{"id":"court_ctb_876_3","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":876,"sub_number":3,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":"2022-09-24","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|\n| In re: | :
:
Chapter 11 |\n| HO WAN KWOK, | :
:
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor. | :
: |\n| -----------------------------------------------------x-----
HK International Funds Investments
(USA) Limited, LLC
Plaintiff | :
:
:
Adv. Proceeding No. 22-05003 |\n| v.
Ho Wan Kwok
Defendant | :
:
:
September 23, 2022
: |\n| -----------------------------------------------------x
Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins
Counter-Plaintiff
v.
HK International Funds Investments | :
:
:
:
:
: |\n| (USA) Limited, LLC, and Mei Guo
Counter-Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------x | :
: |\n\n# **CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR PREJUDGMENT REMEDY PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 7064 AND CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES SECTION 52-278D**\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
| 1 |\n|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| | BACKGROUND
| 5 |\n| | JURISDICTION AND VENUE
| 5 |\n| | RELIEF REQUESTED | 5 |\n| | ARGUMENT | 6 |\n| I. | Applicable Legal Standard | 6 |\n| II. | Probable Cause Exists That Trustee Will Prevail on Counterclaims | 8 |\n| III. | If Court Does Not Grant Prejudgment Attachment, Trustee May Never Be Able to
Enforce Judgment Against Debtor | 29 |\n| | NO PRIOR REQUEST | 31 |\n\n# **Cases**\n\n| In re Affinity Health Care, Mgmt., Inc.,
499 B.R. 246 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013)
24 |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re AMC Invs., LLC,
524 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015)10 |\n| In re Andersen,
166 B.R. 516 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994)
20 |\n| Anderson v. Nedovich,
561 A.2d 948 (1989)7 |\n| In re Antex, Inc.,
397 B.R. 168 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008)26 |\n| Antique Ford Found. v. I.R.S., Dep't of Treasury, U.S.,
791 F. Supp. 1450 (D. Mont. 1992)18 |\n| Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group,
144 A.D.3d 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
27 |\n| ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp.,
396 B.R. 278 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
15 |\n| Ashley v. Ashley,
393 A.2d 637 (Pa. 1978)15 |\n| ASPIC, LLC v. Poitier,
179 Conn. App. 631, 181 A.3d 593 (Conn. 2018)7 |\n| In re B.L. Jennings, Inc.,
373 B.R. 742 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007)
15 |\n| In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,
458 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)27 |\n| In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC,
557 B.R. 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)27 |\n| Blair v. Infineon Tech., AG,
720 F. Supp.2d 462 (D. Del. 2010)15 |\n\n#### **(continued)**\n\n| Carol v. Madison
Plaza Apartment Corp.,
No. 156730/13, 2014 WL 6471482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 2014)11 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| CIT Bank N.A. v. Donovan,
856 F. App'x 335, 337 (2d Cir. 2021)
9 |\n| Cody v. United States,
348 F.Supp.2d 682 (E.D. Va. 2004)
18 |\n| Coleman v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A.,
136 N.Y.S.3d 911 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 2021), appeal dismissed,
175 N.E.3d
923 (2021)9, 12 |\n| In re Combes,
382 B.R. 186 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008)20 |\n| Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
333 F. Supp. 3d 380(D. Del. 2018), aff'd and remanded, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir.
2019)
15 |\n| Daer Holdings, LLC v. Menchise (In re Steffen),
No. 8:13-CV-1700-T-27, 2014 WL 11428827 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014)18 |\n| Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Juchniewich,
No. FSTCV166028759S, 2017 WL 1194769 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2017)
8 |\n| In re Dordevic,
633 B.R. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021)
18, 19 |\n| Ehrlich for Hoffmans Trade Grp. LLC v. Com. Factors of Atlanta,
567 B.R. 684 (N.D.N.Y. 2017)20 |\n| In re First Connecticut Consulting Grp., Inc.,
No. 04-101, 2004 WL 1676211 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 27, 2004), aff'd, 340 B.R.
210 (D. Vt. 2006), aff'd, 254 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2007)
19, 22 |\n| G&F Assocs. No. 3 v. Montville Realty P'ship, LLC,
No. CV136017417, 2013 WL 7020528 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2013)7 |\n| Greenwich Life Settlements, Inc. v. ViaSource Funding Grp., LLC,
742 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)9 |\n| Guido v. 1114 6th Ave. Co.,
2015 WL 1055074 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2015)
29 |\n\n#### **(continued)**\n\n| Harlem Bus. Ctr. v. Rothenberg,
205 N.Y.S. 353 (App. Term 1924)
13 |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re Integrity Graphics, Inc.,
623 B.R. 21 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)
20, 21 |\n| J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC,
71 A.3d 492 (Conn. 2013)
7 |\n| In re Jevic Holding Corp.,
No. 08-11006 BLS, 2011 WL 4345204 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15,
2011)25 |\n| In re Jie Xiao,
608 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019)
20, 21, 23 |\n| Katcher v. 3V Cap. Partners LP,
No. X05CV085008383S, 2011 WL 1105724 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2011)
7 |\n| In re Kellel,
No. 8-18-76679-LAS, 2022 WL 24057 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2022)26 |\n| Kenwell Trading Ltd. v. Porcelen Ltd. CT LLC,
No. 3:22-CV-00248 (KAD), 2022 WL 3359159 (D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2022)6 |\n| Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc.,
967 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009)
13 |\n| LiButti v. United States,
968 F. Supp. 71 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 178 F.3d 114
(2d Cir. 1999)18 |\n| Lombard v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, Inc.,
280 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2002)29 |\n| In re LXEng LLC,
607 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019)
20 |\n| In re M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc.,
541 F. Appx. 55 (2d Cir. 2013)25 |\n| In re Maxus Energy Corp.,
641 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022)24, 25, 26, 28 |\n\n#### **(continued)**\n\n| PAX v. Kwok,
Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)4, 29, 31 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC,
988 F.3d 634 (2d Cir. 2021)10 |\n| Pope v. Enzo Biochem, Inc.,
432 F. App'x 7 (2d Cir. 2011)
11 |\n| Revital Realty Grp., LLC v. Kalmon Dolgin Affiliates, Inc.,
981 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)11 |\n| Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,
631 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)20 |\n| In re Servicom, LLC,
No. 18-31722 (AMN), 2021 WL 825155 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2021)24, 25 |\n| In re Smith,
No. 19-40964, 2022 WL 1814415 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 2, 2022)28 |\n| Stockton v. Lansiquot,
838 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1988)
13 |\n| Tahirou v. New Horizon Enterprises, LLC,
No. 3:20-CV-00281 (SVN), 2022 WL 510044 (D. Conn. Feb. 21, 2022)
6, 7 |\n| In re Tronox Inc.,
503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2013)28 |\n| Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Frankel,
538 F. App'x 267 (4th Cir. 2013)
12 |\n| Universitas Educ., LLC v. Benistar,
No. 3:20-CV-00738 (JAM), 2021 WL 965794 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021)14 |\n| In re Wolf,
595 B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)
24 |\n| In re
Wyly,
607 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018)19 |\n\n| 11 U.S.C. |\n|--------------------------------------------------|\n| § 5444, 20 |\n| § 544(b)26, 27, 28 |\n| § 546(a)26 |\n| § 5484, 20, 25 |\n| § 548(a)(1)
28 |\n| § 548(a)(1)(A)20 |\n| § 5504, 20, 24 |\n| § 550(a)23 |\n| § 550(a)(2)
24 |\n| § 550(b)24 |\n| |\n| 26 U.S.C. |\n| § 6502(a)(2)
28 |\n| § 690128 |\n| 28 U.S.C. |\n| § 1575 |\n| § 157(b)5 |\n| § 13345 |\n| § 14085 |\n| § 14095 |\n| § 174630 |\n| |\n| Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-278d (West)6 |\n| Connecticut Prejudgment Remedy Statute |\n| § 52-278d(a)(4)6 |\n| § 52-278d(d)1, 6 |\n| § 52-278d(e)6 |\n| § 52-278d et seq1 |\n| § 52-278d(f)
6 |\n| |\n| N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law |\n| § 203(g)27 |\n| § 213(8)26, 27 |\n| N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 27620 |\n| New York Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
25 |\n\nMr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), hereby submits this memorandum in support of his application (the \"Application\"), pursuant to Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7064 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\"), and section 52-278d *et seq.* of the Connecticut General Statutes (the \"Connecticut Prejudgment Remedy Statute\"), for a prejudgment remedy against (i) HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA\"), plaintiff and counter-claim defendant in the above captioned adversary proceeding (the \"Adversary Proceeding\") and (ii) Mei Guo (the \"Debtor's Daughter\"), counterclaim-defendant in the Adversary Proceeding. 1 In support of this memorandum,2 the Trustee states as follows:\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Debtor and his family have vigorously defended, at immense expense, the Debtor's status as a judgment-proof billionaire who is able to enjoy all the trappings of immense wealth without any responsibility to repay his creditors. That strategy continues in this Adversary Proceeding, in which HK USA, a company purportedly owned by the Debtor's Daughter, asserts that the Lady May*—*a luxury yacht which at the time of its purchase had a value of nearly \\$32 million3—belongs to HK USA and not to the Debtor's chapter 11 estate. HK\n\n1 The Trustee has also moved for an order, pursuant to § 52-278d(d), requiring HK USA and the Debtor's Daughter to disclose property in which they have an interest.\n\n2 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the *Chapter 11 Trustee's Answer and Counterclaims* (the \"Answer and Counterclaims\"), filed contemporaneously herewith.\n\n3 The *Lady May*'s Bill of Sale, dated February 23, 2015, lists a purchase of price of €28,000,000.00, which, multiplied by the applicable exchange rate on February 23, 2015 (of 1.1333 dollars per euro), equals \\$31,732,400.00. *See* Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 36, Sale documents in connection with the sale of the Lady May, at 1 (Bill of Sale).\n\nUSA's position is at odds with reality. As Justice Ostrager of the New York Supreme Court (the \"State Court\") has already ruled, the record is clear that the Debtor, and not HK USA, beneficially owns and controls the Lady May. HK USA's claim in this adversary proceeding is therefore wholly without merit.\n\n2. The Trustee, by contrast, holds several meritorious counterclaims (the \"Counterclaims\") against HK USA*.* The Counterclaims assert, among other things, that HK USA is the Debtor's alter ego or is equitably owned by the Debtor, that HK USA received the Lady May via an actual fraudulent transfer, and that HK USA committed the tort of negligence against the Debtor, thus harming his estate. These Counterclaims entitle the Trustee to relief equal to or greater than the value of HK USA itself and/or its known assets, including the *Lady May* as well as the funds—originally \\$37 million—that HK USA placed into an escrow account (the \"Escrowed Funds\") under the April 29, 2022 stipulation regarding the *Lady May*'s return to the United States [Docket No. 299] (the \"Lady May Stipulation\").4\n\n3. Pursuant to this application, the Trustee seeks a prejudgment attachment order under the Connecticut Prejudgment Remedy Statute against (i) the Debtor's Daughter attaching the ownership interest in HK USA purportedly held by her and (ii) HK USA attaching (a) the Lady May and (b) HK USA's interest in the Escrowed Funds. This prejudgment relief is critical to ensure that assets will be available to the Trustee to satisfy his eventual judgment. Indeed, the record makes clear that the Debtor will stop at nothing to protect his wealth from the reach of his creditors, with the State Court having found that the Debtor is \"a self-declared multi-billionaire\n\n4 The Trustee is *not* a party to the Lady May Stipulation, as this Court has recognized. *See, e.g.*, Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 89, Aug. 30, 2022 Tr. at 18:6-9 (\"[O]bviously the trustee -- the trustee was not a party to any of this. He was not in the case when the parties agreed to forego a hearing on relief from stay and a ruling on relief from stay.\").\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 10 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 10 of 39 39\n\n[who has] secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members\" to evade his creditors. Accordingly, there is a real risk that if the Trustee does not attach HK USA's purported assets now, they will be long gone by the time this litigation concludes.\n\n4. The Trustee readily meets the requirement of the Connecticut Prejudgment Remedy Statute that he show \"probable cause\" for his Counterclaims. The Counterclaims are supported by detailed factual allegations, together with citations to record evidence in this and other proceedings, which paint a clear picture of HK USA's liability. Drawing reasonable inferences in the Trustee's favor, as the Court should in ruling on this Application, there can be no doubt that the Trustee has demonstrated an entitlement to the requested attachment.\n\n5. Specifically, as to Count I of the Counterclaims, the Trustee has established probable cause that he is entitled to a declaration that the Lady May is property of the estate based on collateral estoppel arising from HK USA's extensive participation alongside the Debtor in the State Court litigation with Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P (the \"State Court Action\"). As Justice Ostrager found in the State Court Action, based on \"clear[] and convincing[]\" evidence—including the testimony of the Debtor's Daughter who supposedly owns HK USA—the Debtor \"beneficially owns and controls\" the Lady May. HK USA cannot now relitigate that same issue before this Court.\n\n6. The Trustee has also shown in Count II of his Counterclaims that he is entitled to a declaration that HK USA is the Debtor's alter ego and, therefore, *all* of HK USA's property not just the Lady May—belongs to the estate. All of the key factors that courts consider in determining whether an entity is an alter ego are satisfied here. HK USA is a holding company with no independent existence that the Debtor has consistently manipulated as part of his \"shell game\" to place valuable assets in the ostensible possession of his daughter while he continues to\n\n-3-\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 11 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 11 of 39 39\n\nuse and enjoy those assets. These and the other facts alleged in the Counterclaims are more than sufficient to establish HK USA's alter ego status.\n\n7. In the alternative, if HK USA is not the Debtor's alter ego, the Trustee has established probable cause that HK USA was the recipient of actual fraudulent transfers that the Trustee may now avoid and recover under sections 544, 548, and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, as alleged in Count III of the Counterclaims. Specifically, the evidence shows that, in 2017, the Debtor caused the transfer of his ownership in HK International (which then owned the Lady May) to his daughter for a payment *of only \\$1.00***.** This transfer for essentially no consideration is surrounded by numerous other badges of fraud, leaving no doubt the Debtor undertook this transfer as part of his \"shell game\" to evade creditors.\n\n8. Finally, as set forth in Count IV, the Trustee also holds a negligence claim against HK USA as a result of its brazen violation of the order (the \"October 2020 Restraining Order\") issued by Justice Ostrager (i) prohibiting the Debtor \"*and/or the registered owners*\" of the Lady May from sailing the Lady May away from the United States5 and (ii) fining the Debtor \\$500,000 per day if the Lady May were to leave United States. HK USA knew this, but it and its representatives nevertheless caused the Lady May to leave the United States for a period of 268 days as of February 7, 2022. As a consequence, Justice Ostrager issued his February 9, 2022 decision and order (the \"Final Contempt Decision\"), imposing approximately *\\$134 million in contempt fines* on the Debtor, for which the estate is now allegedly liable. Having caused these fines, HK USA is liable to the estate in an amount equal to the fines based on its negligence.\n\n5 *See* Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 50, Decision and Order at 1, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 630 (emphasis added).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 12 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 12 of 39 39\n\n9. Evidence supporting each of these claims has been filed contemporaneously herewith. To be clear, although the Trustee has readily satisfied probable cause for each of his Counterclaims, the Court need only find that probable cause exists for one of the Counterclaims to support this Application. The Trustee more than meets that burden, and, therefore, this Application should be granted.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n10. The Trustee incorporates by reference the facts set forth in the Trustee's Answer and Counterclaims, filed contemporaneously herewith.\n\n#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n11. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the Standing Order of Reference from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (as amended). This is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n12. The statutory bases for the relief requested herein are Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Bankruptcy Rule 7064, and the Connecticut Prejudgment Remedy Statute.\n\n#### **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n13. In the Application and in this supporting memorandum, the Trustee, pursuant to Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Bankruptcy Rule 7064, and the Connecticut Prejudgment Remedy Statute, seeks prejudgment attachment against HK USA. Specifically, the Trustee requests an order attaching certain assets allegedly owned by HK USA that are, in reality, property of the estate and that should be available to the Debtor's creditors and/or turned over to the Trustee. Those assets are the Lady May yacht and HK USA's interest in the Escrowed Funds of approximately \\$37 million. Because HK USA, allegedly owned by the\n\n-5-\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 13 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 13 of 39 39\n\nDebtor's Daughter, is also, in reality, property of the estate, the Trustee also requests attachment of the ownership interests in HK USA.\n\n# **ARGUMENT**\n\n# **I. Applicable Legal Standard**\n\n14. Under Connecticut law,6 a court considering a request for a prejudgment remedy should limit its consideration to the following three factors: \"(1) whether or not there is probable cause that a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, taking into account any defenses, counterclaims or set-offs, will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiff, (2) whether payment of any judgment that may be rendered against the defendant is adequately secured by insurance, (3) whether the property sought to be subjected to the prejudgment remedy is exempt from execution.\"7 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-278d (West).8\n\n15. \"Probable cause is a *bona fide* belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a man of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in entertaining it.\" *Tahirou v. New Horizon Enterprises,*\n\n6 Bankruptcy Rule 7064 incorporates Fed.R.Civ.P. 64, which itself incorporates certain state law collection remedies, including attachment, that are available \"under the law of the state where the court is located\"—here, Connecticut.\n\n7 None of the property the Trustee seeks to attach is exempt, and the Trustee is not aware of any insurance policy held by HK USA that would defeat the need for attachment, nor would insurance exempt HK USA from turning over property of the estate. Accordingly, this memorandum will focus on the first, and primary, statutory requirement: probable cause.\n\n8 The Connecticut Prejudgment Remedy Statute also includes a fourth consideration: if the court has determined to grant a prejudgment remedy, whether a bond should be required. *See* § 52-278d(a)(4). HK USA bears the burden, in the first instance, of requesting and demonstrating the need for a bond, which it cannot do. *See* §§ 52-278d(d) and (e); *Kenwell Trading Ltd. v. Porcelen Ltd. CT LLC*, No. 3:22-CV-00248 (KAD), 2022 WL 3359159, at \\*5 (D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2022) (denying defendant's request that plaintiff post bond). Even if HK USA could make such a showing, the Trustee should be excused from any bond requirement pursuant to § 52- 278d(f), and reserves all rights accordingly.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 14 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 14 of 39 39\n\n*LLC*, No. 3:20-CV-00281 (SVN), 2022 WL 510044, at \\*4 (D. Conn. Feb. 21, 2022) (internal quotation marks and references omitted). \"It is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.\" *Id.* (internal quotation marks and references omitted). \"The probable cause standard is *less demanding than standards which require findings to be made based on a preponderance of the evidence or even a likelihood of success*.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and references omitted).\n\n16. The Connecticut Supreme Court has compared the probable cause standard to the standard for defeating a motion to dismiss, explaining that its review of an order of prejudgment remedy \"view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.\" *J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC*, 71 A.3d 492, 510 (Conn. 2013); *see also ASPIC, LLC v. Poitier*, 179 Conn. App. 631, 640, 181 A.3d 593, 598 (Conn. 2018) (\"We will not upset a prejudgment remedy order in the absence of clear error ... viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.\") (quoting *J.E. Robert Co.*, 71 A.3d 492).\n\n17. For the same reason, a prejudgment remedy applicant is entitled to reasonable inferences supported by the identified facts and evidence. *See G&F Assocs. No. 3 v. Montville Realty P'ship, LLC*, No. CV136017417, 2013 WL 7020528, at \\*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2013) (granting prejudgment remedy based on \"evidence at the hearing, including the reasonable inferences from the same\"); *Katcher v. 3V Cap. Partners LP*, No. X05CV085008383S, 2011 WL 1105724, at \\*21 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2011) (same); *Anderson v. Nedovich*, 561 A.2d 948, 949 (1989) (\"In addition, the trier is entitled to draw reasonable inferences based on the facts proven.\").\n\n18. In contrast to the flexible and easily satisfied probable cause standard that applies to the applicant, a \"heightened standard is applied for those defending a prejudgment remedy\n\n-7-\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 15 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 15 of 39 39\n\napplication.\" *Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Juchniewich*, No. FSTCV166028759S, 2017 WL 1194769, at \\*6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2017). Because the statute provides a specific (and lower) standard of probable cause for the applicant but \"is silent as to the standard of proof for a defense of a PJR application,\" courts have held that the standard for proving defenses, counterclaims or set-offs, as permitted by the statute, \"is the preponderance of the evidence standard.\" *Id.* at \\*7 (internal citations omitted).\n\n19. In sum, while the Trustee is confident that he will ultimately prevail on each of his Counterclaims under the more exacting preponderance standard that will be applied at trial, at this stage the Trustee need only demonstrate \"probable cause\" that he will prevail—a standard that does not require even a 51% percent chance of prevailing on the Counterclaims. In meeting that standard, the Trustee is entitled to the reasonable inferences of his evidence, and to have the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to him. On the other hand, HK USA cannot rely on the probable cause standard in proving defenses, counterclaims, or set-offs but must, instead, satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard.\n\n20. For the reasons explained below, the Trustee has easily met the applicable standard, and is entitled to prejudgment remedy against HK USA.\n\n#### **II. Probable Cause Exists That Trustee Will Prevail on Counterclaims**\n\n21. The Trustee asserts counterclaims against HK USA based on four principal, and distinct, theories: (a) the Debtor is the owner of the Lady May based on collateral estoppel (Count I); (b) the Debtor is the true owner of HK USA, including all of its assets (*i.e.*, the Lady May and the \\$37 million of Escrowed Funds), under an alter ego theory or other equitable principles (Counts II and III); (c) HK USA obtained the Lady May by means of an actual fraudulent transfer (Count IV); and (d) HK USA committed the tort of negligence against the Debtor, which caused the Debtor to incur \\$134 million of liability in connection with the Final\n\n-8-\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 16 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 16 of 39 39\n\nContempt Decision and other applicable damages, thus giving rise to a claim by the estate for at least \\$134 million against HK USA (Count V). Probable cause exists that the Trustee will prevail on each of these theories.\n\n#### a. Probable Cause Exists that Lady May is Property of Debtor\n\n22. In his Final Contempt Decision, Justice Ostrager found that the Debtor \"beneficially owns and controls the Lady May.\"9 This finding both (i) precludes HK USA from asserting ownership of the Lady May under principles of collateral estoppel and (ii) establishes definitively that the Trustee will prevail on his claim that the Debtor owns the Lady May.\n\n23. Because the Final Contempt Decision was issued by a New York state court, this Court should apply New York state law regarding collateral estoppel. *See Greenwich Life Settlements, Inc. v. ViaSource Funding Grp., LLC*, 742 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"To determine the effect of a state court judgment, federal courts . . . are required to apply the preclusion law of the rendering state.\") (internal citations omitted); *see also CIT Bank N.A. v. Donovan*, 856 F. App'x 335, 337 (2d Cir. 2021) (\"Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court must apply New York issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) law to New York state-court judgments.\").\n\n24. Under New York law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue that was raised in a prior action and decided against that party or those in privity. *Coleman v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A.*, 136 N.Y.S.3d 911, 932 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 2021), *appeal dismissed,* 175 N.E.3d 923 (2021). Specifically, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue when: (1) the identical issue necessarily was decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action and (2) the party\n\n9 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 1, Final Contempt Decision at 7.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 17 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 17 of 39 39\n\nto be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. *See Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC*, 988 F.3d 634, 642 (2d Cir. 2021) (applying New York law).\n\n#### 1. *Identical Issues Decided in State Court Litigation*\n\n25. The first prong of the collateral estoppel analysis—whether identical issues were necessarily decided in the State Court litigation—addresses the question of which factual findings made by a prior court will be given preclusive effect. On this point, it has been ruled that issues are \"necessarily determined\" if they are an \"essential element of a finding\" and that \"even factual issues that are only implicitly relied upon in reaching a decision can be given preclusive effect. Similarly, factual issues are 'decisive' if they tend to establish a claim.\" *In re AMC Invs., LLC*, 524 B.R. 62, 78 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (applying New York law).\n\n26. Here, collateral estoppel would apply to numerous factual issues decided by Justice Ostrager. Most obviously, collateral estoppel would apply to Justice Ostrager's ultimate finding that the Lady May was beneficially owned and controlled by the Debtor. As discussed in the Counterclaims, this was the central question Justice Ostrager was asked to resolve by the Appellate Division, and had to be decided in order for Justice Ostrager to issue the Final Contempt Decision. This finding alone demonstrates probable cause that the Trustee will prevail on his claim that the Debtor, and not HK USA, owns the Lady May.\n\n27. In addition, collateral estoppel should also apply to Justice Ostrager's numerous other subsidiary findings in the Final Contempt Decision, which include, as discussed in more detail in the Counterclaims, findings that the Debtor parked assets with shell companies and family members as part of the Debtor's scheme to \"assert that he has no assets despite his lavish\n\n-10-\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 18 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 18 of 39 39\n\nlifestyle.\"10 These findings were among a number of other findings that Justice Ostrager relied upon to reach his ruling, and they strongly support the Trustee's position here that the Debtor, and not his daughter or HK USA, truly owns the Lady May.\n\n2. *HK USA Had Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate in State Court* 28. Under New York Law, a nonparty to a prior action is considered to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and thus subject to collateral estoppel when the nonparty is in privity with a party to the prior action. *See Revital Realty Grp., LLC v. Kalmon Dolgin Affiliates, Inc.*, 981 N.Y.S.2d 638, 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (\"The principle of collateral estoppel 'precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue clearly raised in a prior action and decided against that party or *those in privity*.'\") (internal references omitted) (emphasis added). Here, HK USA was in privity with the Debtor in the State Court litigation and, thus, is subject to collateral estoppel on the issue of ownership of the Lady May.\n\n29. \"In the context of collateral estoppel, a party in privity is one that had 'a relationship with a party to the prior litigation such that his own rights or obligations in the subsequent proceeding are conditioned in one way or another on, or derivative of, the rights of the party to the prior litigation.'\" *Id.* (quoting *Juan C. v. Cortines*, 89 N.Y.2d 659, 667 (1997)). The concept of privity for collateral estoppel purposes \"requires a flexible analysis of the facts and circumstances of the actual relationship between the party and nonparty in the prior litigation,\" *Carol v. Madison Plaza Apartment Corp.*, No. 156730/13, 2014 WL 6471482, at \\*3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 2014), and which revolves around the question of if a \"nonparty's interests were adequately represented.\" *Pope v. Enzo Biochem, Inc.*, 432 F. App'x 7, 10 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying New York law).\n\n10 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 1, Final Contempt Decision at 1.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 19 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 19 of 39 39\n\n30. Courts have found parties to be in privity for the purposes of collateral estoppel in a variety of contexts where it is clear that the parties' interests were aligned, whether by dint of their common goals and/or their close legal, financial, or familial relationships. *See, e.g.*, *Coleman*, 136 N.Y.S.3d at 932 (affirming lower court's finding that a party was collaterally estopped from seeking quiet title to real property when \"his interests [were] represented by his wife, who was a defendant in the prior foreclosure action.\") (internal quotation marks omitted); *Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Frankel*, 538 F. App'x 267, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2013) (individual collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue that was resolved during the first trial by the company he co-owned with his brother and business partner, because he was a co-owner and cocontroller the company and had a substantial role in the prior suit).\n\n31. Here, it is clear from the record set forth in the Counterclaims that the Debtor and HK USA were in privity due to their close relationship and their common legal and financial goals. HK USA was allegedly owned and controlled by the Debtor's Daughter, and thus the Debtor and HK USA had a close, familial relationship. In addition, HK USA and the Debtor had the same interests. They both alleged and argued in the State Court Action that the Lady May was owned and controlled by HK USA, not the Debtor. The same is true now, as the Debtor's counsel has stated the Debtor is fully aligned with HK USA in connection with this Adversary Proceeding. *See* Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 91, Aug. 1, 2022 Tr. 39:3-8 (\"[The Debtor's] position is that HK [USA] owns the boat so [the Debtor and HK USA] are not adverse.\" He does not believe that he owns the boat. He does not believe that it's property of the bankruptcy estate. I'll say that unequivocally on the record. So I don't see how they can be adverse if they take the same position.\"). For these reasons, the Debtor and HK USA were in privity during the State Court Action for collateral estoppel purposes.\n\n-12-\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 20 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 20 of 39 39\n\n32. Even if HK USA was not formally in privity with the Debtor in connection with the State Court Action, courts in numerous states have permitted the use of collateral estoppel against parties who, while not in privity with a party to prior litigation, were nonetheless bound by the previous decision by dint of their appearance, and open and active participation, in the prior litigation. *See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc.*, 967 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2009) (\"Both Connecticut and sister state case law in the area of collateral estoppel and res judicata make clear that . . . . It is not essential in the application of the doctrine of res [judicata] that a party to be bound by the former adjudication should have been a formal party thereto or privy to a formal party. It is sufficient if he, having an interest in the subject matter, participated openly and actively in so much of the former litigation as led to the judgment adjudicating the cause of action in question.\") (internal quotation marks omitted); *Stockton v. Lansiquot*, 838 F.2d 1545, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988) (\"It is well settled Florida law that even though a party in a subsequent suit was not a named party in a prior suit, such party is bound by the prior judgment if he participated in the first proceeding.\") (internal quotation marks omitted); *Harlem Bus. Ctr. v. Rothenberg*, 205 N.Y.S. 353, 353 (App. Term 1924) (\"The application of the doctrine of res adjudicata, beyond the immediate parties to the previous adjudication, prescribes that the third party must be either privy to, or have the right to control the conduct of, the litigation, or have been vouched in, or perhaps have taken some open and notoriously active part in the actual conduct of the litigation.\").\n\n33. Here, it is clear from the record set forth in the Counterclaims that HK USA was openly and actively involved in the State Court Action. HK USA made an appearance in the State Court Action to oppose PAX's motion seeking the Final Contempt Decision on the grounds\n\n-13-\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 21 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 21 of 39 39\n\nthat HK USA's property interests were being affected by the motion.11 HK USA then helped defend the Debtor at the evidentiary hearing regarding the ownership of the Lady May, presenting four of the five witnesses offered on behalf of the defense, including the Debtor's Daughter, the alleged owner of HK USA. Moreover, HK USA's counsel and the Debtor's counsel in the State Court Action were paid by the same Debtor-linked shell company, Golden Spring (and now, HK USA and the Debtor are represented by the same law firm in this chapter 11 case). For all of these reasons, HK USA is bound by the State Court's findings by virtue of having participated in that litigation.\n\n#### b. Probable Cause HK USA is Alter Ego of the Debtor\n\n34. The Trustee alleges that HK USA is, in truth, an alter ego of the Debtor and that, therefore all of HK USA's assets should be deemed property of the estate and surrendered to the Trustee. The Trustee has established probable cause in support of this claim based on numerous facts demonstrating that HK USA has no independent existence but, rather, is a shell company the Debtor has used as part of his scheme to hide assets from creditors.\n\n35. Under Delaware law, in determining whether one entity is the alter ego of another, 12 a court must focus on (1) whether the entities in question operated as a single economic unit and (2) whether there was an overall element of injustice or unfairness. With regard to the former, Delaware courts consider a number of factors, including: (i) whether the company was adequately capitalized; (ii) whether the company was solvent; (iii) whether corporate formalities were observed; (iv) whether the dominant shareholder siphoned company\n\n11 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 90, Vartan Affirmation at ¶ 4.\n\n12 Because HK USA is a Delaware entity, Delaware law applies to the alter ego/veil piercing claim. *See, e.g.*, *Universitas Educ., LLC v. Benistar*, No. 3:20-CV-00738 (JAM), 2021 WL 965794, at \\*7 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021) (\"[B]ecause [defendant] is incorporated in Delaware, I must apply Delaware law to decide if it may be subject to an alter ego claim for reverse veil piercing liability.\").\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 22 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 22 of 39 39\n\nfunds; and (v) whether, in general, the company functioned as a facade for the dominant shareholder. *See Blair v. Infineon Tech., AG*, 720 F. Supp.2d 462, 470-71 (D. Del. 2010). This \"list of factors is not exhaustive and no single factor is dispositive.\" *Id*. at 471.\n\n36. A number of courts have explained that control over, and/or ownership of, the property or assets of the allegedly separate entity is evidence that the entity is really the alter ego of the controlling party. For example, in *ASARCO*, the court, applying Delaware law, found that the debtor and its subsidiary operated as a single economic unit in part because the \"dividends from [subsidiary's] *only asset* went directly to [debtor], its dominant shareholder, which had *total control* of the funds.\" *ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp*., 396 B.R. 278, 320 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (emphasis added). And in *Crystallex*, the court explained that the allegedly separate instrumentality will be considered an alter ego if the controlling entity has extensive control of the instrumentality, including if it \"uses the instrumentality's property as its own.\" *Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela*, 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 401(D. Del. 2018), *aff'd and remanded*, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2019).13 Other courts have ruled similarly. *See, e.g.*, *Ashley v. Ashley*, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (Pa. 1978) (\"We have said that whenever one in control of a corporation uses that control, *or uses the corporate assets*, to further his or her own personal interests, the fiction of the separate corporate identity may properly be disregarded.\") (emphasis added); *In re B.L. Jennings, Inc.*, 373 B.R. 742, 759 n. 10 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (\"partnerships\n\n13 The *Crystallex* court was applying the so-called \"*Bancec* standard,\" which is the alter ego test developed specifically in the context of determining whether a governmental instrumentality is the alter ego of the sovereign that established it, and which test was \"developed pursuant to federal common law.\" *Crystallex*, 333 F.Supp. 3d at 396. However, the \"*Bancec* standard is in fact most similar to the 'alter ego' or piercing the corporate veil' standards applied in many states.\" *Id.*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 23 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 23 of 39 39\n\nand other business entities *may also be found to be the 'alter egos' of those in control or dominion over their assets*\") (emphasis added). 14\n\n37. Here, the record provides overwhelming support for the Trustee's alter ego allegations. As an initial matter, the record is not disputed that the Lady May was at all relevant times HK USA's only asset, and Justice Ostrager has already found that the Lady May is beneficially owned and controlled by the Debtor. This finding—that the Debtor exercised dominion and control over HK USA's only asset, and therefore HK USA itself—is binding on HK USA based on collateral estoppel and cannot be relitigated.\n\n38. Justice Ostrager also issued other preclusive findings that HK USA was part of a \"shell game\" the Debtor used to hide his assets from creditors, thus establishing that the Debtor used HK USA to perpetuate a fraud or injustice upon his creditors. For example, Justice Ostrager found that:\n\n- a) The Debtor had made \"efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members.\"15\n- b) The Debtor, \"who is a self-declared multi-billionaire, had secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members.\"16\n- c) The Debtor's use of corporate entities to shield assets from creditors was a \"scheme\" that had \"enabled Kwok to assert that he has no assets despite his lavish lifestyle.\"17\n\n17 *Id*.\n\n14 *See* 114 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 403 (2010) (\"Under Florida, Delaware, Pennsylvania, or New York law, the elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil or establish alter-ego liability are essentially the same.\").\n\n15 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 1, Final Contempt Decision at 1.\n\n16 *Id*.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 24 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 24 of 39 39\n\n- d) The Debtor's Daughter \"introduced no evidence that she exercised dominion and control of the *Lady Ma*y, and provided no confirmation that she came into possession of the Lady May, other than as a ruse to shield the Lady May from being levied upon by her father's creditors.\"18\n- 39. Finally, the Counterclaims are replete with other evidence that HK USA was the\n\nDebtor's alter ego. Among other things:\n\n- a) At all relevant times, HK USA's sole member was the Debtor's Daughter, and it had no directors, officers, or employees, did not file tax returns, had no bank account and was not otherwise capitalized, and kept no documents.\n- b) HK USA and the Debtor are represented by the same law firm.\n- c) HK USA, the Debtor, and a number of other Debtor-linked entities use the same address at 162 East 64th Street, New York, New York 10065.\n- d) HK USA received the Lady May from Hong Kong International Funds Investments Limited (\"HK International\"), another entity ostensibly owned and controlled by the Debtor's Daughter, for no consideration.\n- e) HK USA has no source of income, and, as HK USA has conceded, HK USA's expenses have been paid for by Golden Spring and Lamp Capital. These are entities that, by the Defendant's own admissions, are purportedly owned by the Debtor's Son19 and part of a network of family controlled entities used by the Debtor to perpetuate his \"shell game\" and defraud creditors. Golden Spring and/or Lamp Capital have for years paid the Debtor's expenses, including his legal counsel and counsel to HK USA.\n- f) The Debtor filed a chapter 11 plan under which HK USA would, in exchange for no apparent consideration, contribute the Lady May to fund distributions to *the Debtor's* creditors.\n\n18 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 1, Final Contempt Decision at 7.\n\n19 *See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶ 24 (\"The Lady May's expenses were previously funded through [Golden Spring]. Now they are funded by Lamp Capital.\"); Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 69, Letter from L. Vartan, dated May 4, 2021 (\"In connection with its representation [of HK USA], the firm has received payments from Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. and Lamp Capital LLC.\"); Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 42, Letter from L. Vartan, dated June 7, 2021 (\"I can confirm that all expenses for the Lady May yacht, including staff, crew, and maintenance, are paid by Golden Spring New York.\").\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 25 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 25 of 39 39\n\ng) Himalaya Financial Group Limited (\"Himalaya Financial\"), lender of the \\$37 million paid into escrow by HK USA in connection with the Lady May Stipulation, is itself likely an alter ego of the Debtor, given, among other issues, the highly unusual circumstances of the loan and the close relationship between Himalaya Financial and other Debtor-linked entities.\n\n40. In sum, the evidence that HK USA is an alter ego of the Debtor easily clears the low hurdle of the probable cause standard, justifying the prejudgment attachment of all of HK USA's assets and the equity interest in HK USA purportedly held by the Debtor's Daughter.\n\n- c. Probable Cause Trustee Will Prevail on Equitable Ownership Claim\n- 41. In addition to his claim that HK USA is an alter ego of the Debtor, the Trustee has\n\nasserted that the Debtor is the equitable owner of HK USA, notwithstanding that the Debtor's Daughter holds legal or nominal title to it, and that therefore ownership of HK USA should be turned over to the Trustee. \"Because there is no established test for [the question of equitable ownership] under [Delaware] law, it is appropriate for the Court to apply the common-law factors generally applied by federal courts to determine the existence of a nominee relationship.\" *In re Dordevic*, 633 B.R. 553, 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021).20\n\n42. \"In general terms, a nominee is one who holds bare legal title to property for the benefit of another.\" *Dordevic*, 633 B.R. at 557 (internal quotations marks omitted). \"As one\n\n20 Federal courts in multiple jurisdictions agree with this approach. *See, e.g.*, *Daer Holdings, LLC v. Menchise (In re Steffen)*, No. 8:13-CV-1700-T-27, 2014 WL 11428827, at \\*4 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014) (\"While the federal courts generally apply the law of the forum state (in this case, Florida) to resolve nominee, alter-ego and similar questions, Florida, like many states, does not have a bright-line test for determining nominee ownership. Therefore, federal common law applies.\") (internal quotation omitted); *Cody v. United States*, 348 F.Supp.2d 682, 694 (E.D. Va. 2004) (\"[F]ederal courts sitting in states whose law of nominee ownership is similarly undeveloped have typically looked to nominee ownership criteria employed in other federal tax collection cases.\"); *LiButti v. United States*, 968 F. Supp. 71, 75 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part*, 178 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1999) (\"The Court has found no reported New Jersey cases addressing the factors relevant to nominee theory. Thus, the Court applies factors used by other courts that have considered the nominee theory.\" (footnote omitted); *Antique Ford Found. v. I.R.S*.*, Dep't of Treasury, U.S.*, 791 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (D. Mont. 1992) (subsequent history omitted) (noting there \"appear to be no reported Montana decisions which address the issue of what factors are relevant in determining whether a business entity is the nominee of an individual\" and applying factors identified by other courts).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 26 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 26 of 39 39\n\ncourt has described it, a nominee is like a dummy, holding mere title to the property without any beneficial interest; it is an arrangement of convenience.\" *In re First Connecticut Consulting Grp., Inc.*, No. 04-101, 2004 WL 1676211, at \\*4 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 27, 2004), *aff'd*, 340 B.R. 210 (D. Vt. 2006), *aff'd*, 254 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2007). The nominee theory, therefore, allows courts to look past legal title and recognize the true, or beneficial, owner. *See In re Wyly*, 607 B.R. 862, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (\"The nominee theory is a basis for attaching the property of a third party to satisfy a delinquent taxpayer's liability that is similar to but distinct from the alter ego theory.\").\n\n43. \"Courts consider several factors in determining whether a titleholder is actually serving as a nominee for the benefit of another, including whether: (1) there is a close personal relationship between the nominee and the transferor; (2) the nominee paid little or no consideration for the property; (3) the parties placed the property in the name of the nominee in anticipation of collection activity; (4) the parties did not record the conveyance; and (5) the transferor continues to exercise dominion and control over the property.\" *Dordevic*, 633 B.R. at 557.\n\n44. The allegations in the Counterclaims easily provide probable cause to meet this standard. No consideration was paid for the nominal transfer of HK International to the Debtor's Daughter, or the subsequent transfer of the Lady May to HK USA, also nominally held by the Debtor's Daughter. There is obviously a close personal relationship between Kwok and his daughter—an unemployed 28 year old. Further, Justice Ostrager has preclusively determined that, as part of his shell game, the Debtor moved assets, including the Lady May, to avoid liability and continued to enjoy the benefits of the transferred property. From these\n\n-19-\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 27 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 27 of 39 39\n\ncircumstances, it is clear that the Debtor's Daughter serves merely as nominee holding bare legal title to the Lady May, while the Debtor exhibits all the characteristics of true ownership.\n\nd. Probable Cause Trustee Will Prevail on Fraudulent Transfer Claims\n\n45. As an alternative to his Counterclaims seeking ownership of HK USA and its assets, the Trustee asserts actual fraudulent transfer claims against HK USA pursuant to (1) sections 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code and (2) section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code and section 276 of New York's Debtor and Creditor Law.\n\n46. A claim of actual fraud under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code requires allegations that the defendant made a transfer or incurred an obligation with \"actual intent\" to \"hinder, delay or defraud\" a past or future creditor. *In re Integrity Graphics, Inc.*, 623 B.R. 21, 29-30 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020). The debtor-transferor's intent is at issue in such claims, not the transferee's. *In re LXEng LLC*, 607 B.R. 67, 91 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019).21\n\n47. \"Because of the difficulty in proving actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud in making its case, a party can rely on the 'badges of fraud,' which are 'circumstances so commonly associated with fraudulent transfers that their presence gives rise to an inference of intent.'\" *In re Jie Xiao*, 608 B.R. 126, 157 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019); *see also In re Andersen*, 166 B.R. 516, 529 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (\"In recognition of that reality, courts have held that fraudulent intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transfer. *Indirect evidence of fraud may consist of the circumstances of the transfer and the conduct and action*\n\n21 The Trustee has also asserted actual fraudulent transfer under New York law. There is no need to analyze the two separately, because \"[t]he analysis of the debtor's intent to hinder, delay, or defraud under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and under New York law is identical.\" *In re Combes*, 382 B.R. 186, 193-94 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008); *Ehrlich for Hoffmans Trade Grp. LLC v. Com. Factors of Atlanta*, 567 B.R. 684, 692–93 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (Noting that 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), and New York Debtor and Creditor Law section 276 \"are substantially similar such that if a transfer is fraudulent under the DCL, it is also fraudulent under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code\"); *Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC*, 631 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (\"New York fraudulent transfer law and § 548 are substantially the same.\").\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 28 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 28 of 39 39\n\n# *of the parties to the alleged fraudulent transfer with respect to the possession, management and control of the premises*.\") (emphasis added).22\n\n48. Furthermore, \"where the actual fraudulent intent claim is asserted by a bankruptcy trustee, applicable Second Circuit precedent instructs court to adopt a 'more liberal view [of any strict pleading requirements] since a trustee is an outsider to the transaction who must plead fraud from second-hand knowledge.'\" *Integrity Graphics*, 623 B.R. at 31 (internal references omitted).\n\n49. The Counterclaims demonstrate probable cause that there is, at the very least, circumstantial evidence to establish actual fraudulent intent. The key sequence of events\n\ndescribed in the Counterclaims is as follows:\n\n- a) Between October 2014 and June 27, 2017, ownership of HK International was held by one of the Debtor's associates, Qu Guo Jiao (\"Ms. Qu\") through an undisclosed trust agreement for the benefit of the Debtor, who remained beneficial owner of HK International.\n- b) On February 23, 2015, HK International became owner of the *Lady May*.\n- c) The funds used to purchase the Lady May were transferred to by the Debtor to Bravo Luck Limited, an entity registered in the British Virgin Islands and in which the Debtor, at the time, held a 50% ownership interest, with the remaining 50% held by the Debtor's son, and then by Bravo Luck Limited to the seller (the \"2015 Transfer\").\n- d) On June 27, 2017, ownership of HK International was transferred to the Debtor's daughter *for no consideration* (the \"2017 Transfer\").\n- e) In 2019, HK USA was formed.\n- a) In April 2020, the *Lady May* was transferred from HK International to HK USA *for no consideration* (the \"2020 Transfer\").\n\n22 \"Examples of 'badges of fraud' include, *inter alia*: (1) concealing facts and false pretenses; (2) an unconscionable discrepancy in consideration received in exchange for the value of the property transferred; (3) creating a closely-held corporation for property receipt; (4) closeness in relationship between the parties; (5) retaining the property in question for benefit or use; (6) the financial condition of the transferor and transferee both before and after the transfer(s); (7) repeated patterns or cumulative effect of courses of conduct postinsolvency or financial troubles; and (8) the timeline of events. . . The transfer of property to a spouse is a 'classic' badge of fraud. . . . Asset shifting to different corporate entities wholly owned or 'so closely assimilated' by the debtor is an additional badge of fraud.\" *In re Jie Xiao*, 608 B.R. at 157.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 29 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 29 of 39 39\n\n50. This sequence of events, established both by the voluminous record set forth in the Counterclaims and by the preclusive findings made by Justice Ostrager in his Final Contempt Decision, shows that, from the moment he first sought to purchase the Lady May, the Debtor engaged in a series of intentional transactions as part of his comprehensive efforts to judgmentproof himself by placing his valuable assets with shell companies or family members.\n\n51. First, in 2015, the Debtor used Bravo Luck Limited, an entity he controlled and shared with his son, as a pass-through to fund the purchase of the Lady May on behalf of HK International, an entity that one of the Debtor's associates (Ms. Qu) held in trust, through an undisclosed trust agreement, for the Debtor's benefit. That the funds used to purchase the Lady May came from the Debtor is supported by Justice Ostrager's finding that \"there is no evidence that [the Debtor's son] was involved with the corporate transactions leading to\" HK International's acquisition of the Lady May,\"23 and that the facts presented supported the \"reasonable inference [] that Kwok provided the funds to HK International which were used to purchase the yacht.\"24 Second, in 2017 the Debtor, for no consideration, transferred HK International itself to his daughter. Third, and finally, in 2020, the Debtor—again for no consideration—caused his alter ego HK International to transfer the Lady May to HK USA. All three of these transactions were clearly part of the Debtor's comprehensive effort to judgmentproof himself by placing his valuable assets with shell companies or family members.\n\n52. On these facts, there are two separate fraudulent transfers by the Debtor. The most obvious is the 2017 Transfer, pursuant to which the Debtor caused HK International which at the time he beneficially owned pursuant to an undisclosed trust agreement—to be\n\n23 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 1, Final Contempt Decision at 5.\n\n24 *Id.* at 4.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 30 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 30 of 39 39\n\ntransferred to his daughter for no consideration. Given the lack of any consideration, as well as the extensive evidence and findings by Justice Ostrager that the Debtor has repeatedly engaged in efforts to hide his assets from creditors, the 2017 Transfer is avoidable as an actual fraudulent transfer. *See In re Jie Xiao*, 608 B.R. at 157-58 (finding actual fraud where \"[t]he Debtor had one paramount goal: to leave himself and LXEng judgment-proof while channeling their assets to his wife, children, and extended family. His willingness to channel, transfer, and distribute those monies reveals his conscious intention and design.\").\n\n53. In the alternative, in the event the Court were to determine (despite the clear evidence to the contrary) that the Debtor did not hold a beneficial interest in HK International at the time of the 2017 Transfer, then the 2015 Transfer is avoidable as an actual fraudulent transfer. As noted above, the funds that allowed HK International to purchase the Lady May in 2015 came from the Debtor, using Bravo Luck as a pass-through. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Debtor did not own HK International at that time, then he effectively gifted the funds necessary to purchase the Lady May to HK International for no consideration. Such a transfer fits squarely into the Debtor's fraudulent \"shell game\" and is avoidable for that reason.\n\n# *i. Lady May or its Value at the time of the Transfer is Recoverable from HK USA*\n\n54. Because at least one of these transfers is avoidable, the Trustee may recover from HK USA the Lady May or its value at the time of the transfer, either because HK USA is a subsequent transferee liable under section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, or because the transactions in 2015, 2017, and 2020 can be collapsed into one transaction under the collapsing doctrine.\n\n55. Under section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee may recover fraudulently transferred property from the initial transferee or from any immediate or mediate\n\n-23-\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 31 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 31 of 39 39\n\nsubsequent transferee. The only restriction on the Trustee's ability to recover from a subsequent transferee is that such transferee must not have acquired the property for value, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §550(b). Here, HK USA did not take the Lady May for value, nor did it do so in good faith and without knowledge of the voidability of the initial transfer. Accordingly, the Trustee may recover the Lady May, or its value at the time of the transfer, 25 from HK USA under section 550(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. *See In re Wolf*, 595 B.R. 735, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018) (where there was a fraudulently transferred business, \"[t]o the extent the proceeds, products, or profits of the fraudulently transferred [] business have been plausibly alleged to have been transferred (whether formally . . . or otherwise) to other mediate or immediate transferees, those transferees are liable under section 550(a)(2)\").\n\n56. In the alternative, the Trustee may recover the Lady May directly from HK USA under the collapsing doctrine. The collapsing doctrine \"is an equitable doctrine which allows court to dispense with the structure [or] structures of a transaction or series of transactions.\" *In re Maxus Energy Corp.*, 641 B.R. 467, 532 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \"Courts have applied the collapsing transactions doctrine in cases involving fraudulent transfers to \"allow the bankruptcy court to 'collapse' various 'legs' of a transaction and deem the entire chain of transfers avoidable.\" *In re Servicom, LLC*, No. 18-31722 (AMN),\n\n25 It is likely that a luxury yacht like the Lady May has depreciated significantly since it was purchased in 2015. \"When property declines in value after the transfer, a trustee may recover the value of the property at the time of the transfer rather than the property.\" 5 Collier on Bankruptcy P 550.02 (16th 2022); *see also In re Affinity Health Care, Mgmt., Inc.*, 499 B.R. 246, 261 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013) (section 550 \"protects the trustee against attempts to impede recovery by an initial transferee and give the trustee a degree of flexibility when the actual transferee or its assets have disappeared *or when recovery of the property would not suffice, e.g., when the property has depreciated*\") (emphasis added). Accordingly, to the extent the Lady May has depreciated, the Trustee is entitled to recover an amount equal to the depreciation from HK USA's other assets, *i.e.*, its interest in the Escrowed Funds.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 32 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 32 of 39 39\n\n2021 WL 825155, at \\*15 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2021) (as modified) (internal citations omitted).26\n\n57. \"In deciding whether to collapse the transaction and impose liability on particular defendants, courts have looked frequently to the knowledge of the defendants of the structure of the entire transaction and to whether its components were part of a single scheme.\" *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This analysis considers three factors: (i) whether all of the parties involved had knowledge of the multiple transactions; (ii) whether each transaction would have occurred on its own; and (iii) whether each transaction was dependent or conditioned on other transactions. *Id.* Because \"the collapsing doctrine is rooted in equity,\" these factors should not be interpreted \"narrowly.\" *Maxus Energy*, 641 B.R. at 536. Ultimately, \"[t]o determine whether a series of transactions should be 'collapsed' and viewed as a single integrated transaction, courts focus on the substance rather than on the form of the transactions and consider the overall intent and impact of the transactions.\" *In re Jevic Holding Corp.*, No. 08-11006 BLS, 2011 WL 4345204, at \\*5 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15, 2011).\n\n58. While the collapsing doctrine treats nominally separate transactions as one, there is no requirement that every detail be planned from the very beginning of the overall scheme. *See Maxus Energy*, 641 B.R. at 536 (\"Simply because every detail of the alleged [collapsing scheme] was not determined by both [parties to the collapsing scheme] from the outset does not automatically result in this factor being unsatisfied.\"). Otherwise, parties would have \"free reign to hinder and delay creditors so long as they could strategically plan their scheme over the course\n\n26 The collapsing doctrine \"derives from federal bankruptcy law and provisions of the New York Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,\" and is, therefore, applicable to the Trustee's claims under the New York DCL and the Bankruptcy Code's own fraudulent transfer provisions in section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. *In re M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc.*, 541 F. Appx. 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2013).\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 33 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 33 of 39 39\n\nof multiple steps.\" *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Relatedly, the \"passage of some time between the various transactions sought to be collapsed is not fatal if they are sufficiently related.\" *Id.* at 532 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\n\n59. Here, as discussed above and at length in the Counterclaims, there is voluminous evidence that the Lady May was initially acquired and then transferred with actual fraudulent intent as part of a wider \"shell game\" strategy to move the Debtor's assets to Family Shell Companies, thus allowing the Debtor to live in luxury while claiming to be judgment proof. In these circumstances, there is probable cause to apply the collapsing doctrine.\n\n#### *ii. Actual Fraudulent Transfer Claims Are Within Statute of Limitations*\n\n60. Avoidance actions brought pursuant to section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code are subject to the applicable non-bankruptcy law limitations period. New York law applicable to the 2017 Transfer provides for a six-year statute of limitations to bring an actual fraud claim. *See* N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 213(8) (\"time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it\"). Accordingly, the Trustee's claim to avoid the 2017 Transfer is within the limitations period provided by New York law.27\n\n27 Courts have held that section 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code tolls the expiration of a statute of limitations when a debtor files for bankruptcy. *See In re Kellel*, No. 8-18-76679-LAS, 2022 WL 24057, at \\*3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2022) (\"As long as the statute of limitations has not expired as of the petition date, a trustee is permitted to bring New York fraudulent conveyance actions looking back six years from the petition date in accordance with section 544(b) at *any* point during the two-year period set out in section 546(a).\") (emphasis in original) (as modified) (internal references omitted); *see also In re Antex, Inc.*, 397 B.R. 168, 174 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008) (noting that \"majority of courts\" agree that as long as the applicable state's limitations period has not expired prior to the petition date, the trustee can bring a fraudulent conveyance action under § 544(b) within the time limitations set forth in § 546(a)\").\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 34 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 34 of 39 39\n\n61. Additionally, even the 2015 Transfer is within New York's statute of limitations pursuant to the 'discovery rule' applicable to intentional fraud, which \"permits a plaintiff to commence a cause of action predicated on actual fraud within two years of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered with reasonable diligence.\" *In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC*, 458 B.R. 87, 109 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing NYCPLR §§ 213(8), 203(g)). To invoke the discovery rule, a bankruptcy trustee need only identify a single creditor, or even a category or type of creditor, with \"potentially viable claims.\" *Id.*\n\n62. Here, the Debtor's own statements of financial affairs identify such creditors: the numerous creditors who have filed lawsuits against the Debtor alleging that he defrauded them.28 Those creditors would have had no reason to suspect, that the vast personal wealth the Debtor routinely boasted of was (at least on paper) a lie, and that the Debtor had fraudulently transferred (as relevant to this Application) the Lady May. *See generally*, *In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC*, 557 B.R. 89, 119 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"The question of whether a creditor exists who could not have discovered Madoff's fraud with reasonable diligence until it was revealed to the public is inherently factual but gives little pause.\").29 The existence of these creditors, whose claims arose less than two years prior to the Petition Date, allows the Trustee to assert their intentional fraudulent transfer claims pursuant to section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n28 *See* Global Notes and Statements of Limitations, Methodology, and Disclaimers Regarding the Debtor's Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statement of Financial Affairs, (March 9, 2022) Docket No. 77 (\"SOFA\") at 22-25 (response to question 9 \"[w]ithin 1 year before you filed for bankruptcy, were you a party in any lawsuit, court action, or administrative proceeding?\").\n\n29 It is the *defendant's* burden to show, at least initially, that the plaintiff should have known of or discovered the fraudulent transfer. *See Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group*, 144 A.D.3d 437, 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (\"Defendants must make a *prima facie* showing that [plaintiff] was on such inquiry notice of its fraud claims more than two years before the action was commenced.\") (internal quotations and citations omitted).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 35 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 35 of 39 39\n\n63. The 2015 Transfer is also within the statute of limitations applicable to the Trustee's rights under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code for another reason. That section gives the trustee the rights of unsecured creditors to avoid prepetition transfers. One such creditor into whose shoes the trustee may step is the IRS, and federal law grants the IRS ten years to avoid transfers under state law *without* being bound by state statutes of limitation. *See* 26 U.S.C. §§ 6502(a)(2), 6901. The Trustee, therefore, may avoid transfers as far back as ten years if the IRS holds an unsecured claim (which it does). *See In re Smith*, No. 19-40964, 2022 WL 1814415, at \\*6 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 2, 2022).\n\n64. Finally, the two year limitations period in section 548(a)(1) is no bar to the Trustee's claim under that section, because, as discussed above, there is probable cause to collapse the various transfers of the Lady May into one transfer from the Debtor to HK USA that occurred in April 2020, less than two years prior to the Petition Date. *See Maxus Energy*, 641 B.R. at 533 (describing *In re Tronox Inc.*, 503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2013), as holding \"it was appropriate to collapse the fraudulent transactions and to apply the statute of limitations from the last act that finalized the defendants' scheme\").\n\ne. Probable Cause for Trustee's Negligence Claim Against HK USA\n\n65. If the Court disagrees with the Trustee that the Debtor is the true owner of the Lady May, HK USA is still liable to the estate for removing the Lady May from the United States, thus causing the Debtor to incur \\$134 million in fines under Justice Ostrager's contempt order. The Trustee asserts a negligence claim against HK USA as a result of this conduct, and such claim is supported by probable cause.\n\n66. The elements of a negligence claim under New York law are: \"(i) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (ii) breach of that duty; and (iii) injury substantially caused by that\n\n-28-\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 36 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 36 of 39 39\n\nbreach.\" *Lombard v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, Inc.*, 280 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing *Merino v. New York City Transit Auth.*, 639 N.Y.S.2d 784, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)).\n\n67. These elements are satisfied here. Regardless of whether HK USA is the alter ego of the Debtor, HK USA owed a duty to the Debtor to exercise ordinary care and skill to refrain from injuring him. *Guido v. 1114 6th Ave. Co*., 2015 WL 1055074, at \\*15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2015) (\"all persons have a common-law duty to exercise ordinary care and skill to refrain from injuring others.\"). HK USA violated this duty because it was aware of Justice Ostrager's order, which clearly applied to HK USA as the yacht's registered owner, but it nevertheless moved the Lady May overseas and kept it there until July 2022. These facts are not in dispute; they have been admitted by the Debtor's Daughter, who testified in the State Court that \"I was aware . . . of the [March 2021 Contempt Order] requiring the Lady May to return to New York in May 2021. However, . . . I did not want the boat to travel to New York, and, after consulting with counsel, directed instead that it proceed to Europe . . . that decision was mine alone, not my father's.\"30 HK USA thus caused the Debtor to incur a contempt fine of \\$134 million, and is liable to the estate for damages in that amount.\n\n# **III. If Court Does Not Grant Prejudgment Attachment, Trustee May Never Be Able to Enforce Judgment Against Debtor**\n\n68. The amount of the Counterclaims asserted against HK USA far exceeds the combined value of the assets the Trustee seeks to attach. The Lady May is worth no more than approximately \\$32 million, and the Escrowed Funds total approximately \\$37 million. Meanwhile, the Contempt Order, which forms the basis for only the Trustee's negligence claim, alone imposes\n\n30 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 41, Mei Guo Affidavit, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 1162, at ¶ 20.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 37 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 37 of 39 39\n\n\\$134 million of liability on the Debtor.31 As a result, there is no question that the Trustee, having established probable cause, is entitled to attachment of the Lady May and HK USA's interest in the Escrowed Funds (as well as the Debtor's Daughter's interest in HK USA) to secure an eventual judgment on the Counterclaims.\n\n69. If the attachment order is not granted, a substantial risk exists that the Trustee will never be able to obtain the relief to which he is entitled. Indeed, HK USA has made it clear to this Court that as soon as it obtains the release of the Escrowed Funds pursuant to the Lady May Stipulation, it will pay those funds to Himalaya Financial, the British Virgin Islands entity, closely associated with the Debtor's cryptocurrency schemes, that purportedly lent the \\$37 million to HK USA in highly unusual circumstances (as noted above and discussed in greater detail in the Counterclaims).32 A hearing on the establishment of a repair reserve under the Lady May Stipulation is now scheduled for October 7, 2022. If HK USA is successful in obtaining a court order establishing the reserve and complying with other conditions of the Lady May Stipulation, HK USA may be able to obtain the release of the Escrowed Funds soon thereafter.33 There can be little doubt that, as soon as the Escrowed Funds are released, they will be wired overseas.\n\n70. Further, while the Lady May Stipulation requires that the Lady May remain in Connecticut waters,34 the Debtor and HK USA have a history of violating court orders by taking\n\n31 The Trustee reserves all rights with regards to the allowability and plan treatment of this, and any other, claim.\n\n32 *See HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC'S Motion for Order Establishing Repair Reserve for The Lady May*, Docket No. 728 at ¶ 19.\n\n33 Lady May Stipulation, ¶ 7 (\"Upon satisfaction of the Delivery Obligation, the Debtor and HK USA and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well as any and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with HK USA and the Debtor, including, but not limited to, the Captain and Yachtzoo SARL (collectively, the \"HK USA Parties\"), shall keep and maintain at all times the Lady May physically present in the navigable waters of Connecticut, subject to the provisions of this Order and any further order of this Court upon motion of any party-in-interest, and entered after notice and a hearing.\").\n\n34 *Id.* ¶ 3 (requiring \"declaration made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by the Captain and Yachtzoo SARL consenting that each shall be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to this Order, acknowledging\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 38 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 38 of 39 39\n\nand keeping the Lady May overseas. The Debtor's disrespect and \"contempt for . . . the judicial process\"35 is well known, evidenced by, among other things, the Debtor's penchant for violating court orders36 and misleading courts.37 There is thus a material risk that the Debtor may violate yet another court order and again take the *Lady May* overseas.\n\n71. Accordingly, to protect the creditors of this estate, it is imperative that the Court enter the requested prejudgment relief.\n\n# **NO PRIOR REQUEST**\n\n72. The Trustee has not previously sought the relief requested herein from this or any other court.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nthat they are bound by the provisions of this Order which are applicable to them including specifically that they are restrained from removing the Lady May from the navigable waters of Connecticut\").\n\n35 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 1, Final Contempt Decision at 7.\n\n36 *See, e.g.*, Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 62, May 27, 2021 Tr. at 16:8-9, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 833 (\"Mr. Kwok flaunts the Court's orders at will.\").\n\n37 *See* Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 49, Tr. at 21:13-16, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 647 (\"The Court believes . . . that Mr. Kwok has attempted to mislead the Court. The Court believes that Mr. Kwok is, as the plaintiff contends, playing a shell game with his assets, and has violated if not the letter of court orders, the spirit of court orders.\"); *Id.* 26:3-8 (\"[O]rders of the Court are either flaunted or exceedingly liberally interpreted, and . . . intentional or unintentional misstatements that have misled the Court have been made to the Court.\").\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 39 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 39 of 39 39\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests entry of the\n\nProposed Order granting the relief requested in this Motion and such other relief as is just and\n\nproper.\n\nDated: September 23, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett *(pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft *(pro hac vice* pending) Douglass Barron (*pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： :\n:\n第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）， :\n:\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 :\n\n-----------------------------------------------------x-----\nHK International Funds Investments\n(USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）\n原告 :\n:\n:\n对抗程序案号：22-05003\n诉\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）\n被告 :\n:\n:\n2022年9月23日\n\n第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平）\n反诉原告\n诉\nHK International Funds Investments :\n\n(USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）及 Mei Guo（郭美）\n反诉被告。\n-------------------------------------------------------x :\n\n第11章受托人根据《联邦破产程序规则》第7064条及《康涅狄格州一般法规》第52-278D条就申请判决前救济所提交的支持备忘录\n目录\n\n初步陈述\n背景\n\n管辖权及审判地\n\n请求的救济 5\n论证 6\nI. 适用的法律标准 6\nII. 存在受托人将在反诉请求中胜诉的合理可能性 8\nIII. 如法院不准予判决前扣押，受托人可能永远无法\n对债务人执行判决书 29\n此前未提出请求 31\n判例\n\nIn re Affinity Health Care, Mgmt., Inc.,\n499 B.R. 246 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013)\nIn re AMC Invs., LLC,\n524 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015)10\nIn re Andersen,\n166 B.R. 516 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994)\n\nAnderson v. Nedovich,\n561 A.2d 948 (1989)7\nIn re Antex, Inc.,\n397 B.R. 168 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008)26\nAntique Ford Found. v. I.R.S., Dep't of Treasury, U.S.,\n791 F. Supp. 1450 (D. Mont. 1992)18\nAozora Bank, Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group,\n144 A.D.3d 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)\n\nASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp.,\n396 B.R. 278 (S.D. Tex. 2008)\n\nAshley v. Ashley,\n393 A.2d 637 (Pa. 1978)15\nASPIC, LLC v. Poitier,\n179 Conn. App. 631, 181 A.3d 593 (Conn. 2018)7\nIn re B.L. Jennings, Inc.,\n373 B.R. 742 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007)\n\nIn re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,\n458 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)27\nIn re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC,\n557 B.R. 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)27\nBlair v. Infineon Tech., AG,\n720 F. Supp.2d 462 (D. Del. 2010)15\n（续）\n\nCarol v. Madison\nPlaza Apartment Corp.,\nNo. 156730/13, 2014 WL 6471482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 2014)11\n\nCIT Bank N.A. v. Donovan,\n856 F. App'x 335, 337 (2d Cir. 2021)\n\nCody v. United States,\n348 F.Supp.2d 682 (E.D. Va. 2004)\n\nColeman v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A.,\n136 N.Y.S.3d 911 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 2021), appeal dismissed,\n175 N.E.3d\n923 (2021)9, 12\nIn re Combes,\n382 B.R. 186 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008)20\nCrystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,\n333 F. Supp. 3d 380(D. Del. 2018), aff'd and remanded, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir.\n2019)\n\nDaer Holdings, LLC v. Menchise (In re Steffen),\nNo. 8:13-CV-1700-T-27, 2014 WL 11428827 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014)18\nDeutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Juchniewich,\nNo. FSTCV166028759S, 2017 WL 1194769 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2017)\n\nIn re Dordevic,\n633 B.R. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021)\n18, 19\nEhrlich for Hoffmans Trade Grp. LLC v. Com. Factors of Atlanta,\n567 B.R. 684 (N.D.N.Y. 2017)20\nIn re First Connecticut Consulting Grp., Inc.,\nNo. 04-101, 2004 WL 1676211 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 27, 2004), aff'd, 340 B.R.\n210 (D. Vt. 2006), aff'd, 254 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2007)\n19, 22\nG&F Assocs. No. 3 v. Montville Realty P'ship, LLC,\nNo. CV136017417, 2013 WL 7020528 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2013)7\nGreenwich Life Settlements, Inc. v. ViaSource Funding Grp., LLC,\n742 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)9\nGuido v. 1114 6th Ave. Co.,\n2015 WL 1055074 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2015)\n\n（续）\n\nHarlem Bus. Ctr. v. Rothenberg,\n205 N.Y.S. 353 (App. Term 1924)\nIn re Integrity Graphics, Inc.,\n623 B.R. 21 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)\n20, 21\nJ.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC,\n71 A.3d 492 (Conn. 2013)\n\nIn re Jevic Holding Corp.,\nNo. 08-11006 BLS, 2011 WL 4345204 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15,\n2011)25\nIn re Jie Xiao,\n608 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019)\n20, 21, 23\nKatcher v. 3V Cap. Partners LP,\nNo. X05CV085008383S, 2011 WL 1105724 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2011)\n\nIn re Kellel,\nNo. 8-18-76679-LAS, 2022 WL 24057 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2022)26\nKenwell Trading Ltd. v. Porcelen Ltd. CT LLC,\nNo. 3:22-CV-00248 (KAD), 2022 WL 3359159 (D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2022)6\nLiberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc.,\n967 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009)\n\nLiButti v. United States,\n968 F. Supp. 71 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 178 F.3d 114\n(2d Cir. 1999)18\nLombard v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, Inc.,\n280 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2002)29\nIn re LXEng LLC,\n607 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019)\n\nIn re M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc.,\n541 F. Appx. 55 (2d Cir. 2013)25\nIn re Maxus Energy Corp.,\n641 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022)24, 25, 26, 28\n（续）\n\nPAX v. Kwok,\nIndex No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)4, 29, 31\n\nPlymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC,\n988 F.3d 634 (2d Cir. 2021)10\nPope v. Enzo Biochem, Inc.,\n432 F. App'x 7 (2d Cir. 2011)\n\nRevital Realty Grp., LLC v. Kalmon Dolgin Affiliates, Inc.,\n981 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)11\nSec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,\n631 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)20\nIn re Servicom, LLC,\nNo. 18-31722 (AMN), 2021 WL 825155 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2021)24, 25\nIn re Smith,\nNo. 19-40964, 2022 WL 1814415 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 2, 2022)28\nStockton v. Lansiquot,\n838 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1988)\n\nTahirou v. New Horizon Enterprises, LLC,\nNo. 3:20-CV-00281 (SVN), 2022 WL 510044 (D. Conn. Feb. 21, 2022)\n6, 7\nIn re Tronox Inc.,\n503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2013)28\nUniversal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Frankel,\n538 F. App'x 267 (4th Cir. 2013)\n\nUniversitas Educ., LLC v. Benistar,\nNo. 3:20-CV-00738 (JAM), 2021 WL 965794 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021)14\nIn re Wolf,\n595 B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)\n\nIn re\nWyly,\n607 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018)19\n\n11 U.S.C.\n\n§ 5444, 20\n§ 544(b)26, 27, 28\n§ 546(a)26\n§ 5484, 20, 25\n§ 548(a)(1)\n\n§ 548(a)(1)(A)20\n§ 5504, 20, 24\n§ 550(a)23\n§ 550(a)(2)\n\n§ 550(b)24\n\n26 U.S.C.\n§ 6502(a)(2)\n\n§ 690128\n28 U.S.C.\n§ 1575\n§ 157(b)5\n§ 13345\n§ 14085\n§ 14095\n§ 174630\n\nConn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-278d (West)6\n《康涅狄格州判决前救济法》\n§ 52-278d(a)(4)6\n§ 52-278d(d)1, 6\n§ 52-278d(e)6\n§ 52-278d et seq1\n§ 52-278d(f)\nN.Y. Civ. Prac. Law\n§ 203(g)27\n§ 213(8)26, 27\nN.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 27620\n《纽约州统一欺诈性转让法》\nLuc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平）先生，以在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（下称“债务人”）第11章案件（下称“第11章案件”）中获指定的第11章受托人（下称“受托人”）身份，现根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第64条、《联邦破产程序规则》（下称“《破产规则》”）第7064条及《康涅狄格州一般法规》第52-278d条及以下条款（下称“《康涅狄格州判决前救济法》”），提交本备忘录以支持其申请（下称“本申请”），请求对以下主体采取判决前救济：(i) HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）（下称“HK USA”），即上述标题所列对抗程序（下称“对抗程序”）中的原告及反诉被告；以及(ii) Mei Guo（郭美）（下称“债务人的女儿”），即该对抗程序中的反诉被告。1 为支持本备忘录，2 受托人陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 债务人及其家人以巨额开支积极抗辩，维持债务人作为无法执行判决的亿万富翁的身份；该债务人能够享受巨额财富的一切排场，却无需承担偿还其债权人的任何责任。该策略在本对抗程序中仍在继续，其中，据称由债务人的女儿拥有的公司HK USA主张，Lady May——一艘豪华游艇，在购置时价值近$32 million3——属于HK USA，而不属于债务人的第11章财产。HK\n\n1 受托人还根据§ 52-278d(d)提出动议，请求作出命令，要求HK USA及债务人的女儿披露其拥有权益的财产。\n\n2 本文中使用但未另行定义的首字母大写术语，应具有与同期提交的《第11章受托人答辩及反诉请求》（下称“答辩及反诉请求”）中赋予其的含义。\n\n3 Lady May的售卖契据日期为February 23, 2015，其中列明购置价格为€28,000,000.00；以February 23, 2015适用的汇率（每欧元1.1333美元）相乘，等于$31,732,400.00。见《答辩及反诉请求》，附件36，与Lady May出售有关的出售文件，第1页（售卖契据）。\n\nUSA的立场与事实不符。正如 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）的 Ostrager 法官（下称“州法院”）已经裁定的，案卷清楚表明，Lady May的受益所有人和控制人是债务人，而非HK USA。因此，HK USA在本对抗程序中的主张完全毫无依据。\n\n2. 相比之下，受托人对HK USA提出了数项有充分依据的反诉请求（下称“反诉请求”）。反诉请求主张，除其他事项外，HK USA是债务人的另一个自我，或由债务人在衡平法上拥有；HK USA通过实际欺诈性转让取得Lady May；以及HK USA对债务人实施了过失侵权，从而损害了其财产。这些反诉请求使受托人有权获得相当于或高于HK USA本身和／或其已知资产价值的救济，包括Lady May以及HK USA根据关于Lady May返回美国的April 29, 2022协议[Docket No. 299]（下称“Lady May协议”）存入托管账户（下称“托管资金”）的资金——原为$37 million。4\n\n3. 根据本申请，受托人寻求根据《康涅狄格州判决前救济法》作出判决前扣押命令，对以下对象实施扣押：(i) 债务人的女儿，据称由其持有的HK USA所有权权益；以及(ii) HK USA，(a) Lady May及(b) HK USA对托管资金的权益。该判决前救济对于确保受托人可获得资产以满足其最终判决至关重要。事实上，案卷清楚表明，债务人将不择手段地保护其财富免受债权人追索；州法院已认定，债务人是“一名自称的数十亿美元富翁\n\n4 如本法院所确认，受托人并非Lady May协议的一方。见，例如，《答辩及反诉请求》，附件89，Aug. 30, 2022庭审记录第18:6-9页（“[O]bviously the trustee -- the trustee was not a party to any of this. He was not in the case when the parties agreed to forego a hearing on relief from stay and a ruling on relief from stay.”）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 876-3 Filed 09/24/22 Entered 09/24/22 18:59:04 Page 10 of Case 22-05003 Doc 38 Filed 09/23/22 Entered 09/23/22 20:14:42 Page 10 of 39 39\n\n[其]为逃避债权人，已将其资产藏匿于由公司实体及家庭成员构成的迷宫之中。”因此，存在真实风险：如受托人现在不扣押HK USA据称拥有的资产，待本诉讼结束时，该等资产将早已不复存在。\n\n4. 受托人轻易满足《康涅狄格州判决前救济法》的要求，即其必须证明其反诉请求具有“合理可能性”。反诉请求有详细的事实主张以及对本程序和其他程序中案卷证据的引用作为支持，清晰展现了HK USA的责任。在本法院就本申请作出裁定时应当作出的、有利于受托人的合理推论下，毫无疑问受托人已证明其有权获得所请求的扣押。\n\n5. 具体而言，就反诉请求中的第一项罪名项而言，受托人已确立相当理由，证明其有权基于 HK USA 与负债人共同广泛参与州法院与 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）之间的诉讼（以下简称“州法院诉讼”）所产生的争议排除，获得一项确认 Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）属于破产财团财产的判决。正如 Ostrager 法官在州法院诉讼中所认定，依据“明确且令人信服”的证据——包括据称拥有 HK USA 的负债人女儿的证词——负债人“实益拥有并控制”Lady May。HK USA 现不得在本院就同一问题再次进行诉讼。\n\n6. 受托人在其反诉请求第二项罪名项中还表明，其有权获得一项确认 HK USA 为负债人另我、因而 HK USA 的全部财产——而非仅 Lady May——均属于破产财团财产的判决。法院在确定某实体是否为另我时考量的所有关键因素，在此均已满足。HK USA 是一家没有独立存在的控股公司，负债人一贯将其作为其“障眼法”的一部分加以操纵，以便将有价值资产置于其女儿名义上持有之下，而其本人继续\n\n-3-\n案件 22-50073 文件 876-3 提交日期 09/24/22 录入日期 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 11 页；案件 22-05003 文件 38 提交日期 09/23/22 录入日期 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 11 页，共 39 页\n\n使用并享有该等资产。反诉请求中指称的这些及其他事实，完全足以确立 HK USA 的另我地位。\n\n7. 作为替代，如果 HK USA 并非负债人的另我，受托人已确立相当理由，证明如反诉请求第三项罪名项所述，HK USA 是实际欺诈性转让的受让人，受托人现可依据《破产法典》第 544、548 和 550 条撤销并追回该等转让。具体而言，证据表明，2017 年，负债人促成将其对 HK International 的所有权权益（该公司当时拥有 Lady May）以仅 $1.00 的对价转让给其女儿。该项实质上无对价的转让伴随着众多其他欺诈迹象，毫无疑问，负债人实施该项转让是其为逃避债权人而进行的“障眼法”的一部分。\n\n8. 最后，如第四项罪名项所述，受托人还因 HK USA 公然违反 Ostrager 法官作出的命令（以下简称“2020 年 10 月限制令”）而对 HK USA 提出过失请求；该命令：(i) 禁止负债人“和/或”Lady May 的登记所有人将 Lady May 驶离美国5；以及 (ii) 若 Lady May 离开美国，则每日对负债人处以 $500,000 罚款。HK USA 知悉该命令，但其及其代表仍促使 Lady May 离开美国，截至 February 7, 2022 已达 268 日。因此，Ostrager 法官作出其 February 9, 2022 决定及命令（以下简称“最终藐视法庭决定”），对负债人处以约 $134 million 的藐视法庭罚款，据称现由破产财团承担责任。HK USA 既已导致该等罚款，便应基于其过失向破产财团承担相当于该等罚款金额的责任。\n\n5 见答辩及反诉请求，证据 50，PAX v. Kwok，Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)，NYSCEF Doc. No. 630，第 1 页决定及命令（着重号系后加）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 876-3 提交日期 09/24/22 录入日期 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 12 页；案件 22-05003 文件 38 提交日期 09/23/22 录入日期 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 12 页，共 39 页\n\n9. 支持上述各项请求的证据已与本文件同时提交。为明确起见，尽管受托人已轻易满足其每项反诉请求的相当理由标准，本院仅需认定其中一项反诉请求存在相当理由，即足以支持本申请。受托人绰有余裕地满足该举证责任，因此，本申请应予准许。\n\n背景\n\n10. 受托人通过援引方式纳入受托人与本文件同时提交的答辩及反诉请求中所载事实。\n\n管辖权与审判地\n\n11. 本院依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 以及 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）作出的移送常设命令（经修订），对本事项具有管辖权。本案属于 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) 所称的核心程序。依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适当审判地。\n\n12. 本文所请求救济的法定依据为《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 64 条、《破产规则》第 7064 条以及《康涅狄格州判决前救济法》。\n\n请求的救济\n\n13. 受托人根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 64 条、《破产规则》第 7064 条以及《康涅狄格州判决前救济法》，在本申请及本支持备忘录中请求对 HK USA 实施判决前查封。具体而言，受托人请求作出命令，查封据称由 HK USA 拥有、但实际上属于破产财团财产且应可供负债人的债权人使用和/或应移交给受托人的某些资产。该等资产为 Lady May 游艇及 HK USA 对约 $37 million 的托管资金所享有的权益。由于据称由负债人女儿拥有的 HK USA 实际上亦属于破产财团财产，受托人还请求查封 HK USA 的所有权权益。\n\n论证\n\nI. 适用的法律标准\n\n14. 根据康涅狄格州法律，审理判决前救济请求的法院应将其审查限于以下三项因素：“(1) 是否存在相当理由相信，考虑任何抗辩、反诉请求或抵销后，本案将作出有利于原告、金额等于或高于所请求判决前救济金额的判决；(2) 针对被告可能作出的任何判决的支付是否已由保险充分保障；(3) 拟受判决前救济约束的财产是否免于执行。”7 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-278d (West).8\n\n15. “相当理由是对依法构成诉讼所必需事实存在的善意相信，该等事实足以使具有通常谨慎、审慎和判断力的人在该等情形下形成此种相信。”Tahirou v. New Horizon Enterprises, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00281 (SVN), 2022 WL 510044, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 21, 2022)（省略内部引号和引文）。“这是一项灵活的常识性标准，不要求该相信正确，或更可能为真而非为假。”同上（省略内部引号和引文）。“相当理由标准比要求基于优势证据，甚至基于胜诉可能性作出认定的标准要求更低。”同上（着重号系后加）（省略内部引号和引文）。\n\n16. Connecticut Supreme Court（康涅狄格州最高法院）将相当理由标准与驳回动议的抗辩标准相比较，解释称，其审查判决前救济命令时，“以最有利于原告的角度审视证据。”J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 71 A.3d 492, 510 (Conn. 2013)；另见 ASPIC, LLC v. Poitier, 179 Conn. App. 631, 640, 181 A.3d 593, 598 (Conn. 2018)（“除非存在明显错误……我们不会推翻判决前救济命令，并且以最有利于原告的角度审视证据。”）（引自 J.E. Robert Co., 71 A.3d 492）。\n\n17. 出于同一原因，判决前救济申请人有权获得由所确认事实和证据支持的合理推论。见 G&F Assocs. No. 3 v. Montville Realty P'ship, LLC, No. CV136017417, 2013 WL 7020528, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2013)（基于“听证中的证据，包括由此得出的合理推论”准许判决前救济）；Katcher v. 3V Cap. Partners LP, No. X05CV085008383S, 2011 WL 1105724, at *21 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2011)（同）；Anderson v. Nedovich, 561 A.2d 948, 949 (1989)（“此外，事实裁判者有权根据已证明的事实作出合理推论。”）。\n\n18. 与适用于申请人的灵活且易于满足的相当理由标准相反，“对抗辩判决前救济申请的一方适用更高标准。”Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Juchniewich, No. FSTCV166028759S, 2017 WL 1194769, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2017)。由于该法规为申请人规定了具体的（且较低的）相当理由标准，却“未规定 PJR 申请抗辩的证明标准”，法院认定，该法规允许提出的抗辩、反诉请求或抵销的证明标准“是优势证据标准。”同上，第 *7 页（省略内部引文）。\n\n19. 总而言之，虽然受托人确信其最终将在审判中适用的更严格优势证据标准下，就其每项反诉请求胜诉，但在现阶段，受托人仅须证明其将胜诉具有“相当理由”——该标准甚至不要求其在反诉请求中具有 51% 的胜诉可能性。在满足该标准时，受托人有权获得其证据所支持的合理推论，并有权使证据以最有利于其的角度予以审视。另一方面，HK USA 在证明抗辩、反诉请求或抵销时不得依赖相当理由标准，而必须满足优势证据标准。\n\n20. 基于下述理由，受托人已轻易满足适用标准，并有权获得针对 HK USA 的判决前救济。\n\nII. 存在相当理由相信受托人将就反诉请求胜诉\n\n21. 受托人基于四项主要且彼此独立的理论，对HK USA（美国HK公司）提出反诉请求：(a) 根据争点排除原则，债务人为Lady May（“五月女士”号游艇）的所有人（罪名项 I）；(b) 根据另一自我理论或其他衡平原则，债务人是HK USA（包括其全部资产，即Lady May及$37 million的托管资金）的真实所有人（罪名项 II和III）；(c) HK USA通过实际欺诈性转让取得Lady May（罪名项 IV）；以及(d) HK USA对债务人实施了过失侵权，致使债务人就最终藐视法庭裁定及其他适用损害赔偿承担$134 million的责任，从而使破产财产对HK USA产生至少$134 million的请求权（罪名项 V）。有合理根据认为，受托人将在上述每项理论上胜诉。\n\na. 存在合理根据认为Lady May属于债务人的财产\n\n22. 在其最终藐视法庭裁定中，Justice Ostrager（奥斯特拉格法官）认定债务人“享有Lady May的实益所有权并对其实施控制。”9 该认定既(i)根据争点排除原则阻却HK USA主张Lady May的所有权，亦(ii)最终确定受托人将就债务人拥有Lady May的主张胜诉。\n\n23. 由于最终藐视法庭裁定由纽约州法院作出，本院应适用关于争点排除的纽约州法律。参见Greenwich Life Settlements, Inc.（格林尼治人寿和解公司） v. ViaSource Funding Grp., LLC（ViaSource融资集团有限责任公司）, 742 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)（“为确定州法院判决的效力，联邦法院……必须适用作出判决之州的排除法。”）（省略内部引文）；另参见CIT Bank N.A.（CIT国家银行） v. Donovan（多诺万）, 856 F. App'x 335, 337 (2d Cir. 2021)（“根据《完全信任与承认法》，28 U.S.C. § 1738，联邦法院必须将纽约州争点排除（抵触禁止）法适用于纽约州法院判决。”）。\n\n24. 根据纽约州法律，争点排除（或争点先决）原则阻却一方当事人在后续诉讼中重新争议已在先前诉讼中提出，并已对该方当事人或与其具有利害关系者作出不利裁决的争点。Coleman（科尔曼） v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A.（摩根大通银行）, 136 N.Y.S.3d 911, 932 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 2021), appeal dismissed, 175 N.E.3d 923 (2021)。具体而言，在以下情形中，争点排除禁止重新争议某一争点：(1)相同争点在先前诉讼中已被必然裁决，且对本案具有决定性；以及(2)被阻却重新争议该争点的一方当事人，在先前诉讼中曾获得充分且公平的机会就该争点进行诉讼。参见Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P.（普利茅斯风险合伙人II有限合伙企业） v. GTR Source, LLC（GTR来源有限责任公司）, 988 F.3d 634, 642 (2d Cir. 2021)（适用纽约州法律）。\n\n9 答辩及反诉请求，证据1，最终藐视法庭裁定，第7页。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 876-3 提交 09/24/22 登记 09/24/22 18:59:04 第17页；案件 22-05003 文档 38 提交 09/23/22 登记 09/23/22 20:14:42 第17页，共39页\n\n1. 州法院诉讼中裁决的相同争点\n\n25. 争点排除分析的第一要件——相同争点是否已在州法院诉讼中被必然裁决——涉及的问题是，先前法院作出的哪些事实认定将被赋予排除效力。就此，已有裁决认为，如某些争点属于“一项认定的必要要素”，则该等争点即被“必然确定”；并且，“即使是在作出决定时仅被默示依赖的事实争点，也可被赋予排除效力。同样，如事实争点有助于确立一项请求权，则其具有‘决定性’。”In re AMC Invs., LLC（AMC投资有限责任公司破产案）, 524 B.R. 62, 78 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015)（适用纽约州法律）。\n\n26. 本案中，争点排除将适用于Justice Ostrager裁决的众多事实争点。最明显的是，争点排除将适用于Justice Ostrager关于Lady May由债务人享有实益所有权并实施控制的最终认定。如反诉请求中所述，这是上诉分庭要求Justice Ostrager解决的核心问题，且为Justice Ostrager作出最终藐视法庭裁定所必需裁决。仅此认定即表明，存在合理根据认为受托人将就债务人而非HK USA拥有Lady May的主张胜诉。\n\n27. 此外，争点排除亦应适用于Justice Ostrager在最终藐视法庭裁定中作出的众多其他附属认定；如反诉请求中更详细所述，该等认定包括：债务人作为其计划的一部分，将资产转移给空壳公司和家庭成员，以“主张尽管其生活奢华，他没有任何资产。”10 这些认定是Justice Ostrager作出裁决时所依赖的若干其他认定之一，并有力支持受托人在本案中的立场，即Lady May的真实所有人为债务人，而非其女儿或HK USA。\n\n2. HK USA在州法院获得了充分且公平的诉讼机会\n\n28. 根据纽约州法律，如先前诉讼的非当事人与先前诉讼的一方当事人具有利害关系，则该非当事人被视为曾获得充分且公平的诉讼机会，因而受争点排除约束。参见Revital Realty Grp., LLC（Revital房地产集团有限责任公司） v. Kalmon Dolgin Affiliates, Inc.（卡尔蒙·多尔金关联公司）, 981 N.Y.S.2d 638, 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)（“争点排除原则‘阻却一方当事人在后续诉讼中重新争议已在先前诉讼中明确提出，并已对该方当事人或与其具有利害关系者作出不利裁决的争点。’”）（省略内部引文）（着重号为后加）。本案中，HK USA在州法院诉讼中与债务人具有利害关系，因而在Lady May所有权问题上受争点排除约束。\n\n29. “在争点排除的语境中，具有利害关系的一方，是指‘其与先前诉讼一方当事人之间存在某种关系，以致其在后续程序中的自身权利或义务，以某种方式取决于先前诉讼一方当事人的权利，或源自该等权利。’”同上（引自Juan C.（胡安·C.） v. Cortines（科尔蒂内斯）, 89 N.Y.2d 659, 667 (1997)）。为争点排除目的而确定利害关系的概念，“要求对先前诉讼中当事人与非当事人之间实际关系的事实和情形进行灵活分析”，Carol（卡罗尔） v. Madison Plaza Apartment Corp.（麦迪逊广场公寓公司）, No. 156730/13, 2014 WL 6471482, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 2014)，其核心问题在于“非当事人的利益是否得到充分代表”。Pope（波普） v. Enzo Biochem, Inc.（恩佐生物化学公司）, 432 F. App'x 7, 10 (2d Cir. 2011)（适用纽约州法律）。\n\n10 答辩及反诉请求，证据1，最终藐视法庭裁定，第1页。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 876-3 提交 09/24/22 登记 09/24/22 18:59:04 第19页；案件 22-05003 文档 38 提交 09/23/22 登记 09/23/22 20:14:42 第19页，共39页\n\n30. 在多种情形下，如当事人之间因共同目标和/或密切的法律、财务或家庭关系而显然利益一致，法院已认定该等当事人为争点排除目的而具有利害关系。参见，例如，Coleman, 136 N.Y.S.3d at 932（维持下级法院的认定，即一方当事人不得通过争点排除重新请求确认不动产产权，因“其利益由其妻子代表，其妻子系先前止赎诉讼的被告。”）（省略内部引号）；Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc.（环球家具国际公司） v. Frankel（弗兰克尔）, 538 F. App'x 267, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2013)（一名个人被争点排除，不得重新争议其与兄弟及商业合伙人共同所有并共同控制的公司在第一次审判中已解决的争点，因其系该公司的共同所有人和共同控制人，并在先前诉讼中发挥实质性作用）。\n\n31. 本案中，反诉请求所载记录清楚表明，债务人与HK USA因其密切关系及共同的法律和财务目标而具有利害关系。据称，HK USA由债务人的女儿拥有并控制，因此债务人与HK USA之间存在密切的家庭关系。此外，HK USA与债务人具有相同利益。二者均在州法院诉讼中主张并辩称，Lady May由HK USA而非债务人拥有和控制。现在也是如此，因为债务人的律师已表示，债务人在本对抗程序中与HK USA完全立场一致。参见答辩及反诉请求，证据91，Aug. 1, 2022庭审记录39:3-8（“[债务人]的立场是，HK [USA]拥有该船，因此[债务人与HK USA]之间不存在对立。他不认为自己拥有该船。他不认为该船是破产财产。我将毫不含糊地在记录中如此表明。因此，如果他们持有相同立场，我不明白他们如何能够彼此对立。”）。基于上述理由，为争点排除目的，债务人与HK USA在州法院诉讼期间具有利害关系。\n\n32. 即使HK USA在州法院诉讼中并未与债务人正式具有利害关系，众多州的法院仍准许对如下当事人适用争点排除：该等当事人虽不与先前诉讼的一方当事人具有利害关系，但因其在先前诉讼中出庭并公开、积极参与，仍受先前裁决约束。参见Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.（利宝互助保险公司） v. Lone Star Indus., Inc.（孤星工业公司）, 967 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2009)（“康涅狄格州及其姐妹州关于争点排除和既判力领域的判例法均明确表明，……适用既判力原则时，受先前裁判约束的一方不必是该先前诉讼的正式当事人，亦不必与正式当事人具有利害关系。如其对争议标的享有利益，并公开、积极参与了导致对有关诉因作出判决的先前诉讼部分，即属充分。”）（省略内部引号）；Stockton（斯托克顿） v. Lansiquot（兰西科）, 838 F.2d 1545, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988)（“佛罗里达州法律已确立，即使后续诉讼的一方当事人并非先前诉讼的具名当事人，只要其参与第一次程序，仍受先前判决约束。”）（省略内部引号）；Harlem Bus. Ctr.（哈莱姆商业中心） v. Rothenberg（罗森伯格）, 205 N.Y.S. 353, 353 (App. Term 1924)（“既判事项原则适用于先前裁判的直接当事人之外时，要求第三人必须与先前诉讼一方具有利害关系，或有权控制诉讼的进行，或曾被通知参加诉讼，或者可能曾以公开且众所周知的积极方式实际参与诉讼的进行。”）。\n\n33. 本案中，反诉请求所载记录清楚表明，HK USA曾公开、积极参与州法院诉讼。HK USA在州法院诉讼中出庭，反对PAX（PAX）提出的、以如下理由请求作出最终藐视法庭裁定的动议。\n\nHK USA（美国香港公司）的财产权益正因该动议而受到影响。11 随后，HK USA协助债务人在就Lady May（“五月夫人”号）所有权举行的证据听证中进行抗辩，提交了代表辩方出庭的五名证人中的四名，包括债务人的女儿——据称为HK USA所有人的人士。此外，HK USA的律师与债务人在州法院诉讼中的律师均由同一与债务人有关联的空壳公司Golden Spring（“金泉”公司）支付费用（现今，HK USA与债务人在本第11章案件中由同一家律师事务所代理）。基于所有这些理由，HK USA因参与该诉讼而受州法院认定的约束。\nb. 有合理根据认定HK USA系债务人的另一个自我\n\n34. 受托人主张，HK USA实质上是债务人的另一个自我，因此，HK USA的全部资产均应视为破产财团财产并移交受托人。受托人已基于大量事实确立支持该主张的合理根据，这些事实表明HK USA并无独立存在，而是债务人用于其向债权人隐匿资产计划的一家空壳公司。\n\n35. 根据特拉华州法律，在确定一个实体是否为另一个实体的另一个自我时，12 法院必须着重考虑：(1) 相关实体是否作为单一经济单位运作；以及(2) 是否存在整体性的不公或不公平因素。就前者而言，特拉华州法院考量多项因素，包括：(i) 公司是否资本充足；(ii) 公司是否具有偿付能力；(iii) 是否遵守公司形式要件；(iv) 控股股东是否抽取公司资金；以及(v) 一般而言，公司是否充当控股股东的门面。见 Blair v. Infineon Tech., AG, 720 F. Supp.2d 462, 470-71 (D. Del. 2010)。该“因素清单并非穷尽，且任何单一因素均不具有决定性。”同上，第471页。\n\n11 答辩及反诉，证据90，Vartan声明第4段。\n\n12 由于HK USA是特拉华州实体，特拉华州法律适用于另一个自我/揭开公司面纱主张。见，例如，Universitas Educ., LLC v. Benistar, No. 3:20-CV-00738 (JAM), 2021 WL 965794, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021)（“[B]ecause [defendant] is incorporated in Delaware, I must apply Delaware law to decide if it may be subject to an alter ego claim for reverse veil piercing liability.”）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 876-3 提交 09/24/22 录入 09/24/22 18:59:04 第22页；案件 22-05003 文书 38 提交 09/23/22 录入 09/23/22 20:14:42 第22页，共39页 第22页\n\n资金；以及(v) 一般而言，公司是否充当控股股东的门面。见 Blair v. Infineon Tech., AG, 720 F. Supp.2d 462, 470-71 (D. Del. 2010)。该“因素清单并非穷尽，且任何单一因素均不具有决定性。”同上，第471页。\n\n36. 多家法院已说明，对据称独立实体的财产或资产拥有控制权及/或所有权，是该实体实为控制方另一个自我的证据。例如，在ASARCO案中，法院适用特拉华州法律，认定债务人与其子公司作为单一经济单位运作，部分原因是“[子公司]唯一资产产生的股息直接流向[债务人]——其控股股东，后者对该等资金拥有完全控制权。”ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 320 (S.D. Tex. 2008)（强调系后加）。在Crystallex案中，法院说明，如控制实体对该机构拥有广泛控制权，包括其“将该机构的财产作为其自身财产使用”，则该据称独立的机构将被视为另一个自我。Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 401(D. Del. 2018), aff'd and remanded, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2019).13 其他法院亦作出类似裁定。见，例如，Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (Pa. 1978)（“我们曾指出，凡控制公司者利用该控制权，或利用公司资产，来促进其自身个人利益时，独立公司身份的拟制可被适当地忽略。”）（强调系后加）；In re B.L. Jennings, Inc., 373 B.R. 742, 759 n. 10 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007)（“合伙企业及其他商业实体亦可被认定为对其资产拥有控制权或支配权者的‘另一个自我’”）（强调系后加）。14\n\n13 Crystallex法院适用的是所谓“Bancec标准”，即专门在确定政府机构是否为设立该机构的主权国家之另一个自我的情形下形成的另一个自我检验标准，该标准“依据联邦普通法发展而来。”Crystallex, 333 F.Supp. 3d at 396。然而，“Bancec标准实际上最类似于许多州所适用的‘另一个自我’或‘揭开公司面纱’标准。”同上。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 876-3 提交 09/24/22 录入 09/24/22 18:59:04 第23页；案件 22-05003 文书 38 提交 09/23/22 录入 09/23/22 20:14:42 第23页，共39页 第23页\n\n以及其他商业实体亦可被认定为对其资产拥有控制权或支配权者的“另一个自我”）（强调系后加）。14\n\n37. 在本案中，案卷材料为受托人关于另一个自我的主张提供了压倒性支持。首先，案卷材料中无争议的是，在所有相关期间，Lady May始终是HK USA的唯一资产，且Ostrager法官已认定Lady May由债务人实益拥有和控制。该认定——即债务人对HK USA的唯一资产、因而对HK USA本身行使支配和控制——基于争点排除原则对HK USA具有约束力，且不得重新诉讼。\n\n38. Ostrager法官还作出其他具有排除效力的认定，即HK USA属于债务人用于向债权人隐匿资产的“空壳把戏”的一部分，从而确立债务人利用HK USA对其债权人实施欺诈或不公。例如，Ostrager法官认定：\n\na) 债务人曾“通过将其大量个人资产存放于一系列公司、受信任的密友及家庭成员名下，作出规避和欺骗其债权人的努力。”15\n\nb) 债务人“自称为亿万富翁，却将其资产藏匿于错综复杂的公司实体及家庭成员之中。”16\n\nc) 债务人利用公司实体使资产免受债权人追索的做法，是一项“计划”，该计划“使Kwok（郭文贵）得以尽管生活奢华仍主张其没有资产。”17\n\n17 同上。\n\n14 见 114 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 403 (2010)（“根据佛罗里达州、特拉华州、宾夕法尼亚州或纽约州法律，揭开公司面纱或确立另一个自我责任所必需的要件实质上相同。”）。\n\n15 答辩及反诉，证据1，最终藐视法庭裁决，第1页。\n\n16 同上。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 876-3 提交 09/24/22 录入 09/24/22 18:59:04 第24页；案件 22-05003 文书 38 提交 09/23/22 录入 09/23/22 20:14:42 第24页，共39页 第24页\n\nd) 债务人的女儿“未提交任何证据证明其对Lady May行使支配和控制，且除作为保护Lady May免遭其父亲债权人扣押的诡计外，未提供任何其取得Lady May占有的确认。”18\n\n39. 最后，反诉还充满了其他证明HK USA是债务人另一个自我的证据。其中包括：\n\na) 在所有相关期间，HK USA的唯一成员为债务人的女儿；其没有董事、高管或雇员，未申报纳税申报表，没有银行账户，亦未以其他方式获得资本注入，且未保存任何文件。\n\nb) HK USA与债务人由同一家律师事务所代理。\n\nc) HK USA、债务人以及多个其他与债务人有关联的实体均使用同一地址：162 East 64th Street, New York, New York 10065。\n\nd) HK USA从Hong Kong International Funds Investments Limited（“HK International”）无偿取得Lady May；HK International是另一家表面上由债务人的女儿拥有和控制的实体。\n\ne) HK USA没有收入来源，并且如HK USA已承认，其费用由Golden Spring及Lamp Capital（Lamp Capital）支付。根据被告自身的承认，这些实体据称由债务人的儿子19拥有，并属于债务人用以实施其“空壳把戏”及欺诈债权人的一系列由家庭控制实体。多年来，Golden Spring及/或Lamp Capital一直支付债务人的费用，包括其法律顾问费用及HK USA律师的费用。\n\nf) 债务人提交了一项第11章计划，根据该计划，HK USA将在显然未获得对价的情况下出资Lady May，以资助向债务人债权人作出的分配。\n\n18 答辩及反诉，证据1，最终藐视法庭裁决，第7页。\n\n19 见，例如，起诉状第24段（“Lady May的费用此前通过[Golden Spring]支付。现由Lamp Capital支付。”）；答辩及反诉，证据69，L. Vartan于May 4, 2021出具的函件（“就本所对[HK USA]的代理而言，本所已收到Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.及Lamp Capital LLC的付款。”）；答辩及反诉，证据42，L. Vartan于June 7, 2021出具的函件（“我可以确认，Lady May游艇的所有费用，包括员工、船员及维护费用，均由Golden Spring New York支付。”）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 876-3 提交 09/24/22 录入 09/24/22 18:59:04 第25页；案件 22-05003 文书 38 提交 09/23/22 录入 09/23/22 20:14:42 第25页，共39页 第25页\n\ng) Himalaya Financial Group Limited（“Himalaya Financial”）是HK USA根据Lady May约定支付至托管账户的$37 million的出借人。鉴于该贷款情形极不寻常，以及Himalaya Financial与其他多个债务人关联实体关系密切等问题，Himalaya Financial本身很可能是债务人的另一个自我。\n\n40. 总而言之，证明HK USA是债务人另一个自我的证据，显然满足合理根据标准的较低门槛，从而证明对HK USA的全部资产以及据称由债务人女儿持有的HK USA股权实施判决前扣押具有正当性。\n\nc. 有合理根据认定受托人将在衡平所有权主张中胜诉\n\n41. 除主张HK USA是债务人的另一个自我外，受托人还主张，尽管债务人的女儿持有其法定或名义所有权，债务人仍为HK USA的衡平所有人，因此HK USA的所有权应移交受托人。“由于[特拉华州]法律下并无针对[衡平所有权问题]的既定检验标准，法院适宜适用联邦法院通常用于确定是否存在代名人关系的普通法因素。”In re Dordevic, 633 B.R. 553, 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021).20\n\n42. “概括而言，代名人是为他人利益持有财产单纯法定所有权之人。”Dordevic, 633 B.R. at 557（省略内部引号）。“作为一人\n\n20 多个司法辖区的联邦法院同意这种做法。参见，例如，Daer Holdings, LLC v. Menchise (In re Steffen), No. 8:13-CV-1700-T-27, 2014 WL 11428827, at \\*4 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014)（“尽管联邦法院通常适用法院地所在州的法律（本案中为佛罗里达州）来解决名义持有人、另我及类似问题，但佛罗里达州与许多州一样，并无确定名义持有人所有权的明确标准。因此，适用联邦普通法。”）（省略内部引文）；Cody v. United States, 348 F.Supp.2d 682, 694 (E.D. Va. 2004)（“[F]ederal courts sitting in states whose law of nominee ownership is similarly undeveloped have typically looked to nominee ownership criteria employed in other federal tax collection cases.”）；LiButti v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 71, 75 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 178 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1999)（“法院未发现任何已报告的新泽西州判例处理与名义持有人理论相关的因素。因此，法院适用其他审理过名义持有人理论的法院所使用的因素。”（省略脚注））；Antique Ford Found. v. I.R.S., Dep't of Treasury, U.S., 791 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (D. Mont. 1992)（省略后续诉讼历史）（指出“似乎没有已报告的蒙大拿州判决处理在确定某一商业实体是否为某个人的名义持有人时哪些因素具有相关性的问题”，并适用其他法院确定的因素）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 登记于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 26 页；案号 22-05003 文件 38 提交于 09/23/22 登记于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 26 页，共 39 页\n\n法院曾如此描述，名义持有人如同一个傀儡，仅持有财产的名义所有权而不享有任何受益权益；这是一种便利安排。”In re First Connecticut Consulting Grp., Inc., No. 04-101, 2004 WL 1676211, at \\*4 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 27, 2004), aff'd, 340 B.R. 210 (D. Vt. 2006), aff'd, 254 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2007)。因此，名义持有人理论允许法院穿透法定所有权，并确认真正的或受益所有人。参见 In re Wyly, 607 B.R. 862, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018)（“名义持有人理论是为清偿拖欠税款的纳税人的债务而可对第三方财产设定负担的依据；该理论与另我理论相似，但又有区别。”）。\n\n43. “法院在确定某一产权持有人是否实际上作为名义持有人为他人利益服务时，会考虑若干因素，包括：（1）名义持有人与转让人之间是否存在密切的个人关系；（2）名义持有人是否为该财产支付了很少或未支付对价；（3）当事人是否预期到追收活动而将财产置于名义持有人名下；（4）当事人是否未登记该转让；以及（5）转让人是否继续对该财产行使支配和控制。”Dordevic, 633 B.R. at 557.\n\n44. 反诉中的指称轻易提供了满足该标准的合理根据。将 HK International（香港国际）名义上转让给债务人的女儿，以及随后将 Lady May（“梅夫人”号）转让给同样名义上由债务人的女儿持有的 HK USA（美国香港），均未支付任何对价。Kwok（郭文贵）与其女儿——一名无业的 28 岁人士——之间显然存在密切的个人关系。此外，Ostrager 法官已具有排除效力地认定，作为其障眼法的一部分，债务人转移了包括 Lady May 在内的资产以逃避责任，并继续享有被转让财产的利益。根据这些情形，显然债务人的女儿仅作为名义持有人持有 Lady May 的裸法定所有权，而债务人则表现出真正所有权的一切特征。\n\n-19-\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 登记于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 27 页；案号 22-05003 文件 38 提交于 09/23/22 登记于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 27 页，共 39 页\n\nd. 受托人很可能将在欺诈性转让请求中胜诉\n\n45. 作为其寻求取得 HK USA 及其资产所有权的反诉的替代方案，受托人依据（1）《破产法典》第 548 条和第 550 条，以及（2）《破产法典》第 544 条和《纽约州债务人与债权人法》第 276 条，对 HK USA 主张实际欺诈性转让请求。\n\n46. 根据《破产法典》第 548(a)(1)(A) 条提出的实际欺诈请求，要求指称被告以“实际意图”作出转让或承担债务，以“阻碍、拖延或欺诈”现有或未来债权人。In re Integrity Graphics, Inc., 623 B.R. 21, 29-30 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)。此类请求所涉及的是债务人—转让人的意图，而非受让人的意图。In re LXEng LLC, 607 B.R. 67, 91 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019).21\n\n47. “由于在举证时证明阻碍、拖延或欺诈的实际意图存在困难，当事人可以依赖‘欺诈迹象’，即‘与欺诈性转让如此普遍相关的情形，以至于其存在会产生意图推定。’”In re Jie Xiao, 608 B.R. 126, 157 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019)；另参见 In re Andersen, 166 B.R. 516, 529 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994)（“鉴于这一现实，法院认为，可从转让周围的情形推断欺诈意图。欺诈的间接证据可包括转让的情形，以及被指称欺诈性转让的当事人就该场所的占有、管理和控制所作的行为和举动。”）（强调系后加）。22\n\n48. 此外，“若实际欺诈意图请求由破产受托人提出，适用的第二巡回区判例指示法院采取‘更宽松的观点[看待任何严格的起诉要求]，因为受托人是交易的局外人，必须基于二手知识主张欺诈。’”Integrity Graphics, 623 B.R. at 31（省略内部引注）。\n\n49. 反诉表明，至少存在可用以确立实际欺诈意图的间接证据，从而构成合理根据。反诉中所述的关键事件顺序如下：\n\na) 2014 年 10 月至 2017 年 6 月 27 日期间，HK International 的所有权由债务人的一名关联人 Qu Guo Jiao（瞿国娇，以下简称“Qu 女士”）通过一项未披露的信托协议为债务人利益持有，债务人仍为 HK International 的受益所有人。\n\nb) 2015 年 2 月 23 日，HK International 成为 Lady May 的所有人。\n\nc) 用于购买 Lady May 的资金由债务人转让给 Bravo Luck Limited（好运有限公司），该实体注册于英属维尔京群岛，债务人当时持有其 50% 的所有权权益，其余 50% 由债务人的儿子持有；随后，Bravo Luck Limited 将该等资金转给卖方（以下简称“2015 年转让”）。\n\nd) 2017 年 6 月 27 日，HK International 的所有权在未支付对价的情况下转让给债务人的女儿（以下简称“2017 年转让”）。\n\ne) 2019 年，HK USA 成立。\n\nf) 2020 年 4 月，Lady May 在未支付对价的情况下从 HK International 转让给 HK USA（以下简称“2020 年转让”）。\n\n22 “‘欺诈迹象’的例子包括但不限于：（1）隐瞒事实和虚假借口；（2）就转让财产价值所获得的对价存在显失公平的差异；（3）为接收财产而设立封闭式公司；（4）当事人之间关系密切；（5）保留涉案财产以供受益或使用；（6）转让人和受让人在转让前后双方的财务状况；（7）资不抵债或财务困难后行为模式的重复或累积效果；以及（8）事件时间线。……向配偶转让财产是‘典型’的欺诈迹象。……将资产转移至由债务人完全拥有或与债务人‘紧密融合’的不同公司实体，是另一项欺诈迹象。”In re Jie Xiao, 608 B.R. at 157.\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 登记于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 29 页；案号 22-05003 文件 38 提交于 09/23/22 登记于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 29 页，共 39 页\n\n50. 这一事件顺序既由反诉中列出的浩繁记录所确立，也由 Ostrager 法官在其最终藐视法庭裁决中作出的具有排除效力的认定所确立，表明自债务人首次寻求购买 Lady May 之时起，他便进行了一系列故意交易，作为其通过将有价值资产置于空壳公司或家庭成员名下来使自己免于强制执行的全面努力的一部分。\n\n51. 首先，于 2015 年，债务人利用其控制并与其儿子共同持有的实体 Bravo Luck Limited 作为过渡通道，代表 HK International 为购买 Lady May 提供资金；HK International 是由债务人的一名关联人（Qu 女士）通过一项未披露的信托协议为债务人利益而信托持有的实体。用于购买 Lady May 的资金来自债务人这一点，得到 Ostrager 法官以下认定的支持：“没有证据表明[债务人的儿子]参与了导致”HK International 取得 Lady May 的“公司交易”，23 并且所呈事实支持“合理推断[]，即 Kwok 向 HK International 提供了用于购买该游艇的资金。”24 其次，于 2017 年，债务人在未支付对价的情况下将 HK International 本身转让给其女儿。第三，也是最后，于 2020 年，债务人再次在未支付对价的情况下，使其另我 HK International 将 Lady May 转让给 HK USA。这三项交易显然均是债务人为通过将有价值资产置于空壳公司或家庭成员名下来使自己免于强制执行而作出的全面努力的一部分。\n\n52. 根据这些事实，债务人作出了两项独立的欺诈性转让。最明显的是 2017 年转让，债务人据此使其当时根据一项未披露的信托协议而享有受益所有权的 HK International，在未支付对价的情况下被转让给其女儿。鉴于未有任何对价，以及 Ostrager 法官关于债务人一再试图向债权人隐匿其资产的大量证据和认定，2017 年转让可作为实际欺诈性转让予以撤销。参见 In re Jie Xiao, 608 B.R. at 157-58（认定存在实际欺诈，理由是“[债务人]有一个至高无上的目标：在将其资产输送给其妻子、子女和大家庭成员的同时，使其本人和 LXEng 免于判决执行。他愿意输送、转让和分配这些款项，揭示了其有意识的意图和谋划。”）。\n\n53. 作为备选，如果法院认定（尽管有明确的相反证据）债务人在2017 Transfer时并未持有HK International（香港国际）的受益权益，则2015 Transfer作为一项实际欺诈性转让可予撤销。如上所述，使HK International能够于2015年购买Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）的资金来自债务人，并以Bravo Luck（布拉沃幸运）作为通道。即使为论证之便假定债务人当时并不拥有HK International，那么他实际上是在无任何对价的情况下，向HK International赠与了购买Lady May所必需的资金。该等转让完全符合债务人的欺诈性“障眼法”，并因此可予撤销。\n\ni. 可向HK USA追回Lady May或其在转让时的价值\n\n54. 由于上述转让中至少有一项可予撤销，受托人可向HK USA（美国HK）追回Lady May或其在转让时的价值，理由可以是HK USA属于根据《破产法》第550(a)条承担责任的后续受让人，或者是2015年、2017年和2020年的交易可根据合并审查原则合并为一项交易。\n\n55. 根据《破产法》第550(a)条，受托人可从初始受让人或任何直接或间接受让人处追回经欺诈性转让的财产。\n\n-23-\n案件 22-50073 文档 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 录入于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 31 页，共 案件 22-05003 文档 38 提交于 09/23/22 录入于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 31 页，共 39 页 39\n\n对受托人从后续受让人处追回财产的唯一限制是，该受让人不得系为取得价值、善意且不知悉该转让可撤销性而取得该财产。11 U.S.C. §550(b)。在本案中，HK USA并非为取得价值而取得Lady May，也并非在善意且不知悉初始转让可撤销性的情况下取得该游艇。因此，受托人可根据《破产法》第550(a)(2)条向HK USA追回Lady May，或其在转让时的价值，25。参见 In re Wolf, 595 B.R. 735, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)（在存在经欺诈性转让的企业时，“[t]o the extent the proceeds, products, or profits of the fraudulently transferred [] business have been plausibly alleged to have been transferred (whether formally . . . or otherwise) to other mediate or immediate transferees, those transferees are liable under section 550(a)(2)”）。\n\n56. 作为备选，受托人可根据合并审查原则直接从HK USA追回Lady May。合并审查原则“是一项衡平法原则，允许法院不受一项交易或一系列交易的结构约束”。In re Maxus Energy Corp., 641 B.R. 467, 532 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022)（省略内部引号和引文）。“法院已在涉及欺诈性转让的案件中适用交易合并审查原则，以‘允许破产法院将交易的各个“环节”予以“合并”，并认定整条转让链均可撤销。’”In re Servicom, LLC, No. 18-31722 (AMN),\n\n25 自2015年购买以来，像Lady May这样的豪华游艇很可能已大幅贬值。“当财产于转让后贬值时，受托人可追回该财产于转让时的价值，而非该财产本身。”5 Collier on Bankruptcy P 550.02 (16th 2022); see also In re Affinity Health Care, Mgmt., Inc., 499 B.R. 246, 261 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013)（第550条“保护受托人免受初始受让人阻碍追回的企图，并在实际受让人或其资产已经消失，或追回财产并不足够时，例如财产已贬值时，给予受托人一定程度的灵活性”）（强调系原文所加）。因此，如Lady May已经贬值，受托人有权从HK USA的其他资产，即其对Escrowed Funds（托管资金）的权益中，追回等同于该贬值额的金额。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 录入于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 32 页，共 案件 22-05003 文档 38 提交于 09/23/22 录入于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 32 页，共 39 页 39\n\n2021 WL 825155, at \\*15 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2021)（经修改）（省略内部引文）。26\n\n57. “在决定是否合并该交易并对特定被告追究责任时，法院经常考察被告对整项交易结构的知情程度，以及其组成部分是否属于一项单一计划。”同上（省略内部引号和引文）。该分析考量三个因素：(i) 所有相关当事人是否均知悉多项交易；(ii) 每项交易是否会独立发生；以及 (iii) 每项交易是否依赖于或以其他交易为条件。同上。由于“合并审查原则根植于衡平法”，这些因素不应被“狭隘地”解释。Maxus Energy, 641 B.R. at 536。归根结底，“为确定一系列交易是否应被‘合并’并视为一项单一的整合交易，法院侧重于交易的实质而非形式，并考量交易的总体意图和影响。”In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 BLS, 2011 WL 4345204, at \\*5 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15, 2011)。\n\n58. 虽然合并审查原则将名义上独立的交易视为一项交易，但并不要求该总体计划的每一细节从一开始就已规划。参见 Maxus Energy, 641 B.R. at 536（“仅因所主张的[合并计划]的每一细节并非自一开始即由[合并计划双方当事人]共同确定，并不当然导致该因素不成立。”）。否则，只要当事人能够在多个步骤的过程中策略性地规划其计划，他们就会“拥有阻碍和拖延债权人的完全自由。”同上（省略内部引号和引文）。同样，“如果拟合并的各项交易之间经过了一段时间，只要它们具有充分关联性，这并不构成致命障碍。”同上，at 532（省略内部引号和引文）。\n\n26 合并审查原则“源自联邦破产法及《纽约统一欺诈性让与法》的规定”，因此适用于受托人依据《纽约DCL》以及《破产法》第548条所规定的欺诈性转让条款提出的请求。In re M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc., 541 F. Appx. 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2013)。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 录入于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 33 页，共 案件 22-05003 文档 38 提交于 09/23/22 录入于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 33 页，共 39 页 39\n\n59. 如上所述并在反诉中详尽讨论，本案存在大量证据表明，Lady May最初被购置并随后被转让时具有实际欺诈意图，系作为一项更广泛的“障眼法”策略的一部分，旨在将债务人的资产转移至Family Shell Companies（家族空壳公司），从而使债务人在声称自己无可供强制执行财产的同时仍能奢华生活。在此情形下，适用合并审查原则具有合理依据。\n\nii. 实际欺诈性转让请求未逾诉讼时效\n\n60. 根据《破产法》第544(b)条提起的撤销诉讼受适用的非破产法时效期间约束。适用于2017 Transfer的纽约州法律规定，提起实际欺诈请求的诉讼时效为六年。参见 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 213(8)（“time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it”）。因此，受托人请求撤销2017 Transfer的主张处于纽约州法律规定的时效期间内。27\n\n27 法院认为，债务人申请破产时，《破产法》第546(a)条中止诉讼时效届满。参见 In re Kellel, No. 8-18-76679-LAS, 2022 WL 24057, at \\*3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2022)（“只要诉讼时效在申请日尚未届满，受托人即可在第546(a)条规定的两年期间内的任何时候，根据第544(b)条提起纽约州欺诈性让与诉讼，追溯申请日前六年。”）（原文强调）（经修改）（省略内部引述）；另参见 In re Antex, Inc., 397 B.R. 168, 174 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008)（指出“多数法院”同意，只要适用州法的时效期间在申请日之前尚未届满，受托人即可在§ 546(a)规定的时限内，根据§ 544(b)提起欺诈性让与诉讼）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 录入于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 34 页，共 案件 22-05003 文档 38 提交于 09/23/22 录入于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 34 页，共 39 页 39\n\n61. 此外，即使是2015 Transfer，亦根据适用于故意欺诈的“发现规则”处于纽约州的诉讼时效期间内；该规则“允许原告在欺诈已被发现，或经合理勤勉本应被发现之日起两年内，提起以实际欺诈为依据的诉讼请求。”In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 458 B.R. 87, 109 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)（引用 NYCPLR §§ 213(8), 203(g)）。为援用发现规则，破产受托人仅需指明一名债权人，甚至一类或一种债权人，其拥有“可能有效的请求权”。同上。\n\n62. 本案中，债务人本人提交的财务状况说明书已确定了该等债权人：众多对债务人提起诉讼并主张其欺诈了他们的债权人。28 这些债权人没有理由怀疑，债务人惯常夸耀的巨额个人财富（至少在账面上）是谎言，且债务人已欺诈性转让（就本申请而言）Lady May。概言之，参见 In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC, 557 B.R. 89, 119 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“是否存在某一债权人，在马多夫的欺诈行为向公众揭露之前，经合理勤勉仍不可能发现该欺诈行为，这一问题本质上属于事实问题，但并无多少疑问。”）。29 这些债权人的存在，其请求权产生于申请日前不足两年，使受托人得以根据《破产法》第544(b)条主张其故意欺诈性转让请求。\n\n28 参见 Global Notes and Statements of Limitations, Methodology, and Disclaimers Regarding the Debtor's Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statement of Financial Affairs, (March 9, 2022) Docket No. 77（“SOFA”）第22-25页（对问题9的答复：“[w]ithin 1 year before you filed for bankruptcy, were you a party in any lawsuit, court action, or administrative proceeding?”）。\n\n29 至少在初步阶段，被告负有证明原告本应知悉或已发现该欺诈性转让的举证责任。参见 Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group, 144 A.D.3d 437, 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)（“被告必须初步证明，[原告]在诉讼提起前两年以上，已就其欺诈请求收到足以引发调查的通知。”）（省略内部引号和引文）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 876-3 提交于 09/24/22 录入于 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 35 页，共 案件 22-05003 文档 38 提交于 09/23/22 录入于 09/23/22 20:14:42 第 35 页，共 39 页 39\n\n63. 2015 Transfer（2015年转让）亦在《破产法典》第 544(b) 条项下适用于受托人权利的诉讼时效期间内，理由另有一项。该条赋予受托人无担保债权人为撤销破产申请前转让而享有的权利。受托人可以代位行使其权利的一类债权人是 IRS（美国国税局）；联邦法律赋予 IRS 十年期限，以依据州法撤销转让，且不受州诉讼时效法规的约束。见 26 U.S.C. §§ 6502(a)(2), 6901。因此，如 IRS 持有无担保债权（其确实持有），受托人可撤销最早可追溯至十年前的转让。见 In re Smith, No. 19-40964, 2022 WL 1814415, at *6 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 2, 2022)。\n\n64. 最后，第 548(a)(1) 条规定的两年时效期间并不妨碍受托人依据该条提出的请求，因为如上所述，有合理根据将涉及 Lady May（“Lady May”号）的各项转让合并视为债务人向 HK USA 作出的一项转让，该转让发生于 2020 年 4 月，距 Petition Date（申请日）不足两年。见 Maxus Energy, 641 B.R. at 533（将 In re Tronox Inc., 503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2013) 描述为认定“适宜将欺诈性交易合并，并自最终完成被告方案的最后行为起算诉讼时效”）。\n\ne. 关于受托人针对 HK USA 的过失请求的合理根据\n\n65. 即使法院不同意受托人关于债务人系 Lady May 的真正所有人的意见，HK USA 仍应就其将 Lady May 移离美国的行为向破产财产承担责任，从而导致债务人根据 Ostrager 法官（奥斯特拉格法官）的藐视法庭命令承担 $134 million 的罚款。受托人因该行为对 HK USA 提出过失请求，该请求具有合理根据。\n\n66. 纽约州法律下过失请求的构成要件为：“(i) 被告对原告负有的注意义务；(ii) 违反该义务；以及 (iii) 该违反实质性导致的损害。”Lombard v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 280 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Merino v. New York City Transit Auth., 639 N.Y.S.2d 784, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996))。\n\n-28-\n案件 22-50073 文书 876-3 提交日期 09/24/22 登记日期 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 36 页，所属案件 22-05003 文书 38 提交日期 09/23/22 登记日期 09/23/22 20:14:42，第 36 页，共 39 页 39\n\n67. 本案满足上述要件。无论 HK USA 是否为债务人的另一个自我，HK USA 均对债务人负有以通常注意和技能避免伤害其的义务。Guido v. 1114 6th Ave. Co., 2015 WL 1055074, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2015)（“所有人均负有普通法上的义务，应以通常注意和技能避免伤害他人。”）。HK USA 违反了该义务，因为其知悉 Ostrager 法官的命令，该命令显然适用于作为该游艇登记所有人的 HK USA，但其仍将 Lady May 移往海外，并使其留在海外直至 2022 年 7 月。这些事实不存在争议；债务人的女儿已承认该等事实，她在 State Court（州法院）作证称：“我知道……[2021 年 3 月藐视法庭命令]要求 Lady May 于 2021 年 5 月返回纽约。然而，……我不希望该船前往纽约，并且在咨询律师后，转而指示其前往欧洲……该决定完全是我作出的，而非我父亲作出的。”30 因此，HK USA 致使债务人承担 $134 million 的藐视法庭罚款，并应就该数额向破产财产承担损害赔偿责任。\n\nIII. 如法院不准予诉前扣押，受托人可能永远无法对债务人执行判决书\n\n68. 针对 HK USA 提出的反请求金额，远超受托人寻求扣押资产的合计价值。Lady May 的价值不超过约 $32 million，Escrowed Funds（托管资金）合计约为 $37 million。与此同时，作为受托人过失请求唯一基础的藐视法庭命令，单独即令债务人承担 $134 million 的责任。31 因此，既然受托人已证明存在合理根据，其有权扣押 Lady May 以及 HK USA 在托管资金中的权益（以及债务人之女在 HK USA 中的权益），以担保将来就反请求作出的判决。\n\n69. 如不准予扣押命令，受托人将可能永远无法获得其有权获得的救济，存在重大风险。事实上，HK USA 已向本法院明确表示，其一旦根据 Lady May Stipulation（Lady May 约定）获得托管资金的解除托管，便会将该等资金支付给 Himalaya Financial（喜马拉雅金融），该英属维尔京群岛实体与债务人的加密货币计划关系密切，据称其在极不寻常的情形下向 HK USA 出借了该 $37 million（如上所述，并在反请求中作了更详细讨论）。32 现已排定于 2022 年 10 月 7 日举行关于根据 Lady May 约定设立维修准备金的听证会。如 HK USA 成功获得设立该准备金的法院命令，并满足 Lady May 约定的其他条件，HK USA 可能在此后不久获得托管资金的解除托管。33 几乎毫无疑问，托管资金一经解除托管，即会被电汇至海外。\n\n70. 此外，尽管 Lady May 约定要求 Lady May 留在 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）水域，34 债务人和 HK USA 过去曾通过将 Lady May 移往并留置于海外而违反法院命令。债务人对司法程序的“不尊重”和“蔑视”35 众所周知，证据包括但不限于债务人惯于违反法院命令36以及误导法院。37 因此，债务人存在重大风险，可能再次违反法院命令并再次将 Lady May 移往海外。\n\n71. 因此，为保护该破产财产的债权人，法院作出所请求的诉前救济至关重要。\n\n此前未提出请求\n\n72. 受托人此前未曾向本法院或任何其他法院请求本文件所请求的救济。\n\n[本页剩余部分有意留白。]\n\n其受本命令中适用于他们的条款约束，具体包括其被禁止将 Lady May 移离康涅狄格州的可航行水域”。\n\n35 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 1, Final Contempt Decision at 7。\n\n36 见，例如，Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 62, May 27, 2021 Tr. at 16:8-9, PAX v. Kwok, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 833（“Kwok 先生随意蔑视法院命令。”）。\n\n37 见 Answer and Counterclaims, Ex. 49, Tr. at 21:13-16, PAX v. Kwok, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 647（“法院认为……Kwok 先生曾试图误导法院。法院认为，正如原告所主张，Kwok 先生在其资产方面玩弄障眼法，并且即使未违反法院命令的字面规定，也违反了法院命令的精神。”）；同上，第 26:3-8 页（“法院命令要么被蔑视，要么被极其宽松地解释，并且……向法院作出了故意或非故意的虚假陈述，从而误导了法院。”）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 876-3 提交日期 09/24/22 登记日期 09/24/22 18:59:04 第 39 页，所属案件 22-05003 文书 38 提交日期 09/23/22 登记日期 09/23/22 20:14:42，第 39 页，共 39 页 39\n\n因此，基于上述理由，受托人谨请求法院作出所附拟议命令，准予本动议所请求的救济及其他公正和适当的救济。\n\n日期：September 23, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯），\n\nNew Haven（纽黑文）, Connecticut（康涅狄格州） CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE（第11章受托人）\n\n签字：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）(ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）(pro hac vice pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）(pro hac vice pending) Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）(pro hac vice pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人代理律师","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CIPA","Guo","Himalaya","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":38,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":13330,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-09-24 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-09-24","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:37:40"}