{"id":"court_ctb_98_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":98,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| In re:                                       | Chapter 11 Case No. |\n|----------------------------------------------|---------------------|\n| Ho Wan Kwok1                                 | 22-50073 (JAM)      |\n| Debtor.                                      |                     |\n|                                              |                     |\n| Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P., |                     |\n| Movant,                                      |                     |\n| vs.                                          |                     |\n| Ho Wan Kwok,                                 |                     |\n| Respondent                                   | March 18, 2022      |\n\n# **PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER CONFIRMING THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO SECTION 362(d)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE**\n\nTO THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:\n\nPAX submits this reply in support of its *Motion for Entry of an Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the Alternative, Relief From the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code* [ECF No. 57] (the \"Motion\") and in response to the *Debtor's Objection to Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. For*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n*Entry of An Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code* [ECF No. 83] (the \"Objection\").<sup>2</sup>\n\n#### **REPLY**\n\n1. Contrary to Kwok's misrepresentations, PAX brings this Motion to ensure that a valuable estate asset is brought to New York where it can be protected for the benefit of Kwok's creditors subject to further order of the Court—not to put Kwok in jail. Consistent with his past behavior that led to the Supreme Court of the State of New York (Justice Ostrager presiding) (the \"NY State Court\") ordering Kwok to return the Lady May to New York and holding him in contempt, Kwok continues to resist all efforts to marshal his assets and act on behalf of anyone's interests, but his family's and his own. In doing so, Kwok leaves the Lady May at risk of misuse and abuse by his family (who asserts they exclusively own the Lady May—a claim rejected by the NY State Court) and, if Kwok is to be believed, at risk of seizure in foreign waters by the same foreign governments he claims have frozen his purported other assets.<sup>3</sup>\n\n2. The Objection seeks improperly to re-litigate the facts underpinning the February 9 Contempt Order, which was preceded by a full evidentiary hearing with testimony from seven witnesses, including Kwok's daughter. *See* February 9 Contempt Order at 2. Following that hearing, the NY State Court found that \"[t]he testimony adduced at the hearing out of the mouths of [Kwok's] witnesses clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Kwok beneficially owns and controls the Lady May.\" *Id.* at 4.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms used but not defined in this reply shall have meanings given to such terms in the Motion.\n\n<sup>3</sup> *See* Global Notes and Statements of Limitations, ECF No. 77 at 6–7 (describing a Hong Kong court order freezing and subjecting to seizure \"[a]s much as billions [] of funds and property . . . purportedly subject to the Debtor's 'effective control'\"); *see also*, Notes to Question 19 (describing the Chinese government's raid and seizure of certain of Kwok's business records).\n\n3. But rather than seeking relief from the stay to continue his appeal of the February 9 Contempt Order (to which PAX would not object), Kwok opposes the Motion and impermissibly seeks to re-litigate the NY State Court finding that the Lady May is his property. As explained in more detail below, under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and the principle of *res judicata*, this Court cannot revisit the NY State Court's determination that Kwok \"beneficially owns and controls\" the Lady May.\n\n4. Kwok also mischaracterizes the Motion. The Motion's purpose is to request confirmation that the automatic stay does not apply to the February 9 Contempt Order, or in the alternative, to request a narrow modification of the automatic stay to allow the NY State Court to enforce its order insofar as it required Kwok to return the Lady May to New York, which will benefit all of Kwok's creditors. *See* Motion at ¶ 8. The Motion does not seek, and is not intended to seek, to put Kwok in jail. PAX—acting for the benefit of all creditors—filed the Motion to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order to ensure that the €28 million Lady May is returned to New York so it can be monitored and safeguarded for the benefit of satisfying the claims of Kwok's creditors pursuant to further order of the Court. As Kwok acknowledges, any interest that he holds in the Lady May is part of his bankruptcy estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. *See* Objection at ¶ 4. If Kwok were a true fiduciary for the benefit of his estate, Kwok would not only support the Motion, but would be actively seeking the turnover of the Lady May and prosecuting stay violations against his family members.<sup>4</sup> Of course, Kwok has done no such thing, choosing instead to persist in his judicially discredited claim that he has no control over the yacht.\n\n<sup>4</sup> Hong Kong International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, whose sole member is Mei Guo, Kwok's daughter, holds legal title to the Lady May. *See* February 9 Contempt Order at 4. Ms. Guo testified at the February 9, 2022 hearing that her brother Qiang Guo, purchased the boat for her. *Id.* at 5. Her testimony was not supported by documentary evidence and Justice Ostrager discredited her testimony on this point. *Id.* Golden Spring New York Ltd., Kwok's \"family office,\" pays the multi-million dollar annual expenses in yacht upkeep. *Id.* at 4-5.\n\nIf that course of conduct results in Kwok's imprisonment pursuant to a court order, it will be a consequence of his behavior and his fault, no one else's. *See* February 9 Contempt Order at 7.\n\n5. The February 9 Contempt Order is designed to secure Kwok's compliance with the NY State Court's prior orders to return the Lady May to its jurisdiction. As such, it falls within the exception to the automatic stay for certain categories of civil contempt orders.<sup>5</sup> But even if the February 9 Contempt Order does not fall within that exception, relief from the automatic stay is warranted to permit the NY State Court to compel the return of the Lady May to New York.<sup>6</sup> As discussed in the Motion—and contrary to Kwok's argument that doing so unfairly prejudices the administration of his chapter 11 estate—returning the Lady May would unquestionably benefit the estate and all of its creditors (all of whom support the primary relief sought in the Motion). Indeed, the only people who could be prejudiced by the return of the fugitive Lady May are those currently enjoying it as it floats around European waters in violation of repeated judicial orders, risking damage and depreciation of a valuable estate asset and potential seizure by foreign authorities.<sup>7</sup> As to the administration of Kwok's estate, this is an individual chapter 11 case for a debtor who asserts he has no job and virtually no assets to satisfy his creditors, and thus no estate to administer.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, the Court should grant the Motion and permit the NY State Court to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order to seek the return of the Lady May to New York.\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Objection notes that the NY State Court requested that PAX withdraw another contempt motion because of Kwok's bankruptcy filing. *See* Objection at ¶ 6. Although the Motion only applies to the February 9 Contempt Order, PAX reserves all rights regarding the application of the automatic stay to its other contempt motion.\n\n<sup>6</sup> In the event that removal of the NY State Court action is valid, PAX consents to a federal court ordering Kwok to return the Lady May to the locale of the applicable federal court with appropriate sanctions to be imposed if he fails to do so.\n\n<sup>7</sup> *See supra* note 3.\n\n<sup>8</sup> *See* Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, ECF No. 78 at 3–7 (claiming to have \\$3,850 in assets); see also Official Form 106I, Schedule I: Income, ECF No. 78 at 14–15 (claiming to have \\$0 in income).\n\n# **I. KWOK IS BARRED FROM SEEKING TO RE-LITIGATE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LADY MAY BEFORE THIS COURT**\n\n6. The Objection argues, based on a purported declaration from Kwok that was never filed,<sup>9</sup> that the February 9 Contempt Order was \"wrongfully issued against him.\" Objection at ¶ 14.<sup>10</sup> Kwok further asserts that \"[w]hatever interest the Debtor *may ultimately be determined* to have in the Lady May is now part of the bankruptcy estate and squarely under [the Bankruptcy Court's] jurisdiction.\" Objection at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). For purposes of the Motion (and, as explained below, for all purposes in this case) Kwok is bound by the NY State Court's ruling. Kwok cannot oppose the Motion by claiming he does not own the Lady May or cannot bring it to New York: his property interest in, and control over, the Lady May was determined by the NY State Court after a full evidentiary hearing with witnesses and an opportunity for Kwok to testify (which he declined to do, having previously invoked his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination). *See* February 9 Contempt Order at 9–10.\n\n7. It is undisputed that \"[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law.\" *Butner v. U.S.*, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). The \"[u]niform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.\" *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *see also In re Cysen/Montenay Energy Co.*,\n\n<sup>9</sup> The Objection states that \"contemporaneously with the filing of this Objection, the Debtor filed the *Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok in Support of the Chapter 11 Cases and Certain Motions*, dated March 15, 2022.\" Objection at 1. As of the filing of this reply, no such declaration has been filed.\n\n<sup>10</sup> Apropos of nothing, Kwok also continues to assert that his personal guaranty that had been at issue in the NY State Court contract dispute was a \"forgery\" that his prior litigation counsel submitted without showing it to him first. PAX will not sidetrack this Court by detailing the numerous ways this assertion is perjurious nonsense that was repeatedly rejected by the NY State Court (*e.g.,* Kwok produced the guaranty from his own files; he admitted its authenticity in responses to requests for admission; and he relied on the agreement for years in litigation before going rogue at his merits deposition and claiming he had never seen it before). Suffice it to say that for the same reason described in this reply that Kwok cannot challenge the February 9 Contempt Order in this Court, Kwok cannot re-litigate the validity of the February 3, 2021 NY State Court merits judgment.\n\n902 F.2d 1098, 1101 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"[S]tate law determines the 'nature of a debtor's interest' in a given item.\" (internal citation omitted)); *In re de Hertogh,* 412 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) (in order to determine whether property constituted property of the debtors' estate, the court had to determine \"whether, under applicable Connecticut law, the Debtors had a legally cognizable interest in the [property] as of the Petition Date.\").\n\n8. Bankruptcy court review of the NY State Court's findings regarding Kwok's ownership and control of the Lady May is barred by both the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and *res judicata*. The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is \"aimed at 'cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review of those judgments.'\" *McKithen v. Brown*, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). The doctrine applies to state court judgments that remain subject to appeal.<sup>11</sup> It \"directs federal courts to abstain from considering claims when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff's federal suit commenced.\" *Id.* at 154 (internal citations omitted).\n\n9. Kwok is a multiple time \"state-court loser.\" Before his chapter 11 case, Kwok lost on the issue of ownership of the Lady May in the NY State Court, resulting in the issuance of the February 9 Contempt Order, and his Objection is, in effect, a complaint that he has been and will\n\n<sup>11</sup> *See Caldwell v. Gutman*, 701 F. Supp. 2d 340, 346–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"Regardless of the status of any state court appeals, the litigant is still seeking federal review of a state-court judgment. . . . This is what Rooker–Feldman prohibits.\" (internal citations omitted)); *see also Cohen v. Rosenthal*, No. 3:15-cv-01043 (CSH), 2016 WL 7340280, at \\*4 , n.7 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2016) (\"Although the Second Circuit has not yet addressed whether all state proceedings, including appeals, must have ended before the federal action commences for purposes of applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts within the Second Circuit have not confined application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to situations where the federal plaintiffs have exhausted their state-court appeals.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).\n\nbe injured by that order.<sup>12</sup> Under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, Kwok cannot use this Court to review the findings of the NY State Court. S*ee McKithen v. Brown*, 626 F.3d at 154–55 (refusing to consider challenge to state court judgment on application of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, holding \"[t]he proper vehicle for [the Plaintiff] to challenge the state court's interpretation of section 440.30(1–a)(a) was an appeal to the New York Appellate Division\" (internal citation omitted)); *In re Booker*, No. 19-30787, 2020 WL 504799, at \\*6 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2020), *reconsideration denied*, No. 19-30787 (AMN), 2020 WL 930091 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2020) (applying the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and concluding, \"the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to review the state court's decision . . . and therefore must accept the judgment.\"); *cf. In re Van Eck*, 425 B.R. 54, 63 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2010) (finding that the state court judgment and order had \"conclusively establish[ed]\" the issues that the debtor was seeking to re-litigate and holding that \"[u]sing a chapter 11 case as a platform to attack final orders of other courts constitutes Other Cause\" to dismiss the chapter 11 case (internal citations omitted)).\n\n10. *Res judicata* also bars Kwok from arguing the Motion should be denied because he lacks ownership or control of the Lady May.<sup>13</sup> *Res judicata*, or claim preclusion, provides that \"a\n\n<sup>12</sup> In an attempt to re-litigate these issues, Kwok has sought to remove the NY State Court Action to this Court. *See*  Objection at ¶ 7. But as these issues are subject to pending appeals that are fully briefed, removal is improper, and PAX will be seeking remand to the NY State Court. *See In re Briarpatch Film Corp.*, 281 B.R. 820, 830–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ordering remand of state court actions that were part of a \"long, tangled history of litigation\" where \"the doctrine of comity strongly supports remand . . . so that the State court can enforce its own orders and, if an appeal lies from the Order and Judgment, review its own judgments.\"). Notably, the Court in *Briarpatch* also dismissed the debtor's chapter 11 petition as a bad faith filing finding that the debtor who was \"devoid of assets as well as business and corporate legitimacy\" had \"no cognizable intent to reorganize but filed the Chapter 11 petition in order to relitigate issues already determined by the State Court.\" *Id.* at 831, 835. PAX will pursue the same relief here.\n\n<sup>13</sup> Kwok is also collaterally estopped from re-litigating the ownership of the Lady May. *See DiSorbo v. Hoy*, 343 F.3d 172, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"Under New York law, collateral estoppel may be invoked to preclude a party from raising an issue (1) identical to an issue already decided (2) in a previous proceeding in which that party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. . . . [T]he mere pendency of an appeal does not prevent the use of the challenged judgment as the basis of collaterally estopping a party to that judgment in a second proceeding.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); *Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Penn*, 225 F. Supp. 3d 225, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Defendant was \"collaterally estopped from challenging the facts underlying his criminal convictions. . . . The fact that [he] ha[d] an appeal pending from his criminal convictions d[id] not affect the collateral estoppel analysis.\" (internal citations omitted)).\n\nfinal judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from re-litigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.\" *Burgos v. Hopkins,* 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).<sup>14</sup> Under New York's doctrine of *res judicata* \"once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.\" *Yeiser v. GMAC Mortgage Corp*.*,* 535 F.Supp.2d 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citation omitted). As discussed above, the NY State Court's decision on ownership and control was based on extensive briefing and substantial written and live testimonial evidence.<sup>15</sup> Kwok had every opportunity to litigate these issues in the NY State Court.<sup>16</sup> This Court must accept Justice Ostrager's orders and accordingly, Kwok's only vehicle to challenge the NY State Court's findings regarding the Lady May is to proceed with his appeal of the February 9 Contempt Order.\n\n11. Thus, under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and *res judicata*, Kwok cannot re-litigate whether he \"beneficially owns and controls\" the Lady May, and his already judicially discredited\n\n<sup>14</sup> *Res judicata* also applies here notwithstanding the February 9 Contempt Order remains on appeal. *See Oparaji v. Mun. Credit Union*, No. 19-CV-4034 (JPC)(SN), 2020 WL 9815188, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2020), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 19 CIV. 4034 (JPC), 2021 WL 2414859 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) (\"Under New York law, 'the mere pendency of an appeal does not deprive a challenged judgment of its res judicata effects.'\" (internal citations omitted)); *Truong v. Hung Thi Nguyen*, No. 10 CIV. 386 (DAB) (HBP), 2011 WL 1198254, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011) (collecting cases, holding: \"[u]nder New York law, a judgment entered by a trial court is 'final' for purposes of res judicata, even where an appeal is pending from the trial court's judgment.\" (internal citations omitted)).\n\n<sup>15</sup> The parties fully briefed the contempt issue before Justice Ostrager, which resulted in the Initial Contempt Order. *See* Motion at ¶ 5. Kwok subsequently appealed Justice Ostrager's decision to the Appellate Division First Department. *See id*. The parties re-briefed the issue on appeal and the First Department found that \"[t]he motion court acted within its discretion in holding defendant in civil contempt, as plaintiff established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant violated a lawful, clear mandate of the court, of which he had knowledge, and that such violation resulted in prejudice to plaintiff's rights.\" *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Wan*, 199 A.D.3d 423, 423 (1st Dep't 2021). The Appellate Division upheld the daily fine of \\$500,000 and instructed the motion court to proceed with an evidentiary hearing to resolve a dispute as to ownership and control of the yacht, and to assess appropriate penalties. *Id*. Justice Ostrager then conducted a full evidentiary hearing on February 2, 2022, after which he determined that PAX had clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Kwok beneficially owns and controls the yacht. *See* February 9 Contempt Order at 4.Accordingly, the NY State Court issued a final order of civil contempt. *Id.*  at 10.\n\n<sup>16</sup> *See supra* note 15.\n\ncontention that he does not own or control the Lady May is not a proper basis for objecting to the Motion.\n\n# **II. THE MOTION FALLS WITHIN THE EXCEPTION TO THE AUTOMATIC STAY FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT ORDERS**\n\n12. Kwok spends a significant portion of the Objection trying to convince the Court that the February 9 Contempt Order is civil and not criminal in nature. *See* Objection at ¶¶ 16–30. That is undisputed. The Motion specifically argues that the automatic stay is inapplicable to the February 9 Contempt Order because the *civil contempt* order was designed to punish Kwok's flagrant and continued disregard of the NY State Court's orders, and PAX relies on cases where courts found the stay inapplicable to the enforcement of civil contempt orders. *See* Motion at ¶ 12.\n\n13. Moreover, contrary to Kwok's claims, PAX is not seeking payment of the fines that the NY State Court levied against him for failing to return the Lady May to its jurisdiction. *See*  Motion at ¶ 13. Rather, PAX wants the Lady May returned for the benefit of all of Kwok's creditors. Kwok's mischaracterization of the February 9 Contempt Order as one addressing compensation ignores both the Motion and the origins of the February 9 Contempt Order. The February 9 Contempt Order resulted from Kwok's failure to comply with *two other* NY State Court orders. First, Kwok moved the Lady May outside of New York in direct violation of the NY State court's September 30 and October 15, 2020 orders. *See* Motion at ¶ 4. Second, in March 2021, the NY State Court issued a conditional order of civil contempt—which was unanimously affirmed by the New York Appellate Division, First Department—requiring Kwok or the yacht's registered owner to return the Lady May by May 15, 2021, or face a \\$500,000 fine for each day that the yacht remained outside of that court's jurisdiction. *See id.* at ¶ 5. More than eight months later, after the Lady May was *still* outside of the court's jurisdiction in violation of its prior orders, the NY State Court held the February 2, 2022 evidentiary hearing, the findings of which are reflected in the February 9 Contempt Order. *See id.* at ¶ 6.\n\n14. In the Objection, Kwok relies heavily on *In re White*, 478 B.R. 177, 181 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) to argue that the automatic stay is applicable to the February 9 Contempt Order. *See* Objection at ¶ 32. In *White*, the movant had an outstanding judgment against the debtors, and served subpoenas on one of the debtors pre-petition to ascertain the location of his assets to satisfy the judgment. *In re White*, 478 B.R. at 179–80. The state court ordered compliance with the subpoena, which the debtor ignored, resulting in a state court contempt order and warrant directing the sheriff to compel the debtor's compliance. *Id.* at 80.\n\n15. The bankruptcy court found that the contempt order involved civil contempt but that this did \"not end the inquiry\" as \"[c]ourts have recognized a non-statutory exception to the automatic stay where the goal of a civil contempt proceeding is to vindicate the dignity of the court rather than collect a pre-petition claim or obtain property of the estate.\" *Id* at 183–84. Ultimately, the movant's motion to enforce the contempt order was held to be subject to the stay because it fell outside of that exception, as an effort to \"recover a pre-petition claim for *damages*.\" *Id* at 184 (emphasis added). The additional relief sought—enforcement of the subpoenas and if necessary, imprisonment of the debtor if he failed to comply—did not change the result because the bankruptcy court had already issued a Rule 2004 order authorizing the movant to obtain the information sought by the subpoenas. *Id.*\n\n16. Here, unlike in *White*, the Motion explicitly states that PAX is not seeking to collect on its pre-petition contempt fines<sup>17</sup> or take possession of the Lady May. *See* Motion at ¶ 12. Rather,\n\n<sup>17</sup> The February 9 Contempt Order does not constitute \"damages\" suffered by PAX, but is a monetary sanction imposed to punish Kwok for his repeated insults to the dignity of the NY State Court. This monetary sanction is separate from PAX's judgment against Kwok.\n\nPAX is seeking to marshal and protect an estate asset for the benefit of all creditors. *See id.* at ¶ 21. Accordingly, the Motion fits squarely within the exception to the automatic stay for certain civil contempt orders. *See, e.g., Int'l Distrib. Ctrs, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., Inc.*, 62 B.R. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that its \"inherent power to 'punish the debtor for contumacious conduct against the dignity of either the state or federal court,' is not curtailed by the bankruptcy action\" and finding the stay inapplicable where contempt request was \"designed to uphold an order of this Court, and [wa]s not one calculated to enforce a money judgment.\" (internal citation omitted)); *Booth v. Wilson*, No. 96 CIV. 920 (RO), 1997 WL 241050, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (\"[T]his contempt order enforcing my pre-bankruptcy order to compel discovery is not stayed by § 362(a) as it is 'vindicat[ing] the integrity of the court.'\"); *Shaoxing Bon Textiles Co., Ltd. v. 4-U Performance Grp. LLC*, 16 Civ. 6805, 2017 WL 6413993, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2017) (motion for relief from the stay unnecessary where \"the proceeding in reality is one to punish the debtor for contumacious conduct against the dignity of [the] court.\" (internal citation omitted)).\n\n17. Kwok attempts to distinguish *Roberts v. Bennaceur*, No. 3:12-CV-01222, 2015 WL 1471889 (D. Conn. 2015) on the basis that the contempt sanctions issued against corporate officers in that case did not apply to the debtor. *See* Objection at ¶ 38. However, the court in *Roberts* confirmed that it could issue contempt sanctions \"as long as the sanction does not have the effect of 'securing assets protected by the stay or harassing' the debtor.\" *Id.* at \\*16 (internal citations omitted). The court relied on *David v. Hooker, Ltd.*, 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977), which held that \"'suits' or 'actions' to be stayed, as used in the bankruptcy statutes and rules, would not include contempt proceedings arising out of disobedience of a state court order made prior to the stay.\" Accordingly, \"it was entirely consistent for the trial court to grant a stay of the principal proceedings but to continue to order the corporate defendant and its managing agent to comply with a prior discovery order issued by the United States Magistrate and later adopted by the trial court . . . it was also within the trial judge's power to consider whether the defendant and its agent were in contempt of court . . . for failure to follow the prior orders. \" *Id.* Further, the court in *Roberts* acknowledged its authority \"in the midst of a bankruptcy stay, to decide contempt motions designed to 'to punish the debtor for contumacious conduct against the dignity of either the state or federal court.'\" *Roberts*, 2015 WL 1471889 at \\*16 (*citing Serio v. Black, Davis & Shue Agency, Inc.*, 2006 WL 176983, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y.2006)). Here, PAX is neither trying to secure an asset for itself, nor is it harassing Kwok. By continuing to do nothing to protect his assets for the benefit of his creditors, this is a situation of Kwok's own making.\n\n### **III. PAX IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY**\n\n18. If this Court determines that the automatic stay applies to the February 9 Contempt Order, PAX's narrow request for relief from the automatic stay to allow Justice Ostrager to impose an appropriate, non-monetary sanction if Kwok fails to bring the Lady May back to New York should be granted. The Motion describes in detail that *Sonnax* factors (1), (2), (4), (7), (10), and (12) weigh in favor of granting relief from the automatic stay. *See* Motion at ¶¶ 12–18. Specifically,\n\n- Sonnax Factor 1: Modifying the stay will resolve PAX's year-long effort to have the yacht safeguarded and in the United States.\n- Sonnax Factor 2: Enforcement of the February 9 Contempt Order will not interfere with the bankruptcy case.\n- Sonnax Factors 4 &10: The NY State Court has been overseeing the dispute between PAX and Kwok for five years. All discovery, motion practice, evidentiary hearings, and conferences precipitating the February 9 Contempt Order has taken place before Justice Ostrager.\n- Sonnax Factors 7 & 12: Creditors will not be prejudiced or harmed by the return of the Lady May. To the contrary, absent stay relief, creditors will be directly harmed as Kwok will have no incentive to bring the Lady May back to New York.\n\n19. Most importantly, the return of the Lady May will bring an extremely valuable asset back to the United States for the benefit of Kwok's creditors. This is in contrast to the facts of *In re Sonnax Industries, Inc*., 907 F.2d 1280 (2d Cir. 1990), which Kwok inexplicably relies on in his Objection. In *Sonnax*, the debtor filed a chapter 11 petition after failing to obtain relief in New York state courts from an injunction prohibiting it from soliciting business from, or doing business with, customers of another entity called Tri Component. *Id.* at 1282. Following Sonnax's bankruptcy filing, Tri Component moved to modify the automatic stay to allow it to continue prosecution of its state court claim and to pursue completely new motions for contempt for violation of the state court injunction. *Id.* In deciding not to modify the automatic stay, the *Sonnax* court focused on the effect lifting the stay would have on Sonnax's bankruptcy case, finding that:\n\n- \"[T]he state-court injunction barred Sonnax from doing business with any customers of Tri Component, its chief competitor,\" and would constitute \"a prohibition that may have a drastic impact on a company in a narrow market.\" *Id.*\n- Modifying the stay might \"doom Sonnax's attempts to reorganize\" because it \"would prevent Sonnax from doing much of its usual business.\" *Id.*\n- The interest of judicial economy supported denial of relief from the stay because \"the litigation in state court has not progressed even to the discovery phase.\" *Id.* at 1287\n\n20. None of these concerns are present here; in fact, their stark absence underscores how strongly stay relief is warranted. First, Kwok is an individual debtor with no job and, allegedly, no assets. He thus has no operating business that would be affected by modifying the stay.<sup>18</sup> Second, far from \"dooming Kwok's attempts to reorganize,\" bringing the Lady May back to the United States will aid Kwok's bankruptcy case by preventing an asset from being misused or dissipated. Third, modifying the stay will not prevent Kwok from doing any business because, by his own admission, he has no business. And finally, as discussed in the Motion, the NY State\n\n<sup>18</sup> *See* Official Form 107, Statement of Financial Affairs for Individuals Filing Bankruptcy, ECF No. 77 at 14–15.\n\nCourt has overseen the dispute between PAX and Kwok for five years. Summary judgment was granted on PAX's underlying claim, and all discovery, motion practice, evidentiary hearings, and conferences precipitating the February 9 Contempt Order (which arose in the context of postjudgment proceedings) have taken place before Justice Ostrager (in comparison to *Sonnax*, where no discovery had occurred and the contempt motion had not even been filed, much less litigated to completion). Even if Kwok were not precluded by the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and *res judicata*  (he is), it would be a gross mismanagement of the estate's allegedly limited assets to have this Court adjudicate these issues when they are already far-advanced in the NY State Court. Simply put, this case is nothing like *Sonnax.*\n\n21. Similarly, Kwok's reliance on *In re Residential Capital, LLC*, 501 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) for the conclusory proposition that allowing PAX to enforce the February 9 Contempt Order would have a \"drastic impact\" on Kwok and his estate is misplaced. *See* Objection at ¶ 24. In *Residential Capital*, a creditor sought relief from the stay to pursue an appeal of a state court litigation it had already lost. *Id.* at 631. In denying the stay motion, the court found that \"[l]itigation in non-bankruptcy courts would hinder the Debtors' attempts to reorganize by forcing the Debtors to utilize time and resources that would otherwise be spent in resolution of the Debtors' chapter 11 cases.\" *Id.*\n\n22. *Residential Capital* is an absurd comparison to this case. As Judge Glenn observed in a different *Residential Capital* proceeding, \"before filing for bankruptcy, the Debtors were a leading originator of residential mortgage loans and, together with their non-Debtor affiliates, the fifth largest servicer of residential mortgage loans in the United States, servicing approximately \\$374 billion of domestic residential mortgage loans and working with more than 2.4 million mortgage loans across the United States.\" *Residential Cap., LLC v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re*\n\n*Residential Cap., LLC)*, 501 B.R. 549, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). Permitting piecemeal litigation in a case with thousands of creditors while the debtors sought to unwind a massive book of residential real estate loans would be disruptive. In contrast (and, at the risk of being repetitive), Kwok claims to have no business with which to interfere. Moreover, Judge Glenn's decision focused on the interests of all of the debtors' creditors; here, creditors support lifting of the stay.<sup>19</sup> And in *Residential Capital*, the court noted that modifying the automatic stay there would not completely resolve any piece of litigation. *In re Residential Capital, LLC*, 501 B.R. at 644. Here, the limited relief PAX seeks will resolve a discrete issue: whether Kwok will return the Lady May to the United States or not. No other issue need be litigated in the NY State Court at this time. Further, granting PAX's requested relief would not cause Kwok to expend \"time and resources that would otherwise be spent on the resolution of this case,\" but rather will materially enhance resolution of this case.\n\n23. Bringing the Lady May—worth an estimated €28 million—to New York would have a drastic impact on Kwok's chapter 11 case. But the impact would be for the benefit of his estate and creditor body rather than to their detriment as Kwok claims. According to the schedules of assets and liabilities filed in this chapter 11 case, Kwok asserts that he has effectively no assets to satisfy the approximately \\$374 million in claims asserted against him.<sup>20</sup> The return of the Lady May and the potential satisfaction of creditor claims from the proceeds of its liquidation would provide an immense benefit to Kwok's creditors that greatly outweighs any harm to Kwok.<sup>21</sup> The\n\n<sup>19</sup> *See Statement of Creditors Rui Ma and Zheng Wu in Qualified Support of Relief Requested by Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.* ECF No. 84 (expressing support for the relief requested by PAX in the Motion); *Creditor Logan Cheng's Reply to Objection to Motion to Stay* ECF No. 97 (same).\n\n<sup>20</sup> *See* Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B (Property), ECF. No. 78 at 3; *see also* Official Form E/F, Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims, ECF No. 78 at 10, 19–21.\n\n<sup>21</sup> In fact, to permit the Lady May to remain in international waters could lead to significant harm to creditors as the yacht is subject to seizure by foreign jurisdictions under maritime law and is at constant risk of being damaged or\n\nonly people who benefit from denying the Motion are Kwok's family members, who get continued use of the Lady May, which is debtor property, and Kwok personally, who continues to ignore court orders.\n\n24. Kwok's argument that his interests in the Lady May are already protected because the Lady May is part of his worldwide bankruptcy estate provides no comfort to Kwok's creditors. *See* Objection at ¶ 4. Kwok has demonstrated no respect for court orders. Indeed, the NY State Court found that \"[t]he machinations associated with the shell game Kwok has orchestrated with respect to the Lady May are of a piece with every other evasive and contemptuous act Kwok has taken during the five years this litigation has been pending.\" February 9 Contempt Order at 7. There is no reason to believe that Kwok's machinations and disregard of court orders will stop with the filing of his chapter 11 case.\n\n25. Finally, Kwok's argument that enforcement of the February 9 Contempt Order will lead to his incarceration (and harm his chapter 11 case) does not warrant denial of the Motion. First, if Kwok wants to avoid incarceration, he can simply return the yacht. The NY State Court has held that it is within his power. Second, as discussed above, there is no chapter 11 case to administer. Kwok has no operating business, he allegedly has no assets, and he has not sought turnover of any assets from family members. His (non-existent) businesses will not suffer if he is incarcerated for his continued contempt. And, while Kwok's incarceration may negatively impact the continued viability of this chapter 11 case (which has no legitimate purpose), that would be an unfortunate consequence of Kwok's own contumacious behavior.\n\notherwise devalued by Kwok's family members who continue to use and enjoy the yacht in violation of the NY State Court's orders.\n\n#### **RESPONSE TO THE STATEMENT OF QUALIFIED SUPPORT**\n\n26. The *Statement of Creditors Rui Ma and Zheng Wu in Qualified Support of Relief Requested by Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.* [ECF No. 84] (the \"Statement\") filed by creditors Rui Ma and Zheng Wu (the \"Supporting Creditors\") supports the relief requested in the Motion and proposes two modifications to the proposed order granting the Motion. *See*  Statement at ¶ 3.<sup>22</sup> With respect to the Supporting Creditors' first proposed modification, PAX believes that such modification is not necessary because the Motion is not an effort for PAX to obtain the Lady May for its own benefit. However, PAX agrees with the Supporting Creditors that upon the return of the Lady May, any further disposition of the yacht should be subject to further order of this Court. With respect to the Supporting Creditors' second proposed modification, PAX is not, at this point, seeking the imposition of additional monetary sanctions against Kwok, however, PAX agrees that if any additional monetary sanctions are imposed, the priority and payment of such sanctions *vis-à-vis* any party that holds an allowed, unsubordinated claim should be subject to further Court order. PAX will work with the Supporting Creditors to arrive at mutually acceptable language on these two points.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons stated above and in the Motion, this Court should find that (i) the automatic stay is inapplicable to the February 9 Contempt Order with respect to the return of the Lady May to New York or (ii) in the alternative, relief from the automatic stay is warranted to permit PAX to seek enforcement of the February 9 Contempt Order to seek the return of the Lady May for the benefit of all creditors.\n\n<sup>22</sup> An additional creditor, Logan Cheng joins in the Supporting Creditors' support for the Motion and request for modification of the proposed order granting the Motion. *See Creditor Logan Cheng's Reply to Objection to Motion to Stay* ECF No. 97. PAX will include Mr. Cheng in any discussions with the Supporting Creditors regarding modifications to the proposed order.\n\nDated: March 18, 2022 Hartford, Connecticut\n\n### **Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.**\n\n*By*: */s/ Patrick M. Birney*  Patrick M. Birney (CT No. 19875) Annecca H. Smith (CT No. 31148) **ROBINSON & COLE LLP**  280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: (860) 275-8275 Facsimile: (860) 275-8299 E-mail: pbirney@rc.com asmith@rc.com\n\n-and-\n\nPeter Friedman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Stuart M. Sarnoff (admitted *pro hac vice*) **O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP**  7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 326-2000 Facsimile: (212) 326-2061 Email: pfriedman@omm.com ssarnoff@omm.com","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格地区破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：　第11章案件编号\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）1　22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金 L.P.），\n动议人，\n诉\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n答辩人　March 18, 2022\n太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金 L.P. 就支持请求作出裁定确认自动中止不适用，或备选地，根据《破产法典》第362(d)(2)条请求解除自动中止之动议所提交的答复\n\n致尊敬的美国破产法院法官 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）：\n\nPAX 提交本答复，以支持其《请求作出裁定确认自动中止不适用，或备选地，根据《破产法典》第362(d)(2)条解除自动中止之动议》[ECF No. 57]（下称“该动议”），并答复债务人对 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 提出的动议所作的异议，即请求作出裁定确认根据《破产法典》第362(d)(2)条自动中止不适用之动议。1\n\n1 债务人纳税人识别号码的后四位数为9595。\n\n《请求作出裁定确认根据《破产法典》第362(d)(2)条自动中止不适用》[ECF No. 83]（下称“该异议”）。2\n\n答复\n\n1. 与 Kwok 的不实陈述相反，PAX 提出该动议，是为了确保一项有价值的遗产资产被带至纽约，从而可依照法院后续命令受到保护，以惠及 Kwok 的债权人——而非为了使 Kwok 入狱。与其过去的行为一致，该等行为曾导致 Supreme Court of the State of New York（纽约州最高法院）（由 Justice Ostrager（奥斯特拉格法官）主持）（下称“纽约州法院”）命令 Kwok 将 Lady May（梅夫人号）送回纽约并认定其藐视法庭，Kwok 继续抗拒一切归集其资产及代表除其家庭和本人之外任何人利益行事的努力。如此一来，Kwok 使 Lady May 面临被其家人滥用的风险（其家人主张其独占拥有 Lady May——该主张已被纽约州法院驳回）；并且，如应相信 Kwok 所言，该船还面临在外国水域被其声称已冻结其所谓其他资产的同一外国政府扣押的风险。3\n\n2. 该异议不当试图重新争讼支撑 February 9 Contempt Order 的事实，而该命令此前经过了一场完整的证据听证会，包括 Kwok 女儿在内的七名证人作了证言。见 February 9 Contempt Order 第2页。听证会后，纽约州法院认定，“[在]听证会上由[Kwok]证人亲口作出的证言，以清楚且令人信服的方式证明，Kwok 实益拥有并控制 Lady May。”同上，第4页。\n\n2 本答复中使用但未定义的首字母大写术语，应具有该动议中赋予该等术语的含义。\n\n3 见 Global Notes and Statements of Limitations, ECF No. 77 第6–7页（描述香港法院作出的命令，冻结并使“数以十亿计[]的资金和财产……据称受债务人‘有效控制’”的资产面临扣押）；另见，对问题19的说明（描述中国政府突击搜查并扣押 Kwok 的部分商业记录）。\n\n3. 然而，Kwok 并未寻求解除中止以继续其对 February 9 Contempt Order 提起的上诉（PAX 不会反对该项救济），而是反对该动议，并不当试图重新争讼纽约州法院关于 Lady May 为其财产的认定。如以下进一步详述，根据 Rooker-Feldman doctrine（鲁克—费尔德曼原则）及既判力原则，本院不能重新审查纽约州法院关于 Kwok“实益拥有并控制”Lady May 的裁定。\n\n4. Kwok 还歪曲了该动议。该动议的目的，是请求确认自动中止不适用于 February 9 Contempt Order；或者，备选地，请求对自动中止作出有限修改，以允许纽约州法院执行其命令中要求 Kwok 将 Lady May 送回纽约的部分，这将惠及 Kwok 的所有债权人。见该动议第¶ 8段。该动议并未请求、也无意请求使 Kwok 入狱。PAX——为全体债权人的利益行事——提交该动议以执行 February 9 Contempt Order，确保价值 €28 million 的 Lady May 被送回纽约，从而可受到监督和保护，以依照法院后续命令满足 Kwok 债权人的债权。如 Kwok 所承认，其在 Lady May 中持有的任何权益均根据《破产法典》第541条构成其破产遗产的一部分。见该异议第¶ 4段。如果 Kwok 真正是为其遗产利益服务的受托人，他不仅会支持该动议，而且会积极寻求交还 Lady May，并针对其家庭成员提起违反中止规定的诉讼。4 当然，Kwok 并未采取任何此类行动，反而选择坚持其已被司法否定的主张，即其对该游艇不具有任何控制权。\n\n4 Hong Kong International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限公司，LLC）的唯一成员为 Kwok 的女儿 Mei Guo（郭美），该公司持有 Lady May 的法定所有权。见 February 9 Contempt Order 第4页。Ms. Guo 在 February 9, 2022 的听证会上作证称，其兄弟 Qiang Guo（郭强）为其购买了该船。同上，第5页。其证言未获书面证据支持，Justice Ostrager 就此不采信其证言。同上。Golden Spring New York Ltd.（纽约金泉有限公司）是 Kwok 的“家族办公室”，支付游艇维护每年数百万美元的费用。同上，第4–5页。\n\n如果该等行为导致 Kwok 依照法院命令被监禁，那将是其行为及其自身过错的后果，并非任何其他人的过错。见 February 9 Contempt Order 第7页。\n\n5. February 9 Contempt Order 旨在确保 Kwok 遵守纽约州法院先前要求其将 Lady May 送回其管辖范围内的命令。因此，该命令属于自动中止对某些类别民事藐视法庭命令的例外。5 但即使 February 9 Contempt Order 不属于该例外，也有理由解除自动中止，以允许纽约州法院强制将 Lady May 送回纽约。如该动议所述——且与 Kwok 关于此举会不公平损害其第11章遗产管理的论点相反——送回 Lady May 无疑将惠及该遗产及其所有债权人（他们均支持该动议所寻求的主要救济）。事实上，唯一可能因送回潜逃中的 Lady May 而受到不利影响的人，是那些目前在欧洲水域享用该船的人；该船在该水域航行，违反了多项司法命令，致使一项有价值的遗产资产面临损坏、贬值及被外国当局潜在扣押的风险。7 至于 Kwok 遗产的管理，本案是针对一名债务人的个人第11章案件，该债务人声称其没有工作，也几乎没有可用于清偿债权人的资产，因此不存在可供管理的遗产。8 因此，本院应准许该动议，并允许纽约州法院执行 February 9 Contempt Order，以寻求将 Lady May 送回纽约。\n\n5 该异议指出，纽约州法院因 Kwok 提交破产申请，要求 PAX 撤回另一项藐视法庭动议。见该异议第¶ 6段。尽管该动议仅适用于 February 9 Contempt Order，PAX 保留有关自动中止适用于其另一项藐视法庭动议的一切权利。\n\n6 如移送纽约州法院案件有效，PAX 同意由联邦法院命令 Kwok 将 Lady May 送至适用联邦法院所在地，并在其未能如此行事时施加适当制裁。\n\n7 见上文注3。\n\n8 见 Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, ECF No. 78 第3–7页（声称拥有 \\$3,850 的资产）；另见 Official Form 106I, Schedule I: Income, ECF No. 78 第14–15页（声称收入为 \\$0）。\n\n一、KWOK 被禁止在本院寻求重新争讼 LADY MAY 的所有权问题\n\n6. 该异议依据一份据称由 Kwok 作出但从未提交的声明，9 主张 February 9 Contempt Order 是“被不当针对其作出的”。该异议第¶ 14段。10 Kwok 进一步主张，“债务人最终可能被认定在 Lady May 中拥有的任何权益，现已成为破产遗产的一部分，并完全处于[破产法院]的管辖之下。”该异议第¶ 4段（着重号为原文所加）。就该动议而言（并且，如下文所述，就本案一切目的而言），Kwok 均受纽约州法院裁定的约束。Kwok 不得以其不拥有 Lady May 或不能将其带至纽约为由反对该动议：其对 Lady May 的财产权益及控制权，已由纽约州法院在举行完整证据听证会后作出认定，该听证会有证人出席，并给予 Kwok 作证的机会（其此前援引第五修正案免于自证其罪权利，故拒绝作证）。见 February 9 Contempt Order 第9–10页。\n\n7. 毫无争议，“财产权益由州法创设和界定。”Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)。“一州内州法院和联邦法院对财产权益的统一处理，有助于减少不确定性，阻止挑选法院，并防止一方仅因破产这一偶然情形而获得意外利益。”同上（省略内部引号及引证）；另见 In re Cysen/Montenay Energy Co.,\n\n9 该异议称，“在提交本异议的同时，债务人提交了日期为 March 15, 2022 的 Ho Wan Kwok 先生支持第11章案件及若干动议的声明。”该异议第1页。截至提交本答复时，尚未提交任何此类声明。\n\n10 与本案无关的是，Kwok 还继续主张，在纽约州法院合同争议中曾有争议的其个人保证书是“伪造的”，其先前的诉讼律师在未先向其出示的情况下提交了该保证书。PAX 不会通过详细说明该主张何以构成伪证性质的无稽之谈而使本院偏离重点；该主张已被纽约州法院反复驳回（例如，Kwok 从其自己的文件中出示了该保证书；其在对承认请求的答复中承认了其真实性；并且，他在诉讼中多年依赖该协议，直至其在实体问题证言录取中擅自变卦，声称其此前从未见过该协议）。只须说明的是，基于本答复中所述的同一理由，即 Kwok 不能在本院质疑 February 9 Contempt Order，Kwok 亦不能重新争讼 February 3, 2021 纽约州法院实体判决的有效性。\n\n902 F.2d 1098, 1101 (2d Cir. 1990)（“州法决定债务人在某一特定财产项目中的‘权益性质’。”（省略内部引证））；In re de Hertogh, 412 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009)（为确定财产是否构成债务人遗产的财产，法院必须确定“根据适用的康涅狄格州法律，债务人在破产申请日是否对该[财产]享有法律上可认定的权益。”）。\n\n8. 破产法院对 NY State Court（纽约州法院）就 Kwok（郭文贵）对 Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）的所有权和控制权所作认定进行审查，受到 Rooker-Feldman doctrine（Rooker-Feldman原则）和 res judicata（既判力原则）的双重禁止。Rooker-Feldman doctrine“旨在适用于‘由州法院败诉方提起的案件；该等当事人就地区法院诉讼开始前作出的州法院判决所导致的损害提出异议，并请求地区法院审查该等判决。’”McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010)（省略内部引文）。该原则适用于仍可上诉的州法院判决。11 当满足以下四项要求时，该原则“指示联邦法院避免审理相关请求：(1) 原告在州法院败诉；(2) 原告所称损害系由州法院判决所致；(3) 原告请求地区法院审查该判决；以及 (4) 州法院判决在原告提起联邦诉讼之前作出。”Id. at 154（省略内部引文）。\n\n9. Kwok 是多次“州法院败诉方”。在其 chapter 11 案件之前，Kwok 就 Lady May 的所有权问题在 NY State Court 败诉，由此导致 February 9 Contempt Order 的作出；其实质上，其 Objection 是主张其已经并将因该命令而受到损害。12 根据 Rooker-Feldman doctrine，Kwok 不得利用本院审查 NY State Court 的认定。See McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d at 154–55（根据 Rooker-Feldman doctrine 拒绝审理对州法院判决的质疑，并认定“[原告]质疑州法院对第 440.30(1–a)(a) 条解释的适当途径，是向 New York Appellate Division 提起上诉”（省略内部引文））；In re Booker, No. 19-30787, 2020 WL 504799, at \\*6 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2020), reconsideration denied, No. 19-30787 (AMN), 2020 WL 930091 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2020)（适用 Rooker-Feldman doctrine，并认定“破产法院无管辖权审查州法院的裁决……因此必须接受该判决。”）；cf. In re Van Eck, 425 B.R. 54, 63 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2010)（认定州法院的判决和命令已“最终确定”债务人试图重新争讼的问题，并裁定“将 chapter 11 案件作为攻击其他法院终局命令的平台，构成驳回 chapter 11 案件的 Other Cause”（省略内部引文））。\n\n11 See Caldwell v. Gutman, 701 F. Supp. 2d 340, 346–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)（“无论任何州法院上诉处于何种状态，诉讼当事人仍在寻求联邦法院对州法院判决的审查……这正是 Rooker–Feldman 所禁止的。”（省略内部引文））；see also Cohen v. Rosenthal, No. 3:15-cv-01043 (CSH), 2016 WL 7340280, at \\*4, n.7 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2016)（“尽管 Second Circuit 尚未处理为适用 Rooker-Feldman doctrine 之目的，是否包括上诉在内的所有州程序均须在联邦诉讼开始前终结的问题，但 Second Circuit 辖区内的地区法院并未将 Rooker-Feldman doctrine 的适用限于联邦原告已穷尽其州法院上诉救济的情形。”（省略内部引号和引文））。\n\n10. 既判力原则还禁止 Kwok 主张应因其不拥有或控制 Lady May 而驳回 Motion。13 既判力，或请求排除，规定：“对一项诉讼实体问题作出的终局判决，禁止当事人或与其具有法律关系者重新争讼在该诉讼中已经提出或本可提出的问题。”Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1994)（省略内部引文）。14 根据纽约州既判力原则，“一旦某项请求获得终局解决，源于同一交易或同一系列交易的所有其他请求均被禁止，即使该等请求基于不同理论或寻求不同救济。”Yeiser v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 535 F.Supp.2d 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)（省略内部引文）。如上所述，NY State Court 关于所有权和控制权的裁决，是以广泛的书面陈述以及大量书面和现场证人证言为依据作出的。15 Kwok 在 NY State Court 有充分机会就这些问题进行诉讼。16 本院必须接受 Justice Ostrager（奥斯特拉格法官）的命令；因此，Kwok 对 NY State Court 就 Lady May 所作认定提出质疑的唯一途径，是继续其对 February 9 Contempt Order 提起的上诉。\n\n12. 为试图重新争讼这些问题，Kwok 曾寻求将 NY State Court Action 移送至本院。See Objection at ¶ 7。但由于这些问题正处于已完成充分书面陈述的待决上诉中，移送不当，PAX 将寻求将案件发回 NY State Court。See In re Briarpatch Film Corp., 281 B.R. 820, 830–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（命令将构成“漫长、错综复杂诉讼历史”一部分的州法院诉讼发回，因“礼让原则强烈支持发回……以便州法院执行其自身命令，并且，如可对该命令和判决提起上诉，则审查其自身判决。”）。值得注意的是，Briarpatch 法院还以恶意提交为由驳回债务人的 chapter 11 申请，认定该债务人“既无资产，也不具有商业和公司合法性”，“没有任何可认知的重整意图，而是提交 Chapter 11 申请以重新争讼已由 State Court 裁定的问题。”Id. at 831, 835。PAX 将在本案中寻求同样救济。\n\n13. Kwok 还因争点排除而不得重新争讼 Lady May 的所有权问题。See DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2003)（“根据纽约州法律，争点排除可被援引，以禁止一方当事人提出以下争点：(1) 与已作出裁决的争点相同，且 (2) 该当事人在先前程序中已有充分和公平的诉讼机会……仅因上诉尚未审结，并不妨碍在第二程序中将受质疑判决作为对该判决当事人适用争点排除的基础。”（省略内部引号和引文））；Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Penn, 225 F. Supp. 3d 225, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)（被告“因争点排除而不得质疑其刑事定罪所依据的事实……[其]就其刑事定罪提起的上诉尚未审结这一事实，并不影响争点排除分析。”（省略内部引文））。\n\n11. 因此，根据 Rooker-Feldman doctrine 和既判力原则，Kwok 不得重新争讼其是否“受益性拥有并控制”Lady May；其已经受到司法否定的、其并不拥有或控制 Lady May 的主张，并非反对 Motion 的适当依据。\n\n14. 尽管 February 9 Contempt Order 仍在上诉中，既判力原则仍适用于此。See Oparaji v. Mun. Credit Union, No. 19-CV-4034 (JPC)(SN), 2020 WL 9815188, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19 CIV. 4034 (JPC), 2021 WL 2414859 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021)（“根据纽约州法律，‘仅因上诉尚未审结，并不剥夺受质疑判决的既判力效力。’”（省略内部引文））；Truong v. Hung Thi Nguyen, No. 10 CIV. 386 (DAB) (HBP), 2011 WL 1198254, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011)（汇集案例，并裁定：“根据纽约州法律，初审法院作出的判决，就既判力而言属于‘终局’判决，即使针对该初审法院判决的上诉尚未审结亦然。”（省略内部引文））。\n\n15. 各方当事人在 Justice Ostrager 面前就藐视法庭问题进行了充分书面陈述，进而形成 Initial Contempt Order。See Motion at ¶ 5。Kwok 随后向 Appellate Division First Department（纽约州上诉分庭第一司法部门）对 Justice Ostrager 的裁决提出上诉。See id. 各方当事人就上诉再次进行了书面陈述，First Department 认定：“动议法院在认定被告构成民事藐视法庭时行使了其自由裁量权，因为原告以清楚且令人信服的证据证明，被告违反了其知悉的法院合法、明确命令，且该违反行为损害了原告的权利。”Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Wan, 199 A.D.3d 423, 423 (1st Dep't 2021)。Appellate Division 维持每日 \\$500,000 的罚款，并指示动议法院举行证据听证，以解决有关该游艇所有权和控制权的争议，并评估适当处罚。Id. Justice Ostrager 随后于 February 2, 2022 举行了完整的证据听证会，此后认定 PAX 已以清楚且令人信服的证据证明 Kwok 受益性拥有并控制该游艇。See February 9 Contempt Order at 4。因此，NY State Court 作出了民事藐视法庭的终局命令。Id. at 10。\n\n16. See supra note 15。\n\nII. 该 MOTION 属于民事藐视法庭命令的 AUTOMATIC STAY 例外情形\n\n12. Kwok 在 Objection 中花费大量篇幅试图说服本院，February 9 Contempt Order 在性质上属于民事而非刑事。See Objection at ¶¶ 16–30。这一点不存在争议。Motion 明确主张，automatic stay 不适用于 February 9 Contempt Order，因为该民事藐视法庭命令旨在惩罚 Kwok 对 NY State Court 命令的公然且持续不予理会，并且 PAX 援引了法院认定 stay 不适用于执行民事藐视法庭命令的案例。See Motion at ¶ 12。\n\n13. 此外，与 Kwok 的主张相反，PAX 并未寻求收取 NY State Court 因其未将 Lady May 送回该院管辖范围而对其征收的罚款。See Motion at ¶ 13。相反，PAX 希望收回 Lady May，以使 Kwok 的所有债权人受益。Kwok 将 February 9 Contempt Order 错误描述为涉及补偿的命令，既忽视了 Motion，也忽视了 February 9 Contempt Order 的起因。February 9 Contempt Order 源于 Kwok 未遵守 NY State Court 的另外两项命令。第一，Kwok 将 Lady May 移出纽约，直接违反了 NY State Court 于 September 30 和 October 15, 2020 作出的命令。See Motion at ¶ 4。第二，于 March 2021，NY State Court 作出附条件民事藐视法庭命令——该命令经 New York Appellate Division, First Department 一致维持——要求 Kwok 或该游艇的登记所有人于 May 15, 2021 前送回 Lady May，否则该游艇每在该法院管辖范围外停留一日，即面临 \\$500,000 罚款。See id. at ¶ 5。八个多月后，在 Lady May 仍违反先前命令而处于该法院管辖范围外的情况下，NY State Court 于 February 2, 2022 举行证据听证会，其认定载于 February 9 Contempt Order。See id. at ¶ 6。\n\n14. 在 Objection 中，Kwok 大量援引 In re White, 478 B.R. 177, 181 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)，主张 automatic stay 适用于 February 9 Contempt Order。See Objection at ¶ 32。在 White 案中，动议人对债务人享有一项未清偿判决，并在申请破产前向其中一名债务人送达传票，以查明其资产所在地，从而满足该判决。In re White, 478 B.R. at 179–80。州法院命令遵守该传票，但债务人未予理会，导致州法院作出藐视法庭命令和令状，指示警长强制债务人遵守。Id. at 80。\n\n15. 破产法院认定，该藐视法庭命令涉及民事藐视法庭，但这并“未终结审查”，因为“[c]ourts have recognized a non-statutory exception to the automatic stay where the goal of a civil contempt proceeding is to vindicate the dignity of the court rather than collect a pre-petition claim or obtain property of the estate.” 同上，第183–84页。最终，动议人的执行该藐视法庭命令之动议被认定受自动中止约束，因为其不属于该例外，乃是为“追索一项破产申请前的损害赔偿请求权”。同上，第184页（着重号为原文所加）。所请求的额外救济——执行传票，以及如有必要，在债务人未予遵从时将其监禁——并未改变该结果，因为破产法院已经根据规则2004发布命令，授权动议人取得传票所要求的信息。同上。\n\n16. 与 White（怀特案）不同，本案中，该动议明确说明，PAX（PAX）并非寻求收取其破产申请前的藐视法庭罚款17，亦非寻求取得 Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）的占有。见动议，第12段。相反，\n\n17. 2月9日藐视法庭命令并不构成 PAX 所遭受的“损害赔偿”，而是为惩罚 Kwok（郭文贵）一再侮辱 NY State Court（纽约州法院）尊严而施加的金钱制裁。该金钱制裁独立于 PAX 对 Kwok 取得的判决。\n\nPAX 寻求为全体债权人的利益归集并保护一项破产财产。见同上，第21段。因此，该动议明确属于针对某些民事藐视法庭命令的自动中止例外。参见，例如，Int'l Distrib. Ctrs, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., Inc., 62 B.R. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)（认定其“惩罚债务人针对州法院或联邦法院尊严所作藐视行为”的“固有权力，并不因破产程序而受限”，并认定在藐视法庭请求“旨在维护本院的一项命令，且并非旨在执行金钱判决”时，自动中止不适用。（省略内部引文））；Booth v. Wilson, No. 96 CIV. 920 (RO), 1997 WL 241050, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997)（“[T]his contempt order enforcing my pre-bankruptcy order to compel discovery is not stayed by § 362(a) as it is 'vindicat[ing] the integrity of the court.'”）；Shaoxing Bon Textiles Co., Ltd. v. 4-U Performance Grp. LLC, 16 Civ. 6805, 2017 WL 6413993, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2017)（在“the proceeding in reality is one to punish the debtor for contumacious conduct against the dignity of [the] court”时，无需提出解除自动中止的动议。（省略内部引文））。\n\n17. Kwok 试图区分 Roberts v. Bennaceur, No. 3:12-CV-01222, 2015 WL 1471889 (D. Conn. 2015)，理由是该案中针对公司高级管理人员作出的藐视法庭制裁并不适用于债务人。见异议，第38段。然而，Roberts 案法院确认，只要该制裁不产生“‘取得受中止保护的资产或骚扰’债务人”的效果，其即可作出藐视法庭制裁。同上，第\\*16页（省略内部引文）。该法院援引 David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977)，该案认定，破产法和规则中所称应当中止的“‘诉讼’或‘程序’，不包括因不遵守自动中止前作出的州法院命令而产生的藐视法庭程序。”因此，“初审法院中止主要程序，但继续命令公司被告及其管理代理人遵守美国治安法官先前作出的、后经初审法院采纳的证据开示命令，完全一致……初审法官亦有权审议被告及其代理人是否因未遵守先前命令而构成藐视法庭……”。同上。此外，Roberts 案法院承认，其有权“在破产自动中止期间，裁决旨在‘惩罚债务人针对州法院或联邦法院尊严所作藐视行为’的藐视法庭动议。”Roberts, 2015 WL 1471889 at \\*16（援引 Serio v. Black, Davis & Shue Agency, Inc., 2006 WL 176983, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y.2006)）。本案中，PAX 既非试图为自身取得一项资产，亦非骚扰 Kwok。Kwok 持续不采取任何行动以为其债权人的利益保护其资产，此种情形系其一手造成。\n\nIII. PAX 有权获得解除自动中止的救济\n\n18. 如本院认定自动中止适用于2月9日藐视法庭命令，则应准许 PAX 所作范围有限的解除自动中止请求，以允许 Ostrager 法官（Ostrager 法官）在 Kwok 未能将 Lady May 带回纽约时施加适当的非金钱制裁。该动议详细说明，Sonnax 因素（1）、（2）、（4）、（7）、（10）及（12）均支持准许解除自动中止。见动议，第12–18段。具体而言，\n\nSonnax 因素1：修改自动中止将解决 PAX 历时一年的努力，即确保该游艇得到保全并位于美国境内。\n\nSonnax 因素2：执行2月9日藐视法庭命令不会干扰破产案件。\n\nSonnax 因素4和10：纽约州法院已监督 PAX 与 Kwok 之间的争议五年。导致2月9日藐视法庭命令的全部证据开示、动议程序、证据听证及会议，均在 Ostrager 法官面前进行。\n\nSonnax 因素7和12：Lady May 的返还不会使债权人受到不利影响或损害。相反，若不解除自动中止，债权人将直接受到损害，因为 Kwok 将没有动机将 Lady May 带回纽约。\n\n19. 最重要的是，Lady May 的返还将使一项极具价值的资产回到美国，以惠及 Kwok 的债权人。这与 In re Sonnax Industries, Inc., 907 F.2d 1280 (2d Cir. 1990) 的事实形成对比，Kwok 莫名其妙地在其异议中依赖该案。在 Sonnax 案中，债务人在未能从纽约州法院获得救济、撤销一项禁止其招揽另一实体 Tri Component 的客户或与其客户开展业务的禁令后，提出第11章破产申请。同上，第1282页。Sonnax 提出破产申请后，Tri Component 提出动议，要求修改自动中止，以允许其继续推进州法院诉讼请求，并针对违反州法院禁令的行为提出全新的藐视法庭动议。同上。Sonnax 法院在决定不修改自动中止时，重点考量解除自动中止将对 Sonnax 破产案件产生的影响，并认定：\n\n“[T]he state-court injunction barred Sonnax from doing business with any customers of Tri Component, its chief competitor,” 并将构成“a prohibition that may have a drastic impact on a company in a narrow market.” 同上。\n\n修改自动中止可能“doom Sonnax's attempts to reorganize”，因为其“would prevent Sonnax from doing much of its usual business.” 同上。\n\n司法经济利益支持拒绝解除自动中止，因为“the litigation in state court has not progressed even to the discovery phase.” 同上，第1287页。\n\n20. 本案不存在任何这些顾虑；事实上，这些顾虑的明显不存在凸显出解除自动中止为何极具正当性。首先，Kwok 是一名没有工作且据称没有资产的个人债务人。因此，他并无会因修改自动中止而受到影响的经营性业务。18 其次，将 Lady May 带回美国绝非“毁掉 Kwok 的重整努力”，而是将通过防止一项资产被滥用或耗散来帮助 Kwok 的破产案件。第三，修改自动中止不会妨碍 Kwok 从事任何业务，因为依其自身承认，他没有任何业务。最后，如动议中所述，纽约州法院已监督 PAX 与 Kwok 之间的争议五年。PAX 的基础请求权已获简易判决，导致2月9日藐视法庭命令的全部证据开示、动议程序、证据听证及会议（该命令产生于判决后程序的背景下）均已在 Ostrager 法官面前进行（相比之下，在 Sonnax 案中，尚未进行任何证据开示，甚至连藐视法庭动议都未提出，更遑论审理完毕）。即使 Kwok 未受 Rooker-Feldman doctrine（Rooker-Feldman 原则）和 res judicata（既判力）禁止（而他确实受到禁止），在这些事项已在纽约州法院得到高度推进的情况下，让本院裁决这些问题也将是对破产财产据称有限资产的严重管理不善。简言之，本案与 Sonnax 案毫不相似。\n\n18. 见 Official Form 107, Statement of Financial Affairs for Individuals Filing Bankruptcy, ECF No. 77 at 14–15。\n\n21. 同样，Kwok 依赖 In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)，并断言允许 PAX 执行2月9日藐视法庭命令将对 Kwok 及其破产财产产生“drastic impact”，亦属不当。见异议，第24段。在 Residential Capital 案中，一名债权人寻求解除自动中止，以追诉其已经败诉的一项州法院诉讼的上诉。同上，第631页。该法院在驳回解除自动中止动议时认定，“[l]itigation in non-bankruptcy courts would hinder the Debtors' attempts to reorganize by forcing the Debtors to utilize time and resources that would otherwise be spent in resolution of the Debtors' chapter 11 cases.” 同上。\n\n22. 将 Residential Capital 与本案进行比较是荒谬的。正如 Glenn 法官（Glenn 法官）在另一 Residential Capital 程序中所观察到的，“before filing for bankruptcy, the Debtors were a leading originator of residential mortgage loans and, together with their non-Debtor affiliates, the fifth largest servicer of residential mortgage loans in the United States, servicing approximately \\$374 billion of domestic residential mortgage loans and working with more than 2.4 million mortgage loans across the United States.” Residential Cap., LLC v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential Cap., LLC), 501 B.R. 549, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)。在债务人试图解除规模巨大的住宅房地产贷款账簿之时，允许在一个有数千名债权人的案件中进行零散诉讼将造成干扰。相比之下（并且，即使有重复之虞），Kwok 声称其没有任何会受到干扰的业务。此外，Glenn 法官的裁决着重于全体债务人债权人的利益；而本案中，债权人支持解除自动中止。19 并且，在 Residential Capital 案中，法院指出，修改该案中的自动中止并不会完全解决任何一部分诉讼。In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. at 644。本案中，PAX 所寻求的有限救济将解决一个独立问题：Kwok 是否将 Lady May 返还美国。此时无需在纽约州法院审理任何其他问题。此外，准许 PAX 所请求的救济不会导致 Kwok 花费“原本将用于解决本案的时间和资源”，反而将实质性地促进本案的解决。\n\n23. 将估值为 €28 million 的 Lady May 带至纽约，将对 Kwok 的第11章案件产生重大影响。但该影响将有利于其破产财产及债权人群体，而非如 Kwok 所称对其造成不利影响。根据在本第11章案件中提交的资产和负债清单，Kwok 主张其实际上没有资产可满足针对其提出的约 \\$374 million 请求权。20 Lady May 的返还以及以其清算所得潜在地满足债权人请求权，将为 Kwok 的债权人带来极大益处，远远超过对 Kwok 的任何损害。21 该\n\n19 参见债权人 Rui Ma（马蕊）和 Zheng Wu（吴征）就 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）所请求救济提供的有限支持声明，ECF No. 84（表示支持 PAX 在该动议中请求的救济）；债权人 Logan Cheng（程隆）对暂缓执行动议异议的答复，ECF No. 97（同上）。\n\n20 参见 Official Form 106A/B，Schedule A/B（财产），ECF. No. 78，第 3 页；另参见 Official Form E/F，无担保债权债权人，ECF No. 78，第 10、19–21 页。\n\n21 事实上，允许 Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）留在国际水域，可能会对债权人造成重大损害，因为该游艇可根据海事法被外国司法管辖区扣押，并且持续面临被损坏或\n\n从驳回该动议中获益的唯一人士是 Kwok（郭文贵）的家庭成员，他们得以继续使用作为债务人财产的 Lady May，以及郭文贵本人，他继续无视法院命令。\n\n24. 郭文贵主张，其对 Lady May 的权益已受到保护，因为 Lady May 已构成其全球破产财产的一部分；该主张并不能使郭文贵的债权人感到安心。参见异议，第 ¶ 4 段。郭文贵未表现出对法院命令的任何尊重。事实上，New York State Court（纽约州法院）认定：“郭文贵就 Lady May 所策划的空壳游戏所涉及的种种操弄，与本诉讼待决五年期间郭文贵实施的其他一切逃避性和藐视性行为如出一辙。”2 月 9 日藐视法庭命令，第 7 页。没有理由相信，随着其第 11 章案件的提交，郭文贵的操弄行为和对法院命令的漠视将会停止。\n\n25. 最后，郭文贵关于执行 2 月 9 日藐视法庭命令将导致其被监禁（并损害其第 11 章案件）的主张，不足以支持驳回该动议。第一，如果郭文贵希望避免被监禁，他只需返还该游艇。纽约州法院已认定，此事在其控制能力范围内。第二，如上所述，并无第 11 章案件可供管理。郭文贵没有经营中的企业，据称也没有资产，并且未寻求要求其家庭成员交还任何资产。如果他因持续藐视法庭而被监禁，其（并不存在的）企业不会受到损害。而且，尽管郭文贵被监禁可能会对本第 11 章案件的持续存续能力产生不利影响（该案件并无合法目的），但这将是郭文贵自身藐视法庭行为所导致的不幸后果。\n\n以其他方式贬值，因为郭文贵的家庭成员继续违反纽约州法院命令使用和享有该游艇。\n对有限支持声明的答复\n\n26. 债权人 Rui Ma 和 Zheng Wu（以下简称“支持债权人”）提交的《债权人 Rui Ma 和 Zheng Wu 就 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 所请求救济提供的有限支持声明》[ECF No. 84]（以下简称“声明”）支持该动议所请求的救济，并提议对准予该动议的拟议命令作出两项修改。参见声明，第 ¶ 3 段。22 关于支持债权人提出的第一项修改，PAX 认为该修改并无必要，因为该动议并非 PAX 为自身利益取得 Lady May 的行为。然而，PAX 同意支持债权人的意见，即在 Lady May 被返还后，对该游艇作出的任何进一步处置均应受本法院进一步命令的约束。关于支持债权人提出的第二项修改，PAX 目前并未寻求对郭文贵施加额外金钱制裁；但是，PAX 同意，如施加任何额外金钱制裁，则该等制裁相对于持有获准且未居次债权的任何一方的优先顺位及支付，均应受法院进一步命令的约束。PAX 将与支持债权人合作，就这两点形成双方均可接受的措辞。\n结论\n\n基于上述理由及该动议中所述理由，本法院应认定：(i) 自动中止不适用于有关将 Lady May 返还纽约的 2 月 9 日藐视法庭命令；或 (ii) 作为替代方案，有理由解除自动中止，以允许 PAX 寻求执行 2 月 9 日藐视法庭命令，从而为全体债权人的利益寻求返还 Lady May。\n\n22 另一名债权人 Logan Cheng 加入支持债权人对该动议的支持及其修改准予该动议的拟议命令的请求。参见债权人 Logan Cheng 对暂缓执行动议异议的答复，ECF No. 97。PAX 将使 Cheng 先生参与与支持债权人就修改拟议命令进行的任何讨论。\n\n日期：March 18, 2022，Hartford, Connecticut\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick M. Birney  Patrick M. Birney（CT No. 19875）Annecca H. Smith（CT No. 31148）ROBINSON & COLE LLP  280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 电话：(860) 275-8275 传真：(860) 275-8299 电子邮件：pbirney@rc.com asmith@rc.com\n\n以及\n\nPeter Friedman（获准临时出庭）Stuart M. Sarnoff（获准临时出庭）O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP  7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 电话：(212) 326-2000 传真：(212) 326-2061 电子邮件：pfriedman@omm.com ssarnoff@omm.com","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":77,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":83,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":84,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":97,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6611,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:34:44"}