege is not property of the bankrupt forming part of the bankrupt's estate which vests in the trustee. The deputy judge did not consider the proper interpretation of section 311 by reference to the correct principles.\n- 83. For all those reasons, the Judge in the present case was correct in his interpretation of section 311(1).\n- 84. There is a further reason why the Trustees could not in any event authorise the deployment of Mr Shlosberg's privilege in the present case in the conspiracy proceedings: such deployment is not within the duty and ancillary powers of the Trustees. Mr Smith submitted that such duty and powers extend to assisting a third party in a claim against another person if that would result in the reduction or elimination of a creditor's claim against the estate, such as would be the position in the present case if Avonwick recovered damages in the conspiracy proceedings against all or any of Castle, Vi Holdings, Globoid and Mr Machitski (and so reducing Avonwick's claim against Mr Shlosberg's estate).\n- 85. I do not agree with that submission of Mr Smith. The statutory function of a bankruptcy trustee, as stated in IA 1986 s.305(2), is to get in, realise and distribute the bankrupt's estate. Deployment of Mr Shlosberg's privilege in the way suggested by Mr Smith would not be for any of those purposes. Mr Smith relied on IA 1986 s.314 and schedule 5, which set out the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy. He relied specifically on the power in paragraph 12 of schedule 5, which is as follows:\n\n### 8/15/22, 12:49 PM 22-50073 Doc 7 Q 27 27 Subside Ed Bell 2018 PM 2 12 11 Si Friender 2018 14 Of \"Power to exercise in relation to any property comprised in the bankrupt's estate any powers the capacity to exercise which is vested in him under Parts VIII to XI of this Act.\"\n\n86. For the reasons I have given, Mr Shlosberg's privilege is neither property which has vested in the Trustees, nor is it something which the Trustees can deploy under section 311(1) in such a way as to waive the privilege. Paragraph 12 of schedule 5 is, therefore, of no application to any proposed deployment in the conspiracy proceedings.\n\nRemedy\n\n- 87. Avonwick contends on this appeal that, even if the Judge was otherwise correct in his analysis and conclusion on the proper meaning and effect of the relevant provisions of IA 1986, he was wrong to order that Dechert cease to act as solicitors for Avonwick in respect of any matter relating to Mr Shlosberg or his affairs.\n- 88. Avonwick submits that the present situation is one where the court will not generally restrain a solicitor from acting. It says, citing Re Shuppar [1996] 2 All ER 664, that there is nothing inherently objectionable about a bankruptcy trustee engaging the same solicitors who are already engaged by a major creditor, and, in particular, there is nothing objectionable about solicitors acting simultaneously for a creditor and a trustee in bankruptcy in circumstances where the major creditor, or even the solicitors themselves, are or may be engaged in litigation with the bankrupt.\n- 89. Avonwick further contends that, where a solicitor becomes possessed of confidential (or even privileged) information belonging to another party to a dispute without having previously acted for that party, in the ordinary course the court will not grant an injunction restraining the solicitor from acting, but will seek to ensure that the solicitor does not use that information unless it determines that there is a real risk of documents being used in breach of confidence. It relies, in support of that proposition, on Re a Firm of Solicitors [1997] Ch 1 at 13; Virgin Media Ltd v BSkyB plc [2008] 1 WLR 2854 at [21] – [24]; and Stiedl v Enyo Law [2011] EWHC 2649 at [44]. It contrasts the position in such a situation with the position where there has been a previous solicitor/client relationship as in as in Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222.\n- 90. Avonwick contends that, having regard to the evidence as to the practical safeguards implemented by Dechert, the Judge ought to have concluded that there is no real risk of documents being used in breach of the Trustees' obligation of confidentiality to Mr Shlosberg and that conflicts of interest are unlikely to arise.\n- 91. Avonwick further contends that, even if all that is wrong, the Judge still ought to have refused to make the order in relation to Dechert because, as the Judge found, the privilege is a joint privilege of Mr Shlosberg and Webinvest. Mr Shlosberg therefore cannot maintain the privilege against Webinvest in the conspiracy proceedings, and Dechert are also retained as Webinvest's solicitors in the conspiracy proceedings and have reviewed or will be entitled to review the privileged material in that capacity.\n- 92. I would also dismiss this part of the appeal. The Judge had a discretion as to what, if any, relief to grant to protect Mr Shlosberg's fundamental right to privilege. He considered the safeguards relied upon by the Trustees and Avonwick and a number of authorities, including Re A Firm of Solicitors and the Stiedl case. He listed eleven matters which he considered particularly relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion, including the position of Webinvest and the status of Dechert as Webinvest's solicitors. It is not possible, in all the circumstances, to say that his order in respect of Dechert was plainly wrong or outside the ambit of a proper exercise of judicial discretion.\n- 93. I should make it clear, however, that my rejection of the appeal in relation to remedy does not in any way indicate to judges handling the future case management of the conspiracy proceedings what steps, if any, they should take to protect Mr Shlosberg's privilege. The reality that Avonwick is overwhelmingly the majority creditor in the liquidation of Webinvest, that Mr Shlosberg cannot maintain the privilege against Webinvest, that Dechert will continue to act for Webinvest in the conspiracy proceedings, and that the\n\n# 845122, 12:4988 22-50073 Doc 7922-90073 Doc 7627 Shippens Reserver 2006 15 of\n\nclaim is a claim of conspiracy against all the defendants, will be a relevant backdrop to any case management decisions regarding Mr Shlosberg's privilege.\n\nCosts\n\n- 94. Finally, I turn to Avonwick's application for permission to appeal against the Judge's order for costs against Dechert alone on the ground that he should have made a joint and several order against both Avonwick and Dechert for payment of Mr Shlosberg's costs of his application.\n- 95. I would refuse permission to appeal on the ground that an appeal on this point has no real prospect of success. The fact that the order deprived Avonwick of the opportunity to set off Mr Shlosberg's substantial unpaid liability to it does not in any way undermine the legitimacy of the Judge's order. It was sufficient justification for the Judge's order that Mr Shlosberg only sought costs against Dechert, and that Dechert had actively and unsuccessfully defended the application. Moreover, even if a joint and several order had been made by the Judge, Mr Shlosberg could still have enforced the order against Dechert alone in respect of its several liability and, had Mr Shlosberg done so, Avonwick would still have been unable to deploy a set off.\n\nConclusion\n\n96. For all those reasons, I would dismiss this appeal.\n\n#### Lady Justice Gloster:\n\n97. I agree.\n\nLady Justice Sharp:\n\n98. I also agree.\n\nBAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII URL: htt","body_zh":"811522, 12:59 $6, 22-50073　Doc 76 x 2014 with 88 (47.12.2017) 16:47 x Revember 20115\n\n[主页] [数据库] [世界法律] [多数据库检索] [帮助] [反馈]\n英格兰和威尔士上诉法院（民事庭）判决\n\n您当前所在位置：BAILII >> 数据库 >> 英格兰和威尔士上诉法院（民事庭）判决 >> Avonwick Holdings Ltd & Anor v Shlosberg [2016] EWCA Civ 1138 (18 November 2016) URL：htt 引用格式：[2016] WLR(D) 616, [2017] BPIR 1, [2017] 2 WLR 1075, [2016] EWCA Civ 1138\n\n[新检索] [可打印的 RTF 版本] [查看 ICLR 摘要：[2016] WLR(D) 616] [购买 ICLR 报告：[2017] 2 WLR 1075] [帮助]\n\n中立引证编号：[2016] EWCA Civ 1138\n\n案号：A2/2015/2154 & 2156\n\n英格兰和威尔士上诉法院（民事庭）\n对高等法院衡平法庭破产法院裁判的上诉\nARNOLD 法官\n4387 OF 2014\n\n皇家法院\nStrand, London, WC2A 2LL\n18/11/2016\n\n审判法官：\n\nSIR TERENCE ETHERTON, MR（特伦斯·埃瑟顿爵士，院长法官）\nLADY JUSTICE GLOSTER（格洛斯特上诉法院女法官）及\nLADY JUSTICE SHARP（夏普上诉法院女法官）\n\n双方当事人：AVONWICK HOLDINGS LIMITED（Avonwick控股有限公司）\n\nJEREMY MARK WILLMONT（杰里米·马克·威尔蒙特）及 EMMA SAYERS（艾玛·塞耶斯）（作为 MIKHAIL SHLOSBERG（米哈伊尔·什洛斯伯格）的共同破产受托人）\n\n上诉人\n\n与\n\nMIKHAIL SHLOSBERG（米哈伊尔·什洛斯伯格）\n\n被上诉人\n\n8/15/22, 12:59 PM 22-50073 Doc 76 July 2017/2017 12:27 July 2017/2019 10:00 PM 15\n\nTom Smith QC（汤姆·史密斯御用大律师）及 Henry Phillips（亨利·菲利普斯）（由 Dechert LLP（德杰特律师事务所）委托）代表上诉人\nPhilip Marshall QC（菲利普·马歇尔御用大律师）及 James Mather（詹姆斯·马瑟）（由 Enyo Law LLP（Enyo律师事务所）委托）代表被上诉人\n开庭日期：25 & 26/10/2016\n判决书 HTML 版本\n\n王室版权 ©\n另见：[2016] EWHC 1001 (Ch)\nSIR TERENCE ETHERTON, MR（特伦斯·埃瑟顿爵士，院长法官）\n\n1. 本上诉源于被上诉人米哈伊尔·什洛斯伯格的破产。第二上诉人杰里米·威尔蒙特和艾玛·塞耶斯为其破产受托人（“受托人”）。第一上诉人Avonwick控股有限公司（“Avonwick”）为其最大债权人。\n\n2. 本上诉针对 Arnold 法官于 5 May 2016 作出的命令，该命令系根据什洛斯伯格先生的申请作出。该申请的被申请人为 Avonwick、受托人及 Dechert LLP（“Dechert”）；Dechert 同时担任 Avonwick 和受托人的律师。Arnold 法官的命令要求 Dechert 停止就与什洛斯伯格先生或其事务有关的任何事项代理 Avonwick。\n\n3. 该命令的依据是，Dechert 曾持有、阅览及审阅大量文件，其中部分文件受什洛斯伯格先生的法律专业保密特权（“特权”）保护；受托人希望 Avonwick 在 Avonwick、Webinvest Limited（Webinvest有限公司）及 Webinvest 的清算人对什洛斯伯格先生、Castle Investment Fund Limited（城堡投资基金有限公司）及另外三名被告提起的共谋诉讼（“共谋诉讼”）中使用该等文件。\n\n4. Dechert 未就法官的禁令提起上诉，但已就法官的费用命令提起上诉。\n\n5. 该申请及本上诉提出的问题包括：附着于破产人信息和文件的特权是否属于归属破产受托人的财产，以及受托人可如何使用该等信息和文件。\n\n背景\n\n6. 如该简短介绍所示，事实背景颇为复杂。完整说明应参阅 Arnold 法官在 [2016] EWHC 1001 (Ch) 作出的详尽判决。以下为足以理解本上诉所涉问题的高度简化说明。我谨采纳法官的说明。\n\n7. 什洛斯伯格先生是定居于英格兰的俄罗斯商人。他是 Webinvest 的受益所有人。其家人是拥有 Castle 的一项酌情信托的受益人。\n\n8. 2010 年，什洛斯伯格先生有一项与 Vimetco NV（Vimetco）有关的投资项目；Vimetco 是一家经营铝厂的荷兰公司。Vimetco 的母公司 Vi（“Vi Holding”）由 Vitaliy Machitski（维塔利·马奇茨基）拥有或控制。Vimetco 项目需要 UD$200 million。该金额的资金来源如下。\n\n9. Avonwick 根据于 23 April 2010 签署的一份贷款协议向 Webinvest 出借 US$100 million（“Avonwick 贷款”）。什洛斯伯格先生根据同日签署的一份保证契据（“保证”），为 Webinvest 在 Avonwick 贷款项下的义务提供保证。Castle 另向 Webinvest 出借 US$100 million。\n\n8115122, 1249666 22-50073 Doc 76273wickFileshg8288666262674884666666666666666666666666666666666666\n\n10. Webinvest 向马奇茨基先生在列支敦士登注册成立的公司 Globoid Finance Establishment（Globoid）出借 US$200 million（“Globoid 贷款”）。\n\n11. Globoid 未在到期日偿还 Globoid 贷款。继而，Webinvest 未能偿还 Avonwick 贷款。\n\n12. 15 May 2013，Webinvest 就追偿 Globoid 贷款及利息对 Globoid 提起仲裁（“Globoid 仲裁”）。Globoid 仲裁随后通过一系列协议和解，尤其是日期为 23 和 24 June 2014 的协议（“和解协议”）。16 January 2015，Globoid 被置于清算程序。\n\n13. Avonwick 就偿还 Avonwick 贷款及保证项下到期未付金额提起诉讼（“Avonwick 诉讼”）。Avonwick 在该诉讼中由 Dechert 代理。Webinvest 和什洛斯伯格先生由 Fladgate LLP（弗拉德盖特律师事务所）代理。\n\n14. 根据 Avonwick 诉讼中的一项特定披露命令，Webinvest 和什洛斯伯格先生向 Avonwick 提供了与和解协议有关的文件。\n\n15. Sales 法官于 6 November 2014 在 Avonwick 诉讼中作出有利于 Avonwick 的判决，命令 Webinvest 和什洛斯伯格先生支付 US$195,159,649.03，并按每日 US$42,774.72 的利率支付利息。\n\n16. 在 Avonwick 诉讼随后的判决过程中，Sales 法官指出，尽管就和解协议披露的文件晦涩且不完整，但似乎 Webinvest 对 Globoid 的 US$172 million 债权和解的实际所得已转移给 Castle，而非 Webinvest（对 Globoid 享有相关合同权利的一方）；而 Castle 拟仅将该金额的一半支付给 Webinvest，以使其可供 Avonwick 追偿；并且，按照对文件的一种解释，该金额没有任何部分可供 Webinvest 使用（因而也不可供 Avonwick 使用），使 Avonwick 对其已取得的判决没有任何可供执行的财产。\n\n17. Webinvest 和什洛斯伯格先生均未就 Avonwick 取得的判决支付任何款项。根据 Avonwick 的申请，14 January 2015 对什洛斯伯格先生作出破产令。27 February 2015 对 Webinvest 作出清盘令。受托人于 20 January 2015 获任命。威尔蒙特先生和 Michael Finch（迈克尔·芬奇）（“清算人”）于 24 March 2015 获任命为 Webinvest 的共同清算人。什洛斯伯格先生仍为未获解除的破产人。\n\n18. 什洛斯伯格先生和 Webinvest 的主要债权人均为 Avonwick。就什洛斯伯格先生的无力偿债而言，Avonwick 的判决债权占什洛斯伯格先生破产财产所欠债务至少 95 per cent，甚至更高。\n\n19. Avonwick 于 19 November 2014 对 Castle 提起共谋诉讼。随后，Webinvest 和清算人被追加为原告。其后，Vi Holding、Globoid、马奇茨基先生和什洛斯伯格先生被追加为被告。共谋诉讼中主张，和解协议是为使 Webinvest 在面对 Avonwick 对其主张的数额极大的债权时无可供执行财产而安排的一项计划的一部分。Avonwick 认为，和解协议是什洛斯伯格先生一方与马奇茨基先生／Globoid／Vi Holding 另一方之间非法共谋的一部分，旨在确保 Webinvest 主要资产的价值不可用于清偿 Avonwick 对 Webinvest 的债权，而是转移给什洛斯伯格先生或其拥有或控制的公司。\n\n20. 受托人获任命后不久，即聘请 Dechert 作为其律师。清算人获任命后不久，也聘请 Dechert 作为其律师。Dechert 的负责合伙人 Adam Silver（亚当·西尔弗）在法官面前的证据中确认，Dechert 内部并未在为 Avonwick 提供意见的人员与为受托人及清算人提供意见的人员之间设置任何信息隔离。相反，西尔弗先生亲自领导 Dechert 的团队，为全部三组客户提供意见。\n\n815/22, 12:08 PM 22-50073 Doc 76 Andrewick Hall 4 May shatter 1984 MB 2007 Poly 10 S\n\n21. Fladgate 已向受托人提供三张载有大量文件副本的 CD（“Fladgate CD”）。证据显示，Fladgate CD 的内容涉及以下三项事项：(a) 县法院中有关对什洛斯伯格先生的猫实施攻击的诉讼；(b) Avonwick 向什洛斯伯格先生和 Webinvest 发出的法定催款通知书，以及随后为禁止 Avonwick 申请什洛斯伯格先生破产及 Webinvest 清盘而提出的申请；以及 (c) Avonwick 诉讼。本上诉不涉及类别 (a) 中的文件。类别 (b) 和 (c) 中的部分文件（“该等文件”）受什洛斯伯格先生和 Webinvest 的共同特权保护。受托人将 Fladgate CD 交给 Dechert 作为受托人的律师进行审阅。若有助于维持 Avonwick 在共谋诉讼中的请求，受托人希望允许 Avonwick 为该等请求之目的使用该等文件或其中部分文件。\n\nArnold 法官的申请及判决\n\n22. 2015年12月4日，Shlosberg先生（什洛斯伯格）针对Avonwick（埃文威克）、Dechert（德杰律师事务所）及受托人提出申请，请求作出命令，指示Dechert停止担任Avonwick及受托人的诉讼代理律师。正如法官在其判决书中所说明，该申请主要针对Dechert担任Avonwick诉讼代理律师的地位提出，仅次要针对Dechert担任受托人诉讼代理律师的地位提出。\n\n23. 法官于2016年5月5日作出了一份内容翔实、全面且审慎的判决书。无意对法官不敬，仅有必要对该判决书作如下极为简要的概述，足以理解下文的讨论及我的结论。\n\n24. 法官称（第[66]段），该申请的被申请人主张，文件中的特权已转移给受托人。法官详细审查了本司法辖区以及加拿大、澳大利亚和爱尔兰的若干判例，并就申请的被申请人所援引的各种评注作出评论。\n\n25. 他称，IA 1986 s.311(1)表明，立法机关在制定IA 1986时已考虑到特权问题。他指出，该款并未规定破产人的特权应转归受托人，但似乎隐含受托人可在履行其法定职能时，使用其依照第311(1)条取得占有的文件中所载的信息，包括特权文件。然法官指出，将特权文件所载信息用于诉讼以外的目的，与将其用于诉讼目的之间存在区别。\n\n26. 随后，法官审议了该申请的被申请人提出的四项具体论点。\n\n27. 法官驳回了（第[114]段）该申请的被申请人的第一项论点，即由于文件根据IA s.306(1)作为Shlosberg先生遗产的一部分归属受托人，受托人亦取得了该特权的利益。他称，即使受托人已取得文件的所有权——对此他认为无须作出结论——作为原则问题，行使特权的权利不能取决于记载特权信息的纸张之所有权。\n\n28. 随后，法官驳回了（第[121]及[125]段）该申请的被申请人的第二项论点，即特权利益归属于受托人，是因为特权本身要么是IA 1986 s. 436(1)所称的财产，要么是IA 1986 s.283(4)所称对财产的权力，或有关财产的权力。\n\n29. 法官称（第[128]段），如有必要，他将裁定特权具有破产人特有的个人属性，因而被排除在IA 1986 s.283(1)及(4)之外。\n\n30. 随后，法官审议了第三项论点，该论点针对与Shlosberg先生的猫有关的郡法院诉讼程序相关的(a)类材料。就该问题而言，他作出了有利于该申请的被申请人的认定。\n\n31. 该申请的被申请人的第四项论点是，文件（即(b)及(c)类文件）已在破产日期之前导致对Shlosberg先生作出判决，该判决属于IA 1986 s.436(1)中“财产”定义范围内的“义务”，因而属于归属受托人的财产。法官在第[141]段驳回了该论点。\n\n32. 法官称（第[144]段），鉴于其就特权作出的结论，无须单独审议Shlosberg先生关于保密性的主张。\n\n33. 随后，法官转而审议救济问题。他列明了（第[145]段）该申请的被申请人为保护Shlosberg先生的保密信息而设置的各种保障措施。Shlosberg先生主张，在大量其有权享有特权——尽管该特权与Webinvest（韦布因维斯特）/the Liquidators（清算人）共同享有——的文件不仅由诉讼中对立一方即Avonwick的诉讼代理律师占有，且已由其详细审阅的情形下，适当的救济应为命令Dechert停止担任Avonwick的诉讼代理律师。该申请的被申请人主张，已设置的保障措施将为Shlosberg先生提供充分保护；或者，禁止滥用有关信息的禁令将为Shlosberg先生提供充分保护。\n\n34. 在审查若干判例并列出与本案行使法院自由裁量权有关的十一项因素后，法官得出结论（第[160]段），应当授予禁令，要求Dechert停止担任Avonwick的诉讼代理律师。他称，除非在Dechert内部建立严格的信息隔离墙，并指派一支全新的团队担任Avonwick的诉讼代理律师，否则他不认为通过授予禁止Dechert使用特权信息的禁令，能够充分保护Shlosberg先生就特权信息享有的权利。\n\n35. 法官准许就该命令提起上诉，“理由是法律专业保密特权已从Shlosberg先生转归[受托人]”。\n\n上诉\n\n36. Avonwick及受托人基于五项理由提起上诉。第一项理由是，法官在法律上错误地认定，破产法定制度并未使受托人取得Shlosberg先生就文件享有的特权权利（与“Shlosberg先生特有的个人”事项有关的材料除外）。第二项理由是，法官在法律上错误地认定，破产受托人无权放弃其根据法定权力从破产人处取得的文件或信息所涉特权。第三项理由是，法官在法律上错误地驳回了另一项论点，即Avonwick针对Shlosberg先生取得的High Court（高等法院）判决的效力是，文件涉及Shlosberg先生的一项债务，该债务在其破产后成为遗产的一项债务，因而构成IA 1986 s.436所指的财产。第四项理由是，法官在法律上错误地未分析Shlosberg先生针对受托人所享有的保密权范围。第五项理由是，法官错误地授予禁令。\n\n37. 当事人之间存在争议，即第四项理由是否属于法官准许上诉的范围。显然，第五项理由的全部或部分不属于该许可范围。就Avonwick及受托人须取得上诉许可而言，尽管该许可申请在技术上已逾期，我仍会授予该等许可。Avonwick拟就保密性及救济提出的论点均已在法官面前提出，已载入上诉理由，并已在Avonwick本次上诉的书面提纲中予以论述。\n\n38. Shlosberg先生已提交被上诉人通知书，以一项附加理由维持法官的命令。此处无须列明该理由。\n\n39. Dechert及Avonwick已就法官作出的诉讼费用命令另行提交上诉人通知书，尤其是就法官仅命令Dechert而非同时命令Dechert及Avonwick承担诉讼费用的部分提出上诉。该上诉须取得上诉许可。基于下文所述理由，我会拒绝准许上诉。\n\n讨论\n\n相互竞争的政策\n\n40. 本申请及上诉的核心问题涉及两项公共利益政策之间的相互关系：一是破产人的受托人能够依照IA 1986的法定制度收回、变现及分配破产人遗产的公共利益；二是个人能够在确信其告知律师的内容未经其同意绝不会被披露的前提下，与其律师进行保密咨询的公共利益。\n\n41. 无须就前一项政策作更多说明。债权人获得适当清偿，以及当个人或公司无力偿债时，其资产被收回、变现并分配给债权人，显然是国家经济繁荣和总体福祉的至关重要因素。IA 1986 s.305(2)正是如此规定：“[破产]受托人的职能，是依照本章下列条文收回、变现及分配破产人的遗产。”\n\n42. 同样重要的是，破产人协助受托人履行该职能，并有许多法定条文确保此种合作。这些条文包括第312条规定的义务，即交付受托人占有破产人占有或控制、且受托人须取得占有的任何财产、账簿、文件或其他记录；以及第333条规定的义务，即向受托人提供受托人为履行该法定职能而可能合理要求的信息，在受托人可能要求的时间到受托人处报到，并作出受托人为该目的可能合理要求的一切其他事项。\n\n43. 转而论及特权，在我们面前，任何一方均未批评法官对其所作的描述（第[62]段），即抵制被强制披露信息的权利，尤其是抵制披露载有法律意见，或为就实际或拟议诉讼取得信息或意见这一主要目的而制作的文件。因此，这是一项消极权利。\n\n44. Lord Taylor CJ（泰勒首席大法官）在R v Derby Magistrates' Court ex p. B [1996] 1 AC 487一案中详细审查了该原则的历史。在其发言中，上议院上诉委员会的其他全体成员均表示同意，Lord Taylor于第507D页将特权描述为整个司法行政所赖以存在的基本条件，并于第507H页承认其为《European Convention on Human Rights（欧洲人权公约）》所保护的一项基本人权。\n\n45. 在该案中，一名被控谋杀的人希望从律师处取得一名先前被控犯有该罪行之人的指示及向其提供的意见；该人最初曾向警方承认其对该谋杀案负有唯一责任，但后来撤回该陈述，并随后获判无罪。上议院推翻下级裁决后裁定，被告无权取得要求出示该等文件的证人传票，且应命令高等法院撤销一名有薪治安法官及一名治安法官作出的、签发要求出示该等文件之传票的决定。Lord Taylor称（第508H-409A页），一旦特权成立，不应对其绝对性质作出任何例外。\n\n46. 在R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2002] UKHL 21, [2003] 1 AC 563一案中，Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵），上议院上诉委员会的其他成员均与其一致，\n\n一致同意，并称（第[7]段）法律专业保密特权是普通法长期确立的一项基本人权，也是任何人获得关于法律的专业意见之权利所必然附随的权利。他称，除非当事人能够毫无顾虑地将全部事实告知顾问，不担心这些事实日后可能被披露并用于损害其利益，否则无法有效获得此类意见。\n\n47. Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）称（第[8]段），法院通常会将法规中的一般性措辞解释为并非意图推翻基本人权，尽管如果按字面理解，该等措辞可能具有该效果；推翻此类权利的意图必须以明示方式表明，或通过必然含义显现。他提及（第[39]段）European Court of Human Rights（欧洲人权法院）的判例法，即仅在例外情形下方可侵犯特权。\n\n48. Lord Hobhouse（霍布豪斯勋爵）就审议尽管受法律专业保密特权保护的文件是否必须交出时，正确的法定解释方法作了进一步阐述。他引述了Lord Hoffmann在R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115第131页的发言中的以下段落，认为其简明地阐述了法定解释原则：\n\n“议会主权意味着，议会如选择如此，可以制定违反人权基本原则的法律……其行使权力所受到的限制，归根结底是政治性的，而非法律性的。但合法性原则意味着，议会必须正视其所为并承担政治代价。基本权利不得被一般性或含糊的措辞推翻。这是因为，在民主程序中，该等措辞无保留含义的全部影响很可能未被注意到，风险过大。因此，在不存在相反的明示措辞或必然含义的情况下，法院推定即使是最一般性的措辞，也意在受个人基本权利的限制。”\n\n49. Lord Hobhouse在指出该原则适用于主张特权的权利后，说明如下（第[45]段）在此语境中何谓必然含义：\n\n“如Lord Hutton（赫顿勋爵）在B (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 AC 428, 481中所指出，必然含义不同于合理含义。必然含义，是指从结合其语境解释的法规明文规定中必然得出的含义。它区分了议会纳入某项内容本属明智或合理之举、或议会如曾考虑此事很可能会纳入某项内容，与法规明文措辞清楚表明该法规必定已纳入某项内容之间的差别。必然含义是明示措辞和逻辑的问题，而非解释的问题。”\n\n50. 法官称（第[67]段），他认为House of Lords（上议院）在Morgan Grenfell案中阐述的原则并不直接适用于本案。我推断（根据第[66]段），这是因为他认为本案所涉是文件中的特权是否已转移给受托人，而非该特权是否被废除。我不同意该分析。从Shlosberg先生的角度看，唯一的问题是，法定破产法典的效果是否使其非自愿地丧失了主张其对文件所载信息享有特权这一基本权利。我看不出Derby Magistrates案、Simms案和Morgan Grenfell案中的原则为何不应适用于回答该问题。\n\n作为财产的特权\n\n51. Smith先生就上诉实体部分提出的总体论点是，法官审理了错误的问题：他本应询问特权权利的利益是否归属于受托人，而不是询问文件在受托人手中是否受保密义务约束。Avonwick（埃文威克）承认该等文件受保密义务约束，但主张在共谋诉讼中拟对其加以使用仍属允许。\n\n52. Avonwick的主张建立在IA 1986的规定之上。其主张，文件以及附随于其中所载信息的任何特权，均构成Shlosberg先生破产财产的一部分，并根据IA 1986 ss.283 and 306于受托人获任命时归属于受托人。其另行主张，第311条的必然含义是，受托人有权为履行其职能和行使其权力之目的使用该等文件及特权；该等职能和权力包括采取可能减少对破产财产提出的债权的措施——如果Avonwick在共谋诉讼中成功向除Shlosberg先生以外的该诉讼全部或任何被告追偿损害赔偿，即属此种情形。这是因为，在共谋诉讼中判给Avonwick的任何该等损害赔偿，将在同等程度上减少Avonwick作为Shlosberg先生破产财产债权人的债权。\n\n53. 我不接受特权属于归属于受托人的财产。为法官面前的申请及本次上诉之目的，双方已假定文件属于Shlosberg先生，因此将根据IA 1986 s. 306归属于受托人。然而，我认为，基于以下理由，显然附随于文件所载信息的特权并非构成Shlosberg先生破产财产一部分、并归属于受托人的财产。\n\n54. 为该目的构成破产人财产一部分的财产，定义见IA 1986 ss. 283 and 436。第436(1)条的定义如下：\n\n“财产”包括金钱、货物、诉权、土地以及无论位于何处的各种财产，还包括因财产产生或附随于财产的义务及各种权益，无论该等权益为现有或将来、既得或或有；\n\n55. 在Bristol Airport plc v Powdrill [1990] 1 Ch 744第759D页，Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C（尼古拉斯·布朗-威尔金森爵士副大法官）称，其他法官均同意其意见，“很难设想有比这更宽泛的财产定义”。\n\n56. 根据第382(4)条，归属于破产受托人的破产人财产还包括：\n\n“[破产人]就财产或与财产有关可行使的任何权力，但该权力就并非当时构成破产人财产一部分的财产或与该等财产有关而可行使的范围除外”。\n\n57. Avonwick主张，特权是在第436(1)条“财产”定义范围内因文件产生或附随于文件的一项权益。\n\n58. Smith先生另行主张，特权构成Shlosberg先生破产财产的一部分并归属于受托人，因为它是其可就文件或与文件有关行使的一项权力，即拒绝披露文件的权利，因此落入IA 1986 s. 283(4)的字面含义之内。他主张，法官以特权并非有助于受托人实现文件价值或分配所得款项的权力为由驳回该论点（判决书第[125]段），属错误。Smith先生再次主张，这是对法定条文作出的不允许的附加解释，并且无论如何，使用或放弃特权的权利将有助于受托人收取构成Shlosberg先生破产财产一部分的财产。\n\n59. 在法官面前及本次上诉中，双方提及Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553，以及所谓Crescent Farm原则在Re Konigsberg [1989] 1 WLR 1257中的适用。在Crescent Farm案中，原告作为买受人，第一被告作为次买受人，均为一份土地转让契据的当事人；该契据规定，如第一被告在其后20年内希望出售该土地或其任何部分，买受人享有回购选择权。在该期间内，第一被告订立合同将该土地出售给第二被告，随后又将该土地转让给第二被告，且未获解除该选择权。在就包括违约和共谋在内事项请求损害赔偿的诉讼过程中，原告发出传票，要求第二被告披露第一被告向大律师作出的指示以及大律师的意见；该等文件已由第一被告发送给第二被告。Goff J（戈夫法官）援引Minet v Morgan (1873) 8 Ch.App 361、若干同样援引Minet的其他案件以及Halsbury's Laws of England（《哈尔斯伯里英国法律全书》，第3版），称（第562页）已明确确立，前权利人的特权为其继受人的利益而存续。他称，第二被告作为权利继受人收到了该等文件。Goff法官裁定，应维持第二被告对特权的主张，并驳回原告的传票。\n\n60. 在 Re Konigsberg 案中，破产受托人请求宣告，将婚姻住所从破产人与其妻子共同所有转至仅以其妻子名义所有，构成《Bankruptcy Act 1914》第 42 条所称的自愿财产处分，且对其不发生效力。妻子主张该项转让属于出售。她请求排除就婚姻住所出售事宜共同受委托的律师所作的宣誓书证据；该证据涉及该交易究竟是赠与还是出售的问题。Peter Gibson J（彼得·吉布森法官）基于两项理由驳回了妻子的申请。第一项理由是，妻子在宣誓书中提及了与该律师之间的通信，并附上该律师的一封信，从而放弃了特权。第二项理由是，破产受托人就破产人可供其债权人分配的全部资产而言是破产人的权利继受人，其中包括因第 42 条规定可撤销的财产处分而转让财产的权利；并且，根据 Crescent Farm 案，破产受托人作为权利继受人继受并有权主张破产人的特权。看来（根据第 1267B 页），妻子的律师接受了破产人的相关特权已转归破产受托人的观点。Peter Gibson J 认为，该特权属于破产人与其妻子共同享有的特权，而破产受托人已取代破产人的地位，因此应适用通常规则：特权的一名共同持有人（妻子）不得对另一名共同持有人（受托人）维持该特权。\n\n61. Mr Smith（史密斯先生）在口头辩论中未继续主张关于上诉第三项理由，即 IA 1986 s.436(1) 中“property”定义内“obligations”一词在本案中的含义及适用问题。\n\n62. 为支持其关于 LLP 不属于第 436(1) 条和第 283(4) 条所定义的财产的论点，Mr Marshall（马歇尔先生）援引了 Deloitte & Touche Inc v Bennett Jones Verchere (2002) 206 DLR (444) 280，该案是 Alberta Court of Appeal（阿尔伯塔上诉法院）作出的加拿大判决，以及 R v Dunwoody [2004] QCA 413，该案是 Supreme Court of Queensland（昆士兰州最高法院）作出的澳大利亚判决。在 Deloitte & Touche 案中，法院审议了与 IA 1986 s. 436(1) 中“property”的定义相似的澳大利亚法定规定，以及与 IA 1986 s.283(4) 对财产上的或有关财产的权力的处理相似的规定；法院的三名法官均认为，特权及放弃该特权的权利，并非可供债权人分配的财产或附属于财产的权力，而是一项人身权利。在 Dunwoody 案中，McMurdo P（麦克默多首席法官）称（第 [25] 段），特权本质上是破产人享有的人身概念，并非财产；只有在法律使用最明确的措辞或依必要默示时，才能将其剥夺。\n\n63. 我认为，对 IA 1986 相关规定作出正确解释后，显然特权并非自动归属破产受托人的破产人财产。根据 Morgan Grenfell 案和 Simms 案，只有在 IA 1986 明确作出规定，或从其条文的明确语言中得出必要默示时，破产人才可被剥夺特权。在本案中，受托人就此方面所依赖的唯一规定，是第 436(1) 条中“property”的定义，以及第 382(4) 条对“power over or in respect of property”的处理，并结合第 283 条和第 306 条关于破产人遗产所包含的破产人财产自动归属受托人的一般规定。上述所有规定均为一般性措辞。它们未明确将特权视为自动从破产人转移给受托人的破产人财产。这也并非这些规定的必要默示。\n\n64. 无须考虑加拿大和澳大利亚的案件，因为我们所关注的是作为本国国内立法的 IA 1986 的解释。Re Rae 案和 Re Hemming 案均无助益，因为它们均不涉及特权。Crescent Farm 案和 Re Konigsberg 案均不妨碍我的结论。Crescent Farm 案并非破产清偿不能案件。作为 Crescent Farm 案先例被引用的 Minet 案也不是。它们均取决于各自的具体事实。在 Re Konigsberg 案中，律师承认特权已转归破产受托人。更关键的是，Re Konigsberg 案早于 Derby Magistrates 案、Simms 案和 Morgan Grenfell 案；后述案件确立了正确的方法，因此 Peter Gibson J 未适用这些案件中的原则并不令人意外。就当前所审议的问题而言，该案并不正确。\n\nIA 1986 s.311\n\n65. IA s.311(1) 规定：\n\n“受托人应占有所有与破产人遗产或事务有关，且属于破产人或由其占有或控制的账簿、文件及其他记录（包括在任何诉讼中可享有免于披露特权的任何文件）。”\n\n66. 括号中的文字并未出现在前身立法即《Bankruptcy Act 1914》第 48(1) 条的对应规定中。\n\n67. Avonwick（阿文维克）承认，根据第 311(1) 条由破产受托人占有的文件，受托人负有保密义务。然而，Avonwick 主张，依据第 311(1) 条的明确条款或必要默示，从破产人处取得且受特权保护的文件中所载的信息，可由受托人用于履行其法定职责及附随权力的目的，包括在与第三方的诉讼中使用；该使用将构成对特权的放弃。\n\n68. Avonwick 的主张是，第 311(1) 条中括号内的文字表明，议会直接处理了破产人持有的受特权保护文件的问题；既然受托人负有占有该等文件的义务，议会必定意图允许受托人为其法定目的使用该等文件。Peter Gibson J 在 Re Konigsberg 案中（第 1267F 页）作出了类似评论，Pumfrey J（庞弗里法官）在 Surface Technology plc v Young [2002] FSR 25 第 [25] 段中亦然。\n\n69. 该项主张具有实践上的吸引力。事实上，Mr Marshall 承认，受托人可以为收取及变现破产人遗产这一法定目的，使用受特权保护的文件及其中所载信息。然而，他主张且法官认定，受托人只能以不会构成放弃特权的方式使用该等文件和信息。我同意。\n\n70. 再次适用的原则，是 Derby Magistrates 案、Simms 案和 Morgan Grenfell 案所阐述的原则，同时应始终注意特权作为一项基本权利的地位。第 311(1) 条的明确条款说明了受托人占有其中所述文件的职责。该条对受托人如何使用这些文件只字未提。然而，第 311(1) 条必然默示，受托人应为收取、变现和分配破产人遗产这一首要职能而占有文件。因此，受托人至少必须有权查阅文件，以获取与该等事项相关的信息。这本身即为履行受托人法定职能的一项宝贵优势。\n\n71. 然而，受托人为破产人遗产的利益对第三方采取行动时，可以放弃破产人的法律专业特权，并非当然可以从条文中作出必要默示；尽管从债权人的角度看，这样做可能是可取的。借用上文所引 Morgan Grenfell 案中 Lord Hobhouse（霍布豪斯勋爵）的话，仅因议会将此类权力纳入法律会是明智或合理的，并不意味着鉴于该法的明确语言，这一权力即属必要默示。\n\n72. 不存在任何此类默示，也可由第 311(1) 条括号内文字——“(including any which would be privileged from disclosure in any proceedings)”——产生的背景予以支持。由 Sir Kenneth Cork（肯尼思·科克爵士）主持的 Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice（破产法与实务审查委员会）于 1982 年公布的报告（Cmnd 8558）（“Cork Report”）第 908 至 911 段，讨论了法律专业特权问题，背景是：破产受托人希望从一名在破产前为债务人代理的律师处获取信息，而该律师掌握的信息可能有助于收取债务人的财产及管理破产人的遗产。\n\n73. 科克报告（Cork Report）注意到，关于特权范围的立场并不明确，并指出（第910段），对受托人而言，关键领域是对债务人在无力偿债之前的行为进行调查，尤其是对债务人作出的、减少了可供债权人受偿之财产的金钱支付或财产转让进行调查；受托人寻求查明的不仅是有关该项支付或转让本身的事实，而且包括与债务人的知情程度及意图有关的所有周边情形。\n\n74. 科克报告指出（第911段），债务人为向其受托人隐瞒相关信息而提出特权主张，与其协助变现其财产并将所得款项分配给债权人的义务不一致。报告称，委员会多数成员认为，在非公开讯问中，债务人对于为最大化可供债权人受偿的财产而公平、适当地提出且与此相关的问题，不应享有特权。因此，科克报告就该议题所作的全部讨论均围绕向受托人披露信息展开。报告并未涉及随后以会放弃该特权的方式针对第三方使用文件和信息的问题。\n\n75. 奇尔沃思的卢卡斯勋爵（Lord Lucas of Chilworth），时任贸易和工业部政务次官，在1985年2月7日上议院（House of Lords）委员会阶段就《无力偿债法案》（Insolvency Bill）进行辩论时明确表示，后来成为第311(1)条的条款措辞旨在落实科克报告第911段中多数成员的建议。\n\n76. 此外，就本次上诉的这一方面而言，第311(1)条款不限于属于破产人的文件，这一点与埃文威克（Avonwick）就第311(1)条提出的主张相悖。该条款还延及属于他人但由破产人占有或控制的文件。无人主张第311(1)条中括号内的文字不适用于此类第三方文件。然而，不能据此主张，第311(1)条必然意味着受托人可以以会放弃该等第三方特权的方式使用这些文件。\n\n77. 史密斯先生（Mr Smith）援引下列案件，以支持埃文威克对第311(1)条的解释，即该条隐含地授权受托人以会放弃特权的方式，针对第三方使用享有特权的文件和信息。我认为，其中任何一案均无助于埃文威克的主张。\n\n78. 在 Re Esal (Commodities) Ltd (No 2) [1990] BCC 708 一案中，米利特法官（Millett J）准许一家正在清算的公司之监察委员会成员，在其提起的诉讼中使用文件对抗一家银行；该诉讼涉及（除其他事项外）该银行参与该公司的欺诈性交易。清算人依据《1948年公司法》（Companies Act 1948）第268条，或因该条项下诉讼的威胁而取得了这些文件，并已将其以申请人作为监察委员会成员的身份提供给申请人。清算人亦已就该银行参与公司的欺诈性交易对该银行提起诉讼，但法院获告知，清算人提起的诉讼很可能会和解。米利特法官认为，申请人的诉讼依附于清算人的诉讼，但他并不认为该诉讼严格属于第268条的目的范围内。他指出（第724C页），确实，如果申请人的诉讼成功，将在相应范围内减少清算程序中的债权申报，但这并非申请人的目的，对清算程序的利益纯属附带。他仍基于若干因素准予许可，其中包括申请人诉讼的标的与清算密切相关，以及由于清算人已向银行送达诉状，该材料已可能进入公共领域。\n\n79. 在 Re a Company [1993] BCC 734 一案中，哈曼法官（Harman J）授权一家公司的行政接管人使用其收到的文件，以追究针对该公司一名董事以及该公司和该董事的一名前律师的索赔。哈曼法官称（第735B页）：\n\n“在这一错综复杂的事项中，后续处理引发了关于所进行某些活动是否适当的严重问题，并且初步表明存在试图逃避在债务到期时付款的行为。在这种情况下，对于通过援引《1986年法》（1986 Act）第236条取得信息之人所施加的保密义务，如法院确信，披露信息要么是为寻求披露该信息的任职人员所担任职务的目的，要么鉴于应如何适当实现正义的利益衡量而另有正当理由，法院可以予以解除。我这一结论依据米利特法官在 Re Esal (Commodities) Ltd (No. 2) [1990] BCC 708 一案中的裁决……”\n\n80. 我看不出上述任何案件与解决本申请和上诉有任何关联。它们涉及由行政接管人和清算人取得的文件，而行政接管人和清算人是公司的代理人。破产受托人并非破产人的代理人。更重要的是，这些案件均未审议涉及特权的文件和信息这一具体问题，以及应适用于其使用的原则。\n\n81. 在 Sutton v GE Capital Commercial Finance Limited [2004] EWCA Civ 315 一案中，上诉法院（Court of Appeal）裁定，行政接管人取得的享有特权的文件被其交给另一家公司的律师，而该公司希望在强制执行保证的诉讼中使用这些文件，并未导致处于行政接管状态的公司放弃保密权和特权。这是因为，向该等律师披露文件超出了行政接管人的权限。再次，我看不出该案有任何关联或帮助。该案涉及的是行政接管人，而非破产受托人；且法院既然认定行政接管人无论如何均系越权行事，便无须审议享有特权材料的特殊地位。\n\n82. 在 Re Cook [1999] BPIR 881 一案中，作为高等法院副法官审理案件的斯坦利·伯恩顿御用大律师（Stanley Burnton QC）确认，破产受托人有权授权一名曾代理破产人的律师向严重欺诈办公室（Serious Fraud Office）提供有关破产人事务的信息，从而放弃破产人的特权。并非副法官之过错，该案的推理和裁决均不正确。副法官并非不合理地依赖 Re Konigsberg 一案，并称（第884页），有关破产人财产和事务的放弃特权的权力和权利，按照与破产人的资产以及与其财产和事务有关的账簿、文件及其他记录的占有权依第311条移转给受托人相同的方式，移转给其受托人。然而，基于我已给出的理由，相关原则并非载于 Re Konigsberg 一案，而是载于 Derby Magistrates 一案、Simms 一案及 Morgan Grenfell 一案。特权并非构成破产人财产并归属于受托人的破产人财产。副法官并未参照正确原则审议第311条的恰当解释。\n\n83. 基于上述所有理由，本案法官对第311(1)条的解释是正确的。\n\n84. 受托人在任何情况下均不得授权在本案的共谋诉讼中使用施洛斯伯格先生（Mr Shlosberg）的特权，另有一个理由：该等使用不属于受托人的职责及附随权力范围。史密斯先生主张，若协助第三方对另一人提出索赔将导致债权人对财产的债权减少或消灭，则该等职责和权力延及该项协助；例如，在本案中，如果埃文威克在针对卡斯尔（Castle）、维控股（Vi Holdings）、格洛博伊德（Globoid）及马奇茨基先生（Mr Machitski）中全部或任何一方的共谋诉讼中获得损害赔偿，从而减少埃文威克对施洛斯伯格先生财产的债权，即属此种情形。\n\n85. 我不同意史密斯先生的该项主张。根据 IA 1986 s.305(2)，破产受托人的法定职能是收取、变现并分配破产人财产。以史密斯先生所建议的方式使用施洛斯伯格先生的特权，并非为了上述任何目的。史密斯先生援引 IA 1986 s.314 及附表5，该等规定列明破产受托人的权力。他具体援引附表5第12段所规定的权力，内容如下：\n\n“就构成破产人财产的任何财产，行使其根据本法第VIII部至第XI部享有行使资格的任何权力的权力。”\n\n86. 基于我已给出的理由，施洛斯伯格先生的特权既非归属于受托人的财产，亦非受托人可以依第311(1)条以放弃该特权的方式使用之物。因此，附表5第12段不适用于在共谋诉讼中拟议进行的任何使用。\n\n救济\n\n- 87. Avonwick（埃文威克）在本次上诉中主张，即使法官就 IA 1986 相关条款的正确含义和效力所作的分析和结论在其他方面均属正确，其命令 Dechert（德杰特）停止就与 Shlosberg 先生或其事务有关的任何事项担任 Avonwick 的律师，仍属错误。\n\n- 88. Avonwick 提交称，当前情形属于法院通常不会限制律师执业的情形。其援引 Re Shuppar [1996] 2 All ER 664 称，破产受托人聘请已受一名主要债权人委聘的同一律师，并无任何内在不当；尤其是在主要债权人，甚至该等律师本身，正与或可能与破产人进行诉讼的情况下，律师同时代理一名债权人和一名破产受托人，亦无任何不当。\n\n- 89. Avonwick 进一步主张，如一名律师在此前未曾代理争议另一方当事人的情况下，获得属于该另一方当事人的保密信息（甚至特权信息），则在通常情况下，法院不会授予禁令限制该律师执业，而会设法确保该律师不使用该等信息，除非法院认定文件存在被违反保密义务使用的实际风险。为支持该主张，其援引 Re a Firm of Solicitors [1997] Ch 1 at 13；Virgin Media Ltd v BSkyB plc [2008] 1 WLR 2854 at [21] – [24]；以及 Stiedl v Enyo Law [2011] EWHC 2649 at [44]。其将该情形下的立场与此前存在律师/客户关系的情形作出对比，例如 Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222 所涉情形。\n\n- 90. Avonwick 主张，鉴于有关 Dechert 已实施的实际保障措施的证据，法官本应认定，不存在文件被违反受托人对 Shlosberg 先生负有的保密义务而使用的实际风险，且不太可能产生利益冲突。\n\n- 91. Avonwick 进一步主张，即使上述主张均属错误，法官仍应拒绝就 Dechert 作出该命令，因为正如法官所认定，该特权为 Shlosberg 先生和 Webinvest（韦布投资）共同享有的特权。因此，Shlosberg 先生不能在共谋诉讼中针对 Webinvest 主张该特权，而 Dechert 亦在共谋诉讼中受聘担任 Webinvest 的律师，并已审阅或将有权以该身份审阅特权材料。\n\n- 92. 我亦会驳回本次上诉的这一部分。法官对于为保护 Shlosberg 先生享有特权的基本权利而应授予何种救济（如有），享有酌处权。他审议了受托人和 Avonwick 所依赖的保障措施以及多项判例，包括 Re A Firm of Solicitors 和 Stiedl 案。他列举了其认为与行使法院酌处权尤为相关的十一项事项，其中包括 Webinvest 的立场以及 Dechert 作为 Webinvest 律师的身份。综合所有情形，不能说其就 Dechert 作出的命令明显错误，或超出正当行使司法酌处权的范围。\n\n- 93. 然而，我应明确指出，我驳回有关救济的上诉，绝不意味着对今后处理共谋诉讼案件管理的法官应采取何种步骤（如有）以保护 Shlosberg 先生的特权有所指示。Avonwick 是 Webinvest 清算程序中压倒性多数债权人、Shlosberg 先生不能针对 Webinvest 主张该特权、Dechert 将继续在共谋诉讼中代理 Webinvest，以及该项请求是针对所有被告提出的共谋请求，这些事实将构成就 Shlosberg 先生特权作出任何案件管理决定时的相关背景。\n\n费用\n\n- 94. 最后，我转而审理 Avonwick 就法官仅命令 Dechert 承担费用而提出的上诉许可申请。其理由是，法官本应作出由 Avonwick 和 Dechert 共同及连带支付 Shlosberg 先生就其申请所产生费用的命令。\n\n- 95. 我会拒绝准许上诉，理由是就此问题提出的上诉并无真正的成功前景。该命令剥夺了 Avonwick 抵销 Shlosberg 先生对其所负大额未偿债务的机会，这一事实丝毫不损害法官命令的正当性。Shlosberg 先生仅向 Dechert 请求费用，且 Dechert 积极但未成功地抗辩该申请，这已足以构成法官作出该命令的正当理由。此外，即使法官作出了共同及连带责任命令，Shlosberg 先生仍可仅就 Dechert 的分别责任向其执行该命令；如 Shlosberg 先生如此行事，Avonwick 仍无法主张抵销。\n\n结论\n\n96. 基于上述所有理由，我会驳回本次上诉。\n\nGloster 女法官：\n\n97. 我同意。\n\nSharp 女法官：\n\n98. 我亦同意。\n\nBAILII：版权政策　免责声明　隐私政策　反馈　向 BAILII 捐款　网址：htt","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":7,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":76,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":762,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":792,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":7627,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":7922,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":9143,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:39:35"}