{"id":"court_ctb_83_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":83,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2022-03-01","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| -----------------------------------------------------------------X |                                                                                    |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re:                                                             | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11                                                               |\n| Ho Wan Kwok,                                                       | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)<br>:                                             |\n| Debtor.                                                            | Ref. Dkt. No. 57<br>:<br>:<br>Response Deadline: May 15, 2022 at 5:00 pm (ET)<br>: |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------------X |                                                                                    |\n\n# **DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION OF PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER CONFIRMING THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO SECTION 362(d)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE**\n\n# TO THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:\n\nHo Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), through his below proposed counsel, hereby files this Objection to the *Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. for Entry of an Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the Alternative, Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code*, dated March 1, 2022 [Dkt. No. 57] (the \"PAX Motion\"), filed by Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\"). Substantially contemporaneous with the filing of this Objection, the Debtor filed the *Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok in Support of the Chapter 11 Case and Certain Motions*, dated March 15, 2022 (the \"Kwok Declaration\" or \"Kwok Decl.\"), which the Debtor incorporates herein by reference. In support hereof, the Debtor respectfully states as follows:\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Debtor commenced this Chapter 11 case with certain objectives, specifically to: (a) create a single forum to orderly address the various competing claims asserted against him; (b) afford stakeholders an efficient opportunity to investigate the Debtor's assets, liabilities and financial affairs, given what the Debtor perceives to be a misunderstanding in that regard; (c) establish what assets are estate property and, in turn, available for distribution to the competing creditor interests; and, hopefully (d) reach consensus with creditors (including PAX) on a fair and equitable distribution of estate assets pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan. Kwok Decl. ¶ 2.\n\n2. As noted in the Kwok Declaration, this Chapter 11 case is designed and funded (through unsecured, subordinated post-petition financing) to allow a fair investigation and for stakeholders to present whatever admissible evidence they deem appropriate, as part of the typical Chapter 11 adversary process. Kwok Decl. ¶ 3. This bankruptcy is, in other words, intended to allow a reasoned vetting of all pertinent demonstrable case facts, without prejudicing any creditor's economic rights – except to the extent that any unsecured creditor hoped to jump ahead in payment priority via a \"race to the courthouse\" which is necessarily unfair to some. Id. The automatic stay and the breathing spell afforded thereby is critical to the Debtor's reorganization effort. As countless courts have observed, the automatic stay is \"central\" to \"an orderly bankruptcy process,\" and a \"fundamental debtor protection\" that \"not only protects debtors but protects creditors as well.\"\n\n3. The PAX Motion seeks to thwart the fundamental protections of the bankruptcy stay and, if granted, would materially impair the Debtor's ability to administer this case, severely impede the Debtor's reorganization efforts, and significantly prejudice the Debtor, the estate, and all of the Debtor's creditors. Through its Motion, PAX seeks one thing – to have the Debtor thrown\n\n2\n\nin jail. PAX states that it seeks to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order (defined below), \"except to the extent any relief requires [the Debtor] to immediately pay any money to PAX.\" PAX Motion ¶ 9. But, the February 9 Contempt Order requires *only one thing* – that the Debtor tender immediate payment of a \\$134 million prepetition fine to PAX. Failure to do this – which is clearly subject to the automatic stay, as, among other things, it would require the use of estate assets to the detriment of the Debtor's many other creditors, *and which PAX is expressly asking the Court not to authorize* – could well result in the Debtor's imprisonment under the February 9 Contempt Order. Moreover, as reflected in his filed schedules of assets and liabilities and statement of financial affairs (see Dkt. Nos. 77, 78), the Debtor does not presently have the cash or other assets sufficient to immediately pay the \\$134 million fine. [1](#page-2-0)\n\n4. PAX claims that its intent in seeking stay relief is to \"bring the valuable Lady May to the United States and prevent dissipation.\" PAX's true goal, though, is to have the Debtor imprisoned. And, even if PAX's self-described intent were true, this goal has substantively been achieved through the bankruptcy filing. Whatever interest the Debtor may ultimately be determined to have in the Lady May is now part of the bankruptcy estate and squarely under this Court's jurisdiction. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (creating a worldwide estate comprising all of the Debtor's legal and equitable interests in property, \"wherever located and by whomever held,\" as of the filing date). And, although the Debtor does not have the ability to direct the physical movement of the Lady May (see Kwok Decl. ¶ 18), to the extent that the Debtor is determined to have an interest in the Lady May, this Court would have the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to authorize appropriate relief. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 542 (requiring turnover of estate property).\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor reserves all rights respecting all claims or amounts allegedly owing to PAX, including, without limitation, the right to object to such claims or amounts on any applicable grounds and all rights respecting whether all or any portion of such claims or amounts are dischargeable in bankruptcy.\n\nThe PAX Motion, therefore, does not further any goals of this bankruptcy case or provide any additional benefit to creditors.\n\n5. The PAX Motion should be denied for three principal reasons. First, the February 9 Contempt Order is plainly civil in nature and, thus, subject to the automatic stay. It is designated as a \"final order of civil contempt\" and the Debtor was found to be in \"civil contempt\"[2](#page-3-0) ; it was issued pursuant to New York Judiciary Law § 753 (a civil contempt statute); it is predicated on a \"clear and convincing\" evidentiary standard (not a \"beyond a reasonable doubt\" standard) and does not contain a \"willfulness\" finding; although the Order contemplates imprisonment, this is to compel compliance with the Order and could (theoretically) be purged (thus, the Debtor, again in theory, would \"hold the keys to his jail cell,\" which applicable jurisprudence tells us is \"a sure sign that the contempt is civil\"); and the amounts to be paid under the Order are to be paid to PAX, the movant in the litigation.\n\n6. Second, PAX's attempt to apply a narrow exception to the general rule that civil contempt proceedings are subject to the stay is unavailing. Here, PAX's efforts are plainly an attempt to continue prepetition litigation with respect to its alleged prepetition claim. And, the February 9 Contempt Order clearly relates to estate property, as it would require the Debtor to pay a \\$134 million fine to PAX (which, to be sure, the Debtor states that he does not presently have the means to do). Further, enforcement of the February 9 Contempt Order would have a severe and negative impact on the estate. PAX's attempt to equate this matter to compliance with a document subpoena, or to an injunction narrowly tailored to protect a party's intellectual property rights, thus fails. In this respect, it bears observing that the New York Supreme Court (\"NY State Court\"), which issued the February 9 Contempt Order, instructed PAX to withdraw a second\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> It bears noting that PAX's motion before the New York Supreme Court sought entry of an order for civil contempt.\n\ncontempt motion because of the Debtor's bankruptcy filing (which, as PAX notes, it did). See PAX Motion ¶ 9 n. 38; Court Notice (attached to PAX Motion as Exh. 15). Indeed, the NY State Court indicated that PAX could renew such motion \"upon the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings\" or upon \"an appropriate application in the Bankruptcy Court,\" strongly indicating the NY State Court's recognition that, contrary to PAX's assertion, the civil contempt proceedings before it are indeed subject to the automatic stay.\n\n7. Finally, PAX's request, in the alternative, for modification of the automatic stay should likewise be denied. PAX has failed to carry its heavy burden that stay relief is appropriate. The requested relief is \"inextricably intertwined\" with this bankruptcy case and would have a drastic and adverse impact on the administration of this case and the estate; PAX does not allege (let alone demonstrate) that this case was commenced in bad faith; modifying the stay to allow PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order would likely \"doom\" the Debtor's attempt to reorganize; and the centralized administration of this Court represents the most efficient and effective forum in which to resolve all disputes between the Debtor, PAX, and all other creditors and parties in interest. The Debtor notes, in this regard, that he is in the process of removing the underlying litigation between the Debtor and PAX, ultimately, to this Court, in accordance with 28 U.S.C § 1452, Rule 9027 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and Local Rule 9027- 1 of the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Further, maintaining the stay would ensure that the Debtor's full time and attention remains focused on administering this case, and not diverted from this case to defending himself with respect to PAX's efforts to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order.\n\n8. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein and in the Kwok Declaration, the PAX Motion should be denied.\n\n### **RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n9. A more complete description of the facts and circumstances precipitating this bankruptcy case are set forth in the Kwok Declaration, which the Debtor incorporates herein by reference. The following provides an overview of facts germane to the dispute between the Debtor and PAX.\n\n10. PAX, a Hong Kong investment fund, commenced actions against the Debtor in New York and the British Virgin Islands (\"BVI\"). Kwok Decl. ¶ 15. The New York action, commenced in April 2017 before the NY State Court, entirely concerned the collection of a disputed debt. Id.\n\n11. In 2008, PAX made a \\$100 million loan (the \"PAX Loan\") to a Chinese entity called Spirit Carter. Kwok Decl. ¶ 16. The \\$100 million loan came in two tranches: (1) a \\$30 million initial loan secured by a personal guaranty made by the Debtor, and (2) a second \\$70 million dollar loan secured by a 49% interest in the company that owns the land/development that eventually became the Pangu Plaza. Id.\n\n12. In 2009, PAX received repayment of \\$100 million, acknowledged satisfaction of the loan, and further acknowledged that the Debtor's obligation under the 2008 personal guaranty has been satisfied. Kwok Decl. ¶ 17. PAX disputes that an \"accord and satisfaction\" has actually occurred, and asserts claims against the Debtor under what the Debtor maintains is a subsequentdated personal guaranty that he believes to be a forgery. Id. Without showing the Debtor this guaranty, the Debtor's prior litigation counsel submitted it to the NY State Court in support of certain motions. Id. When the Debtor subsequently learned of the document's existence, he stated that he believes it to be a forgery; but the Court ruled (and the Debtor maintains improperly so) that, by its prior submission, the Debtor no longer had the ability to challenge authenticity. Id. Consequently, on September 15, 2020, the Court entered summary judgement in PAX's favor without conducting an evidentiary trial. Id. The judgment, with interest, amounts to approximately \\$125 million as of today. Id. The Debtor timely appealed this judgment to the New York Appellate Division, which appeal remains pending as of today.[3](#page-6-0) Id.\n\n13. Two weeks after summary judgment had been granted in PAX's favor (on October 15, 2020), the NY State Court issued a restraining order respecting the Debtor's assets (the \"NYS Restraining Order\"). Kwok Decl. ¶ 18. PAX intended to seek payment of the judgment, focusing primarily on a yacht named the \"Lady May,\" which is described further below. Id. The Debtor maintains that he does not own the Lady May; it is owned by his daughter. Id. The boat's maintenance was always paid for by the Debtor's son. Id. The Debtor did have access to the boat, but he did not control it or have the ability to order the boat back to New York. Id. Nevertheless, on March 16, 2021, Justice Ostrager (without conducting an evidentiary hearing) directed the Debtor to return the boat to New York by May 15, 2021, and prospectively fined the Debtor \\$500,000 for every day that the boat remained outside the jurisdiction. Id. As of earlier this year, the fine exceeded the amount of the judgment that had been entered in PAX's favor and was approximately five or six times the stated value of the yacht. Id.\n\n14. On February 9, 2022, Justice Ostrager issued a *Final Order of Civil Contempt* (the \"February 9 Contempt Order\") against the Debtor. Kwok Decl. ¶ 19. In the February 9 Contempt Order, Justice Ostrager found that the Debtor holds a beneficial interest in and controls the Lady May, and ordered the Debtor to pay a \\$134 million fine to PAX within five business days or risk incarceration for civil contempt. Id. The Debtor does not agree with the February 9 Contempt Order. Id. He believes it was wrongfully issued against him and he has separately appealed this\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> The Debtor's schedules include a potential malpractice claim against the Debtor's historical litigation counsel.\n\norder to the Appellate Division. Id. Regardless, the Debtor maintains that he simply does not have the means to satisfy the judgment. Id. The threat of imprisonment if the February 9 Contempt Order were enforced is one of the precipitating factors for the commencement of the Debtor's Chapter 11 case. Id.\n\n15. On March 1, 2022, PAX filed its Motion seeking entry of an order determining that the \"that the automatic stay is inapplicable to the enforcement of the … February 9 Contempt Order\" or, alternatively, \"modifying the automatic stay to permit PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order, except to the extent any relief requires Kwok to immediately pay any money to PAX.\" PAX Motion ¶ 9. As set forth in the Kwok Declaration, the Debtor believes that granting the relief requested by the PAX Motion would cause him significant harm and materially prejudice the Debtor's estate and its creditors. Kwok Decl. ¶ 19 n.10. Enforcement of the February 9 Contempt Order could result in the Debtor's imprisonment in New York, which the Debtor believes would materially impair his ability to achieve the objectives that he set forth to accomplish in commencing this Chapter 11 Case. Id. Chiefly, if incarcerated, the Debtor will be unable to adequately and appropriately administer this estate, participate in this bankruptcy case, negotiate with creditors, appear and be heard before this Court, consult with and direct counsel, investigate and marshal the assets of the estate, or formulate and negotiate a Chapter 11 plan. Id.\n\n### **ARGUMENTS IN OBJECTION**\n\n## **I. THE FINAL CONTEMPT ORDER IS CIVIL IN NATURE AND SUBJECT TO THE AUTOMATIC STAY.**\n\n16. With very few exceptions, the filing of a bankruptcy petition and operation of the automatic stay halts all litigation against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); In re Enron Corp., 306 B.R. 465, 475 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (\"The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay\n\n8\n\napplicable to all entities regarding the commencement or continuation of judicial proceedings against the debtor.\").\n\n17. The automatic stay is \"central\" to \"an orderly bankruptcy process,\" and \"is designed to provide the debtor with a breathing spell from his creditors.\" Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 137 (2d. Cir. 1992) (\"The stay is a procedural rule, designed to provide for an orderly bankruptcy proceeding. Indeed, so central is the § 362 stay to an orderly bankruptcy process that 'actions taken in violation of the stay are void and without effect.'\") (citations omitted); Kookik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567, 568 (2d Cir. 1994) (\"The stay is designed to provide the debtor with 'a breathing spell from his creditors.'\"). Indeed, the stay is a \"fundamental debtor protection[,] that not only protects debtors but protects creditors as well.\" Enron, 306 B.R. at 475 (citations omitted).\n\n18. Thus, the \"scope of the stay is broad,\" and exceptions to the stay are construed narrowly. Enron, 306 B.R. at 475. Among the few exceptions to the automatic stay are criminal proceedings (e.g., criminal contempt). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1). By contrast, civil proceedings (including civil contempt proceedings), which \"are considered private collection devices,\" are typically subject to the automatic stay. See In re White, 478 B.R. 177, 181 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (\"Generally, actions for civil contempt are considered private collection devices subject to the automatic stay while criminal contempt proceedings are not.\"); In re Allison, 182 B.R. 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (purpose of a civil contempt order is to enforce the private rights of a party in litigation).\n\n19. To be sure, courts in the Second Circuit observe that the line between criminal contempt (exempt from the stay) and civil contempt (subject to the stay) may not always be clear. White, 478 B.R. at 182 (\"It is not always easy to distinguish between the two forms of contempt,\n\n9\n\nand both involve some form of punishment for contumacious disregard of a state court order.\"). In this respect, it bears observing that courts recognize a presumption in favor of finding civil contempt where it may not be clear. See United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978) (\"Finally, while we are satisfied that the contempts here were civil in nature, the presumption in favor of finding civil as opposed to criminal contempt where there is some doubt as to the nature of the contempt, 3 C. Wright, supra*,* § 704, at 158, militates in favor of concluding that the citations of Mr. Wendy were for civil contempt.\").\n\n20. Here, the February 9 Contempt Order is plainly a civil, not criminal, order and is subject to the automatic stay. The S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court's decision in In re White is directly on point. There, the New York Supreme Court issued a prepetition judgment against the debtor in a civil proceeding. White, 478 B.R. at 179. The party in whose favor the judgment was entered served subpoenas on the debtor in an effort to identify assets to satisfy the judgment. Id. at 180. The debtor failed to comply with the subpoenas, and the issuing party moved for an order to compel compliance within 30 days, which order the New York Supreme Court issued. Id. After the debtor failed to comply with this order, the party moved for a further order holding the debtor in contempt. Id. The New York Supreme Court conducted a hearing on the contempt motion, found the debtor in contempt, and issued a civil contempt order directing the sheriff to compel the debtor's compliance and ordering an assessment of damages. Id. Days after the issuance of the contempt order, the debtor and his wife filed joint Chapter 7 petitions. Id. The other party to the prepetition litigation filed a motion to \"annul\" or lift the automatic stay to prospectively enforce the contempt order. Id. The movant subsequently amended its motion, narrowing the relief requested (i.e., only the assessment of damages, not the arrest of the debtor, and directing the debtor to answer the subpoenas and appear for an examination under Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure), and arguing that the automatic stay did not apply to the contempt order because it was a criminal, not civil, contempt order issued in light of the debtor's allegedly \"contumacious\" behavior. Id. at 181.\n\n21. The S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court denied the motion based on a determination that the contempt order was civil, not criminal, in nature. First, the court noted that the order was issued pursuant to Judiciary Law § 753 and CPLR § 2308, both of which \"authorize[] the court to punish for civil contempt\". White, 478 B.R. at 182-83 (\"Similarly, Judiciary Law § 753 authorizes the court to punish for civil contempt, as its title suggests ('Power of courts to punish for civil contempts').\"). Moreover, the order itself was \"expressly clear that the state court was adjudicating a civil contempt,\" as it \"specifically refer[red] to civil contempt\". Id. at 183.\n\n22. Second, the court analyzed the applicable evidentiary standard, observing that Judicial Law § 753 applied a \"clear and convincing\" standard, not \"beyond a reasonable doubt,\" and did not require a \"willfulness\" finding. White, 478 B.R. at 183 (\"The evidentiary standard is 'clear and convincing,' and does not require a finding of 'willfulness.' In contrast, Judiciary Law § 750 empowers the court to punish criminal contempts, and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the contemnor has *willfully* disobeyed a court order.\") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see Iacovacci v. Brevet Holdings, Inc., Case No. 158735/2016, 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 50657, at \\*7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2021) (\"In line with the distinct and separate purposes of the two kinds of contempt, a movant seeking a criminal contempt has the additional requirement to demonstrate that the disobedience of an order was willful – an element that is noticeably absent from the civil contempt statute and case law…. Further, the two types of contempt have different standards of proof: a finding of criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt; whereas a finding of civil contempt requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.\").\n\n23. Consistent with the statute, the contempt order at issue in White applied a \"clear and convincing evidentiary standard, and [did] not include a finding of 'willfulness.'\" White, 478 B.R. at 183. The court held that, absent specificity that the contempt was criminal, and without a willfulness finding, \"the alleged contempt must be considered to have been civil in nature.\" Id. (quoting Sentry Armored Courier Corp. v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).\n\n24. Third, as the court noted, although the contempt order contemplated the issuance of a warrant and the possible arrest of the debtor, this was done to compel compliance with the order and could be purged through such compliance; thus, the debtor held \"the keys to his jail cell,\" which is \"a sure sign that the contempt is civil.\" White, 478 B.R. at 183 (\"Moreover, the Contempt Order authorized the issuance of a warrant to compel White's compliance which meant that the Sheriff would commit White until he complied with the Subpoenas or was relieved of the obligation to do so. Hence, White held the keys to his jail cell and could purge himself of contempt through compliance.\"; \"The contemnor holds the keys to his jail cell, a sure sign that the contempt is civil.\").\n\n25. Finally, the court noted that the contempt order authorized the assessment of damages and, although it did not specify whose damages, it \"obviously refers to [the moving party in the litigation].\" White, 478 B.R. at 183. Where \"the contemnor is liable to the person on whose behalf the subpoena was issued for penalties and damages caused by the contemnor's noncompliance,\" the penalty is civil, not criminal. Id. at 183.\n\n26. Here, each factor identified by the court in White weighs decisively in favor of finding the February 9 Contempt Order to be civil in nature and, thus, subject to the automatic stay. First, the February 9 Contempt Order is designated a \"final order of civil contempt\" and its\n\n12\n\nfinding is expressly confined to \"civil contempt.\" See February 9 Contempt Order (attached to PAX Motion as Exh. 5) (order entitled \"Final Order of Civil Contempt\" and finding that \"[Debtor] has violated New York Judiciary Law § 753 and is [in] civil contempt of this Court's order.\"). Indeed, PAX's motions seeking entry of the order expressly requested entry of an order for civil contempt. See, e.g., PAX Motion, Exhs. 11, 12; *Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'s Motion for a Final Order of Civil Contempt as to Defendant Miles Kwok*, dated July 8, 2021, in *PAX v. Kwok, et al.*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2021), ECF No. 857.\n\n27. Second, the Order was issued pursuant to Judiciary Law § 753, which authorizes civil contempt. See New York Judiciary Law § 753; February 9 Contempt Order at 2 (\"[Debtor] has violated New York Judiciary Law § 753 and is [in] civil contempt of this Court's order.\").\n\n28. Third, in his opinion accompanying the February 9 Contempt Order, Justice Ostrager applied a \"clear and convincing\" evidentiary standard, and did not make any \"willfulness\" finding. See *Decision and Order on Motion* (attached to PAX Motion as Exh. 1), at 9 (\"The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Kwok holds a beneficial interest in and controls the Lady May.\").\n\n29. Fourth, although the Order provides that the NY State Court shall exercise its full authority under Judicial Law § 753 if the fine is not timely paid to PAX, the possibility of jail as contemplated under the Order would (at least theoretically) be within the Debtor's control (i.e., the Debtor would \"hold the keys to his jail cell\"). February 9 Contempt Order (fine continues to accrue \"until Kwok returns the Lady May to the jurisdiction\"; \"Court shall exercise its full authority under New York Judiciary Law § 753 in the event the fine is not timely paid to PAX.\").\n\n30. Finally, the February 9 Contempt Order requires payment of amounts to PAX, the party on whose behalf the Order was issued. February 9 Contempt Order (\"Kwok is directed to tender immediate payment to PAX\"; \"the amount due to PAX shall continue to accrue\"; \"Payments of the amount set forth in paragraph 2 above shall be made to PAX within five business days from service of this Order, with Notice of Entry.\"). Accordingly, the February 9 Contempt Order is plainly a civil, not criminal, order and, consequently, is subject to the automatic stay.\n\n# **II. THE NARROW EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT CIVIL CONTEMPT ORDERS ARE SUBJECT TO THE AUTOMATIC STAY DOES NOT APPLY HERE.**\n\n31. Certain courts have recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that civil contempt proceedings are subject to the stay, that is where an order is intended \"to vindicate the dignity of the court rather than collect a pre-petition claim or obtain property of the estate.\" White, 478 B.R. at 183-84. PAX attempts to categorize the relief it seeks as falling within this narrow exception, see PAX Motion ¶ 11, but this effort fails.\n\n32. White, again, is directly on point. There, the S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court cautioned that essentially every instance of contempt \"involves an affront to the dignity of a court and every punishment meted out for contempt vindicates that court's dignity.\" White, 478 B.R. at 183-84. \"Yet, many if not most civil contempt proceedings are stayed, and a broad construction of the exception would swallow up the rule.\" Id. at 184.\n\n33. The ultimate inquiry is \"very fact specific, and decisions recognizing a nonstatutory exception or granting stay relief to prosecute a contempt motion 'are useful far more for general guidance than as binding precedents.'\" White, 478 B.R. at 184 (citing Sonnax Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1990)). In White, the contempt order granted two forms of relief: (i) liquidating the movant's damages that resulted from the debtor's non-compliance, (ii) and compelling the debtor to comply with subpoenas, and, if necessary, face imprisonment. Id. at 184. The court found that the former relief was clearly an effort to continue a prepetition litigation on account of a prepetition claim, and fell squarely within the ambit of the automatic stay. Id. And, the latter relief \"serve[d] no purpose\" as the tools of bankruptcy (e.g. Rule 2004 discovery) enable the same result and eliminate the impetus for the contempt order. Id.\n\n34. In Sonnax, the Second Circuit similarly refused to apply the narrow stay exception to a contempt proceeding where the underlying order related to property of the estate (in that instance, an injunction preventing the debtor from engaging in certain business), and was not narrowly tailored to the movant's specific, identified property rights. Sonnax, 907 F.2d at 1288.\n\n35. Here, the February 9 Contempt Order requires only one thing – that the Debtor immediately pay a \\$134 million fine (plus other fines that continue to accrue until the Lady May is returned to New York). February 9 Contempt Order at 2. To the extent that the Debtor had assets to immediately pay the fine, such assets would undeniably be property of the estate. Thus, the February 9 Contempt Order relates to property of the estate and falls outside the narrow stay exception.\n\n36. Moreover, the impetus for the February 9 Contempt Order, as argued by PAX and determined by the NY State Court, was that PAX was purportedly prejudiced by the Lady May not being within the NY State Court's jurisdiction and available for PAX to levy upon to satisfy its judgment. NY State Court February 9 Opinion, at 7; *Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'s Motion for a Final Order of Civil Contempt as to Defendant Miles Kwok*, dated July 8, 2021, in *PAX v. Kwok, et al.*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2021), ECF No. 857, at 4 (\"Kwok's violation prejudices PAX by depriving this Court of jurisdiction over a major \\$27 million asset owned and controlled by Kwok, which would otherwise be available to contribute to satisfying the Judgment.\"). This impetus \"is clearly an effort to continue a litigation that was commenced pre-petition and to recover a prepetition claim for damages.\" White, 478 B.R. at 184.\n\n37. PAX suggests that the February 9 Contempt Order \"has the ultimate goal of seeing the return of the Lady May to New York.\" PAX Motion ¶ 16. Even if accurate, the goal of bringing whatever interest the Debtor may be determined to have in the Lady May within the jurisdiction of a competent court has already been achieved through the bankruptcy filing, including the creation of the bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code Section 541(a) (including all legal and equitable interests of the Debtor in property as of the filing date), jurisdiction of the Court over the estate's assets, and tools available under the Bankruptcy Code (e.g., Bankruptcy Code Section 542).\n\n38. The jurisprudence cited by PAX in support of its position is mischaracterized or misplaced. For example, PAX cites to Roberts v. Bennaceur, No. 3:12-CV-01222, 2015 WL 1471889 (D. Conn. 2015), stating that, in that case, \"the defendant filed for bankruptcy after repeatedly failing to disclose information relating to its assets and financial condition,\" and that \"Judge Meyer held that the bankruptcy filing did not preclude the Court from issuing sanctions relating to the debtor's abuses of the disclosure and discovery process….\" PAX Motion ¶ 11. PAX mischaracterizes the facts and law in that case. There, the defendants did *not* file for bankruptcy protection; rather, a co-defendant (TriPlanet), for whom the defendants were directors and officers, itself filed for bankruptcy. Roberts, 2015 WL 1471889, at \\*1. The sanctions motion was being pursued only with respect to the *non-debtor* defendants; it was not being pursued with respect to the debtor. Id. Indeed, the District Court recognized that the action was stayed as against the debtor. Id. (\"Following the issuance of a prejudgment remedy in plaintiff's favor and in the midst of innumerable discovery disputes, TriPlanet filed for bankruptcy *and was subject to an automatic bankruptcy stay*. I now address plaintiff's second motion for sanctions and other pending motions *only as to defendants Sophien and Imed Bennaceur*.). Id. (emphasis added). The Court held that the TriPlanet bankruptcy (pending in the S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court) did not prevent sanctions proceedings from moving forward as against the non-debtor defendants in the separate District Court proceeding. Id. There was no stay analysis in the opinion because there were no sanctions proceedings against *the debtor* and, therefore, no need to modify/lift the stay. PAX's assertion that \"the court sanctioned the debtor … *after* the bankruptcy filing\" is simply wrong. PAX Motion ¶ 11 (emphasis in original).\n\n39. PAX's reliance on Shaoxing Bon Textiles v. 4-U Performance Group LLC, 2017 WL 6413993 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), is also misplaced. That case involved an entity that was both a codefendant in litigation pending in the S.D.N.Y District Court and a debtor in a case concurrently pending in the same court (the bankruptcy case was removed to S.D.N.Y. and the reference was withdrawn to the S.D.N.Y District Court). Id. at \\*1-\\*2. The S.D.N.Y. District Court had issued an injunction prohibiting the debtor and the other co-defendants from transferring certain funds, including estate assets; the debtor violated this injunction *post-petition*; and the plaintiff moved *post-petition* for a contempt finding and sanctions. Id. at \\*9-\\*10. The S.D.N.Y. District Court held that the debtor's requirement to comply with the injunction was not stayed by the bankruptcy filing because the purpose of the injunction and the stay were the same: to preserve estate value. Id. at \\*9. Although the S.D.N.Y. District Court granted the contempt motion, it did so based on the findings that \"[t]he order will not affect the administration of the bankruptcy … and rather than prioritizing one creditor over others … furthers the same goals as the automatic stay by protecting all of 4-U's creditors against further waste of estate property. Id. at \\*10.\n\n40. The facts of this case are markedly different. The Debtor has not violated the February 9 Contempt Order; rather, he filed for bankruptcy (staying the effect of the February 9 Contempt Order) precisely because he knew he could not satisfy its requirements and he did not want to violate it. More importantly, the February 9 Contempt Order requires only one thing: that the Debtor immediately pay a \\$134 million fine to PAX or potentially face jail time. Payment of any such fine to PAX (which, tellingly, PAX is not asking the Court to authorize) would not preserve estate value and, thus, is not congruous with the automatic stay; rather, enforcing the Order would prioritize PAX over other estate creditors and could result in the Debtor being imprisoned to the substantial detriment of the estate and all creditors.\n\n41. PAX's reliance on Int'l Distrib. Ctrs, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., Inc., 62 B.R. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), is unpersuasive. First, the procedural posture of that case is materially different. Unlike here, Walsh did not involve a lift stay request to enforce a prepetition civil contempt order that required the payment of estate proceeds to the movant, and which could have resulted in the debtor's imprisonment; rather, it involved a post-petition motion seeking to hold the debtor in contempt for breaching an injunction restraining the debtor from transferring assets. Id. at 726, 729-730. Moreover, the S.D.N.Y. District Court *denied the request to hold the debtor in contempt*, noting that the purpose of the underlying injunction was not undermined by the debtor's actions. Id. at 730 (\"The background and purpose of the Order were to ensure that the defendants did not effectively deplete their assets during the stay of judgment, and in fact, they have not, to date, done so.\"). Here, as noted, the Debtor did not breach the February 9 Contempt Order (he filed for bankruptcy to avoid such result), and insofar as the underlying purpose of the February 9 Contempt Order is, as PAX suggests, to bring the Debtor's interest in the Lady May (whatever it may be determined to be) within a competent court's jurisdiction, the Debtor's bankruptcy filing has achieved this end.\n\n42. PAX's reference to In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc., 62 B.R. 369, 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd, 70 B.R. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 831 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.1987), is likewise unpersuasive. There, the S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court declined to find that a landlord had violated the automatic stay when it sought to hold the debtor in contempt for refusing to deliver possession of a property belonging to the landlord, as ordered by a state court. Id. at 377. Critically, the property in question was definitively determined not to be estate property and, therefore, the landlord's contempt motion did not \"relate to property of the estate.\" Id. (\"As to Associates' motion for contempt, the New York Supreme Court order directing the debtor to deliver possession of the leased property to Associates in exchange for the receipt of \\$350,000 from Associates, relates to property that is not part of the debtor's estate and with respect to which the debtor denies that it holds any possessory interest.\"). Here, the February 9 Contempt Order unquestionably relates to property of the estate.\n\n43. Finally, in Booth vs. Wilson, the S.D.N.Y. District Court found that the automatic stay did not preclude contempt proceedings against a debtor. 1997 WL 241050 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (Owen, J.). But, critically, the S.D.N.Y. District Court found that the motion for contempt was not intended to satisfy a judgment; rather it was intended simply to compel the debtor to turn over documents integral to the plaintiff's case. Id. at \\*2. Here, in contrast, the February 9 Contempt Order compels the Debtor to pay a \\$134 million fine to PAX or potentially go to jail.\n\n# **III. PAX'S REQUEST TO MODIFY THE AUTOMATIC STAY SHOULD BE DENIED; PAX HAS FAILED TO SATISFY ITS BURDEN THAT STAY RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE.**\n\n44. In the alternative, PAX seeks entry of an order pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d) modifying the automatic stay. This request should be denied.\n\n45. Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d)(1)[4](#page-19-0) permits modification of the automatic stay, on request of a party in interest, \"for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest.\" 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). As the movant, PAX bears the initial burden of demonstrating adequate \"cause\" exists to modify the automatic stay. Sonnax, 907 F.2d at 1285 (\"Section 362(d)(1) requires an initial showing of cause by the movant….\"). Failure to satisfy this burden results in denial of the motion. See id. (\"If the movant fails to make an initial showing of cause, however, the court should deny relief without requiring any showing from the debtor that it is entitled to continued protection.\").\n\n46. In Sonnax, the Second Circuit, in affirming the denial of a lift stay request, identified twelve factors (first articulated by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah in In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984)) when considering a lift stay request:\n\n> (1) \"whether relief would result in a partial or complete resolution of the issues;\"\n\n> (2) \"lack of any connection with or interference with the bankruptcy case;\"\n\n(3) \"whether the other proceeding involves the debtor as a fiduciary;\"\n\n(4) \"whether a specialized tribunal with the necessary expertise has been established to hear the cause of action;\"\n\n(5) \"whether the debtor's insurer has assumed full responsibility for defending it;\"\n\n<span id=\"page-19-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Although the caption of the PAX Motion and the proposed order indicate that PAX is seeking stay relief under Section 362(d)(2), PAX's analysis in its Motion focuses on Section 362(d)(1).\n\n(6) \"whether the action primarily involves third parties;\"\n\n(7) \"whether litigation in another forum would prejudice the interests of other creditors;\"\n\n(8) \"whether the judgment claim arising from the other action is subject to equitable subordination;\"\n\n(9) \"whether movant's success in the other proceeding would result in a judicial lien avoidable by the debtor;\"\n\n(10) \"the interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and economical resolution of litigation;\"\n\n(11) \"whether the parties are ready for trial in the other proceeding;\" and\n\n(12) \"impact of the stay on the parties and the balance of harms.\"\n\nSonnax, 907 F.2d at 1286.\n\n47. PAX's Motion focuses on six of the Sonnax factors (1, 2, 4, 7, 10, and 12), but\n\nthese factors do not support PAX's request. Rather, they militate strongly against the relief.\n\n# **A. Stay Relief Will Not Help Resolve The Dispute With PAX Or The Bankruptcy Case; Rather, It Would Materially Impair Administration Of This Case And Prejudice The Debtor, The Estate, And Creditors.**\n\n48. PAX alleges that the first Sonnax factor weighs in favor of stay relief because (i) \"[t]he February 9 Contempt Order has the ultimate goal of seeing the return of the Lady May to New York\"; (ii) the Debtor failed to disclose its interests in the Lady May as part of his alleged \"scheme\" to \"keep the Lady May out of the reach of his creditors\"; and (iii) returning the Lady May to the NYS State Court's jurisdiction will allegedly \"facilitate the marshaling of that asset and the ultimate distribution of the proceeds for the benefit of all creditors.\" PAX Motion ¶¶ 16- 18. These allegations do not support modification of the stay.\n\n49. As noted, the February 9 Contempt Order has one requirement – the immediate payment of a \\$134 million fine to PAX or else the Debtor could be thrown in jail. PAX asks this Court to lift the stay to allow PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order, but not authorize the Debtor to satisfy the fine – which the Debtor is adamant that he is unable to do, in any event, and even if he could, would be inequitable to the estate's many other creditors. PAX's goal is singular and clear – have the Debtor thrown in jail, nothing more.\n\n50. Second, the Debtor's interest in the Lady May (whatever it may be) is already subject to this Court's jurisdiction and so, to the extent that one of the \"ultimate goals\" of the February 9 Contempt Order is to bring the Debtor's interest in the Lady May within a court of competent jurisdiction, such purpose has been achieved through the bankruptcy filing.\n\n51. Third, Debtor notes that he has now filed his schedules of assets and liabilities and statement of financial affairs (see Dkt. Nos. 77, 78, 79, 80), and such materials include a disclosure in respect of Justice Ostrager's order regarding the Lady May. See Dkt. No. 77, at 5.[5](#page-21-0)\n\n52. Finally, there is no evidence supporting PAX's contention that allowing PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order will facilitate the marshaling of estate value or benefit creditors in this bankruptcy case.\n\n<span id=\"page-21-0\"></span>\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Debtor's disclosure regarding the Lady May is as follows:\n\nQuestion 4 – Do you own, lease, or have legal or equitable interest in any vehicles, whether they are registered or not? Watercraft, aircraft, motor homes, ATVs and other recreational vehicles, other vehicles, and accessories. The Debtor previously had access to the use of a yacht named the 'Lady May.' The Lady May is owned by HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, which is owned by the Debtor's daughter. The Lady May is currently in port in Europe. The Debtor currently has no access to the Lady May and has had no access to the Lady May for over a year.\n\nThe ownership and/or control of the Lady May was disputed by the Debtor in the New York State Supreme Court action commenced by PAX against the Debtor in response to sanctions and contempt proceedings initiated by PAX. Following an evidentiary hearing, conducted on February 9, 2021, Justice Barry Ostrager found (the 'February 9 Decision'), among other things, that that the evidence established that the Debtor 'beneficially owns and controls' the Lady May. The Debtor disagrees with the February 9 Decision and has appealed it. Due to the pending appeal (which is currently stayed), the Debtor does not include the Lady May as an asset of his estate. However, if included as an asset (which the Debtor anticipates will be resolved through this Chapter 11 Case) of his estate, the Lady May may have significant value – in 2015, the sales price for the Lady May was €28 million.\n\n53. The Second Circuit's decision in Sonnax is instructive. There, the debtor was involved in prepetition litigation against Tri Component. Tri Component obtained an injunction against the debtor prohibiting it from engaging in certain business activities. 907 F.2d at 1282. The debtor filed for bankruptcy, after which Tri Component filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case and moved to lift the stay to allow it to proceed in state court with respect to the litigation. Id. Tri Component also requested authority to file motions for contempt against the debtor for violating the prepetition injunction. Id. As noted, in affirming the district court's denial of the lift stay motion, the Second Circuit highlighted the twelve factors first articulated in Curtis, and focused its analysis on four of those factors:\n\nWe believe four of the Curtis factors are relevant to the instant case: (1) whether the New York proceeding is connected to or might interfere with the bankruptcy case; (2) whether the bankruptcy petition was filed in bad faith; (3) the balance of harms; and (4) the interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and economical resolution of litigation.\n\nId. at 1286.\n\n54. As to the first factor, the Second Circuit found it \"undeniable\" that the state court proceeding would interfere with the bankruptcy case because \"the two matters were inextricably intertwined\" – i.e., proceeding with the state court action \"may have a drastic impact\" on the debtor. Id. at 1287. Respecting the second factor, the movant failed to demonstrate bad faith in respect of the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 1287. On the third factor, the court observed that lifting the stay \"might doom [debtor's] attempts to reorganize,\" whereas Tri Component would not suffer significant harm by maintaining the stay. Id. Finally, the court held that judicial economy favored maintaining the stay, as the bankruptcy proceeding \"provides a single, expeditious forum for resolution of disputed issues\". Id.\n\n55. Each of these factors favors denial of the PAX Motion. The underlying state court proceeding is \"inextricably intertwined\" with this bankruptcy proceeding, and permitting PAX to move to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order (including potentially seeking the Debtor's imprisonment in New York) would have a \"drastic impact\" on the Debtor and the estate, and would materially jeopardize the Debtor's effort to reorganize. Residential Capital, 501 B.R. 624, 644 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"Second, lifting the stay is connected to and will interfere with the Debtors' chapter 11 cases [\\(Sonnax](http)) Factor No. 2). Litigation in non-bankruptcy courts would hinder the Debtors' attempts to reorganize by forcing the Debtors to utilize time and resources that would otherwise be spent in resolution of the Debtors' chapter 11 cases.\"). PAX does not allege, let alone prove, that the Debtor's filing was in bad faith. Finally, the centralized administration of this bankruptcy case provides the best avenue for resolving all claims against the estate, and will ensure that all creditors are treated similarly and equitably. Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 644 (\"Fourth, litigation in another forum would prejudice the interests of other creditors (Sonnax Factor No. 7). Requiring the Debtors to continue litigation in California would upend the 'strong bankruptcy code policy that favors centralized and efficient administration of all claims in the bankruptcy court....' Publicker Indus. Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.), 980 F.2d 110, 117 (2d Cir.1992).\"). Moreover, maintaining the stay would ensure that the Debtor's time and attention remains focused on administering this case, and not diverted to defending himself with respect to PAX's enforcement of the February 9 Contempt Order. Id.\n\n56. The jurisprudence cited by PAX does not support its position. In Fleming, the Court granted limited stay relief to allow movants to confirm a prior FINRA arbitration award in a pending Connecticut State Court case. Ahuja v. Fleming (In re Fleming), 2020 WL 3816282, at \\*1 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2020) (Manning, C.J.). Applying the Sonnax factors, the Court found that the requested stay relief was appropriate because (i) it \"would result in a partial resolution of the issues\" (i.e., if the arbitration award were confirmed, bankruptcy litigation regarding the underlying claim may not be necessary); (ii) the requested stay relief would \"not interfere with the bankruptcy case\" (rather, it would expedite resolution of the case); and (iii) judicial economy was served by allowing the state court action to proceed to judgment. Id. at \\*3.\n\n57. Here, enforcement of the February 9 Contempt Order would not resolve any issues; the Debtor's appeals relating to PAX will still be pending and stayed (PAX is not seeking stay relief to adjudicate such appeals). Residential Capital, 501 at 644 (\"First, stay relief might not result in a partial or complete resolution of the issues (Sonnax Factor No. 1). Even if Sweeting were to win an appeal of the dismissal of the Second Sweeting Action, he would still have to come back to this Court to prove the merits of his claim.\"). The only thing stay relief may accomplish in this instance would be the Debtor's incarceration, which would result in enormous interference with the administration of this case. Moreover, maintaining the stay and resolving all issues in this centralized forum would promote judicial economy. Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 644 (\"Fifth, the interests of judicial economy and economical resolution of the actions are best served by maintaining the automatic stay [\\(Sonnax](http)) Factor No. 10). As discussed above, stay relief would only result in adjudication of Sweeting's ability to bring the claims in the Second Sweeting Action; the actual merits of the claims will still have to be litigated and decided. Resolution of these issues would be costly in terms of both judicial resources and the value of the bankruptcy estate. For all of these reasons, the Sonnax factors weigh in favor of denying relief from the automatic stay.\").\n\n58. In Ice Cream Liquidation, the Court granted limited stay relief to allow for the adjudication of certain personal injury tort claims. 281 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002). Critical to the Court's conclusion that stay relief was warranted was its determination that: (i) it was precluded from adjudicating the merits of the underlying personal injury tort claims as a result of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5); (ii) the court in which the claims were pending was competent to adjudicate\n\n25\n\nthe merits and ready for trial (pre-trial discovery and dispositive motion practice was largely complete); and (iii) liquidation of the claim was critical to plan confirmation (which was scheduled to commence shortly). Id. at 166-68. None of these issues are at play here. Rather, allowing PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order would likely significantly impair the Debtor's reorganization efforts.\n\n59. In In re David X. Manners Company, Inc., the Court approved limited stay relief agreed to under a joint stipulation between the Chapter 7 trustee and the movant to allow the movant to reduce a jury verdict obtained after trial to a final judgment, but not to enforce such judgment. 2018 WL 1997674, at \\*1 (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 26, 2018) (Tancredi, J.). The joint stipulation between the Chapter 7 trustee and movant was entered into after the Court granted the movant derivative standing to object to a claim filed by another party (the claimant). Id. In granting limited stay relief, the Court noted that reducing the jury verdict to judgment could resolve the movant's claim objection (the operative facts of both were intertwined) and, thus, provide partial resolution of issues in the bankruptcy case. Id. at \\*6. Further, the Court found that the relief \"would by no means interfere with the bankruptcy case,\" but, instead, was likely to foster progress in the case. Id. Allowing the state court action to move forward to judgment was more efficient, given the state court's experience with the trial. Id. And, no party would be prejudiced by lifting the stay, as the movant would seek only entry of the judgment, not enforcement. Id. Here, as noted, granting stay relief will not resolve any issues in this case (not even the pending issues between the Debtor and PAX, which are subject to appeal); it would substantially interfere with the administration of this case, as the Debtor could be in jail; will not promote efficiency; and will prejudice the estate and its creditors.\n\n### **B. Stay Relief Will Significantly Interfere With The Bankruptcy Case.**\n\n60. PAX contends that granting stay relief to allow it to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order will not significantly interfere with this bankruptcy case. PAX Motion ¶ 14. This is not true.\n\n61. Lifting the stay to permit PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order could result in the Debtor's imprisonment. Such a result would significantly interfere with the bankruptcy case, to the detriment of the estate and its creditors. The Debtor's imprisonment would materially impair his ability to achieve the objectives that he set forth to accomplish in commencing this Chapter 11 Case. The Debtor would be unable to adequately and appropriately administer the estate, participate in this bankruptcy case, negotiate with creditors, appear and be heard before this Court, consult with and direct counsel, investigate and marshal the assets of the estate, or formulate and negotiate a Chapter 11 plan. Kwok Decl. ¶ 19 n.10.\n\n62. The jurisprudence cited by PAX misses the mark. In re Dunne involved a U.S. bankruptcy and parallel bankruptcy in Ireland involving the same debtor. 2015 WL 7625609 (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (Shiff, J.). The two estates completely overlapped (i.e., \"same debtor and estates consisting of the same property\"); the Chapter 7 trustee and official assignee (appointed in Ireland) agreed to work cooperatively to augment the estates; and both agreed not to distribute assets absent further order of the U.S. bankruptcy court. Id. at \\*3. The official assignee initiated a fraudulent transfer action against the debtor's wife in Ireland to augment the estates, and (following certain arguments raised before the court in Ireland) the Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion in the U.S. bankruptcy court confirming that the automatic stay did not apply to the official assignee's claw-back action. Id. at \\*4. The U.S. bankruptcy court granted the motion over the objection of the debtor's wife, finding that the stay did not apply because the official assignee and\n\nChapter 7 trustee were essentially \"co-administrators\" of the overlapping estates and shared a \"symbiotic relationship\"; the official assignee's action was attempting to augment both estates; the Chapter 7 trustee supported the official assignee's action; and such action was a more efficient and expeditious means of obtaining the relief requested.[6](#page-27-0) Id. at \\*5. Here, PAX's efforts are not aimed at augmenting the estate, but rather in seeking the Debtor's imprisonment; PAX's interests are not aligned with either the Debtor or the estate; the Debtor obviously does not support PAX's request; and PAX's requested relief will serve only to hamper progress in this case, not to provide a more efficient or expeditious means of moving the case forward.\n\n63. In In re Mildred Deli Grocery, Inc., the S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court lifted the stay to allow a prepetition action under the Fair Labor Standards Act to proceed to trial. 2018 WL 1136017 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (Glenn, J.). The court's holding was predicated on finding that liquidation of the claim was integral to resolution of the bankruptcy case; all pre-trial discovery and motion practice had been completed and the matter was ready for trial and close to completion; and the debtor would not be harmed and no creditors would be prejudiced because the stay was being lifted solely to permit the liquidation of the claim, not collection. Id. at \\*4-\\*5. Here, PAX is not seeking stay relief to liquidate a claim that is trial-ready; rather, it seeks to have the Debtor jailed. And, as noted, both the interests of the Debtor and his creditors would be materially harmed by such an outcome.\n\n64. PAX's assertion that the Debtor is \"exploiting the bankruptcy process\" to evade sanctions is incorrect, and its reliance on In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prod. Ltd., 83 B.R. 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), is unpersuasive. There, the court granted limited stay relief solely to enable the movant to initiate contempt proceedings against the debtor for violation of a state court\n\n<span id=\"page-27-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> The Court in Dunne also noted that the debtor's wife lacked standing to oppose the Chapter 7 trustee's motion.\n\npreliminary injunction enjoining the debtor from selling a competing product in violation of a contractual agreement. Id. at 247. In distinguishing Rudaw, the Second Circuit observed in Sonnax that the Rudaw court \"permitted contempt proceedings to proceed where the prepetition order *was not related to property of the estate* and when the order *was specifically tailored to protect carefully defined property rights*.\" Sonnax, 907 F.2d at 1287 (emphasis added).\n\n65. Further, PAX's reliance on In re Cinnabar 200 Haircutters, Inc., 20 B.R. 575 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) is similarly inapt. There, Estee Lauder obtained a prepetition injunction enjoining the debtor from using the tradename \"Cinnabar.\" Id. at 576. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, Estee Lauder sought stay relief to permit contempt proceedings for the debtor's continued use of the Cinnabar tradename in violation of the injunction. The bankruptcy court granted the relief, observing that the underlying court order related to Estee Lauder's property rights and there was no other means to prevent the dilution of that property right by the debtor's continued use of the name. Id. at 577. Here, PAX's request is not intended to protect its property rights, and to the extent that PAX's goal truly is bringing any interest that the Debtor may have in the Lady May within the jurisdiction of a competent court, the bankruptcy filing has achieved this goal. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).\n\n## **C. The Requested Stay Relief Will Not Promote Judicial Economy; Lifting The Stay Will Materially Harm The Debtor And Prejudice Creditors.**\n\n66. Finally, relying on previously cited case law (which, as explained above, is mischaracterized or misplaced), PAX claims that its requested stay relief is appropriate because it will promote judicial economy and will not materially prejudice creditors. The Debtor does not question Justice Ostrager's experience with respect to the litigation between the parties. But, the dispute is, at bottom, a dispute as to the validity of a creditor's claim against a debtor, it does not require specialized expertise to resolve, and this Court is perfectly capable of resolving these\n\n29\n\nmatters. Indeed, as noted, the Debtor is in the process of removing the litigation with PAX ultimately to this Court. More to the point, PAX is not requesting stay relief to resolve the disputes between the parties (e.g., the pending appeals); rather, it is seeking stay relief solely to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order and have the Debtor incarcerated. For the reasons described above, the Debtor's reliance on Ice Cream Liquidation, Mildred Deli, and Fleming is unavailing.\n\n67. PAX's contention that stay relief will benefit all creditors \"because it will bring the valuable Lady May to the United States and prevent dissipation\" is not true. First, as noted, whatever interest the Debtor may be determined to have in the Lady May is already squarely under this Court's jurisdiction, and this Court has the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to authorize appropriate relief in this respect (e.g., the turnover provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 542). Second, the limited stay relief to allow PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order will not bring the Lady May to the United States. The February 9 Contempt Order does not compel this; rather, it imposes additional fines to the extent the Lady May is not returned.\n\n68. The Debtor further notes that other pertinent Sonnax factors excluded by PAX in its analysis further militate against the requested relief. For example, only PAX and the Debtor (and certain affiliates owned by the Debtor) are parties to the underlying dispute; thus, the action does not primarily involve third parties. Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 644 (\"Third, the California Appeal does not primarily involve third parties; GMACM is the only named defendant in the pending Second Appeal (Sonnax Factor No. 6).\").\n\n## *[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 83 Filed 03/15/22 Entered 03/15/22 16:52:51 Page 31 of 31\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\n**WHEREFORE**, for the foregoing reasons, the Debtor requests that the Court:\n\n(i) deny the relief requested in the PAX Motion; and (ii) grant to the Debtor such other or further relief as deemed appropriate.\n\nDated: March 15, 2022\n\n### **BROWN RUDNICK LLP**\n\nBy: */s/ William R. Baldiga* Dylan P. Kletter, Esq. 185 Asylum Street Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Telephone: (860) 509-6500 Facsimile: (860) 509-6501 Email: dkletter@brownrudnick.com\n\n-and-\n\nWilliam R. Baldiga, Esq. Robert J. Stark, Esq. Bennett S. Silverberg, Esq. Seven Times Square New York, New York 10036 Telephone: (212) 209-4800 Facsimile: (212) 209-4801 Email: wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com rstark@brownrudnick.com bsilverberg@brownrudnick.com\n\n*Proposed Counsel for Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：　：\n：\n第11章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）：　：\n：\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。　参见案卷编号 57\n：\n：\n答复截止时间：May 15, 2022 at 5:00 pm (ET)\n：\n\n债务人对 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）提出的动议之异议，该动议请求作出裁定，确认自动中止不适用，或备位地依据《破产法典》第 362(d)(2) 条解除自动中止\n\n致尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING 美国联邦破产法官：\n\nHo Wan Kwok（以下简称“债务人”）通过其下述拟任律师，特此就 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 提出的、日期为 March 1, 2022 的《请求作出裁定确认自动中止不适用，或备位地依据《破产法典》第 362(d)(2) 条解除自动中止的动议》[案卷编号 57]（以下简称“PAX 动议”）提出本异议。债务人在提交本异议的同时，实质上同期提交了日期为 March 15, 2022 的《Ho Wan Kwok 关于支持第11章案件及若干动议的声明》（以下简称“Kwok 声明”），债务人将其通过援引并入本文。为支持本异议，债务人谨陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 债务人提起本第11章案件具有若干目标，具体为：(a) 建立一个统一审理平台，以有序处理针对其提出的各种相互竞争的债权主张；(b) 鉴于债务人认为在此方面存在误解，为利益相关方提供有效机会，以调查债务人的资产、负债及财务事务；(c) 确定哪些资产属于破产财产，继而可供向相互竞争的债权人利益进行分配；以及，希望能够 (d) 根据第11章重整计划，就破产财产的公平、公正分配与债权人（包括 PAX）达成共识。Kwok 声明第 2 段。\n\n2. 如 Kwok 声明所述，本第11章案件经设计并获得资金支持（通过无担保、次级的申请后融资），以便进行公平调查，并使利益相关方能够作为典型第11章对抗程序的一部分，提交其认为适当的任何可采证据。Kwok 声明第 3 段。换言之，本破产程序旨在允许对所有相关且可证明的案件事实进行理性审查，而不损害任何债权人的经济权利——但任何无担保债权人希望通过“抢先起诉”而在受偿顺位上领先的情形除外，因为这必然对某些人不公平。同上。自动中止及其所提供的喘息期，对于债务人的重整努力至关重要。正如无数法院所指出，自动中止是“有序破产程序”的“核心”，也是一项“根本性的债务人保护措施”，其“不仅保护债务人，也保护债权人。”\n\n3. PAX 动议试图破坏破产中止的根本保护；如获准，将实质性削弱债务人管理本案的能力，严重阻碍债务人的重整努力，并显著损害债务人、破产财团及债务人的全体债权人。PAX 通过其动议寻求一件事——使债务人入狱。PAX 称，其寻求执行 February 9 藐视法庭命令（定义见下文），“但任何救济要求[债务人]立即向 PAX 支付任何款项的范围除外。”PAX 动议第 9 段。但是，February 9 藐视法庭命令仅要求一件事——债务人立即向 PAX 支付一项申请前 $134 million 的罚金。不履行该项要求——该要求显然受自动中止约束，因为除其他事项外，它将要求使用破产财产资产，从而损害债务人的众多其他债权人，且 PAX 明确要求本院不予授权——很可能导致债务人根据 February 9 藐视法庭命令被监禁。此外，如其已提交的资产和负债清单以及财务状况说明书所反映（见案卷编号 77、78），债务人目前并无足以立即支付 $134 million 罚金的现金或其他资产。[1]\n\n4. PAX 主张，其寻求解除中止的意图是“将宝贵的 Lady May 带到美国并防止其被耗散。”然而，PAX 的真实目标是使债务人被监禁。而且，即便 PAX 所称的意图属实，该目标已通过提交破产申请在实质上实现。无论债务人最终被认定对 Lady May 享有何种权益，该权益现已构成破产财产的一部分，并完全处于本院管辖之下。见 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)（设立一项全球范围的破产财团，包括截至申请日债务人在财产中享有的所有法定及衡平权益，无论“位于何处或由何人持有”）。此外，尽管债务人无权指示 Lady May 的实际移动（见 Kwok 声明第 18 段），但如债务人被认定对 Lady May 享有权益，本院将有权依据《破产法典》授权适当救济。见，例如，11 U.S.C. § 542（要求交还破产财产）。\n\n1 为免生疑，债务人保留就所有据称应付 PAX 的债权或款项所享有的一切权利，包括但不限于以任何适用理由对该等债权或款项提出异议的权利，以及就该等债权或款项的全部或任何部分是否可在破产中获得免责所享有的一切权利。\n\n因此，PAX 动议既未推进本破产案件的任何目标，也未向债权人提供任何额外利益。\n\n5. PAX 动议应基于三个主要理由予以驳回。第一，February 9 藐视法庭命令显然属于民事性质，因此受自动中止约束。该命令被指定为“民事藐视法庭终局命令”，且债务人被认定构成“民事藐视法庭”[2]；其依据 New York Judiciary Law § 753 作出（一项民事藐视法庭法规）；其以“清楚且令人信服”的证据标准（而非“排除合理怀疑”的标准）为依据，且不包含“故意性”认定；尽管该命令设想监禁，但此举是为了强制遵守该命令，并且可（理论上）通过纠正而解除（因此，债务人再次在理论上将“掌握自己牢房的钥匙”，而相关判例法表明，这是“藐视法庭属于民事性质的确凿标志”）；且根据该命令应支付的款项应支付给 PAX，即该诉讼中的动议提出方。\n\n2 值得注意的是，PAX 在 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）提出的动议寻求作出民事藐视法庭命令。\n\n6. 第二，PAX 试图适用民事藐视法庭程序受中止约束这一一般规则的狭窄例外，但并无依据。在此，PAX 的努力显然是试图继续就其所称的申请前债权进行申请前诉讼。而且，February 9 藐视法庭命令显然涉及破产财产，因为其将要求债务人向 PAX 支付 $134 million 的罚金（诚然，债务人称其目前无力支付）。此外，执行 February 9 藐视法庭命令将对破产财团产生严重不利影响。因此，PAX 试图将本事项等同于遵守文件传票，或等同于为保护一方知识产权而量身定制的禁令，不能成立。就此而言，值得注意的是，作出 February 9 藐视法庭命令的纽约州最高法院（以下简称“纽约州法院”）因债务人提交破产申请，指示 PAX 撤回第二项藐视法庭动议（正如 PAX 所称，其已如此行事）。见 PAX 动议第 9 段注 38；法院通知（作为证据 15 附于 PAX 动议）。事实上，纽约州法院表示，PAX 可在“破产程序结束后”或通过“向破产法院提出适当申请”时重新提出该动议，这有力表明纽约州法院认识到，与 PAX 的主张相反，其面前的民事藐视法庭程序确实受自动中止约束。\n\n7. 最后，PAX 备位提出的修改自动中止请求亦应予以驳回。PAX 未能承担其证明解除中止适当的沉重举证责任。所请求的救济与本破产案件“密不可分”，并将对本案及破产财团的管理产生严重不利影响；PAX 未主张（更遑论证明）本案系出于恶意而提起；修改中止以允许 PAX 执行 February 9 藐视法庭命令，很可能会“注定”债务人的重整尝试失败；而本院的集中管理构成解决债务人、PAX 与所有其他债权人及利害关系人之间一切争议的最有效率、最有效的审理平台。债务人就此指出，其正依照 28 U.S.C § 1452、Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）Rule 9027 以及 Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（破产程序地方法规）Local Rule 9027-1，着手最终将债务人与 PAX 之间的基础诉讼移送至本院。此外，维持中止将确保债务人的全部时间和注意力仍集中于管理本案，而不会因就 PAX 执行 February 9 藐视法庭命令的努力为自己辩护而从本案中分散。\n\n8. 因此，基于本文及 Kwok 声明所述理由，PAX 动议应予驳回。\n\n相关事实背景\n\n9. Kwok 声明对促成本破产案件的事实和情形作出了更完整的说明，债务人通过援引将其并入本文。下文概述与债务人与 PAX 之间争议相关的事实。\n\n10. PAX（一家香港投资基金）在纽约及 British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛，以下简称“BVI”）对债务人提起诉讼。Kwok 声明第 15 段。纽约诉讼于 April 2017 在纽约州法院提起，完全涉及追收一项有争议的债务。同上。\n\n11. 于 2008 年，PAX 向一家名为 Spirit Carter 的中国实体提供了 $100 million 贷款（以下简称“PAX 贷款”）。Kwok 声明第 16 段。该 $100 million 贷款分两笔发放：(1) 由债务人提供个人保证担保的 $30 million 初始贷款；以及 (2) 由最终成为 Pangu Plaza（盘古大观）的土地／开发项目所属公司 49% 权益担保的第二笔 $70 million 贷款。同上。\n\n12. 于 2009 年，PAX 收到 $100 million 偿还款，确认贷款已获清偿，并进一步确认债务人在 2008 年个人保证项下的义务已获清偿。Kwok 声明第 17 段。PAX 对是否实际发生“和解及清偿”提出异议，并基于债务人主张为后日期个人保证、且其认为系伪造的文件向债务人主张债权。同上。债务人的先前诉讼律师在未向债务人出示该保证文件的情况下，为支持若干动议而将其提交至纽约州法院。同上。债务人随后得知该文件的存在时，称其认为该文件系伪造；但法院裁定（债务人主张该裁定不当），由于先前已提交该文件，债务人不再有权对其真实性提出质疑。同上。因此，于 September 15, 2020，法院未进行证据审判即作出有利于 PAX 的简易判决。同上。截至今日，该判决连同利息约为 $125 million。同上。债务人及时向 New York Appellate Division（纽约上诉分院）对该判决提出上诉，该上诉截至今日仍在审理中。[3] 同上。\n\n13. 在作出有利于 PAX 的简易判决两周后（2020年10月15日），纽约州法院（NY State Court）就债务人的资产发布了一项限制令（下称“NYS Restraining Order（纽约州限制令）”）。Kwok Decl. ¶ 18。PAX 拟寻求执行该判决，主要聚焦于一艘名为“Lady May”的游艇，下文将对其作进一步说明。Id. 债务人主张，其并不拥有 Lady May；该游艇归其女儿所有。Id. 该游艇的维护费用始终由债务人的儿子支付。Id. 债务人确实可以使用该游艇，但其并不控制该游艇，也无权命令该游艇返回纽约。Id. 尽管如此，2021年3月16日，Ostrager 法官（Justice Ostrager）在未举行证据听证的情况下，命令债务人于2021年5月15日前将该游艇驶回纽约，并预先对债务人处以每日 \\$500,000 的罚款，直至该游艇返回本辖区。Id. 截至今年年初，该罚款已超过作出有利于 PAX 的判决金额，约为该游艇所载明价值的五倍或六倍。Id.\n\n14. 2022年2月9日，Ostrager 法官对债务人作出民事藐视法庭最终命令（下称“February 9 Contempt Order（2月9日藐视法庭命令）”）。Kwok Decl. ¶ 19。在2月9日藐视法庭命令中，Ostrager 法官认定债务人持有 Lady May 的受益权益并控制该游艇，且命令债务人在五个营业日内向 PAX 支付 \\$134 million 的罚款，否则可能因民事藐视法庭而被监禁。Id. 债务人不同意2月9日藐视法庭命令。Id. 他认为该命令被错误地针对其作出，并已就该命令向上诉分庭（Appellate Division）另行提出上诉。Id. 无论如何，债务人主张其根本无力清偿该判决。Id. 如执行2月9日藐视法庭命令而面临的监禁威胁，是促使债务人启动其 Chapter 11 案件的因素之一。Id.\n\n3 债务人的申报表包括一项针对债务人先前诉讼律师的潜在律师执业过失索赔。\n\n15. 2022年3月1日，PAX 提交其动议，请求作出一项裁定，认定“自动停止不适用于执行……2月9日藐视法庭命令”，或者作为备选，“修改自动停止，以允许 PAX 执行2月9日藐视法庭命令，但任何救济要求 Kwok 立即向 PAX 支付款项的范围除外。”PAX Motion ¶ 9。如 Kwok Declaration 所述，债务人认为，准许 PAX Motion 所请求的救济将对其造成重大损害，并实质性损害债务人财产及其债权人的利益。Kwok Decl. ¶ 19 n.10。执行2月9日藐视法庭命令可能导致债务人在纽约被监禁，债务人认为，这将实质性削弱其实现其在启动本 Chapter 11 Case 时所列目标的能力。Id. 最主要的是，如被监禁，债务人将无法充分且适当地管理该财产、参与本破产案件、与债权人谈判、在本院出庭并陈述意见、与律师协商并指示律师、调查并归集财产资产，或制定并协商 Chapter 11 计划。Id.\n\n异议理由\n\nI. 最终藐视法庭命令具有民事性质，且受自动停止约束。\n\n16. 除极少数例外外，提交破产申请及自动停止的生效会中止针对债务人的所有诉讼。11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); In re Enron Corp., 306 B.R. 465, 475 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)（“提交破产申请即构成一项适用于所有实体的停止，涉及对债务人提起或继续进行司法程序。”）。\n\n17. 自动停止是“有序破产程序”的“核心”，并且“旨在使债务人获得免受其债权人追索的喘息期”。Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.（联邦存款保险公司）v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 137 (2d. Cir. 1992)（“停止是一项程序规则，旨在保障有序的破产程序。事实上，§ 362 停止对于有序破产程序如此核心，以至于‘违反停止而采取的行动无效且不产生效力。’”）（引文略）；Kookik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567, 568 (2d Cir. 1994)（“停止旨在使债务人获得‘免受其债权人追索的喘息期。’”）。事实上，该停止是一项“基本的债务人保护[,]，其不仅保护债务人，也保护债权人。”Enron, 306 B.R. at 475（引文略）。\n\n18. 因此，“停止的范围广泛”，对停止的例外作狭义解释。Enron, 306 B.R. at 475。自动停止的少数例外包括刑事程序（例如刑事藐视法庭）。See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)。相比之下，民事程序（包括民事藐视法庭程序）通常受自动停止约束，该等程序“被视为私人追偿手段”。See In re White, 478 B.R. 177, 181 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)（“通常，民事藐视法庭诉讼被视为受自动停止约束的私人追偿手段，而刑事藐视法庭程序则不受约束。”）；In re Allison, 182 B.R. 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995)（民事藐视法庭命令的目的在于执行诉讼当事人的私人权利）。\n\n19. 诚然，第二巡回区（Second Circuit）的法院指出，刑事藐视法庭（不受停止约束）与民事藐视法庭（受停止约束）之间的界限未必总是明确。White, 478 B.R. at 182（“区分两种形式的藐视法庭并不总是容易，二者均涉及对公然无视州法院命令的某种形式的惩罚。”）。在此方面，应注意到，法院承认，在情形不明确时，推定认定为民事藐视法庭。See United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978)（“最后，尽管我们确信此处的藐视法庭行为具有民事性质，但在对藐视法庭性质存有某种疑问时，倾向于认定民事而非刑事藐视法庭的推定，3 C. Wright, supra*,* § 704, at 158，支持得出 Wendy 先生所受传唤系因民事藐视法庭的结论。”）。\n\n20. 本案中，2月9日藐视法庭命令显然是民事命令，而非刑事命令，并受自动停止约束。纽约南区破产法院（S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court）在 In re White 一案中的裁决直接切中要点。该案中，纽约州最高法院（New York Supreme Court）在破产申请前的民事程序中对债务人作出判决。White, 478 B.R. at 179。判决受益人向债务人送达传票，试图查明可用于清偿该判决的资产。Id. at 180。债务人未遵从传票，送达方遂申请命令，要求债务人在30日内遵从；纽约州最高法院作出了该命令。Id. 债务人未遵从该命令后，该方申请进一步命令，认定债务人藐视法庭。Id. 纽约州最高法院就藐视法庭动议举行听证，认定债务人藐视法庭，并作出民事藐视法庭命令，指示治安官强制债务人遵从，并命令核定损害赔偿额。Id. 在作出藐视法庭命令数日后，债务人与其妻子共同提交 Chapter 7 申请。Id. 破产申请前诉讼的另一方提交动议，请求“撤销”或解除自动停止，以前瞻性地执行该藐视法庭命令。Id. 动议方随后修改其动议，缩小所请求救济的范围（即仅核定损害赔偿额，而不逮捕债务人，并要求债务人答复传票及根据 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 第2004条出席接受审查），并主张自动停止不适用于该藐视法庭命令，因为该命令是鉴于债务人据称“公然藐视”的行为而作出的刑事藐视法庭命令，而非民事藐视法庭命令。Id. at 181。\n\n21. 纽约南区破产法院认定该藐视法庭命令具有民事而非刑事性质，并据此驳回该动议。首先，法院指出，该命令依据 Judiciary Law § 753 和 CPLR § 2308 作出，两者均“授权法院处罚民事藐视法庭”。White, 478 B.R. at 182-83（“同样地，Judiciary Law § 753，如其标题所示（‘法院处罚民事藐视法庭的权力’），授权法院处罚民事藐视法庭。”）。此外，该命令本身“明确表明州法院正在裁决民事藐视法庭”，因为其“具体提及民事藐视法庭”。Id. at 183。\n\n22. 其次，法院分析了适用的证据标准，并指出 Judicial Law § 753 适用“清楚且令人信服”的标准，而非“排除合理怀疑”，且不要求作出“故意性”认定。White, 478 B.R. at 183（“证据标准是‘清楚且令人信服’，并且不要求认定‘故意性’。相比之下，Judiciary Law § 750 授权法院处罚刑事藐视法庭，并要求证明被认定藐视法庭者故意不遵从法院命令，且该证明须达到排除合理怀疑的程度。”）（原文强调）（引文略）；see Iacovacci v. Brevet Holdings, Inc., Case No. 158735/2016, 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 50657, at \\*7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2021)（“与两种藐视法庭的不同且独立目的相一致，寻求刑事藐视法庭的动议方还须证明对命令的不遵从是故意的——该要件在民事藐视法庭法规和判例法中显著缺失……此外，两种藐视法庭的证明标准不同：认定刑事藐视法庭要求达到排除合理怀疑的证明标准；而认定民事藐视法庭要求以清楚且令人信服的证据加以证明。”）。\n\n23. 与该法规一致，White 案中所涉藐视法庭命令适用了“清楚且令人信服的证据标准，且[并]未包括‘故意性’认定。”White, 478 B.R. at 183。法院认为，若未明确说明该藐视法庭行为具有刑事性质，且未作出故意性认定，“所称藐视法庭必须被视为具有民事性质。”Id.（引自 Sentry Armored Courier Corp. v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)）。\n\n24. 第三，如法院所指出，尽管藐视法庭命令设想签发逮捕令及可能逮捕债务人，但此举是为强制其遵从该命令，并且可通过该等遵从消除；因此，债务人掌握着“其牢房的钥匙”，这“是藐视法庭具有民事性质的确凿标志。”White, 478 B.R. at 183（“此外，藐视法庭命令授权签发逮捕令以强制 White 遵从，这意味着治安官将拘押 White，直至其遵从传票或被免除遵从义务。因此，White 掌握着其牢房的钥匙，并可通过遵从消除其藐视法庭状态。”；“被认定藐视法庭者掌握着其牢房的钥匙，这是藐视法庭具有民事性质的确凿标志。”）。\n\n25. 最后，法院指出，藐视法庭命令授权核定损害赔偿额，尽管其未指明何人的损害赔偿额，但其“显然是指[诉讼中的动议方]。”White, 478 B.R. at 183。在“被认定藐视法庭者应就其不遵从所造成的罚金和损害赔偿，向为其签发传票的一方承担责任”的情况下，该处罚具有民事而非刑事性质。Id. at 183。\n\n26. 在此，White（怀特案）中法院认定的每一项因素均决定性地支持如下结论：2月9日藐视法庭命令属于民事性质，因而受自动中止的约束。第一，2月9日藐视法庭命令被定性为“一项最终民事藐视法庭命令”，其认定明确限于“民事藐视法庭”。见2月9日藐视法庭命令（作为PAX（Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.，太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）动议的附件5附上）（该命令标题为“最终民事藐视法庭命令”，并认定“[债务人]违反了New York Judiciary Law § 753，并[因]藐视本法院命令而构成民事藐视法庭。”）。事实上，PAX要求作出该命令的动议明确请求作出民事藐视法庭命令。见，例如，PAX动议，附件11、12；《支持原告Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.就被告Miles Kwok（郭文贵）作出最终民事藐视法庭命令之动议的法律备忘录》，日期为July 8, 2021，载于PAX v. Kwok, et al., Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2021), ECF No. 857。\n\n27. 第二，该命令系依据Judiciary Law § 753作出，该法授权民事藐视法庭。见New York Judiciary Law § 753；2月9日藐视法庭命令第2页（“[债务人]违反了New York Judiciary Law § 753，并[因]藐视本法院命令而构成民事藐视法庭。”）。\n\n28. 第三，在随2月9日藐视法庭命令一并发布的意见中，Justice Ostrager（奥斯特拉格法官）适用了“清楚且令人信服”的证据标准，且未作出任何“故意性”认定。见动议裁决及命令（作为PAX动议的附件1附上），第9页（“证据清楚且令人信服地表明，Kwok（郭文贵）对Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）享有受益权益并对其实施控制。”）。\n\n29. 第四，尽管该命令规定，如未及时向PAX缴纳罚款，NY State Court（纽约州法院）将根据Judicial Law § 753行使其全部权力，但该命令所设想的监禁可能性将（至少在理论上）处于债务人的控制之中（即，债务人将“掌握其牢房的钥匙”）。2月9日藐视法庭命令（罚款持续累积，“直至Kwok将Lady May送回本法院管辖范围”；“如未及时向PAX缴纳罚款，法院将根据New York Judiciary Law § 753行使其全部权力。”）。\n\n30. 最后，2月9日藐视法庭命令要求向PAX支付款项，PAX为该命令代表其利益而作出的一方。2月9日藐视法庭命令（“命令Kwok立即向PAX付款”；“应付PAX的金额应继续累积”；“应在本命令连同入案通知送达之日起五个营业日内，向PAX支付上述第2段所列金额。”）。因此，2月9日藐视法庭命令显然属于民事命令，而非刑事命令，故受自动中止的约束。\n\nII. 民事藐视法庭命令受自动中止约束这一一般规则的狭窄例外不适用于本案。\n\n31. 某些法院承认，对民事藐视法庭程序受中止约束这一一般规则存在一项狭窄例外，即某项命令旨在“维护法院尊严，而非收取破产申请前债权或取得破产财产”。White, 478 B.R. at 183-84。PAX试图将其所寻求的救济归类为属于该狭窄例外，见PAX动议¶ 11，但该尝试不能成立。\n\n32. White再次直接切中要点。在该案中，S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court（纽约南区破产法院）告诫称，实质上每一宗藐视法庭事件“均涉及对法院尊严的冒犯，而针对藐视法庭施加的每一项惩罚均维护该法院的尊严”。White, 478 B.R. at 183-84。“然而，许多即使不是大多数民事藐视法庭程序均被中止，而对该例外作宽泛解释将吞没该规则。”Id. at 184。\n\n33. 最终审查“高度依赖具体事实，而承认非制定法例外或准许中止救济以推进藐视法庭动议的判决，‘作为一般性指引的作用远大于作为具有约束力先例的作用。’”White, 478 B.R. at 184（援引Sonnax Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1990)）。在White案中，藐视法庭命令给予两种救济：(i) 确定动议方因债务人不遵从而产生的损害赔偿额；以及(ii) 强制债务人遵从传票，并在必要时面临监禁。Id. at 184。法院认定，前一项救济显然是试图就一项破产申请前债权继续进行破产申请前提起的诉讼，完全落入自动中止的范围之内。Id. 而后一项救济“并无任何作用”，因为破产程序中的工具（例如Rule 2004取证）能够实现同样结果，并消除作出藐视法庭命令的必要性。Id.\n\n34. 在Sonnax案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）同样拒绝将该狭窄的中止例外适用于一项藐视法庭程序；该程序的基础命令涉及破产财产（在该案中，是禁止债务人从事某些商业活动的禁令），且并未狭义地限定于动议方具体、已确定的财产权利。Sonnax, 907 F.2d at 1288。\n\n35. 在本案中，2月9日藐视法庭命令仅要求一件事——债务人立即支付$134 million罚款（另加在Lady May被送回纽约前持续累积的其他罚款）。2月9日藐视法庭命令第2页。若债务人拥有可立即支付该罚款的资产，该等资产无疑将属于破产财产。因此，2月9日藐视法庭命令涉及破产财产，不属于该狭窄的中止例外。\n\n36. 此外，正如PAX所主张并经NY State Court认定，作出2月9日藐视法庭命令的动因是，据称Lady May不在NY State Court的管辖范围内，且PAX无法对其执行扣押以满足其判决，从而使PAX受到损害。NY State Court February 9 Opinion，第7页；《支持原告Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.就被告Miles Kwok作出最终民事藐视法庭命令之动议的法律备忘录》，日期为July 8, 2021，载于PAX v. Kwok, et al., Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2021), ECF No. 857，第4页（“Kwok的违法行为使PAX受到损害，因为其使本法院失去对由Kwok拥有和控制的一项重大$27 million资产的管辖权；该资产原本可用于帮助满足该判决。”）。这一动因“显然是试图继续进行一项在破产申请前提起的诉讼，并追索一项破产申请前的损害赔偿债权”。White, 478 B.R. at 184。\n\n37. PAX主张，2月9日藐视法庭命令“最终目标是促成Lady May返回纽约”。PAX动议¶ 16。即使该主张准确，通过破产申请已实现将债务人可能被认定对Lady May享有的任何权益置于有管辖权法院管辖范围内的目标，包括根据Bankruptcy Code Section 541(a)设立破产财产（包括截至申请日债务人对财产享有的一切法定及衡平权益）、本法院对破产财产资产的管辖权，以及Bankruptcy Code规定的可用工具（例如Bankruptcy Code Section 542）。\n\n38. PAX为支持其立场所援引的判例法，或者被错误描述，或者不适用。例如，PAX援引Roberts v. Bennaceur, No. 3:12-CV-01222, 2015 WL 1471889 (D. Conn. 2015)，称在该案中，“被告在多次未披露与其资产和财务状况有关的信息后申请破产”，且“Meyer法官认为，破产申请并不妨碍法院就债务人滥用披露及取证程序的行为作出制裁……”。PAX动议¶ 11。PAX错误描述了该案的事实和法律。该案中，被告并未申请破产保护；相反，共同被告TriPlanet（被告担任其董事和高级管理人员）自行申请了破产。Roberts, 2015 WL 1471889, at *1。制裁动议仅针对非债务人被告推进；并非针对债务人推进。Id. 事实上，District Court（地区法院）承认，对债务人的诉讼已被中止。Id.（“在原告获得预判决救济后以及无数取证争议期间，TriPlanet申请破产并受自动破产中止约束。我现仅就被告Sophien和Imed Bennaceur处理原告的第二项制裁动议及其他待决动议。”）。Id.（原文强调）。法院认定，TriPlanet破产程序（在S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court审理中）并不妨碍在另一独立的District Court程序中针对非债务人被告继续推进制裁程序。Id. 该意见中并无中止分析，因为并不存在针对债务人的制裁程序，因此无需修改或解除中止。PAX关于“法院在破产申请后制裁了债务人……”的主张完全错误。PAX动议¶ 11（原文强调）。\n\n39. PAX对Shaoxing Bon Textiles v. 4-U Performance Group LLC, 2017 WL 6413993 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)的依赖同样不当。该案涉及一个实体，其既是在S.D.N.Y District Court待决诉讼中的共同被告，也是同一法院同时待决案件中的债务人（该破产案件被移送至S.D.N.Y.，且管辖权移交被撤回至S.D.N.Y District Court）。Id. at *1-*2。S.D.N.Y. District Court曾发出禁令，禁止债务人及其他共同被告转移某些资金，包括破产财产资产；债务人在破产申请后违反了该禁令；原告于破产申请后提出动议，请求作出藐视法庭认定并施加制裁。Id. at *9-*10。S.D.N.Y. District Court认定，债务人遵从该禁令的义务并未因破产申请而被中止，因为该禁令和自动中止的目的相同：保全破产财产价值。Id. at *9。尽管S.D.N.Y. District Court准许了藐视法庭动议，但其依据是如下认定：“[该]命令不会影响破产管理……并且，该命令并非使一名债权人优先于其他债权人……而是通过保护4-U的所有债权人免受破产财产进一步浪费，促进与自动中止相同的目标。”Id. at *10。\n\n40. 本案事实显著不同。债务人并未违反2月9日藐视法庭命令；相反，他申请破产（从而中止2月9日藐视法庭命令的效力），正是因为他知道自己无法满足该命令的要求，且不愿违反该命令。更重要的是，2月9日藐视法庭命令仅要求一件事：债务人立即向PAX支付$134 million罚款，否则可能面临监禁。向PAX支付任何该等罚款（值得注意的是，PAX并未请求本法院予以授权）不会保全破产财产价值，因此与自动中止并不一致；相反，执行该命令将使PAX优先于其他破产财产债权人，并可能导致债务人被监禁，从而对破产财产及所有债权人造成重大损害。\n\n41. PAX 对 Int'l Distrib. Ctrs, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., Inc., 62 B.R. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 的援引并无说服力。首先，该案的程序姿态存在实质性差异。与本案不同，Walsh 并不涉及为执行一项要求向动议方支付破产财产收益、且可能导致债务人被监禁的破产申请前民事藐视法庭命令而提出的解除自动中止请求；相反，该案涉及一项破产申请后动议，寻求因债务人违反禁止其转移资产的禁令而认定其藐视法庭。Id. at 726, 729-730。此外，Southern District of New York District Court（纽约南区联邦地区法院）驳回了认定债务人藐视法庭的请求，并指出债务人的行为并未损害作为基础的禁令之目的。Id. at 730（“该命令的背景和目的，是确保被告在判决中止期间不会实际上耗尽其资产；事实上，截至目前，他们并未如此。”）。如前所述，债务人并未违反 February 9 Contempt Order（2月9日藐视法庭命令）（其申请破产以避免该结果）；且倘若如 PAX 所主张，February 9 Contempt Order 的根本目的在于使债务人对 Lady May（Lady May 号）的权益（无论最终被认定为何种权益）纳入有管辖权法院的管辖，则债务人的破产申请已实现该目的。\n\n42. PAX 对 In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc., 62 B.R. 369, 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd, 70 B.R. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 831 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.1987) 的援引同样没有说服力。在该案中，Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court（纽约南区破产法院）拒绝认定一名房东违反自动中止，彼时该房东寻求因债务人拒绝按州法院命令交还属于该房东的一处房产之占有而认定债务人藐视法庭。Id. at 377。关键在于，涉案房产已被明确认定不属于破产财产，因此，房东提出的藐视法庭动议并不“涉及破产财产”。Id.（“就 Associates 的藐视法庭动议而言，New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）命令债务人交还租赁房产的占有，以换取从 Associates 收取 \\$350,000，所涉及的财产并非债务人破产财产的一部分，且债务人否认其对该财产享有任何占有权益。”）。本案中，February 9 Contempt Order 毫无疑问涉及破产财产。\n\n43. 最后，在 Booth vs. Wilson 一案中，Southern District of New York District Court（纽约南区联邦地区法院）认定，自动中止并不排除针对债务人的藐视法庭程序。1997 WL 241050 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (Owen, J.)。但是，关键在于，Southern District of New York District Court 认定，藐视法庭动议并非旨在清偿判决；相反，其仅旨在迫使债务人交出对原告案件不可或缺的文件。Id. at \\*2。相较之下，本案中，February 9 Contempt Order 强制债务人向 PAX 支付 \\$134 million 罚金，否则可能入狱。\n\nIII. 应驳回 PAX 修改自动中止的请求；PAX 未能履行其证明解除中止适当的举证责任。\n\n44. 或者，PAX 寻求根据 Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d) 作出一项修改自动中止的命令。该请求应予驳回。\n\n45. Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d)(1)[4] 允许基于利害关系人的请求，“因正当理由，包括未能为该利害关系人对财产的权益提供充分保护”，修改自动中止。11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)。作为动议方，PAX 负有初步举证责任，以证明存在修改自动中止的充分“正当理由”。Sonnax, 907 F.2d at 1285（“Section 362(d)(1) 要求动议方初步证明存在正当理由……。”）。未能履行该举证责任将导致动议被驳回。See id.（“然而，如动议方未能初步证明存在正当理由，法院应驳回救济请求，而无需债务人证明其有权继续获得保护。”）。\n\n46. 在 Sonnax 一案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）在维持驳回解除中止请求的决定时，列举了审查解除中止请求时应考虑的十二项因素（该等因素最初由 Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah（犹他州联邦破产法院）在 In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) 一案中提出）：\n\n(1) “该救济是否将导致争议事项得到部分或全部解决；”\n\n(2) “与破产案件不存在任何关联或干扰；”\n\n(3) “其他程序是否涉及债务人作为受托人；”\n\n(4) “是否已设立具有必要专业知识的专门审裁机构来审理该诉因；”\n\n(5) “债务人的保险人是否已承担为其辩护的全部责任；”\n\n4 尽管 PAX Motion（PAX 动议）的标题及拟议命令表明 PAX 正根据 Section 362(d)(2) 寻求解除中止，但 PAX 在其 Motion（动议）中的分析侧重于 Section 362(d)(1)。\n\n(6) “该诉讼是否主要涉及第三方；”\n\n(7) “在另一法庭进行诉讼是否会损害其他债权人的利益；”\n\n(8) “因另一诉讼而产生的判决债权是否应予衡平居次；”\n\n(9) “动议方在另一程序中的胜诉是否会导致债务人可撤销的司法留置权；”\n\n(10) “司法经济以及迅速、经济地解决诉讼的利益；”\n\n(11) “当事人是否已准备好在另一程序中接受审判；”以及\n\n(12) “中止对当事人的影响及损害的权衡。”\n\nSonnax, 907 F.2d at 1286。\n\n47. PAX 的 Motion 侧重于 Sonnax 因素中的六项（1、2、4、7、10 和 12），但这些因素并不支持 PAX 的请求。相反，它们强烈不利于给予该救济。\n\nA. 解除中止不会有助于解决与 PAX 的争议或破产案件；相反，其将实质性损害本案的管理，并损害债务人、破产财产及债权人。\n\n48. PAX 主张，第一项 Sonnax 因素有利于解除中止，因为：(i)“[February 9 Contempt Order] 的最终目标是促成 Lady May 返回纽约”；(ii)债务人未披露其对 Lady May 的权益，系其所谓“计划”的一部分，旨在“使 Lady May 不受其债权人的追索”；以及 (iii)使 Lady May 返回 NYS State Court（纽约州法院）的管辖，据称将“促进对该资产的归集以及最终为全体债权人的利益分配所得款项”。PAX Motion ¶¶ 16-18。这些主张不支持修改中止。\n\n49. 如前所述，February 9 Contempt Order 仅有一项要求——立即向 PAX 支付 \\$134 million 罚金，否则债务人可能被投入监狱。PAX 请求本院解除中止，以允许 PAX 执行 February 9 Contempt Order，却不授权债务人缴纳罚金——无论如何，债务人坚称其无力缴纳，即使其能够缴纳，对破产财产的众多其他债权人亦属不公平。PAX 的目标单一且明确——让债务人入狱，仅此而已。\n\n50. 第二，债务人对 Lady May 的权益（无论其为何）已经受本院管辖，因此，倘若 February 9 Contempt Order 的“最终目标”之一是使债务人对 Lady May 的权益纳入有管辖权法院的管辖，则该目的已通过破产申请得以实现。\n\n51. 第三，债务人指出，其现已提交资产和负债明细表及财务状况说明书（see Dkt. Nos. 77, 78, 79, 80），且该等材料包括关于 Justice Ostrager（Ostrager 法官）就 Lady May 所作命令的披露。See Dkt. No. 77, at 5.[5]\n\n52. 最后，没有任何证据支持 PAX 的主张，即允许 PAX 执行 February 9 Contempt Order 将促进归集破产财产价值或使本破产案件中的债权人受益。\n\n5 债务人关于 Lady May 的披露如下：\n\n问题 4——您是否拥有、租赁，或对任何车辆享有法律或衡平权益，无论其是否已登记？船舶、航空器、房车、全地形车辆及其他休闲车辆、其他车辆和配件。债务人此前可使用一艘名为“Lady May”的游艇。Lady May 由 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC）所有，该公司由债务人的女儿所有。Lady May 目前停泊于欧洲港口。债务人目前无法使用 Lady May，且已超过一年无法使用 Lady May。\n\n在 PAX 针对债务人提起的、因 PAX 发起制裁及藐视法庭程序而开始的 New York State Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）诉讼中，债务人对 Lady May 的所有权和/或控制权提出争议。在于 February 9, 2021 举行证据听证会后，Justice Barry Ostrager（Barry Ostrager 法官）认定（以下简称“February 9 Decision（2月9日裁决）”），除其他事项外，证据表明债务人“实益拥有并控制”Lady May。债务人不同意 February 9 Decision，并已对此提起上诉。由于该上诉尚未审结（目前处于中止状态），债务人未将 Lady May 列为其破产财产的资产。然而，若将其列为其破产财产的资产（债务人预计该问题将通过本 Chapter 11 Case（第11章案件）解决），Lady May 可能具有重大价值——2015 年，Lady May 的售价为 €28 million。\n\n53. Second Circuit 的 Sonnax 判决具有指导意义。在该案中，债务人与 Tri Component（Tri Component）之间存在破产申请前诉讼。Tri Component 获得了一项针对债务人的禁令，禁止其从事某些商业活动。907 F.2d at 1282。债务人申请破产，此后 Tri Component 在破产案件中提交了债权证明，并申请解除中止，以允许其就该诉讼在州法院继续进行。Id. Tri Component 还请求授权其针对债务人提出藐视法庭动议，理由是债务人违反了破产申请前禁令。Id. 如前所述，Second Circuit 在维持地区法院驳回解除中止动议的决定时，强调了 Curtis 最初提出的十二项因素，并将其分析集中于其中四项因素：\n\n我们认为，Curtis 的四项因素与本案相关：(1) 纽约程序是否与破产案件有关联，或者是否可能干扰破产案件；(2) 破产申请是否出于恶意而提出；(3) 损害的权衡；以及 (4) 司法经济以及迅速、经济地解决诉讼的利益。\n\nId. at 1286。\n\n54. 关于第一项因素，Second Circuit 认定，州法院程序将干扰破产案件是“不可否认的”，因为“这两项事务密不可分地交织在一起”——即，继续进行州法院诉讼“可能对债务人产生严重影响”。Id. at 1287。关于第二项因素，动议方未能证明该破产申请存在恶意。Id. at 1287。关于第三项因素，法院指出，解除中止“可能注定使[债务人]的重组努力失败”，而维持中止不会使 Tri Component 遭受重大损害。Id. 最后，法院认定，司法经济有利于维持中止，因为破产程序“提供了一个单一、迅速的争议问题解决平台”。Id.\n\n55. 上述各项因素均支持驳回PAX（PAX）动议。相关州法院程序与本破产程序“密不可分地交织在一起”，准许PAX申请执行2月9日藐视法庭命令（包括可能寻求在纽约监禁债务人）将对债务人及破产财产产生“剧烈影响”，并将实质性危及债务人重组的努力。Residential Capital, 501 B.R. 624, 644 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)（“第二，解除中止与债务人的第11章案件有关联，并将干扰该等案件（Sonnax因素第2项）。在非破产法院进行诉讼，将迫使债务人投入原本可用于解决其第11章案件的时间和资源，从而妨碍债务人的重组努力。”）。PAX并未主张，更遑论证明，债务人的申请系出于恶意。最后，对本破产案件进行集中管理，为解决针对破产财产的所有请求提供了最佳途径，并将确保所有债权人得到类似且公平的对待。Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 644（“第四，在其他审理机构进行诉讼将损害其他债权人的利益（Sonnax因素第7项）。要求债务人在加利福尼亚州继续诉讼，将颠覆‘《破产法》所强烈倡导的、在破产法院集中且高效管理所有请求的政策……’Publicker Indus. Inc. v. United States (In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.), 980 F.2d 110, 117 (2d Cir.1992).”）。此外，维持中止将确保债务人的时间和注意力继续集中于管理本案，而不会被转移至就PAX执行2月9日藐视法庭命令一事为其自身进行辩护。Id.\n\n56. PAX援引的判例法不支持其立场。在Fleming案中，法院给予有限的中止解除救济，以允许动议人确认康涅狄格州法院一宗待决案件中先前作出的FINRA仲裁裁决。Ahuja v. Fleming (In re Fleming), 2020 WL 3816282, at *1 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2020) (Manning, C.J.). 法院适用Sonnax因素后认定，请求的中止解除救济适当，因为：(i) 其“将导致对争议的部分解决”（即，如仲裁裁决获确认，则可能无须就基础请求进行破产诉讼）；(ii) 请求的中止解除救济将“不会干扰破产案件”（而是将加快案件的解决）；以及(iii) 允许州法院诉讼继续进行至作出判决，有利于司法经济。Id. at *3.\n\n57. 在本案中，执行2月9日藐视法庭命令不会解决任何争议；债务人与PAX有关的上诉仍将处于待决及中止状态（PAX并未寻求中止解除救济以裁决该等上诉）。Residential Capital, 501 at 644（“第一，中止解除救济可能不会导致对争议的部分或完全解决（Sonnax因素第1项）。即使Sweeting（斯威廷）在就驳回第二项Sweeting诉讼提起的上诉中胜诉，他仍须回到本院证明其请求的实体理由。”）。在此情形下，中止解除救济唯一可能实现的结果是监禁债务人，而这将对本案的管理造成巨大干扰。此外，维持中止并在这一集中审理机构解决所有争议，将促进司法经济。Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 644（“第五，维持自动中止最符合司法经济及以经济方式解决诉讼的利益（Sonnax因素第10项）。如上所述，中止解除救济只会导致对Sweeting是否能够在第二项Sweeting诉讼中提出该等请求的裁决；该等请求的实际实体理由仍须经诉讼并作出裁决。解决这些争议，无论就司法资源还是破产财产价值而言，成本均会很高。基于所有这些理由，Sonnax因素支持拒绝解除自动中止。”）。\n\n58. 在Ice Cream Liquidation案中，法院给予有限的中止解除救济，以允许对若干人身伤害侵权请求作出裁决。281 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002). 对法院认定有必要给予中止解除救济至关重要的是，其认定：(i) 因28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5)，法院被排除在对基础人身伤害侵权请求的实体理由作出裁决之外；(ii) 该等请求待决所在的法院有权对实体理由作出裁决，且已准备好开庭审理（审前证据开示及终局性动议程序大体已完成）；以及(iii) 对该请求进行清算对于确认计划至关重要（计划确认程序拟于不久后开始）。Id. at 166-68. 本案不存在上述任何情形。相反，允许PAX执行2月9日藐视法庭命令，很可能会显著损害债务人的重组努力。\n\n59. 在In re David X. Manners Company, Inc.案中，法院批准了第7章受托人与动议人根据联合约定达成的有限中止解除救济，允许动议人将经审判获得的陪审团裁决转化为终局判决，但不得执行该判决。2018 WL 1997674, at *1 (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 26, 2018) (Tancredi, J.). 第7章受托人与动议人之间的联合约定，是在法院授予动议人派生地位以反对另一方当事人（即请求权人）提出的请求之后达成的。Id. 法院在给予有限中止解除救济时指出，将陪审团裁决转化为判决可能解决动议人对该请求提出的异议（两者的关键事实相互交织），从而为破产案件中的争议提供部分解决。Id. at *6. 此外，法院认定，该救济“绝不会干扰破产案件”，反而可能促进案件进展。Id. 鉴于州法院对该审判已有经验，允许州法院诉讼继续进行至作出判决更为高效。Id. 而且，任何一方均不会因解除中止而受到损害，因为动议人仅寻求判决的作出，而非执行。Id. 如前所述，本案中给予中止解除救济不会解决任何争议（甚至不会解决债务人与PAX之间正在上诉中的待决争议）；其将实质性干扰本案的管理，因为债务人可能被监禁；不会促进效率；并将损害破产财产及其债权人。\n\nB. 中止解除救济将显著干扰破产案件。\n\n60. PAX主张，给予中止解除救济以允许其执行2月9日藐视法庭命令，不会显著干扰本破产案件。PAX Motion ¶ 14. 此说不实。\n\n61. 解除中止以允许PAX执行2月9日藐视法庭命令，可能导致债务人被监禁。此种结果将显著干扰破产案件，损害破产财产及其债权人的利益。债务人被监禁将实质性损害其实现其在启动本第11章案件时所拟实现目标的能力。债务人将无法充分且适当地管理破产财产、参与本破产案件、与债权人谈判、出席本院并陈述意见、与律师协商并指导律师、调查并归集破产财产资产，或制定并协商第11章计划。Kwok Decl. ¶ 19 n.10.\n\n62. PAX援引的判例法未切中要害。In re Dunne案涉及同一债务人在美国进行的破产程序及在爱尔兰进行的平行破产程序。2015 WL 7625609 (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 25, 2015) (Shiff, J.). 两项破产财产完全重叠（即，“同一债务人，且破产财产由相同财产构成”）；第7章受托人与正式受让人（在爱尔兰指定）同意合作以充实破产财产；双方均同意，在美国破产法院另行作出命令前不分配资产。Id. at *3. 正式受让人在爱尔兰对债务人的妻子提起欺诈转让诉讼，以充实破产财产；并且（在爱尔兰法院提出某些论点后），第7章受托人在美国破产法院提出动议，请求确认自动中止不适用于正式受让人的追回诉讼。Id. at *4. 美国破产法院不顾债务人妻子的反对，准许了该动议，认定中止不适用，因为正式受让人与第7章受托人实质上是重叠破产财产的“共同管理人”，并具有“共生关系”；正式受让人的诉讼试图充实两项破产财产；第7章受托人支持正式受让人的诉讼；且该诉讼是获得所请求救济的更高效、更迅速的方式。[6] Id. at *5. 本案中，PAX的努力并非旨在充实破产财产，而是寻求监禁债务人；PAX的利益与债务人或破产财产的利益均不一致；债务人显然不支持PAX的请求；且PAX所请求的救济只会妨碍本案进展，而不会提供推动案件向前发展的更高效或更迅速的方式。\n\n63. 在In re Mildred Deli Grocery, Inc.案中，纽约南区（Southern District of New York）破产法院解除中止，以允许一项申请前依据《公平劳动标准法》提起的诉讼继续进行至审判。2018 WL 1136017 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (Glenn, J.). 法院的裁定基于以下认定：对该请求进行清算是解决破产案件不可或缺的；所有审前证据开示和动议程序均已完成，案件已准备好开庭审理且接近完成；并且债务人不会受到损害，任何债权人也不会受到不利影响，因为解除中止仅为允许对该请求进行清算，而非收取。Id. at *4-*5. 本案中，PAX并非寻求中止解除救济以清算一项已准备好审判的请求；相反，其寻求将债务人监禁。而且，如前所述，债务人及其债权人的利益均将因这种结果而受到实质性损害。\n\n64. PAX关于债务人正“利用破产程序”逃避制裁的主张不正确，其对In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prod. Ltd., 83 B.R. 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)的依赖亦缺乏说服力。该案中，法院仅给予有限的中止解除救济，以使动议人能够针对债务人违反州法院初步禁令的行为启动藐视法庭程序；该初步禁令禁止债务人违反合同协议销售竞争产品。Id. at 247. 第二巡回法院在Sonnax案中区分Rudaw案时指出，Rudaw法院“允许藐视法庭程序继续进行，是在申请前命令与破产财产无关，且该命令经特别定制以保护经谨慎界定的财产权利的情形下。”Sonnax, 907 F.2d at 1287 (emphasis added).\n\n6. Dunne案中的法院还指出，债务人的妻子不具备反对第7章受托人动议的诉讼资格。\n\n65. 此外，PAX 对 In re Cinnabar 200 Haircutters, Inc., 20 B.R. 575 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) 的援引同样不当。在该案中，Estee Lauder（雅诗兰黛）在破产申请前获得了一项禁令，禁止债务人使用商号“Cinnabar”。同上，第576页。债务人申请破产后，Estee Lauder 请求解除自动中止，以允许就债务人违反该禁令继续使用 Cinnabar 商号的行为进行藐视法庭程序。破产法院准许了该救济，并指出，基础法院命令涉及 Estee Lauder 的财产权利，且不存在其他方法可防止债务人继续使用该名称而稀释该财产权利。同上，第577页。本案中，PAX 的请求并非旨在保护其财产权利；且如果 PAX 的目标确实是将债务人可能在 Lady May（“Lady May”号）中拥有的任何权益置于有管辖权法院的管辖之下，则破产申请已经实现了该目标。见 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)。\n\nC. 所请求的解除中止救济不会促进司法经济；解除中止将对债务人造成实质性损害并损害债权人利益。\n\n66. 最后，PAX 援引先前引用的判例法（如上所述，其表述失实或援引不当），主张其所请求的解除中止救济适当，因为该救济将促进司法经济且不会对债权人造成实质性损害。债务人并不质疑 Ostrager 法官（Justice Ostrager）在当事人之间诉讼方面的经验。但该争议归根结底是关于债权人对债务人所主张债权有效性的争议，解决该争议并不需要专门知识，本院完全有能力解决这些事项。事实上，如前所述，债务人正着手最终将与 PAX 的诉讼移送至本院。更关键的是，PAX 并非请求解除中止以解决当事人之间的争议（例如，尚未裁决的上诉）；相反，其仅寻求解除中止以执行 2月9日藐视法庭命令，并使债务人遭到监禁。基于上述理由，债务人对 Ice Cream Liquidation、Mildred Deli 和 Fleming 的援引均不能成立。\n\n67. PAX 所称解除中止将使全体债权人受益，“因为其将把有价值的 Lady May 带到美国并防止财产耗散”，并不属实。第一，如前所述，债务人经认定可能在 Lady May 中拥有的任何权益已经明确处于本院管辖之下，且本院有权依据《破产法》授权在此方面给予适当救济（例如，11 U.S.C. § 542 的交付规定）。第二，允许 PAX 执行 2月9日藐视法庭命令的有限解除中止救济不会将 Lady May 带到美国。2月9日藐视法庭命令并未强制要求如此；相反，如未返还 Lady May，该命令将施加额外罚款。\n\n68. 债务人进一步指出，PAX 在其分析中排除的其他相关 Sonnax 因素进一步不利于所请求的救济。例如，只有 PAX 和债务人（以及债务人拥有的某些关联方）是基础争议的当事人；因此，该诉讼并非主要涉及第三方。Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 644（“第三，加州上诉并非主要涉及第三方；GMACM 是尚未裁决的第二次上诉中唯一被列名的被告（Sonnax 因素第6项）。”）。\n\n[本页其余部分特意留白。]\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 83 提交于 03/15/22 录入于 03/15/22 16:52:51 第 31 页，共 31 页\n\n结论\n\n因此，基于上述理由，债务人请求本院：\n\n(i) 驳回 PAX 动议中请求的救济；以及 (ii) 向债务人授予被认为适当的其他或进一步救济。\n\n日期：March 15, 2022\nBROWN RUDNICK LLP（BROWN RUDNICK 律师事务所）\n\n签字人：/s/ William R. Baldiga\nDylan P. Kletter, Esq.\n185 Asylum Street\nHartford, Connecticut 06103\n电话：(860) 509-6500\n传真：(860) 509-6501\n电子邮箱：dkletter@brownrudnick.com\n\n以及\n\nWilliam R. Baldiga, Esq.\nRobert J. Stark, Esq.\nBennett S. Silverberg, Esq.\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, New York 10036\n电话：(212) 209-4800\n传真：(212) 209-4801\n电子邮箱：wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com\nrstark@brownrudnick.com\nbsilverberg@brownrudnick.com\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）、债务人的拟议代理律师","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":77,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":857,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":10172,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-03-01 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-03-01","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:03:19"}