{"id":"court_sdny_101_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":101,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2023-06-30","title":"SDNY ECF 101","summary_zh":"被告答辩意见书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #101（2023年6月30日）。被告人Yanping Wang答辩反对政府羁押申请，主张其无犯罪记录、无逃亡风险，与社区有紧密联系，并辩称存在可满足的保释条件足以确保其出庭。","summary_en":"Defendant's reply in opposition to detention — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #101 (June 30, 2023). Defendant Yanping Wang opposes the government's pretrial detention motion, arguing she presents no flight risk, has no criminal history, maintains strong community ties, and conditions of release exist that would reasonably assure her appearance.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nCase No. 23-CR-118-AT\nv.\nYANPING WANG,\nDefendant.\nDEFENDANT YANPING WANG’S REPLY\nIN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR AN ORDER REVOKING\nTHE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER OF DETENTION\nDATED APRIL 21, 2023, AND AUTHORIZING PRETRIAL RELEASE\nPriya Chaudhry\nCHAUDHRYLAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\nTel: (212) 785-5550\nEmail: priya@chaudhrylaw.com\nAlex Lipman\nLIPMAN LAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\nTel: (212) 401-0070\nEmail: alexlipman@lipmanpllc.com\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... ii\nI. THE GOVERNMENT IGNORES AND THUS CONCEDES IMPORTANT LEGAL\nAND FACTUAL ISSUES AS TO FLIGHT RISK .......................................................... 4\nA. The Government Does Not Show that Ms. Wang Intends to Flee ..................... 4\nB. Ms. Wang Has Strong Communal Ties ................................................................ 7\nC. Ms. Wang Has Nowhere Else to Go ..................................................................... 8\nD. The Government Abandons Its Cryptocurrency Theory for Another Theory\nThat Is Equally Groundless .................................................................................. 9\nE. The Government Fails to Address the Case Law Supporting That Wealth\nand the Possibility of Non-Extradition Alone Do Not Justify Pretrial\nDetention ............................................................................................................... 11\nF. Ms. Wang Did Not Lie to Pretrial Services ....................................................... 11\nII. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT NO CONDITIONS EXIST\nTHAT WOULD REASONABLY ASSURE MS. WANG’S APPEARANCE .............. 12\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM MAKING NEW\nALLEGATIONS OR ASSERTING NEW GROUNDS FOR DETENTION THAT IT\nDID NOT ASSERT BEFORE JUDGE PARKER AND JUDGE LEHRBURGER ... 13\nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 15\ni\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nAT&T Corp. v. Syniverse Techs., Inc.,\nNo. 12-CV-1812-NRB, 2014 WL 4412392 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2014) ................................. 5\nCurry Mgmt. Corp. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,\nNo. 22-CV-05006-CM, 2022 WL 17342495 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) ............................. 5\nHung v. United States,\n439 U.S. 1326 (1978) ...................................................................................................... 4, 5\nUnited States v. Barnett,\n986 F. Supp. 385 (W.D. La. 1997) ................................................................................... 7, 8\nUnited States v. Berger,\nNo. 06-CR-130-NGG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006) .............. 14\nUnited States v. Byrd,\n969 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................... 13\nUnited States v. Carriles,\n481 F. Supp. 2d 792 (W.D. Tex. 2007) ................................................................................ 7\nUnited States v. Kostadinov,\n572 F. Supp. 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ..................................................................................... 5\nUnited States v. Yaming Nina Qi Hanson,\n613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009) ....................................................................................... 6\nStatutes\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) .................................................................................................................. 13\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) ....................................................................................................................... 14\n18 U.S.C. § 3148 ............................................................................................................................. 5\nii\n\nYanping Wang is a typical white-collar defendant in the Southern District of New York—\nshe has no criminal history, faces charges with enormous alleged loss amounts (creating\nelephantine sentencing guidelines), and has no history of failing to appear in court or fleeing to\navoid capture. Pretrial detention is an extraordinary measure that cannot be deployed lightly and\nis not employed for other defendants situated similarly to Ms. Wang. The reality is that if Ms. Wang\nwas not connected to Mr. Miles Kwok and rather appeared as a lone defendant on the exact same\nallegations, she would very likely have been released on bail conditions that she could meet, like\nSam Bankman-Fried. It is, and has always been, the government’s burden to demonstrate by a\npreponderance of the evidence that Ms. Wang is enough of a flight risk to warrant detention and\nthat no set of conditions would reasonably assure her appearance. Unable to meet this burden, the\ngovernment has consistently attempted to shift the burden to Ms. Wang to demonstrate why she\nshould not be detained, including in its opposition. The government has failed to meet its burden.\nMs. Wang must be released on bail.\nThe government’s jejune opposition suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) it fails to\ndemonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Wang presents enough of a flight risk to\nwarrant detention; (2) it fails to establish why the current detention order is appropriate for\nMs. Wang and instead merely repeats its case for detention of Mr. Kwok (perhaps hoping the Court\nwould not notice that these are distinct defendants); and (3) it inappropriately throws into its\nopposition entirely new allegations and then misconstrues the law to argue that these new\nallegations would (on their own, or in addition to the current allegations) warrant detention. In\nessence, the government simply pays lip service to its burdens of proof, as evidenced by its utter\nfailure to address several issues that are central to whether those burdens have been satisfied.\n\nOne reason the government fails to meet its burden of showing that Ms. Wang is likely to\nflee is that it paints with too broad a brush, thereby overstating Ms. Wang’s alleged culpability in\nsupport of its assertion that the strength of its evidence favors detention. An important example of\nthis: the government positions its case as one in which all the companies mentioned in the\nindictment, as well as any other company associated with Mr. Kwok, were fraudulent, such that\nany work for any of these companies was in furtherance of the various frauds charged in the\nindictment. That is simply not so. Each of the relevant companies—G|Clubs, GTV, G|Fashion,\nHymalaya Exchange, Gettr, HCHK Technologies, and HCHK Properties—are or were real\ncompanies with real businesses and real employees. Consistent with that, the government admitted\nin a Brady letter sent to counsel on June 26, 2023, that,\nIt also cannot be disputed that these companies were used,\nat least in part, to advance the cause of the anti-CCP movement (as the government alleges, this is\nprecisely what incentivized the dissident community to invest) and that their products and services\nwere meant to advance the movement in some way—for example, supporting the maintenance of\nan online anti-CCP presence (HCHK Technologies), distributing anti-CCP content (GTV),\nfostering social interaction among members of the anti-CCP dissident movement (G|Clubs), and\ndesigning and selling fashionable clothes for the anti-CCP dissident movement participants, many\nof which bear anti-CCP slogans and symbols (G|Fashion). In fact, the real gravamen of the\ngovernment’s case is not that all these companies were not real or that all of the money raised was\ndiverted. Rather, the core of the allegations is that people other than Ms. Wang made false\nstatements in connection with raising the funds (Mr. William Je wrote the PPM (ECF No. 19 ¶ 13c)\n2\n\nand Mr. Kwok made public statements to his supporters (id. ¶ 13a)), and that some of the money\nraised for these companies from the dissident community was diverted for the personal use of\nMessrs. Kwok and Je (and their families) as well as invested in a manner inconsistent with the use-\nof-funds disclosures given to prospective investors. Put another way, the government’s allegation\nis not that these businesses were illegal per se, but that in connection with these legal businesses,\nthe defendants (mainly Messrs. Kwok and Je) committed discreet illegal acts.\nWhat this means is that Ms. Wang’s mere participation in a company’s business—for\nexample, by reviewing legitimate payroll and interviewing prospective employees—is not, in the\nabsence of evidence that the specific activity in question was directly related to fraudulent\nconduct—evidence of fraud. The government simply makes a logical leap (without sticking the\nlanding) that Ms. Wang’s participation in any activity related to any of these companies is by itself\nevidence of her involvement in the conspiracy and all the allegedly fraudulent conduct.\nConsidering all circumstances, this logical leap improperly shifts the burden to Ms. Wang to\ndisprove the government’s suppositions about her role.\nEqually as grave, instead of assessing the relevant issues, the government attempts to\nintroduce several new allegations and grounds for detention never previously raised. The\ngovernment should not be able to do so, as permitting the government to proceed in this manner\nis an afront to the procedural parameters set forth in the Bail Reform Act. But even if these\nstrategically delayed contentions were to be considered, they nevertheless fail to support detention.\nFor example, as we discuss below, Ms. Wang cannot be detained on the basis that she has engaged\nin “obstructive behavior” because the cases upon which the government relies are inapposite.\nUnlike those cases, Ms. Wang has in no way engaged in witness tampering or worse. But even on\nthe merits, the government’s proffer on this issue is weak, as we detail below.\n3\n\nIn addition, the government also fails to show that no conditions would reasonably assure\nMs. Wang’s appearance. While it is true that Ms. Wang requests this Court to set bail conditions\nless onerous than originally set, the government fails to address the adequacy of some of the\nconditions that Ms. Wang proposes. The government fails to explain why a secured $2 million\npersonal recognizance bond (representing Ms. Wang’s entire net worth) would be insufficient to\nreasonably assure Ms. Wang’s appearance. The government also does not even bother to offer its\nreasons for why in-home monitoring by a responsible person is insufficient to assure compliance\nwith home confinement, given that whoever monitors (and lives with Ms. Wang for that reason)\nwould be doing so on pain of being held in contempt, should the monitor fail to carry out her\nresponsibilities faithfully. Such failures should prevent the conclusion that the government has\ncarried its burden on this issue.\nI. THE GOVERNMENT IGNORES AND THUS CONCEDES IMPORTANT LEGAL\nAND FACTUAL ISSUES AS TO FLIGHT RISK\nA. The Government Does Not Show that Ms. Wang Intends to Flee\nWe raised the issue of evidence of a defendant’s intent to flee as being a necessary\ncomponent to whether the defendant presents sufficient flight risk to warrant detention, as\nnumerous courts have held. (ECF No. 81 at 9). Specifically, we explained with supporting case\nlaw that “evidence substantiating ‘an actual risk of flight,’” i.e., the required risk-of-flight showing\nin the Second Circuit, “must be something akin to evidence that the defendant possesses an intent\nto flee.” (Id.). We then argued that the government “failed to meet its burden with respect to an\nintent to flee because it offered very little by way of evidence, relying, instead, on supposition and\nconjecture.” (Id. at 10). Tellingly, the government stands silent on this issue, effectively conceding.\nTo be sure, holding that Ms. Wang is a flight risk would directly conflict with the cases we\ncited and would run afoul of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Hung v. United States, where the\n4\n\nSupreme Court assessed a similar issue of whether the district court had erred in revoking a\ndefendant’s bail after he was convicted. 439 U.S. 1326, 1326 (1978) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3148).\nAssessing that issue, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, which had found no abuse\nof discretion in the district court’s decision to revoke the defendant’s bail because, among other\nreasons, the defendant supposedly posed a risk of flight. Id. at 1326–27. In assessing whether the\nappellate court’s conclusion that there was no set of conditions that would reasonably assure the\ndefendant’s appearance, the Supreme Court focused predominantly on what the evidence\nestablished with respect to the defendant’s state of mind—i.e., his “inclination” to flee. Id. at 1329\n(“But if these considerations suggest opportunities for flight, they hardly establish any inclination\non the part of applicant to flee. And other evidence supports the inference that he is not so\ninclined.”). See also United States v. Kostadinov, 572 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Thus,\nin . . . Hung Justice Brennan noted that opportunities for flight alone are insufficient grounds for\ndenial of bail. There must also be a showing that, if released, defendant has an inclination to flee.”).\nConsistent with Hung, the Court should conclude here that the government has failed to show that\nMs. Wang has an intention to flee and, therefore, Ms. Wang is not a flight risk.\nThis conclusion is especially true here, given the government’s silence on the issue. By\nstaying silent, the government has conceded it, meaning that the Court should conclude that an\n“actual risk of flight” requires evidence akin to an intent to flee, as we have contended. See Curry\nMgmt. Corp. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 22-CV-05006-CM, 2022 WL 17342495, at *3\n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) (“A party may be deemed to concede an argument by failing to address\nit in an opposition brief.”); AT&T Corp. v. Syniverse Techs., Inc., No. 12-CV-1812-NRB, 2014 WL\n4412392, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2014) (factual issue was conceded through silence; collecting\nSDNY cases).\n5\n\nFurthermore, as the government failed to proffer evidence of an intent to flee, the Court\nshould conclude that this obvious omission favors finding that Ms. Wang is not a flight risk or that\nsome set of conditions would ensure her appearance. See, e.g., United States v. Yaming Nina Qi\nHanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2009) (“In this case, . . . there is no strong circumstantial\nevidence indicating that [the defendant] intends to flee the United States.”). Indeed, the\ngovernment has not even bothered to argue that Ms. Wang possesses an intent or even an\ninclination to flee. Instead, the government has asserted that she may have opportunity to flee,\nwhich we debunked (ECF No. 81 at 11–20), or help from others to facilitate flight (also debunked,\nid.); but it is silent as to state of mind. No wonder: as we demonstrated in our brief, Ms. Wang has\nno intention to flee, if for no other reason than that she is more afraid of the CCP (which would\nlikely torture and kill her) than she is even of a long sentence in the U.S. (The government has\nnow admitted that Victim-1 in the Eastern District indictment is Mr. Kwok (“[T]he Government\ncan confirm that Kwok is ‘Victim-1.’”). Ms. Wang’s fear of being harassed, followed, and exposed\nby the Chinese government’s agents in the U.S. should she flee are well-founded (ECF No. 81 at\n16–17), and the government does not spare a single word refuting that because it is true.\nThe government’s argument that Ms. Wang’s application to travel for business is evidence\nof flight risk stands logic on its head. Knowing that the federal prosecutor cavalry was coming for\nher (id. at 15–16), she informed the government of her desire to travel to save her asylum\napplication. If she were inclined to flee and had the means and opportunity to do so, as the\ngovernment alleges (if, for example, she were able to hide in Abu Dhabi or anywhere else)—she\nwould have boarded a plane on her Chinese passport and left.\nIn short, the government makes no attempt to provide any evidence akin to corroborating\nthat Ms. Wang intends to flee, relying instead on conclusory supposition and conjecture for its\n6\n\nproffer on this issue. (See ECF No. 89 at 27 (“With this backdrop, it is not credible for Wang to\nclaim she has ‘no intention to flee.’”)). Absent evidence of intent to flee, much less a discussion\nof it, the Court should hold that Ms. Wang does not present enough of a flight risk to warrant\ndetention.\nB. Ms. Wang Has Strong Communal Ties\nThat Ms. Wang’s community in the U.S. consists primarily of other members of the anti-\nCCP movement who are also in the U.S. is a sufficient showing of community ties, unless, of\ncourse, the government were to take the position that immigrants living here cannot form a\ncommunity. Again, Ms. Wang is not only a member, but a leader, of the anti-CCP movement in the\nU.S. (ECF No. 81 at 1 (“Ms. Wang is one of the leaders of a dissident movement whose aim is\nnothing short of the overthrow of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule in China.”), 13, 19–20).\nThe government is once again silent on these points and thereby concedes that Ms. Wang does in\nfact have strong ties to the anti-CCP community here in the U.S.\nHowever, even if the government’s concession on this issue were somehow not enough to\nestablish strong communal ties, many facts would still heavily support a finding of a strong bond\nbetween Ms. Wang and the anti-CCP community. Perhaps most probative of this is the fact that\nmany individuals from within that community voluntarily came forward to offer their assets as\nsecurity to ensure Ms. Wang’s release. Moreover, even more of the same came in solidarity to\nattend Ms. Wang’s detention hearing. Those facts strongly favor finding a strong community to\nwhich Ms. Wang belongs, as some courts have observed. See, e.g., United States v. Carriles, 481\nF. Supp. 2d 792, 796 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (“[The defendant] has ample ties to the community, as\nevidenced by the thousands of supporters who have signed petitions on his behalf and volunteered\ntheir personal resources to aid in his defense.”); United States v. Barnett, 986 F. Supp. 385, 396\n7\n\n(W.D. La. 1997) (“[A]pproximately fifteen to twenty members of the community appeared at [the\ndefendant’s] . . . hearing, indicating that he retains strong ties to this community.”).\nC. Ms. Wang Has Nowhere Else to Go\nRelying on the connections of her co-defendants but not Ms. Wang’s, the government\nattempts to portray her as someone having substantial international connections, implying that she\nwould use these connections of others to flee the U.S. (ECF No. 89 at 28 (“As described above,\nKwok and others have been moving the operations of the Himalaya Exchange and other Kwok-\ncontrolled entities to the UAE for the admitted purpose of evading the U.S. legal system. . . . Her\nco-defendant, Je, is presently believed to be hiding in the UAE.”) (emphasis added)). In doing so,\nthe government entirely ignores our analysis showing that Ms. Wang has nowhere else to go. (ECF\nNo. 81 at 2 (“She literally has nowhere to go.”), 20 (“She really has nowhere else to go.”)). So,\neven if Ms. Wang did have an expansive network of international connections of her own (she does\nnot), the fact would still remain that Ms. Wang is incapable of utilizing those networks to ensure\nshe remains unfound.\nNotably also, Ms. Wang’s supposed international connections, really others’ connections,\ncould not ensure her flight from the U.S. Missing from the government’s analysis is any\nexplanation as to how Ms. Wang is tied to the connections of others that she would supposedly\nutilize. For example, the government points to Ms. Wang’s co-defendant as being “suspected” of\nbeing in the UAE but presents no evidence supporting this, much less evidence supporting that\nMs. Wang would desire to join him or that he (presumably, a fugitive in hiding) would want her\nto, such that she could lead the authorities to him. In sum, the government’s entire presentation of\nMs. Wang’s international contacts can be summarized as: she knows people in other parts of the\nworld. But so does almost every single New Yorker and defendant in this district. That does not,\n8\n\nand cannot, demonstrate an intent or ability to flee. That is quite the stretch. The government’s\nproffered international connections theory should in no way sustain continued detention.\nD. The Government Abandons Its Cryptocurrency Theory for Another Theory\nThat Is Equally Groundless\nPreviously, the government sought to show that Ms. Wang had access to substantial funds\nto support flight from the U.S. because she held and had allegedly failed to disclose millions of\ndollars in cryptocurrency. We already detailed why the government’s cryptocurrency theory failed\nto hold water (id. at 23–28), and tellingly, the government failed to address that point, providing\nno specifics as to Ms. Wang’s purported crypto holdings. In place of its cryptocurrency theory, the\ngovernment has now pivoted to trying to establish Ms. Wang’s alleged access to funds by painting\nan image of Ms. Wang as being highly connected to the entities that allegedly carried out the\nconspiracy and now purportedly contain a treasure trove of money that is all supposedly accessible\nto Ms. Wang and that she would use if given the chance to flee. (See ECF No. 89 at 28–30 (“[T]his\nclaim is belied by Wang’s role in the fraud and her effective control over tens of millions of dollars,\nas described in greater detail herein.”)).\nThe elephant in the room here is that, as noted, these are real businesses with real\nemployees. For this reason, the government is unable to even proffer any evidence showing that\nMs. Wang can access the funds for her own use from these entities. Even if the government were\ncorrect (and it is not), it has presented no evidence that Ms. Wang still has access to the funds\nassociated with any of these entities. The summary of accounts that the government points to does\nnot establish access to funds. (See id. at 30 (“[T]he defendant had printed summaries of account\nbalances for six bank accounts held in the names of Kwok-controlled GF Italy, GFNY, HCHK\nTechnologies, and HCHK Property in her purse, which indicated that those six accounts alone held\nmore than $55 million as of March 13, 2023.”)). Clever phrasing in the government’s opposition\n9\n\nmakes it seem like Ms. Wang now has access to numerous bank accounts, (ECF No. 89 at 29 n.22),\nbut read closely, the language indicates that she may have had access, not that she still does. The\ngovernment offers no explanation for how Ms. Wang could access corporate funds of active\nbusinesses for her personal use, none. Moreover, the bulk of that $55 million is in HCHK\nTechnologies and HCHK Properties. But, as the government well knew before filing its opposition,\nboth HCHK Technologies and HCHK Properties (and all their assets) were transferred to an\nassignee (acting as a fiduciary of those companies) for the benefit of their creditors. Ms. Wang is\nnot one of them.\nIndeed, neither the indictment nor any other allegation made by the government to date has\nmentioned Ms. Wang’s ability to divert or participation in diverting corporate funds for anyone’s\npersonal use. The only specific allegation in the indictment relating to misuse of funds by\nMs. Wang is investing funds in a manner inconsistent with use-of-funds disclosure to investors.\n(Id. at 18 (“On June 5, 2020, Wang authorized the $100 million wire transfer . . . [and t]he\nsubscription agreement, which Wang signed, made clear that $100 million investment . . . was\nmade on behalf of Saraca, whose ultimate beneficial owner is Kwok’s son.”) (emphasis added)).\nIn other words, concluding that Ms. Wang would appropriate funds for her own use is yet another\nleap untethered to facts or logic.1 In short, only because it benefits the government’s conclusory\ntheory does the government now claim that Ms. Wang, a salaried employee, can now take and use\n1 The government’s opposition paints with a broad brush and attempts to expand the nature of\nMs. Wang’s involvement in the conspiracy to extend beyond the GTV Private Placement. (See\nECF No. 89 at 19). But a review of the indictment reveals that Ms. Wang is only specifically\nconnected to the GTV Private Placement, nothing more. (ECF No. 81 at 11–12).\n1 0\n\nthe funds that she never once touched or received before.2 Unsupported hypotheses are not\nevidence.\nE. The Government Fails to Address the Case Law Supporting That Wealth and\nthe Possibility of Non-Extradition Alone Do Not Justify Pretrial Detention\nThe government does nothing to try and refute the cases we cited showing that affluent\nforeign nationals who may possibly flee to jurisdictions where extradition is impossible cannot be\ndetained on those grounds alone. (See ECF No. 81 at 21–22). Nevertheless, those grounds are\nessentially the grounds upon which the government seeks to detain Ms. Wang. As we have\ndiscussed, at base, the government believes Ms. Wang will flee because she allegedly has access\nto a substantial amount of money and reason to flee—supposedly having no connection here but\nmany connections elsewhere—to countries where extradition would be impossible, such as the\nUAE. Yet at this moment, Sam Bankman-Fried, who indisputably had and likely still has actual\naccess to opulent wealth and boundless resources—and faces staggering sentencing guidelines,\nwhile periodically disobeying Judge Kaplan—fights his case from his home. The government\ncannot (and therefore it did not) distinguish Ms. Wang from Mr. Bankman-Fried; neither of them\nwarrants detention. And yet one—the foreign national with modest personal funds and nowhere to\ngo—is detained. The Court should follow the authorities we cited and conclude that this is an\ninsufficient basis upon which to detain Ms. Wang.\nF. Ms. Wang Did Not Lie to Pretrial Services\nWe thoroughly addressed and refuted the government’s assertion that Ms. Wang lied to\nPretrial Services (“PTS”) about cash in her home safe. (See id. at 28). In response, the government\n2 In the absence of proof of personal enrichments, the government has attempted to paint\nMs. Wang’s salary as extraordinary. Ms. Wang’s compensation was consistent with that of other\nsimilar executives. See http\nretention-strategies-in-family-offices-Citi-Private-Bank.pdf. This is certainly not evidence of\nreceiving fraud proceeds.\n11\n\ncompletely fails to address the fact that it presented an imaginary transcript of Ms. Wang’s PTS\ninterview. Indeed, the Court now has additional evidence supporting Ms. Wang’s truthful assertion\nthat she was not asked whether she had any cash aside from what was on her person at the time of\nher arrest. As the Court is aware, certain confidential notes were accidentally filed with our motion.\nThose notes indicate that Ms. Wang disclosed to counsel prior to her PTS interview that she had\ncash in her safe. Two things follow: one, Ms. Wang was not hiding the fact that she had cash in her\napartment; and two, had the right question been asked and Ms. Wang had given an incorrect\nanswer, counsel would have corrected the record on the spot in the interview. That did happen with\nrespect to another question asked in the PTS interview. When asked about her bank accounts,\nMs. Wang mistakenly identified one of them as JPMorgan instead of Morgan Stanley. Counsel,\nwho had asked that question before the interview, immediately corrected her.\nII. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT NO CONDITIONS EXIST\nTHAT WOULD REASONABLY ASSURE MS. WANG’S APPEARANCE\nThough the government bears the burden of proof on this issue, it nevertheless fails to show\nby a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions exist that would reasonably assure\nMs. Wang’s appearance. One problem with the government’s analysis of this issue is that it fails\nto describe how or why many of Ms. Wang’s proposed conditions would be insufficient to\nreasonably assure her appearance. For instance, Ms. Wang proposes that restrictions be placed\nupon her ability to use her bank accounts—e.g., she would only be able to use funds for necessities.\nThe government says nothing about this, though it writes at length about how Ms. Wang’s\nresources lean in favor of her being a flight risk. Likewise, the government says nothing directly\nrefuting the efficacy of Ms. Wang’s proposal to have a friend live with and monitor her to ensure\nMs. Wang’s compliance with her proposed conditions. (See ECF No. 89 at 40 (contending\ngenerally that Ms. Wang’s past conduct should lead the Court to believe that she would not comply\n1 2\n\nwith her proposed conditions)). For obvious reasons, someone willing to submit to this Court’s\ncontempt power has a strong incentive to report Ms. Wang should she not abide by her conditions.\nAt the very least, that incentive creates reasonable assurance that Ms. Wang will appear.\nSeparately, up to now, Ms. Wang has been penalized for not knowing enough wealthy\nindividuals who could afford to act as sureties. Indeed, although Ms. Wang continues to believe\nthat she has sufficient moral suasion over the individuals whom she offered as potential sureties,\nMs. Wang was forced to lower the amount of her proposed bond (from $5 million to $2 million)\nbecause this is all she has. Any amount above that would run afoul of Congress’ enacted directive\nthat financial conditions may not be imposed if they result in the pretrial detention of the defendant.\nSee 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results\nin the pretrial detention of the person.”).\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM MAKING NEW\nALLEGATIONS OR ASSERTING NEW GROUNDS FOR DETENTION THAT IT\nDID NOT ASSERT BEFORE JUDGE PARKER AND JUDGE LEHRBURGER\nNotably absent from the government’s opposition is any authority supporting its present\nattempt to make allegations and raise grounds for detention that it previously did not. The\ngovernment is in essence engaging in a game of “whack-a-mole” in which the government raises\na new allegation every time Ms. Wang addresses a prior false contention of the government. The\nCourt should not permit this. Instead, the Court should conclude that the government is estopped\nat this juncture from making any new allegations and from raising any new grounds for detention.\nAlternatively, the Court should hold a hearing at which the government would be required to\nprovide Ms. Wang with adequate discovery to examine and opportunity to challenge these new\nallegations. United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Detention can be ordered,\ntherefore, only ‘in a case that involves’ one of the six circumstances listed in (f), and in which the\n1 3\n\njudicial officer finds, after a hearing, that no condition or combination of conditions will\nreasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and\nthe community.”). At the pretrial detention hearing, the defendant “shall be afforded an opportunity\nto testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to\npresent information by proffer or otherwise.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).\nAs it did before Judge Lehrburger, the government has waited until the eleventh hour to\ncreate a new justification for detaining Ms. Wang. Now, the government would have this Court\ndetain Ms. Wang on the basis that she is an obstructionist because she has supposedly lied to PTS,\nviolated bankruptcy orders, and continues to operate the alleged conspiracy from behind bars.\n(ECF No. 89 at 32–39). While the prejudice to Ms. Wang caused by the belated nature in which\nthe government raises these issues cannot be overstated, the Court need not address any of these\nissues because the authority upon which the government relies is entirely inapposite. What the\ngovernment ignores in raising this issue is that only a specific type of “obstruction” has been\nrecognized by courts as warranting pretrial detention. As the Eastern District of New York\nobserved, “[i]n such cases, defendants have consistently been found to have engaged in severe\nwitness tampering or worse to support a finding of obstruction.” United States v. Berger, No. 06-\nCR-130-NGG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55844, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006) (collecting cases).\nAs the government raises no such allegations, the Court should not detain Ms. Wang on its alleged\n“obstructive behavior” grounds.\nBut even if the Court were to consider the government’s new allegations, the Court should\nstill not detain Ms. Wang on the basis that she has engaged in the alleged obstructive behavior. To\nbegin, Ms. Wang was not herself subject to any order that the government alleges was violated.\nAll that the government alleges is that Mr. Kwok was held in contempt for violating a court order\n1 4\n\nand that a court found troubling an adverse party’s allegation that Ms. Wang transferred a company\nafter the court found that company to be property of the estate. (Significantly, Mr. Kwok was found\nnot to have communicated proper instructions to Ms. Wang. (ECF No. 89, Exhibit D ¶ 5)). The\ntype of behavior alleged here—involvement in others disobeying a court order or giving\ninstructions to run a business, including by informing others who are not alleged to be co-\nconspirators where company funds are located—does not rise to the type of “obstruction” that\nleads courts to snatch up and lock up defendants. As this Court well knows, disobeying a condition\nof release, on its own, does not necessarily result in a remand; it usually warrants a strict lecture\nfrom the supervising PTS officer.\nCONCLUSION\nFor all the forgoing reasons and those we raised in our motion, Ms. Wang should be\nreleased and given ten business days to meet all her proposed bail conditions.\nDated: June 30, 2023 Respectfully submitted,\n/s/ Alex Lipman\nPriya Chaudhry\nCHAUDHRYLAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\nTel: (212) 785-5550\nEmail: priya@chaudhrylaw.com\nAlex Lipman\nLIPMAN LAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\nTel: (212) 401-0070\nEmail: alexlipman@lipmanlawpllc.com\nAttorneys for Defendant Yanping Wang\n1 5","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国），\n案号：23-CR-118-AT\n诉\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），\n被告。\n被告 YANPING WANG（王雁平）支持其申请\n撤销治安法官于 2023 年 4 月 21 日作出的拘留命令\n并准予审前释放动议的答辩书\nPriya Chaudhry\nCHAUDHRYLAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\n电话：(212) 785-5550\n电子邮箱：priya@chaudhrylaw.com\nAlex Lipman\nLIPMAN LAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\n电话：(212) 401-0070\n电子邮箱：alexlipman@lipmanpllc.com\n\n目录\n权威判例及法条目录 ....................................................................................................... ii\nI. 政府忽视并进而承认了有关逃跑风险的重要法律与事实问题 .......................................................... 4\nA. 政府未证明王女士具有逃跑意图 ..................... 4\nB. 王女士具有牢固的社区联系 ................................................................ 7\nC. 王女士无处可去 ..................................................................... 8\nD. 政府放弃了其加密货币理论，转而采用同样毫无根据的另一套理论 .................................................................................. 9\nE. 政府未能回应支持“仅凭财富和不引渡的可能性不足以证明审前拘留具有正当性”的相关判例法 ............................................................................................................... 11\nF. 王女士并未向审前服务部门说谎 ....................................................... 11\nII. 政府未能证明不存在能够合理保证王女士出庭的条件 ..................................................................... 12\nIII. 应禁止政府提出其此前未向 PARKER 法官和 LEHRBURGER 法官提出的新指控或拘留新理由 ... 13\n结论 ............................................................................................................................ 15\ni\n\n权威判例及法条目录\n判例\nAT&T Corp. v. Syniverse Techs., Inc.,\nNo. 12-CV-1812-NRB, 2014 WL 4412392 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2014) ................................. 5\nCurry Mgmt. Corp. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,\nNo. 22-CV-05006-CM, 2022 WL 17342495 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) ............................. 5\nHung v. United States,\n439 U.S. 1326 (1978) ...................................................................................................... 4, 5\nUnited States v. Barnett,\n986 F. Supp. 385 (W.D. La. 1997) ................................................................................... 7, 8\nUnited States v. Berger,\nNo. 06-CR-130-NGG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55844 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006) .............. 14\nUnited States v. Byrd,\n969 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................... 13\nUnited States v. Carriles,\n481 F. Supp. 2d 792 (W.D. Tex. 2007) ................................................................................ 7\nUnited States v. Kostadinov,\n572 F. Supp. 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ..................................................................................... 5\nUnited States v. Yaming Nina Qi Hanson,\n613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009) ....................................................................................... 6\n法规\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) .................................................................................................................. 13\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) ....................................................................................................................... 14\n18 U.S.C. § 3148 ............................................................................................................................. 5\nii\n\nYanping Wang（王雁平）是 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）一名典型的白领被告人——她无犯罪记录，面临涉案损失金额巨大的指控（导致了庞大的量刑指南适用范围），并且没有任何不出庭或潜逃以规避抓捕的过往记录。审前拘留是一项非同寻常的措施，绝不能轻易适用，对其他处于与王女士类似处境的被告人也并未采用。现实情况是，如果王女士与 Miles Kwok（郭文贵）先生没有关联，而是作为独任被告面对完全相同的指控出庭，她极有可能已经像 Sam Bankman-Fried（萨姆·班克曼-弗里德）那样，在能够满足的保释条件下获释。以优势证据证明王女士具有足以构成拘留必要的逃跑风险，并且没有任何一套条件能够合理保证其出庭，一直且历来都是政府的举证责任。由于无法达到这一举证要求，政府在其反对意见中一贯企图将证明为何不应被拘留的责任转嫁给王女士。政府未能完成其举证责任。王女士必须获得保释释放。\n\n政府浅薄乏味的反对意见存在三个致命缺陷：(1) 未能以优势证据证明王女士具有足以支持拘留的逃跑风险；(2) 未能确立为何当前的拘留命令适用于王女士，而是仅仅重复其对郭先生适用拘留的主张（或许是希望法院不会注意到这是两名不同的被告人）；以及 (3) 不恰当地在其反对意见中抛出全新的指控，进而曲解法律，辩称这些新指控（单独而言，或与现有指控结合）足以支持拘留。实质上，政府对其举证责任不过是口惠而实不至，其完全未能应对与这些举证责任是否已得到满足密切相关的若干核心问题，便充分证明了这一点。\n\n政府未能承担证明 Ms. Wang（王女士）有可能潜逃的举证责任，其原因之一在于政府打击面过宽，从而夸大了王女士所受指控的可归责性，以支持其关于证据力度支持羁押的主张。一个重要的例证是：政府将其案件定性为起诉书中所提及的所有公司、以及与 Mr. Kwok（郭文贵先生）相关的任何其他公司均为欺诈性公司，以至于为这些公司中的任何一家工作都是为了推进起诉书中所指控的各项欺诈行为。这根本不是事实。每一家相关公司——G|Clubs、GTV、G|Fashion、Hymalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）、Gettr、HCHK Technologies 以及 HCHK Properties——现在或曾经都是拥有真实业务和真实员工的真实公司。与此相符的是，政府在 2023年6月26日 发送给辩护律师的 Brady letter（布雷迪信函）中承认：\n\n同样无可争议的是，这些公司至少在一定程度上被用于推进 anti-CCP movement（反中共运动）的事业（正如政府所指控的那样，这恰恰是激励异见人士群体进行投资的原因），且它们的产品和服务旨在以某种方式推进该运动——例如，支持维持反中共的网络存在（HCHK Technologies）、分发反中共内容（GTV）、促进反中共异见运动成员之间的社交互动（G|Clubs），以及为反中共异见运动的参与者设计和销售带有反中共口号和标志的时尚服装（G|Fashion）。事实上，政府案件的真正要害并非在于所有这些公司都不是真实的，或者所有筹集到的资金都被挪用了。相反，指控的核心在于王女士以外的人员在筹集资金过程中作出了虚假陈述（Mr. William Je（余建明先生）撰写了 PPM（私募集资备忘录）（ECF No. 19 ¶ 13c），且郭先生向其支持者发表了公开声明（同上 ¶ 13a）），并且从异见人士群体中为这些公司筹集的部分资金被挪作郭先生和余先生（及其家属）的个人用途，且投资方式与向潜在投资者披露的资金用途不符。换言之，政府的指控并不是说这些业务本身是非法的，而是在与这些合法业务相关的过程中，被告人（主要是郭先生和余先生）实施了个别的违法行为。这意味着，在缺乏证据证明所涉具体活动与欺诈行为直接相关的情况下，王女士仅参与公司业务——例如审核合法的工资单和面试应聘员工——并不构成欺诈的证据。政府只是作出了逻辑跳跃（且未能站得住脚），即王女士参与与这些公司相关的任何活动本身就构成了她参与共谋以及所有涉嫌欺诈行为的证据。\n\n综合考虑所有情况，这种逻辑跳跃不当地将举证责任转移给了王女士，要求其反驳政府关于其角色的推测。\n\n同样严重的是，政府不仅没有评估相关问题，反而试图提出若干此前从未提出过的新的指控和羁押理由。政府不应被允许这样做，因为允许政府以这种方式行事是对 Bail Reform Act（《保释改革法》）所规定的程序性界限的违背。但是，即使考虑这些策略性拖延的主张，它们也依然无法支持羁押。\n\n例如，正如我们在下文所讨论的，不能以王女士从事了“阻碍司法行为”为由将其羁押，因为政府所依据的先例并不适用。与那些先例不同，王女士绝没有从事干扰证人或更恶劣的行为。但即使从实体层面来看，政府在此问题上的提请证明也是薄弱的，正如我们在下文详述的那样。\n\n此外，政府也未能证明没有任何保释条件能够合理确保王女士到庭。虽然王女士确实请求本法院设定比最初设定的更为宽松的保释条件，但政府并未论证王女士所提出的某些条件的充分性。政府未能解释为何一份附担保的 200万美元 个人保释保证书（代表了王女士的全部净资产）不足以合理确保王女士到庭。鉴于由负责人员实施居家监控（并因此与王女士同住）若未能忠实履行职责将面临被判藐视法庭的风险，政府甚至根本没有说明为何由负责人员实施居家监控不足以确保其遵守居家监禁。此类缺失应足以排除政府已在此问题上完成举证责任的结论。\n\nI. 政府忽视并因此承认了关于潜逃风险的重要法律和事实问题\n\nA. 政府未能证明王女士具有潜逃意图\n\n正如众多法院所认定的那样，我们提出了被告人的潜逃意图证据是判断被告人是否存在足以导致羁押的潜逃风险的必要组成部分这一问题。（ECF No. 81 at 9）。具体而言，我们结合支持性判例法解释了，“证明‘实际潜逃风险’的证据”，即 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）所要求的潜逃风险证明，“必须类似于证明被告人具有潜逃意图的证据”。（同上）。我们随后主张，政府“未能承担关于潜逃意图的举证责任，因为其几乎没有提供任何证据，反而依赖于臆测和推断”。（同上 at 10）。显而易见的是，政府在此问题上保持沉默，实际上等于默认。\n\n诚然，认定王女士存在潜逃风险将直接与我们引用的判例相冲突，并将违反 Supreme Court（最高法院）在 Hung v. United States（洪诉合众国案）中的指导意见，在该案中，最高法院评估了类似问题，即地区法院在被告人被定罪后撤销其保释是否存在错误。439 U.S. 1326, 1326 (1978)（援引 18 U.S.C. § 3148）。在评估该问题时，最高法院撤销了上诉法院的判决，上诉法院曾认为地区法院撤销被告人保释的决定并无滥用裁量权，理由包括被告人据称具有潜逃风险等。同上 at 1326–27。在评估上诉法院关于没有任何一组条件可以合理确保被告人到庭的结论时，最高法院主要聚焦于证据就该被告人的心理状态（即其潜逃的“倾向性”）所确立的事实。同上 at 1329（“但是，如果这些考虑因素暗示了潜逃的机会，它们也难以确立申请人有任何潜逃的倾向。而其他证据支持了他并无此倾向的推论。”）。亦见 United States v. Kostadinov（合众国诉科斯塔迪诺夫案），572 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院） 1983)（“因此，在……Hung 案中，布伦南大法官指出，仅有潜逃机会不足以作为拒绝保释的理由。还必须证明，若获释，被告人具有潜逃的倾向。”）。与 Hung 案相一致，本法院在此应得出结论：政府未能证明王女士具有潜逃意图，因此王女士不构成潜逃风险。\n\n鉴于政府在该问题上的沉默，这一结论在此尤其成立。通过保持沉默，政府已经承认了这一点，这意味着本法院应当如我们所主张的那样，认定“实际潜逃风险”需要类似于潜逃意图的证据。见 Curry Mgmt. Corp. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.，No. 22-CV-05006-CM, 2022 WL 17342495, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022)（“一方当事人若未在答辩意见书中对某一论点作出回应，可被视为放弃/承认该论点。”）；AT&T Corp. v. Syniverse Techs., Inc.，No. 12-CV-1812-NRB, 2014 WL 4412392, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2014)（事实问题因沉默而被承认；汇总纽约南区联邦地区法院案例）。\n\n此外，由于政府未能提供潜逃意图的证据，本法院应当得出结论：这一明显的遗漏有利于认定王女士不构成潜逃风险，或者某些条件的组合可以确保其到庭。见，例如，United States v. Yaming Nina Qi Hanson，613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C.（哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院） 2009)（“在本案中，……没有强有力的间接证据表明［被告人］企图逃离美国。”）。事实上，政府甚至都未曾费心主张王女士具有潜逃的意图甚至倾向。相反，政府断言她可能有潜逃的机会（对此我们已予以驳斥，ECF No. 81 at 11–20），或者有其他人协助其潜逃（同样已予以驳斥，同上）；但政府对其心理状态却保持沉默。难怪如此：正如我们在辩护状中所证明的那样，王女士毫无潜逃意图，哪怕仅仅是因为她对 CCP（中国共产党）的恐惧（中共很可能会对她施以酷刑并杀害她）甚至超过了对在美国被判处长期监禁的恐惧。（政府现已承认，Eastern District（纽约东区）起诉书中的受害人-1 为郭先生（“［政］府可以确认郭为‘受害人-1’。”）。王女士关于一旦潜逃将在美国遭到中国政府特工骚扰、跟踪和曝光的担忧是有充分根据的（ECF No. 81 at 16–17），而政府对此未置一词予以反驳，因为这千真万确。\n\n政府关于王女士申请因公出境构成潜逃风险证据的论点在逻辑上是本末倒置的。在得知联邦检察官大军正冲她而来（同上 at 15–16）的情况下，她向政府告知了其因挽救庇护申请而希望出境的愿望。正如政府所指控的那样，如果她有潜逃倾向，且具备潜逃的手段和机会（例如，如果她能够藏身于 Abu Dhabi（阿布扎比）或任何其他地方）——她早就拿着中国护照登机离开了。\n\n简而言之，政府根本没有试图提供任何类似于证实王女士具有潜逃意图的证据，而是在该问题上的举证完全依赖于结论性的推测和臆断。（参见 ECF No. 89 at 27（“在此背景下，王声称自己‘无意潜逃’是不可信的。”））。在缺乏潜逃意图的证据、更不用说道理阐述的情况下，本法院应当认定王女士并未构成足以被羁押的潜逃风险。\n\nB. 王女士具有深厚的社区纽带\n\n王女士在美国的社区主要由同样身在美国的反中共运动其他成员组成，这充分表明了其社区纽带，当然，除非政府采取居住在此的移民无法形成社区的立场。再次说明，王女士不仅是美国反中共运动的成员，更是该运动的领导者之一。（ECF No. 81 at 1（“王女士是一场异见运动的领导者之一，该运动的目标正是推翻中国共产党（CCP）在中国的统治。”），13, 19–20）。\n\n政府在这些要点上再次保持沉默，从而承认了王女士确实与美国本土的反中共群体存在深厚的纽带。\n\n然而，即使政府在这一问题上的承认出于某种原因尚不足以确立深厚的社区纽带，众多事实依然有力支持王女士与反中共群体之间存在紧密联结的认定。或许最能证明这一点的事实是，该群体内部的许多人自愿站出来提供自身资产作为担保，以确保王女士获释。此外，更有同仁出于团结一致前来参加王女士的羁押听证会。这些事实有力支持认定存在一个王女士所……\n\n正如若干法院所注意到的那样，Wang（王女士）属于后一种情况。参见，例如，United States v. Carriles（美国诉卡里莱斯案），481 F. Supp. 2d 792, 796 (W.D. Tex. 2007)（“[被告]与社区有着充分的联系，数千名支持者代表他签署请愿书并自愿提供个人资源协助其辩护即证明了这一点。”）；United States v. Barnett（美国诉巴尼特案），986 F. Supp. 385, 396 (W.D. La. 1997)（“大约十五至二十名社区成员出席了[被告的]……听证会，表明他与该社区保持着紧密的联系。”）。\n\nC. 王女士无处可去\n\n政府依赖其同案被告而非王女士本人的社会关系，企图将她描绘成拥有大量国际人脉的人，暗示她会利用他人的这些关系逃离美国。（ECF No. 89 第 28 页（“如上所述，Kwok（郭文贵）等人一直在将 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）及其他由郭控制的实体的业务转移至 UAE（阿联酋），其承认的目的就是逃避美国法律体系。……她的同案被告 Je（余建明）目前据信藏匿在阿联酋。”）（强调为后加））。政府这样做完全忽视了我方表明王女士无处可去的分析。（ECF No. 81 第 2 页（“她确实无处可去。”），第 20 页（“她真的无处可去。”））。因此，即便王女士确实拥有她自己庞大的国际关系网（她并没有），事实仍然是王女士根本没有能力利用这些网络来确保自己不被发现。\n\n同样值得注意的是，王女士所谓的国际关系——实际上是他人的关系——并不能确保她逃离美国。政府的分析中缺失了任何关于王女士如何与那些她据称会利用的他人的关系相联系的解释。例如，政府指出王女士的同案被告被“怀疑”身处阿联酋，但并未提出任何支持这一说法的证据，更没有证据表明王女士会想要去与他会合，或者他（据推测是一名藏匿中的逃犯）会希望她去，从而导致她把执法机关引向他。总而言之，政府对王女士国际人脉的全部陈述可以概括为：她认识世界其他地方的人。但这几乎与本地区的每一位纽约人和每一位被告别无二致。这并没有、也绝不可能证明具有潜逃的意图或能力。这未免过于牵强。政府提出的国际关系理论绝不应支持继续羁押。\n\nD. 政府放弃其加密货币理论，转而采用另一个同样毫无根据的理论\n\n此前，政府试图证明王女士能够获取巨额资金以支持其逃离美国，因为她持有且据称未能披露数百万美元的加密货币。我们已经详细阐述了为什么政府的加密货币理论站不住脚（同上，第 23–28 页），显而易见的是，政府未能对该要点作出回应，未提供关于王女士据称持有的加密货币的任何具体细节。政府现在放弃了其加密货币理论，转而试图通过将王女士描绘成与据称实施了共谋的实体高度相关联的形象，来确立王女士据称可以获取资金；并称这些实体现在据称包含巨额财富，王女士全都可以获取，且一旦有机会潜逃她就会使用这些资金。（参见 ECF No. 89 第 28–30 页（“[这]一主张被王在欺诈中所扮演的角色及其对数千万美元的实际控制所推翻，正如本文中更详细描述的那样。”））。\n\n这里显而易见却被忽视的事实是，如前所述，这些都是拥有真正员工的真实企业。正因如此，政府甚至无法提出任何证据证明王女士可以从这些实体中获取资金供个人使用。即使政府的说法是正确的（事实并非如此），它也没有提出任何证据证明王女士仍能获取与这些实体中任何一个相关的资金。政府指出的账户摘要并不能证明其能够获取资金。（参见同上，第 30 页（“[该]被告的手提包中放有以郭控制的 GF Italy（GF意大利）、GFNY（GF纽约）、HCHK Technologies（HCHK科技）以及 HCHK Property（HCHK置业）名义开设的六个银行账户的余额打印摘要，显示截至 2023年3月13日，仅这六个账户就持有超过 5500万美元。”））。政府在反对意见中巧妙的措辞使其看起来像王女士现在仍可使用众多银行账户（ECF No. 89 第 29 页注 22），但仔细研读后，该文句表明的是她过去可能曾有权使用，而不是她现在仍有权使用。政府没有解释王女士何以能够将运营中企业的公司资金用于其个人用途，完全没有解释。此外，这 5500万美元的大部分属于 HCHK科技和 HCHK置业。但是，正如政府在提交反对意见之前就已经非常清楚的那样，HCHK科技和 HCHK置业两者（及其所有资产）都已为了其债权人的利益转让给了一名受让人（作为这些公司的受托人）。王女士并不是债权人之一。\n\n事实上，无论是起诉书还是政府迄今为止提出的任何其他指控，都未提及王女士有能力挪用或参与挪用公司资金供任何人个人使用。起诉书中关于王女士滥用资金的唯一具体指控是以与向投资者披露的资金用途不符的方式投资资金。（同上，第 18 页（“2020年6月5日，王批准了 1亿美元的电汇……[且]王签署的认购协议明确表明，该笔 1亿美元的投资……是代表 Saraca（萨拉卡公司）进行的，其实际实益拥有人为郭的儿子。”）（强调为后加））。\n\n换言之，得出王女士会侵占资金供个人使用的结论，是又一次脱离事实与逻辑的飞跃。1 简而言之，仅仅因为这符合政府结论性的理论，政府现在才声称王女士这名拿固定薪水的雇员现在能够拿走并使用\n\n1 政府的反对意见大而化之，企图将王女士参与共谋的性质扩大到超出 GTV Private Placement（GTV私募）的范围。（参见 ECF No. 89 第 19 页）。但审查起诉书可以发现，王女士仅具体与 GTV私募相关联，仅此而已。（ECF No. 81 第 11–12 页）。\n\n她此前从未触碰或接收过该笔资金。2 毫无根据的假设并非证据。\n\nE. 政府未能回应支持「仅凭财富和不可引渡的可能性并不能构成审前羁押理由」的判例法\n\n对于我们所引用的判例——即表明可能逃往无法引渡之司法管辖区的富裕外国公民不能仅凭这些理由被羁押——政府完全没有尝试反驳。（见 ECF No. 81 第 21–22 页）。然而，这些理由本质上正是政府寻求羁押 Wang（王）女士所依据的理由。正如我们所讨论的，从根本上说，政府认为王女士会逃跑，是因为她据称可以获取巨额资金，并有逃跑的动机——据称在此地毫无联系，但在其他地方有诸多联系——可逃往如 UAE（阿联酋）等无法引渡的国家。然而此时此刻，Sam Bankman-Fried（萨姆·班克曼-弗里德）——无可争议地曾经拥有且可能仍能实际获取巨额财富和无限资源，并面临惊人的量刑指南建议，且期间还时常违抗 Judge Kaplan（卡普兰法官）的命令——却在其家中为自己的案件抗辩。政府无法（因此也未能）将王女士与班克曼-弗里德先生区分开来；他们两人均不应被羁押。然而，其中一人——个人资金有限且无处可去的外国公民——却被羁押了。法院应当遵循我们引用的权威判例，并认定这不足以构成羁押王女士的依据。\n\nF. 王女士并未对审前服务处说谎\n\n我们已经全面回应并反驳了政府关于王女士就其家中保险柜内的现金对 Pretrial Services（审前服务处，简称“PTS”）说谎的主张。（见同上，第 28 页）。对此，政府\n\n2 在缺乏个人非法获利证据的情况下，政府试图将王女士的薪资描述为异乎寻常。王女士的报酬与同类其他高管相一致。参见 http retention-strategies-in-family-offices-Citi-Private-Bank.pdf。这绝非收取欺诈收益的证据。\n\n完全未能正面回应其提交了一份虚构的王女士 PTS 访谈记录这一事实。事实上，法院现在掌握了额外的证据，支持王女士的真实陈述，即当时并未有人询问她在被捕时随身携带的现金之外是否还有其他现金。正如法院所知，某些保密笔记在随我们的动议提交时不慎归档。这些笔记表明，王女士在接受 PTS 访谈之前曾向律师披露其保险柜内有现金。由此可得出两点结论：第一，王女士并未隐瞒其公寓内有现金的事实；第二，如果当时提出了正确的问题而王女士给出了不正确的回答，律师在访谈现场就会当场纠正记录。关于 PTS 访谈中提出的另一个问题，确实发生过这种情况。当被问及其银行账户时，王女士错误地将其中一个认定为 JPMorgan（摩根大通）而非 Morgan Stanley（摩根士丹利）。在访谈前询问过该问题的律师立即纠正了她。\n\nII. 政府未能证明不存在能够合理保证王女士出庭的条件\n\n尽管政府在此问题上承担举证责任，但它仍未能以优势证据证明不存在能够合理保证王女士出庭的条件。政府对该问题的分析存在一个缺陷，即它未能说明王女士提出的诸多条件为何或如何在合理保证其出庭方面是不充分的。例如，王女士提议对其使用银行账户的能力施加限制——例如，她只能将资金用于必需品。政府对此只字未提，尽管它长篇大论地阐述王女士的资源如何倾向于表明她存在逃跑风险。同样，王女士提议由一位朋友与其同住并对其进行监督，以确保王女士遵守其提议的条件，政府并未直接反驳该提议的有效性。（见 ECF No. 89 第 40 页（概括性地主张王女士过去的品行应使法院相信她不会遵守其提议的条件））。出于显而易见的原因，愿意服从本法院藐视法庭权管辖的人，在王女士未能遵守其条件时具有强烈的动机去举报王女士。至少，这种动机为王女士的出庭提供了合理保证。\n\n另外，截至目前，王女士因不认识足够多的有能力担任保证人的富裕人士而受到惩罚。事实上，尽管王女士仍然相信自己对提议作为潜在保证人的人士具有足够的道德说服力，但王女士被迫降低了其提议的保释金数额（从 500 万美元降至 200 万美元），因为这是她的全部资产。任何超过该数额的金额都将违反国会制定的法定准则，即如果财务条件会导致被告被审前羁押，则不得施加该财务条件。参见 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2)（“司法官员不得施加导致该人被审前羁押的财务条件。”）。\n\nIII. 应当禁止政府提出此前未在 PARKER 法官和 LEHRBURGER 法官面前提出的新指控或新羁押理由\n\n值得注意的是，政府的反对意见中明显缺乏支持其目前试图提出先前未曾提出过的指控和羁押理由的任何权威依据。政府本质上是在玩一场“打地鼠”游戏，即每当王女士回应了政府先前的一项虚假主张时，政府就会提出一项新的指控。法院不应允许这种做法。相反，法院应当认定政府在此关头不得提出任何新指控，也不得提出任何新羁押理由。或者，法院应当举行听证会，届时政府应被要求向王女士提供充分的证据开示以供审查，并提供质疑这些新指控的机会。United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)（“因此，只有在‘涉及’(f)款所列六种情形之一的案件中，且司法官员在听证会后认定不存在任何条件或条件组合能够按要求合理保证该人的出庭以及任何其他人与社区的安全时，方可下达羁押令。”）。在审前羁押听证会上，被告“应被给予作证、传唤证人、对出庭证人进行交叉询问以及通过书面陈述或其他方式提供信息的合理机会。”18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)。\n\n正如其在 Judge Lehrburger（勒伯格法官）面前所做的那样，政府一直等到最后一刻才制造出羁押王女士的新借口。现在，政府希望本法院以王女士具有阻碍行为为由羁押王女士，因为她据称对 PTS 说谎、违反了破产命令，并且在狱中继续操纵涉案共谋。（ECF No. 89 第 32–39 页）。虽然政府迟延提出这些问题给王女士造成的损害无论如何强调都不为过，但法院无需处理这些问题中的任何一个，因为政府所依据的权威判例完全不适用。政府在提出该问题时忽略的是，只有特定类型的“阻碍行为”才被法院认定为应当予以审前羁押。正如 Eastern District of New York（纽约东区）所指出的那样，“在此类案件中，被告均被一致认定存在严重的干扰证人或更恶劣的行为，以支持阻碍行为的认定。”United States v. Berger, No. 06-CR-130-NGG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55844, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006)（汇集多起判例）。鉴于政府并未提出此类指控，法院不应以其指称的“阻碍行为”为由羁押王女士。\n\n但即使法院考虑政府的新指控，法院仍不应基于王女士从事了所指称的阻碍行为而羁押她。首先，王女士本人并未受到政府指称被违反的任何命令的约束。政府所指控的全部内容，只是 Kwok（郭）先生因违反法院命令而被判藐视法庭，以及法院认为对方当事人指控王女士在法院认定某公司属于破产财产后转让该公司这一点令人不安。（值得注意的是，郭先生被认定未向王女士传达适当的指示。（ECF No. 89, Exhibit D ¶ 5））。此处所指控的行为类型——牵涉到他人不服从法院命令，或发出经营业务的指示（包括告知未被指控为共谋者的其他人公司资金的存放位置）——并未上升到促使法院直接抓捕并关押被告的那种“阻碍”程度。正如本法院深知的那样，仅凭不遵守释放条件本身并不必然导致还押；通常只需由负责监督的 PTS 官员给予严厉训诫即可。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述所有理由以及我们在动议中提出的理由，应当释放王女士，并给予她十个工作日的时间以满足其提议的所有保释条件。\n\n日期：2023年6月30日 谨呈，\n\n/s/ Alex Lipman\nPriya Chaudhry\nCHAUDHRYLAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\n电话：(212) 785-5550\n电子邮箱：priya@chaudhrylaw.com\n\nAlex Lipman\nLIPMAN LAW PLLC\n147 West 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\n电话：(212) 401-0070\n电子邮箱：alexlipman@lipmanlawpllc.com\n\n被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）之代理律师","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":5409,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-06-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-06-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:44:22"}