{"id":"court_ctb_898_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":898,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| -----------------------------------------------------------<br>x |                                        |  |  |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                           | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11                   |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                                     | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)<br>: |  |  |\n| Debtor.1                                                         | :<br>:                                 |  |  |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------      | x                                      |  |  |\n\n# **MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER AUTHORIZING COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 2004 SUBPOENAS AND ENFORCING CONSENT ORDER REGARDING CONTROL OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION RELATED TO RULE 2004 SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION**\n\nLuc A. Despins, as the appointed Chapter 11 Trustee to the Debtor's estate (the \"Trustee\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, submits this motion (the \"Motion\") pursuant Rules 2004 and 9016 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\"), for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A** (the \"Proposed Order\"), authorizing Brown Rudnick LLP (\"Brown Rudnick\") and Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. (\"Verdolino\") to produce Rule 2004 subpoenaed documents and information and enforcing the Court's *Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information* [ECF No. 856] (the \"Privilege Order\"). In support of the Motion, the Trustee respectfully states as follows:\n\n<sup>1</sup> Although the Debtor's legal name is Ho Wan Kwok, he is also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases. The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. On August 17, 2022 the Trustee served Brown Rudnick and Verdolino<sup>2</sup> with subpoenas (the \"Rule 2004 Subpoenas\") pursuant to the Court's order granting the Trustee's motion to conduct a Rule 2004 investigation of certain of the Debtor's current and former advisors, including Brown Rudnick and Verdolino. Despite their best efforts to diligently comply with the Rule 2004 Subpoenas, and the Privilege Order's clear direction that all post-petition privileged documents in the custody and possession of Brown Rudnick and Verdolino are presumed to be under the control of the Trustee, Brown Rudnick and Verdolino have been unable to produce to the Trustee a single responsive, post-petition, privileged document to date. The Debtor has prevented Brown Rudnick and Verdolino from making any production by taking unreasonable and improper positions in violation of the Privilege Order. The Trustee, Brown Rudnick, and Verdolino now ask the Court to enforce the Privilege Order and authorize Brown Rudnick and Verdolino to immediately produce all responsive documents in their possession to the Trustee.\n\n2. Based on discussions with Brown Rudnick, for itself and on behalf of Verdolino, the Trustee understands that, initially, the Debtor first took the unreasonable position, prior to the subpoena Production Deadline, 3 that he would neither (i) permit Brown Rudnick and Verdolino to produce post-petition, privileged documents to the Trustee, despite not identifying to Brown Rudnick and Verdolino a single privileged document or category of document likely in the possession of Brown Rudnick and/or Verdolino that might cause the Debtor personal harm as required by the Privilege Order, nor (ii) be willing to allow his current counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler,\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Debtor applied to employ Verdolino as his financial advisor, but that application was later withdrawn. (*See*  [ECF No. 737]). Brown Rudnick accepted service of a Rule 2004 subpoena directed to Verdolino, on behalf of Verdolino.\n\n<sup>3</sup> Capitalized terms not defined in the Preliminary Statement have the meanings ascribed to them in subsequent sections of the Motion.\n\nP.C., to undertake its own timely review of the documents. Now, weeks later, with both the Production Deadline and the 10-day deadline for producing a privilege log under the Privilege Order having passed, the Debtor wishes to avail himself of an opportunity he previously spurned, requesting that his counsel review *every single post-petition privileged document of Brown Rudnick and Verdolino prior to its production*. The Debtor makes this request despite not being able to articulate a good faith basis to believe that any document in the files of Brown Rudnick and/or Verdolino could give rise to personal harm to the Debtor if disclosed to the Trustee, which is the only basis on which the Debtor can seek to withhold documents under the Privilege Order.\n\n3. The review the Debtor requests to undertake will cause nothing but further delay in the Trustee's investigation, and is wholly improper. Given the presumption in the Privilege Order that the Trustee controls the privilege as to all of the documents in the possession of Brown Rudnick and Verdolino, Brown Rudnick and Verdolino should be permitted to produce them immediately. To the extent the Debtor believes in good faith any of the document(s) should have been withheld due to a likelihood of causing personal harm, he can exercise his right under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the \"Federal Rules\") to claw back the documents and seek to log them pursuant to the Privilege Order. The Debtor will not be prejudiced by this procedure because the Privilege Order expressly provides that production of documents to the Trustee will not result in a privilege waiver, and the Trustee cannot seek to effect any such waiver without further order of the Court.\n\n4. Accordingly, for these reasons and those discussed below, the Trustee requests that Brown Rudnick and Verdolino be authorized to immediately produce to the Trustee all responsive post-petition privileged documents in their possession and custody, subject to the Debtor's right\n\n3\n\nto seek to claw back any such documents he believes, in good faith, will cause him personal harm, in accordance with the requirements of the Privilege Order.\n\n### **PROCEDURAL POSTURE**\n\n5. On August 17, 2022, the Trustee served the Rule 2004 Subpoenas on Brown Rudnick and Verdolino, requesting the production of documents and information concerning, among other topics, potential assets of the Debtor's estate (the \"Estate\"). Pursuant to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas and the Court's *Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor* [ECF No. 756], Brown Rudnick and Verdolino were directed to produce all responsive documents to the Trustee by September 16, 2022 (the \"Production Deadline\").\n\n6. On September 14, 2022, the Court entered the consensually negotiated and agreed upon Privilege Order, the purpose of which was to expedite the investigation process by clearly setting out which privileged documents were under the control of the Trustee and which remained controlled by the Debtor. With regard to post-petition documents in the possession or control of Brown Rudnick and Verdolino, the Privilege Order explicitly provides that\n\n> it is presumed that the Trustee has exclusive control over all postpetition documents and files in the possession or control of Brown Rudnick LLP and Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. in connection with their representation of the Debtor in this case, subject to the terms set forth in paragraph 7.\n\n(Privilege Order, ¶ 6.).\n\n7. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Privilege Order, the Debtor has only a limited ability to seek to withhold documents as privileged on the grounds that disclosure would cause him personal harm (\"Personal Harm Documents,\" and each, a \"Personal Harm Document\") (*Id.,* ¶ 7). Specifically,\n\nto the extent the Debtor believes in good faith that particular documents or information . . . could result in *personal harm* to the Debtor if disclosed to the Trustee, then (i) *the Debtor's counsel* [*i.e.*, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.] *shall, within 10 days of the applicable production deadline* . . . log all such documents . . . and/or identify all such non-documentary information in a manner necessary to support the claim of privilege including with sufficient information to prima facie identify the basis for asserting the potential for personal harm[, however,] . . . that the disclosure of documents or information in question could result in the Trustee identifying potential assets of the estate, or could constitute evidence relating to the ownership or control of assets by the Debtor, *shall not* constitute \"personal harm to the Debtor\" sufficient to withhold documents or information pursuant to [paragraph 7], regardless of any position or opinion of the Debtor regarding the ownership or control of such assets.\n\n*Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n8. Accordingly, to the extent the Debtor seeks to withhold a document from the Trustee as privileged, any such privilege: (i) may only be asserted based on purported personal harm to the Debtor that is unrelated to (a) the identification of potential Estate assets or (b) evidence concerning the Debtor's potential ownership or control of various assets, and (ii) must be asserted by the Debtor within 10 days of the applicable Production Deadline by causing the documents to be placed on a privilege log (the \"Privilege Log Deadline\"). (*Id.*).\n\n### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n9. Based on discussions with Brown Rudnick, the Trustee understands that following entry of the Court's order authorizing Rule 2004 examinations of, among others, Brown Rudnick and Verdolino, (*see* [ECF No. 756]) (entered Aug. 16, 2022) and continuing until September 28, 2022, Brown Rudnick engaged in numerous discussions with Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., current counsel to the Debtor in the chapter 11 case (the \"Debtor's Counsel\"), regarding Brown Rudnick and Verdolino's ability to produce responsive post-petition privileged documents to the Trustee.\n\n10. On or about September 14, 2022, Brown Rudnick informed the Debtor's Counsel that, given Brown Rudnick's lack of access to the Debtor, and its inability to presume what the Debtor may believe would cause him personal harm, Brown Rudnick was not in a position to withhold responsive documents on that basis. The Trustee understands that the Debtor's Counsel, despite having access to the Debtor, did not inform Brown Rudnick of any documents, nor categories of information or conduct, that it believed would cause the Debtor personal harm, leading Brown Rudnick to request that the Debtor agree that Brown Rudnick may produce all responsive post-petition privileged documents to the Trustee. The Debtor refused.<sup>4</sup>\n\n11. Given the Debtor's refusal, Brown Rudnick stated that in the alternative it would provide the Debtor's Counsel with all of the Brown Rudnick and Verdolino documents prior to their production to allow the Debtor and/or the Debtor's Counsel conduct a review for Personal Harm Documents. Unreasonably, the Debtor refused this offer as well, informing Brown Rudnick that it was somehow Brown Rudnick's responsibility to divine what might cause personal harm to the Debtor. This, of course, is incorrect, because the Debtor owns the privilege, and only the Debtor—through his current counsel—can decide what may cause him personal harm if disclosed.\n\n12. With Brown Rudnick being provided no basis by the Debtor to withhold any privileged documents, but yet being faced with the prospect of the Debtor claiming that Brown Rudnick had no right to produce his privileged documents, the September 16 Production Deadline and September 26 Privilege Log Deadline passed without production of documents or a log.\n\n13. Made aware of the impasse by discussions with Brown Rudnick and Debtor's Counsel throughout the relevant time period, the Trustee proposed to the Debtor (the \"Trustee Proposal\") that Brown Rudnick and Verdolino produce the responsive post-petition privileged\n\n<sup>4</sup> The Trustee's understanding of the discussions that are described herein and other facts set forth in this Factual Background are based principally on statements made by Brown Rudnick.\n\ndocuments to the Trustee and that, in the unlikely event that any Personal Harm Document existed, the Debtor could exercise his right to claw back the document as having been inadvertently produced pursuant to Federal Rule 26. The Debtor rejected the Trustee Proposal.\n\n14. After the Production Deadline passed, the Debtor's Counsel informed counsel for the Trustee and Brown Rudnick that it would agree to perform a review of potential Personal Harm Documents, on condition that it (a) could review every responsive post-petition privileged document, despite the Privilege Order's directive that such documents are presumed to be under the control of the Trustee, and (b) be permitted an unspecified (and seemingly unlimited) \"reasonable time\" to perform such a review. The Debtor's alternative offer was to maintain its incorrect position that Brown Rudnick and Verdolino, and not the Debtor, should be required to determine what privilege documents might cause personal harm to the Debtor, and undertake a review of all responsive post-petition privileged documents in Brown Rudnick's possession. Given the almost certain likelihood that either of the Debtor's proposals would cause the already late productions of Brown Rudnick and Verdolino to become further delayed, to the prejudice of the Trustee and the Estate, the Trustee rejected the Debtor's proposals.\n\n15. On September 29, 2022, counsel for the Debtor, the Trustee and Brown Rudnick conducted a conference call to attempt to find a consensual path forward. In an attempt to reach consensus, the Trustee, once again, reiterated its proposal for full production of documents by Brown Rudnick and Verdolino, protected by a claw back right of the Debtor, emphasizing that the Trustee Proposal would allow the Trustee to obtain the documents in a timely manner, while preserving, and not waiving, any rights or arguments of the Debtor. Unfortunately, the Debtor once again took the position that, prior to any production, his counsel needed to review each postpetition, privileged document in Brown Rudnick and Verdolino's possession, despite his continued inability to articulate why any documents might exist that would give rise to personal harm if disclosed to the Trustee.\n\n#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n16. The Court has jurisdiction to consider this matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Venue is proper in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n17. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).\n\n#### **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n18. The Trustee seeks entry of an order, in substantially the form of the Proposed Order, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 2004 and 9016, authorizing Brown Rudnick and Verdolino to produce Rule 2004 subpoenaed documents and enforcing the Privilege Order.\n\n### **BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n19. It is axiomatic that \"Bankruptcy courts retain jurisdiction to enforce and interpret their own orders.\" *In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc.*, 419 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Furthermore, Bankruptcy Courts have \"broad administrative power\" to issue any order that serves the interest of preserving the value of the Debtor's assets and to facilitate an efficient process to manage its docket. *See, e.g., Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. v. The Am. Channel, LLC (In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.)*, 345 B.R. 69, 85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining the court \"may use its equitable powers to assure the orderly conduct of the reorganization proceedings\") (quoting *In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.*, 765 F.2d 343, 348 (2d Cir. 1985)).\n\n20. Federal Rule 26, together with Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), \"provide[s] for a clawback of confidential documents contained among other materials knowingly produced.\" *U.S. v. Caroleo,* No. 17-cr-177 (ENV), 2019 WL 5869690 at, \\*2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 2019).\n\n> Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which is referenced by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), a party in receipt of information\n\nsubject to a claim of privilege must, after being notified, 'promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B). In this world of electronic document production by the terabyte, bench and bar concluded that it was incumbent *not to slow production pending scrupulous scrutiny of each document for privilege*. *See id.* advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment (noting that the risk of waiver as to electronically stored information 'and the time and effort required to avoid it, can increase substantially because of the volume of electronically stored information and the difficulty in ensuring that all information to be produced has in fact been reviewed').\n\n*Id.* (emphasis added). *See also Bretillot v. Burrow,* No. 14cv7633 (JGK)(MHD), 2015 WL 5306224,at \\*27 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015) (discussing interplay between Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Rule 26(b)(5)(B), and, given the growing costs of electronic discovery, the need to permit clawback of documents). Accordingly, the Trustee's Proposal, by providing for a claw back right of the Debtor, is consistent with the plain meaning and purpose the Federal Rules and is a reasonable, common-sense approach that preserves the rights of all Parties.\n\n21. Given the Production Deadline and Privilege Log Deadline have passed, and the absence of any stated grounds to believe any Personal Harm Documents might exist, coupled with the presumption in paragraph 6 of the Privilege Order that the Trustee now controls the privilege over all documents in the possession or custody of Brown Rudnick and Verdolino, the Court can and should order that: (i) Brown Rudnick and Verdolino are authorized to immediately produce all privileged documents to the Trustee pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Privilege Order; (ii) if the Debtor believes any such document is a Personal Harm Document, the production of such Personal Harm Document will be treated as inadvertent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B); and, (iii) such Personal Harm Document may be clawed backed by the Debtor and logged in a privilege log, upon which either the Trustee or Debtor may avail itself of its right to request adjudication of any dispute concerning the claim of privilege as set forth more fully in paragraph 7 of the Privilege Order.\n\n22. The Debtor's rejection of this approach, and its position to the contrary that it should be permitted to review every Brown Rudnick and Verdolino document prior to production, is unreasonable and unnecessary and would do nothing more than further delay the Trustee's investigation. The Debtor has been on notice of the privilege issue for months and has never sought relief under the Privilege Order for an \"extension of time\" to fulfill its obligations under the Privilege Order by the Privilege Log Deadline. (*See* Privilege Order, ¶ 7(i)). The Privilege Order is explicit that, if the Debtor wishes to assert privilege over a document on the basis of personal harm, *the Debtor's Counsel (Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.) has 10 days from the Production Deadline to produce a privilege log*. This 10-day deadline has passed, and the Debtor's Counsel has not logged a single document; thus, the Debtor no longer has the right to log any documents, and they can be produced, subject to the Debtor's claw-back rights under Federal Rule 26.\n\n23. The relief the Trustee seeks in the Proposed Order will provide a means for all parties, including the Debtor, to comply with the Privilege Order without waiving any right or suffering any prejudice and will ensure that the Trustee's investigation not be further disrupted by the Debtor's unreasonable positions and obstructionist tactics. Accordingly, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Proposed Order be entered by the Court.\n\n#### **NO PRIOR REQUEST**\n\n24. No prior request for the relief sought herein has been made to this or any other court.\n\n10\n\nWHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion\n\nand (a) enter the Proposed Order in substantially the form attached hereto and (b) grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.\n\nDated: September 30, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n**Exhibit A – Proposed Order**\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| -----------------------------------------------------------<br>x |        |                         |  |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|--|\n| In re:                                                           | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                                     | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |\n| Debtor.5                                                         | :<br>: |                         |  |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------      | :<br>x |                         |  |\n\n# **[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER AUTHORIZING COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 2004 SUBPOENAS AND ENFORCING CONSENT ORDER REGARDING CONTROL OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION RELATED TO RULE 2004 SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION**\n\nUpon consideration of the Motion seeking an order authorizing Brown Rudnick LLP and Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. to produce Rule 2004 subpoenaed documents and information and enforcing the Court's *Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information* [ECF No. 856] (the \"Privilege Order\"), after notice and a hearing, see 11 U.S.C. § 102(1), it appearing that cause exists to grant the requested relief as conditioned hereafter; it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED**: The Motion is granted as set forth below.\n\n**ORDERED**: Brown Rudnick LLP and Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. are hereby authorized to immediately produce to the Trustee all post-petition documents responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena the Trustee served on Brown Rudnick LLP and Verdolino & Lowey, P.C., respectively, on August 17, 2022.\n\n**ORDERED**: The Debtor may exercise his rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) to seek to claw back any document produced by Brown Rudnick LLP and/or Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. and to assert privilege over any such document to the extent he is permitted to do so in accordance with paragraph 7 of the Privilege Order.\n\n**ORDERED**: Any document clawed back by the Debtor shall be logged in a privilege log provided to the Trustee within two days of the Debtor's notice of such claw back.\n\n<sup>5</sup> Although the Debtor's legal name is Ho Wan Kwok, he is also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases. The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n**ORDERED**: Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Privilege Order, either the Trustee or Debtor may avail itself of its right to request adjudication of any dispute concerning the Debtor's claim of privilege over any clawed back document at any time.\n\n**ORDERED**: This Order is immediately enforceable.\n\nDated: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, 2022\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_","body_zh":"United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut Bridgeport Division（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部）\n\nx\n\n关于：\n第 11 章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。1\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n第 11 章受托人请求作出命令以授权遵守第 2004 条传票并执行关于与第 2004 条传票所调取文件及信息相关的律师-当事人保密特权及工作成果保护控制权的合意裁定的动议\n\nLuc A. Despins 作为获任命的债务人破产财产的第 11 章受托人（下称“受托人”），由其下述签字律师代表，依据《联邦破产程序规则》（下称“《破产规则》”）第 2004 条和第 9016 条提交本动议（下称“本动议”），请求作出实质上如本动议附件 A 所附形式的命令（下称“拟议命令”），授权 Brown Rudnick LLP（布朗·鲁德尼克律师事务所，下称“Brown Rudnick”）和 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（下称“Verdolino”）出具第 2004 条传票所调取的文件和信息，并执行法院的《关于与第 2004 条传票所调取文件及信息相关的律师-当事人保密特权及工作成果保护控制权的合意裁定》[ECF No. 856]（下称“《特权裁定》”）。为支持本动议，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n1 尽管债务人的法定姓名为 Ho Wan Kwok，但其亦被称为 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、Miles Guo、Miles Kwok 以及其他诸多化名。债务人纳税人识别号的后四位为 9595。\n引言\n\n1. 2022年8月17日，受托人依据法院准许受托人对债务人某些现任及前任顾问（包括 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino）进行第 2004 条调查的动议的命令，向 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino2 送达了传票（下称“第 2004 条传票”）。尽管他们已尽最大努力勤勉遵守第 2004 条传票，且《特权裁定》明确指示由 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 保管和占有的所有申请破产后享有特权的文件均推定处于受托人的控制之下，但迄今为止 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 仍未能向受托人出具任何一份符合要求的、申请破产后的、享有特权的文件。债务人通过采取不合理的、不当的立场违反《特权裁定》，阻止了 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 进行任何出具。受托人、Brown Rudnick 以及 Verdolino 现请求法院强制执行《特权裁定》，并授权 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 立即向受托人出具其占有的所有符合要求的文件。\n\n2. 基于与代表自身及代表 Verdolino 的 Brown Rudnick 的讨论，受托人了解到，最初，债务人在传票出具截止日期3之前首先采取了不合理的立场，即他既(i) 不允许 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 向受托人出具申请破产后享有特权的文件，尽管他并未按照《特权裁定》的要求向 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 指明任何可能由 Brown Rudnick 和/或 Verdolino 占有的且可能对债务人造成人身损害的特权文件或文件类别，也(ii) 不愿意允许其现任法律顾问 Zeisler & Zeisler,\n\n2 债务人曾申请聘请 Verdolino 担任其财务顾问，但该申请随后被撤回。（参见 [ECF No. 737]）。Brown Rudnick 代表 Verdolino 接受了向 Verdolino 发出的第 2004 条传票的送达。\n\n3 引言中未定义的首字母大写术语具有本动议后续部分赋予它们的含义。\n\nP.C.（下称“Zeisler & Zeisler 律师事务所”）对这些文件进行其自身的及时审查。如今，数周过去后，在出具截止日期和《特权裁定》项下出具特权清单的 10 天截止日期均已届满的情况下，债务人希望利用其此前拒绝的机会，要求其法律顾问在出具前审查 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 的每一份申请破产后享有特权的文件。债务人提出此项要求，尽管其无法说明任何善意理由以证明 Brown Rudnick 和/或 Verdolino 的卷宗中的任何文件若向受托人披露会对债务人造成人身损害，而这是债务人根据《特权裁定》可以寻求扣留文件的唯一依据。\n\n3. 债务人要求进行的审查除了会进一步延误受托人的调查外不会有任何其他作用，并且是完全不当的。鉴于《特权裁定》中推定受托人对 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 所占有的所有文件享有特权控制权，应允许 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 立即出具这些文件。在债务人善意认为因可能造成人身损害而本应扣留任何文件的范围内，他可以行使《联邦民事诉讼规则》（下称“《联邦规则》”）第 26 条项下的权利追回这些文件，并根据《特权裁定》寻求将其记入清单。债务人不会因此程序而受到损害，因为《特权裁定》明确规定，向受托人出具文件不会导致特权放弃，且未经法院进一步命令，受托人不得寻求实现任何此类放弃。\n\n4. 因此，基于这些理由以及下文讨论的理由，受托人请求授权 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 立即向受托人出具其占有和保管的所有符合要求的申请破产后特权文件，但受制于债务人按照《特权裁定》的要求，就其善意认为会对其造成人身损害的任何此类文件寻求追回的权利。\n诉讼程序状况\n\n5. 2022年8月17日，受托人向 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 送达了第 2004 条传票，要求出具关于债务人破产财产（下称“破产财产”）潜在资产等主题的文件和信息。根据第 2004 条传票以及法院的《准许第 11 章受托人关于对债务人的若干法律和财务顾问进行第 2004 条证据开示的申请的命令》[ECF No. 756]，Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 被责令于 2022年9月16日（下称“出具截止日期”）之前向受托人出具所有符合要求的文件。\n\n6. 2022年9月14日，法院作出了经协商一致同意的《特权裁定》，其目的是通过明确列出哪些特权文件由受托人控制、哪些仍由债务人控制来加快调查进程。关于 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 占有或控制的申请破产后的文件，《特权裁定》明确规定\n\n推定受托人对 Brown Rudnick LLP 和 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. 因在本案中代表债务人而占有或控制的所有申请破产后的文件和卷宗享有专属控制权，但须遵守第 7 段所载条款。\n\n（《特权裁定》第 6 段）。\n\n7. 根据《特权裁定》第 7 段，债务人仅有有限的能力以披露会对其造成人身损害为由寻求将文件作为特权文件予以扣留（下称“人身损害文件”，单称“人身损害文件”）（出处同上，第 7 段）。具体而言，\n\n在债务人善意认为特定文件或信息……若向受托人披露可能导致对债务人造成人身损害的范围内，则 (i) 债务人的法律顾问 [即 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.] 应在适用的出具截止日期后 10 天内……将所有此类文件记入清单……和/或以支持特权主张所必需的方式指明所有此类非文件信息，包括提供足以初步指明主张潜在人身损害依据的充分信息 [；但是，] ……所涉文件或信息的披露可能导致受托人发现破产财产的潜在资产，或可能构成与债务人对资产的所有权或控制权相关的证据，不应构成足以根据 [第 7 段] 扣留文件或信息的“对债务人的人身损害”，无论债务人关于此类资产的所有权或控制权持何种立场或观点。\n\n出处同上（强调为后加）。\n\n8. 因此，在债务人寻求将文件作为特权文件对受托人予以扣留的范围内，任何此类特权：(i) 仅能基于声称对债务人造成的人身损害而主张，且该损害与 (a) 识别潜在破产财产资产或 (b) 有关债务人对各项资产的潜在所有权或控制权的证据无关，并且 (ii) 必须由债务人在适用的出具截止日期后 10 天内通过将文件记入特权清单来主张（下称“特权清单截止日期”）。（出处同上）。\n事实背景\n\n9. 基于与 Brown Rudnick 的讨论，受托人了解到，在法院作出授权对包括 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 等人在内进行第 2004 条询问的命令（参见 [ECF No. 756]）（于 2022年8月16日 作出）之后，直至 2022年9月28日，Brown Rudnick 与债务人在第 11 章案件中的现任法律顾问 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（下称“债务人律师”）进行了多次讨论，讨论内容涉及 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 向受托人出具符合要求的申请破产后特权文件的能力。\n\n10. 2022年9月14日或前后，Brown Rudnick 告知债务人律师，鉴于 Brown Rudnick 无法接触债务人，且无法推定债务人可能认为什么会对其造成人身损害，Brown Rudnick 无法以此为由扣留符合要求的文件。受托人了解到，债务人律师尽管能够接触债务人，但并未告知 Brown Rudnick 其认为会对债务人造成人身损害的任何文件，亦未告知任何信息或行为类别，导致 Brown Rudnick 请求债务人同意 Brown Rudnick 可以向受托人出具所有符合要求的申请破产后特权文件。债务人予以拒绝。4\n\n11. 鉴于债务人的拒绝，Brown Rudnick 表示，作为替代方案，它将在出具之前向债务人律师提供 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 的所有文件，以允许债务人和/或债务人律师进行人身损害文件审查。不合理的是，债务人同样拒绝了这一提议，告知 Brown Rudnick 无论如何 Brown Rudnick 都有责任去推测什么可能会对债务人造成人身损害。这当然是不正确的，因为特权归债务人所有，且只有债务人——通过其现任律师——才能决定披露何种内容可能会在披露后对其造成人身损害。\n\n12. 由于债务人未向 Brown Rudnick 提供扣留任何特权文件的依据，但 Brown Rudnick 又面临着债务人声称 Brown Rudnick 无权出具其特权文件的前景，9月16日 的出具截止日期和 9月26日 的特权清单截止日期在既未出具文件也未出具清单的情况下届满。\n\n13. 在整个相关期间通过与 Brown Rudnick 及债务人律师的讨论获悉僵局后，受托人向债务人提议（下称“受托人提议”），由 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 出具符合要求的申请破产后特权\n\n4 受托人对本文所述讨论的理解以及本事实背景中阐述的其他事实主要基于 Brown Rudnick 所作的陈述。\n\n文件移交给受托人，且万一存在任何个人损害文件，债务人可以根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26条行使其追回权，将该文件视为疏忽提交的文件予以追回。债务人拒绝了受托人的提议。\n\n14. 在提交截止日期过后，债务人的律师通知受托人及 Brown Rudnick 的律师，其同意对潜在的个人损害文件进行审查，条件是其 (a) 可以审查每一份符合调取要求的申请破产后享有特权的文件，尽管《特权裁定》明确指示该等文件推定由受托人控制；以及 (b) 获准拥有未指定（且看似无限制）的“合理时间”来开展此类审查。债务人的替代方案是维持其错误立场，即应要求 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino，而非债务人，来确定哪些特权文件可能会对债务人造成个人损害，并对 Brown Rudnick 占有的所有符合调取要求的申请破产后特权文件进行审查。鉴于债务人的任何一项提议几乎必然会导致 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 本已逾期的文件提交进一步延迟，从而损害受托人和破产财团的利益，受托人拒绝了债务人的提议。\n\n15. 2022年9月29日，债务人、受托人和 Brown Rudnick 的律师举行了电话会议，试图找到一条协商一致的前进路径。为了达成共识，受托人再次重申其关于 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 全面提交文件、并由债务人的追回权予以保护的提议，强调受托人的提议将允许受托人及时获得文件，同时保留且不放弃债务人的任何权利或抗辩理由。不幸的是，债务人再次主张，在进行任何提交之前，其律师需要审查 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 占有的每一份申请破产后享有特权的文件，尽管他始终无法阐明为何可能存在若向受托人披露就会造成个人损害的文件。\n\n管辖权与审判地\n\n16. 本法院根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 和 1334 对审理本案具有管辖权。根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，审判地是适当的。\n\n17. 根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)，本案属于核心程序。\n\n请求的救济\n\n18. 受托人根据《破产规则》第2004条和第9016条，寻求作出大体符合《拟议裁定》形式的裁定，授权 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 提交根据第2004条传票调取的文件，并强制执行《特权裁定》。\n\n请求救济的事实与法律依据\n\n19. 显而易见的是，“破产法院保留强制执行和解释其自身命令的管辖权。”In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc., 419 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2005)（引文省略）。此外，破产法院拥有“广泛的行政权力”来发布任何有利于维护债务人资产价值并促进有效管理其案卷程序的命令。参见例如 Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. v. The Am. Channel, LLC (In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.), 345 B.R. 69, 85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)（说明法院“可以运用其衡平权力以确保重组程序的有序进行”）（引自 In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d 343, 348 (2d Cir. 1985)）。\n\n20. 《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26条连同《联邦证据规则》第502(b)条，“规定了对故意提交的其他材料中包含的机密文件享有追回权。”U.S. v. Caroleo, No. 17-cr-177 (ENV), 2019 WL 5869690 at, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 2019)。\n\n根据《联邦证据规则》第502(b)条所引用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26条，收到属于特权主张范围的信息的一方\n\n在接到通知后，必须“立即归还、隔离或销毁指定的信息”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B)。在当今以太字节（terabyte）计的电子文件提交时代，法官与律师界一致认为，有责任不因等待对每份文件进行特权严谨细致的审查而拖延文件提交。参见同上，2006年修正案顾问委员会注释（指出电子存储信息的弃权风险“以及避免该风险所需的时间和精力可能会因电子存储信息的庞大数量以及确保所有拟提交信息确实已经过审查的困难性而大幅增加”）。\n\n同上（强调为后加）。亦见 Bretillot v. Burrow, No. 14cv7633 (JGK)(MHD), 2015 WL 5306224, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015)（探讨《联邦证据规则》第502条与《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26(b)(5)(B)条之间的相互作用，并指出鉴于电子证据开示成本的不断增加，允许追回文件的必要性）。因此，受托人的提议通过规定债务人的追回权，符合《联邦规则》的字面含义和立法目的，是一项保留各方权利的合理且符合常理的途径。\n\n21. 鉴于提交截止日期和特权清单截止日期均已过去，且没有任何声明的理由令人相信可能存在任何个人损害文件，再加上《特权裁定》第6段中推定受托人现对 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 占有或保管的所有文件享有特权控制权，本法院可以且应当裁定：(i) 授权 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 根据《特权裁定》第6段立即向受托人提交所有特权文件；(ii) 如果债务人认为任何此类文件属于个人损害文件，则该等个人损害文件的提交将根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26(b)(5)(B)条被视为疏忽提交；以及 (iii) 债务人可以追回此类个人损害文件并列入特权清单，据此，受托人或债务人均可行使其权利，要求就有关特权主张的任何争议进行裁决，具体如《特权裁定》第7段所详述。\n\n22. 债务人拒绝这一途径，并坚持认为在提交前应允许其审查 Brown Rudnick 和 Verdolino 的每份文件，这一立场是不合理且不必要的，只会进一步拖延受托人的调查。债务人知悉特权问题已有数月之久，且从未根据《特权裁定》寻求救济以请求“延期”，以便在特权清单截止日期前履行其在《特权裁定》项下的义务。（参见《特权裁定》第 7(i) 段）。《特权裁定》明确规定，如果债务人希望以个人损害为由对某份文件主张特权，债务人的律师（Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.）自提交截止日期起有10天时间提供特权清单。这10天的截止日期已经过去，债务人的律师尚未将任何一份文件列入清单；因此，债务人不再有权将任何文件列入清单，这些文件可以予以提交，但受限于债务人根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26条享有的追回权。\n\n23. 受托人在《拟议裁定》中所寻求的救济将为包括债务人在内的所有当事方提供一种遵守《特权裁定》的途径，而无需放弃任何权利或遭受任何损害，并将确保受托人的调查不再受到债务人不合理立场和阻挠策略的进一步破坏。因此，受托人谨请法院签署《拟议裁定》。\n\n未曾提出前次请求\n\n24. 此前未曾向本法院或任何其他法院提出过本动议所寻求救济的请求。\n\n为此，受托人谨请法院批准本动议，\n\n并 (a) 签署大体符合本动议所附形式的《拟议裁定》，以及 (b) 准予可能属于公正且适当的其他及进一步的救济。\n\n日期：2022年9月30日 LUC A. DESPINS，\n康涅狄格州纽黑文 第11章破产受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（经特许出庭 / admitted pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nAvram E. Luft（经特许出庭 / admitted pro hac vice）\nDouglass Barron（经特许出庭 / admitted pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章破产受托人之代理律师\n\n证据 A – 拟议裁定\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）\nDISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分部）\n\nx\n\nIn re: （案件关联：） :\n: Chapter 11（第11章）\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）， :\n: Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)（案号：22-50073 (JAM)）\nDebtor.5（债务人。5） :\n\nx\n\n[拟议] 准予第11章破产受托人关于作出授权遵守第2004条传票并强制执行关于控制与第2004条传票调取之文件及信息相关的律师-当事人保密特权及工作成果保护之同意裁定的动议的裁定\n\n经审议请求作出裁定以授权 Brown Rudnick LLP 和 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. 提交根据第2004条传票调取的文件及信息并强制执行本法院《关于控制与第2004条传票调取之文件及信息相关的律师-当事人保密特权及工作成果保护之同意裁定》[ECF No. 856]（以下简称“《特权裁定》”）的动议，经送达通知并举行听证后，参见 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)，鉴于存在在此后所附条件下准予所请求救济的正当理由；特此\n\n裁定：动议按以下所述予以批准。\n\n裁定：特此授权 Brown Rudnick LLP 和 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. 立即向受托人提交符合受托人分别于2022年8月17日向 Brown Rudnick LLP 和 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. 送达的第2004条传票要求的全部申请破产后文件。\n\n裁定：债务人可行使其在《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26(b)(5)(B)条项下的权利，寻求追回由 Brown Rudnick LLP 及/或 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. 提交的任何文件，并在《特权裁定》第7段允许的范围内对任何此类文件主张特权。\n\n裁定：债务人追回的任何文件，均应在债务人发出该等追回通知后两日内列入提供给受托人的特权清单中。\n\n5 尽管债务人的法定姓名是 Ho Wan Kwok，但他也以 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、Miles Guo、Miles Kwok 以及许多其他化名为人所知。债务人纳税人识别号的后四位是9595。\n\n裁定：根据《特权裁定》第7段，受托人或债务人均可行使其权利，随时请求就有关债务人对任何被追回文件主张特权的任何争议进行裁决。\n\n裁定：本裁定即刻生效并具有执行力。\n\n日期：______________，2022年\n\nJulie A. Manning，美国破产法官\n\n________________________________________","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Miles Guo","Despins","Paul Hastings","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":737,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":756,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3662,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:50:54"}