{"id":"court_ctb_801_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":801,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x      |                         |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                                | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor.1                                                    | :<br>: |                         |\n|                                                             | :      |                         |\n\n#### ---------------------------------------------------------- x **TRUSTEE'S REPLY TO DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER (A) PROVIDING THAT CONTROL OF ANY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION, AND OTHER PRIVILEGES RELATED TO RULE 2004 SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS PASSED TO TRUSTEE UPON APPOINTMENT, (B) DIRECTING THAT DEBTOR AND OTHER EXAMINEES NOT WITHHOLD DOCUMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH PRIVILEGES, AND (C) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), files this Reply (the \"Reply\") to Debtor's Objection (the \"Objection\") to Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order (A) Providing that Control of Any Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product Protection, and Other Privileges Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents Passed to Trustee Upon Appointment, (B) Directing that Debtor and Other Examinees Not Withhold Documents on Account of Such Privileges, and (C) Granting Related Relief (the \"Privileges Motion\"). In support of this Reply,\n\nthe Trustee represents as follows:\n\n<sup>1</sup> Although the Debtor's legal name is Ho Wan Kwok, he is also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases. The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Objection is more of the same from this Debtor: another attempt to muddy the issues, delay progress in this case, and evade his responsibilities under the Bankruptcy Code.<sup>2</sup> The Privileges Motion—similar to the Trustee's motion concerning corporate governance rights, which the Court recently granted<sup>3</sup>—does no more than ask the Court to confirm what the law requires: upon the Trustee's appointment, he gained control of the Debtor's privileges on matters relating to his assets and financial condition and to the post-petition administration of his estate. In his Objection, the Debtor blatantly mischaracterizes the nature of the relief being sought as asking for a \"blanket waiver\" of all his privileges and also contends—contrary to statements he made previously to the Trustee and the Court—that the Court cannot issue an order identifying the privileges that passed to the Trustee other than on a document-by-document basis. The Debtor is wrong on all counts, and his Objection should be overruled.\n\n2. As an initial matter, the Trustee is not asking for the Court to order a \"blanket waiver\" of the Debtor's privileges. In fact, the Trustee is not asking for a \"waiver\" of anything. The issue the Privileges Motion addresses is the transfer of control of privileges to the Trustee under the Bankruptcy Code, which has nothing to do with whether or not a privilege is \"waived,\" but rather simply establishes that the Trustee controls certain of the Debtor's privileges moving forward. Moreover, the Privileges Motion does not ask for an order providing that *all privileges on all topics* have passed to the Trustee; rather, the Trustee's request is limited to confirming that, under the balancing test utilized by the vast majority of courts, the Trustee now controls all\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Privileges Motion.\n\n<sup>3</sup> *See* The *Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 541, 1108, and 105, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All of Debtor's Economic Rights in Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee to Act in Any Foreign Country on Behalf of the Estate, and Granting Related Relief* (ECF No. 598).\n\nprivileges relating to the identification of estate assets, the Debtor's financial condition, and matters involving the post-petition administration of the estate. These are the types of documents the Trustee seeks in his subpoenas to the Debtor, his current and former professionals, and individuals and entities associated with the Debtor. The Trustee is *not*  presently asking for documents concerning the Debtor's criminal activities (such as the rape and false imprisonment allegations he mentions) or other unrelated topics. To the extent there are privileged documents concerning such topics that would be responsive to the Trustee's requests, the Trustee is not seeking control over those privileges at this time. The Debtor's purported concerns in this regard are, therefore, unfounded.\n\n3. Neither is the Trustee seeking access to documents covered by privileges held by *other parties*, as the Debtor contends. The Trustee has served a number of Rule 2004 Subpoenas on the Debtor's family members, current and former law firms, and other associated entities and individuals. The Trustee is not, however, seeking control over the privileges, if any, that belong exclusively to such parties. The Privileges Motion asks only that the Debtor not instruct any of his law firms or the other Discovery Recipients to withhold documents from production on the basis of a privilege that the *Debtor* purportedly owns and controls, either by himself or through an alleged common interest with another party. To the extent that a Debtor's family member or other party holds *their own privileges* that have not been waived and that they have the right to assert under applicable law, such privileges are unaffected by the Privileges Motion.<sup>4</sup>\n\n4. Finally, the Debtor's newly-minted position that the Court cannot make a determination as to the Trustee's control of privileges except on a document-by-document basis is not only an attempt to delay, but it is also meritless and entirely inconsistent with the Debtor's\n\n<sup>4</sup> The Trustee reserves all rights to contest any documents that any Discovery Recipient withholds from production for any reason, including based on the assertion of one or more privileges.\n\nown prior statements. During the parties' initial meet and confer on the Rule 2004 Motions, the Debtor's counsel said it would not make sense to discuss privileges on a document-by-document basis. The Debtor reiterated this position in the declaration his counsel submitted in support of the Debtor's objection to the Trustee's Rule 2004 Motions:\n\n# *I, as the Debtor's counsel, indicated [in the meet and confer] that I did not believe it would be possible to address privilege issues on a document-bydocument basis in connection with the Rule 2004 Motions*.\n\n(Romney Declaration, ¶ 18 (emphasis added)). Counsel instead proposed that the Court address the privilege issues in an \"*omnibus fashion*\"— *see id.* at ¶ 15 (emphasis added)**—***i.e.,* precisely the manner in which the Trustee has presented the issue in the Privileges Motion.\n\n5. Based on this history, any assertion that the Privileges Motion is not ripe for adjudication is baseless and amounts to nothing more than another attempt by this Debtor to frustrate the Trustee's investigation and delay progress in this case. Indeed, the Debtor has, to date, remarkably not produced a *single document* to the Trustee in response to either the Rule 2004 Motion or the Trustee's informal requests. The Court should see through the Debtor's antics, overrule his Objection, and grant the Privileges Motion.\n\n### **REPLY**\n\n6. The Objection first misstates the nature of the relief sought by the Privileges Motion and claims it is procedurally improper. Once these meritless arguments are debunked, it is clear the Debtor has no meaningful objection to the substance of the Privileges Motion because the law plainly provides that the Trustee controls the Debtor's privileges on matters related to his assets and financial condition and the administration of his estate.\n\n4\n\n## **A. Privileges Motion Does Not Seek Impermissible \"Blanket Waiver\"**\n\n7. As noted above, and as the Privileges Motion itself makes clear, the relief the Trustee seeks is limited. The Trustee does *not* ask for a \"waiver\" of any privileges but rather asks for a ruling that the control of privileges on certain subject matters has passed to the Trustee. The \"Relief Requested\" section of the Privileges Motion states as follows:\n\nBy this Motion, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court enter an order confirming that, upon the Trustee's appointment, control over any attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and other privileges relating to the assets, liabilities, financial status or administration of the estate passed to the Trustee, and that neither the Debtor nor any other Discovery Recipient shall withhold any documents responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas on the basis of any such privilege or attempt to assert any such privilege.\n\n(Privileges Motion, ¶ 31.) Thus, the Privileges Motion seeks only to confirm that the Trustee controls all of the Debtor's former privileges *on issues related to the recovery of estate assets, the Debtor's financial condition, and the administration of his estate*. The Debtor's purported concern regarding a \"blanket waiver\" is entirely unfounded.\n\n8. In addition, the Trustee does not, as the Debtor contends, seek control of privileges that *other parties* exclusively own and control. As described in the Privileges Motion, if the other Discovery Recipients claim to hold a common interest or joint defense privilege with the Debtor, the Trustee has gained control over the Debtor's rights with respect to such privilege. However, if another Discovery Recipient holds documents that are legitimately subject to a claim of privilege belonging only to that Discovery Recipient (and not also to the Debtor), their right to assert that privilege is unaffected by the Privileges Motion. The Trustee, of course, reserves his right to later challenge any such privileges—and, in fact, the Trustee finds it hard to believe that another Discovery Recipient could legitimately claim privilege over issues affecting assets of *the Debtor's estate*—but that issue is preserved for another day.\n\n## **B. Issue of Trustee's Control Of Privilege Need Not Be Decided on Document-by-Document Basis**\n\n9. The Debtor already told this Court in the Romney Declaration submitted on August 11 that it would *not be possible* to address privilege issues on a document-by-document basis and, therefore, the Court should address such issues in an omnibus fashion. This is precisely what the Privileges Motion asks the Court to do. Despite having invited the Trustee to file the Privileges Motion, the Debtor now contends it is improper to proceed in this manner. The Court should see the Debtor's gamesmanship for what it is—yet another attempt to delay and obstruct the Trustee's investigation in this case.\n\n10. The Trustee does not dispute that, in a typical litigation, where there are isolated questions regarding the privileged nature of specific documents, it may be more common to litigate privilege issues after a producing party has specifically identified such documents on a privilege log. But this case is unique for important reasons, and nothing prevents the Court from addressing key threshold privilege issues now, at the outset of the Rule 2004 process.\n\n11. First, as the Court has repeatedly recognized, it is imperative that the Trustee's investigation move forward expeditiously. The Debtor filed his case six months ago and has done everything in his power to prevent the Court, the Trustee, and other parties in interest from making meaningful progress. If the Debtor is allowed to prolong the Court's consideration of privilege issues until he produces a privilege log, it will only result in further delay.\n\n12. Second, the parties have already joined issue on the question presented to the Court—*i.e.*, whether the Trustee controls the Debtor's privileges and, if so, to what extent. The Debtor has taken the position that either he retains *all* of his privileges or that the balancing test allows him to continue to assert privileges over matters relating to his assets and financial condition. The Trustee, on the other hand, takes the position that the Trustee controls all the\n\n6\n\nDebtor's privileges on these topics. Accordingly, there is a clear dispute between the parties that the Court can and should resolve at this time.\n\n13. Finally, the Debtor's arguments in his Objection are inconsistent on whether the Court can resolve privilege issues other than on a document-by-document basis. While he initially takes the position that the Court cannot do so, he later invites the Court to issue an order, prior to the production of any documents or privilege log, that \"direct[s] the parties how to conduct the [balancing test] analysis to the Debtor's information.\" (Objection at ¶ 33.)<sup>5</sup> Thus, the Debtor concedes that the issues presented by the motion are properly before the Court.\n\n# **C. Under Balancing Analysis, Trustee Controls All Privileges Relating to Potential Estate Assets, Debtor's Financial Condition, and Estate Administration**\n\n14. The Debtor's meritless process-based objections aside, it is clear that the Debtor has no legitimate objection to the Privileges Motion's substance. Specifically, the law is clear that the Court should apply a \"balancing test\" and that, under such test, the Trustee obtained control of all privileges of the Debtor relating to estate assets, his financial condition, and the estate's post-petition administration immediately upon the Trustee's appointment. The Debtor has no credible argument to the contrary.\n\n15. The Debtor first suggests, half-heartedly, that \"one line of authority\" supports the conclusion that a trustee never acquires control over *any* of an individual debtor's privileges. The Debtor, as he did in his limited objection to the Rule 2004 Motions, cites *Gottlieb v.*\n\n<sup>5</sup> To be clear, the Debtor's specific proposal regarding the guidance the Court should provide is problematic and not workable. The Debtor suggests, \"[f]or example, the Court could direct the recipients of the Subpoenas to withhold documents on the basis of privilege . . . only documents that they believe potentially implicate harm to the Debtor, such as criminal allegations, facts relating to non-dischargeability, or facts that have nothing to do with the Debtor's estate, such as his pending asylum application.\" (Objection at ¶ 33.) The Debtor's amorphous standard, contrary to any case law regarding the balancing test, would allow the recipients to use their own subjective judgment of what may \"implicate harm to the Debtor\" or relate to non-dischargeability, to effectively withhold almost any document that the Debtor thinks would be unfavorable to him, including documents related to his efforts to keep assets outside the reach of his creditors.\n\n*Fayerman (In re Ginzburg)*, 517 B.R. 175, 181 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014), in support of this position. But the Debtor fails to acknowledge that this non-binding case (i) is an extreme outlier and (ii) erred in its analysis and conclusions (including due to its misplaced reliance on *Swidler & Berlin v. United States*, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)), for all the reasons set forth in the Privileges Motion. (*See* Privileges Motion at ¶ 52 (\"The Supreme Court [in *Swidler*] did not consider when the attorney-client privilege passes to a trustee, or to any other successor in interest. Rather its focus was on an independent counsel's request that a new exception to the attorney-client privilege be created to allow a third-party access to previously privileged information.\")).<sup>6</sup>\n\n16. The Debtor next argues that, to the extent the balancing test governs, the Trustee has misapplied that test. Specifically, the Debtor contends that a \"trustee is not entitled to information simply because it concerns the Debtor's finances and financial condition.\" (Objection, ¶ 25.) The case law, however, holds just the opposite—a trustee necessarily controls the Debtor's privileges over information related to the Debtor's assets and financial condition because that information is central to the Trustee's core function of identifying potential estate assets for the benefit of creditors. *See, e.g.*, *In re Bazemore*, 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998), 216 B.R. at 1024 (finding that trustee had control of privilege where it sought documents to determine if estate held cause of action); *Bame*, 251 B.R. at 377 (finding in favor of trustee's request to control privilege of individual debtor when seeking discovery of documents to recover assets); *In re Horvath*, No. 13-34137, 2015 WL 2195060, at \\*6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 7, 2015) (trustee controlled debtor's privilege regarding potential assets where\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Debtor also fails to acknowledge that there is yet a third line of cases holding that *all of the Debtor's privileges* automatically pass to a Trustee. (*See* Privileges Motion at ¶ 38 n.9 (\"As noted by the court in *Bame*, . . . [some courts hold] that '*per se* an individuals' attorney-client privileged communications always transfer to the trustee.'\" (citing *In re Bame*, 251 B.R. 367, 376-77 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000))).\n\n\"the sole purpose of the Trustee's inquiry is to augment her ability to administer the estate with respect to those assets and to potentially increase the value of Debtor's estate to his creditors\").\n\n17. The Debtor's primary concern appears to be that the Trustee could get access to privileged information relating to the Debtor's potential criminal liability or to pending nondischargeability actions. As discussed above, however, the Trustee is only seeking discovery related to the Debtor's assets, financial condition, and the administration of his estate; the Trustee is not seeking documents concerning unrelated allegations of criminal liability, such as allegations of false imprisonment or rape, or other unrelated legal issues, such as the Debtor's pending asylum application. To be clear, the Debtor has not articulated any basis—and there is none—for him to withhold documents related to the location of his assets, including his potential real or personal property assets, such as the *Lady May* or his New York apartment, and his ownership and control over various businesses and legal entities. The law is clear that documents related to these topics must be produced.<sup>7</sup>\n\n18. The Debtor contends that certain of the Trustee's document requests (e.g., Request No. 17, which asks for documents relating to legal disputes involving the Debtor) can potentially be read to call for the production of privileged documents implicating his criminal liability on unrelated issues, such as the aforementioned false imprisonment and rape allegations. To the extent Request No. 17 or any other request would call for the production of such\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Debtor's apparent concern that the Trustee may use documents obtained in discovery against the Debtor in pending non-dischargeability actions is also unfounded for the separate reason that the Debtor himself has *taken the position that the Trustee does not have standing to be heard in a non-dischargeability action under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code***.** Accordingly, by the Debtor's admission, there should be no concern with the Trustee obtaining access to documents related to pending non-dischargeability actions.\n\ndocuments, the Trustee is willing to revise the language of his proposed order to state that the Debtor is not, at this time, being asked to pass control of such privileges to the Trustee.<sup>8</sup>\n\n19. Finally, the Debtor does not appear to take issue with the Trustee's position that all privileged post-petition documents relating to the administration of this case prior to the Trustee's appointment automatically pass to the Trustee, without regard to the balancing test. (*See* Privileges Motion at ¶ 49). Accordingly, all such documents, including specifically all documents in the possession of the Debtor's former bankruptcy counsel, Brown Rudnick LLP, should be provided to the Trustee in response to the Rule 2004 Motions.\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court enter an order confirming that, upon the Trustee's appointment, control over any attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and other privileges relating to the assets, liabilities, financial status or administration of the estate passed to the Trustee, and that neither the Debtor nor any other Discovery Recipient shall withhold any documents responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas on the basis of any such privilege or attempt to assert any such privilege.\n\nDated: August 29, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\n<sup>8</sup> To be clear, the Trustee reserves all rights to challenge any privilege assertions based on the argument that a withheld document relates to potential criminal liability, including the right to argue that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege prevents the Debtor from asserting such privilege.\n\nNicholas A. Bassett *(pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft *(pro hac vice* pending) Douglass Barron (*pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x                                |       |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11             |       |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                                | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073<br>: | (JAM) |\n| Debtor.                                                     | :<br>:                           |       |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x                                |       |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on August 29, 2022, the foregoing Reply was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing.<sup>1</sup> Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\n| Dated: | August 29, 2022        | LUC A. DESPINS,    |\n|--------|------------------------|--------------------|\n|        | New Haven, Connecticut | CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\n<sup>1</sup> To the extent that the foregoing was filed outside regular business hours, service by mail on recipients unable or not qualified to accept electronic notice was made on the next business day.\n\nNicholas A. Bassett *(pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft *(pro hac vice* pending) Douglass Barron (*pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于：\n第 11 章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1\n\n---------------------------------------------------------- x 受托人就债务人对第 11 章受托人请求作出如下裁定的动议所提异议的答复：(A) 规定自受托人获任命起，与依第 2004 条规则传票调取的文件相关的任何律师-委托人保密特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权即移交予受托人；(B) 命令债务人及其他受审查人不得以此类特权为由扣留文件；以及 (C) 准予相关救济\n\nLuc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）以在 Ho Wan Kwok（债务人）第 11 章案件中获任命的第 11 章受托人（「受托人」）身份，就债务人对第 11 章受托人请求作出如下裁定的动议（「特权动议」）所提异议（「异议」）提交本答复（「答复」）：(A) 规定自受托人获任命起，与依第 2004 条规则传票调取的文件相关的任何律师-委托人保密特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权即移交予受托人；(B) 命令债务人及其他受审查人不得以此类特权为由扣留文件；以及 (C) 准予相关救济。为支持本答复，\n\n受托人陈述如下：\n\n1 尽管债务人的法定姓名是 Ho Wan Kwok，但他也以 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok 以及其他诸多别名为人所知。债务人纳税人识别号的后四位为 9595。\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 该异议不过是该债务人故技重施：又一次企图混淆问题、拖延本案进展并逃避其在《破产法》（Bankruptcy Code）项下的责任。2 特权动议——类似于受托人关于公司治理权的动议，该动议法院最近已予批准3——所要求的无非是请法院确认法律所规定的内容：在受托人获任命后，他就其资产及财务状况相关事项以及申请提出后破产财产管理事项，获得了对债务人各项特权的控制权。债务人在其异议中，公然将所寻求救济的性质歪曲为要求对其所有特权进行「一揽子放弃」，并主张——这与其此前向受托人和法院作出的陈述相悖——法院不能逐份文件审查之外以其他方式发布裁定以明确移交给受托人的特权。债务人在所有论点上均属错误，其异议应予驳回。\n\n2. 首先，受托人并未要求法院裁定债务人特权的「一揽子放弃」。事实上，受托人并未要求对任何事项进行「放弃」。特权动议所处理的问题是依据《破产法》将特权的控制权移交给受托人，这与特权是否被「放弃」毫无关系，而仅仅是确立受托人今后控制债务人的某些特权。此外，特权动议并未要求作出裁定规定所有主题的所有特权均已移交给受托人；相反，受托人的请求仅限于确认，根据绝大多数法院所适用的利益衡量标准（balancing test），受托人现控制与查明破产财产、债务人财务状况以及涉及破产申请提出后财产管理事项相关的所有特权。\n\n2 本文中使用但未予定义的专有名词具有特权动议中赋予它们的含义。\n\n3 参见《第 11 章受托人依据〈破产法〉第 363、541、1108 和 105 条请求作出如下裁定的动议：(A) 确认第 11 章受托人享有债务人在债务人控制实体中的全部经济权利；(B) 授权第 11 章受托人代表破产财产在任何外国行事，并准予相关救济》（ECF No. 598）。\n\n这些正是受托人在向债务人、其现任及前任专业人士以及与债务人相关的个人和实体发出的传票中所索取的文件类型。受托人目前并未索取有关债务人犯罪活动（例如他提及的强奸和非法拘禁指控）或其他无关主题的文件。即使存在涉及此类主题且符合受托人请求的特权保护文件，受托人目前亦未就此类特权寻求控制权。因此，债务人在该方面的所谓担忧毫无根据。\n\n3. 受托人也并非如债务人所主张的那样，是在寻求获取受其他各方所享特权保护的文件。受托人已向债务人的家庭成员、现任及前任律师事务所以及其他相关实体和个人送达了多份依第 2004 条规则发出的传票。然而，受托人并未寻求控制专属于此类各方的特权（如有）。特权动议仅要求债务人不得指示其任何律师事务所或其他调查取证接收方以债务人单方拥有和控制、或通过与另一方主张的共同利益而拥有和控制的特权为由拒绝提供文件。如果债务人的家庭成员或其他方拥有其自身未被放弃且依适用法律有权主张的特权，此类特权不受特权动议的影响。4\n\n4. 最后，债务人最新抛出的关于法院除逐份文件审查外无法就受托人对特权的控制权作出决定的立场，不仅是一种拖延企图，而且毫无根据，且与债务人\n\n4 受托人保留对任何调查取证接收方以任何理由（包括基于主张一项或多项特权）扣留而不予提供的任何文件提出异议的所有权利。\n\n自身先前的陈述完全矛盾。在双方就第 2004 条规则动议进行的最初会商（meet and confer）中，债务人的律师曾表示逐份文件讨论特权问题毫无意义。债务人在其律师为支持债务人对受托人第 2004 条规则动议的异议而提交的声明中重申了这一立场：\n「我作为债务人的律师，[在会商中]表示我不认为在第 2004 条规则动议相关事项中能够逐份文件地处理特权问题。」\n\n（Romney 声明，第 18 段（强调为后加））。该律师反而建议法院以「综合方式」（omnibus fashion）处理特权问题——参见同上第 15 段（强调为后加）——即完全是受托人在特权动议中提出该问题的方式。\n\n5. 基于这一背景，任何声称特权动议尚未成熟到可供裁判的主张都是毫无根据的，这不过是该债务人企图阻挠受托人调查并拖延本案进展的又一次尝试。事实上，令人瞠目结舌的是，截至目前，债务人针对第 2004 条规则动议或受托人的非正式要求，尚未向受托人提供过任何一份文件。法院应当识破债务人的把戏，驳回其异议，并准予特权动议。\n\n答复\n\n6. 该异议首先歪曲了特权动议所寻求救济的性质，并声称其在程序上不当。一旦这些毫无价值的论点被揭穿，显而易见的是，债务人对特权动议的实质内容并无任何有意义的异议，因为法律明确规定，受托人就与其资产、财务状况以及破产财产管理相关的事项控制债务人的特权。\n\nA. 特权动议并未寻求不被允许的「一揽子放弃」\n\n7. 如上所述，且如特权动议本身所明确指出的，受托人所寻求的救济是有限的。受托人并未要求对任何特权进行「放弃」，而是请求裁定特定主题特权的控制权已移交给受托人。特权动议的「请求救济」部分表述如下：\n\n通过本动议，受托人谨请求法院作出一项命令，确认自受托人获任命起，对与破产财产的资产、负债、财务状况或管理相关的任何律师-委托人保密特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权即移交予受托人，且债务人及任何其他调查取证接收方均不得以任何此类特权为由扣留符合第 2004 条规则传票要求的任何文件，亦不得试图主张任何此类特权。\n\n（特权动议，第 31 段。）因此，特权动议仅寻求确认受托人在与追回破产财产、债务人财务状况以及破产财产管理相关的问题上，控制债务人原先的所有特权。债务人关于「一揽子放弃」的所谓担忧完全是没有根据的。\n\n8. 此外，受托人并非如债务人所主张的那样，寻求控制其他各方单独拥有和控制的特权。正如特权动议中所阐述的，如果其他调查取证接收方主张与债务人享有共同利益特权或联合辩护特权，受托人已取得债务人就此类特权享有的权利的控制权。然而，如果另一名调查取证接收方持有的文件正当地属于仅归该调查取证接收方所有（而非同时归债务人所有）的特权主张范围，其主张该特权的权利不受特权动议的影响。当然，受托人保留日后对任何此类特权提出质疑的权利——事实上，受托人很难相信另一名调查取证接收方能够就影响债务人破产财产的问题正当地主张特权——但该问题留待日后解决。\n\nB. 受托人对特权的控制权问题无需逐份文件作出裁决\n\n9. 债务人早在 8 月 11 日提交给本法院的 Romney 声明中就已表示，逐份文件处理特权问题是不可能的，因此法院应当以综合方式处理此类问题。这正是特权动议请求法院所做的事情。尽管债务人曾促使受托人提交特权动议，但其现在却主张以这种方式推进是不当的。法院应当看清债务人的策略手段——这又是本案中拖延和阻碍受托人调查的企图。\n\n10. 受托人并不否认，在典型的诉讼中，当关于特定文件是否具有特权性质存在个别疑问时，在提供文件的一方于特权清单（privilege log）中具体列明此类文件后再就特权问题进行诉讼可能更为常见。但由于重大原因，本案具有特殊性，且没有任何规定阻止法院在目前处于第 2004 条规则程序的初期阶段就处理关键的前提性特权问题。\n\n11. 首先，正如法院一再认定的，受托人的调查必须迅速推进。债务人于六个月前提出本案申请，并竭尽所能阻止法院、受托人和其他利害关系方取得实质性进展。如果允许债务人将法院对特权问题的审议一直拖延到其出具特权清单之时，只会导致进一步的延误。\n\n12. 其次，双方就呈交给法院的问题——即受托人是否控制债务人的特权，以及如果控制，其范围为何——已经形成争点。债务人主张的立场是：要么他保留其全部特权，要么权衡测试允许他继续就与其资产及财务状况相关的事项主张特权。另一方面，受托人主张的立场是：受托人控制债务人在这些主题上的全部特权。因此，双方之间存在明确的争议，法院此时能够且应当予以解决。\n\n13. 最后，债务人在其《异议书》（Objection）中的论点在“法院是否能够非逐份文件地解决特权问题”上前后矛盾。虽然他最初主张法院不能这样做，但随后他又促请法院在出示任何文件或特权清单之前发布一项命令，“就如何对债务人的信息进行［权衡测试］分析向各方发出指示”。（《异议书》第 33 段。）5 因此，债务人承认本动议所提出的问题已正当地呈交至法院面前。\n\nC. 根据权衡分析，受托人控制与潜在破产财产资产、债务人财务状况以及破产财产管理相关的所有特权\n\n14. 抛开债务人毫无根据的基于程序的异议不谈，显而易见的是，债务人对《特权动议》（Privileges Motion）的实质内容并无合法的异议。具体而言，法律明确规定法院应当适用“权衡测试”，并且在该项测试下，受托人在获任命后，立即取得债务人与破产财产资产、其财务状况以及申请破产后破产财产管理相关的所有特权的控制权。债务人对此提不出任何可信的反驳理由。\n\n15. 债务人首先半心半意地提出，存在“一系列判例”支持受托人绝不会取得个人债务人任何特权控制权的结论。正如债务人在针对《第 2004 条规则动议》（Rule 2004 Motions）的有限异议中所做的那样，债务人援引了 Gottlieb v. Fayerman (In re Ginzburg), 517 B.R. 175, 181 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014) 一案来支持该立场。但债务人未能承认的是，出于《特权动议》中所阐述的全部理由，该起不具约束力的先例 (i) 属于极端的个例判决，且 (ii) 其分析和结论均存在错误（包括因其错误地依赖了 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) 一案）。（参见《特权动议》第 52 段（“最高法院［在 Swidler 案中］并未考虑律师-委托人保密特权何时转移给受托人或任何其他权益继承人。相反，其关注重点是独立检察官提出的设立一项新的律师-委托人保密特权例外以允许第三方查阅此前享有特权之信息的请求。”））。6\n\n5 澄清说明：债务人关于法院应当提供的指导意见的具体提议存在问题且不可行。债务人提出，“例如，法院可以指示传票的接收人仅基于特权扣留他们认为可能对债务人造成实质损害的文件，如刑事指控、与不可免责性相关的事实，或与债务人破产财产无关的事实，例如他尚未完结的庇护申请。”（《异议书》第 33 段。）债务人这种模糊的标准违背了有关权衡测试的任何判例法，该标准将允许接收人运用其关于何种情况可能“对债务人造成实质损害”或与不可免责性相关的主观判断，从而实质上扣留债务人认为对其不利的几乎任何文件，包括与其试图将资产置于其债权人触及范围之外的相关文件。\n\n6 债务人同样未能承认，还存在第三类判例认为债务人的所有特权均自动转移给受托人。（参见《特权动议》第 38 段脚注 9（“正如 Bame 案法院所指出的，……［一些法院认为］‘个人享有的受律师-委托人保密特权保护的通信在法律上始终必然转移给受托人。’” (援引 In re Bame, 251 B.R. 367, 376-77 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000)))）。\n\n16. 债务人接下来辩称，在权衡测试适用的限度内，受托人错误适用了该项测试。具体而言，债务人声称“受托人无权仅因信息涉及债务人的财务与财务状况就获得该等信息”。（《异议书》第 25 段。）然而，判例法得出的结论恰恰相反——受托人必然控制债务人就与债务人资产和财务状况相关信息所享有的特权，因为该等信息对于受托人为了债权人的利益识别潜在破产财产资产的核心职责至关重要。参见，例如，In re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998)（认定受托人在寻求文件以确定破产财产是否享有诉由时拥有特权控制权）；Bame, 251 B.R. at 377（支持受托人在寻求文件开示以追回资产时控制个人债务人特权的请求）；In re Horvath, No. 13-34137, 2015 WL 2195060, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 7, 2015)（在“受托人调查的唯一目的是增强其就该等资产管理破产财产的能力，并潜在地为其债权人增加债务人破产财产的价值”的情况下，受托人控制了债务人关于潜在资产的特权）。\n\n17. 债务人的主要担忧似乎在于受托人可能会获取与债务人潜在刑事责任或尚未完结的不可免责诉讼相关的特权信息。然而，如上文所述，受托人仅在寻求与债务人资产、财务状况以及其破产财产管理相关的证据开示；受托人并未寻求有关不相关刑事责任指控的文件（例如非法监禁或强奸指控），亦未寻求有关其他不相关法律事项的文件（例如债务人尚未完结的庇护申请）。澄清说明：债务人并未阐明任何依据——事实上也不存在任何依据——可供其扣留与其资产位置相关的文档，包括其潜在的不动产或个人财产资产（例如 Lady May 号游艇或其纽约公寓），以及他对各家企业和法律实体的所有权及控制权。法律明确规定与这些主题相关的文档必须出示。7\n\n7 债务人表面上对受托人可能在尚未完结的不可免责诉讼中将通过证据开示获得的文件用于对抗债务人的担忧也是站不住脚的，另一个单独的理由是债务人本人已主张受托人无权在根据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第 523 条提起的不可免责诉讼中发表意见。因此，根据债务人自己的承认，受托人获得查阅与尚未完结的不可免责诉讼相关文件的权限不应存在任何担忧。\n\n18. 债务人主张，受托人的某些文件出示请求（例如第 17 号请求，其要求出示与涉及债务人的法律争议相关的文档）可能被理解为要求出示涉及其在不相关事项上刑事责任的特权文档，例如前述的非法监禁和强奸指控。在第 17 号请求或任何其他请求要求出示此类文档的范围内，受托人愿意修改其拟议命令的措辞，声明目前并未要求债务人将此类特权的控制权转移给受托人。8\n\n8 澄清说明：受托人保留就任何基于被扣留文档涉及潜在刑事责任之抗辩而主张特权提出异议的全部权利，包括主张律师-委托人特权的犯罪-欺诈例外阻却债务人主张该等特权的权利。\n\n19. 最后，债务人似乎并未对受托人的以下立场提出异议：即在受托人获任命之前产生的、与本案管理相关的所有享有特权的破产申请后文档，无论权衡测试结果如何，均自动转移给受托人。（参见《特权动议》第 49 段）。因此，所有此类文档，特别是债务人前破产法律顾问 Brown Rudnick LLP 持有的所有文档，均应针对《第 2004 条规则动议》提供给受托人。\n\n为此，受托人谨请求法院作出一项命令，确认：受托人获任命后，就与破产财产的资产、负债、财务状况或管理相关的任何律师-委托人保密特权、工作成果保护（work product protection）及其他特权的控制权均已转移给受托人；且债务人或任何其他证据开示接收人均不得以任何该等特权为由扣留响应《第 2004 条规则传票》的任何文档，亦不得试图主张任何该等特权。\n\n日期：2022年8月29日\n康涅狄格州纽黑文（New Haven, Connecticut）\nLUC A. DESPINS，第 11 章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（特许出庭申请审理中 (pro hac vice pending)）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nAvram E. Luft（特许出庭申请审理中）\nDouglass Barron（特许出庭申请审理中）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n第 11 章受托人之法律顾问\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）\nDISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分院）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\nIn re: :\n:\nChapter 11（第 11 章）\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）, :\n:\nCase No. 22-50073\n: (JAM)\nDebtor（债务人）. :\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE（送达证明）\n\n下述署名人特此证明：于 2022年8月29日，上述《答辩书》（Reply）已通过电子方式提交。本提交事项的通知已通过法院的电子案卷系统（“CM/ECF”）以电子邮件形式发送给上述第 11 章案件的所有当事人，或按照《电子提交通知书》上的指示，通过邮寄方式发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人。1 各方当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交的文件。\n\n日期：2022年8月29日\n康涅狄格州纽黑文\nLUC A. DESPINS，第 11 章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n及\n\n1 在上述文件于正常工作时间之外提交的范围内，向无法或不具备资格接受电子通知的接收人进行的邮寄送达已在下一个工作日完成。\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（特许出庭申请审理中）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nAvram E. Luft（特许出庭申请审理中）\nDouglass Barron（特许出庭申请审理中）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n第 11 章受托人之法律顾问","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","Despins","Guo","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":598,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3638,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:50:50"}