{"id":"court_sdny_1115_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":1115,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":null,"title":"SDNY ECF 1115","summary_zh":"债权人异议书——与美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案相关联的文件，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #1115。债权人 Logan Cheng（经律师 Jay M. Wolman）就康涅狄格州破产法院（案号 22-50073）第11章托管人就民事藐视法庭动议相关材料提出的封存申请、以及托管人口头请求闭庭一事提出异议，援引 Brown v. Maxwell、Nixon v. Warner Communications 等判例，主张公众对法庭记录享有普通法及宪法第一修正案上的知情权，认为托管人未提出封存或闭庭的充分理由，请求法院驳回封存动议、全程公开该藐视程序庭审。","summary_en":"Creditor objection — a filing connected to United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #1115. Creditor Logan Cheng, through counsel Jay M. Wolman, objects to the Chapter 11 Trustee's motion in the related Connecticut bankruptcy proceeding (Case No. 22-50073) to seal exhibits tied to a civil-contempt motion against the debtor, and to the Trustee's oral request to close the courtroom, invoking Brown v. Maxwell and Nixon v. Warner Communications to argue that the public and press retain a common-law and First Amendment right of access, contending the Trustee offered no compelling justification for sealing or closure, and asking the court to deny the sealing motion and keep the entire contempt hearing open.","body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n|                       | : |  |\n|-----------------------|---|--|\n| In Re:                | : |  |\n|                       | : |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1 | : |  |\n|                       |   |  |\n|                       | : |  |\n| Debtors.              | : |  |\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **CREDITOR LOGAN CHENG'S OBJECTION TO (I) CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO SEAL REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER HOLDING DEBTOR IN CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RIGHTS ORDER AND RELATED DOCUMENTS; AND (II) CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S ORAL MOTION TO CLOSE THE COURTROOM**\n\n:\n\nLogan Cheng, Creditor, objects to the *Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion to seal reply in support of Motion for Entry of Order Holding Debtor in Civil Contempt for Failure to Comply with Corporate Governance Rights Order and Related Documents* (ECF No. 1095) and the related oral request made November 17, 2022, to close the courtroom for that portion of the hearing on the contempt motion addressing the documents sought to be sealed.\n\nThe Trustee has identified his Exhibits 20-24, 28-30, and 34-38 (ECF No. 1099), as documents to be sealed on the basis of privilege per ECF No. 856, and Exhibit 27 (ECF No. 1100) as a document to be sealed on the basis of having been designated as confidential under the protective order at ECF No. 923. The Court, on November 17, 2022, appeared to suggest that the exhibits at issue appear at ECF No. 1083, but that document stops at Exhibit 27 and there is little indication in those documents as to what, if anything, is withheld from the public. Moreover, the\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202), and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nsealing motion makes no reference to ECF No. 1083. Thus, Creditor Cheng is arguing with his proverbial hand tied behind his back—he has no idea what is sought to be sealed or the particularized reason for it, and he cannot, as a result, make a complete argument or analysis as to the propriety of sealing or courtroom closure.\n\nThe Court must avoid shielding from scrutiny that which rightfully should be exposed to sunlight. It should avoid repeating the errorss the Second Circuit reversed in *Brown v. Maxwell*, where it determined, \"in contravention of our precedent, the District Court failed to review the documents individually and produce specific, on-the-record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values.\" 929 F.3d 41,48 (2d Cir. 2019). The courts do not belong to Kwok – they belong to the people. *Craig v. Harney*, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (\"what transpires in the court room is public property\"). As discussed herein, there is no proper basis to deny Creditor and the public access to the information at issue. There are both common law and First Amendment rights of access. The Trustee and Debtor have not provided any compelling reason why those rights should be abridged.\n\nMoreover, under the Bankruptcy Code, \"the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) mandates that all papers filed in a bankruptcy case are public records open to examination unless the court decides to protect information in them under § 107(b).\" *In re Purdue Pharma L.P*., 632 B.R. 34, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)(finding the common law right of access having been superseded by Section 107). The Trustee does not purport the documents to be sealed (and therefore necessitating courtroom closure) to be \"a trade secret or confidential research, development, or commercial information\" or \"scandalous or defamatory matter\" under Section 107(b), the only categories on which exclusion can be had (barring risk of identity theft or *unlawful* injury under Section 107(c)). Merely being marked \"confidential\" or claimed \"privileged\" does not either make such so nor automatically meet the statutory requirements; the markings and claims of others do not govern. Further, under Section 107(c), perhaps Debtor or another might be injured by the disclosure, but there is nothing to suggest that it would be from unlawful activity.[2](#page-2-0)\n\n### **1.1 Historical and Constitutional Presumptions**\n\nApart from the statute, there is both a First Amendment and common law right of access to court records.[3](#page-2-1) Both remind us that there is a strong presumption of openness in the judicial branch. That presumption should not be laid aside lightly. And, to the extent this Court does not agree with *Purdue Pharma* that Section 107 superseded the common law, Creditor invokes his rights thereunder.\n\n### **1.1.1 Common Law Right to Access**\n\nThe common law right to access is long-established. *See Nixon v. Warner Communications*, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). In *Nixon*, the Supreme Court recognized the federal common law right \"to inspect and copy public records and documents.\" *Id*. This right extends to exhibits filed in cases. \"[H]istorically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.\" *E\\*Trade Fin. Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG*, 582 F. Supp. 2d 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing *Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia*, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980)); *see also id*. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring); *and see Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc*., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (\"one of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should know what goes on in courts\").\n\nCourts have consistently noted that access to courts and court records is important for public education, public trust, and the integrity of the court system. \"[A] trial courtroom also is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been through to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.\" *Richmond Newspapers*, 448 U.S. at 587 (1980). Those who observe and report on\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> This is in contrast to the Court's determination that proceedings on November 16, 2022, should be sealed due to the risk of unlawful physical violence against the Trustee, his counsel, and counsel for PAX, apparently inspired by Kwok's broadcasts, as well as the disparaging nature of the remarks. (ECF No. 1108)\n\n<span id=\"page-2-1\"></span><sup>3</sup> To the extent any order or rule of the Court conflicts with the right of access under statute, common law controlling precedent, or the Constitution, it must yield to that authority.\n\ncourt proceedings play a vital role in ensuring that the public can view the workings of the judicial process. \"What better way to demonstrate to the public that its courts are fair and just than to say to the public, 'come and view the proceedings yourself and judge for yourself?'\" *Suen v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.*, District Court, Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A493744-C at 8 (Apr. 16, 2013). Here, access to the court records, especially the Kwok exhibits at issue, are particularly important because this case involves matters of public concern. As the Court is well aware, Mr. Kwok is a high-profile, self-professed billionaire, who has had dealings involving Steve Wynn, Steve Bannon, the Chinese Communist Party, and others. Secretive adjudications in this case will cast doubt on the system and the people may be left wondering if another politician, celebrity, or businessperson has been tied to any of the already public allegations regarding Kwok and his associates.\n\nThe Second Circuit reinforced the common law presumption in *Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP*, 814 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2016) (\"The courts have long recognized the \"general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.\") (citing *Nixon*, 435 U.S. at 597, 598 & n.7). \"This right is said to predate the Constitution.\" *Bernstein* 814 F.3d at 142 (citing *United States v. Amodeo II*, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That general right means that sealing is inappropriate.\n\n### **1.1.2 The First Amendment Compels Access**\n\nThe First Amendment requires public access to court proceedings. *See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986); [4](#page-3-0) *Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino*, 380 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (the public and the press have a \"qualified First Amendment right to attend judicial\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Historically, the Supreme Court noted: \"Long ago in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for treason, for example, with Chief Justice Marshall sitting as trial judge, the probable-cause hearing was held in the Hall of the House of Delegates in Virginia, the courtroom being too small to accommodate the crush of interested citizens*.*\" *Press-Enter,* 478 U.S. at 10*,* citing to *United States v. Burr*, 25 F. Cas. 1 (No. 14,692) (CC Va. 1807).\n\nproceedings and to access certain judicial documents.\"). This is long unquestioned in the criminal context, but the Supreme Court has made it clear that this extends to all cases. *Richmond Newspapers*, 448 U.S. at 580 n.7. \"[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal.\" *Id*. at 599 (Stewart, J. concurring). \"[T]he First Amendment guarantees a qualified right of access not only to criminal but also to civil trials and to their related proceedings and records. *N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth*., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing *Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad*. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1984)); *see also Hartford Courant*, 380 F.3d at 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding a right to civil and criminal docket sheets).\n\nNotably, every circuit that has considered whether the First Amendment requires public access in civil cases has concluded it does. *See*, *e.g.*, *Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc*., 846 F.2d 249, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1988); *In re Continental Ill. Secs. Litig*., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); *Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen*, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984); *In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council*, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983); *Newman v. Graddick*, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983). \"The First Amendment requires that court proceedings be open to the public, and by extension the news media, absent the most clearly articulated and compelling reason for closing them in a particular circumstance.\" *Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue*, 923 F. Supp. 580, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The First Amendment, \"protects the public's right to have access to judicial documents [and] has been understood to be stronger than its common law ancestor and counterpart.\" *United States v. Erie Cty*., 763 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2014). No compelling reason for secrecy exists here. This defies the constitutional mandate that legal proceedings are inherently public affairs. *Richmond Newspapers*, 448 U.S. at 580; *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).\n\n# **1.2 Standard for Sealing a Court Record**\n\nThe Court should begin from a strong presumption in favor of access and, \"[i]n most cases, a judge must carefully and *skeptically* review sealing requests to insure that there really is an\n\nextraordinary circumstance or compelling need.\" *In re Orion Pictures Corp*., 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); *see also SEC v. TheStreet.com*, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); *Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino*, 380 F.3d 83, 91(2d Cir. 2004) (\"The Supreme Court [has] recognized that the First Amendment grants both the public and the press a qualified right of access\" to judicial proceedings.); *Westmoreland v. CBS*, Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1984) (\"There is, to be sure, an abundance of support in the cases for a constitutionally grounded public right of access to the courtroom.\"); *United States v. Myers (In re in re Nat'l Broad. Co.)*, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that there is an especially strong presumption requiring extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions). \"Once a First Amendment right of access to judicial documents is found, the documents may be sealed only if specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. And, broad and general findings by the trial court are not sufficient to justify closure.\" *United States v. Erie Cty*., 763 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2014).\n\nThe starting point is to determine whether the documents at issue are \"judicial documents\" for which a presumption of access applies. *See SEC v. TheStreet.Com*, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[A] subspecies of sealed documents in civil cases—so-called 'judicial documents' deserve a presumption in favor of access.\") When evidence is used in a dispositive motion or its opposition, there must be a compelling reason to shield it from public view. Generally, a \"[f]inding that a document is a \"judicial document\" triggers a presumption of public access.\" *Newsday LLC v. Cty. of Nassau*, 730 F.3d 156, 167 n.15 (2d Cir. 2013). Civil contempt has been deemed a dispositive motion. *See Cardell Fin. Corp. v. Suchodolski Assocs*., 896 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Contempt proceedings are \"independent and collateral proceedings for the purposes of appellate jurisdiction,\" *Kiobel v. Millson*, 592 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2010) (Cabranes, J., concurring) (*citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,* 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990)),\n\nDocuments that directly affect adjudication or are used, \"to determine litigants' substantive legal rights, the presumption of access is at its zenith…and thus can be overcome only by extraordinary circumstances.\" *Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP*, 814 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing *Lugosch v. Pyramid Co*., 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006) and *United States v. Amodeo II*, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The locus of the inquiry is whether the document \"is presented to the court to invoke its powers or affect its decisions.\" *Bernstein*, 814 F.3d at 142. The exhibits at issue are being presented to the Court to adjudicate whether or not Kwok should be held in contempt. *Newsday, supra,* involved the right of access to documents in connection with a contempt proceeding, but in that case, the document was not required to be made public because it was not being used to determine whether a finding of contempt should be made. In contrast, the exhibits here are submitted directly for the purpose of convincing the Court to hold Kwok in contempt and they are, therefore, judicial documents. To find otherwise would mean the documents should be inadmissible as irrelevant, and not even Kwok made that objection.\n\n### **1.2.1 The Compelling Reason Standard Applies to the Documents at Issue**\n\nThe exhibits sought to be sealed are judicial documents, and there must be compelling reasons to seal them. \"Since such a document is the basis for the adjudication, only the most compelling reasons can justify sealing.\" *Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP*, 814 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2016). The claimed compelling reasons must be supported by specific factual findings. *See United States v. Erie Cty*., 763 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2014). The compelling reason and facts must show more than mere conjecture, and more than embarrassment, incrimination, or wider exposure of the facts to the public. *See Bernstein*, 814 F.3d at 144 (finding that information that was embarrassing or suggested the party was complicit in a kickback scheme fell, \"woefully short of the kind of showing which raises even an arguable issue as to whether it may be kept under seal\") (internal citation omitted).\n\nThe only reason suggested by the Trustee is that UBS might somehow use them in defending against the claims in the UK litigation is not compelling. The Trustee does not assert in any way what UBS might do with the information or how it might prejudice the Estate. The\n\nTrustee does not even assert this will happen, only that there could be some hypothetical, unknown use. Presumably, the documents *do not* undermine the claims against UBS as a whole, else the Trustee and his counsel would have abided the ethical duty of withdrawing a meritless claim. For a party to prevail on a showing of a compelling reason to seal a court record, that party must present specific factual findings sufficient to overcome the presumption that court records will be open to the public. There are no compelling reasons to seal this information.\n\n### **1.2.2 There is Neither a \"Compelling Reason\" nor \"Good Cause\" to Seal the Exhibits**\n\nThe Court must apply the stringent compelling reason standard to judicial documents. Although the Second Circuit demands a strong presumption for judicial documents, the Trustee could not, hypothetically even meet a lower \"good cause\" standard. The \"materials at issue…are subject to at least some presumption of public access\" and the Court must \"articulate specific and substantial reasons for sealing such material\". *Brown, supra* at 50. There are no such reasons to seal the Exhibits. Ultimately, mere privacy concerns are insufficient to warrant sealing of records. This is not a case involving merely spurious and defamatory allegations. There is no specific, articulated harm that would befall Kwok, the Estate, or any third party.\n\n### **2.0 Conclusion**\n\nKwok is a public figure and the case has been covered by multiple state and national media outlets. The public has a vested interest in these and all court proceedings, and the public has a strong interest in how the courts are used to shield bankrupt billionaires, especially debtors deemed unfit to remain in possession. There is no basis to seal the exhibits under Section 107, the common law, or the First Amendment.\n\nWHEREFORE the motion to seal the exhibits should be denied and the courtroom should be open for the entire contempt proceeding.\n\nDated: November 17, 2022 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jay M. Wolman\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nJay M. Wolman – ct29129 of Randazza Legal Group, PLLC 100 Pearl Street, 14th Floor Hartford, CT 06103 P: 702-420-2001 F: 305-437-7662 [ecf@randazza.com](mailto:ecf@randazza.com)\n\n*Counsel for Creditor Logan Cheng f/k/a Shui-Yuan Cheng*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on November 17, 2022, the foregoing document was served on all parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system, or otherwise via U.S. Mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing pursuant to the Notice of Electronic Filing.\n\n> /s/ Jay M. Wolman\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ Jay M. Wolman – ct29129","body_zh":"United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut Bridgeport Division（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等人，1\n债务人。\n\n第 11 章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并审理）\n\n债权人 Logan Cheng（程洛根）对以下事项的异议：(I) 第 11 章受托人关于对支持因未能遵守公司治理权利裁定而判处债务人民事蔑视法庭的裁定之动议的答辩状及相关文件予以封存的动议；以及 (II) 第 11 章受托人关于关闭法庭的口头动议\n\n：\n\n债权人程洛根对《第 11 章受托人关于对支持因未能遵守公司治理权利裁定而判处债务人民事蔑视法庭的裁定之动议的答辩状及相关文件予以封存的动议》（ECF No. 1095）以及于 2022年11月17日 提出的关于在蔑视法庭动议听证会中涉及申请封存文件的那一部分关闭法庭的相关口头请求提出异议。\n\n受托人已指出其证据 20-24、28-30 和 34-38（ECF No. 1099）是依据 ECF No. 856 以特权为由应予封存的文件，且证据 27（ECF No. 1100）是依据 ECF No. 923 的保护令被指定为保密因而应予封存的文件。法院在 2022年11月17日 似乎暗示涉案证据出现在 ECF No. 1083 中，但该文件至证据 27 即告终止，并且这些文件中几乎没有说明对公众隐瞒了什么内容（如果有的话）。此外，\n\n1 这些第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，又名郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他诸多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财团受托人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于接收通知和联络目的）。\n\n封存动议并未提及 ECF No. 1083。因此，债权人程洛根是在被束缚住手脚的情况下进行抗辩——他根本不知道被申请封存的是什么内容，也不知道其具体理由，结果导致他无法就封存或关闭法庭的正当性提出完整的抗辩或分析。\n\n法院必须避免将理应置于阳光之下的事物遮蔽起来使其免受审查。法院应当避免重蹈第二巡回上诉法院在 Brown v. Maxwell 案中予以撤销的错误，在该案中第二巡回法院认定，“违反了我们的先例，地区法院未能对文件进行逐一审查，也未在记录中作出证明封存对于维护更高价值确属必要的具体认定。”929 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2019)。法院不属于郭——它们属于人民。Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)（“法庭上发生的一切都是公共财产”）。正如本文所讨论的，没有任何正当依据剥夺债权人和公众查阅涉案信息的权利。既存在普通法上的查阅权，也存在宪法第一修正案规定的查阅权。受托人和债务人均未提供任何令人信服的理由说明为何应当削减这些权利。\n\n此外，根据《破产法典》，“11 U.S.C. § 107(a) 的字面含义要求，在破产案件中提交的所有文书均为供查阅的公开记录，除非法院决定根据 § 107(b) 对其中的信息予以保护。”In re Purdue Pharma L.P., 632 B.R. 34, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)（认定普通法上的查阅权已被第 107 条所取代）。受托人并未声称被申请封存的文件（并因此必然需要关闭法庭）属于第 107(b) 条规定的“商业秘密或保密的研发或商业信息”或“丑闻或诽谤性事项”，而这些是排除公开的唯一种类（除非存在第 107(c) 条项下的身份盗用风险或非法伤害）。仅仅被标注为“保密”或被声称为“特权”，既不能使其成真，也不能自动符合法定要求；他人的标注和主张并不具有约束力。此外，根据第 107(c) 条，或许债务人或其他人可能会因披露而受到损害，但没有任何迹象表明这会来自于非法活动。2\n\n1.1 历史与宪法推定\n\n除成文法外，查阅法院记录既享有宪法第一修正案的权利，也享有普通法权利。3 两者都在提醒我们，司法部门存在极强的公开推定。该推定不应被轻易搁置。并且，只要本法院不同意 Purdue Pharma 案中关于第 107 条已取代普通法的观点，债权人便援引其在该法下的权利。\n\n1.1.1 普通法查阅权\n\n普通法查阅权确立已久。见 Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)。在 Nixon 案中，最高法院承认了“查阅和复制公共记录及文件”的联邦普通法权利。同上。该权利延伸至案件中提交的证据材料。“从历史上看，民事和刑事审判均被推定为公开。”E*Trade Fin. Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 582 F. Supp. 2d 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)（援引 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980)）；亦见同上，第 599 页（Stewart 法官，协同意见）；并见 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950)（“民主社会的要求之一是公众应当了解法院中发生的事情”）。\n\n法院一贯指出，查阅法院和法院记录对于公众教育、公众信任以及法院系统的廉洁公正至关重要。“审判法庭也是一个公共场所，公众普遍和媒体代表有权在场，并且历史上人们一直认为他们的在场能够提高正在发生之事的公正性与质量。”Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (1980)。那些观察和报道\n\n2 这与法院认定 2022年11月16日 的诉讼程序应予封存形成了对比，该封存是因为受托人、其律师以及 PAX 的律师面临遭受非法身体暴力的风险（显然是由郭的广播所煽动的），以及言论的贬损性质。（ECF No. 1108）\n\n3 只要法院的任何命令或规则与成文法、普通法管辖先例或宪法所规定的查阅权相抵触，其必须屈从于该等权威。\n\n法庭诉讼程序的人在确保公众能够了解司法程序运作方面发挥着至关重要的作用。“向公众证明其法院公平正义的最好方式，莫过于对公众说：‘亲自来看诉讼程序并亲自作出评判’，还有什么比这更好的呢？”Suen v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., District Court, Clark County, Nevada（内华达州克拉克县地区法院），Case No. A493744-C，第 8 页（2013年4月16日）。在本案中，查阅法院记录，特别是涉案的郭文贵证据材料尤为重要，因为本案涉及公共关切事项。正如法院所深知的，郭先生是一位备受瞩目、自封的亿万富翁，其往来涉及 Steve Wynn、Steve Bannon、中国共产党等人。本案中的秘密审判将使人们对该系统产生怀疑，人们可能会想知道是否还有其他政客、名人或商界人士卷入到任何针对郭及其关联方已被公开的指控中。\n\n第二巡回法院在 Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP 案中强化了普通法推定，814 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2016)（“法院长期以来一直承认‘查阅和复制公共记录和文件（包括司法记录和文件）的一般权利’。”）（援引 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597, 598 & n.7）。“据说这项权利早于宪法存在。”Bernstein 814 F.3d at 142（援引 United States v. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)）（内部引用引号省略）。这一一般权利意味着封存是不恰当的。\n\n1.1.2 宪法第一修正案强制要求公开查阅\n\n宪法第一修正案要求公众查阅法庭诉讼程序。见 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986)；4 Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004)（公众和媒体拥有“出席司法\n\n4 从历史上看，最高法院指出：“例如，很久以前在著名的 Aaron Burr 叛国罪审判中，由首席大法官 Marshall 担任主审法官，由于法庭太小无法容纳蜂拥而至的关注此案的公民，合理根据听证会是在弗吉尼亚州众议院大厅举行的。”Press-Enter, 478 U.S. at 10，援引 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (No. 14,692) (CC Va. 1807)。\n\n诉讼程序并查阅某些司法文件的有限的第一修正案权利”）。这在刑事审判中早已不容置疑，但最高法院已明确表示这适用于所有案件。Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.7。“第一和第十四修正案明确赋予媒体和公众参与审判本身的权利，无论是民事审判还是刑事审判。”同上，第 599 页（Stewart 法官，协同意见）。“第一修正案不仅保障了参与刑事审判，而且保障了参与民事审判及其相关诉讼程序和记录的有限查阅权。N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2011)（援引 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1984)）；亦见 Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 93 (2d Cir. 2004)（认定对民事和刑事案卷表享有查阅权）。\n\n值得注意的是，每个审理过第一修正案是否要求在民事案件中实行公众查阅的巡回法院都得出了肯定的结论。例如，参见 Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1988)；In re Continental Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984)；Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984)；In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983)；Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983)。“第一修正案要求法庭诉讼程序向公众开放，并以此延伸向新闻媒体开放，除非在特定情况下有最明确阐述的令人信服的理由予以关闭。”Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 923 F. Supp. 580, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)。第一修正案“保护公众查阅司法文件的权利，且已被理解为比其普通法渊源及对应权利更为强有力。”United States v. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2014)。本案不存在任何令人信服的保密理由。这违背了法律诉讼程序本质上属于公共事务的宪法要求。Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982)。\n\n1.2 封存法院记录的标准\n\n法院应当从强烈支持公开的推定出发，并且，“在大多数案件中，法官必须仔细且持怀疑态度地审查封存请求，以确保确实存在一个\n\n非同寻常的情形或令人信服的需求。」In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994)（强调为后加）；亦见 SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001)；Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91(2d Cir. 2004)（「最高法院[已]承认第一修正案赋予公众和新闻界对司法程序享有有限的查阅权」）；Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1984)（「诚然，判例法中有大量判例支持公众享有基于宪法的旁听法庭审理的权利」）；United States v. Myers (In re in re Nat'l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980)（认定存在极强的推定，须有非同寻常的情形方可对公开予以限制）。「一旦认定对司法文件享有第一修正案下的查阅权，则唯有在作出具体的、记录在案的事实认定，证明不公开对于维护更高价值至关重要且严格限于服务该项利益的必要范围内时，方可将文件予以封存。而且，初审法院宽泛且概括的事实认定不足以证明封存具有正当理由。」United States v. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2014)。\n\n出发点是确定涉案文件是否属于适用查阅推定的「司法文件」。见 SEC v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001)（「民事案件中封存文件的一个亚类——即所谓的『司法文件』——应享有支持公开查阅的推定。」）当证据被用于处置性动议或其异议中时，必须有令人信服的理由方可使其规避公众视线。通常，「[认]定某份文件属于『司法文件』即触发公众查阅推定。」Newsday LLC v. Cty. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 167 n.15 (2d Cir. 2013)。民事蔑视法庭已被视为处置性动议。见 Cardell Fin. Corp. v. Suchodolski Assocs., 896 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)。蔑视法庭程序属于「出于上诉管辖权目的的独立及附随程序」，Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2010) (Cabranes, J., 协同意见) (援引 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990))。\n\n对于直接影响裁判或用于「确定诉讼当事人实体法律权利的文件，查阅推定处于顶峰……因此唯有通过非同寻常的情形方可被推翻。」Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2016)（援引 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006) 及 United States v. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995)）（内部引文省略）。审查的核心在于该文件是否「系向法院提交以求行使其权力或影响其判决。」Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 142。涉案证据正是为了由法院裁决是否应判定 Kwok（郭文贵）蔑视法庭而向法院提交的。前引 Newsday 案涉及与蔑视法庭程序相关的文件查阅权，但在该案中，该文件未被要求公开，因其并未被用于确定是否应作出蔑视法庭的认定。相比之下，本案的证据是直接为了说服法院判定郭文贵蔑视法庭而提交的，因此它们属于司法文件。若作出相反认定，则意味着这些文件因不具相关性而应不予采信，但连郭文贵本人都未提出此项异议。\n\n1.2.1 令人信服的理由标准适用于涉案文件\n\n请求封存的证据属于司法文件，封存必须具有令人信服的理由。「由于此类文件系裁判的基础，唯有最令人信服的理由方可证明封存具有正当性。」Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2016)。所主张的令人信服的理由必须有具体的事实认定作为支持。见 United States v. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2014)。令人信服的理由和事实所表明的必须不仅仅是单纯的推测，且不仅仅是感到难堪、招致罪责或使事实向公众进一步曝光。见 Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 144（认定令人难堪或暗示当事人参与回扣计划的信息「远远达不到能就其是否可予封存引发哪怕任何具争议性问题的证明程度」）（内部引证省略）。\n\nTrustee（破产受托人）提出的唯一理由——即 UBS（瑞士信贷/瑞银集团）可能会以某种方式在应对英国诉讼中的索赔时使用这些文件——并不构成令人信服的理由。受托人根本没有说明瑞银可能会如何利用该信息，或者它会如何损害破产财产的利益。\n\n受托人甚至并未断言这一定会发生，仅仅是称可能存在某种假设的、未知的用途。据推测，这些文件整体上并未损害对瑞银的索赔主张，否则受托人及其律师早就会遵守职业道德义务撤回毫无根据的索赔主张。当事人若要通过表明存在令人信服的理由而在封存法院记录的主张中胜诉，该当事人必须提出具体的事实认定，足以推翻法院记录应向公众公开的推定。封存此等信息并无令人信服的理由。\n\n1.2.2 封存证据既不存在「令人信服的理由」，亦不存在「正当理由」\n\n法院必须对司法文件适用严格的令人信服的理由标准。尽管 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）对司法文件要求适用强烈的推定，但即使是假设适用标准更低的「正当理由（good cause）」，受托人亦无法达到。「涉案材料……至少受到一定程度的公众查阅推定的约束」，且法院必须「阐明封存此类材料的具体且充分的理由」。前引 Brown 案第 50 页。封存证据并不存在此类理由。归根结底，仅凭对隐私的顾虑不足以支持对记录进行封存。本案并非仅仅涉及虚假及诽谤性指控。没有任何具体的、明确阐述的损害会降临至郭文贵、破产财产或任何第三方。\n\n2.0 结论\n\n郭文贵系公众人物，且该案已被多家州级和全国性媒体报道。公众对本案及所有法庭程序享有重大利益，且公众对法院如何被用于庇护破产亿万富翁（尤其是被认定不适宜继续占有财产的债务人）抱有极大关注。依据 Section 107（第 107 条）、普通法或第一修正案，封存证据均无依据。\n\n据此，封存证据的动议应予驳回，且整个蔑视法庭程序均应向法庭旁听开放。\n\n日期：2022年11月17日 谨呈，\n\n/s/ Jay M. Wolman_______________\n\nJay M. Wolman – ct29129\nRandazza Legal Group, PLLC\n100 Pearl Street, 14th Floor\nHartford, CT 06103\n电话：702-420-2001\n传真：305-437-7662\necf@randazza.com\n\n债权人 Logan Cheng（曾用名 Shui-Yuan Cheng，程水元）之代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2022年11月17日，前述文件已通过 CM/ECF 系统送达予所有当事人或其记录在案的代理律师，或根据电子备案通知，通过美国邮政向无法接受电子备案的任何人进行了送达。\n\n/s/ Jay M. Wolman_______________ Jay M. Wolman – ct29129","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":3086,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:32:12"}