{"id":"court_ctb_939_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":939,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nChapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nDebtor.\n\nCase No: 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n# **THE DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER AUTHORIZING COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 2004 SUBPOENAS AND ENFORCING CONSENT ORDER REGARDING CONTROL OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION RELATED TO RULE 2004 SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION**\n\nHo Wan Kwok, the debtor (the \"Debtor\") in the above-captioned bankruptcy case (the \"Bankruptcy Case\"), hereby objects to the Chapter 11 Trustee's (the \"Trustee\") Motion for Entry of Order Authorizing Compliance With Rule 2004 Subpoenas and Enforcing Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents And Information (the \"Motion\") (Doc. No. 898). In support of his objection, the Debtor respectfully represents as follows:\n\n### **Background**\n\n1. The Motion for Order seeks the entry of an order \"authorizing\" the Debtor's former law firm, Brown Rudnick LLP (\"BR\"), and former financial advisory firm, Verdolino & Lowey (\"V&L\"), to produce all Debtor related documents in their possession without first satisfying their obligations to make a determination as to whether the debtor is entitled to withhold them on privilege grounds under the terms of the Court's Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information (the \"Privilege Order\"). (Doc. No. 856).\n\n2. The Motion, consistent with the Trustee's *modus operandi*, accuses the Debtor of intentionally seeking to delay this proceeding by delaying the production of documents by BR. The Trustee's contentions are misleading at best. In fact, the Debtor has consistently responded to the Trustee's motions on an expedited basis in accordance with the Court's orders, and the Debtor had attempted to proactively address the subject of the Trustee's emergency *de jure*  raised by the current Motion before the Trustee even filed it.\n\n3. The Motion is the product of a collaborative effort between the Trustee and the Debtor's former bankruptcy law firm, BR, calculated to serve (i) the Trustee's interest in accessing the Debtor's privileged information to which he is not entitled; and (ii) BR's interest in avoiding its obligation to perform the work and analysis required under the Rules of Professional Conduct to intelligently assert all colorable bases for withholding from production its former client's attorney-client privileged communications and work product. The Trustee's and BR's collaboration is evidenced most clearly by the fact that BR filed a five (5) page \"Consent to Further Relief Sought by Trustee\" (Doc. No. 901) at 10:18 p.m. on Friday, September 30, 2022—a mere twenty-four (24) minutes after the Trustee filed the Motion at 9:54 p.m. on Friday.\n\n4. ABA Formal Opinion 473 (\"FO 473\"), dated February 17, 2016, governs a law firm's obligations when served with process that purports to compel production of a client or former client's privileged information. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 defines the types of information that an attorney may, and may not, disclose related to the representation of a client. Rule 1.6(b)(6) makes clear that a lawyer cannot argue that Rule 1.6 bars or excuses compliance with a court order. FO 473 at p. 3.\n\nBut a lawyer facing a court order requiring the disclosure of client confidential information still is faced with complex, critical and fact intensive questions on how to respond—e.g., what challenges should be considered, what specific information should be disclosed, and what protective measures should be sought. In making these judgments the lawyer must balance obligations inherent in the lawyer's dual role as advocate for the client and an officer of the court. In doing so, the lawyer should disclose confidential information only to the extent 'the lawyer reasonably believes necessary' to comply with the order. *Provision (b)(6) enables—indeed calls upon—the lawyer to make these delicate judgments.*\n\nId. (emphasis added.). A copy of FO 473 Is attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n\n5. FO 473 further states:\n\nOnce a lawyer determines disclosure is appropriate—in response to an initial demand or to an order and whether or not the client is available—the lawyer may produce documents and information '*only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes . . . is necessary . . . .***'** The lawyer should seek appropriate protective orders and similar arrangements 'to the fullest extent practicable.' 'Disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it.'\n\nId. at p. 8 (emphasis added). An attorney's obligations to a client under FO 473 apply equally to clients and former clients. See id at p. 4 n.12; *see also* ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(c)(1) and (2).\n\n6. In the present case, the Trustee states that it served BR and V&L with subpoenas on August 17, 2022 (the \"Subpoenas\"). The scope of the Subpoenas is incredibly broad, seeking, without limitation, \"All documents related to any obligation, claim, liability or debt associated with *any legal dispute involving the Debtor***,** including but not limited to those relating to any litigation before any local, state, federal or international body, whether an administrative body, court, panel or alternate dispute resolution entity.\" The scope of the Subpoenas is not, and could not have been, tailored or limited to the type of information to which the Trustee is entitled under the Privilege Order because the Privilege Order did not exist when the Trustee served the Subpoenas.\n\n7. The Debtor has consistently made clear that he has not and will not waive any attorney-client privilege that he retained notwithstanding the Trustee's appointment in July of\n\n2022. However, the Debtor has made equally clear that, under no circumstances, will he obstruct the Trustee's access to information to which the Trustee is entitled.\n\n8. Due to the existence of conflicting authorities regarding the scope of the privilege that an individual debtor retains notwithstanding the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee to administer his or her bankruptcy estate, on the one hand, and the scope of privileges that transfer to the trustee, on the other hand—absent a court order proscribing the particular standard to be applied in this case—it would have been impossible for any professional to determine which privileges the Debtor retained after the Trustee was appointed in the Debtor's bankruptcy case. *Compare Gottlieb re Fayerman (In re Ginzburg)*, 517 B.R. 175 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014) (individual debtor retains control of attorney-client privilege) *with In re Wilkerson*, 393 B.R. 734, 745 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008) (adopting a balancing test approach and holding an individual debtor retained privilege when debtor was in an adversarial posture with the trustee)*; Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore)*, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (adopting a balancing approach and holding trustee controlled privilege with respect to debtor's pre-petition cause of action against a third-party).\n\n9. As a result, absent the Privilege Order, the attorneys who received subpoenas from the trustee, including BR, likely would have been required pursuant to FO 473 to withhold from the Trustee and log every one of their privileged documents concerning the Debtor. That is because some authority holds that an individual debtor's attorney client privilege never transfers to a debtor's bankruptcy trustee, and attorneys are required to assert all non-frivolous arguments to protect their client's privileged information. *See e.g. In re Ginzburg*, 517 B.R. 175; *see also* FO 473, at p. 6 n.22 (collecting authorities).\n\n10. Contrary to the Trustee's unsubstantiated and baseless running narrative that the Debtor is somehow seeking to delay the administration of his bankruptcy estate, the Debtor stipulated to the Privilege Order because he believed that the sooner all parties in interest had a clearer understanding of the scope of privileged documents that the Trustee is, and is not, entitled to receive, the more efficiently the parties (including the Debtor's professionals and former professionals) would be able to provide the Trustee with the information to which he is entitled—which would lead to a more expeditious and efficient administration of the Debtor's estate.\n\n11. The Debtor's counsel and the Trustee's counsel—with substantial assistance and guidance from the Court—worked tirelessly to agree upon the terms of a stipulated Privilege Order that proscribes a standard that will help the Debtor and other recipients of subpoenas from the Trustee to determine whether the information under their control should be produced to the Trustee, on the one hand, or logged and withheld from the Trustee on the basis of privilege, on the other hand. See Doc. No. 856 (Privilege Order).\n\n12. The Privilege Order does not and could not, in any way, absolve BR and other professionals of their professional and ethical obligations to the Debtor under FO 473—nor was it ever intended by the Debtor to do so. Rather, the Privilege Order was intended to provide guidance on how BR and other professionals should apply their professional and ethical obligations to the particular facts of this case, with the objective of avoiding a scenario where professionals over withheld documents due to lack of clarity regarding the scope of privilege that the Debtor retained, and did not retain, upon the Trustee's appointment.\n\n13. The Debtor and his counsel certainly did not agree to the Privilege Order to *excuse* the Debtor's professionals and former professionals from their obligation to apply the\n\n5\n\nPrivilege Order to the information in their files and assert all non-frivolous claims of privilege on the Debtor's behalf. To the contrary, the Debtor and his counsel stipulated to the Privilege Order to *enable* the Debtor's professionals and former professionals to assert privilege claims on his behalf on a more informed basis.\n\n14. The Privilege Order entered on September 14, 2022. See Doc. No. 856. Responses to the Subpoenas that the Trustee served on BR and V&L were due, pursuant to their terms, only two days later, on September 16, 2022. It would have been impossible for BR, the Debtor or anyone else to apply the Privilege Order to the documents in BR's files on or before September 16. For that reason, in this context, it would be absurd for anyone to contend or conclude that BR, V&L or any other recipient of a subpoena from the Trustee could have made (or should have been required to make) privilege determinations pursuant to the Privilege Order by September 16, 2022—or any time remotely close to that date given the volume of documents involved and the number of issues being raised by the Trustee in the Debtor's bankruptcy case at any given time.\n\n15. In addition, neither the Debtor nor the Debtor's counsel has ever demanded that BR, V&L or any other professional withhold any particular documents in their possession from the Trustee based on the assertion of privilege. Likewise, neither the Debtor nor the Debtor's counsel ever purported to direct BR or V&L that they were required to undertake a documentby-document review of their entire files. The Debtor's counsel at Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (\"Z&Z\") has expressly, consistently, and repeatedly asked BR to the comply with the Trustee's subpoena to the best of its ability based on the Debtor's reservation of all privileges that he retained, BR's professional responsibilities to the Debtor and the Court, and BR's knowledge of the content of its own files—knowledge that, until very recently, was exclusively within BR's possession and control.<sup>1</sup>\n\n16. The Debtor and his counsel never directed BR, one way or another, whether a document-by-document review of BR's files was necessary. The Debtor expressly deferred to BR to determine the manner in which it was required to comply with the Subpoena while fulfilling its obligations under FO 473.\n\n17. Shortly after the Privilege Order entered, it became clear that BR was not willing to undertake, or even attempt to undertake, an analysis of what documents in its file for the Debtor should, or should not, be withheld on the basis of privilege.\n\n18. For that reason, in an attempt to avoid a dispute and minimize the disturbance to the administration of the Debtor's estate over this issue, on September 21, 2022, the Debtor's undersigned counsel—while he and his entire family were confined to their home and experiencing moderate Covid 19 symptoms—engaged in a number of discussions with the Trustee's counsel and BR. The undersigned informed the Trustee's counsel that although Z&Z would prefer not to undertake the task of reviewing BR and V&L's files and logging privileged information— and that it was not Z&Z's obligation to do so—*Z&Z would agree to do so as an accommodation* because it would be more efficient for Z&Z to do so than for the parties to expend the time and incur the expense litigating the issue.\n\n19. The Trustee's counsel rejected this proposal. Instead, the Trustee's counsel demanded that BR and V&L produce their files to the Trustee immediately, subject only to the Debtor's right to claw back after the fact any privileged documents that were improperly produced. The Trustee ostensibly proposed this procedure as a \"compromise.\" However, Fed R. Civ P. 26(b)(1)(B), along with the Privilege Order's express terms, already allow all parties the\n\n<sup>1</sup> Z&Z has engaged in no direct communication with V&L concerning compliance with the Trustee's subpoena.\n\nright to claw back inadvertently produced privileged documents. Thus, the Trustee's \"compromise\" was merely an offer to allow the Debtor rights that he already had, while depriving him of the right to a determination on the merits of any privilege claim that he, his counsel or former counsel might assert based on the contents of the Debtor's files.\n\n20. Based on the undersigned's understanding that the Trustee's counsel would not\n\nagree to allow the Debtor's counsel a reasonable time to review BR's file for privilege issues, on\n\nSeptember 22, 2022, the Debtor's counsel emailed BR and stated the following:\n\nAs you know, Z&Z tried to accommodate everyone's concerns/interests (the Debtor's, the Trustee's and Brown Rudnick's) by agreeing to review documents in Brown Rudnick's possession for purposes of assessing privilege, but the Trustee appears unwilling to allow us a reasonable time to do so. At this point, I don't see any alternative other than that Brown Rudnick respond to the subpoena in the manner it deems is required based on the debtor's stated reservation of whatever privilege rights he has, the applicable rules of professional conduct, the applicable rules of professional responsibility and the order entered in this case governing privilege.\n\nI'm happy to discuss this one more time if you like but given the Trustee's position I'm not sure that there is anything else I can do.\n\n(Exhibit B, at p. 3).\n\n21. That evening, BR responded to the Debtor's counsel, stating that it was pulling together its entire client file, would produce to the Trustee any documents that could be categorically excluded from a privilege determination, such as BR's communications with thirdparties, and it would produce to Z&Z the balance of its file so Z&Z could make the determination of whether to withhold documents based on privilege pursuant to the standard set forth in the Privilege Order. BR advised the undersigned that he believed the Trustee's counsel was agreeable to that approach. (Exhibit B, at p. 1-2).\n\n22. The following day, September 23, 2022, the undersigned called Patrick Linsey, the Trustee's Connecticut counsel, to inquire whether the procedure proposed by BR the previous day was acceptable to the Trustee. Attorney Linsey stated he would speak with his cocounsel and one of them would respond.\n\n23. To the best of the undersigned's recollection, no substantive communication occurred between the Trustee's counsel and the Debtor's counsel concerning the BR subpoena until the following Thursday, September 29, 2022, when the Trustee reiterated his demand that BR and V&L produce their files immediately, subject only to the Debtor's right to claw back any privileged documents that should not have been produced. The Trustee filed the Motion at 9:54 the following evening, September 30, 2022.<sup>2</sup>\n\n24. On October 6, 2022, V&L produced its file to the Debtor's counsel. That same day, BR produced the first tranche of its file, which the Debtor's counsel understands to be BR's file other than its internal communications. The Debtor's counsel worked with its E-Discovery vendor to have the information provided by V&L and BR loaded to a review platform which was completed late in the day on October 7. On Monday, October 10, 2022, the Debtor's counsel completed its review of the first tranche of BR's file, which contained 3,263 documents and V&L's files, which contained 14,258 documents. Of those documents, the Debtor's counsel identified 33 documents, some of which are likely duplicative, that it intends to log as privileged under the terms of the Privilege Order. The Debtor's counsel expects to receive a second tranche of documents from BR containing its internal communications and will endeavor to review them as expeditiously as the first.\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Trustee's counsel and the Debtor's counsel discussed a subpoena to a different professional firm, Clark Hill, on the evening of September 28, 2022. However, to the best of the undersigned's recollection they deferred discussion of the BR and V&L subpoenas until their call with BR that had already been scheduled for the following day.\n\n### **Argument**\n\n25. The Second Circuit has held that it is reversible error to require a party to produce potentially privileged documents—subject only to the right to claw back those documents later before a judicial determination has been made on the merits of the privilege claim. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC*, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d. Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit acknowledged that the magistrate in *Turner & Newall* who had erroneously ordered a party to produce privileged documents before resolving the merits of the privilege claim had \"sought an economical means to accomplish the awesome task of testing claims of privilege concerning thousands of documents.\" *Id.* However:\n\nThe economies seemingly offered by this procedure, if it becomes widely used, will be offset by the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' arguments that will inevitably arise when an adversary is allowed to see documents that are later held to be privileged and inadmissible at trial. Such documents may alert adversary counsel to evidentiary leads or give insights regarding various claims and defenses. Moreover, attorneys cannot unlearn what has been disclosed to them in discovery. Some of the economies gained by the practice of pre-adjudication disclosure may thus be offset by later proceedings seeking to unscramble the effects of the disclosure of materials subsequently held to be privileged. *Our research suggests that the present practice of pre-disclosure adjudication avoids all but a small number of unscrambling problems*.\n\n*Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n26. Here, the Debtor cannot be held to have waived the right to assert privilege over any documents in BR or V&L's file based on the passage of time. As an initial matter, the Debtor has never asked BR to delay the production of non-privileged documents in BR's files and it expressly requested that BR make a determination of which documents could, and could not, be produced to the Trustee based on applicable law and the Debtor's reservation of rights on privilege issues. The Privilege Order only entered on September 14, 2022, and since that time the Debtor and his counsel have worked to resolve privilege issues related to the documents in BR's files.\n\n27. On September 22, 2022, BR informed the Debtor's counsel that it believed the Trustee would agree to allow BR to produce to Z&Z the portion of its files that could not be categorically determined to be non-privileged so that Z&Z could make a privilege determination on the Debtor's behalf. On September 23, 2022, the Debtor's counsel asked the Trustee's counsel to confirm that agreement, and it did not become clear to the Debtor's counsel that the arrangement was unacceptable to the Trustee until BR, the Trustee's counsel and the Debtor's counsel all spoke on September 29, 2022. The Trustee filed the Motion late at night on September 30, 2022.\n\n28. V&L produced its files and BR produced the first tranche of its files to Z&Z on Thursday, October 6, 2022. Before that time, the Debtor did not possess or control any of the documents in BR's files, and Z&Z completed its review of the documents it received from BR and V&L in one business day. Under these circumstances, the equitable and appropriate solution is to deny the Motion and allow Z&Z to complete its review of BR's files within a reasonable time from when Z&Z receives it. 3\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Debtor requests that the Court deny the Motion, allow Z&Z a reasonable time from when it receives the balance of the documents in BR's files to review those documents and identify privilege issues, if any, and grant the Debtor such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\n<sup>3</sup> Z&Z will not be able to review the files of all, or even many, of the professionals who have represented the Debtor and received a subpoena from the Trustee. However, the unique role of BR as the Debtor's BK counsel weighed in favor of Z&Z reviewing BR's files for privilege issues here based on BR's unwillingness to do so.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 11th day of October, 2022.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 11th day of October, 2022, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\n\n第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n债务人。\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人对第 11 章受托人请求作出授权遵守第 2004 条传票并执行关于控制与第 2004 条传票传唤文件和信息相关的律师-委托人保密特权及工作成果保护的合意裁定的动议的异议\n\n上述标题破产案件（“破产案件”）中的债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（“债务人”）特此对第 11 章受托人（“受托人”）请求作出授权遵守第 2004 条传票并执行关于控制与第 2004 条传票传唤文件和信息相关的律师-委托人保密特权及工作成果保护的合意裁定的动议（“动议”）（文件编号：898）提出异议。为支持其异议，债务人谨陈述如下：\n背景\n\n1. 该请求裁定的动议旨在寻求作出一项裁定，“授权”债务人的前代理律师事务所 Brown Rudnick LLP（“BR”）及前财务咨询公司 Verdolino & Lowey（“V&L”）提交其占有的所有与债务人相关的文档，而无需首先履行其依据本院《关于控制与第 2004 条传票传唤文件和信息相关的律师-委托人保密特权及工作成果保护的合意裁定》（“特权裁定”）（文件编号：856）条款判定债务人是否有权基于特权理由予以扣留的义务。\n\n2. 该动议延续了受托人一贯的做法，指控债务人故意通过拖延 BR 提交文件来拖延本案程序。受托人的主张往好里说也是误导性的。事实上，债务人一贯按照法院的命令在加急的基础上回应受托人的各项动议，而且债务人早在受托人提起本动议之前，就已试图主动解决受托人当前动议所提出的法律上的紧急事态问题。\n\n3. 该动议是受托人与债务人前破产代理律所 BR 之间协同合作的产物，旨在满足：(i) 受托人获取其无权获取的债务人特权信息的利益；以及 (ii) BR 逃避其依据《职业行为规则》履行必要工作与分析的义务，即理性地主张所有合理依据以拒绝提交其前客户受律师-委托人特权保护的通信和工作成果的利益。受托人与 BR 的协同合作最明显的证据在于：在受托人于 2022 年 9 月 30 日星期五晚上 9:54 提交该动议仅二十四 (24) 分钟后，BR 便于星期五晚上 10:18 提交了一份长达五 (5) 页的《对受托人所寻求之进一步救济的同意书》（文件编号：901）。\n\n4. 日期为 2016 年 2 月 17 日的美国律师协会第 473 号正式意见（ABA Formal Opinion 473，“第 473 号正式意见”）规定了律师事务所在收到意图强制作出客户或前客户特权信息的法律文书时所承担的义务。《职业行为规则》第 1.6 条界定了律师在代理客户过程中可以披露和不得披露的信息类型。第 1.6(b)(6) 条明确规定，律师不能主张第 1.6 条禁止或免除其遵守法院命令的义务。第 473 号正式意见第 3 页。\n\n然而，面临要求披露客户机密信息的法院命令的律师，在如何应对方面仍面临复杂、关键且高度依赖事实的问题——例如，应考虑提出何种异议、应披露何种具体信息，以及应寻求何种保护措施。在作出这些判断时，律师必须平衡其作为客户倡导者和法院官员的双重角色所固有的义务。在这样做时，律师应当仅在“律师合理认为必要”以遵守命令的限度内披露机密信息。第 (b)(6) 款规定使律师能够——实际上是要求律师——作出这些审慎的判断。\n\n同上（强调后加）。第 473 号正式意见的副本作为附件 A 附于本文件之后。\n\n5. 第 473 号正式意见进一步指出：\n\n一旦律师判定披露是适当的——无论是响应最初的要求还是响应命令，也无论客户是否在场——律师“仅可在律师合理认为……属于必要……的限度内”提供文件和信息。律师应当“在最大可行限度内”寻求适当的保护令及类似安排。“披露的方式应当使该信息的获取仅限于审判庭或其他有知悉必要的人员。”\n\n同上，第 8 页（强调后加）。律师依据第 473 号正式意见对客户承担的义务同样适用于现有客户和前客户。参见同上，第 4 页脚注 12；另见《ABA 职业行为示范规则》第 1.9(c)(1) 和 (2) 条。\n\n6. 在本案中，受托人称其于 2022 年 8 月 17 日向 BR 和 V&L 送达了传票（“传票”）。传票的范围极其宽泛，寻求包括但不限于“与涉及债务人的任何法律争议相关的任何义务、索赔、责任或债务相关的所有文件，包括但不限于与在任何地方、州、联邦或国际机构（无论是行政机构、法院、仲裁庭或替代性争议解决实体）进行的任何诉讼相关的文件”。传票的范围并没有、也绝不可能针对或受限于受托人依据《特权裁定》有权获得的信息类型，因为在受托人送达传票时，《特权裁定》尚不存在。\n\n7. 债务人一贯明确表示，尽管受托人于 2022 年 7 月获得任命，但他并未且绝不会放弃其保留的任何律师-委托人特权。然而，债务人同样明确表示，在任何情况下，他都不会阻碍受托人获取受托人有权获得的信息。\n\n8. 由于一方面关于个人债务人在破产受托人获任命接管其破产财产后仍保留的特权范围存在相互冲突的先例，另一方面关于转移给受托人的特权范围亦存在分歧——在缺乏明确规定本案应适用之特定标准的法院命令的情况下——任何专业人士在受托人于债务人破产案中获任命后，都绝不可能确定债务人保留了哪些特权。比较 Gottlieb re Fayerman (In re Ginzburg), 517 B.R. 175 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014)（个人债务人保留对律师-委托人特权的控制权）与 In re Wilkerson, 393 B.R. 734, 745 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008)（采纳利益衡量法，并认定当债务人与受托人处于对抗态势时，个人债务人保留特权）；Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore), 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998)（采纳利益衡量法，并认定受托人对债务人在破产申请前针对第三方的诉由拥有特权控制权）。\n\n9. 因此，若无《特权裁定》，收到受托人传票的律师（包括 BR）根据第 473 号正式意见，很可能被要求向受托人扣留并逐一登记其所持有的关于债务人的每一份特权文件。这是因为部分判例认定，个人债务人的律师-委托人特权绝不转移给债务人的破产受托人，且律师必须提出所有非无理的主张以保护其客户的特权信息。参见例如 In re Ginzburg, 517 B.R. 175；另见第 473 号正式意见第 6 页脚注 22（汇总相关判例）。\n\n10. 与受托人毫无根据、凭空捏造的关于债务人企图以某种方式拖延其破产财产管理的持续说法相反，债务人之所以签署同意该《特权裁定》，是因为他认为，所有利害关系方越快明确理解受托人有权与无权接收的特权文件范围，各方（包括债务人的专业人士和前专业人士）就能越高效地向受托人提供其有权获得的信息——这将促使债务人破产财产的管理更为迅速和高效。\n\n11. 债务人的律师与受托人的律师——在法院的大力协助和指导下——孜孜不倦地工作，就一项协议订立的《特权裁定》条款达成一致，该裁定明确规定了一项标准，以帮助债务人及受托人传票的其他接收方判定其控制下的信息是应当提交给受托人，还是应当基于特权予以登记并向受托人扣留。参见文件编号：856（特权裁定）。\n\n12. 《特权裁定》绝没有也不可能以任何方式免除 BR 和其他专业人士依据第 473 号正式意见对债务人负有的职业和执业道德义务——债务人也从未打算以此免除其义务。相反，《特权裁定》旨在就 BR 和其他专业人士应如何将他们的职业和道德义务适用于本案的具体事实提供指引，其目的是避免因对受托人任命后债务人所保留及未保留的特权范围缺乏清晰界定，而导致专业人士过度扣留文件的情况。\n\n13. 债务人及其律师绝不是为了免除债务人的专业人士和前专业人士将《特权裁定》适用于其卷宗内信息的义务，并代表债务人主张所有非无理的特权主张，才同意该《特权裁定》的。相反，债务人及其律师签署同意该《特权裁定》，是为了让债务人的专业人士和前专业人士能够在更加知情的基础上代表他主张特权权利。\n\n14. 《特权裁定》于 2022 年 9 月 14 日作出。参见文件编号：856。依据其条款，受托人送达 BR 和 V&L 的传票的答复截止日期仅在两天之后的 2022 年 9 月 16 日。BR、债务人或任何其他人绝不可能在 9 月 16 日或之前将《特权裁定》适用于 BR 卷宗中的文件。出于这一原因，在此背景下，任何人如果主张或得出结论认为 BR、V&L 或受托人传票的任何其他接收方本可以在 2022 年 9 月 16 日之前（或鉴于涉及的文件体量以及受托人在债务人破产案中随时提出的诸多争议事项，在距该日期相近的任何时间内）依据《特权裁定》作出（或应当被要求作出）特权判定，都将是荒谬的。\n\n15. 此外，无论是债务人还是债务人的律师，从未要求 BR、V&L 或任何其他专业人士基于主张特权而向受托人扣留其占有的任何特定文件。同样，无论是债务人还是债务人的律师，也从未企图指示 BR 或 V&L 必须对其整个卷宗进行逐件文件的审查。债务人在 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（“Z&Z”）的代理律师已明确、一贯且反复地要求 BR 根据债务人对其所保留之全部特权的保留声明、BR 对债务人和法院负有的职业责任，以及 BR 对其自身卷宗内容的知悉情况——直到最近，这种知悉情况一直完全由 BR 独家掌握和控制1——尽其最大能力遵守受托人的传票。\n\n16. 债务人及其律师从未以任何方式指示 BR（Brown Rudnick 律师事务所），是否有必要对 BR 的案卷进行逐件审查。债务人明确交由 BR 自行决定在履行其在 FO 473 项下义务的同时，应以何种方式遵守传票要求。\n\n17. 在《特权裁定》（Privilege Order）作出后不久，情况便已明朗：BR 不愿意承担、甚至不愿尝试承担对其为债务人所立案卷中哪些文件应以特权为由予以扣留、哪些不应扣留的分析工作。\n\n18. 出于该原因，为了避免争议并最大程度减少该问题对债务人破产财产管理的干扰，2022年9月21日，债务人下述署名律师——当时他及其全家均被隔离在家并出现中度 Covid 19 症状——与受托人律师及 BR 进行了多次沟通。署名律师告知受托人律师，尽管 Z&Z（Zeisler & Zeisler 律师事务所）不愿承担审查 BR 及 V&L（Vedder Price 律师事务所）案卷并记录特权信息的任务——且 Z&Z 亦无义务这样做——但出于融通便利，Z&Z 愿意承担此项工作，因为由 Z&Z 来做，比各方就该问题花费时间并承担费用进行诉讼更为高效。\n\n19. 受托人律师拒绝了该提议。相反，受托人律师要求 BR 和 V&L 立即向受托人出示其案卷，仅保留债务人事后对任何被不当出示的特权文件进行追回（claw back）的权利。受托人表面上将该程序作为一种“妥协”提出。然而，Fed R. Civ P. 26(b)(1)(B)（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 26(b)(1)(B) 条）连同《特权裁定》的明文条款，本就已赋予所有当事方追回非故意出示的特权文件的权利。因此，受托人的“妥协”只不过是提出允许债务人享有其本已拥有的权利，同时却剥夺了债务人、其律师或前任律师基于债务人案卷内容可能主张的任何特权主张获得实体审理判定的权利。\n\n1 Z&Z 就遵守受托人传票事宜未与 V&L 进行过任何直接沟通。\n\n20. 基于署名律师对受托人律师不同意给予债务人律师合理时间审查 BR 案卷特权问题的理解，债务人律师于2022年9月22日向 BR 发送电子邮件，声明如下：\n\n如你所知，Z&Z 曾试图通过同意审查 Brown Rudnick 占有的文件以评估特权的方式，兼顾各方的关切/利益（债务人、受托人及 Brown Rudnick 的利益），但受托人似乎不愿意给予我们合理的时间来完成此项工作。在此关头，除 Brown Rudnick 根据债务人对其拥有的任何特权权利的明确保留声明、适用的职业行为规则、适用的执业责任规则以及本案中就特权事宜作出的裁定，以其认为被要求的方式对传票作出答复之外，我看不出有任何其他替代方案。\n\n如果你愿意，我很乐意就此再进行一次讨论，但鉴于受托人的立场，我不确定我还能做些什么。\n\n（证物 B，第 3 页）。\n\n21. 当晚，BR 回复债务人律师，称其正在汇总其全部客户案卷，并将向受托人出示可以明确排除在特权判定之外的任何文件（例如 BR 与第三方的通信），且其将把案卷的其余部分出示给 Z&Z，以便 Z&Z 能够根据《特权裁定》中规定的标准就是否基于特权扣留文件作出判定。BR 告知署名律师，他认为受托人律师同意该方法。（证物 B，第 1-2 页）。\n\n22. 次日，即2022年9月23日，署名律师致电受托人的康涅狄格州律师 Patrick Linsey，询问受托人是否接受 BR 前一日提议的程序。Linsey 律师表示他将与他的共同代理律师商议，他们其中一人将予以回复。\n\n23. 就署名律师的最佳记忆所及，在随后的周四（即2022年9月29日）之前，受托人律师与债务人律师之间未就 BR 传票进行任何实质性沟通；届时，受托人重申其要求 BR 和 V&L 立即出示其案卷，仅保留债务人追回任何本不应出示的特权文件的权利。受托人于次日晚间（即2022年9月30日）9:54 提交了动议。2\n\n24. 2022年10月6日，V&L 向债务人律师出示了其案卷。同日，BR 出示了其第一批案卷，债务人律师认为这是除 BR 内部通信之外的案卷。债务人律师与其电子证据开示（E-Discovery）服务商合作，将 V&L 和 BR 提供的信息加载至审查平台，该工作于10月7日晚间完成。2022年10月10日星期一，债务人律师完成了对 BR 第一批案卷（包含 3,263 份文件）以及 V&L 案卷（包含 14,258 份文件）的审查。在这些文件中，债务人律师识别出 33 份文件（其中部分可能为重复文件），并拟根据《特权裁定》的条款将其作为特权文件进行记录。债务人律师预计将收到 BR 包含其内部通信的第二批文件，并将努力像审查第一批文件一样迅速地进行审查。\n\n2 受托人律师与债务人律师曾于2022年9月28日晚间就针对另一家专业机构 Clark Hill 的传票进行了讨论。然而，就署名律师的最佳记忆所及，他们将关于 BR 和 V&L 传票的讨论推迟到了已预定于次日与 BR 进行的通话中。\n\n辩论意见\n\n25. 第二巡回法院已认定，要求当事人出示具有潜在特权的文件——仅保留在法院对特权主张的实体问题作出司法判定之前事后追回这些文件的权利——属于可撤销的错误。Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d. Cir. 1992)。第二巡回法院承认，Turner & Newall 案中在解决特权主张的实体问题之前错误地命令当事人出示特权文件的治安法官，“曾试图寻求一种经济的方法来完成检验涉及数千份文件的特权主张这一艰巨任务。”Id.。然而：\n\n如果这种程序被广泛采用，其表面上带来的经济效益将被“毒树之果”的辩论所抵消；当允许对手方查看事后被认定具有特权且在审判中不可采信的文件时，必然会引发这种辩论。此类文件可能会提醒对手方律师注意证据线索，或提供有关各种诉求和抗辩的见解。此外，律师无法在开示程序中忘掉已经向其披露的内容。因此，通过判决前披露的做法所获得的某些经济利益，可能会被事后旨在消除随后被认定具有特权的材料披露后果的诉讼程序所抵消。我们的研究表明，目前的披露前判决做法可以避免除极少数情况之外的所有消除披露后果的问题。\n\nId.（强调为后加）。\n\n26. 在本案中，不能基于时间的推移而认定债务人放弃了对 BR 或 V&L 案卷中任何文件主张特权的权利。首先，债务人从未要求 BR 延迟出示 BR 案卷中的非特权文件，并且明确要求 BR 根据适用法律及债务人对特权问题的权利保留，判定哪些文件可以、哪些文件不可以向受托人出示。《特权裁定》直至2022年9月14日才作出，自那时起，债务人及其律师一直在努力解决与 BR 案卷中文件相关的特权问题。\n\n27. 2022年9月21日，BR 告知债务人律师，其认为受托人会同意允许 BR 向 Z&Z 出示其案卷中无法被明确判定为非特权的部分，以便 Z&Z 可以代表债务人作出特权判定。2022年9月23日，债务人律师要求受托人律师确认该协议，直到 BR、受托人律师和债务人律师于2022年9月29日共同通话时，债务人律师才明确该安排不被受托人接受。受托人于2022年9月30日深夜提交了动议。\n\n28. V&L 于2022年10月6日星期四向 Z&Z 出示了其案卷，BR 亦于同日向 Z&Z 出示了其第一批案卷。在此之前，债务人并不占有或控制 BR 案卷中的任何文件，且 Z&Z 在一个工作日内便完成了对从 BR 和 V&L 处收到的文件的审查。在此等情况下，衡平且适当的解决办法是驳回动议，并允许 Z&Z 在收到 BR 案卷后的合理时间内完成审查。3\n\n为此，债务人请求法院驳回动议，允许 Z&Z 在收到 BR 案卷中剩余文件后的合理时间内审查这些文件并识别特权问题（若有），并给予债务人法院认为公正和适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n3 Z&Z 将无法审查曾代表债务人并收到受托人传票的所有、甚至多数专业人士的案卷。然而，鉴于 BR 不愿对 BR 案卷进行审查，BR 作为债务人破产代理律师的独特角色支持了由 Z&Z 在本案中就特权问题审查 BR 案卷的做法。\n\n2022年10月11日订于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n债务人：Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）\n\n/签名/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144)\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮箱：[aromney@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证书\n\n本人特此证明，于2022年10月11日，前述文书的一份副本已通过电子方式提交。本提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统的运行以电子邮件形式发送给所有当事方，或按照电子提交通知上的指示，以邮寄方式发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人。各当事方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交的文件。\n\n/签名/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":3633,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:44:51"}