{"id":"court_sdny_1174_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":1174,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":null,"title":"SDNY ECF 1174","summary_zh":"保护令动议答辩意见 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）破产案，康州破产法院第11章案号22-50073 ECF #1174（2022年11月29日）。债务人Ho Wan Kwok答辩破产管理人的异议，主张庇护申请根据联邦法规8 C.F.R. § 208.6受保护不得向管理人披露，且超出法院授权的调查范围。","summary_en":"Reply in Support of Motion for Protective Order — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui, Miles Guo), Bankruptcy Case, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, Chapter 11 case no. 22-50073, ECF No. 1174 (November 29, 2022). Debtor Ho Wan Kwok argues in reply that his asylum application is protected from disclosure to the Trustee under federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 and falls outside the scope of authorized investigation topics.","body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK<br>et al.,                | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor.                               | Jointly Administered    |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n#### **REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER**\n\nThe individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), through his undersigned counsel, hereby submits his reply in further support of his Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 1063) (the \"Motion\") seeking to preclude the disclosure of the Asylum Application<sup>1</sup> to the Trustee. The Chapter 11 Trustee's Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. No. 1105) (the \"Objection\") conspicuously ignores the clear language of the Consent Order and federal regulation. Therefore, the Motion should be granted. In further support of the Motion, the Debtor respectfully states as follows:\n\n#### **I. The Trustee Ignores the Clear Language of the Consent Order**\n\n1. Unsurprisingly, given his predilection for *ad hominem* attacks, the Trustee begins\n\n<sup>1</sup> Capitalized terms herein shall have the same meaning as in the Motion, unless otherwise indicated.\n\nthe Objection by making a thinly-veiled accusation that the Debtor has not been forthright with the Court. (Objection, ¶ 2.) However, it is the Trustee who ignores the clear language of the Consent Order. The Trustee relies upon Paragraph 2 of the Consent Order to argue that the Debtor cannot claim any privilege as to the Asylum Application. However, the Trustee conveniently reads Paragraph 2 in isolation and ignores the Consent Order's language that applies specifically to the Asylum Application.\n\n2. Paragraph 2 of the Consent Order identifies certain privileges that belonged to the Debtor and transferred to the Trustee (defined in the Consent Order as \"Trustee Privileges\"). Paragraph 2 limits Trustee privileges to \"attorney-client privileges[s] or work product protection[s] that could otherwise be asserted by the Debtor . . . concerning [Investigation Topics]\" (as defined in the Consent Order).\n\n3. By contrast, Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order specifically (i) applies to the Debtor's Asylum Application; (ii) extends to all privileges (not just the attorney-client and work product privileges) and (iii) acknowledges that the substance of the Debtor's Asylum Application is not an Investigation Topic. Paragraph 4 provides:\n\nNothing herein shall prevent the Debtor from asserting **any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as** unrelated criminal allegations or **the Debtor's asylum application** (other than documents related to the litigation styled as *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC*, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [(the \"Clark Hill Action\")] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action, **as distinguished from the merits of the Debtor's asylum application**, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, **which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application**).\n\n(Consent Order, ¶ 4.) (emphasis added). Thus, Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order makes clear that the Debtor retains his rights to assert any and all privileges related to the merits of the Asylum Application.\n\n4. Although the completed version of the Asylum Application was not technically protected by the attorney-client privilege once it was submitted to the government for consideration, the Asylum Application is, nonetheless, protected from disclosure by federal law, and specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a). Therefore, it is privileged from disclosure. Because only the attorney client and work product privileges transferred to the Trustee under the Consent Order, and only with respect to Investigation Topics (and even then, only when the personal harm to the Debtor from disclosure did not outweigh the Trustee's interest in obtaining the document or information)—and the Debtor retained all other privileges, including privileges that concern the substance of the Asylum Application—the Consent Order precludes disclosure of the Asylum Application to the Trustee. 2\n\n### **II. The Substance of the Asylum Application Is Not at Issue in the Malpractice Action**\n\n5. The substance of the entire Asylum Application is not at issue in the action captioned *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC*, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) (the \"Malpractice Action\"). Rather, the primary issue is whether Clark Hill, PLC (\"Clark Hill\") committed malpractice, breached its fiduciary duties, and/or breached its contract for legal representation by failing to maintain adequate security to protect the Asylum Application from being publicly leaked by a data breach. Moreover, to the extent the Malpractice Action concerns damages, *i.e.,* the emotional distress that the Debtor suffered from disclosure of certain portions of his Asylum Application into the public sphere, the Trustee presumably can obtain that information from the public sphere. Regardless, and more importantly, the Trustee's interest in obtaining the Asylum\n\n<sup>2</sup> In his Objection to the Motion, the Trustee cites and attaches emails in which the Debtor's undersigned counsel stated that the Asylum Application is not privileged. (*E.g.*, Objection, ¶ 34.) However, that statement implicitly referred only to the attorney-client privilege, and was made before the undersigned, who is not an immigration attorney, had spoken with immigration counsel and was not aware of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a).\n\nApplication, whatever it may be, certainly does not trump the federal protections that preclude disclosure of asylum applications to third-parties or the substantial personal harm that the Debtor will suffer from additional disclosure of his Asylum Application. *See Consent Order,* ¶ 7 (requiring a balancing test weighing personal harm to the Debtor against the Trustee's interest in obtaining privileged information).\n\n6. Moreover, after the Trustee's counsel acknowledged that the Subpoena, among other subpoenas, \"could be read to include . . . [the Debtor's] asylum application\", he \"[made] clear on the record that [the Trustee was] not seeking to get that type of information and we'll limit that request accordingly.\" (Tr. 8/30/22, at 110: 20-111:2 (Bassett, N.).)\n\n7. Finally, neither Clark Hill's data breach nor Clark Hill's more limited disclosures under seal in the Malpractice Action constitute a waiver of the Debtor's privilege or rights as to the Asylum Application. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) (\"Information contained in or pertaining to any application for . . . asylum . . . shall not be disclosed **without the written consent of the applicant**, except as permitted by this section or at the discretion of the Secretary [of the Department of Homeland Security.\").<sup>3</sup>\n\n#### **III. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) Is Not Limited to the Government**\n\n8. Nothing within the text of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) limits its application so as to only preclude disclosure of an asylum application by government actors. Rather, *only certain exceptions* to the general prohibition against disclosure of an asylum application in 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) apply only to government actors. *E.g.*, 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c) (\"**This section shall not apply to any disclosure to: (1) Any United States Government official or contractor having a need**\n\n<sup>3</sup> 8 C.F.R § 208.6 and § 1208.6 are substantively identical, except that § 208.6 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to authorize disclosure of an asylum application and § 1208.6 authorizes the Attorney General to authorize disclosure.\n\n**to examine information in connection with**. . . .\") (emphasis added). Clearly, the Department of Homeland Security demonstrated that it knows how to limit a regulation's application to government actors—and it chose not to do so in 8 C.F.R. § 208.6.\n\n9. Further evidencing the intent of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6, the \"Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis\" (the \"Synopsis\"), which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, expressly states that third parties who receive an asylum application are bound by the confidentiality regulations. *See Synopsis, Frequently Asked Question 2*, at p. 3 (\"In general, asylum-related information must not be shared with third parties without the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's specific authorization.\"); *Frequently Asked Question 7*, at p. 4 (Q: If asylum-related information is properly disclosed to a third party pursuant to the regulation, what is the third party's obligation with respect to confidentiality? A: *As the new custodian of the asylum-related information, the third-party recipient is bound by the confidentiality regulation under 8 CFR 208.6.*\") (emphasis added).\n\n10. The Trustee relies upon a single case for the proposition that 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 applies only to government actors, *Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas*, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68380, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021). However, that case, which is not controlling, is not persuasive in light of the foregoing. In *Al Otro Lado*, the parties did not dispute that the regulation applied only to government actors, and the Court accepted their agreement without analysis. Here, the issue is disputed, and the Court should resolve the issue by looking to the clear language of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 and the *Synopsis* attached hereto.\n\n11. **WHEREFORE,** the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court grant the Motion and enter an order precluding the disclosure of the Asylum Application to the Trustee.\n\n5\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 29th day of November, 2022.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK<br>et al.,                | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor.                               | Jointly Administered    |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 29 th day of November, 2022, copies of foregoing Reply in Further Support of Motion for Protective Order was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n### **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)","body_zh":"美国破产法院 康涅狄格区 布里奇波特分院（United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut Bridgeport Division）\n\n关于：第11章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，案件号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。合并审理\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章破产受托人\n被答辩人。\n\n进一步支持保护令动议的答辩状\n\n个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（下称“债务人”），通过其下述署名律师，特此提交其进一步支持保护令动议（文件编号：1063）（下称“该动议”）的答辩状，该动议旨在阻止向受托人披露庇护申请1。第11章受托人对该动议的反对答辩（文件编号：1105）（下称“异议”）显而易见地无视了同意令及联邦法规的明确措辞。因此，该动议应当获得准许。为进一步支持该动议，债务人谨陈述如下：\n\nI. 受托人无视同意令的明确措辞\n\n1. 鉴于受托人偏好进行人身攻击，其在异议开篇便毫不掩饰地指责债务人未对法院坦诚相待，这并不令人意外。（异议，第2段。）\n\n1 除非另有说明，本文件中使用的大写术语应具有与动议中相同的含义。\n\n然而，正是受托人无视了同意令的明确措辞。受托人依据同意令第2段主张债务人不能就庇护申请主张任何特权。然而，受托人为了自身便利孤立地解读第2段，并无视了同意令中专门适用于庇护申请的措辞。\n\n2. 同意令第2段明确了原属于债务人并已转移给受托人的某些特权（在同意令中定义为“受托人特权”）。第2段将受托人特权限定为“债务人原本可能针对[调查主题]（如同意令中所定义）主张的律师-委托人保密特权或工作成果保护”。\n\n3. 相比之下，同意令第4段专门(i) 适用于债务人的庇护申请；(ii) 延伸至所有特权（不仅限于律师-委托人特权和工作成果特权）；以及(iii) 确认债务人庇护申请的实体内容不属于调查主题。第4段规定：\n\n本文件中的任何内容均不妨碍债务人针对与调查主题无关的法律事项主张任何及所有特权，例如与调查主题无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请（但在名为 Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC（郭文贵诉克拉克希尔有限责任合伙），案件号：19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.)[（下称“克拉克希尔案”）]的诉讼中涉及法律执业过错诉讼实体是非、有别于债务人庇护申请实体是非的文件除外，但须受本文所载的利益权衡测试约束，该测试与庇护申请的实体内容无关）。\n\n（同意令，第4段。）（强调为后加）。因此，同意令第4段明确规定，债务人保留就庇护申请的实体是非主张任何及所有特权的权利。\n\n4. 尽管填妥的庇护申请版本在提交给政府审议后，从技术层面上讲不再受律师-委托人保密特权保护，但庇护申请仍然受到联邦法律、特别是联邦行政法规第8编第208.6(a)条（8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a)）的披露保护。因此，其免于披露享有特权。由于根据同意令只有律师-委托人特权和工作成果特权转移给了受托人，且仅限于针对调查主题（即使如此，也仅限于在披露给债务人造成的个人损害未超过受托人获取该文件或信息的利益时）——而债务人保留了所有其他特权，包括涉及庇护申请实体内容的特权——因此同意令排除了向受托人披露庇护申请。2\n\nII. 庇护申请的实体内容并非执业过错诉讼的争议焦点\n\n5. 整个庇护申请的实体内容并非案由为 Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC，案件号：19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.)（下称“执业过错诉讼”）一案的争议焦点。相反，主要问题是 Clark Hill, PLC（克拉克希尔有限责任合伙）（下称“克拉克希尔”）是否因未能维持足够的安全保障来防止庇护申请因数据泄露而公开流出，从而构成执业过错、违反信义义务和/或违反法律代理合同。此外，就执业过错诉讼涉及损害赔偿而言，即债务人因其庇护申请的某些部分被披露到公共领域而遭受的情绪困扰，受托人据推测可以从公共领域获取该信息。无论如何，且更重要的是，受托人获取庇护申请的利益，\n\n2 在其对动议的异议中，受托人引用并附上了债务人署名律师声称庇护申请不受特权保护的电子邮件。（例如，异议，第34段。）然而，该声明含蓄地仅指律师-委托人特权，且是在并非移民律师的署名律师与移民律师沟通之前做出的，当时并不知晓 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a)。\n\n无论其为何种利益，显然不能压过禁止向第三方披露庇护申请的联邦保护，也不能压过债务人因其庇护申请被额外披露而将遭受的重大个人损害。参见同意令，第7段（要求进行利益权衡测试，权衡对债务人的个人损害与受托人获取特权信息的利益）。\n\n6. 此外，在受托人律师承认该传票及其他传票“可被解读为包括……[债务人的]庇护申请”之后，其“在记录中明确表示，[受托人]无意获取此类信息，我们将对该请求作出相应限制”。（2022年8月30日庭审笔录，第110:20-111:2页 (Bassett, N.)。）\n\n7. 最后，无论克拉克希尔的数据泄露，还是克拉克希尔在执业过错诉讼中密封提交的更为有限的披露，均不构成债务人放弃其就庇护申请所享有的特权或权利。8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a)（“未经申请人书面同意，不得披露……庇护申请中包含的或与该申请有关的信息，但本条允许的或经[Department of Homeland Security（国土安全部）]部长酌情决定的除外。”）。3\n\nIII. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 并非仅限于政府主体\n\n8. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 的正文中没有任何内容限制其适用范围，以使其仅阻止政府主体披露庇护申请。相反，8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 中关于禁止披露庇护申请的一般性规定中，仅某些例外情况才仅适用于政府主体。例如，8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c)（“本条不适用于向下列人员进行的任何披露：(1) 因……而需要查阅信息的任何美国政府官员或承包商……”）\n\n3 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 与 § 1208.6 在实质上相同，区别仅在于 § 208.6 授权国土安全部长批准披露庇护申请，而 § 1208.6 授权司法部长批准披露。\n\n（强调为后加）。显而易见，国土安全部表明了其知晓如何将法规的适用范围限制在政府主体——而在 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 中，它选择不作此类限制。\n\n9. 本文所附附件A《保护庇护申请人保密性的联邦法规概要》（下称“《概要》”）进一步证明了 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 的立法意图，其中明确指出接收庇护申请的第三方同样受保密法规的约束。参见《概要》，常见问题 2，第3页（“一般而言，未经庇护申请人书面同意或国土安全部部长的明确授权，不得与第三方共享与庇护相关的信息。”）；常见问题 7，第4页（“问：如果根据该法规向第三方正当披露了庇护相关信息，第三方在保密方面的义务是什么？答：作为庇护相关信息的新保管人，第三方接收人受 8 CFR 208.6 保密法规的约束。”）（强调为后加）。\n\n10. 受托人仅依据单一判例来主张 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 仅适用于政府主体，即 Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas（阿尔奥特罗拉多诉马约卡斯案），案号 No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68380, at *22 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021)。然而，鉴于前述理由，该案既不具有约束力，亦缺乏说服力。在 Al Otro Lado 案中，各方当事人对该法规仅适用于政府主体并无争议，法院未作分析便采纳了双方的一致意见。而在本案中，该问题存在争议，法院应当通过查阅 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 的明确措辞以及本文所附的《概要》来裁决此问题。\n\n11. 综上所述，债务人谨请求法院准许该动议，并作出裁定，阻止向受托人披露庇护申请。\n2022年11月29日订于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney（阿伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144)\nJohn L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·塞萨罗尼）(ct29309)\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：aromney@zeislaw.com\njcesaroni@zeislaw.com\n\n美国破产法院 康涅狄格区 布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：第11章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，案件号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。合并审理\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章破产受托人\n被答辩人。\n\n送达证明\n\n我特此证明，于2022年11月29日，上述《进一步支持保护令动议的答辩状》之副本已通过电子方式归档。本归档通知将通过法院电子归档系统的运行以电子邮件形式发送给所有当事人，或按照电子归档通知上的指示通过邮寄方式发送给任何无法接受电子归档的人员。各方当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次归档文件。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney（阿伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144)\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：aromney@zeislaw.com","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":1704,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:27:57"}