{"id":"court_ctb_777_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":777,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2022-08-22","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x           |                            |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11                 |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                                | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073<br>(JAM) |\n| Debtor.1                                                    | :<br>:<br>: |                            |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x           |                            |\n\n# **MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER (A) PROVIDING THAT CONTROL OF ANY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION, AND OTHER PRIVILEGES RELATED TO RULE 2004 SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS PASSED TO TRUSTEE UPON APPOINTMENT, (B) DIRECTING THAT DEBTOR AND OTHER EXAMINEES NOT WITHHOLD DOCUMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH PRIVILEGES, AND (C) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), hereby moves (the \"Motion\"), pursuant to sections 323, 521, 541, and 1108 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"), rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Rules\"), and the Court's orders granting the Trustee's motions for examination pursuant to Rule 2004, for an order confirming that the Trustee controls certain privileges formerly held by the Debtor and directing that the Debtor and other examinees not withhold documents or information from production to the Trustee on the basis of any such privileges or attempt to assert any such privileges that are properly owned by the Trustee. In support of this Motion, the Trustee respectfully states as follows:\n\n<sup>1</sup> Although the Debtor's legal name is Ho Wan Kwok, he is also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases. The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Pursuant to the Court's orders granting the Trustee's motions for Rule 2004 discovery, the Trustee has served subpoenas on the Debtor and numerous law firms and other professional advisors who represented him either in connection with the administration of this case or in relation to other non-bankruptcy matters (collectively, the \"Discovery Recipients\").<sup>2</sup> The information the Trustee seeks from the Discovery Recipients is critical to his investigation, because there is myriad evidence suggesting the Debtor may have sought to place his most valuable assets beyond the reach of his creditors—including through the use of shell companies and purported trusts and with the aid or collusion of his family members and other trusted accomplices. The Debtor could not have designed and implemented these schemes and related transactions without advice and guidance from counsel and other professionals. Accordingly, only through access to this information will the Trustee be able to fully investigate and understand the true extent and nature of the Debtor's assets and financial affairs.\n\n2. The Debtor, however, has taken the position that he may attempt to prevent the Trustee from obtaining some or all of this information by seeking to invoke attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or other privileges or protections. The Debtor's position is unsupported by the law. Rather, the law is clear that, immediately upon the Trustee's appointment, control of any privileges attaching to documents and communications regarding the Debtor's assets, liabilities, financial condition, and the administration of his estate passed to the Trustee, and such privileges may no longer be asserted by the Debtor.\n\n<sup>2</sup> For purposes of this Motion, the Discovery Recipients consist of the Debtor and the 14 professional firms who were the subject of the Debtor's Rule 2004 motion directed to such parties. *See Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor* (ECF No. 637).\n\n3. Bankruptcy courts have frequently entered orders confirming a trustee's rights and authority in this regard. Specifically, in determining when control of privileges passes to a trustee (and does not remain with an individual debtor-out-of-possession), the vast majority of courts have applied a balancing test which considers whether the subject of the privilege relates more to rights and responsibilities of the trustee—such as those relating to the debtor's assets, finances, or estate administration—or instead concern other interests personal to the debtor such as issues relating to his liberty, potential criminal liability, or control of his person.\n\n4. In nearly every instance where a court has applied this balancing test in the context of requests for documents such as those requested by the 2004 subpoenas at issue—i.e., documents squarely related to a trustee's efforts to identify and recover potential assets of the estate, his efforts to understand the debtor's financial affairs, or the administration of the debtor's estate—the court has found the trustee controls the privileges as to such documents. This Court should come to the same conclusion: the Trustee has succeeded to the Debtor's rights to control applicable privileges with regard to the documents and information the Trustee has requested, 3 and the Debtor has no basis to invoke any privileges to withhold such documents and information from production or to instruct other Discovery Recipients (e.g., his current or former counsel) to do so.\n\n5. Accordingly, by this Motion, the Trustee seeks an order in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A** confirming that (i) the Trustee owns and controls the attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and other applicable privileges or protections on issues related to the Debtor's assets and financial affairs and the administration of his estate and (ii) the\n\n<sup>3</sup> To the extent the Debtor has privileged documents that do not relate to these topics and are not responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoenas, the determination of who controls that privilege need not be decided at this time.\n\nDiscovery Recipients cannot withhold documents or information from the Trustee on the basis of any such privileges.\n\n#### **JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND STATUTORY BASES**\n\n6. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (the \"Court\") has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the *Standing Order of Reference* from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (as amended). This is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).\n\n7. Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n8. The statutory bases for the relief requested herein are sections 323, 521, 541, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 2004.\n\n#### **PROCEDURAL POSTURE**\n\n9. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Debtor filed with the Court a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n10. On March 21, 2022, the United States Trustee appointed an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (\"Committee\") in the Debtor's chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\"). No examiner has been appointed in the Chapter 11 Case.\n\n11. On June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order (ECF No. 465) (the \"Trustee Order\") directing the United States Trustee to appoint a chapter 11 trustee in the Chapter 11 Case. Pursuant to the Trustee Order, the United States Trustee selected Luc A. Despins as the Trustee.\n\n12. The Trustee Order held, in relevant part that, \"[w]hen balanced against dismissal or conversion, the complexity of the Debtor's financial affairs and lack of independent managerial oversight in this case warrants the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee who can\n\ninvestigate, identify, and locate the Debtor's assets for the benefit of creditors and the estate\" and that \"[t]he Chapter 11 trustee shall perform all of the duties set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1106.\" (*See*  Trustee Order at 15-16, 18).\n\n13. The Trustee Order further held that \"[t]he appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee will also allow for the effective investigation of the Debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs\" and \"allow[] the Chapter 11 trustee to investigate the Debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs and to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Stipulated Order.\" (See *id.* at 14, 18).\n\n14. On July 8, 2022, the Court entered an order granting the appointment of Luc A. Despins as the Trustee in the Chapter 11 Case (ECF No. 523) (the \"Appointment Order\").\n\n15. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed three related motions: (i) Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Examination of Ho Wan Kwok and Production of Documents (ECF No. 636) (the \"Debtor 2004 Motion\"); (ii) the Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (ECF No. 637) (the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\"); and (iii) the Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Entities and Individuals Affiliated with the Debtor (ECF No. 638) (the \"Third-Party Motion\" and together with the Debtor 2004 Motion and the Professionals 2004 Motion, the \"Rule 2004 Motions,\" attaching the \"Rule 2004 Subpoenas\").\n\n16. On August 2, 2022, counsel for the Trustee and counsel for the Debtor met and conferred via teleconference regarding the limited issues concerning the Rule 2004 Motions (the\n\n\"August 2 Meet and Confer\"). During the meet and confer, counsel for the Debtor suggested that, despite the Rule 2004 Subpoenas being limited to topics core to the Trustee's rights and obligations, including identification and investigation of the estate's assets, financial condition and administration, absent a ruling from the Court, counsel believed it was likely the Debtor would seek to withhold potentially responsive documents on the grounds that the Debtor, and not the Trustee, controlled the relevant privilege. Counsel for the Trustee made clear that it could not see a basis for the Debtor to claim that control of the attorney-client privilege as to the requested information had not passed to the Trustee, and asked that to the extent the Debtor was aware of any such documents, or any basis for the Debtor to assert such a privilege, it identify those issues to the Trustee immediately, so as to avoid any delay. For the Debtor's part, his counsel suggested that the Court should provide guidance on privilege issues in advance of future disagreements over privilege.\n\n17. On August 5, 2022, Brown Rudnick filed a Response and Reservation of Rights to the Professionals 2004 Motion (ECF No. 698) (the \"Brown Rudnick Response\"). The Brown Rudnick Response \"recognize[d] that the Trustee has generally succeeded to the privileges of the Debtor, including the attorney-client privilege.\" (*See* ECF No. 698 at 2). Nonetheless, the Brown Rudnick Response \"reserve[d] all rights to object to any particular discovery request\" including \"nondisclosure owed to third parties.\" (*See* ECF No. 698 at 2–3).\n\n18. On August 5, 2022, Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. filed a Response and Reservation of Rights to the Debtor's Professionals 2004 Motion (ECF No. 699) (the \"Verdolino & Lowey Response\"). The Verdolino & Lowey Response, like the Brown Rudnick Response, \"recognize[d] that the Trustee has generally succeeded to the privileges of the Debtor, including the attorney-client privilege.\" (*See* ECF No. 699 at 2). However, the Verdolino & Lowey\n\nResponse, also like the Brown Rudnick Response, \"reserve[d] all rights to object to any particular discovery request\" and noted that the \"production of documents and examination may be properly subject to certain legal or ethical limitations . . . [which] may be subject to further orders of this Court. (*Id.*).\n\n19. On August 5, 2022, the Debtor filed a Limited Objection to the Rule 2004 Motions (ECF No. 703) (\"Debtor's Limited Objection\"), noting the Debtor's position that control over the attorney-client privilege in connection with the Rule 2004 motion was legally ambiguous and a \"a question for another day.\" *See* Debtor's Limited Objection at 2 (citing Debtor 2004 Motion at 15-16; Professionals 2004 Motion at 19-20). The Debtor's counsel, Aaron Romney of Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., submitted a Declaration in Support of the Debtor's Limited Objection (ECF No. 732) (the \"Romney Declaration\"), reflecting the Debtor's position that the issue of control of the attorney-client privilege be submitted \"to the Court in an omnibus fashion on a reasonable timetable.\" (Romney Declaration at 4).\n\n20. On August 10, 2022, the Trustee filed a Reply in Support of the Rule 2004 Motions (ECF. No. 724) (\"Trustee's Reply\"), reiterating that the Trustee's ownership of the Debtor's privileges is a critical issue that the Court should resolve as soon as possible. (*See* ECF No. 724 at 4 n.2). The Trustee's Reply indicated an intent to bring this issue before the Court in the near future. (*Id.*).\n\n21. On August 12, 2022, the Court held a hearing with respect to the Rule 2004 Motions and directed the Trustee to file revised proposed orders with respect to the Rule 2004 Motions. (*See* ECF No. 742). At the hearing, counsel for the Trustee made clear that, because it appeared that the Debtor would assert a privilege over responsive documents called for under the proposed Rule 2004 subpoenas on the grounds that control of the privilege was ambiguous, the\n\nTrustee intended to seek a ruling from the Court on these issues. (Hr'g Tr. at 15:12-15). Brown Rudnick, as prior counsel to the Debtor, agreed that such a ruling would be extremely helpful. (Hr'g Tr. at 20:19-21).\n\n22. On August 16, 2022, the Court granted the Rule 2004 Motions, authorizing the respective examinations and service of the document requests. (Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (ECF No. 756), Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Examination of Ho Wan Kwok (ECF No. 757), and Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Discovery with Respect to Various Entities and Individuals Affiliated with Debtor (ECF No. 756) (the three orders collectively, the \"Rule 2004 Orders\")).\n\n23. The Trustee has now served, or is in the process of serving, the subpoenas attached to the Rule 2004 Motions on parties to the Rule 2004 Motions.\n\n24. Given the Court's granting of the Rule 2004 Motions, and the parties' disagreement concerning passage of control of the privileges to the Trustee with respect to documents concerning the Debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial condition and the administration of the bankruptcy estate, this Motion is ripe for consideration by the Court, so as to prevent delay caused by unwarranted withholding of responsive documents.\n\n#### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n25. The Debtor's schedules list aggregate unsecured claims against him in the total amount of approximately \\$374 million (*See* ECF No. 78, at 1, hereinafter referred to as the \"Debtor's Schedules\"). The asserted \\$261 million claim of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") is the largest single claim identified among the Debtor's scheduled unsecured claims at this time. (*See id.*, Attached Schedule F). The Debtor's Schedules also list a\n\nsecured claim in an unknown amount purportedly belonging to Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"Golden Spring\"), an entity purportedly owned by the Debtor's son, Qiang Guo (the \"Son\" or \"Qiang\"). (*See id.*, Attached Schedule D). This claim is allegedly secured by \"[c]ertain claims and recoveries thereto,\" and is asserted to have arisen in connection with a \"Litigation Funding Agreement.\"\n\n26. The Debtor's schedules list assets of only \\$3,850.<sup>4</sup> (*See id.* at 3-7). The Debtor, contrary to widespread reports of his numerous business interests and self-described assertions of extraordinary wealth,<sup>5</sup> asserts that he earns no income, and that his expenses are paid for by Golden Spring (*See id.* at 1; *see also* ECF No. 107 at ¶17, hereinafter referred to as the \"Debtor's Declaration\").\n\n27. The New York Supreme Court has found that the Debtor has engaged \"in efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members\" and has \"secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members.\" *See* Decision and Order on Motion, *Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. V. Ho Wan Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Feb. 9, 2022), at 1.\n\n28. The Debtor's Rule 2004 Motion (ECF No. 636) more fully sets forth the known web of entities associated with the Debtor and potential assets he may be secreting in those entities. Many of the entities appear to be part of complex legal constructs designed to obfuscate\n\n<sup>4</sup> The Debtor has scheduled certain assets with unknown values, including disputed unregistered copyrights and litigation claims. (*See* Debtor's Schedules at 6).\n\n<sup>5</sup> \"I have absolutely no regrets for what I have done over the past nine months. I have the *wealthy life that everyone in the world dreams about*. I have the *biggest house in Hong Kong*, thousands of square meters. I have the *most luxurious apartment in London*. I have the *biggest place in Beijing*. I *have more than 10 properties in Pangu*. I have *two private jets*. I have the *most advanced yachts*. I have *hundreds of race cars*. I have *an apartment like this in New York*. I don't have any material needs anymore.\"). (*See, e.g.,* Vice News, Exiled Chinese Billionaire Uses YouTube to Wage A War On Corruption, YOUTUBE, at 6:38-7:07 (Nov. 15 2017) (emphasis added), hereinafter referred to as the \"Vice News Interview\").\n\nthe Debtor's control of assets, and whose existence and use are necessarily predicated on legal advice. Upon information and belief, the Debtor also has financial interests in myriad associated entities and purported not-for profits run by his family members and close allies. These entities and relationships are summarized in more detail in the Rule 2004 Motions.\n\n29. Numerous third parties, including the Debtor's law firms, accountants and financial firms, have advised the Debtor or related entities and individuals on a number of business deals and other matters concerning assets, liabilities or financial interests potentially relevant to the administration of the Debtor's estate. These professionals likely have information, based on their communications with the Debtor and work they performed at his or others' requests that could be of vital importance to the Trustee's investigation.\n\n30. The Trustee has thus far identified thirteen professional and advisory firms (and the principal of one such firm) that may be in possession or control of information or documents concerning potential assets of the estate, the Debtor's financial condition, and administration of the estate. These firms, each of which is a Discovery Recipient, are listed below:\n\n- **BAKER HOSTETLER LLP** has represented the Debtor in the New York state court litigation involving the Debtor's largest scheduled unsecured creditor, PAX, and is party to an executory engagement letter with the Debtor. *See Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).\n- **BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP** was counsel of record for the Debtor \"in connection with several lawsuits.\" *Guo Wengui v. Schiller*, No. 150001/2019, (Cohen, J.) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2019). The Debtor and Boies Schiller Flexner LLP eventually litigated a fee dispute before an arbitrator.\n- **BROWN RUDNICK LLP** is the Debtor's former chapter 11 counsel and would have assisted the Debtor in drafting his petition, schedules of assets and liabilities, and statement of financial affairs.\n- **CLARK HILL PLC** allegedly represented the Debtor in connection with certain immigration matters. The Debtor has initiated litigation against Clark Hill PLC for breach of contract, among other claims, and seeks approximately \\$50 million in\n\ncompensatory damages. This cause of action is estate property that may provide value to creditors and must be investigated thoroughly by the Trustee.\n\n- **THE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC** is a law firm included in the schedules to the Debtor's *Motion for Entry of an Order Authorizing (I) Employment and Payment of Professionals Utilized in the Ordinary Course, (II) Payment of Prepetition Claims, and (III) Granting Related Relief*, (ECF No. 119). In addition to the Francis Firm PLLC's apparent role as outside counsel to the Debtor or others, **MELISSA B. FRANCIS** is General Counsel to Golden Spring, the \"family office\" of the Debtor,<sup>6</sup> which the Debtor claims pays all of his living expenses.\n- **HODGSON RUSS LLP**, like Baker Hostetler LLP, has represented the Debtor in *Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).\n- **JANOVER LLC** is an accounting and advisory firm included in the schedules to the Debtor's *Motion for Entry of an Order Authorizing (I) Employment and Payment of Professionals Utilized in the Ordinary Course, (II) Payment of Prepetition Claims, and (III) Granting Related Relief*, (ECF No. 119).\n- **LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC** is a formal and informal legal advisor to the Debtor and Debtor-related entities across numerous lawsuits, including acting counsel to Genever (US) in certain New York state court matters and representing the Debtor—at least temporarily—before this Court, among other appearances on behalf of the Debtor and Debtor-related entities in other prepetition litigation. Upon information and belief, Lawall & Mitchell, LLC coordinates legal actions across multiple jurisdictions on behalf of multiple entities likely controlled by the Debtor, all for the benefit of the Debtor.\n- **MATTHEW LEVINE** of Elliott Kwok Levine & Jaroslaw, and formerly of Phillips Nizer LLP, represented Lamp Capital LLC in its capacity as a non-party involved in *Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).\n- **PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON** advised the Debtor regarding the formation of Genever NY, a wholly owned subsidiary of Genever BVI, whose equity is held by the Debtor in his individual capacity. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP (c/o Brad Karp), is the registered agent according to Genever NY's Limited Liability Company Agreement.\n- **PHILLIPS NIZER LLP** represented Lamp Capital LLC in its capacity as a non-party involved in *Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).\n\n<sup>6</sup> *Eastern Profit Corp. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116334, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021).\n\n- **VERDOLINO & LOWEY P.C.** is an accounting firm and was the proposed financial advisor to the debtor-in-possession. *See Debtor's Application for Authorization to Retain and Employ Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. as Financial Advisor*, (ECF No. 90).\n- **WHITMAN BREED ABBOTT & MORGAN LLC** has served as counsel to the Debtor and/or Greenwich Land LLC in connection with the acquisition by the Debtor, or entities controlled by the Debtor, of real property in Connecticut that may be estate assets. A representative of Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan LLC has represented to the Trustee that the firm has represented the Debtor.<sup>7</sup>\n\n#### **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n31. By this Motion, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court enter an order confirming that, upon the Trustee's appointment, control over any attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and other privileges relating to the assets, liabilities, financial status or administration of the estate passed to the Trustee, and that neither the Debtor nor any other Discovery Recipient shall withhold any documents responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas on the basis of any such privilege or attempt to assert any such privilege. A proposed form of order granting the relief requested herein is attached hereto as **Exhibit A** (the \"Proposed Order\").\n\n#### **BASIS FOR RELIEF**\n\n# **I. CONTROL OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PASSES TO CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE ON ISSUES RELATED TO ESTATE ASSETS, DEBTOR'S FINANCIAL CONDITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE**\n\n32. The Supreme Court in *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471\n\nU.S. 343 (1985) (\"*Weintraub*\") addressed the issue of whether, upon appointment of a trustee, control of a corporation's attorney-client privilege passes to the trustee, or remains with the debtor's management. The Court stated that \"[t]he dispute in this case centers on the control of the attorney-client privilege of a corporation in bankruptcy. The Government maintains that the\n\n<sup>7</sup> The professionals associated with the Debtor are more fully explored in the Professionals 2004 Motion (ECF No. 637). The Trustee reserves all rights to supplement the list of professionals included therein.\n\npower to exercise that privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications passes to the\n\nbankruptcy trustee.\" *See Weintraub*, 471 U.S. at 349. 8\n\n33. The Supreme Court highlighted that:\n\n[t]he powers and duties of a bankruptcy trustee are extensive. Upon the commencement of a case in bankruptcy, all corporate property passes to an estate represented by the trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541. The trustee is 'accountable for all property received,' §§ 704(2), 1106(a)(1), and has the duty to maximize the value of the estate, *see* § 704(1). He is directed to investigate the debtor's financial affairs, §§ 704(4), 1106(a)(3), and is empowered to sue officers, directors and other insiders to recover, on behalf of the estate, fraudulent or preferential transfers of the debtor's property, §§ 547(b)(4)(B), 548. Subject to court approval, he may use, sell, or lease property of the estate. § 363(b). . . . As even this brief and incomplete list should indicate, the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wideranging management authority over the debtor…. In contrast, the powers of the debtor's directors are severely limited. Their role is to turn over the corporation's property to the trustee and to provide certain information to the trustee and to the creditors. §§ 521, 343. Congress contemplated that when a trustee is appointed, he assumes control of the business, and the debtor's directors are 'completely ousted.'\n\n*Weintraub*, 471 U.S. at 352-53 (citations omitted).\n\n34. Based on this \"allocation of responsibilities\" under the Bankruptcy Code, the Court found that, in bankruptcy, the trustee steps into the shoes of the corporate debtor for the purposes of controlling privilege, just as the trustee does for management of the corporate debtor more generally. *See id.* at 353-54 (\"[I]t is clear that the trustee plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation's management\" and \"vesting in the trustee control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege most closely comports with the allocation of the waiver power to management outside of bankruptcy without in any way obstructing the careful design of the Bankruptcy Code.\").\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Supreme Court's language here, and throughout the decision, makes clear that it was deciding whether control of the attorney-client privilege passed to the trustee in bankruptcy, not whether there was an exception to the attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy, nor whether filing a bankruptcy case effectuated a waiver of any previously existing privilege, thus allowing the trustee access to previously privileged documents.\n\n35. The Supreme Court noted that it was not opining on the passage of the privilege to a trustee in the case of an individual debtor. Specifically, the Court recognized that, insofar as \"there is no 'management' that controls a solvent individual's attorney-client privilege,\" passage of control of the attorney-client privilege to a trustee for an individual debtor must be premised on another theory. *Id.* at 356.\n\n36. The Supreme Court did not however, suggest that control of the attorney-client privilege should not pass to a trustee for an individual debtor or that the needs of a trustee appointed in the case of an individual debtor would in any way differ from the needs of a trustee for a corporate debtor*.* To the contrary, all of the Supreme Court's detailed citations concerning the role and responsibilities of a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code apply equally to a trustee for an individual as they do to a trustee for a corporate debtor.\n\n37. In the wake *Weintraub*, numerous lower courts have set out to determine when the Bankruptcy Code's allocation of responsibilities as between a trustee and an individual debtor out-of-possession require the individual debtor's control of the attorney-client privilege to pass to a trustee, and when a debtor's interests as an individual (an issue not relevant for a corporation) remain paramount, and therefore favor the debtor's retention of the privilege.\n\n38. With respect to prepetition communications, a significant majority of courts addressing this issue have employed a \"balancing test,\" pursuant to which the court attempts to determine whether the privilege at issue relates most closely to a trustee's rights, obligations and allocation of responsibility under the Bankruptcy Code, or whether the privilege primarily concerns the debtor's interests as an individual. *See, e.g., In re Bame*, 251 B.R. 367, 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000). <sup>9</sup> For the avoidance of doubt, what the courts seek to balance is whether control\n\n<sup>9</sup> As noted by the court in *Bame*, in addition to the more common balancing analysis, a minority of courts have fallen on either extreme, with some holding that \"*per se* an individual's attorney-client privilege as to prepetition\n\nof a privilege should pass to a trustee or remain with the debtor, not whether or not the information is privileged in the first instance. 10\n\n39. As the court explained in *In re Bazemore*, 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998), \"[t]he filing of bankruptcy by an individual debtor requires a determination as to whether anyone else controls the privilege. The inquiry requires balancing the interests of a full and frank discussion in the attorney-client relationship and the harm to the debtor upon a disclosure with the trustee's duty to maximize the value of the debtor's estate and represent the interests of the estate.\" (citing *Weintraub*). *See also In re Foster*, 188 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing *Bazemore* and remanding decision to bankruptcy court to apply balancing test).\n\n40. Similarly, the court in *Bame* characterized the analysis as whether an \"individual debtor's attorney-client privilege as to prepetition communications does transfer to the trustee under certain circumstances, i.e., when on balance the trustee's duties to maximize the value of the estate outweigh the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege and the harm to the debtor of disclosure.\" 251 B.R. at 377. *See also In re Courtney*, 372 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (\"[T]he Court finds that the majority view of striking a balance between the harm to the debtor and the benefit to the estate is a more practical, if also more unpredictable, approach.\"); *In re Tarkington*, No. 10-00012-8-JRL, 2010 WL 1416813, at \\*2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 2, 2010) (\"In the wake of *Weintraub,* courts have generally taken one of three approaches when determining if a trustee's waiver is effective. . . . [the balancing test] appears to the most common.\" (citations omitted)).\n\ncommunications never passes to the trustee\" and some holding that \"*per se* an individuals' attorney-client privileged communications always transfer to the trustee.\" *Bame*, 251 B.R. at 376-77. The trend towards favoring the balancing test and away from either absolute principle has only become more widely accepted in the years since *In re Bame* was decided.\n\n<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, any argument by the Debtor that it will not willingly waive its privileges to grant the Trustee access to these documents is inapposite. No privilege is waived when control of the privilege passes to the Trustee.\n\n41. Courts applying this balancing test routinely find the trustee to control the privilege with regard to documents that may identify and aid in the recovery of assets for the benefit of the estate and creditors or that relate to the administration of the estate. *See, e.g.*, *Bazemore*, 216 B.R. at 1024 (finding that trustee held right to waive attorney client privilege where it sought documents to determine if estate held cause of action); *Bame*, 251 B.R. at 377 (finding in favor of trustee's request to control privilege of individual debtor when seeking discovery of documents in order to recover assets); *In re Horvath*, No. 13-34137, 2015 WL 2195060, at \\*6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 7, 2015) (discovery related to claims on schedule of assets permissible from individual debtor because trustee sought to potentially increase value of debtor's estate, and finding that \"the Trustee is entitled to waive Debtor's attorney-client privilege\" and holding that \"the sole purpose of the Trustee's inquiry is to augment her ability to administer the estate with respect to those assets and to potentially increase the value of Debtor's estate to his creditors\"); *Tarkington*, 2010 WL 1416813, at \\*3 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2010) (\"[U]nder the balancing approach . . . the court will allow the 2004 examination . . . to proceed. The trustee's waiver of attorney-client privilege is valid to the extent that questions asked during the examination pertain to the administration of estate property. No harm will befall the debtor through questions posed to determine if there are assets which would be considered estate property\"); *In re Wittmer*, No. 08-61618, 2011 WL 6000799, at \\*3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2011) (finding \"that the Trustee may waive the attorney-client privilege of the debtors as to the Defendants.\")<sup>11</sup>\n\n<sup>11</sup> For clarity, where the courts speak of the ability to \"waive the attorney-client privilege,\" that is a reference to the ability to control the privilege (the holder has the fundamental right to determine if information remain privileged or not), and not that a trustee's ability to review documents that were privileged is predicated on that privilege having been waived.\n\n42. On the other hand, the balance may tip to an individual debtor retaining control of the privilege when transfer of the privilege might result in great harm \"to or control over [a debtor's] person,\" such as exposure to criminal liability, or where there may be an overriding concern for the chilling effect on attorney-client communications. *See Bazemore*, 216 B.R. at 1025; *Bame,* 251 B.R. at 377 (finding that, in regard to \"most questions the Trustee could ask of counsel,\" trustee controls privilege, but noting that in regard to communications having to do with activities that could lead to criminal charges against debtor \"the balance would probably tip in favor of sustaining assertion of the privilege . . . .\"); *In re Miller*, 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (concluding under balancing test that \"Trustee's assumption of the Debtor's attorney-client privilege could potentially cause the Debtors a great deal of harm, as the Trustee's sole purpose for seeking to waive the Debtors' attorney-client privilege is to use that information directly against them. (i.e., to revoke the Debtors' bankruptcy discharge.\").\n\n### **II. TRUSTEE CONTROLS ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR ALL SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS**\n\n#### **A. Balancing Test Supports Passage of Privilege to Trustee for Prepetition Documents**\n\n43. For any prepetition documents responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas, the balance weighs heavily in favor of control of the attorney-client, work product, and any other applicable privileges passing to the Trustee, as the requested documents relate to the Trustee's core responsibilities to investigate potential estate assets and the Debtor's financial affairs.\n\n44. Specifically, the discovery requests attached to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas seek discovery of documents and communications relating to (i) specific assets and property interests discussed in the Motion (e.g. the *Lady May*, the Condominium, the Greenwich properties, and the various other homes, private jets and other assets associated with the Debtor); (ii) the Debtor's interests in and relationships with other individuals, corporate entities and nonprofits,\n\nwhich may be a source of the Debtor's wealth; and (iii) the Debtor's communications with his counsel and other advisors regarding corporate governance issues and the Debtor's finances and property interests. *See, e.g.*, Debtor 2004 Motion at 12-18.\n\n45. The Trustee needs these documents to explore the clear incongruity between the Debtor's lavish lifestyle (as well as his incessant public boasting about the extent of his wealth and assets) and his identification of a mere \\$3,850 in assets on his schedules in this case. <sup>12</sup> *See* ECF No. 78, at 3–7. Moreover, the public record is replete with evidence that the Debtor has utilized complex legal structures to engage \"in efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members\" and to \"secret[] his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members\" in \"efforts to deceive his creditors.\" *See* Decision and Order on Motion, *Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Feb. 9, 2022), at 1. The Debtor no doubt received advice from counsel as to these issues and, therefore, the documents the Trustee seeks from the Discovery Recipients are likely to be highly relevant to the Trustee's investigation into potential estate assets and the Debtor's finances—*i.e.*, exactly the types of issues on which courts hold the privilege passes to the Trustee. Furthermore, given that existing causes of action initiated by the Debtor are assets of the estate, it is only by granting the Trustee control over the attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product related to those matters that the Trustee can oversee and administer those litigations.\n\n46. On the other side of the scale, the subpoenaed documents are not sought to establish the Debtor's criminality, to restrict his liberty, or to abrogate any right he retains as a debtor-out-of-possession. No request under the Rule 2004 Subpoenas focuses on the Debtor's\n\n<sup>12</sup> *See* ¶ 31, *supra*.\n\nunique rights as an individual or his personal liberty. Each request, rather, is tailored to identify information related to Debtor's assets and financial condition, his relevant business practices, and how he administered his estate. The Trustee's role is not to seek criminal liability for the Debtor, nor to impose onerous restrictions on his freedom or person.<sup>13</sup>\n\n47. That the Debtor may have a different view regarding who owns or controls certain assets is inapposite, and certainly not a basis to give the Debtor control of the attorney-client privilege for responsive documents. Indeed, the fact that serious questions surround the Debtor's self-reporting of his purported assets and the administration of his estate is the primary reason for the appointment of the Trustee. The Debtor cannot claim that because he believes another party owns valuable assets (e.g., his purported belief that his daughter or a company controlled by her owns the *Lady May*) that he is \"adverse\" to the Trustee on the issue and, therefore, can retain control of the attorney-client privilege as to documents related to such assets. The Trustee is aware of no case applying the balancing test that would support such an argument. 14\n\n48. Finally, passing control of the attorney-client privilege to the Trustee, as it relates to the core issues for which the Trustee was appointed, will not in any way chill attorney-client communications. There is nothing unique about the Debtor's communications with his counsel\n\n<sup>13</sup> To the extent that some of the documents the Trustee seeks may reveal evidence of activity in furtherance of a crime or fraud, such documents would likely fall within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and, therefore, would still be discoverable, but this issue is not before the court at this time. *See Bame,* 251 B.R. at 377 (noting that in regard to communications having to do with activities that could lead to criminal charges that **\"**the trustee would have the opportunity to raise the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.\"). *See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum*, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) (\"It is well-established that communications that otherwise would be protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product privilege are not protected if they relate to client communications in furtherance of contemplated or ongoing criminal or fraudulent conduct.\").\n\n<sup>14</sup> To the extent that the Debtor opposes the investigation and discovery of potential assets of the estate, such opposition is contrary to the Debtor's duty to cooperate with the Trustee and assist the Trustee in administering the estate and locating estate assets. *See In re McCourt*, 12 B.R. 587, 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (\"The trustee in bankruptcy draws upon Code § 521(2), which directs a debtor to 'cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under . . . (Title 11 of the Act).'\") (alterations in original). The Trustee reserves all rights in this regard.\n\nthat differentiate it from the numerous cases cited herein where bankruptcy courts, in applying the balancing test, have not found passage of the privilege to a trustee to be outweighed by a chilling effect on attorney-client communications. *See, e.g.*, *Bazemore*, 216 B.R. at 1024 (applying balancing test and holding trustee's interest in investigating assets outweighed any potential chilling effect or harm to individual debtor).\n\n#### **B. Privilege Passes to Trustee for Post-Petition Documents Related to Administration of Debtor's Estate**\n\n49. For privileged documents created *post-petition*, but prior to the appointment of the Trustee, when the Debtor served as a debtor-in-possession, courts do not apply a balancing test. Rather, the privilege over such documents passes to the Trustee automatically when the Trustee takes over administration of the estate. *See Bame*, 251 B.R. at 375 (\"I find that the attorney-client privilege has passed to the Trustee with respect to communications between Kennedy & Graven and the Debtor during the period that the Debtor served as the DIP as to all matters having to do with administration of the estate, including, in particular, disclosure and recovery of assets.\"); *In re Eddy*, 304 B.R. 591, 599 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (\"[T]he debtor in possession has a duty to preserve any claims against third parties that might benefit the bankruptcy estate. While the debtor in possession retains control over the attorney-client privilege during his/her stewardship, that control must be exercised consistent with the debtor's fiduciary duties. If a Chapter 11 case is converted to Chapter 7 case, the appointed Chapter 7 trustee['s] . . . powers include the power to waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications incident to the performance of the duties of the debtor in possession.\"). As applied here, the Trustee automatically succeeds to any attorney-client or work product privileges that may have attached to his communications with Brown Rudnick LLP (or any other counsel who may have advised him in relation to this case), and to any documents in such\n\ncounsel's possession. The same is true for any potentially privileged documents in the files of the Debtor's proposed financial advisor, Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.\n\n## **III. ANY ARGUMENT BY DEBTOR IN FAVOR OF BLANKET RULE ALLOWING DEBTOR TO RETAIN ALL PRIVILEGES SHOULD BE REJECTED**\n\n50. Any argument that the Debtor \"retains control of *all* of his or her attorney-client and attorney-work product privileges that existed before the Trustee's appointment\" is not availing. *See* Debtor's Limited Objection at 3 (emphasis added). While not explicitly advocating such a position, the Debtor implies that the Court should consider such a finding, citing a noncontrolling outlier case, *Gottlieb v. Fayerman (In re Ginzburg)*, 517 B.R. 175 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014). Neither *Ginzburg*, nor any other authority, supports this outcome.\n\n51. In *Ginzburg*, a Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding to set aside a debtor's alleged fraudulent conveyance of interest in real property to his estranged wife and sought discovery of communications between the debtor and his divorce attorney. *Id.* at 177-78. The court, balancing the policy underlying the privilege versus the estate's needs, initially rejected the debtor's claim to attorney-client privilege. *Id.* 178. Upon reconsideration, however, the court reversed course and, citing to *Swidler & Berlin v. United States*, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998) (\"*Swidler*\"), held that the balancing test was inappropriate for purposes of determining control of the attorney-client privilege. *See id.* at 181.<sup>15</sup>\n\n52. *Swidler*, however, dictates no such result, and therefore the *Ginzburg* court's decision was fundamentally flawed. The Supreme Court in *Swidler* addressed whether there should be a posthumous exception to the attorney-client privilege for a third party (a grand jury)\n\n<sup>15</sup> The vast majority of cases dealing with a trustee for an individual debtor's control of the attorney-client privilege decided following *Swidler* not only do not follow *Ginzburg*'s analysis, but in fact, do not find *Swidler* applicable at all, and rather are guided by a case-by-case balancing test weighing the potential for harm to the individual debtor against the trustee's duty to maximize the estate. *See, e.g.*, *Bame*, 251 B.R. 367; *Tarkington*, 2010 WL 1416813; *Wittmer*, 2011 WL 6000799; *Horvath*, 2015 WL 2195060, all cited *supra*.\n\nwhere \"the client has died and the information is relevant to a criminal proceeding.\" *Swidler*, 524 U.S. 399 at 403. The Supreme Court did not consider when the attorney-client privilege passes to a trustee, or to any other successor in interest. Rather, its focus was on an independent counsel's request that a new exception to the attorney-client privilege be created to allow a thirdparty access to previously privileged information.\n\n53. While the Supreme Court in *Swidler* noted that it has \"rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours of the privilege,\" here, unlike in *Swidler*, the Trustee is not attempting to define the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Rather, the relevant inquiry is *whether control of that privilege has passed to a trustee*. That a balancing test should not be used to determine the *scope* of the attorney-client privilege does not mean that a court may not compare the interests of a debtor-out-of-possession and a trustee to determine who *controls* that privilege following the trustee's appointment in bankruptcy. 16\n\n## **IV. ANY ARGUMENT BY DEBTOR THAT DOCUMENTS ARE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY JOINT DEFENSE OR COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGES FAILS**\n\n54. The Debtor has also stated that joint defense or common interest privileges apply to certain litigations and other matters concerning property that the Trustee believes is owned by the estate, and accordingly, the Debtor has intimated that he may withhold or direct counsel to withhold, the production of documents on such purported bases. This is not the law.\n\n55. To the extent the Debtor claims to be asserting the attorney-client privilege to protect a confidential communication made to, or by, a codefendant's lawyer related to the defense of both defendants, compliance with the subpoena would not waive any such common\n\n<sup>16</sup> To the extent the Debtor argues that the court in *Ginzburg* understood *Swidler* to hold that due to the importance of the attorney-client privilege, control of the privilege cannot pass to a trustee, such a ruling would inherently mean that *Weintraub* is no longer good law, a position that no court, including *Ginzburg*, which cites to *Weintraub*, has suggested.\n\ninterest or joint-defense privilege. As any such interest in the privilege has passed to the Trustee, the common-interest or joint-defense relationship remains intact, and, thus, passage of control of the privilege will not effectuate a waiver of the privilege. Accordingly, there is no basis to withhold documents, either based on the Debtor's improper assertion of a privilege it no longer holds, or on behalf of the other party to the relationship.\n\n56. Furthermore, bankruptcy courts have typically refused to enforce joint defense agreements if doing so would limit the ability of an appointed trustee to investigate parties' dealings. For example, in *In re Ginn-LA St. Lucie Ltd., LLLP*, the court held that\n\nWhile the [joint defense agreement] might indeed further the presumed intent of the parties, its enforcement in this matter risks frustrating the Trustee's statutory duty to investigate the financial affairs of the Debtors while providing special protection to those who allegedly controlled the Debtors prior to the Petition Date. The ability of such provisions to shield wrongdoers at the expense of a debtor's creditors renders their enforcement in bankruptcy proceedings against public policy.\n\n439 B.R. 801, 805-806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) (Chapter 7 trustee moved to compel compliance with demands for turnover of documents related to legal representation provided by law firms to debtors). *See also In re Mirant Corp.*, 326 B.R. 646, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (\"In a bankruptcy case, the need for investigation is far more acute than is any concern for attorneyclient communications.\").\n\n57. Similarly, in *Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc.*, a trustee was appointed to oversee the liquidation of a corporation in a Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) proceeding. 213 B.R. 433, 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). In deciding whether the trustee could waive a purported joint defense agreement prior to filing suit, the court said, \"I believe that where, as here, a trustee is conducting an investigation as to the factual underpinning and scope of identifiable claims, he or she is adverse to the putative defendants. The trustee should not be stymied in uncovering the facts by the existence of a joint defense privilege which would\n\nevaporate were he or she only to file a complaint.\" *Id.* (internal citation omitted). The court further stated that \"a joint defense privilege is waived where two parties, previously members to a valid joint defense agreement, subsequently find themselves facing each other as adversaries in litigation.\" *Id.* at 439.\n\n\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\n\n58. The Trustee's Rule 2004 requests for documents related to his investigation of the estate's assets, liabilities, financial status and administration are critical to his ability to understand the true state of the Debtor's estate. Control over any attorney-client privilege tied to such documents and communications has passed to the Trustee, along with his rights and responsibilities for these areas under the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, neither the Debtor, nor his counsel, should be permitted to withhold any documents based on an assertion of privilege that the Debtor no longer controls.\n\n#### **NO PRIOR REQUEST**\n\n59. The Trustee has not previously sought the relief requested herein from this or any other court.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests entry of the\n\nProposed Order granting the relief requested in this Motion and such other relief as is just and\n\nproper.\n\nDated: August 22, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett *(pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft *(pro hac vice* pending) Douglass Barron (*pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 777 Filed 08/22/22 Entered 08/22/22 23:48:40 Page 26 of 30\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n**Proposed Order**\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x                                            |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11                         |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                                | :<br>:<br>Case No.<br>22-50073<br>(JAM)<br>: |  |\n| Debtor.                                                     | :<br>:                                       |  |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x                                            |  |\n\n# **ORDER (A) PROVIDING THAT CONTROL OF ANY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION, AND OTHER PRIVILEGES RELATED TO RULE 2004 SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS PASSED TO TRUSTEE UPON APPOINTMENT, (B) DIRECTING THAT DEBTOR AND OTHER EXAMINEES NOT WITHHOLD DOCUMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH PRIVILEGES, AND (C) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF**\n\nUpon the motion (the \"Motion\") of Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), for the entry of an order (this \"Order\"), pursuant to sections 323, 521, 541, and 1108 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"), rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\"), and the Court's orders granting the Trustee's motions for examination pursuant to Rule 2004, (a) confirming that the Trustee owns and controls the attorney-client privilege, work product protection and other privileges on issues related to the Debtor's assets and financial affairs and the administration of his estate, (b) directing that the Discovery Recipients not withhold documents from the Trustee on account of any such privileges in responding to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas, 1 or attempt to assert any such privileges that are properly owned by the Trustee and (c) granting related relief, all as more fully set forth\n\n<sup>1</sup> Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Motion.\n\nin the Motion; and this Court having jurisdiction to consider the Motion and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the *Standing Order of Reference* from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (as amended); and consideration of the Motion and the relief requested therein being a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); and venue being proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and the Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interest of the Estate, its creditors, and all parties in interest; and due and sufficient notice of the Motion having been given under the particular circumstances; and it appearing that no other or further notice need be given; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and any objections to the relief requested herein having been withdrawn or overruled on the merits; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby ORDERED THAT:\n\n1. The Motion is granted as set forth herein.\n\n2. Control of any attorney-client privilege, work product protection, or any related privilege or protection, arising under any applicable law, concerning the documents and information requested in the attachments to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas (the \"Requested Materials\") passed to the Trustee.\n\n3. Neither the Debtor nor his counsel (based on instructions from the Debtor or otherwise), nor any other examinee, is entitled to withhold any of the Requested Materials on the basis of the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, or any related privilege or protection.\n\n4. Neither the Debtor nor his counsel (based on instructions from the Debtor or otherwise), nor any other examinee, shall interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the authority under this Order.\n\n5. The Trustee is authorized and empowered to take all actions necessary to effectuate the relief granted in this Order.\n\n6. The terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry.\n\n7. This Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order.\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ______________________________________x            |   |                            |\n|----------------------------------------------------|---|----------------------------|\n|                                                    | : |                            |\n| In re:                                             | : | CHAPTER 11                 |\n|                                                    | : |                            |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                       | : | CASE NO. 22-50073<br>(JAM) |\n|                                                    | : |                            |\n| Debtor.<br>______________________________________x | : |                            |\n|                                                    |   |                            |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on August 22, 2022 the foregoing Motion and proposed Order was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing pursuant to the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.\n\nDated: August 22, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\n# New Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: /s/ *James C. Graham* Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) James C. Graham (ct06064) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 dskalka@npmlaw.com jgraham@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分庭\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　:\n:　案号 22-50073\n(JAM)\n债务人。1　:\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n第11章受托人关于申请作出命令的动议：（A）规定与根据规则2004传唤的文件有关的任何律师—当事人保密特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权于受托人获任命时移转给受托人；（B）指示债务人及其他受询问人不得以该等特权为由扣留文件；以及（C）准予相关救济\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯）以其在Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）的第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份，现根据《美国法典》第11编（以下简称“破产法典”）第323、521、541及1108条、《联邦破产程序规则》（以下简称“规则”）第2004条，以及本院准予受托人根据规则2004提出的询问动议的命令，提出本动议（以下简称“本动议”），请求作出命令，确认受托人控制原由债务人持有的某些特权，并指示债务人及其他受询问人不得基于任何该等特权而拒绝向受托人提供文件或信息，亦不得试图主张任何依法应由受托人享有的该等特权。为支持本动议，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n1 尽管债务人的法定姓名为Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵），其亦被称为Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名。债务人纳税人识别号的末四位为9595。\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 根据本院准予受托人关于规则2004取证的动议的命令，受托人已向债务人以及众多曾在本案管理过程中或就其他非破产事项代理其事务的律师事务所及其他专业顾问送达传票（统称“取证对象”）。2 受托人向取证对象寻求的信息对其调查至关重要，因为有大量证据表明，债务人可能曾试图将其最有价值的资产置于债权人追索范围之外——包括通过使用空壳公司和所谓信托，以及在其家庭成员及其他受其信任的同谋者协助或串通下进行。债务人不可能在没有律师及其他专业人士的建议和指导下设计并实施这些安排及相关交易。因此，只有取得这些信息，受托人方能全面调查并了解债务人资产及财务事务的真实范围和性质。\n\n2. 然而，债务人采取的立场是，其可能试图援引律师—当事人保密特权、工作成果原则或其他特权或保护，以阻止受托人取得部分或全部该等信息。债务人的立场无法律依据。相反，法律明确规定，受托人一经获任命，与债务人的资产、负债、财务状况及其破产财产管理有关的文件和通信所附随的任何特权的控制权即移转给受托人，债务人不得再主张该等特权。\n\n2 就本动议而言，取证对象包括债务人及作为债务人针对该等当事人提出的规则2004动议对象的14家专业机构。参见第11章受托人根据《破产规则》第2004条及地方法则第2004-1条提出的综合动议，请求作出命令授权就债务人的各类法律及财务顾问进行取证（ECF No. 637）。\n\n3. 破产法院经常作出命令，确认受托人在此方面的权利和权限。具体而言，在确定特权控制权何时移转给受托人（而非继续由作为占有中债务人的个人债务人保有）时，绝大多数法院适用了利益衡量标准，考量该特权所涉事项是否更多地与受托人的权利和职责有关——例如与债务人的资产、财务或破产财产管理有关的事项——抑或涉及债务人个人的其他利益，例如与其人身自由、潜在刑事责任或对其人身的控制有关的问题。\n\n4. 在法院将该利益衡量标准适用于本案所涉规则2004传票所要求的文件等文件的几乎每一案件中——即直接涉及受托人为识别和追回潜在破产财产资产所作努力、其了解债务人财务事务所作努力，或债务人破产财产管理的文件——法院均认定受托人控制与该等文件有关的特权。本院亦应得出同一结论：受托人已承继债务人就受托人所要求的文件和信息控制适用特权的权利，3 且债务人没有依据援引任何特权以拒绝提供该等文件和信息，或指示其他取证对象（例如其现任或前任律师）如此行事。\n\n5. 因此，受托人通过本动议请求作出一项命令，采用随附本动议并列为附件A的形式，确认：(i) 受托人享有并控制与债务人的资产、财务事务及其破产财产管理有关事项的律师—当事人保密特权、工作成果保护及其他适用特权或保护；以及(ii) 取证对象不得基于任何该等特权而向受托人扣留文件或信息。\n\n3 如债务人持有与该等事项无关且不响应规则2004传票的享有特权的文件，则目前无需决定由谁控制该特权。\n\n管辖权、审判地及法定依据\n\n6. 美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院（以下简称“本院”）根据28 U.S.C. §§ 157和1334，以及美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院作出的移送常设命令（经修订），对本事项具有管辖权。本事项构成28 U.S.C. § 157(b)所称的核心程序。\n\n7. 根据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408和1409，本地区为适当审判地。\n\n8. 本文所请求救济的法定依据为破产法典第323、521、541及1108条和规则2004。\n\n程序状况\n\n9. 2022年2月15日（以下简称“申请日”），债务人向本院提交了根据破产法典第11章申请救济的自愿申请书。\n\n10. 2022年3月21日，美国受托人在债务人的第11章案件（以下简称“第11章案件”）中任命了无担保债权人正式委员会（以下简称“委员会”）。第11章案件中尚未任命审查员。\n\n11. 2022年6月15日，本院作出决定备忘录及命令（ECF No. 465）（以下简称“受托人命令”），指示美国受托人在第11章案件中任命第11章受托人。根据受托人命令，美国受托人选定Luc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯）担任受托人。\n\n12. 受托人命令在相关部分裁定，“与驳回或转换程序相比，债务人财务事务的复杂性以及本案缺乏独立管理监督，足以支持任命一名第11章受托人，该受托人能够为债权人和破产财产的利益调查、识别和定位债务人的资产”，并且“第11章受托人应履行11 U.S.C. § 1106规定的全部职责。”（参见受托人命令第15-16、18页。）\n\n13. 受托人命令进一步裁定，“任命第11章受托人还将有助于有效调查债务人的资产、负债及财务事务”，并“使第11章受托人能够调查债务人的资产、负债及财务事务，并确保遵守协议命令的规定。”（参见同上，第14、18页。）\n\n14. 2022年7月8日，本院作出命令，准予在第11章案件中任命Luc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯）为受托人（ECF No. 523）（以下简称“任命命令”）。\n\n15. 2022年7月28日，受托人提交了三项相关动议：(i) 第11章受托人根据《破产规则》第2004条及地方法则第2004-1条提出的动议，请求作出命令授权对Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）进行询问并提供文件（ECF No. 636）（以下简称“债务人2004动议”）；(ii) 第11章受托人根据《破产规则》第2004条及地方法则第2004-1条提出的综合动议，请求作出命令授权就债务人的各类法律及财务顾问进行取证（ECF No. 637）（以下简称“专业人士2004动议”）；以及(iii) 第11章受托人根据《破产规则》第2004条及地方法则第2004-1条提出的综合动议，请求作出命令授权就与债务人有关联的各实体及个人进行取证（ECF No. 638）（以下简称“第三方动议”，并与债务人2004动议及专业人士2004动议合称“规则2004动议”），其附有“规则2004传票”。\n\n16. 2022年8月2日，受托人的律师与债务人的律师就有关规则2004动议的有限问题通过电话会议进行了会商（以下简称“8月2日会商”）。在会商期间，债务人的律师表示，尽管规则2004传票仅限于受托人权利和义务的核心事项，包括识别和调查破产财产的资产、财务状况及管理，但若本院未作出裁定，其认为债务人很可能会以债务人而非受托人控制相关特权为由，试图扣留可能具有响应性的文件。受托人的律师明确表示，其看不出债务人有任何依据主张所要求信息的律师—当事人保密特权控制权未移转给受托人，并要求，如债务人知悉任何该等文件，或知悉债务人主张该等特权的任何依据，应立即向受托人说明该等问题，以避免任何延误。就债务人而言，其律师建议，本院应在日后发生有关特权的争议之前，就特权问题提供指引。\n\n17. 2022年8月5日，Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）就专业人士2004动议提交了答复及保留权利声明（ECF No. 698）（以下简称“Brown Rudnick答复”）。Brown Rudnick答复“承认，受托人通常已承继债务人的特权，包括律师—当事人保密特权。”（参见ECF No. 698第2页。）尽管如此，Brown Rudnick答复“保留就任何特定取证请求提出异议的一切权利”，包括“对第三方负有的保密义务。”（参见ECF No. 698第2-3页。）\n\n18. 2022年8月5日，Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（韦尔多利诺及洛伊律师事务所）就债务人的专业人士2004动议提交了答复及保留权利声明（ECF No. 699）（以下简称“Verdolino & Lowey答复”）。Verdolino & Lowey答复与Brown Rudnick答复相同，“承认，受托人通常已承继债务人的特权，包括律师—当事人保密特权。”（参见ECF No. 699第2页。）然而，Verdolino & Lowey答复也与Brown Rudnick答复相同，“保留就任何特定取证请求提出异议的一切权利”，并指出，“文件的提供及询问可能适当地受到某些法律或伦理限制的约束……[该等限制]可能受本院进一步命令的约束。”（同上。）\n\n19. 2022年8月5日，债务人就Rule 2004动议提交了有限异议（ECF No. 703）（“债务人的有限异议”），指出债务人的立场是，与Rule 2004动议相关的律师—当事人特权控制权在法律上存在歧义，并且是“留待日后解决的问题”。见债务人的有限异议第2页（援引债务人Rule 2004动议第15-16页；专业人士Rule 2004动议第19-20页）。债务人的律师、Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所）的Aaron Romney（阿伦·罗姆尼）提交了支持债务人有限异议的声明（ECF No. 732）（“Romney声明”），反映出债务人的立场，即应在“合理的时间表内以综合方式”将律师—当事人特权控制权问题提交“法院”处理。（Romney声明第4页）。\n\n20. 2022年8月10日，受托人提交了支持Rule 2004动议的答复（ECF. No. 724）（“受托人的答复”），重申受托人对债务人特权的所有权是法院应尽快解决的关键问题。（见ECF No. 724第4页注2）。受托人的答复表明，其拟在不久的将来将该问题提交法院审理。（同上）。\n\n21. 2022年8月12日，法院就Rule 2004动议举行听证，并指示受托人就Rule 2004动议提交修订后的拟议命令。（见ECF No. 742）。在听证会上，受托人的律师明确表示，由于债务人似将以特权控制权存在歧义为由，对拟议Rule 2004传票所要求提供的答复性文件主张特权，受托人拟就这些问题向法院寻求裁定。（听证记录第15:12-15页）。Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）作为债务人的前任律师，同意该等裁定将极具帮助。（听证记录第20:19-21页）。\n\n22. 2022年8月16日，法院准予Rule 2004动议，授权分别进行审查并送达文件请求。（准予第11章受托人关于就债务人的各法律及财务顾问进行Rule 2004取证申请的命令（ECF No. 756）、准予第11章受托人关于对Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）进行Rule 2004审查申请的命令（ECF No. 757），以及准予第11章受托人关于就与债务人有关联的各实体及个人进行Rule 2004取证申请的命令（ECF No. 756）（上述三项命令合称“Rule 2004命令”））。\n\n23. 受托人现已向Rule 2004动议的当事方送达，或正在送达，附于Rule 2004动议的传票。\n\n24. 鉴于法院已准予Rule 2004动议，且各方就有关债务人资产、负债及财务状况以及破产财产管理的文件之特权控制权是否已移转给受托人存在分歧，本动议现已适宜由法院审理，以防止因无正当理由扣留答复性文件而造成延误。\n\n事实背景\n\n25. 债务人的清单列明，对其提出的无担保债权合计约为\\$374 million（见ECF No. 78，第1页，下称“债务人清单”）。Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙）（“PAX”）主张的\\$261 million债权，是目前债务人清单所列无担保债权中数额最大的单项债权。（见同上，所附附表F）。债务人清单还列明一项金额不明、据称属于Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司）（“Golden Spring”）的有担保债权；该实体据称由债务人的儿子Qiang Guo（郭强）（“儿子”或“Qiang”）所有。（见同上，所附附表D）。该债权据称以“[c]ertain claims and recoveries thereto”为担保，并被主张系因一项“Litigation Funding Agreement”而产生。\n\n26. 债务人的清单仅列明\\$3,850.4的资产（见同上第3-7页）。与有关其众多商业利益的广泛报道及其自称拥有非凡财富的说法相反，债务人主张其没有任何收入，其开支由Golden Spring支付（见同上第1页；另见ECF No. 107第¶17段，下称“债务人声明”）。\n\n27. New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）已认定，债务人曾“通过将其大量个人资产存放于一系列公司、受信任的知己及家庭成员名下，试图逃避并欺骗其债权人”，并且已“将其资产隐藏于由公司实体和家庭成员构成的迷宫之中”。见关于动议的裁定及命令，Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok，Index No. 652077/2017（N.Y. Sup. Feb. 9, 2022），第1页。\n\n28. 债务人的Rule 2004动议（ECF No. 636）更详尽地列出了已知的、与债务人有关联的实体网络，以及其可能隐藏于该等实体中的潜在资产。许多该等实体似乎属于旨在混淆债务人对资产控制权的复杂法律架构的一部分，其存在和使用必然以法律意见为基础。据所知并确信，债务人还在由其家庭成员和亲密盟友经营的无数关联实体及据称为非营利组织的实体中拥有财务权益。Rule 2004动议对该等实体及关系作了更详细的概述。\n\n4 债务人将若干资产列为价值不明，包括存在争议的未注册版权和诉讼请求权。（见债务人清单第6页）。\n\n5 “对于过去九个月我所做的事情，我绝对不后悔。我拥有世界上每个人都梦想拥有的富裕生活。我在香港有最大的房子，数千平方米。我在伦敦有最豪华的公寓。我在北京有最大的住所。我在盘古有10多处房产。我有两架私人飞机。我有最先进的游艇。我有数百辆赛车。我在纽约也有这样一套公寓。我已经没有任何物质需求了。”）（见，例如，Vice News（Vice新闻），Exiled Chinese Billionaire Uses YouTube to Wage A War On Corruption，YOUTUBE，第6:38-7:07分钟（Nov. 15 2017）（着重号为原文所加），下称“Vice News采访”）。\n\n29. 众多第三方，包括债务人的律师事务所、会计师事务所和金融公司，曾就多项商业交易及其他涉及资产、负债或财务利益的事项向债务人或相关实体和个人提供意见；该等事项可能与债务人破产财产的管理相关。这些专业人士很可能基于其与债务人的沟通，以及其应债务人或他人要求所完成的工作，掌握对受托人调查至关重要的信息。\n\n30. 受托人迄今已确定十三家专业及咨询公司（以及其中一家公司的负责人），该等公司可能持有或控制有关破产财产潜在资产、债务人财务状况及破产财产管理的信息或文件。该等公司均为取证接收方，列示如下：\n\nBAKER HOSTETLER LLP（贝克·霍斯泰特勒律师事务所）曾在涉及债务人最大已列无担保债权人PAX的纽约州法院诉讼中代理债务人，并且是与债务人签订的尚未履行的委托函的当事方。见Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok，Index No. 652077/2017（N.Y. Sup. Ct.）。\n\nBOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP（博伊斯·席勒·弗莱克斯纳律师事务所）是债务人“就若干诉讼事项”的备案律师。Guo Wengui v. Schiller，No. 150001/2019，（Cohen, J.）（N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2019）。债务人与Boies Schiller Flexner LLP最终在仲裁员面前就律师费争议进行了诉讼。\n\nBROWN RUDNICK LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）是债务人此前的第11章律师，并应曾协助债务人起草其申请书、资产和负债清单以及财务状况说明书。\n\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）据称曾就某些移民事务代理债务人。债务人已就违约及其他请求对Clark Hill PLC提起诉讼，并寻求约\\$50 million的补偿性损害赔偿。该诉因属于破产财产，可能为债权人提供价值，并须由受托人进行彻底调查。\n\nTHE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所）是一家列入债务人《关于授权（一）聘用及支付在正常业务过程中使用的专业人士、（二）支付申请前债权及（三）给予相关救济之命令的动议》附件清单中的律师事务所（ECF No. 119）。除Francis Firm PLLC显然作为债务人或其他人的外部律师所发挥的作用外，MELISSA B. FRANCIS（梅丽莎·B·弗朗西斯）还是Golden Spring这一债务人“家族办公室”的总法律顾问，6 债务人称该实体支付其全部生活开支。\n\nHODGSON RUSS LLP（霍奇森·拉斯律师事务所）与Baker Hostetler LLP一样，曾在Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok，Index No. 652077/2017（N.Y. Sup. Ct.）中代理债务人。\n\nJANOVER LLC（贾诺弗有限责任公司）是一家列入债务人《关于授权（一）聘用及支付在正常业务过程中使用的专业人士、（二）支付申请前债权及（三）给予相关救济之命令的动议》附件清单中的会计及咨询公司（ECF No. 119）。\n\nLAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC（拉沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司）是债务人及与债务人相关实体在众多诉讼中的正式和非正式法律顾问，包括在某些纽约州法院事项中担任Genever (US)的代理律师，并且至少暂时在本法院代理债务人；其还曾在其他申请前诉讼中代表债务人及与债务人相关的实体出庭。据所知并确信，Lawall & Mitchell, LLC代表多个很可能由债务人控制的实体，协调跨多个司法辖区的法律行动，均为债务人之利益而进行。\n\nMATTHEW LEVINE（马修·莱文），Elliott Kwok Levine & Jaroslaw（艾略特·郭·莱文与雅罗斯拉夫律师事务所）的律师、此前为Phillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所）的律师，曾在Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok，Index No. 652077/2017（N.Y. Sup. Ct.）中，作为涉案非当事方Lamp Capital LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）的代理人代表该公司。\n\nPAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON（保尔、魏斯、里夫金德、沃顿与加里森律师事务所）曾就设立Genever NY向债务人提供意见；Genever NY是Genever BVI的全资子公司，其股权由债务人以个人身份持有。根据Genever NY的有限责任公司协议，Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP（c/o Brad Karp（布拉德·卡普））是其注册代理人。\n\nPHILLIPS NIZER LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所）曾在Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok，Index No. 652077/2017（N.Y. Sup. Ct.）中，作为涉案非当事方Lamp Capital LLC的代理人代表该公司。\n\n6 Eastern Profit Corp. v. Strategic Vision US LLC，2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116334，第\\*4页（S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021）。\n\nVERDOLINO & LOWEY P.C.（韦尔多利诺与洛伊会计师事务所）是一家会计师事务所，并曾被提议担任占有债务人的财务顾问。见债务人关于授权聘用Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.担任财务顾问的申请，（ECF No. 90）。\n\nWHITMAN BREED ABBOTT & MORGAN LLC（惠特曼·布里德·阿伯特与摩根有限责任公司）曾就债务人或债务人控制的实体收购康涅狄格州可能属于破产财产的房地产，担任债务人和/或Greenwich Land LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）的律师。Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan LLC的一名代表已向受托人表示，该事务所曾代理债务人。7\n\n请求的救济\n\n31. 受托人通过本动议，谨请法院作出命令，确认在受托人获任命时，与破产财产的资产、负债、财务状况或管理有关的任何律师—客户特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权已移交受托人；债务人及任何其他证据开示接收方均不得以任何该等特权为由扣留对Rule 2004传票具有回应性的任何文件，亦不得试图主张任何该等特权。准许本动议所请求救济的拟议命令格式作为附件A（“拟议命令”）随附于此。\n\n救济依据\n\n一、就与破产财产资产、债务人财务状况及破产财产管理有关的问题，律师—客户特权的控制权移交第11章受托人\n\n32. 美国联邦最高法院（Supreme Court）在Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)（“Weintraub”）一案中审理了这样一个问题：在任命受托人后，公司律师—客户特权的控制权是否移交受托人，还是仍由债务人的管理层保留。法院称：“[本案争议的核心是破产公司律师—客户特权的控制权。政府主张，对于破产前通信，行使该特权的权力移交破产受托人。]”见Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349。8\n\n7 与债务人有关联的专业人士在《专业人士2004动议》（ECF No. 637）中有更为详尽的论述。受托人保留补充其中所列专业人士名单的一切权利。\n\n33. 美国联邦最高法院强调：\n\n“[破产受托人的权力和职责广泛。破产案件开始后，所有公司财产均转入由受托人代表的破产财产。11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541。受托人须‘对收到的所有财产负责’，§§ 704(2), 1106(a)(1)，并负有最大化破产财产价值的职责，见§ 704(1)。受托人被指示调查债务人的财务事务，§§ 704(4), 1106(a)(3)，并有权代表破产财产起诉高级职员、董事及其他内部人士，以追回债务人财产的欺诈性或优先性转让，§§ 547(b)(4)(B), 548。经法院批准，受托人可以使用、出售或出租破产财产。§ 363(b)。……即使这份简短且不完整的清单也应表明，《破产法》赋予受托人对债务人的广泛管理权限……相比之下，债务人董事的权力受到严重限制。他们的职责是将公司的财产移交受托人，并向受托人及债权人提供某些信息。§§ 521, 343。国会设想，在受托人获任命时，其接管企业的控制权，而债务人的董事被‘完全排除在外。’”\n\nWeintraub, 471 U.S. at 352-53（引文省略）。\n\n34. 基于《破产法》下的这种“职责分配”，法院认定，在破产程序中，为控制特权之目的，受托人取代公司债务人的地位，正如受托人在更一般意义上管理公司债务人时所做的一样。见id. at 353-54（“[显然，受托人所扮演的角色最接近于有偿付能力公司的管理层”以及“将公司律师—客户特权的控制权赋予受托人，最符合将破产程序外的放弃权赋予管理层的职责分配，同时丝毫不会妨碍《破产法》的周密设计。”）。\n\n8 美国联邦最高法院在此处以及在其判决全文中的措辞清楚表明，其所裁决的是在破产程序中律师—客户特权的控制权是否移交受托人，而不是破产程序中是否存在律师—客户特权的例外，也不是提交破产案件是否导致放弃任何先前存在的特权，从而允许受托人查阅先前受特权保护的文件。\n\n35. 美国联邦最高法院指出，其并未就个人债务人案件中特权向受托人的移交发表意见。具体而言，法院承认，由于“并不存在控制有偿付能力个人之律师—客户特权的‘管理层’”，个人债务人的律师—客户特权控制权移交受托人必须以另一理论为基础。Id. at 356。\n\n36. 然而，美国联邦最高法院并未暗示个人债务人的律师—客户特权控制权不应移交受托人，亦未暗示在个人债务人案件中获任命的受托人的需求会以任何方式不同于公司债务人受托人的需求。恰恰相反，美国联邦最高法院关于《破产法》下受托人角色和职责的所有详细引述，对个人受托人与对公司债务人受托人同样适用。\n\n37. 在Weintraub之后，众多下级法院着手确定：在受托人与未占有财产的个人债务人之间，《破产法》对职责的分配何时要求个人债务人对律师—客户特权的控制权移交受托人；以及债务人作为个人的利益（与公司无关的问题）何时仍具有优先地位，因而有利于债务人保留该特权。\n\n38. 关于申请破产前的通信，就此问题作出裁判的绝大多数法院采用了“利益衡量检验”，法院据此试图确定所涉特权是否与受托人在《破产法》下的权利、义务及职责分配最为密切相关，还是该特权主要涉及债务人作为个人的利益。见，例如，In re Bame, 251 B.R. 367, 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000)。9 为避免疑义，法院所寻求衡量的是特权的控制权应移交受托人还是由债务人保留，而不是该信息最初是否享有特权。10\n\n39. 如In re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998)一案法院所解释，“个人债务人提交破产申请后，需要确定是否有其他人控制该特权。该审查要求在律师—客户关系中充分坦诚讨论的利益、披露对债务人造成的损害，与受托人最大化债务人破产财产价值并代表破产财产利益的职责之间进行衡量。”（引Weintraub）。另见In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999)（引Bazemore，并将案件发回破产法院适用利益衡量检验）。\n\n40. 同样，Bame案法院将该分析概括为，在某些情形下，“个人债务人就申请破产前通信所享有的律师—客户特权确实移交受托人，即，当受托人最大化破产财产价值的职责，经衡量后超过律师—客户特权所依据的政策及披露对债务人造成的损害时。”251 B.R. at 377。另见In re Courtney, 372 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007)（“[法院认定，在对债务人造成的损害与破产财产所获利益之间进行衡量的多数观点，是一种更为实际、即使也更难预测的方法。”）；In re Tarkington, No. 10-00012-8-JRL, 2010 WL 1416813, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 2, 2010)（“在Weintraub之后，法院在确定受托人放弃是否有效时，通常采取三种方法之一。……[利益衡量检验]似乎最为常见。”（引文省略））。\n\n9 如Bame案法院所指出，除较为常见的利益衡量分析外，少数法院采取了两个极端立场之一，一些法院认为“个人就申请破产前通信所享有的律师—客户特权当然绝不移交受托人”，另一些法院则认为“个人享有特权的律师—客户通信当然始终移交受托人。”Bame, 251 B.R. at 376-77。自In re Bame作出裁决以来，倾向于利益衡量检验、而远离任何绝对原则的趋势，在这些年中愈发获得广泛接受。\n\n10 因此，债务人提出其不会自愿放弃其特权以允许受托人查阅这些文件的任何主张，均不适当。在特权控制权移交受托人时，并不存在特权被放弃。\n\n41. 适用该利益衡量检验的法院通常认定，对于可能识别并有助于为破产财产及债权人的利益追回资产的文件，或与破产财产管理有关的文件，受托人控制特权。见，例如，Bazemore, 216 B.R. at 1024（认定受托人在寻求文件以确定破产财产是否拥有诉讼请求权时，享有放弃律师—客户特权的权利）；Bame, 251 B.R. at 377（在受托人为追回资产而寻求对文件进行证据开示时，支持其控制个人债务人特权的请求）；In re Horvath, No. 13-34137, 2015 WL 2195060, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 7, 2015)（因受托人寻求可能增加债务人破产财产价值，故允许就资产清单上的请求权向个人债务人进行证据开示，并认定“受托人有权放弃债务人的律师—客户特权”，且裁定“受托人调查的唯一目的，是增强其就该等资产管理破产财产的能力，并可能为其债权人增加债务人破产财产的价值”）；Tarkington, 2010 WL 1416813, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2010)（“[根据利益衡量方法……法院将允许2004审查……继续进行。只要审查期间提出的问题涉及破产财产的管理，受托人对律师—客户特权的放弃即为有效。为确定是否存在将被视为破产财产的资产而提出问题，不会对债务人造成损害”）；In re Wittmer, No. 08-61618, 2011 WL 6000799, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2011)（认定“受托人可以就被告方放弃债务人的律师—客户特权。”）11\n\n11 为清楚起见，法院提及“放弃律师—客户特权”的能力时，系指控制该特权的能力（权利人拥有决定信息是否继续享有特权的基本权利），而非指受托人查阅原本享有特权的文件的能力，以该特权已被放弃为前提。\n\n42. 另一方面，当特权的移转可能对债务人的“人身或对其人身的控制”造成重大损害时，例如使其面临刑事责任，或者对律师—委托人沟通产生寒蝉效应存在压倒性担忧时，利益衡量可能倾向于由个人债务人保留对该特权的控制。参见 Bazemore, 216 B.R. at 1025；Bame, 251 B.R. at 377（认定，就“受托人可向律师提出的大多数问题”而言，受托人控制特权，但指出，就涉及可能导致对债务人提出刑事指控的活动的沟通而言，“利益衡量可能会倾向于维持对该特权的主张……。”）；In re Miller, 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)（根据利益衡量标准认定，“受托人承继债务人的律师—委托人特权可能会对债务人造成重大损害，因为受托人寻求放弃债务人律师—委托人特权的唯一目的，是将该信息直接用于对抗债务人。（即，撤销债务人的破产免责。）”）。\n\nII. 受托人控制所有被传唤文件的律师—委托人特权\n\nA. 利益衡量标准支持将申请破产前文件的特权移转给受托人\n\n43. 对于响应 Rule 2004 传票的任何申请破产前文件，利益衡量强烈支持将对律师—委托人特权、工作成果特权及任何其他适用特权的控制权移转给受托人，因为所要求的文件涉及受托人调查潜在破产财产资产及债务人财务事务的核心职责。\n\n44. 具体而言，附于 Rule 2004 传票的证据开示请求寻求开示与下列事项有关的文件和沟通：(i) 动议中讨论的特定资产和财产权益（例如 Lady May、该公寓、Greenwich 房产，以及与债务人有关联的其他各类住宅、私人飞机及其他资产）；(ii) 债务人在其他个人、公司实体及非营利组织中的权益及其与其的关系，\n\n这些可能是债务人财富的来源；以及 (iii) 债务人与其律师及其他顾问就公司治理问题以及债务人的财务和财产权益所进行的沟通。参见，例如，债务人 2004 动议第 12–18 页。\n\n45. 受托人需要这些文件，以探究债务人奢靡的生活方式（以及其不断公开吹嘘自身财富和资产规模）与其在本案清单中仅列报 $3,850 资产之间的明显不一致。12 参见 ECF No. 78, at 3–7。此外，公开记录中充满证据表明，债务人曾利用复杂的法律结构，“通过将其大量个人资产置于一系列公司、受信赖的亲信及家庭成员名下，努力逃避和欺骗其债权人”，并在“欺骗其债权人”的“努力中”，将其资产“隐藏于错综复杂的公司实体及家庭成员之中”。参见 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）v. Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Feb. 9, 2022), at 1 的动议裁决及命令。债务人无疑曾就这些问题获得律师意见，因此，受托人从证据开示对象处寻求取得的文件，很可能与受托人对潜在破产财产资产及债务人财务状况的调查高度相关——即法院认定特权移转给受托人的确切类型问题。此外，鉴于债务人提起的现有诉讼请求属于破产财产资产，只有授予受托人对与该等事项相关的律师—委托人特权及律师工作成果特权的控制权，受托人才能监督和管理这些诉讼。\n\n46. 在利益衡量的另一端，被传唤的文件并非为证明债务人的犯罪性、限制其人身自由，或废止其作为自行管理债务人所保有的任何权利而寻求。Rule 2004 传票项下的任何请求均不侧重于债务人作为个人所享有的独特权利或其人身自由。相反，每一项请求均经专门限定，以识别与债务人的资产和财务状况、其相关经营做法，以及其如何管理其破产财产有关的信息。受托人的职责并非为债务人寻求刑事责任，也并非对其自由或人身施加繁重限制。13\n\n12 参见上文第 31 段。\n\n47. 债务人对于谁拥有或控制某些资产可能持有不同观点，并不相关，当然也不是赋予债务人对响应文件之律师—委托人特权控制权的依据。事实上，围绕债务人对其声称资产的自行申报及其破产财产管理存在严重疑问，正是指定受托人的主要原因。债务人不能声称，由于其认为另一方拥有有价值的资产（例如，其声称相信其女儿或由其女儿控制的公司拥有 Lady May），其在该问题上便与受托人“利益相冲突”，因而可以保留对与该等资产有关文件的律师—委托人特权控制权。受托人并不知悉任何适用利益衡量标准并会支持此类论点的案件。14\n\n48. 最后，将与受托人被指定处理的核心问题相关的律师—委托人特权控制权移转给受托人，绝不会以任何方式对律师—委托人沟通产生寒蝉效应。债务人与其律师之间的沟通并无任何独特之处，\n\n13 在受托人寻求取得的某些文件可能揭示推进犯罪或欺诈活动证据的范围内，该等文件很可能属于律师—委托人特权的犯罪—欺诈例外，因此仍可予以证据开示，但该问题目前并未提交法院审理。参见 Bame, 251 B.R. at 377（指出，就涉及可能导致刑事指控的活动的沟通而言，“受托人将有机会提出特权的犯罪—欺诈例外。”）。一般参见 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984)（“已确立的是，如沟通涉及为推进拟议中或正在进行的犯罪或欺诈行为而进行的委托人沟通，则原本受律师—委托人特权或律师工作成果特权保护的沟通不受保护。”）。\n\n14 在债务人反对对潜在破产财产资产进行调查和证据开示的范围内，该等反对违反了债务人与受托人合作、协助受托人管理破产财产并寻找破产财产资产的义务。参见 In re McCourt, 12 B.R. 587, 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)（“破产受托人依据 Code § 521(2)，该条规定债务人应当‘在必要范围内与受托人合作，使受托人能够履行……（本法第 11 编）项下的受托人职责。’”）（原文改动）。受托人保留与此有关的所有权利。\n\n该等沟通不同于本文所引述的众多案件；在这些案件中，破产法院适用利益衡量标准时，并未认定将特权移转给受托人会被对律师—委托人沟通产生的寒蝉效应所超过。参见，例如，Bazemore, 216 B.R. at 1024（适用利益衡量标准，并裁定受托人调查资产的利益超过对个人债务人的任何潜在寒蝉效应或损害）。\n\nB. 与债务人破产财产管理有关的申请破产后文件的特权移转给受托人\n\n49. 对于在申请破产后、但在指定受托人之前形成的特权文件，在债务人担任自行管理债务人期间，法院不适用利益衡量标准。相反，当受托人接管破产财产管理时，对该等文件的特权自动移转给受托人。参见 Bame, 251 B.R. at 375（“我认定，就债务人担任 DIP 期间 Kennedy & Graven 与债务人之间有关破产财产管理的所有事项，特别包括资产披露和追回的沟通，律师—委托人特权已移转给受托人。”）；In re Eddy, 304 B.R. 591, 599 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004)（“[自行管理债务人]有义务保全可能使破产财产受益的针对第三方的任何诉讼请求。虽然自行管理债务人在其管理期间保有对律师—委托人特权的控制权，但该控制权必须以符合债务人信义义务的方式行使。如果 Chapter 11 案件转换为 Chapter 7 案件，被指定的 Chapter 7 受托人的……权力包括就附随于履行自行管理债务人职责的沟通放弃律师—委托人特权的权力。”）。适用于本案时，受托人自动承继可能附随于其与 Brown Rudnick LLP（布朗·鲁德尼克律师事务所）（或任何可能就本案向其提供意见的其他律师）之间沟通的任何律师—委托人特权或工作成果特权，以及该等律师持有的任何文件。对于债务人拟议财务顾问 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（韦尔多利诺与洛伊专业公司）档案中任何可能享有特权的文件，亦是如此。\n\nIII. 应驳回债务人主张适用允许其保留所有特权之概括规则的任何论点\n\n50. 任何关于债务人“保留对受托人被指定前存在的其全部律师—委托人特权和律师工作成果特权的控制权”的论点均不能成立。参见债务人有限异议第 3 页（着重号为原文所加）。尽管债务人并未明确主张该立场，但其援引一个不具约束力的例外案件 Gottlieb v. Fayerman (In re Ginzburg), 517 B.R. 175 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014)，暗示法院应考虑作出此类认定。Ginzburg 或任何其他依据均不支持该结果。\n\n51. 在 Ginzburg 一案中，一名 Chapter 7 受托人提起对抗程序，要求撤销债务人向其分居妻子转让不动产权益的所谓欺诈性让与，并寻求开示债务人与其离婚律师之间的沟通。Id. at 177-78。该法院在衡量特权所依据的政策与破产财产需要后，最初驳回了债务人关于律师—委托人特权的主张。Id. 178。然而，在复议后，该法院改变立场，并援引 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998)（“Swidler”），裁定利益衡量标准不适合用于确定律师—委托人特权的控制权。参见 id. at 181。15\n\n52. 然而，Swidler 并不要求得出此类结果，因此 Ginzburg 法院的裁决存在根本缺陷。Swidler 中的最高法院处理的是，对于第三方（大陪审团）是否应当设立律师—委托人特权的死后例外，\n\n15 在 Swidler 之后作出的、涉及个人债务人受托人对律师—委托人特权控制权的绝大多数案件，不仅未遵循 Ginzburg 的分析，而且实际上根本未认定 Swidler 适用，而是遵循逐案利益衡量标准，权衡对个人债务人造成损害的可能性与受托人最大化破产财产的义务。参见，例如，Bame, 251 B.R. 367；Tarkington, 2010 WL 1416813；Wittmer, 2011 WL 6000799；Horvath, 2015 WL 2195060，均见上文引述。\n\n其中，“当事人已经死亡，且该信息与刑事程序相关。”Swidler, 524 U.S. 399 at 403。最高法院（Supreme Court）并未审议律师—当事人特权何时转移至受托人或任何其他权利继受人。相反，其关注的是一名独立检察官提出的请求，即创设一项新的律师—当事人特权例外，以允许第三方获取此前受特权保护的信息。\n\n53. 尽管最高法院在 Swidler 一案中指出，其“已否决采用利益衡量测试来界定该特权的范围”，但本案与 Swidler 不同，受托人并非试图界定律师—当事人特权的范围。相反，相关问题是该特权的控制权是否已转移至受托人。不得使用利益衡量测试来确定律师—当事人特权的范围，并不意味着法院不得比较非自行管理债务人与受托人的利益，以确定在破产程序中任命受托人后由谁控制该特权。16\n\nIV. 债务人关于文件受联合辩护或共同利益特权保护的任何主张均不能成立\n\n54. 债务人还称，联合辩护或共同利益特权适用于涉及受托人认为属于破产财产的财产的某些诉讼及其他事项；因此，债务人已暗示，其可能基于该等所谓依据扣留文件，或指示其律师扣留文件。这并非法律规定。\n\n55. 就债务人主张其正在援引律师—当事人特权，以保护向共同被告律师作出或由共同被告律师作出的、与两名被告共同辩护有关的保密通信而言，遵从传票不会放弃任何该等共同利益或联合辩护特权。由于该特权中的任何该等利益已转移至受托人，共同利益或联合辩护关系仍然完整，因此，特权控制权的转移不会导致放弃该特权。因此，无论是基于债务人不当主张其已不再持有的特权，还是代表该关系中的另一方，均无任何依据扣留文件。\n\n16 就债务人主张 Ginzburg 案法院将 Swidler 理解为：鉴于律师—当事人特权的重要性，该特权的控制权不得转移至受托人而言，该等裁决必然意味着 Weintraub 不再是有效法律；包括援引 Weintraub 的 Ginzburg 案在内，尚无任何法院提出过这一立场。\n\n56. 此外，破产法院通常拒绝执行联合辩护协议，如执行该等协议将限制获任命受托人调查各方交易往来的能力。例如，在 In re Ginn-LA St. Lucie Ltd., LLLP 一案中，法院裁定：\n\n尽管该［联合辩护协议］确实可能推进当事人的推定意图，但在本案中执行该协议，可能妨碍受托人履行其法定职责，即调查债务人的财务事务，同时给予被指称在申请日之前控制债务人的人以特别保护。该等条款能够以债务人债权人的利益为代价保护不法行为人的能力，使得在破产程序中执行该等条款违反公共政策。\n\n439 B.R. 801, 805-806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010)（Chapter 7 受托人提出动议，请求强制遵从移交与律师事务所向债务人提供法律代理有关文件的要求）。另见 In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005)（“在破产案件中，调查的需要远比对律师—当事人通信的任何顾虑更为迫切。”）。\n\n57. 同样，在 Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 一案中，在《证券投资者保护法》（Securities Investor Protection Act，SIPA）程序中任命了一名受托人监督公司的清算。213 B.R. 433, 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)。在决定受托人是否可以在提起诉讼前放弃所谓的联合辩护协议时，法院表示：“我认为，在如本案所示、受托人正在就可识别请求权的事实基础和范围开展调查的情形下，受托人与拟被告处于对立地位。受托人不应因存在联合辩护特权而在查明事实方面受到阻碍，因为如果其仅仅提交一份起诉状，该特权便会消失。”同上（省略内部引文）。法院进一步指出：“如果此前作为有效联合辩护协议成员的两方，随后在诉讼中发现彼此成为对手，则联合辩护特权即被放弃。”同上，第439页。\n\n＊\n\n58. 受托人依据规则2004提出的、与其调查破产财产的资产、负债、财务状况及管理有关的文件请求，对于其了解债务人破产财产的真实状况至关重要。与该等文件和通信有关的任何律师—当事人特权的控制权，连同其根据《破产法》就该等领域享有的权利和承担的责任，均已转移至受托人。因此，不应允许债务人或其律师基于债务人已不再控制的特权主张而扣留任何文件。\n\n此前未提出请求\n\n59. 受托人此前未向本院或任何其他法院寻求本文件所请求的救济。\n\n［本页剩余部分故意留白。］\n\n因此，基于前述理由，受托人谨请求作出拟议命令，准予本动议所请求的救济，以及其他公正和适当的救济。\n\n日期：August 22, 2022　LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut　CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE（Chapter 11受托人）\n\n签字人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙泰思专业公司）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（pro hac vice 待决）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯有限责任合伙律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nAvram E. Luft（艾夫拉姆·E·拉夫特）（pro hac vice 待决）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（pro hac vice 待决）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\n\nChapter 11受托人的律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 777 Filed 08/22/22 Entered 08/22/22 23:48:40 Page 26 of 30\n\n附件A\n\n拟议命令\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　：\n：\nChapter 11\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　：\n：\nCase No.\n22-50073\n(JAM)\n\n债务人。　：\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于下列事项的命令：（A）规定与依据规则2004传唤的文件有关的任何律师—当事人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权，于受托人获任命时转移至受托人；（B）指令债务人及其他受询问人不得因该等特权而扣留文件；以及（C）准予相关救济\n\n根据 Mr. Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯先生）以其作为在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）Chapter 11案件中获任命的Chapter 11受托人（“受托人”）的身份提出的动议（“本动议”），请求依照美国法典第11编第323、521、541及1108条（“《破产法》”）、《联邦破产程序规则》（Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure，“《破产规则》”）第2004条，以及本院准许受托人依据规则2004提出询问动议的命令，作出命令（“本命令”），以（a）确认受托人拥有并控制与债务人的资产、财务事务及其破产财产管理有关问题的律师—当事人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权，（b）指令证据开示接收人在回应规则2004传票时，不得因任何该等特权而向受托人扣留文件，1 或试图主张由受托人合法拥有的任何该等特权，以及（c）准予相关救济，所有内容均在本动议中有更充分阐述；并且，本院依据28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334及United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）作出的移送常设命令（经修订），对审理本动议及其中请求的救济具有管辖权；并且，依据28 U.S.C. § 157(b)，审理本动议及其中请求的救济构成核心程序；并且，依据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本院为适当审理地点；并且，本院认定，本动议所请求的救济符合破产财产、其债权人及所有利害关系方的最佳利益；并且，在具体情形下已就本动议作出适当和充分的通知；并且，显然无需作出其他或进一步通知；并且，基于本院已进行的全部程序；并且，对本文件所请求救济提出的任何异议已被撤回或经实体审理被驳回；并且，经适当审议且有充分理由，现命令如下：\n\n1. 本动议按本命令所载内容获准。\n\n2. 根据任何适用法律产生的、涉及规则2004传票附件中所请求文件和信息（“所请求材料”）的任何律师—当事人特权、工作成果保护或任何相关特权或保护的控制权，已转移至受托人。\n\n3. 债务人及其律师（无论基于债务人的指示或其他原因），以及任何其他受询问人，均无权以律师—当事人特权、工作成果原则或任何相关特权或保护为依据扣留任何所请求材料。\n\n4. 债务人及其律师（无论基于债务人的指示或其他原因），以及任何其他受询问人，均不得干涉、阻碍或延迟受托人行使其根据本命令享有的权限。\n\n5. 受托人获授权并被赋予采取一切必要行动以实现本命令所准予救济的权力。\n\n6. 本命令的条款和条件自其作出之时起立即生效并可执行。\n\n7. 本院保留对因实施、解释及执行本命令而产生或与之相关的所有事项的管辖权。\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION\n\n关于：　：　CHAPTER 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　：　CASE NO. 22-50073\n(JAM)\n\n债务人。\n______________________________________x　：\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，前述动议及拟议命令已于 August 22, 2022 以电子方式提交。根据电子提交通知，本院电子提交系统将通过电子邮件向所有当事人发送该提交的通知，或向无法接受电子提交的任何人通过邮寄方式发送通知。当事人可通过本院系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n日期：August 22, 2022　LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），\nNew Haven, Connecticut　CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE（Chapter 11受托人）\n\n签字人：/s/ James C. Graham\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）(ct00616)\nJames C. Graham（詹姆斯·C·格雷厄姆）(ct06064)\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）(ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙泰思专业公司）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 821-2000\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\njgraham@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":90,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":107,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":119,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":637,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":638,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":698,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":699,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":703,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":724,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":732,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":742,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":756,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":757,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":9137,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-08-22 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-08-22","updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:52:48"}