{"id":"court_ctb_796_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":796,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x |                         |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|\n|                                                        | : |                         |\n| In re:                                                 | : | Chapter 11              |\n|                                                        | : |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                           | : | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|                                                        | : |                         |\n| Debtor.1                                               | : |                         |\n|                                                        | : |                         |\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x |                         |\n\n# **TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF ORDER, PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 363, 521, 541, 1108, AND 105, (A) CONFIRMING THAT CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE HOLDS ALL OF DEBTOR'S ECONOMIC AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RIGHTS IN DEBTOR-CONTROLLED ENTITIES, (B) AUTHORIZING CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO ACT IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY ON BEHALF OF ESTATE, AND (C) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the\n\nchapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), files this objection (the \"Objection\") to the\n\n*Debtor's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 363,*\n\n*521, 541, 1108, and 105, (A) Confirming that Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All of Debtor's*\n\n*Economic and Corporate Governance Rights in Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing*\n\n*Chapter 11 Trustee to Act in Any Foreign Country on Behalf of Estate, and (C) Granting Related*\n\n*Relief* (ECF No. 761) (the \"Motion to Stay\"). The Trustee states the following in support of this\n\nObjection:\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span> <sup>1</sup> Although the Debtor's legal name is Ho Wan Kwok, he is also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases. The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Although the Debtor professes to appeal the entirety of the Court's order (ECF 717) (the \"Order\") granting the Trustee's Corporate Governance Rights Motion (defined below), he seeks to stay only one provision—specifically, paragraph 3(b)—of that Order. Moreover, while the Motion to Stay purports to apply to all of paragraph 3(b), the Debtor in reality takes issue with only one aspect of that paragraph. Specifically, the Debtor contends it is improper for the Court to require him to \"deliver, no later than five business days after entry of this Order, a copy of the letter in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit B** to [UK Counsel (defined below)].\" (Order ¶ 3(b)). The Debtor does *not* take issue with the remainder of paragraph 3(b), which states that, \"[f]or the avoidance of doubt, the Trustee shall be deemed, for all purposes, to be the owner of the Debtor's claims asserted in\" the UBS Litigation (defined below) (*Id*.). Accordingly, it is not disputed that the Trustee owns the claims against UBS.\n\n2. As to the Debtor's professed concern regarding the portion of paragraph 3(b) requiring him to execute the Counsel Letter (defined below), the Debtor has not come close to satisfying the standard for a stay pending appeal. To obtain a stay, the Debtor must establish (i) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (ii) that he will suffer irreparable injury if a stay is denied, (iii) that there will be no substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and (iv) that a stay would be in the public interest. The Debtor cannot satisfy any one of these factors, much less show that they on balance entitle him to a stay pending appeal.\n\n3. For starters, the Debtor's appeal has virtually no likelihood of success because the Debtor both fundamentally misunderstands (or misrepresents, or both) the nature of the Order and misstates the relevant law. The Debtor contends his appeal is likely to succeed because the Counsel Letter referenced in paragraph 3(b) of the Order will require him to execute a sweeping \"blanket waiver\" of privileges arising under U.K. law that the Debtor allegedly still \"owns\"\n\ndespite being a debtor-out-of-possession.[2](#page-2-0) In making this assertion, the Debtor appears to rely on a prior version of the Counsel Letter that was not included in the Order, as the final version of the letter requires no such thing. All the final Counsel Letter says is that the Trustee, as owner of the estate's claim in the UBS Litigation, should be provided access to Harcus Parker Limited's (\"UK Counsel\") documents and information regarding the litigation, including any assessment by counsel of its merits and the litigation's settlement posture.\n\n4. As such, the entire premise of the Debtor's appeal of paragraph 3(b)—that he is being compelled to execute a blanket waiver of privileges he still \"owns\" in the UBS Litigation, thus permitting the Trustee to waive such privileges—is a red herring. The Debtor knows (or, at least, should know) that this is the case, because the Court explicitly told his counsel at the August 4 Hearing (defined below) that \"[t]he letter doesn't say that he is waiving his privilege. In fact, it says that any waiver of the privilege is limited to provision of this information to the trustee. That's what it says.\" Aug. 4 Hearing Tr. at 10:17-20 (ECF No. 746).\n\n5. The relief that paragraph 3(b) does seek to effectuate—*i.e.*, to require the Debtor to instruct UK Counsel to provide documents and information to the Trustee—is fully consistent with applicable law. As set forth below, and more generally in the Trustee's Privileges Motion (as defined below), the Debtor does not own (or control) any privileges relating to the UBS Litigation (or to any other litigation)—rather, all of those privileges passed automatically to the Trustee upon his appointment as a matter of federal bankruptcy law. In fact, the Debtor, by his own admission, does not even attempt to establish that he \"owns\" or controls any such privilege. (Motion to Stay at 13, n. 2). Accordingly, there should be no dispute that the Trustee, as the\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span> <sup>2</sup> The Motion to Stay makes repeated reference to \"ownership\" of the privileges. The case law uses the term \"control\" synonymously with how the term \"ownership\" is used in Debtor's motion. Accordingly, unless specifically referencing the Debtor's assertions, the Trustee will reference control of the privileges in his Objection.\n\ncontroller of the Debtor's privileges, is entitled to access information from UK Counsel. To the extent the Debtor believes the Order implicates U.K. privilege law because of his alleged ownership of any privileges in the UBS Litigation, he is incorrect. But even if he were correct, the Order also fully complies with U.K. law, which in no way restricts the Trustee from obtaining access to privileged documents. This should be no surprise given that the Counsel Letter was written in consultation with UK Counsel.\n\n6. Nor can the Debtor establish either that he will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, or that the Trustee will not be harmed if a stay is granted. The Debtor's claims of looming irreparable harm if he is forced to waive the privileges he \"owns\" ring hollow, as the law is clear that control of privileges in the UBS Litigation have passed to the Trustee, and the Debtor has failed to identify a single privileged document, or even a category of privileged documents, that will harm him if disclosed. The Debtor cannot manufacture a harm by simply assuming his conclusion that he owns a privilege and then complaining (incorrectly) that he is being forced to waive such privilege. Moreover, even if the Debtor controls any privileges in the UBS Litigation, the Debtor still will suffer no harm, as the actions called for in the Counsel Letter are wholly consistent with U.K. law.\n\n7. On the other hand, that a stay will occasion substantial harm on the Trustee is indisputable. The Trustee owns the Debtor's claims in the UBS Litigation, the largest identified asset on the Debtor's schedules. UK Counsel has made clear that, absent resolution of these issues, UK Counsel will continue to deny the Trustee essential information about the case, effectively preventing him from fulfilling his obligations and starving the estate from necessary revenue that can potentially be realized from the litigation. In fact, UK Counsel has just\n\nindicated that a hearing in the UBS Litigation will need to be adjourned as a result of the Debtor's actions before this Court.\n\n8. Finally, the public interest weighs heavily towards halting the Debtor's dilatory tactics, and allowing the Trustee to proceed with the important work he has been charged with performing by this Court. This Court is not writing on a blank slate; it has the benefit of the experience of Judge Ostrager who has presided over five years of \"evasive and contemptuous acts\" by the Debtor, and has concluded that the Debtor has \"knowingly and intentionally violat[ed] Court orders.\" Decision + Order on Motion, *PAX v. Kwok*, 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2020), ECF No. 1181 (\"Final Contempt Order\") at 7, 10. There could not be a better description of why the public interest factor weighs heavily in favor of the Trustee here. The requested stay pending appeal should be denied.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n9. On June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order (ECF No. 465) (the \"Trustee Order\") directing the United States Trustee to appoint a chapter 11 trustee in the Chapter 11 Case. Pursuant to the Trustee Order, the United States Trustee selected Luc A. Despins as the Trustee. On July 8, 2022, in accordance with the Trustee Order, the Court entered an order granting the appointment of Luc A. Despins as the Trustee in the Chapter 11 Case (ECF No. 523) (the \"Appointment Order\").\n\n10. In the Trustee Order, the Court highlighted the Trustee's ability to \"use independent judgment and good management to direct the affairs of the estate to attempt to satisfy the claims of creditors\" and to \"optimize recovery for the creditors and the estate\" by, among other things, investigating \"the Debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs.\" (*See*\n\nTrustee Order at 18). The Trustee Order instructed the Trustee to perform \"all of the duties set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1106.\" (See Trustee Order at 15-16, 18)\n\n# **A. Corporate Governance Rights Motion**\n\n11. Following his appointment, the Trustee became concerned that he may be unable to effectively fulfill his duties with respect to the management and control of the Debtor's assets and affairs due to the Debtor's demonstrated history of defying court orders and engaging in efforts to evade his creditors. Accordingly, on July 23, 2022, the Trustee filed his *Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 541, 1108, and 105, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All of Debtor's Economic Rights in Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee to Act in Any Foreign Country on Behalf of the Estate, and Granting Related Relief* (ECF No. 598). In the motion, the Trustee sought, among other things, confirmation that Debtor may not interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to the entities under his control or the Trustee's authority as the Debtor's foreign representative. The Debtor filed his response in opposition to the Trustee's motion on July 29, 2022 (ECF No. 643).[3](#page-5-0)\n\n# **B. UBS Litigation**\n\n12. One of the Debtor's significant known assets is the litigation claim he holds against UBS AG in a litigation pending in the United Kingdom.[4](#page-5-1) Specifically, prior to the\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span> <sup>3</sup> The *Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 541, 1108, and 105, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All of Debtor's Economic Rights in Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee to Act in Any Foreign Country on Behalf of the Estate, and Granting Related Relief*, along with, as applicable, the Initial Revised Proposed Order (defined below) and, as applicable, the Further Revised Proposed Order (defined below) shall be referred to as the \"Corporate Governance Rights Motion.\"\n\n<span id=\"page-5-1\"></span><sup>4</sup> *See* Particulars of Claim, *Kwok Ho Wan & Ors v UBS*, Cl-2020-000345, High Court of Justice of England and Wales Queen's Bench Division Commercial Court (attached hereto as **Exhibit A**). Interestingly, and contrary to Debtor's contention in this Case, the Particulars of Claim noted that Debtor \"is a high net worth individual.\" *Id.*, *¶* 1.\n\nPetition Date, in September 2020, the Debtor and two other plaintiffs the Debtor controls commenced an action against UBS AG seeking a recovery of approximately \\$495 million (the \"UBS Litigation\").\n\n13. Given his responsibilities to identify, manage, and safeguard assets of the estate, the Trustee has a vested interest in ensuring he has the exclusive authority and ability to manage the UBS Litigation and direct counsel in that litigation. The Trustee therefore contacted UK Counsel in London, which had represented the Debtor in the UBS Litigation, to seek to gain access to case files and information on an informal basis. The Trustee's efforts in this regard were not successful.\n\n14. On July 31, 2022, the Trustee submitted a revised proposed order (\"Initial Revised Proposed Order\") on the Corporate Governance Rights Motion, which, among other things, asked the Court to direct the Debtor to (i) provide the Trustee with all books, documents, and records relating to all property of the estate and, (ii) specific to the UBS Litigation, send a letter to UK Counsel, in the form attached as Exhibit B to the Initial Revised Proposed Order, directing that all materials relating to the UBS Litigation, including UK Counsel's case file, be turned over to the Trustee.\n\n15. At the hearing on August 1, 2022 regarding the Corporate Governance Rights Motion, the Debtor objected that he needed additional time to review and object to the Initial Revised Proposed Order. The Court granted the Debtor's request, adjourning the matter to August 4, 2022.\n\n16. On August 2, 2022, the Trustee filed a further revised proposed order (the \"Further Revised Proposed Order\") (ECF No. 671) on the Corporate Governance Rights Motion, with some additional minor changes which had been discussed at the August 1, 2022 hearing.\n\n17. On August 4, 2022, the Debtor objected to the Initial Revised Proposed Order (ECF No. 678) and the Trustee filed his reply (ECF No. 679) discussing, among other things, the basis for the Court to enter the Further Revised Proposed Order.\n\n#### **C. Hearing on Corporate Governance Rights Motion**\n\n18. The Court held a hearing on the Corporate Governance Rights Motion that same day (the \"August 4 Hearing\"). Much of the Debtor's focus, both in his objection and in the comments of his counsel at the hearing, related to the language in the Initial Revised Proposed Order requiring him to send the attached letter to UK Counsel. In particular, the Debtor took the position that it was improper—and a potential violation of United Kingdom privilege law—to compel the Debtor to send a communication that would result in the \"waiver\" of the Debtor's privileges. Aug. 4 Hearing Tr. at 10:12-15, 12:16-22.\n\n19. In response, the Court made clear that, with respect to the Corporate Governance Rights Motion, the Trustee was merely stepping into the shoes of the Debtor's privilege. *See id.* at 19:17-20 (\"The minute the Chapter 11 trustee was appointed, the Chapter 11 trustee steps into the shoes of Mr. Kwok. So the chapter 11 trustee has the privilege of Mr. Kwok in [the UBS Litigation]\"); *id.* at 21:2-4 (\"Mr. Despins stepped into the shoes of the debtor when he became the Chapter 11 Trustee. There's well settled case law on that, Attorney Henzy.\"); *id.* at 73:20-22, 24-25 (\"[A]s soon as the order appointing the trustee was approved, . . . Mr. Despins became Mr. Kwok. . . . Mr. Despins has stepped into all of those rights.\"). Therefore, as the Court observed, *waiver* of privilege was not at issue. *Id.* at 10:17-22 (\"*[T]he letter doesn't say that [the Debtor] is waiving his privilege. In fact, it says that any waiver of the privilege is limited to the provision of this information to the trustee*. That's what it says.\") (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Trustee made clear that he was only interested in privileged information with\n\nrespect to the merits and settlement prospects of the UBS Litigation. *Id.* at 7:17-22 (Trustee noting that he requested UK Counsel draft a letter allowing counsel to \"give [the Trustee] an update on the merits of the claims, [and] any settlement proposals\").\n\n20. The record from the hearing also reflects the fact that Counsel Letter was not prepared by the Trustee in isolation but, rather, was the result of a collaboration with UK Counsel. *See id.* at 7:16-24 (The Trustee said, \"There were a lot of back and forth between me and the counsel . . . for the [D]ebtor in that UBS action. . . . And at the end of the day, I said, look, why don't you just draft a letter that you would be comfortable receiving from Mr. Kwok that would allow you to . . . give me an update on the merits of the claims. . . . And eventually [UK Counsel] did that.\"); *id.* at 8:8-11 (\"And so we took her letter with some minor changes and basically that's the letter that we're now asking the Court to direct the [D]ebtor to send to her that basically says give [the Trustee] full access [to the UBS Litigation case file].\"); *id.* at 13:4- 11 (\"And that letter basically, that she marked up, says that if she gets the letter she will . . . give me the privileged information. As to what? As to the merits of the litigation.\").\n\n#### **D. Order Granting Corporate Governance Rights Motion**\n\n21. On August 10, the Court overruled the Debtor's Objection and granted the Corporate Governance Rights Motion (ECF 717) (the \"Order\"). The Order provides broad confirmation of the Trustee's ownership of and authority over the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights and directs the Debtor to \"surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including, without limitation, books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate.\" (Order at ¶ 3.)\n\n22. In addition, the Order gives the Trustee broad authority to act as the estate's foreign representative in foreign countries, including for the purpose of investigating estate\n\nassets and requesting and obtaining relevant documents. (*Id*. at ¶ 5). The Order further provides that the Debtor \"shall not interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the authority under this Order, including any action taken or to be taken by the Trustee in a foreign court on behalf of the Estate in furtherance of such authority.\" (*Id.* ¶ 6).\n\n23. Finally, paragraph 3(b) of the Order instructs the Debtor to deliver a copy of a further revised letter, attached as Exhibit B to the Order (the \"Counsel Letter\"), to UK Counsel. Importantly, the wording in the Counsel Letter was *different than* the wording of the letter attached to the Initial Revised Proposed Order in that the updated letter reflected additional changes based on the Trustee's ongoing conversations with UK Counsel. *See supra*, ¶ 19. Specifically, the third and fourth paragraphs of the Counsel Letter ultimately approved by the Court provide the following:\n\nIn furtherance of the foregoing, and for the avoidance of doubt, I hereby expressly authorize you to have full and complete discussions on my behalf with Mr. Despins regarding the UBS Litigation, the merits thereof, any related settlement discussions, and any other topics related to the prosecution of the UBS Litigation and to take instructions from him in relation to my claim in the UBS Litigation regardless of any attorney-client privilege, work product, or other privilege which belongs to me. Any waiver of privilege is limited to the provision of this information to the Trustee. *My consent is limited to giving access to the Trustee to the extent that I am entitled and contains no wider waiver of privilege and is*\n\n*not consent by me to the Trustee to waive my privilege.*\n\nAmong other things, and as detailed in the order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (a copy of which is enclosed as Exhibit 1), I instruct you to (i) as soon as is practicable deliver to and share with the Trustee all memoranda, advice, and other communications by you to me regarding the UBS Litigation, any other information (whether in written form or not) regarding the merits of the UBS Litigation, and any settlement offers received or made by me or you in connection with such litigation, and (ii) as soon as is practicable provide the Trustee will full access to the parts of your case file in the UBS Litigation to which I am entitled as well as all pleadings and other court documents filed in the UBS Litigation.\n\n(*See* Order, Exhibit B (emphasis added)).\n\n24. In his Motion to Stay, the Debtor quotes *the prior version* of the proposed letter attached as Exhibit B to the Initial Revised Proposed Order in arguing he is likely to succeed on appeal. (*See* Motion to Stay at 8 (\"I hereby expressly authorize you to have full and complete discussions with Mr. Despins regarding the UBS Litigation . . . regardless of any attorney-client privilege, work product, or other privilege, *which I hereby fully waive for such purposes*\") (quoting the Revised Proposed Order) (emphasis added)). This language is materially different from the language in the final Counsel Letter attached as Exhibit B to the Order. Specifically, as indicated above, the language approved by the Court recognizes that the Trustee is merely stepping into the Debtor's shoes with respect to the UBS Litigation and that no waiver of privilege is occurring. (*See* Order, Exhibit B (\"Any waiver of privilege is limited to the provision of this information to the Trustee. *My consent is limited to giving access to the Trustee to the extent that I am entitled and contains no wider waiver of privilege and is not consent by me to the Trustee to waive my privilege*.\") (emphasis added)).\n\n#### **E. Rule 2004 Motion, Orders, and Privileges Motion**\n\n25. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed three related motions to conduct Bankruptcy Rule 2004 investigations of the Debtor (ECF No. 636), various legal and financial advisors to the Debtor (ECF No. 637), and various entities and individuals affiliated with the Debtor (ECF No. 638) (collectively, the \"Rule 2004 Motions\"). Each of the Rule 2004 Motions attached proposed subpoenas for documents and testimony (the \"Rule 2004 Subpoenas\"). On August 16, 2022, the Court granted the Rule 2004 Motions, authorizing the respective examinations and service of the document requests (ECF Nos. 756, 757, and 758) (collectively, the \"Rule 2004 Orders\").\n\n26. On August 22, 2022, to confirm the Trustee's rights and in aid of his enforcement of the Rule 2004 Orders, the Trustee filed a *Motion for Entry of Order (A) Providing that*\n\n*Control of any Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product Protection, and Other Privileges Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents Passed to Trustee Upon Appointment, (B) Directing that the Debtor and Other Examinees Not Withhold Documents on Account of Such Privileges, and (C) Granting Related Relief* (ECF 777) (the \"Privileges Motion\"). The Privileges Motion requests that the Court enter an order confirming that, upon the Trustee's appointment, control over any attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and other privileges relating to the assets, liabilities, financial status or administration of the estate passed to the Trustee, and that neither the Debtor nor any subpoena recipient shall withhold any documents responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas on the basis of any such privilege or attempt to assert any such privilege controlled by the Trustee.\n\n27. The Privileges Motion is set to be heard on August 30, 2022.\n\n#### **F. Appeal and Motion for Stay Pending Appeal**\n\n28. On August 10, 2022, the Debtor filed a notice of appeal of the Order (ECF No. 723). The Debtor thereafter filed the Motion to Stay. Importantly, the Motion to Stay seeks to stay *only* paragraph 3(b) of the Order relating to the Counsel Letter in the UBS Litigation. It does not seek a stay of—or any other relief with respect to—any other provision of the Order.\n\n29. As explained below, the requested stay would be extremely prejudicial to the Trustee because it could delay not only his access to important information in the UBS Litigation, but it also may prevent that litigation from continuing and, potentially, resulting in a significant settlement or judgment for the benefit of the estate's creditors. Indeed, on August 23, 2022, the Trustee received an email from UK Counsel indicating a desire to seek postponement of an upcoming hearing in October in the UBS Litigation due to confusion over who controls the privilege in that matter and will provide direction to counsel. It is critical for the Trustee to\n\nobtain the Court's assistance to help minimize the possibility of any such postponement or other delays in the UBS Litigation.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n30. For the Order to be stayed, the Debtor must show he has satisfied the four-prong test set out by the Second Circuit in *Mohammed v. Reno*, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002): \"[1] the likelihood of success on the merits, [2] irreparable injury if a stay is denied, [3] substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and [4] the public interest.\"[5](#page-12-0) The Debtor fails establish any of these factors, much less show that they collectively weigh in his favor.\n\n### **I. Debtor Cannot Demonstrate a Likelihood Of Success On Merits**\n\n31. To satisfy the likelihood of success prong of the standard for a stay pending appeal, the movant must make \"a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits.\" *In re Cacioli*, 302 B.R. 429, 431 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (citing *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1987) (noting the factors governing stays pending appeal as \"(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies)). [6](#page-12-1) The Debtor falls far short of meeting this bar, as the entirety of the Order—including specifically the portion of paragraph 3(b) requiring delivery of the Counsel\n\n<span id=\"page-12-0\"></span> <sup>5</sup> The \"degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.\" *McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.)*, 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).\n\n<span id=\"page-12-1\"></span><sup>6</sup> Some other courts in the Second Circuit have articulated slightly modified standards in analyzing motions for stay pending appeal. *See, e.g.*, *In re Country Squire Assoc. of Carle Place, L.P.*, 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d Cir. BAP 1996) (\"(1) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (2) whether a party will suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued, (3) whether the movant has demonstrated 'a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of success' on appeal, and (4) the public interests that may be affected.\"). Here, Debtor fails under both standards.\n\nLetter—is almost certain to be affirmed. This is so because (i) there is no legitimate dispute that control of the Debtor's privileges relating to the UBS Litigation passed to the Trustee upon his appointment, and (ii) even if the Debtor still owns or controls a privilege (he does not), the Order does not require its \"waiver\" and, thus, the Debtor's argument that the Order violates U.K. privilege law is without merit.\n\n#### **A. Control of Attorney-Client Privilege in UBS Litigation Passed to Trustee**\n\n32. As described in detail in the Privileges Motion, control of the attorney-client privilege passes to a Chapter 11 trustee upon his appointment to the extent it relates to assets and liabilities of the estate, the Debtor's financial conditions, and administration of the estate. [7](#page-13-0)\n\n33. The Supreme Court in *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (\"*Weintraub*\") addressed the issue of whether, upon appointment of a trustee, control of a corporation's attorney-client privilege passes to the trustee, or remains with the debtor's management. The Supreme Court held that the trustee steps into the shoes of the corporate debtor for the purposes of controlling attorney-client privilege just as the trustee does for management of the corporate debtor more generally. *See id.* at 353-54. [8](#page-13-1) In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court made clear that the issue was whether control of the privilege passes to a trustee in bankruptcy, not whether there was an exception to the attorney-client privilege,\n\n<span id=\"page-13-0\"></span> <sup>7</sup> As noted above, the Trustee's Privileges Motion, which is also scheduled to be heard on August 30, 2022, sets out the relevant law and arguments in greater detail. In the interests of judicial economy, the Trustee will not repeat here the entirety of its arguments in the Privileges Motion, but rather, will highlight the key relevant points for this Objection, and ask that the law and arguments articulated in the Privileges Motion be incorporated by reference into this Objection.\n\n<span id=\"page-13-1\"></span><sup>8</sup> Although *Weintraub* noted that it was not opining on the passage of the privilege to a trustee in the case of an individual debtor, *see id.* at 356, the Court did not suggest that control of the attorney-client privilege should not pass to a trustee for an individual debtor or that the needs of a trustee appointed in the case of an individual debtor would in any way differ from the needs of a trustee for a corporate debtor. To the contrary, all of the Supreme Court's detailed citations concerning the role and responsibilities of a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code apply equally to a trustee for an individual as they do to a trustee for a corporate debtor.\n\nnor whether filing of a bankruptcy case effectuates a waiver of any previously existing privilege, thus allowing a trustee access to previously privileged documents.\n\n34. Although *Weintraub* dealt only with corporate debtors, a number of lower courts have since addressed whether the privilege also passes to the trustee in an individual debtor case. A significant majority of the courts addressing this question have employed a \"balancing test,\" which looks at whether the privilege at issue relates most closely to a trustee's rights, obligations and allocation of responsibility under the Bankruptcy Code, or whether the privilege primarily concerns the debtor's interests as an individual. *See, e.g.*, *In re Bame*, 251 B.R. 367, 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000); *In re Foster*, 188 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (remanding decision back to bankruptcy court to apply balancing test). Just as in *Weintraub*, this balancing test seeks to determine whether control of the privileges passes to a trustee, not whether the information remains privileged upon provision to a trustee. Therefore, *any concern by the Debtor that any privilege is being waived is inapposite because, no privilege is waived when control of the privilege passes to the Trustee. See, e.g.*, *In re Bazemore*, 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (\"[t]he filing of bankruptcy by an individual debtor requires a determination as to whether anyone else controls the privilege.\" (citing *Weintraub*)); *Bame*, 251 B.R. at 377 (characterizing the balancing analysis as whether an \"individual debtor's attorney-client privilege as to prepetition communications does transfer to the trustee under certain circumstances . . . .\").\n\n35. Courts applying the balancing test routinely find the trustee controls the privilege with regard to documents that relate to assets of the estate, its financial status or to the administration of the estate. *See, e.g.*, *Bazemore*, 216 B.R. at 1024 (finding that trustee held right to waive attorney client privilege where it sought documents to determine if estate held cause of action); *Bame*, 251 B.R. at 377 (finding in favor of trustee's request to control privilege of\n\nindividual debtor when seeking discovery of documents in order to recover assets); *In re Horvath*, No. 13-34137 MAW, 2015 WL 2195060, at \\*6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 7, 2015) (discovery related to claims on schedule of assets permissible from individual debtor because trustee sought to potentially increase value of debtor's estate, and finding that \"the Trustee is entitled to waive Debtor's attorney-client privilege\" and holding that \"the sole purpose of the Trustee's inquiry is to augment her ability to administer the estate with respect to those assets and to potentially increase the value of Debtor's estate to his creditors\"). On the other hand, the balance may tip to an individual debtor retaining control of the privilege when transfer of the privilege might result in great harm \"to or control over [a debtor's] person,\" such as exposure to criminal liability, or where there may be an overriding concern for the chilling effect on attorney-client communications. *See Bame,* 251 B.R. at 377 (finding that, in regard to \"most questions the Trustee could ask of counsel,\" trustee controls privilege, but noting that in regard to communications having to do with activities that could lead to criminal charges against debtor \"the balance would probably tip in favor of sustaining assertion of the privilege . . . .\").\n\n36. Here, for all privileged information related to the UBS Litigation, the balancing test heavily weighs in favor of control of the privileges passing to the Trustee. The UBS Litigation could, if meritorious, represent a substantial potential asset of the Debtor's estate, claiming damages of approximately \\$495 million dollars. It is undisputed that the Trustee is now the owner of the Debtor's claims in that litigation. To effectively fulfill his obligations under the Bankruptcy Code to maximize this asset for the benefit of the estate and its creditors, the Trustee must be provided access to relevant information relating to the litigation held by UK Counsel. Indeed, it would mean nothing for the Trustee to \"own\" the claims in the litigation if all the information he needs to manage and direct counsel in that litigation is withheld from him.\n\n37. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that any privileged information in the possession of UK Counsel relates to the Debtor as an individual, such that his individual interests, such as exposure to potential criminal liability, would outweigh the Trustee's need for the information. First, the UBS Litigation concerns a claim *brought by the Debtor* claiming that UBS provided him with faulty investment advice. This not a subject matter implicating the types of concerns that courts have considered as a basis for not transferring control of privileges to a trustee. If the Debtor had concerns that his claims in the UBS Litigation create criminal exposure for him (he has professed no such concerns), it is implausible that he would have volunteered to make such issues public by filing a lawsuit. Second, and most tellingly, nowhere in the Debtor's Motion to Stay does he explain, even in the broadest of terms, what allegedly privileged materials in the UBS Litigation could result in personal harm if disclosed. While the Trustee has been denied access to these materials, the Debtor, until the appointment of the Trustee, has had continuous access to this information (and likely still retains copies of his prior communications with UK Counsel, as he has not turned them over to the Trustee). If the Debtor knew of any categories of privileged documents that would be harmful if disclosed, he would be able to establish their existence, but he has not even attempted to so. [9](#page-16-0)\n\n38. For these reasons, it is clear under applicable law that control of any privileges relating to the UBS Litigation has passed to the Trustee, and the Debtor does not attempt to argue otherwise. The Debtor instead simply *assumes* his conclusion that he continues to \"own\" these\n\n<span id=\"page-16-0\"></span> <sup>9</sup> The Debtor is well aware of his need to identify allegedly privileged documents relating specifically to the Debtor's individual interests. As his counsel told the Court at the August 4 hearing, \"as I understand my communications from Attorney Morrissey, there may be items that – I think this is true under U.S. law too, a trustee is appointed and there's different standards between a corporate debtor and an actual person. An actual person may maintain certain privilege even after the appointment of a trustee. And as I understand it, it is similar in the U.K. So there may be items that are in the possession of Harcus Parker that Mr. Kwok personally still has a privilege with respect to, as opposed to items that under U.K. law he doesn't.\" (Hr'g Tr. at 1:2-12).\n\nprivileges and then argues he cannot be made to \"waive\" privileges he owns.[10](#page-17-0) The Debtor then builds upon this specious foundation to argue that *Weintraub* and its progeny would not make sense if a debtor can be forced to waive a privilege he still owns, all while ignoring the threshold point that the Debtor does not, in fact, continue to own these privileges. *See* Motion to Stay at 13.\n\n## **B. Even if Debtor Still Owns a Privilege, Which he Does Not, Paragraph 3(b) of Order Does Not Compel its Waiver**\n\n39. The Counsel Letter that paragraph 3(b) of the Order directs to be sent to UK Counsel states, in relevant part, \"I hereby expressly authorize you to have full and complete discussions on my behalf with Mr. Despins regarding the UBS Litigation, the merits thereof, any related settlement discussions, and any other topics related to the prosecution of the UBS Litigation and to take instructions from him in relation to my claim in the UBS Litigation regardless of any attorney-client privilege, work-product, or other privilege which belongs to me. *Any waiver of the privilege is limited to the provision of this information to the Trustee.* My consent is limited to giving access to the Trustee *to the extent that I am entitled* and contains no wider waiver of privilege and *is not consent by me to the Trustee to waive my privilege*.\"[11](#page-17-1)  Counsel Letter at 1 (emphasis added).\n\n40. Nowhere does the letter state that the Debtor \"fully waives\" his privileges for the purpose of providing information to the Trustee, as the Debtor asserts on pages 2 and 8 of the\n\n<span id=\"page-17-0\"></span> <sup>10</sup> *See, e.g.*, \"There is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or in case law providing that an individual debtor automatically waives or must waive any applicable privileges *that they continue to own* after filing bankruptcy or the appointment of a trustee.\" Motion to Stay at 12-13 (emphasis added); \"[T]he Court could not compel him to waive any attorney client privilege he *still owns* in connection with the UBS Action following the appointment of the Trustee.\" Motion to Stay at 9 (emphasis added); \"There has been no claim that the Debtor has waived any privilege that he *still owns* in connection with the UBS Action, whether under U.S. or U.K. law.\" Motion to Stay at 3 (emphasis added).\n\n<span id=\"page-17-1\"></span><sup>11</sup> Notably, the letter does not assume that the Debtor owns any privileges, nor that he has any commensurate right to waive them.\n\nMotion to Stay, nor is there any discussion of a \"blanket waiver\" consistent with the Debtor's uncorroborated claim that \"the Court is compelling the Debtor to make a blanket waiver of any privilege that he continues to own in connection with the UBS Action.\" Motion to Stay, ¶ 25. This makes complete sense because—as discussed in detail above—the Debtor does not own or control any privileges relating to the UBS Litigation, and, therefore, there is nothing to waive.\n\n41. The Debtor nevertheless leverages his dubious assertions that a \"waiver\" is occurring to claim that U.K. law prohibits the Court from compelling the Debtor to send the Counsel Letter. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Debtor continues to own a privilege (he does not), he is wrong about the law. The Counsel Letter—which as noted above was prepared in coordination with UK Counsel—is fully consistent with U.K. law.\n\n42. Under U.K. law, the Trustee is allowed to see privileged documents and communications associated with the UBS Litigation in order to prosecute the litigation, even if the Debtor still claims to own a privilege, so long as the Trustee does not have the ability to waive the privilege. *See Avonwick Holdings Limited v. Shlosberg*, [2016] EWCA (Civ) 1138, ¶¶ 69-71 (Court of Appeal, Civil Division, 2016) (holding that it was necessarily implicit in section 311 (I) of the Insolvency Act 1986 that a trustee can take possession of privileged records relating to the bankrupt's estate or affairs for the overriding function of investigation the bankrupt's affairs and distributing potential assets to the bankrupt's estate, as long as the trustee's use of the privileged documents do not amount to a waiver of privilege as to any third parties) (attached to Debtor's Motion to Stay); *see also Leeds v. Lemos*, [2017] EWHC 1825 (Ch), ¶ 260 (Chancery Division, 2017) (\"There can be no dispute that the trustees are entitled to see the privileged information and use it for the purpose of carrying out their statutory functions,\n\nprovided, as the Court of Appeal has held in Avonwick, that they do not waive legal professional privilege without the bankrupt's consent.\") (attached to Debtor's Motion to Stay). [12](#page-19-0) [13](#page-19-1)\n\n43. Given that the Counsel Letter explicitly states that the Debtor is *not* consenting to the Trustee's waiver of his privilege—and the Trustee is not claiming the Counsel Letter provides for his ability to do so—any argument that U.K. law prohibits a bankruptcy trustee from waiving a debtor's privilege is of no moment. (*See* Order, Exhibit B.)\n\n44. Finally, there is no merit to the Debtor's contention that these issues need to be decided by a U.K. court. US courts frequently decide issues of foreign law, and, if necessary, this Court can do so here. *See, e.g.*, *In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA*, 555 B.R. 323, 350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"The ability of U.S. courts to apply foreign law is especially relevant to U.K. law, which is generally amenable to interpretation by a U.S. court.\" (citation omitted)); *Shipping Corp. of India v. Am. Bureau of Shipping*, 603 F. Supp. 801, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (\"The courts of this country are capable of applying foreign law whenever necessary.\"). The Debtor's demand that a U.K. court decide these issues seems most likely calculated to cause delay and to interfere with the Trustee's work – actions that are directly in conflict with paragraph 6 of the Order, which provides that the Debtor may not \"interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the authority under this Order, including any action\n\n<span id=\"page-19-0\"></span> <sup>12</sup> Moreover, in *Avonwick*, the bankruptcy trustees sought to waive the debtor's privilege for the benefit of Avonwick, a third party, and largest creditor of the debtor's estate, in a conspiracy proceeding that Avonwick brought against multiple defendants including the debtor. *See Avonwick* at ¶¶ 3, 21. Similarly, in *Leed*, the trustees sought to waive the debtor's privilege in a third party action brought to set aside certain transactions that the debtor entered into prior to bankruptcy. *See Leed* at ¶¶ 10, 16, 27, 36. Here, the Trustee would not be waiving any privilege for the benefit of any third party. The Trustee has made this representation before and reaffirms it here. Instead, the Trustee would be reviewing the relevant information solely to control and direct the UBS Litigation.\n\n<span id=\"page-19-1\"></span><sup>13</sup> Notably, these cases do not require consent of the Debtor for the Trustee to be permitted to review any privileged information.\n\ntaken or to be taken by the Trustee in a foreign court on behalf of the Estate in furtherance of such authority.\"[14](#page-20-0)\n\n### **II. Trustee Will Suffer Substantial Injury If Stay is Granted**\n\n45. Every day that the Trustee is prevented from receiving the relevant information regarding the UBS Litigation, which *everyone* agrees the Trustee now owns and controls, the litigation remains paralyzed. Absent the ability to assess counsel's views of the merits of the litigation and prospects for recovery, the Trustee can neither craft a strategy for a successful resolution, nor instruct UK Counsel how best to proceed. The UBS Litigation will remain rudderless until the Trustee can receive information from UK Counsel. [15](#page-20-1)\n\n46. The Debtor's position appears to be that, while the Trustee controls the UBS Litigation, the Trustee should not be able to access any of the existing information regarding the case or work product produced by UK Counsel. This is an absurd position, as it would essentially require the Trustee to find new counsel and attempt to litigate the UBS Litigation anew, despite the matter being in mid-litigation. This would deeply prejudice the Trustee's ability to effectively administer the litigation, and would cost the estate substantial resources it does not have, to redo UK Counsel's work.\n\n<span id=\"page-20-0\"></span> <sup>14</sup> The Debtor's final gambit is to argue that despite Bankruptcy Rule 9013, the oral motion here was allegedly not related to the written motion being heard. This argument is specious. The Corporate Governance Right Motion not only sought confirmation of the Trustee's control of the Debtor's domestic and foreign assets but also authorization for the Trustee to act in any foreign countries on behalf of the Debtor's estate, which plainly implicated the UBS Litigation. At the August 1 hearing, at the Debtor's request, the Court adjourned the hearing for the sole purpose of allowing the Debtor to review and file an objection to the Corporate Governance Right Motion, which he did. At the August 4 hearing, counsel for the Debtor not only argued this point extensively, but in doing so pointed the Court to both case law he had already included for this purpose in his objection and to two new cases he prepared for the hearing and wished to raise to the Court's attention. Aug. 4 Hearing Tr. at 15-16.\n\n<span id=\"page-20-1\"></span><sup>15</sup> At the August 4 Hearing, Debtor's counsel acknowledged this reality, telling the Court: \"So I don't think she's the debtor's lawyer. I don't think she's Mr. Despins lawyer. I frankly am not sure where that leaves the status of whoever is the plaintiff in that action in the U.K.\" Aug. 4 Hearing Tr. at 10.\n\n47. This harm is far from theoretical. Just this week, UK Counsel informed the Trustee and the Debtor that it intended to adjourn an October hearing because they lacked clarity over whom they should be taking instruction from. *See supra*, ¶ 27. A granting of the Motion to Stay will only further sow confusion and exacerbate the lack of control of the litigation.\n\n48. Despite these transparent harms to the Trustee and the estate, the Debtor blithely claims that the only harm the Trustee will suffer is that the \"UBS Action may take longer absent a compelled waiver of any privilege of the privilege of the Debtor.\" Motion to Stay, ¶ 26. Not only is the alleged \"compelled waiver\" a strawman, but any such delay in the resolution of the UBS Litigation is not a trivial concern, as the Debtor implies.\n\n49. Any delay occasioned by the stay the Debtor seeks will not only effectively leave the litigation without a steward able to guide UK Counsel, but in this case, the harm from such a delay is particularly pronounced. Despite his seeming immense wealth, the Debtor's schedules list assets of only \\$3,850,[16](#page-21-0) leaving the Trustee with a paucity of assets on hand to use for the expenses necessary to generate recoveries for the estate's creditors. By tactically delaying the UBS Litigation, which is likely, if meritorious, the largest asset that the Debtor has admitted belongs to the estate, the Debtor is forestalling not only a recovery on that asset, but also interfering with the Trustee's work to find the Debtor's other hidden assets.\n\n## **III. Debtor Will Not Suffer Irreparable Injury Absent a Stay and Balance of Hardship Tips in Favor of Trustee**\n\n50. The Debtor fails to articulate any *actual* irreparable injury he will allegedly suffer absent a stay. Instead, the entirety of the Debtor's claim of alleged irreparable harm revolves around the false premise that \"the Court is compelling the Debtor to make a blanket waiver of\n\n<span id=\"page-21-0\"></span> <sup>16</sup> The Debtor has scheduled certain assets with unknown values, including disputed unregistered copyrights and litigation claims. (*See* Debtor's Schedules at 6) (ECF No. 78).\n\nany privilege that he continues to own in connection with the UBS Action.\" Motion to Stay, ¶ 25. As discussed above, the Debtor fails to make any showing that he \"owns\" any privilege in the UBS Litigation, much less that by allowing the Trustee to communicate with UK Counsel for the claims the Trustee now owns, any blanket waiver of such privilege will be occasioned.\n\n51. To the extent the Debtor is aware of any privileged information in the UBS Litigation that he believes relates most closely to his interests as an individual, such that control of the privilege should not pass to the Trustee, it was incumbent upon the Debtor to identify what, if any, privileges he believed he still \"owned.\" [17](#page-22-0) Instead, the Debtor neither identifies a single privileged communication, nor even a category of privileged documents, that he asserts would fall on the individual side of the balancing test; opting instead to imply that because he cannot identify a single such issue, the purported waiver must be extremely broad. In fact, it is quite the opposite; all the Debtor has demonstrated is that there is no known potential harm at issue here.\n\n52. Control of any privileges in the UBS Litigation no longer belongs to Debtor, but rather passed to the Trustee at the time of his appointment. *See supra* ¶¶ 32-34. As such, the Debtor no longer controls the right to assert such privileges, and thus cannot be harmed when control of such privileges resides with the Trustee.\n\n53. Moreover, despite the Debtor's stated refusal to comply with the Order, the Court has not *sua sponte* held him in contempt, nor has the Trustee moved to hold the Debtor in contempt. The Debtor currently faces no irreparable harm absent a stay.\n\n<span id=\"page-22-0\"></span> <sup>17</sup> Given that this was the Debtor's litigation which he had been pursuing with his choice of counsel, Debtor cannot now claim that he is unaware of what types of privileged communications exist between himself and his counsel.\n\n54. Finally, any balancing of hardship clearly tips in favor of the Trustee. As the Debtor himself concedes, the UBS Litigation is now the Trustee's to administer. The only question is whether it will be done efficiently with the benefit of communications and past attorney work product, or whether the Trustee will be forced to administer the UBS Litigation as if from a blank slate, with no benefit from past attorney work product, at great hardship to the Trustee, the estate, and the its creditors.\n\n#### **IV. Public Interest Weighs Against a Stay**\n\n55. The only public interest that the Debtor raises in support of his requested stay is a bland assertion that the attorney-client privilege is important and should be protected. Motion to Stay ¶ 27. While no one here is disputing that truism, it ignores the point: control of that important privilege has passed to the Trustee, who through the Counsel Letter only seeks to understand the claims he now owns, not to effectuate a broad waiver of any privileges. As *Weintraub* and its progeny make clear, passage of control does not impinge on the privilege, nor does it constitute a waiver of the privilege. See *In re Foster*, 188 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (\"subject to the . . . balancing, a trustee may control an individual debtor's privilege.\"). 56. The actual public interest in this matter is in allowing the Trustee to be able to move ahead with administering his responsibilities and recovering assets for the benefit of the estate and its creditors; a goal the Debtor seems intent on obstructing at every turn. The Debtor voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 to avoid pending actions to collect debts of the Debtor. There is no public interest in allowing the Debtor to use this Court as a shield from his creditors, while working tirelessly to obfuscate his assets, so that he can continue to live the life of a billionaire. As Judge Ostrager noted \"[i]f billionaire litigants can simultaneously seek to use Court process[es] in New York and elsewhere in the United States while knowingly and intentionally\n\nviolating Court orders, there is no rule of law.\" Final Contempt Order at 10. The public interest dictates allowing the Trustee to expediently do his work, in the UBS Litigation and elsewhere, so that estate creditors can be paid as soon as possible.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nDated: August 26, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS, New Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett *(pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft *(pro hac vice* pending) Douglass Barron (*pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:　第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　:　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。1　:\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n受托人对债务人提出的、请求在对裁定提起上诉期间暂停执行的动议的异议；该裁定系根据《破产法》第363、521、541、1108及105条作出，(A) 确认第11章受托人享有债务人在债务人控制实体中的全部经济及公司治理权利，(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财团在任何外国行事，及 (C) 授予相关救济\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘斯）以其在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）的第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（下称“受托人”）身份，就债务人提出的、请求在对裁定提起上诉期间暂停执行的动议提出本异议（下称“本异议”）；该裁定系根据《破产法》第363、\n\n521、541、1108及105条作出，(A) 确认第11章受托人享有债务人在债务人控制实体中的全部\n\n经济及公司治理权利，(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财团在任何外国行事，及 (C) 授予相关\n\n救济（ECF No. 761）（下称“暂停执行动议”）。受托人为支持本\n\n异议，陈述如下：\n\n1 尽管债务人的法定姓名为 Ho Wan Kwok，但其亦被称为 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他化名。债务人纳税人识别号码的后四位为 9595。\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 尽管债务人声称对本院准许受托人公司治理权利动议（定义见下文）的裁定（ECF 717）（下称“该裁定”）整体提起上诉，但其仅请求暂停执行该裁定中的一项规定——即第3(b)段。此外，尽管暂停执行动议表面上适用于第3(b)段的全部内容，但债务人实际上仅对该段的一个方面提出异议。具体而言，债务人主张，本院要求其“在本裁定作出后不迟于五个工作日，向[英国律师（定义见下文）]递交一份采用随附本文件之附件B所附格式的函件副本”并不适当。（裁定第3(b)段）。债务人并未对第3(b)段其余内容提出异议，该部分规定，“为免生疑问，受托人应在一切目的下被视为债务人在” UBS Litigation（定义见下文）中提出的请求的所有人（同上）。因此，受托人拥有针对 UBS 的请求权并无争议。\n\n2. 关于债务人对第3(b)段中要求其签署律师函（定义见下文）部分所声称的担忧，债务人远未满足上诉期间暂停执行的标准。为获得暂停执行，债务人必须证明：(i) 其在实体问题上有实质性胜诉可能性；(ii) 如不予暂停执行，其将遭受不可弥补的损害；(iii) 如准予暂停执行，反对暂停执行的一方不会遭受实质性损害；以及 (iv) 暂停执行符合公共利益。债务人无法满足上述任何一项因素，更遑论证明综合权衡这些因素后其有权在上诉期间获得暂停执行。\n\n3. 首先，债务人的上诉几乎不可能成功，因为债务人既从根本上误解（或歪曲，或二者兼有）该裁定的性质，亦错误陈述了相关法律。债务人主张其上诉很可能成功，理由是该裁定第3(b)段所提及的律师函将要求其签署一项范围广泛的“全面豁免”，放弃其据称在英国法下产生且即使作为占有中债务人仍“拥有”的特权。\n\n在作出该主张时，债务人似乎依赖于未被纳入该裁定的律师函先前版本，因为该函件的最终版本并未要求任何此类事项。最终版律师函仅称，受托人作为破产财团在 UBS Litigation 中请求权的所有人，应当获得 Harcus Parker Limited（哈克斯·帕克有限公司）（下称“英国律师”）与该诉讼有关的文件和信息，包括律师对其实体依据及该诉讼和解立场的任何评估。\n\n4. 因此，债务人对第3(b)段提起上诉的整个前提——即其被迫对其在 UBS Litigation 中仍“拥有”的特权作出全面豁免，从而允许受托人放弃该等特权——是一个转移视线的问题。债务人知道（或者至少应当知道）情况如此，因为本院在 8 月 4 日听证会（定义见下文）上已明确告知其律师：“该函并未说他正在放弃其特权。事实上，其称对该特权的任何放弃仅限于向受托人提供该等信息。函中就是这样写的。”Aug. 4 Hearing Tr. at 10:17-20 (ECF No. 746)。\n\n5. 第3(b)段确实旨在实现的救济——即要求债务人指示英国律师向受托人提供文件和信息——完全符合适用法律。如以下所述，以及更一般地如受托人特权动议（定义见下文）所述，债务人并不拥有（或控制）与 UBS Litigation（或任何其他诉讼）有关的任何特权；相反，根据联邦破产法，所有该等特权均在受托人获任命时自动转移给受托人。事实上，债务人依其自身承认，甚至并未试图证明其“拥有”或控制任何该等特权。（暂停执行动议第13页，脚注 2）。因此，受托人作为\n\n2 暂停执行动议多次提及特权的“所有权”。判例法将“控制”一词与债务人动议中“所有权”一词的用法视为同义。因此，除非具体提及债务人的主张，受托人将在其异议中提及对特权的控制。\n\n债务人特权的控制人，有权从英国律师处获取信息，应无争议。债务人如认为该裁定因其据称拥有 UBS Litigation 中任何特权而涉及英国特权法，则其并不正确。但即使其正确，该裁定也完全符合英国法，英国法绝不限制受托人获得特权文件的查阅权。鉴于律师函是在与英国律师协商后起草的，这一点本不应令人意外。\n\n6. 债务人也无法证明，如不予暂停执行，其将遭受不可弥补的损害，或者如准予暂停执行，受托人不会受到损害。若债务人被迫放弃其“拥有”的特权，其即将遭受不可弥补损害的主张毫无说服力，因为法律明确规定，UBS Litigation 中特权的控制权已转移给受托人，而债务人未能指出任何一份特权文件，甚至未指出任何一类特权文件，其披露将会对其造成损害。债务人不能仅仅假定其拥有某项特权这一结论，再（错误地）抱怨其被迫放弃该项特权，从而凭空制造损害。此外，即使债务人控制 UBS Litigation 中的任何特权，其仍不会遭受任何损害，因为律师函所要求采取的行动完全符合英国法。\n\n7. 另一方面，暂停执行将给受托人造成实质性损害这一点无可争议。受托人拥有债务人在 UBS Litigation 中的请求权，该请求权是债务人清单中已确定的最大资产。英国律师已明确表示，除非这些问题得到解决，英国律师将继续拒绝向受托人提供有关该案件的必要信息，实际上阻止其履行义务，并使破产财团失去可从该诉讼中实现的必要收益。事实上，英国律师刚刚表示，由于债务人在本院的行为，UBS Litigation 中的一场听证会将需要延期。\n\n8. 最后，公共利益强烈支持制止债务人的拖延策略，并允许受托人继续开展本院交由其履行的重要工作。本院并非在一张白纸上作出判断；本院可借鉴 Ostrager 法官（奥斯特拉格法官）的经验，后者曾审理债务人长达五年的“逃避和藐视行为”，并认定债务人“明知且故意违反法院命令”。Decision + Order on Motion, PAX v. Kwok, 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2020), ECF No. 1181（“最终藐视法庭命令”）第7、10页。没有比这更恰当的描述来说明为何本案中公共利益因素强烈支持受托人。应驳回所请求的上诉期间暂停执行。\n\n背景\n\n9. On June 15, 2022，本院作出决定备忘录及命令（ECF No. 465）（下称“受托人命令”），指示 United States Trustee（美国受托人）在该第11章案件中任命一名第11章受托人。根据受托人命令，美国受托人选定 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘斯）担任受托人。On July 8, 2022，根据受托人命令，本院作出命令，批准任命 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘斯）担任该第11章案件的受托人（ECF No. 523）（下称“任命命令”）。\n\n10. 在受托人命令中，本院强调受托人有能力“运用独立判断和良好管理来指导破产财团事务，以尝试清偿债权人的债权”，并通过包括调查“债务人的资产、负债和财务事务”等方式，“为债权人和破产财团实现回收最大化”。（见受托人命令第18页）。受托人命令指示受托人履行“11 U.S.C. § 1106 规定的所有职责”。（见受托人命令第15-16、18页）\n\nA. 公司治理权利动议\n\n11. 受任后，受托人担心，由于债务人有抗拒法院命令及从事逃避其债权人的行为的既往记录，受托人可能无法就债务人资产和事务的管理及控制有效履行其职责。因此，On July 23, 2022，受托人提交其《第11章受托人请求作出命令的动议；该命令系根据《破产法》第363、541、1108及105条作出，(A) 确认第11章受托人享有债务人在债务人控制实体中的全部经济权利，(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财团在任何外国行事，并授予相关救济》（ECF No. 598）。在该动议中，受托人请求的救济包括确认：债务人不得干扰、阻碍或拖延受托人就其控制下实体行使债务人的经济及治理权利，亦不得干扰、阻碍或拖延受托人作为债务人外国代表的权限。债务人于 On July 29, 2022 提交了其反对受托人动议的答复（ECF No. 643）。[3]\n\nB. UBS Litigation（瑞银诉讼）\n\n12. 债务人一项重大的已知资产是其就 United Kingdom（英国）待决诉讼中对 UBS AG（瑞银集团）享有的诉讼请求。[4] 具体而言，在该项诉讼之前\n\n4 参见诉讼请求书，Kwok Ho Wan & Ors v UBS, Cl-2020-000345, High Court of Justice of England and Wales Queen's Bench Division Commercial Court（英格兰和威尔士高等法院王座法庭商事法庭）（随附于本文件，作为证据A）。有意思的是，与债务人在本案中的主张相反，诉讼请求书指出债务人“是一名高净值人士。”同上，第1段。\n\n在申请日之后，于2020年9月，债务人及其控制的另外两名原告对UBS AG（瑞银集团股份公司）提起诉讼，寻求追回约\\$495 million（以下简称“UBS诉讼”）。\n\n13. 鉴于其识别、管理和保护破产财产资产的职责，受托人对于确保其拥有管理UBS诉讼及指示该诉讼中律师的专属权力和能力，具有既得利益。因此，受托人联系了位于伦敦、曾在UBS诉讼中代理债务人的英国法律顾问（UK Counsel），以寻求在非正式基础上获得案件档案和信息。受托人在这方面的努力未获成功。\n\n14. 2022年7月31日，受托人就公司治理权利动议（Corporate Governance Rights Motion）提交了一份经修订的拟议裁定（以下简称“初始经修订拟议裁定”），其中除其他事项外，请求法院命令债务人：(i) 向受托人提供与所有破产财产有关的全部账簿、文件和记录；以及 (ii) 就UBS诉讼而言，按照作为初始经修订拟议裁定证据B所附的格式，向英国法律顾问发出一封信，指示将与UBS诉讼有关的所有材料，包括英国法律顾问的案件档案，移交给受托人。\n\n15. 在2022年8月1日就公司治理权利动议举行的听证会上，债务人提出异议，称其需要额外时间审阅并反对初始经修订拟议裁定。法院准许了债务人的请求，将该事项延期至2022年8月4日。\n\n16. 2022年8月2日，受托人就公司治理权利动议提交了一份进一步经修订的拟议裁定（以下简称“进一步经修订拟议裁定”）（ECF No. 671），其中作出了一些已在2022年8月1日听证会上讨论过的额外轻微修改。\n\n17. 2022年8月4日，债务人对初始经修订拟议裁定提出异议（ECF No. 678），受托人提交了其答复（ECF No. 679），其中除其他事项外，讨论了法院作出进一步经修订拟议裁定的依据。\n\nC. 公司治理权利动议听证会\n\n18. 法院于同日就公司治理权利动议举行听证会（以下简称“8月4日听证会”）。债务人的重点，无论是在其异议中还是在其律师于听证会上的陈述中，大多涉及初始经修订拟议裁定中要求其向英国法律顾问发送所附信函的措辞。具体而言，债务人主张，强迫债务人发送会导致债务人特权被“放弃”的通信是不适当的，并且可能违反英国特权法。Aug. 4 Hearing Tr. at 10:12-15, 12:16-22。\n\n19. 作为回应，法院明确表示，就公司治理权利动议而言，受托人仅仅是承继了债务人的特权。参见同上，at 19:17-20（“Chapter 11受托人一经被任命，Chapter 11受托人即承继Kwok先生的地位。因此，Chapter 11受托人在[UBS诉讼]中拥有Kwok先生的特权”）；同上，at 21:2-4（“Despins先生在其成为Chapter 11受托人时即承继了债务人的地位。对此已有确立的判例法，Henzy律师。”）；同上，at 73:20-22, 24-25（“一旦任命受托人的裁定获批准，……Despins先生便成为Kwok先生。……Despins先生已承继所有这些权利。”）。因此，如法院所指出，特权放弃并非争议事项。同上，at 10:17-22（“该信并未表示[债务人]正在放弃其特权。事实上，该信称，对特权的任何放弃仅限于向受托人提供该等信息。这正是该信所说的。”）（原文强调）。此外，受托人明确表示，其仅关注与UBS诉讼实体理由及和解前景有关的特权信息。同上，at 7:17-22（受托人指出，其请求英国法律顾问起草一封信，允许律师“向[受托人]提供关于各项请求实体理由以及任何和解提议的最新情况”）。\n\n20. 听证会记录还反映，律师函（Counsel Letter）并非受托人单独拟定，而是与英国法律顾问协作的结果。参见同上，at 7:16-24（受托人称：“我与……在该UBS诉讼中代理[债务人]的律师之间进行了许多来回沟通。……最后，我说，听着，你为何不干脆起草一封信，一封你会乐于从Kwok先生处收到的信，该信将允许你……向我提供关于各项请求实体理由的最新情况。……最终，[英国法律顾问]这样做了。”）；同上，at 8:8-11（“因此，我们采纳了她的信函，作出一些轻微修改，而这基本上就是我们现在请求法院命令[债务人]发送给她的信函，该信基本上称，给予[受托人]对[UBS诉讼案件档案]的完全访问权限。”）；同上，at 13:4-11（“而那封信，基本上就是她作出修改标记的那封信，称如果她收到该信，她将……向我提供特权信息。关于什么？关于该诉讼的实体理由。”）。\n\nD. 准许公司治理权利动议的裁定\n\n21. 8月10日，法院驳回债务人的异议，并准许公司治理权利动议（ECF 717）（以下简称“裁定”）。该裁定广泛确认受托人对债务人的经济权利和公司治理权利的所有权及权限，并命令债务人“向受托人交出全部破产财产以及任何记录的信息，包括但不限于与破产财产有关的账簿、文件、记录和文书。”（裁定，第3段。）\n\n22. 此外，该裁定授予受托人以破产财产外国代表身份在外国行事的广泛权限，包括为调查破产财产资产以及请求和取得相关文件之目的。（同上，第5段）。该裁定进一步规定，债务人“不得干预、阻碍或延迟受托人行使本裁定项下的权限，包括受托人为推进该等权限而代表破产财产在外国法院采取或将采取的任何行动。”（同上，第6段）。\n\n23. 最后，裁定第3(b)段指示债务人向英国法律顾问交付一份进一步经修订的信函副本，该信函作为裁定的证据B随附（以下简称“律师函”）。重要的是，律师函中的措辞不同于作为初始经修订拟议裁定证据B所附信函的措辞，因为更新后的信函反映了基于受托人与英国法律顾问持续沟通而作出的额外修改。参见上文，第19段。具体而言，法院最终批准的律师函第三段和第四段规定如下：\n\n为推进上述事项，并为免生疑义，本人特此明确授权贵方代表本人，就UBS诉讼、其实体理由、任何相关和解讨论以及与推进UBS诉讼有关的任何其他事项，与Despins先生进行充分且完整的讨论，并就本人在UBS诉讼中的请求接受其指示，而不论属于本人的任何律师—客户特权、工作成果或其他特权如何。对特权的任何放弃仅限于向受托人提供该等信息。本人同意仅限于在本人有权的范围内向受托人给予访问权限，不包含任何更广泛的特权放弃，且不构成本人同意受托人放弃本人的特权。\n\n除其他事项外，并如美国破产法院（U.S. Bankruptcy Court）的裁定（其副本作为证据1随附）中所详述，本人指示贵方：(i) 在可行的最早时间向受托人交付并与其分享贵方向本人就UBS诉讼作出的全部备忘录、意见和其他通信、关于UBS诉讼实体理由的任何其他信息（无论是否为书面形式），以及本人或贵方就该诉讼收到或提出的任何和解要约；以及 (ii) 在可行的最早时间向受托人提供对贵方UBS诉讼案件档案中本人有权获得部分的完全访问权限，以及在UBS诉讼中提交的所有诉状和其他法院文件。\n\n（参见裁定，证据B（原文强调）。）\n\n24. 债务人在其暂缓执行动议（Motion to Stay）中引用作为初始经修订拟议裁定证据B所附的拟议信函先前版本，以论证其在上诉中很可能胜诉。（参见暂缓执行动议，第8页（“本人特此明确授权贵方与Despins先生就UBS诉讼……进行充分且完整的讨论，而不论任何律师—客户特权、工作成果或其他特权如何，本人特此为该等目的完全放弃该等特权”）（引自经修订拟议裁定）（原文强调）。）该措辞与作为裁定证据B所附最终律师函中的措辞存在实质性差异。具体而言，如上所示，法院批准的措辞承认，就UBS诉讼而言，受托人仅仅承继债务人的地位，并且不存在任何特权放弃。（参见裁定，证据B（“对特权的任何放弃仅限于向受托人提供该等信息。本人同意仅限于在本人有权的范围内向受托人给予访问权限，不包含任何更广泛的特权放弃，且不构成本人同意受托人放弃本人的特权。”）（原文强调）。）\n\nE. Rule 2004 动议、裁定及特权动议\n\n25. 2022年7月28日，受托人提交三项相关动议，以对债务人（ECF No. 636）、债务人的多名法律和财务顾问（ECF No. 637），以及与债务人有关联的多家实体和个人（ECF No. 638）进行《破产程序规则》第2004条调查（统称“Rule 2004 动议”）。各项Rule 2004动议均附有拟议的文件和证言传票（以下简称“Rule 2004 传票”）。2022年8月16日，法院准许Rule 2004动议，授权进行相应审查并送达文件请求（ECF Nos. 756, 757, and 758）（统称“Rule 2004 裁定”）。\n\n26. 2022年8月22日，为确认受托人的权利并协助其执行Rule 2004裁定，受托人提交了一项请求作出裁定的动议，即：(A) 规定与Rule 2004传票所要求文件有关的任何律师—客户特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权，在任命受托人时已转移给受托人；(B) 命令债务人和其他被审查人不得以该等特权为由扣留文件；以及 (C) 授予相关救济（ECF 777）（以下简称“特权动议”）。特权动议请求法院作出裁定，确认在任命受托人后，对与破产财产的资产、负债、财务状况或管理有关的任何律师—客户特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权已转移给受托人，且债务人和任何传票接收人均不得以任何该等特权为由扣留任何回应Rule 2004传票的文件，或试图主张任何由受托人控制的该等特权。\n\n27. 特权动议定于2022年8月30日举行听证会。\n\nF. 上诉及上诉待决期间暂缓执行动议\n\n28. 2022年8月10日，债务人就该命令提出上诉通知（ECF No. 723）。此后，债务人提交了中止执行动议。重要的是，中止执行动议仅请求中止该命令中与UBS（瑞银）诉讼中的律师函有关的第3(b)段。该动议并未请求中止执行该命令的任何其他条款，亦未就该等其他条款请求任何其他救济。\n\n29. 如下所述，所请求的中止执行将对受托人造成极大不利影响，因为其不仅可能延迟受托人获取UBS诉讼中的重要信息，还可能妨碍该诉讼继续进行，并可能妨碍该诉讼最终达成一项有利于破产财产债权人的重大和解或获得重大判决。事实上，2022年8月23日，受托人收到英国律师的电子邮件，称由于对于谁控制该事项中的特权并向律师提供指示存在混乱，希望请求延期举行UBS诉讼中即将于10月举行的听证会。受托人获得法院协助至关重要，以尽量减少UBS诉讼发生任何此类延期或其他延误的可能性。\n\n论证\n\n30. 为使该命令被中止执行，债务人必须证明其满足第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）在Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)中确立的四要件检验：“[1] 在实体问题上胜诉的可能性，[2] 如中止执行被拒绝将造成不可弥补的损害，[3] 如准予中止执行将对反对中止执行的一方造成重大损害，以及[4] 公共利益。”[5] 债务人未能确立其中任何一项因素，更遑论证明这些因素合起来对其有利。\n\n一、债务人无法证明其在实体问题上具有胜诉可能性\n\n31. 为满足上诉待决期间中止执行标准中的胜诉可能性要件，动议方必须“有力证明其很可能在实体问题上胜诉。”In re Cacioli, 302 B.R. 429, 431 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003)（引自Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1987)（指出上诉待决期间中止执行的决定因素为“(1) 申请中止执行者是否有力证明其很可能在实体问题上胜诉；(2) 申请人如未获中止执行是否将遭受不可弥补的损害；(3) 作出中止执行是否将对程序中其他利害关系方造成重大损害；以及(4) 公共利益所在”））。[6] 债务人远未达到该标准，因为该命令的全部内容——包括明确要求交付律师函的第3(b)段——几乎必然会被维持。这是因为，(i) 对于债务人在UBS诉讼中相关特权的控制权在受托人获任命后移交给受托人这一点，不存在任何正当争议；以及(ii) 即使债务人仍拥有或控制某项特权（事实并非如此），该命令亦未要求其“放弃”，因此，债务人关于该命令违反英国特权法的主张毫无依据。\n\n5 “一项因素所需具备的程度，随其他因素的强弱而变化，即一项[因素]越强，便可弥补另一项因素的不足。”McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007)（引文及内部引号省略）（原文改动）。\n\n6 第二巡回上诉法院的其他一些法院在分析上诉待决期间中止执行动议时，表述了略有修改的标准。参见，例如，In re Country Squire Assoc. of Carle Place, L.P., 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d Cir. BAP 1996)（“(1) 动议方如未获中止执行是否将遭受不可弥补的损害，(2) 如准予中止执行一方是否将遭受重大损害，(3) 动议方是否证明其在上诉中具有‘实质性胜诉可能性，尽管尚未达到胜诉可能性的程度’，以及(4) 可能受到影响的公共利益。”）。在此，债务人依照两种标准均不能成立。\n\nA. UBS诉讼中的律师—当事人保密特权控制权已移交给受托人\n\n32. 如特权动议中详细说明，律师—当事人保密特权的控制权在第11章受托人获任命后移交给该受托人，但以该特权涉及破产财产的资产和负债、债务人的财务状况以及破产财产的管理为限。[7]\n\n33. 联邦最高法院（Supreme Court）在Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n（商品期货交易委员会）v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)（“Weintraub”）中审理了以下问题：受托人获任命后，公司律师—当事人保密特权的控制权是移交给受托人，还是仍由债务人的管理层掌握。联邦最高法院认定，受托人在控制律师—当事人保密特权方面取代公司债务人的地位，正如受托人在更广泛意义上管理公司债务人时所作的一样。参见id. at 353-54。[8] 在作出该决定时，联邦最高法院明确指出，问题在于特权的控制权是否移交给破产受托人，而不是律师—当事人保密特权是否存在例外，\n\n7 如上所述，同样定于2022年8月30日举行听证会的受托人特权动议，更详细地阐明了相关法律及论点。为提高司法效率，受托人不会在此重复特权动议中的全部论点，而将着重说明与本异议有关的关键要点，并请求将特权动议中阐明的法律和论点通过援引方式并入本异议。\n\n8 尽管Weintraub指出，其并未就个人债务人案件中该特权向受托人的移交发表意见，参见id. at 356，但法院并未表明律师—当事人保密特权的控制权不应移交给个人债务人的受托人，或个人债务人案件中获任命的受托人的需要会以任何方式不同于公司债务人受托人的需要。恰恰相反，联邦最高法院有关《破产法》下受托人角色和职责的全部详细引述，对个人债务人受托人与公司债务人受托人同等适用。\n\n亦非提出破产案件是否导致放弃任何先前存在的特权，从而允许受托人查阅先前受特权保护的文件。\n\n34. 尽管Weintraub仅涉及公司债务人，此后若干下级法院已审理该特权是否也会在个人债务人案件中移交给受托人。处理该问题的法院中绝大多数采用“利益衡量检验”，即考察所涉特权与受托人根据《破产法》享有的权利、承担的义务及责任分配最为密切相关，还是该特权主要关乎债务人作为个人的利益。参见，例如，In re Bame, 251 B.R. 367, 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000); In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999)（将裁决发回破产法院适用利益衡量检验）。与Weintraub相同，该利益衡量检验旨在确定特权的控制权是否移交给受托人，而不是确定向受托人提供信息后该信息是否仍受特权保护。因此，债务人对于任何特权被放弃的任何担忧均不适用，因为当特权控制权移交给受托人时，并无任何特权被放弃。参见，例如，In re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998)（“个人债务人提出破产申请时，需要确定是否有其他人控制该特权。”（引自Weintraub））；Bame, 251 B.R. at 377（将该利益衡量分析描述为，在某些情形下，“个人债务人就破产申请前通信所享有的律师—当事人保密特权是否确实移交给受托人……”。）。\n\n35. 适用利益衡量检验的法院通常认定，就与破产财产资产、其财务状况或破产财产管理有关的文件而言，受托人控制该特权。参见，例如，Bazemore, 216 B.R. at 1024（认定受托人在其寻求文件以确定破产财产是否拥有诉因时，享有放弃律师—当事人保密特权的权利）；Bame, 251 B.R. at 377（在受托人为追回资产而寻求文件证据开示时，支持受托人控制个人债务人特权的请求）；In re Horvath, No. 13-34137 MAW, 2015 WL 2195060, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 7, 2015)（因受托人寻求可能增加债务人破产财产价值，故允许从个人债务人处进行与资产清单上请求权有关的证据开示，并认定“受托人有权放弃债务人的律师—当事人保密特权”，且裁定“受托人调查的唯一目的，是增强其就该等资产管理破产财产的能力，并可能提高债务人破产财产对其债权人的价值”）。另一方面，当特权移交可能导致对“[债务人]本人造成重大损害或对其本人产生重大控制”时，例如面临刑事责任，或对于律师—当事人通信的寒蝉效应存在压倒性关切时，利益衡量可能倾向于个人债务人保留特权控制权。参见Bame, 251 B.R. at 377（认定就“受托人可以向律师提出的大多数问题”而言，受托人控制特权，但指出，就涉及可能导致对债务人提出刑事指控的活动的通信而言，“利益衡量很可能倾向于维持对该特权的主张……”。）。\n\n36. 在此，对于与UBS诉讼有关的所有特权信息，利益衡量检验强烈支持将特权的控制权移交给受托人。如有事实依据，UBS诉讼可能构成债务人破产财产的一项重大潜在资产，主张的损害赔偿约为$495 million dollars。无争议的是，受托人现为该诉讼中债务人请求权的所有人。为有效履行其根据《破产法》承担的义务，以最大化该资产从而使破产财产及其债权人受益，必须向受托人提供英国律师所持有的与该诉讼有关的信息。事实上，如果受托人管理该诉讼并向该诉讼中的律师提供指示所需的全部信息均被拒绝向其提供，则受托人“拥有”该诉讼中的请求权将毫无意义。\n\n37. 同时，没有理由相信英国律师（UK Counsel）持有的任何享有特权的信息与债务人（Debtor）作为个人有关，以致其个人利益，例如面临潜在刑事责任的风险，会超过受托人（Trustee）对该等信息的需要。第一，UBS 诉讼（UBS Litigation）涉及债务人提出的一项请求，其主张 UBS 向其提供了错误的投资建议。这并非涉及法院曾将其视为不应将特权控制权移交给受托人的依据之类关切事项的主题。如果债务人担心其在 UBS 诉讼中的主张会使其面临刑事责任风险（他并未表示有此类担忧），那么他自愿通过提起诉讼将此类问题公开，便不合情理。第二，也是最能说明问题的是，债务人在其中止动议（Motion to Stay）中没有在任何地方说明，即使以最宽泛的措辞，UBS 诉讼中哪些据称享有特权的材料一旦披露可能导致其遭受个人损害。尽管受托人一直被拒绝查阅这些材料，但债务人在受托人获任命之前一直能够持续获取该等信息（而且他很可能仍保留着其先前与英国律师通信的副本，因为他尚未将其移交给受托人）。如果债务人知悉任何类别的享有特权的文件一旦披露将造成损害，他本能够证明其存在，但他甚至未曾尝试这样做。[9]\n\n38. 基于这些理由，根据适用法律，显然与 UBS 诉讼有关的任何特权的控制权已移交给受托人，且债务人并未试图作出相反论证。债务人反而只是径行假定其结论，即其仍然“拥有”这些\n\n9 债务人完全知悉其需要识别与债务人个人利益具体相关的据称享有特权的文件。正如其律师在 8 月 4 日听证会上向本院（Court）所述：“据我理解 Attorney Morrissey（莫里西律师）向我所作的沟通，可能存在一些项目——我认为根据美国法这也是真实的，受托人被任命后，公司债务人与实际个人之间适用不同标准。即使在受托人获任命后，实际个人仍可能保留某些特权。据我理解，英国也是类似。因此，Harcus Parker（哈克斯·帕克律师事务所）持有的某些项目，Kwok 先生（郭先生）个人可能仍就其享有特权，而根据英国法，他并不就其他项目享有特权。”（Hr'g Tr. at 1:2-12）。\n\n特权，继而主张其不能被迫“放弃”其所拥有的特权。[10] 随后，债务人以这一似是而非的基础为依托，主张如果债务人能够被迫放弃其仍拥有的特权，则 Weintraub（温特劳布案）及其后续判例将毫无意义，同时完全忽略了这一前提要点：债务人事实上并未继续拥有这些特权。见 Motion to Stay at 13。\n\nB. 即使债务人仍拥有某项特权（但其并未拥有），命令（Order）第 3(b) 段亦不强制其放弃该特权\n\n39. 命令第 3(b) 段指示发送给英国律师的律师函（Counsel Letter）相关部分载明：“本人在此明确授权你代表本人就 UBS 诉讼、其实体理由、任何相关和解讨论，以及与推进 UBS 诉讼有关的任何其他事项，与 Despins 先生（德斯平斯先生）进行充分和完整的讨论；并授权你就本人在 UBS 诉讼中的请求，无论本人享有何种律师—当事人特权、工作成果特权或其他特权，均接受其指示。任何特权放弃均仅限于向受托人提供该等信息。本人同意仅限于在本人有权的范围内向受托人提供查阅权限，并不构成更广泛的特权放弃，亦不构成本人同意受托人放弃本人的特权。”[11] Counsel Letter at 1（强调部分已添加）。\n\n40. 该函中没有任何地方表明，为向受托人提供信息之目的，债务人“完全放弃”其特权，正如债务人在 Motion to Stay 的第 2 页和第 8 页所主张；也没有任何关于“全面放弃”的讨论，可支持债务人未经证实的主张，即“本院正在强制债务人全面放弃其在 UBS Action（UBS 诉讼）中仍拥有的任何特权。”Motion to Stay, ¶ 25。这完全合乎逻辑，因为——如上文详细讨论——债务人并不拥有或控制与 UBS 诉讼有关的任何特权，因此不存在任何可供放弃的特权。\n\n41. 尽管如此，债务人仍利用其关于正在发生“放弃”的可疑主张，声称英国法禁止本院强制债务人发送律师函。即使为了论证起见假定债务人仍拥有某项特权（其并未拥有），其对法律的理解也是错误的。律师函——如上所述，其系与英国律师协调拟定——完全符合英国法。\n\n42. 根据英国法，为推进 UBS 诉讼，受托人可以查阅与该诉讼相关的享有特权的文件和通信，即使债务人仍主张拥有某项特权亦然，只要受托人无权放弃该特权即可。见 Avonwick Holdings Limited v. Shlosberg, [2016] EWCA (Civ) 1138, ¶¶ 69-71（Court of Appeal, Civil Division（上诉法院民事庭）, 2016）（裁定，《Insolvency Act 1986（1986 年破产法）》第 311 (I) 条必然隐含受托人可为调查破产人事务及向破产人财产分配潜在资产这一优先职能，而占有与破产人财产或事务有关的享有特权的记录，只要受托人对享有特权文件的使用不构成对任何第三方的特权放弃）（附于债务人的 Motion to Stay）；另见 Leeds v. Lemos, [2017] EWHC 1825 (Ch), ¶ 260（Chancery Division（衡平法庭）, 2017）(“毫无争议，受托人有权查阅享有特权的信息，并为履行其法定职能之目的使用该等信息，\n\n但如上诉法院在 Avonwick 中所裁定，前提是他们未经破产人同意不得放弃法律专业特权。”）（附于债务人的 Motion to Stay）。[12] [13]\n\n43. 鉴于律师函明确载明债务人并未同意受托人放弃其特权——且受托人并未主张律师函赋予其这样做的权限——任何关于英国法禁止破产受托人放弃债务人特权的论点均无关紧要。（见 Order, Exhibit B。）\n\n44. 最后，债务人关于这些问题需要由英国法院裁决的主张毫无依据。美国法院经常裁决外国法问题，如有必要，本院可以在此作出裁决。见，例如，In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA, 555 B.R. 323, 350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“美国法院适用外国法的能力对于英国法尤为相关，因为美国法院通常能够对英国法作出解释。”（引文略））；Shipping Corp. of India v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 603 F. Supp. 801, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)（“本国法院在必要时有能力适用外国法。”）。债务人要求由英国法院裁决这些问题，最有可能意在造成拖延并干扰受托人的工作——该等行为直接违反命令第 6 段，该段规定债务人不得“干扰、阻碍或拖延受托人行使本命令项下的权限，包括受托人为推进该等权限而代表财产在外国法院已经采取或将要采取的任何行动。”[14]\n\nII. 如获准中止，受托人将遭受重大损害\n\n45. 每一天受托人无法获得有关 UBS 诉讼的相关信息——各方均同意受托人现已拥有并控制该诉讼——该诉讼便处于瘫痪状态。若无法评估律师对该诉讼实体理由及追偿前景的看法，受托人既无法制定实现成功解决的策略，也无法指示英国律师如何最妥善地推进。直至受托人能够从英国律师处获得信息之前，UBS 诉讼将始终处于无人掌舵的状态。[15]\n\n46. 债务人的立场似乎是，尽管受托人控制 UBS 诉讼，受托人却不应能够查阅有关该案件的任何现有信息或英国律师制作的工作成果。这一立场荒谬，因为它实质上要求受托人另行寻找律师，并试图从头重新进行 UBS 诉讼，尽管该事项正处于诉讼过程中。这将严重损害受托人有效管理该诉讼的能力，并将耗费该财产并不具备的大量资源，以重复英国律师的工作。\n\n14 债务人的最后一招是主张，尽管有 Bankruptcy Rule 9013（破产程序规则 9013），此处的口头动议据称与正在审理的书面动议无关。该论点似是而非。公司治理权动议（Corporate Governance Right Motion）不仅请求确认受托人对债务人境内外资产的控制权，而且请求授权受托人代表债务人财产在任何外国采取行动，这显然涉及 UBS 诉讼。在 8 月 1 日听证会上，应债务人的请求，本院仅为允许债务人审阅公司治理权动议并提交异议而延期举行听证会；债务人随后确已如此办理。在 8 月 4 日听证会上，债务人的律师不仅广泛论述了这一点，而且在此过程中向本院援引了其已为此目的在异议中列入的判例法，以及其为该听证会准备并希望提请本院注意的两项新判例。Aug. 4 Hearing Tr. at 15-16.\n\n15 在 8 月 4 日听证会上，债务人的律师承认了这一现实，并向本院表示：“因此，我不认为她是债务人的律师。我不认为她是 Despins 先生的律师。坦率地说，我不确定这会如何影响英国该诉讼中作为原告的任何一方的地位。”8 月 4 日听证会记录，第 10 页。\n\n47. 此种损害绝非理论上的。本周，英国律师告知受托人和债务人，由于其不清楚应当从谁处取得指示，其拟将原定于 10 月举行的听证会延期。见上文，第 27 段。准许暂缓动议只会进一步造成混乱，并加剧对该诉讼缺乏控制的状况。\n\n48. 尽管对受托人和破产财产存在这些显而易见的损害，债务人仍轻率地声称，受托人将遭受的唯一损害是：“如果未被强制放弃债务人所享有的任何特权，UBS 诉讼可能会耗时更长。”暂缓动议，第 26 段。所谓“被强制放弃”不仅是一个稻草人论点，而且，如债务人所暗示的，对 UBS 诉讼解决进程的任何此类延误也并非无足轻重。\n\n49. 债务人所寻求的暂缓造成的任何延误，不仅将实际上使该诉讼没有能够指导英国律师的管理者，而且在本案中，此类延误造成的损害尤为显著。尽管债务人表面上拥有巨额财富，其财产申报表所列资产仅为 \\$3,850，[16]，使受托人手头可用于支付为破产财产债权人实现追偿所必需费用的资产极其有限。债务人通过策略性拖延 UBS 诉讼——该诉讼如有实体依据，可能是债务人承认属于破产财产的最大资产——不仅阻碍对该资产的追偿，也妨碍受托人查找债务人其他隐匿资产的工作。\n\nIII. 如不予暂缓，债务人不会遭受不可弥补的损害，且利益衡量有利于受托人\n\n50. 债务人未能明确说明如不予暂缓其据称将遭受的任何实际不可弥补损害。相反，债务人关于所谓不可弥补损害的全部主张，均建立在以下错误前提之上：“本院正强制债务人全面放弃其仍就 UBS 诉讼享有的任何特权。”暂缓动议，第 25 段。如上文所述，债务人未能证明其“拥有” UBS 诉讼中的任何特权，更遑论允许受托人就受托人现已拥有的请求与英国律师沟通，会导致对该等特权的任何全面放弃。\n\n16 债务人在其财产申报表中列报了若干价值未知的资产，包括存在争议的未注册著作权和诉讼请求。（见债务人财产申报表，第 6 页）（ECF No. 78）。\n\n51. 如债务人知悉 UBS 诉讼中的任何特权信息，且其认为该等信息与其作为个人的利益最为密切相关，以致该特权的控制权不应移交受托人，则债务人有责任明确其认为自己仍然“拥有”的任何特权。[17] 然而，债务人既未指出一项特权通信，甚至也未指出其主张应落在利益衡量测试中个人一侧的任何类别的特权文件；反而选择暗示，由于其无法指出任何一项此类问题，所称放弃必定极其广泛。事实上，情况恰恰相反；债务人所证明的只是，此处不存在任何已知的潜在损害。\n\n52. UBS 诉讼中任何特权的控制权已不再属于债务人，而是在受托人获任命时移交给受托人。见上文第 32—34 段。因此，债务人不再控制主张该等特权的权利，因而当该等特权的控制权归属于受托人时，其不可能受到损害。\n\n53. 此外，尽管债务人声明拒绝遵守该命令，本院并未依职权认定其藐视法庭，受托人也未提出动议请求认定债务人藐视法庭。如不予暂缓，债务人目前不会面临任何不可弥补的损害。\n\n17 鉴于这是债务人自行选择律师一直在进行的诉讼，债务人现不能声称其不知道其与律师之间存在何种类型的特权通信。\n\n54. 最后，任何利益衡量均明显有利于受托人。如债务人本人所承认，UBS 诉讼现由受托人管理。唯一的问题是，受托人将凭借通信内容及既往律师工作成果高效地进行管理，还是将被迫如同从零开始管理 UBS 诉讼，无法利用既往律师工作成果，从而给受托人、破产财产及其债权人造成重大困难。\n\nIV. 公共利益不支持暂缓\n\n55. 债务人为支持其所请求的暂缓而提出的唯一公共利益，仅是泛泛主张律师—当事人保密特权重要且应受到保护。暂缓动议，第 27 段。尽管在此无人质疑这一不言自明的事实，但该主张忽略了关键所在：该重要特权的控制权已移交受托人，受托人通过律师函仅寻求了解其现已拥有的请求，而非实施对任何特权的广泛放弃。正如 Weintraub（温特劳布案）及其后续判例明确指出，控制权的移交并不侵害该特权，也不构成对该特权的放弃。见 In re Foster（福斯特案）, 188 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999)（“在……利益衡量的前提下，受托人可以控制个人债务人的特权。”）。\n\n56. 本案真正的公共利益在于，使受托人能够继续履行其管理职责，并为破产财产及其债权人的利益追回资产；债务人似乎有意处处阻挠这一目标。债务人为避免针对其债务的待决追偿行动而自愿申请 Chapter 11（第 11 章破产保护）。允许债务人将本院作为抵御其债权人的盾牌，同时不懈地混淆其资产状况，以便其能够继续过着亿万富翁的生活，并不符合公共利益。正如 Ostrager 法官所指出：“[如]亿万富翁诉讼当事人能够同时寻求利用纽约及美国其他地区的法院程序，而又明知并故意违反法院命令，则法治不复存在。”最终藐视法庭命令，第 10 页。公共利益要求允许受托人迅速开展其在 UBS 诉讼及其他事项中的工作，以便尽快向破产财产债权人付款。\n\n[本页其余部分特意留白。]\n\n日期：August 26, 2022    LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），New Haven（纽黑文）, Connecticut（康涅狄格州）    CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE（第 11 章受托人）\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）(ct29437)    NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（诺伊伯特、佩佩与蒙泰斯律师事务所，专业公司）    195 Church Street, 13th Floor    New Haven（纽黑文）, Connecticut（康涅狄格州）06510    (203) 781-2847    plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）(pro hac vice pending)    PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）    2050 M Street NW    Washington, D.C.（哥伦比亚特区华盛顿）, 20036    (202) 551-1902    nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）(pro hac vice pending)    Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）(pro hac vice pending)    PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）    200 Park Avenue    New York（纽约州纽约市）10166    (212) 318-6079    aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n第 11 章受托人的律师","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":598,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":637,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":638,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":643,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":671,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":678,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":679,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":717,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":723,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":746,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":761,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":777,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1181,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":8898,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:40:33"}