{"id":"court_ctb_799_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":799,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION :","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n:\n\n:\n\n:\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WON KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n# **DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER (A) PROVIDING THAT CONTROL OF ANY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION, AND OTHER PRIVILEGES RELATED TO RULE 2004 SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS PASSED TO TRUSTEE UPON APPOINTMENT, (B) DIRECTING THAT DEBTOR AND OTHER EXAMINEES NOT WITHOLD DOCUMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH PRIVILEGES, AND (C) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF**\n\nThe debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., hereby objects (the \"Objection\") to the August 22, 2022 Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order (A) Providing That Control of Any Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product Production, and Other Privileges Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents Passed to Trustee Upon Appointment, (B) Directing that Debtor and other Examinees Not Withhold Documents on Account of Such Privileges, and (C) Granting Related Relief (the \"Blanket Waiver Motion\"). (Doc. No. 777). In support of this Objection, the Debtor represents as follows:\n\n## **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Blanket Waiver Motion is as bizarre as it is bold. The Trustee acknowledges, correctly, that an individual debtor's attorney-client privilege and related privileges do not simply *per se* transfer to a bankruptcy trustee, as distinguished from a corporate debtor's privileges, which do. The Trustee also concedes, as he must, that most courts undertake a case-by-case balancing test to determine whether a bankruptcy trustee acquires an individual debtor's right to control privilege with respect to particular documents, and that a minority has held that a bankruptcy trustee *never* acquires an individual debtor's right to control privilege. Nonetheless, through a nonsensical hodgepodge devoid of any reasoning, analysis, or effort to apply facts to law, the Trustee asks the Court to enter a blanket order determining that the Trustee—rather than the Debtor—is entitled to all of the Debtor's attorney-client privileged communications and documents that existed prior to the Trustee's appointment.\n\n2. The Second Circuit and numerous other courts have held, unequivocally, that trial courts may not order blanket waivers of the attorney-client privilege. Rather, before compelling a party to disclose potentially privileged information, trial courts must determine the application and ownership of privilege on a fact specific, document by document, basis.\n\n3. The Subpoenas<sup>1</sup> seek a limitless scope of information from fourteen different professional firms who have represented the Debtor and other entities that the Trustee claims, baselessly, the Debtor *or any member of the Debtor's family*, controls.\n\n4. The Trustee made no effort to narrowly tailor the Subpoenas' scope to issues on which he could conceivably control the Debtor's privilege, or even to entities for which the Debtor ever controlled the privilege. Instead, the Trustee seeks to railroad the Debtor, his family, an extensive and conceptually limitless list of \"Associated Individuals\" and \"Associated Entities\" (both terms the Trustee unilaterally and subjectively defined, absent any evidence or judicial determinations) by seeking an order *on an expedited basis* that would deprive the Debtor, the Debtor's Family (another term the Trustee unilaterally defined), Associated Individuals and Associated Entities of the most sacred litigation privilege that has been deeply rooted in our\n\n<sup>1</sup> Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings ascribed in the Blanket Waiver Motion.\n\njudicial system for centuries.<sup>2</sup> The Blanket Waiver Motion seeks to deprive the Debtor, his family and various other persons and entities subjectively selected by the Trustee of due process, and blatantly violates fundamental principles of fairness.\n\n5. The task of determining the scope of an individual debtor's attorney-client and related privileges that transfersto a bankruptcy trustee is admittedly not black and white, and courts differ on the manner in which they approach the issue. However, it is clear that a bankruptcy trustee can never simply acquire carte blanche to control an individual debtor's privileged information—or that of his family, business associates and businesses owned or controlled by his family or business associates. The law expressly precludes that result.\n\n6. For these reasons, as more fully set forth below, the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court enter an order (i) denying the Blanket Waiver Motion; and either (ii) confirming that the Debtor retains his attorney-client privilege notwithstanding the Trustee's appointment; or (iii) identifying the factors that will govern the Court's balancing analysis.\n\n# **I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**\n\n7. The Debtor presumes the Court's familiarity with the basic procedural history of the Debtor's bankruptcy case.\n\n8. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed the Rule 2004 Motions, which include the Debtor 2004 Motion, the Professionals 2004 Motion and the Third-Party Motion.\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Subpoenas define the term \"Associated Individuals\" to include, among other things, \"all individuals that (1) hold, control, have custody over, or discretion over assets . . . enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's family; or (2) have been employees, directors, or otherwise are affiliated with one or more Associated Entities, together with the respective employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on behalf of any of the foregoing.\" The term \"Associated Entities\" includes, but is not limited to, \"all organizations or Entities of any type that (1) have been owned, controlled or invested in by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family; or (2) have an interest, whether directly or indirectly, in any assets . . . enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family\" together with their agents. All other things aside, there is no colorable argument that the Debtor's \"enjoyment\" of property, or the \"Association\" of the Debtor's family with a person or entity, has any bearing on the scope of the attorney-client privilege, any related privilege or the scope of the Subpoenas.\n\n9. On August 2, 2022, the Trustee's counsel and the Debtor's counsel met and conferred regarding the Rule 2004 Motions. During the meet and confer, the parties were unable to agree on language of a proposed order granting the Rule 2004 Motions.<sup>3</sup>\n\n10. On August 5, 2022, the Debtor timely filed a limited objection to the Rule 2004 Motions (the \"Limited Objection\"). The Limited Objection did not contest the Trustee's right to serve the Subpoenas. The Limited Objection only objected to the portion of the Trustee's proposed order that would have compelled the recipients of the Subpoenas to comply with the Subpoenas and deprived them of their right to object or seek to quash the Subpoenas under the Local Bankruptcy Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\n\n11. At the hearing on the Limited Objection, the Court agreed with the Debtor and directed the Trustee to submit revised proposed orders that expressly preserved the recipients of the Subpoenas' right to object to the scope of the Subpoenas after the Trustee served them, as required by the Local Bankruptcy Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court expressly stated:\n\n> Well, I think what will happen under both Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004, and our local rule 2004-1, is that is when a subpoena is served, the party who receives the subpoena can take whatever actions it deems appropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\n\n(Tr. 8/12/22, at 19 (6-11).\n\n12. Eleven (11) days later (minutes before 12:00 am on August 23, 2022), the Trustee filed the Blanket Waiver Motion. The Trustee also filed a \"Motion Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(c)(1), To Expedite Hearing on [the Blanket Waiver Motion].\" (Doc. No. 778). The Trustee\n\n<sup>3</sup> The undersigned declines the Trustee's invitation to rehash the discussions that took place during a meet and confer concerning the Limited Objection on August 2, 2022. Suffice it to say, the undersigned disagrees with the Trustee's perception of that discussion.\n\nhas sought and been granted expedited hearings on every substantive motion he has made since his appointment.\n\n13. Despite the significance and magnitude of the relief that the Blanket Waiver Motion seeks—*i.e.*, a blanket transfer to the Trustee of the Debtor's attorney-client privilege—and that of the Debtor's Family, \"Associated Entities\" and \"Associated Individuals\"—the Trustee's Motion to Expedite sought, successfully, to compel the Debtor to reply to the Blanket Waiver Motion within just four business days—on or before 1pm on Sunday, August 28, 2022.<sup>4</sup>\n\n### **II. ARGUMENT**\n\n# **A. The Trustee Did Not** *Per Se* **Acquire the Debtor's Attorney-Client Privilege and Related Privileges**\n\n14. In *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that a corporate debtor's attorney-client and related privileges passed to the bankruptcy trustee appointed to administer the corporate debtor's estate. Thus, a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege transfers to the bankruptcy trustee by operation of law. *Id.* at 350.\n\n15. The Supreme Court expressly based its decision on the fact that corporate management necessarily passes control of the corporation's privilege to its successor management at the end of its tenure, and a bankruptcy trustee of a corporation most closely resembles the corporate debtor's successor management. *Id.* at 354.\n\n16. The Supreme Court also expressly limited its holding to corporate debtors and held that it did not apply to individual debtors. Unlike corporate management, which knows that a\n\n<sup>4</sup>The Trustee failed to articulate why it required eleven days from the hearing on the Limited Objection to prepare the Blanket Waiver Motion and yet the Debtor should only be allowed four business days (fiveand one-half calendar days) to respond, despite the magnitude of the relief sought by the Trustee.\n\nsuccessor will inevitably one day control the corporation, including its attorney-client privilege, individuals have no such expectation. The Court stated:\n\n> [O]ur holding today has no bearing on the problem of individual bankruptcy, which we have no reason to address in this case. As we have stated, a corporation, as an inanimate entity, must act through agents. *See supra*, at 348. When the corporation is solvent, the agent that controls the corporate attorneyclient privilege is the corporation's management. Under our holding today, this power passes to the trustee because the trustee's functions are more closely analogous to those of management outside of bankruptcy than are the functions of the debtor's directors. An individual, in contrast, can act for himself; there is no \"management\" that controls a solvent individual's attorney-client privilege. If control over that privilege passes to a trustee, it must be under some theory different from the one that we embrace in this case.\n\n*Id.* at 356-57.\n\n17. The Trustee, talking from one cheek, acknowledges what *Weintraub* says—that its holding is inapplicable to individual debtors. (Blanket Waiver Motion, at ¶ 35). However, talking from the other cheek, he argues that \"all of the Supreme Court's detailed citations concerning the role and responsibilities of a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code apply equally to a trustee for an individual as they do to a trustee for a corporate debtor.\" (Id, at ¶ 36). *Weintraub expressly states the opposite.*\n\n# **B. The Trustee Cannot Acquire Any of the Debtor's Privileged Information Unless the Court at a Minimum Conducts an Analysis Balancing the Debtor's Interests and the Trustee's Interest in Maximizing the Debtor's Estate**\n\n18. As the Trustee acknowledges, one line of authority, which relies on the Supreme Court's decision in *Swidler & Berlin v. United States*, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), holds that an individual debtor's bankruptcy trustee *never* acquires the right to control the individual debtor's attorneyclient privilege. *See e.g., Gottlieb v. Fayerman (In re Ginzburg)*, 517 B.R. 175, 181 (2014) (\"A careful reading of *Swidler* dictates that the balancing of interests urged by the Trustee is not to be recognized as an exception to 'one of the oldest, recognized privileges in the law.'\"). \"[T]he loss\n\nof evidence admittedly caused by the privilege is justified in part by the fact that without the privilege, the client may not have made such communications in the first place.\" *Id.* (quoting *Swidler*, 524 U.S. at 408).\n\n19. In *Swidler*, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that \"'existing exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, such as the crime-fraud exception and the testamentary exception, make the impact of one more exception marginal.'\" *Id .*(quoting *Swidler*, 524 U.S. at 408). 5 \"[W]hile the need for a bankruptcy trustee to marshal assets and properly investigate the affairs of a debtor provide a strong basis for the balancing test here, the Supreme Court has clearly prohibited such a 'one more exception' approach.\" *Id.*; *see also In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America, Inc.*, 27 B.R. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); *McClarty v. Gudenau*, 166 B.R. 101, 101- 102 (E.D.Mich.1994) (both holding that an individual's attorney-client privilege cannot be waived by the trustee on behalf of a debtor).\n\n20. Other decisions, which either pre-dated *Swidler* or determined that it did not apply to bankruptcy cases, employ a balancing test that weighs the potential harm to the debtor from disclosing his or her privileged communications and impeding attorney-client communications, on the one hand, against the trustee's interest in maximizing the estate, on the other hand. *See e.g., Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore,* 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S. D. Ga. 1998); *see also* Blanket Waiver Motion, at 14-17.\n\n21. On one end of the spectrum, attorney-client communications that concern a debtor's pre-petition claim against *a third party* will likely assist the trustee to pursue the claim on the estate's behalf and disclosing these types of communications to the trustee is unlikely to cause\n\n<sup>5</sup> *Swidler* was not a bankruptcy case and did not concern a bankruptcy trustee's right, or lack thereof, to a debtor's privileged information.\n\nharm to the Debtor. *See id.* (collecting cases). Courts \"finding that the trustee may waive the privilege of an individual debtor focus on the lack of an adverse effect on the debtor based upon the specific facts of the case.\" *Bazemore*, 216 B.R. at 1024.\n\n22. Conversely, \"[i]t is persuasive that an individual debtor should alone hold the attorney-client privilege waiver when potential harm to or control over his person possibly exists from a disclosure, or communication with an attorney may be chilled.\" *Id.* at 1025; *see also In re Silvio*, 27 B.R. at 28 (where an individual owner of all the stock of a bankrupt corporation also filed for bankruptcy the trustee could waive the privilege of the corporation because only fiscal loss of assets could arise but could not waive for the individual because the disclosure could involve criminal conduct and, thus, a possible loss of personal freedom *i.e.,* prison); *In re Hunt*, 153 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (an independent trustee's attempt to avoid fraudulent transfers and pre-petition preferences of the individual debtors, by examining the debtors' attorneys would chill a full and frank attorney-client communication if sensitive information might be revealed during bankruptcy).\n\n23. The clearest indicator weighing in favor of an individual debtor retaining the attorney-client privilege is when communications implicate non-dischargeability or criminal liability. *Compare Miller v Miller*, 247 B.R. 704, 709-710 (N.D. Bankr. Oh. 2000) (\"merely because the trustee becomes the transferee of all (or most) of the debtor's assets does not thereby denote that the trustee is also the recipient of the debtor's attorney-client privilege. Stated in another way, the mere transfer of assets does not also entail the transfer of the individual's attorney-client privilege as well. . . . the Court is not persuaded that the Trustee should be entitled to succeed to the Debtors' attorney-client privilege, and thereby unilaterally waive the privilege. Of significance in this decision is the fact that the Trustee and the Debtors are in an adversarial relationship . . . As a consequence, the Trustee's assumption of the Debtor's attorney-client privilege could potentially cause the Debtors a great deal of harm, as the Trustee's sole purpose for seeking to waive the Debtors' attorney-client privilege is to use that information directly against them. (i.e., to revoke the Debtors' bankruptcy discharge).\"), *with Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame)*, 251 B.R. 367, 377 (Bankr. D. Minn 2000) (\"In this case the Debtor has already been denied his discharge, and the Trustee is only seeking to uncover assets and avoidable transfers that may benefit the estate.\")\n\n24. While the Trustee purports to embrace the balancing test, the Trustee has completely misstated how that test may be applied. The Trustee contends that \"[c]ourts applying th[e] balancing test routinely find the trustee to control the privilege with regard to documents that may identify and aid in the recovery of assets for the benefit of the estate and creditors or that relate to the administration of the estate.\" (Blanket Waiver Motion, at 16). While purporting to apply this standard, the Trustee urges the Court to apply a blanket transfer of the Debtor's privilege to the Trustee, contending that \"the discovery requests attached to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas seek documents relating to (i) specific assets and property interests discussed in the [Rule 2004] Motion… (ii) the Debtor's interest in and relationships with other individuals, corporate entities and non-profits . . . and (iii) the Debtor's communications with his counsel and other advisors regarding corporate governance issues and the Debtor's finances and property interests. (Id. at 17- 19). The Trustee further misrepresents that \"[e]ach request is tailored to identify information related to Debtor's assets and financial condition, his relevant business practices, and how he administered his estate.\" (Id. at 19).\n\n25. As an initial matter, the standard that the Trustee seeks to impress upon the Court is not a \"balancing\" test because it only weighs one side of the scale. A trustee is not entitled to information simply because it concerns the Debtor's finances and financial condition. The Court\n\nmust *weigh* the Trustee's interest in obtaining that information *against* the potential harm to the Debtor from disclosing his confidential communications with his counsel. *See e.g., Miller*, 247 B.R. at 709-710.\n\n26. Moreover, the Trustee's characterization of the Subpoenas is objectively false. The Trustee made no effort, whatsoever, to limit the scope of the information requested to topics that are likely to augment the estate. The Subpoenas served on fourteen (14) professional firms that represent, or represented, either the Debtor, the \"Debtor's Family,\" \"Associated Individuals,\" or \"Associated Entities\"—all of which terms (other than the Debtor) the Trustee unilaterally defined without a scintilla of evidence or a legal basis to do so—and seeks to compel those professional firms to produce, by way of example and not limitation:\n\n> 17. All Documents relating to any obligation, claim, liability, or debt associated with *any legal dispute involving the Debtor***,** including but not limited to those relating to any litigation before any local, state, federal, or international body, whether an administrative body, court, panel, or alternative dispute resolution entity.<sup>6</sup>\n\n27. It is difficult to conceive of a more broadly worded request for a waiver of privilege than a request for all documents concerning \"any legal dispute involving the Debtor\"—particularly in a case such as this, where creditors have already initiated non-dischargeability actions, the Trustee has publicly questioned the Debtor's right to a discharge, and numerous parties, including creditors of the Debtor's estate, registered agents of the Chinese Government (including Bruno Wu, who is financing numerous litigations against the Debtor) and the Chinese Government itself, have accused the Debtor of numerous serious crimes (albeit baselessly). Indeed, Rui Ma, one of\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Subpoenas also appear to presume that the Trustee is entitled to control the attorney-client privilege and related privileges that belong to the \"Debtor's Family,\" \"Associated Entities\" and \"Associated Persons\", presumably based on pure speculation that the Debtor controls them. All other things aside, the Trustee is not entitled to any rights to control entities or persons other than the the Debtor until he obtains a judicial determination that the Debtor controls those persons or entities, which will never happen because the Trustee lives in a world of fiction that is substantiated by no evidence whatsoever.\n\nthe more vocal creditors, has accused the Debtor of rape and false imprisonment. In this context, the Trustee's request for a blanket transfer of the Debtor's privilege is frivolous. For these reasons alone, the Court cannot grant the Blanket Waiver Motion.\n\n## **C. The Court Cannot Compel the Debtor or His Professionals to Disclose Any Privileged Communications Without Conducting a Fact Specific, Document by Document, Analysis and Application of the Balancing Test**\n\n28. Even where cause exists to order a party to disclose certain privileged information, a trial court must undertake a fact specific analysis to determine which documents must, and must not, be disclosed. *See Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. United States*, 626 Fed. Appx. 324, 328 (2nd Cir. 2015) (\"The District Court's failure to consider and rule expressly on the question of privilege constitutes error, and we vacate the District Court's determination on this issue and remand for reconsideration, including whatever in camera review of the documents at issue may be appropriate in the circumstances presented.\") (internal citations omitted); *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall,* PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 166 (2d. Cir. 1992) (order requiring party to turn over documents withheld from production on the basis of privilege without a judicial ruling on the merits of privilege claim overturned); *International Business Machines Corp. v. United States*, 471 F.2d 507, 509 (2d. Cir. 1972) (\"Since no specific document is before us, we must assume that the contents of the some 1200 documents in question fall within the attorney-client privilege ….\"); *Winfield v. City of New York*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79281, [\\*12-24] (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2018) (\"Controlling precedent … make[s] clear that the court may not run roughshod over a party's assertion of privilege merely to expedite discovery or relieve itself from determining a party's substantive or common law rights. What would be expedient here is simply not right in terms of the resolution of the parties' dispute.\").\n\n29. This rule applies full force in individual bankruptcy cases. *See e.g.*, *Foster v. Hill (In re Foster)*, 188 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999) (\"No general rule allows the trustee for an individual placed in involuntary bankruptcy to invariably control the individual's attorney-client privilege as to the debtor's pre-petition claims.\"). *Foster* squarely precludes the relief sought by the Trustee through the Blanket Waiver Motion. In *Foster*, the bankruptcy court ordered disclosure of the debtor's attorney-client privileged communications to the trustee, based solely on its review of a privilege log, holding that \"the right to assert, or to waive, the attorney-client privilege, passes from a debtor to a bankruptcy trustee where . . . it involves the recovery of assets of the estate in the nature of pre-petition civil actions.\" *Id.* at 1263-64. The Tenth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court, holding that it erred by \"essentially declin[ing] to review or investigate the specifics of [the debtor's] privilege claims after he asserted them and proffered a privilege log of withheld documents.\" *Id.* at 1264.\n\n## 30. The Tenth Circuit further explained that although the bankruptcy court\n\nsuggested it had undertaken a case-specific analysis, describing its conclusion as 'supported by . . . the nature of the claims in this case and the particular documents sought by the trustee.' . . . Its casespecific analysis, though, was limited to noting that the pre-petition suits were the estate's main assets; that they entailed good faith 'affirmative claims for breach of contract, fraud, and claims on promissory notes against third-persons with whom the Debtor conducted business pre-petition' and that the documents sought were 'strictly limited to those in [counsel's] files for pending civil actions . . . [and not] from [the debtor's] criminal files.' . . . *While those observations may have been a good start, the court failed to relate them to the actual documents withheld by reviewing those documents in camera***.** . . . *If a court resolves a privilege dispute by a balancing analysis, it must instead focus on specific facts and documents*.\n\n*Id.* at 1266-1267 (emphasis added).\n\n31. Here, the Trustee impermissibly seeks a blanket waiver or transfer of the Debtor's privilege. Accordingly, the Court must deny the Blanket Waiver Motion. *See id.; see also Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, at 328.\n\n### **D. The Court Can and Should Enter an Order Determining the Standard Governing the Debtor's Right to Retain His Attorney-Client and Related Privileges**\n\n32. Although the Trustee is not entitled to a blanket order transferring the Debtor's attorney-client privilege to him, the parties would all benefit from an order of the Court confirming the line of authority that it intends to follow. Based on the circumstances of this case, *i.e.*, the outstanding criminal allegations against the Debtor and pending actions to deprive him of a discharge, the Court could rule that the Debtor is entitled to retain his entire pre-petition/pre-trustee appointment attorney-client privilege—at least until those allegations are fully and finally resolved. *See e.g.*, *Gottlieb*, 517 B.R. at 181; *In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America, Inc.*, 27 B.R. at 28; *McClarty*, 166 B.R. at 101-102.\n\n33. Alternatively, the Court could enter an order confirming that it intends to conduct a balancing analysis. *See e.g., Bazemore*, 216 B.R. at 1024; *Miller*, 247 B.R. at 709-710.If it does so, the Court could direct the parties how to apply their analysis to the Debtor's information. For example, the Court could direct the recipients of the Subpoenas to withhold documents on the basis of privilege (without prejudice to any other objections that individual recipients of Subpoenas may have) only documents that they believe potentially implicate harm to the Debtor, such as criminal allegations, facts relating to non-dischargeability, or facts that have nothing to do with the Debtor's estate, such as his pending asylum application. *See e.g. In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America, Inc.*, 27 B.R. at 28; *Miller*, 247 B.R. at 709-710**.** An order of this nature would not, and could not, circumvent the need for a subsequent judicial review of the documents that the recipients of the Subpoenas withheld—since the Court—not the Subpoena recipientswill have the final say as to which privileged documents remain within the Debtor's control. However, an order of this nature would almost certainly streamline the process and substantially increase the probability that the Court will agree with the parties' privilege claims because the parties will be able to tailor their privilege claims to the standard ordered by the Court.\n\n**WHEREFORE,** the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court an order (i) denying the Blanket Waiver Motion; and either (ii) confirming that the Debtor retained his attorney-client privilege notwithstanding the Trustee's appointment; or (iii) identifying the factors that will govern the Court's balancing analysis. The Debtor also requests that the Court grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 27 th day of August, 2022.\n\n### **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Aaron A. Romney, Esq.* Eric Henzy (ct12849) Stephen M. Kindseth (ct14640) Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [skindseth@zeislaw.com](mailto:skindseth@zeislaw.com) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 27th day of August, 2022, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney, Esq.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：第11章\n\nHO WON KWOK（郭文贵）：案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。：____________________________________________________________：\n\n____________________________________________________________\n债务人对第11章受托人请求作出命令的动议提出的异议，该命令拟（A）规定，与根据规则2004传唤的文件有关的任何律师—委托人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权，于受托人获任命时移转给受托人；（B）指示债务人及其他受询问人不得以该等特权为由扣留文件；及（C）给予相关救济\n\n债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”），通过其下列签署的代理律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.，特此对第11章受托人于 August 22, 2022 提出的请求作出命令的动议提出异议（“本异议”）；该命令拟（A）规定，与根据规则2004传唤的文件有关的任何律师—委托人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权，于受托人获任命时移转给受托人；（B）指示债务人及其他受询问人不得以该等特权为由扣留文件；及（C）给予相关救济（“全面豁免动议”）。（文件编号 777）。为支持本异议，债务人陈述如下：\n\n一、引言\n\n1. 全面豁免动议既大胆又荒谬。受托人正确地承认，个人债务人的律师—委托人特权及相关特权并不会当然移转给破产受托人，这与确会移转的公司债务人特权不同。受托人也如其必须承认的那样承认，大多数法院会逐案进行利益衡量测试，以确定破产受托人是否取得对特定文件中个人债务人特权控制权的权利，而少数法院认为破产受托人从不取得对个人债务人特权控制权的权利。尽管如此，受托人通过一套毫无推理、分析或将事实适用于法律之努力的荒谬拼凑，请求本院作出一项全面命令，认定受托人——而非债务人——有权取得受托人获任命前存在的债务人全部受律师—委托人特权保护的通讯和文件。\n\n2. 美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）及众多其他法院已毫不含糊地裁定，审判法院不得命令全面豁免律师—委托人特权。相反，在强制一方披露可能受特权保护的信息之前，审判法院必须基于具体事实并逐份文件确定特权的适用及归属。\n\n3. 该等传票1向十四家不同的专业机构寻求范围无限的信息；该等机构曾代理债务人以及受托人毫无根据地声称由债务人或债务人任何家庭成员控制的其他实体。\n\n4. 受托人未作任何努力，将该等传票的范围狭窄限定于其可设想控制债务人特权的事项，甚至未限定于债务人曾对其拥有特权控制权的实体。相反，受托人寻求以加急方式取得一项命令，从而强行压制债务人、其家庭成员、范围广泛且在概念上无限的“关联个人”和“关联实体”（这两个术语均由受托人在缺乏任何证据或司法认定的情况下单方面、主观地定义），并剥夺债务人、债务人家庭成员（该术语亦由受托人单方面定义）、关联个人和关联实体在我国司法制度中已深深扎根数百年的最神圣诉讼特权。2 全面豁免动议寻求剥夺债务人、其家庭成员以及受托人主观选定的各类其他个人和实体的正当程序权利，并公然违反公平的基本原则。\n\n1 本文未定义的首字母大写术语具有全面豁免动议中赋予的含义。\n\n5. 确定移转给破产受托人的个人债务人律师—委托人特权及相关特权的范围，这一任务诚然并非非黑即白，法院在处理该问题的方式上也存在差异。然而，显而易见的是，破产受托人绝不可能仅仅取得不受限制地控制个人债务人特权信息的权力——或控制其家庭成员、商业伙伴及由其家庭成员或商业伙伴拥有或控制的企业之特权信息的权力。法律明确排除了该结果。\n\n6. 基于上述理由，如下文更充分阐述，债务人恭请本院作出命令：（i）驳回全面豁免动议；以及（ii）确认尽管受托人获任命，债务人仍保有其律师—委托人特权；或（iii）确定将支配本院利益衡量分析的因素。\n\n一、事实与程序背景\n\n7. 债务人推定本院熟悉债务人破产案件的基本程序经过。\n\n8. On July 28, 2022，受托人提交了规则2004动议，其中包括债务人2004动议、专业人士2004动议和第三方动议。\n\n2 该等传票将“关联个人”定义为包括但不限于：“（1）持有、控制、保管或可酌情处置……由债务人或债务人家庭成员享有的资产的所有个人；或（2）曾担任一家或多家关联实体的雇员、董事，或以其他方式与一家或多家关联实体有关联的所有个人，以及前述各方各自的雇员、代理人、律师、顾问或代表前述任何一方行事的任何人。”术语“关联实体”包括但不限于：“（1）曾由债务人或债务人家庭成员拥有、控制或投资的所有任何类型组织或实体；或（2）直接或间接地在……由债务人或债务人家庭成员享有的任何资产中拥有权益的所有任何类型组织或实体”，及其代理人。撇开其他事项不谈，不存在任何有可争辩依据的论点表明，债务人对财产的“享有”，或债务人家庭成员与某一人或实体的“关联”，与律师—委托人特权、任何相关特权或该等传票的范围有任何关系。\n\n9. On August 2, 2022，受托人的律师与债务人的律师就规则2004动议进行了会谈与协商。在会谈与协商期间，双方未能就准予规则2004动议的拟议命令措辞达成一致。3\n\n10. On August 5, 2022，债务人及时提交了对规则2004动议的有限异议（“有限异议”）。有限异议并未对受托人送达该等传票的权利提出争议。有限异议仅反对受托人拟议命令中将强制该等传票的接收人遵从传票，并剥夺其根据地方破产规则和《联邦民事诉讼规则》提出异议或申请撤销传票之权利的部分。\n\n11. 在就有限异议举行的听证会上，本院同意债务人的意见，并指示受托人提交经修订的拟议命令，明确保留该等传票接收人在受托人送达传票后，依照地方破产规则和《联邦民事诉讼规则》对传票范围提出异议的权利。本院明确表示：\n\n嗯，我认为，根据《联邦破产程序规则》2004和我们的地方规则2004-1，将发生的情况是，在传票送达时，收到传票的一方可以根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》采取其认为适当的任何行动。\n\n(Tr. 8/12/22, at 19 (6-11).\n\n12. 十一（11）日后（在 August 23, 2022 的 12:00 am 前数分钟），受托人提交了全面豁免动议。受托人还提交了一项“根据破产规则9006(c)(1)提出的动议，请求加急审理[全面豁免动议]。”（文件编号 778）。自获任命以来，受托人就其提出的每一项实体动议均已请求并获准加急听证。\n\n3 下列签署人拒绝接受受托人的邀请，重新叙述在 August 2, 2022 就有限异议进行会谈与协商时所发生的讨论。仅需指出的是，下列签署人不同意受托人对该讨论的理解。\n\n13. 尽管全面豁免动议所寻求救济的重要性和规模——即将债务人的律师—委托人特权，以及债务人家庭成员、“关联实体”和“关联个人”的律师—委托人特权全面移转给受托人——受托人关于加急审理的动议仍成功寻求强制债务人在仅四个工作日内，即不迟于 Sunday, August 28, 2022 1pm，对全面豁免动议作出答复。4\n\n二、论证\n\nA. 受托人并未当然取得债务人的律师—委托人特权及相关特权\n\n14. 在 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) 一案中，美国最高法院（United States Supreme Court）裁定，公司债务人的律师—委托人特权及相关特权移转给被任命管理公司债务人财产的破产受托人。因此，公司债务人的律师—委托人特权依法移转给破产受托人。Id. at 350.\n\n15. 最高法院明确将其裁决建立在以下事实上：公司管理层在任期届满时必然将对公司特权的控制权移交给其继任管理层，而公司的破产受托人与公司债务人的继任管理层最为相似。Id. at 354.\n\n16. 最高法院还明确将其裁定限于公司债务人，并认定其不适用于个人债务人。与明知继任者终有一日将控制公司——包括其律师—委托人特权——的公司管理层不同，个人没有此种预期。法院表示：\n\n我们今日的裁定与个人破产问题无关，我们没有理由在本案中处理该问题。正如我们已述，公司作为无生命实体，必须通过代理人行事。见上文，第348页。当公司具有清偿能力时，控制公司律师—委托人特权的代理人是公司的管理层。根据我们今日的裁定，该权力移转给受托人，因为受托人的职能比债务人董事的职能更类似于破产程序外的管理层职能。相比之下，个人可以自行行事；不存在控制具有清偿能力的个人之律师—委托人特权的“管理层”。如对该特权的控制权移转给受托人，则必须依据不同于我们在本案中所采纳的理论。\n\nId. at 356-57.\n\n17. 受托人一面承认 Weintraub 所述内容——即其裁定不适用于个人债务人。（全面豁免动议，第 ¶ 35 段）。然而，另一面却主张，“最高法院就受托人在《破产法典》下的角色和职责所作的全部详细引述，同样适用于个人受托人和公司债务人受托人。”（Id, at ¶ 36）。Weintraub 明确表示相反结论。\n\nB. 除非法院至少进行一项衡量债务人利益与受托人最大化债务人财产利益的分析，否则受托人不得取得债务人的任何特权信息\n\n18. 如受托人所承认，有一种观点援引美国联邦最高法院（Supreme Court）在 Swidler & Berlin（斯威德勒与柏林律师事务所） v. United States（美国）, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) 中的裁决，认为个人债务人的破产受托人绝不取得控制个人债务人律师—当事人特权的权利。参见，例如，Gottlieb（戈特利布） v. Fayerman（费耶尔曼） (In re Ginzburg（金兹伯格案）), 517 B.R. 175, 181 (2014)（“对 Swidler 的审慎解读表明，受托人所主张的利益衡量不应被视为对‘法律中历史最悠久、获承认的特权之一’的例外。”）。“该特权无疑导致证据的丧失，但这在一定程度上是正当的，因为若无该特权，当事人可能从一开始就不会作出此类通信。”同上（引自 Swidler, 524 U.S. at 408）。\n\n19. 在 Swidler 一案中，美国联邦最高法院驳回了如下论点：“‘律师—当事人特权的既有例外，如犯罪—欺诈例外和遗嘱例外，使再增加一个例外的影响微不足道。’”同上（引自 Swidler, 524 U.S. at 408）。5 “尽管破产受托人归集资产并适当调查债务人事务的需要，为本案中的衡量测试提供了有力依据，但美国联邦最高法院已明确禁止这种‘再增加一个例外’的做法。”同上；另见 In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America, Inc.（Silvio de Lindegg美国海洋开发公司案）, 27 B.R. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)；McClarty（麦克拉蒂） v. Gudenau（古德瑙）, 166 B.R. 101, 101-102 (E.D.Mich.1994)（两案均认定，受托人不得代表债务人放弃个人的律师—当事人特权）。\n\n20. 另有判决作出于 Swidler 之前，或者认定其不适用于破产案件；这些判决采用衡量测试，一方面衡量披露债务人享有特权的通信以及妨碍律师—当事人通信可能对债务人造成的损害，另一方面衡量受托人为使破产财产价值最大化所具有之利益。参见，例如，Moore（摩尔） v. Eason（伊森） (In re Bazemore（贝兹莫尔案）), 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S. D. Ga. 1998)；另见 Blanket Waiver Motion（概括性放弃动议）, at 14-17。\n\n21. 在这一范围的一端，涉及债务人对第三方提出的破产申请前权利主张的律师—当事人通信，很可能有助于受托人代表破产财产追索该项权利主张，而向受托人披露这类通信不太可能对债务人造成损害。见同上（汇集判例）。认定受托人可以放弃个人债务人特权的法院，“侧重于根据案件的具体事实，不会对债务人产生不利影响。”Bazemore, 216 B.R. at 1024。\n\n22. 相反，“当披露可能对个人债务人的人身造成损害或导致其人身受到控制，或者与律师的通信可能受到抑制时，由个人债务人单独持有律师—当事人特权放弃权，这一观点具有说服力。”同上，at 1025；另见 In re Silvio, 27 B.R. at 28（破产公司全部股份的个人所有人也申请破产时，受托人可以放弃该公司的特权，因为可能产生的仅是资产的财务损失；但不得放弃该个人的特权，因为披露可能涉及犯罪行为，因而可能导致丧失人身自由，即入狱）；In re Hunt（亨特案）, 153 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992)（独立受托人试图通过询问个人债务人的律师，撤销债务人的欺诈性转让及破产申请前优先清偿；若敏感信息可能在破产程序中被披露，这将抑制充分坦诚的律师—当事人通信）。\n\n23. 有利于个人债务人保留律师—当事人特权的最明确指标，是通信涉及不可免责性或刑事责任。比较 Miller（米勒） v Miller（米勒）, 247 B.R. 704, 709-710 (N.D. Bankr. Oh. 2000)（“仅因受托人成为债务人全部（或大部分）资产的受让人，并不意味着受托人也成为债务人律师—当事人特权的承受人。换言之，资产的单纯转移并不同时意味着个人律师—当事人特权也随之转移。……本院不认为受托人应有权继受债务人的律师—当事人特权，并由此单方放弃该特权。本裁决中具有重要意义的事实是，受托人与债务人之间处于对立关系……因此，受托人取得债务人的律师—当事人特权可能对债务人造成极大损害，因为受托人寻求放弃债务人律师—当事人特权的唯一目的，是将该信息直接用于对抗债务人。（即撤销债务人的破产债务免除。）”），与 Ramette（拉梅特） v. Bame（贝姆） (In re Bame（贝姆案）), 251 B.R. 367, 377 (Bankr. D. Minn 2000)（“本案中，债务人已被拒绝免除债务，受托人仅寻求查明可能使破产财产受益的资产及可撤销转让。”）相对照。\n\n24. 虽然受托人声称采用衡量测试，但其完全歪曲了该测试的适用方式。受托人主张，“适用该衡量测试的法院通常认定，对于可能识别并有助于为破产财产及债权人利益追回资产的文件，或与破产财产管理有关的文件，受托人控制该特权。”（Blanket Waiver Motion, at 16）。受托人虽声称适用该标准，却敦促法院将债务人的特权概括性转移给受托人，并主张“附于 Rule 2004 Subpoenas（Rule 2004传票）的证据开示请求，寻求与以下事项有关的文件：(i) [Rule 2004] Motion 中讨论的特定资产及财产权益……(ii) 债务人在其他个人、公司实体及非营利组织中的权益及与其之间的关系……以及 (iii) 债务人与其律师及其他顾问就公司治理问题以及债务人财务和财产权益进行的通信。”（同上，at 17-19）。受托人进一步歪曲称，“每项请求均经过限定，以识别与债务人的资产和财务状况、其相关商业惯例以及其如何管理其破产财产有关的信息。”（同上，at 19）。\n\n25. 首先，受托人试图使法院接受的标准并非“衡量”测试，因为其只衡量天平的一端。受托人无权仅因信息涉及债务人的财务及财务状况而取得该信息。法院必须将受托人取得该信息的利益，与披露债务人与其律师之间保密通信可能对债务人造成的损害进行衡量。参见，例如，Miller, 247 B.R. at 709-710。\n\n26. 此外，受托人对传票的描述客观上不实。受托人完全没有努力将所请求信息的范围限定于可能增加破产财产价值的事项。向十四（14）家代表或曾代表债务人、“债务人家庭成员”、“关联个人”或“关联实体”的专业机构送达的传票——除债务人外，所有这些术语均由受托人在毫无任何证据或法律依据的情况下单方定义——试图强制这些专业机构提交，包括但不限于下列文件：\n\n17. 与债务人涉及的任何法律争议有关的任何义务、权利主张、责任或债务有关的全部文件，包括但不限于与在任何地方、州、联邦或国际机构（无论其为行政机构、法院、审理小组或替代性争议解决实体）进行的任何诉讼有关的文件。6\n\n27. 很难设想有任何要求放弃特权的请求会比要求提供与“债务人涉及的任何法律争议”有关的全部文件措辞更宽泛——尤其是在本案中，债权人已提起不可免责性诉讼，受托人已公开质疑债务人获得债务免除的权利，而且众多当事人，包括债务人破产财产的债权人、中国政府的登记代理人（包括 Bruno Wu（吴征），其正资助针对债务人的众多诉讼）以及中国政府本身，均指控债务人犯有多项严重罪行（尽管均无事实依据）。事实上，较为高调的债权人之一 Rui Ma（马蕊）指控债务人犯有强奸和非法拘禁罪。在此背景下，受托人要求概括性转移债务人特权的请求毫无根据。仅基于这些理由，法院即不得准许概括性放弃动议。\n\n6 传票似乎还假定，受托人有权控制属于“债务人家庭成员”、“关联实体”和“关联人员”的律师—当事人特权及相关特权，大概是基于纯粹猜测债务人控制这些主体。撇开其他问题不谈，在受托人获得债务人控制该等个人或实体的司法认定之前，受托人无权控制债务人以外的任何实体或个人；而这一认定永远不会发生，因为受托人生活在一个完全没有任何证据佐证的虚构世界中。\n\nC. 法院如未进行针对具体事实、逐份文件的分析并适用衡量测试，则不得强制债务人或其专业人士披露任何享有特权的通信\n\n28. 即使存在理由命令一方披露某些享有特权的信息，审判法院也必须进行针对具体事实的分析，以确定哪些文件必须披露以及哪些文件不得披露。参见 Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.（高地资本管理有限合伙企业） v. United States（美国）, 626 Fed. Appx. 324, 328 (2nd Cir. 2015)（“地区法院未审议并明确裁定特权问题构成错误，我们撤销地区法院就该问题作出的裁定，并发回重审，包括在所呈现情形下可能适当的、对涉案文件进行的任何不公开审查。”）（省略内部引文）；Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.（大通曼哈顿银行） v. Turner & Newall, PLC（特纳-纽沃尔公众有限公司）, 964 F.2d 159, 166 (2d. Cir. 1992)（推翻要求一方交出基于特权而未予提交的文件、但未就特权主张的实体问题作出司法裁定的命令）；International Business Machines Corp.（国际商业机器公司） v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 509 (2d. Cir. 1972)（“由于没有任何具体文件提交至本院，我们必须假定，所涉约1200份文件的内容属于律师—当事人特权范围内……”）；Winfield（温菲尔德） v. City of New York（纽约市）, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79281, [\\*12-24] (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区） May 10, 2018)（“具有控制力的先例……明确表明，法院不得仅为加快证据开示或免除其确定一方实体性或普通法权利的责任，而粗暴无视一方提出的特权主张。就解决当事人之间的争议而言，在此处看似便宜行事的做法并不正确。”）。\n\n29. 本规则同样完全适用于个人破产案件。参见，例如，Foster v. Hill（Foster 诉 Hill 案）（In re Foster（Foster 破产案）），188 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999)（“并无一般规则允许被置于非自愿破产程序的个人之受托人，一律控制该个人就债务人申请前请求所享有的律师—客户特权。”）。Foster 案直接排除了受托人通过一概放弃动议所寻求的救济。在 Foster 案中，破产法院仅基于其对特权清单的审查，命令向受托人披露债务人的律师—客户特权通信，并认定“主张或放弃律师—客户特权的权利，在……涉及追收具有申请前民事诉讼性质的破产财产资产时，由债务人转移至破产受托人。”Id. at 1263-64. 第十巡回上诉法院推翻了破产法院，认定其错误在于，在债务人主张特权并提交被扣留文件的特权清单后，“实质上拒绝审查或调查[债务人]特权主张的具体情况。”Id. at 1264.\n\n30. 第十巡回上诉法院进一步解释称，尽管破产法院\n\n表示其已进行个案分析，并称其结论“受到……本案请求的性质以及受托人所寻求的特定文件的支持。”……然而，其个案分析仅限于指出，申请前诉讼是破产财产的主要资产；这些诉讼涉及善意的“就债务人在申请前与之开展业务的第三方提出的违约、欺诈及本票请求之积极主张”，且所寻求的文件“严格限于[律师]就待决民事诉讼所持有的档案中的文件……[而非]来自[债务人]刑事档案的文件。”……虽然这些观察可能是一个良好的开端，但法院未通过非公开审查这些文件，将其与实际被扣留的文件联系起来。……如法院通过利益衡量分析解决特权争议，其必须转而聚焦于具体事实和文件。\n\nId. at 1266-1267（着重号系原文所加）。\n\n31. 在此，受托人不当地寻求一概放弃或转移债务人的特权。因此，法院必须驳回一概放弃动议。参见 Id.; 另参见 Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., at 328。\n\nD. 法院能够且应当作出命令，确定规制债务人保留其律师—客户特权及相关特权之权利的标准\n\n32. 尽管受托人无权获得一项将债务人的律师—客户特权一概转移给其的命令，但各方均将受益于法院作出命令，确认其拟遵循的判例路线。根据本案情况，即针对债务人尚未解决的刑事指控，以及拟剥夺其免债资格的待决诉讼，法院可以裁定债务人有权保留其全部申请前／受托人任命前的律师—客户特权——至少在该等指控得到完全且最终解决之前。参见，例如，Gottlieb, 517 B.R. at 181; In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America, Inc., 27 B.R. at 28; McClarty, 166 B.R. at 101-102.\n\n33. 或者，法院可作出命令，确认其拟进行利益衡量分析。参见，例如，Bazemore, 216 B.R. at 1024; Miller, 247 B.R. at 709-710。如其如此，法院可指示各方如何将其分析适用于债务人的信息。例如，法院可指示传票接收人仅基于特权而扣留其认为可能涉及对债务人造成损害的文件（不影响个别传票接收人可能提出的任何其他异议），例如涉及刑事指控、与不可免债性有关的事实，或与债务人的破产财产毫无关系的事实，例如其待决的庇护申请。参见，例如，In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America, Inc., 27 B.R. at 28; Miller, 247 B.R. at 709-710。此类命令不会、也不可能规避随后对传票接收人所扣留文件进行司法审查的必要性——因为将由法院而非传票接收人最终决定哪些享有特权的文件仍由债务人控制。然而，此类命令几乎必然会简化程序，并大幅提高法院同意各方特权主张的可能性，因为各方将能够依照法院命令确定的标准调整其特权主张。\n\n因此，债务人谨请求法院作出命令：(i) 驳回一概放弃动议；以及以下两项中的任一项：(ii) 确认尽管受托人已获任命，债务人仍保留其律师—客户特权；或 (iii) 确定规制法院利益衡量分析的因素。债务人还请求法院授予其认为公正且适当的其他救济。\n\n日期：2022 年 8 月 27 日，地点：康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Aaron A. Romney, Esq.\n\nEric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）(ct12849)\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M. 金德塞斯）(ct14640)\n\nAaron A. Romney（亚伦·A. 罗姆尼）(ct28144)\n\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\n\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n\n电子邮箱：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com]\n\n[skindseth@zeislaw.com]\n\n[aromney@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2022 年 8 月 27 日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。根据法院电子提交系统的运作，提交通知将通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人；或按电子提交通知所示，通过邮寄方式发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人士。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n/s/ Aaron A. Romney\n\nAaron A. Romney（亚伦·A. 罗姆尼）, Esq.","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4545,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:35:01"}