{"id":"court_sdny_120_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":120,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2023-08-04","title":"SDNY ECF 120","summary_zh":"政府撤销律师资格动议的法律意见书——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Miles Guo），SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #120（2023 年 8 月 4 日）。美国司法部南区争取撤销律师 Emil Bove 代理被告人 Yanping Wang（共同被告人 Kwok 的长期员工）的资格；Bove 曾从 2019 年 9 月至 2021 年 12 月担任恐怖主义与国际麻醉品部门共同主任，在任职期间亲自监督了对 Kwok 的联邦刑事调查。","summary_en":"Government's memorandum of law in support of motion to disqualify counsel—United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #120 (filed Aug. 4, 2023). The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York seeks to disqualify attorney Emil Bove from representing defendant Yanping Wang (a longtime employee of co-defendant Kwok) on conflict-of-interest grounds; Bove served as Co-Chief of the Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit from September 2019 to December 2021 and personally supervised the federal criminal investigation of Kwok during his tenure.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n            v.\n\nYANPING WANG,\n     a/k/a “Yvette,”\n\n                                          Defendant.\n\nS1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPARTIALLY SEALED AND EX PARTE\nMEMORANDUM OF LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nIN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISQUALIFY EMIL BOVE\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n\nUnited States Attorney for the\n\nSouthern District of New York\n\nOne St. Andrew’s Plaza\n\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nJuliana N. Murray\nRyan B. Finkel\nMicah F. Fergenson\nAssistant United States Attorneys\n\nOf Counsel\n\n---\n\n1\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nBACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2\nARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 11\nI. Because Bove Previously Supervised a Federal Criminal Investigation of Kwok, Bove\nShould Be Disqualified from Representing Kwok’s Co-Defendant ......................................... 11\nA. Applicable Law ................................................................................................................ 11\n1. The Evans Test .............................................................................................................. 13\n2. Ethical and Criminal Prohibitions Specific to Former Government Attorneys ............ 15\n3. Knowing Waivers of Conflicts ..................................................................................... 18\nB. Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 20\n1. Bove Should Be Disqualified Under the Evans Test .................................................... 20\n2. Bove Should be Disqualified Under New York Rule of Professional Conduct\n1.11(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 207 ......................................................................................... 25\n3. Bove Should Be Disqualified to Avoid Trial Taint ...................................................... 26\nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 28\n\n---\n\n1\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nThis Court should disqualify Emil Bove from representing Yanping Wang.\nFrom September 19, 2019, through December 20, 2021, Bove was Co-Chief of the\nTerrorism and International Narcotics Unit (“TIN”) for the United States Attorney’s Office for the\nSouthern District of New York (the “Office”).  In that role, Bove personally supervised a TIN\ninvestigation of Ho Wan Kwok—Wang’s co-defendant, the leader of the charged criminal\nconspiracy, and Wang’s longtime boss. Now, less than two years after leaving the Office for\nprivate practice, Bove is seeking to represent Wang in this prosecution by the United States of\nWang and Kwok.\nApplicable statutes, ethical rules, and Second Circuit precedent regarding conflicts of\ninterest require Bove’s disqualification in this case on two primary grounds.  First, this Court can\nhave no confidence that Bove will not use, whether intentionally or not, information obtained while\na Government lawyer against the Government.  Bove’s representation would thereby prejudice his\nformer client, the United States, and undermine trust in the notion that public employees must\nwork for the public benefit and not their own private interests.  Second, the Government has an\ninterest in a fair trial and in obtaining a conviction that can be defended on appeal and from\ncollateral attack.  Those interests are at risk if Bove represents Wang, because she cannot give the\ninformed consent required to validly waive Bove’s conflicts.  Specifically, Bove cannot explain to\nWang the numerous limitations on the kinds of information he can share and the actions he can\ntake on behalf of Wang in light of his prior work as an AUSA, because such an explanation would\nrequire divulging classified, privileged, and confidential information, which the law and the rules\nof professional conduct governing attorneys prevent Bove from doing.  Accordingly, the Court\nshould disqualify Bove from representing Wang.\n\n---\n\n2\n BACKGROUND\nA. Bove’s Employment with the U.S. Attorney’s Office\nBove was an Assistant United States Attorney in this Office from approximately October\n2012 to December 20, 2021.  On September 19, 2019, Bove was appointed as a supervisor of the\nOffice’s TIN Unit.  Bove remained in that position until his departure from the Office in December\n2021.  Supervisory AUSAs participate “personally and substantially” in any and all cases under\ntheir supervision.  See 18 U.S.C. §  207(a)(1).  During his time as a TIN supervisor, Bove was\nresponsible for supervising all matters in the TIN unit, which includes consulting with AUSAs\nregarding their cases, receiving factual briefings, reviewing AUSA work product, providing advice\nand guidance, and directing investigative steps and other government actions.  Supervisors often\nbrief the Office’s executive management on selected matters and interface with supervisors of\nother units as appropriate, including when cases overlap.\nB. The TIN Investigation of Kwok\nKwok emigrated from China to the United States in approximately 2015.  On or about\nSeptember 6, 2017, Kwok filed an application for political asylum from the Chinese Communist\nParty, which remains pending.  (Dkt. 10 at 1-2.)  From April 2018 through May 2019, Kwok\nvoluntarily provided information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in the hope of\nreceiving assistance with respect to his U.S. immigration status.  Typically, Kwok met with a\nparticular FBI agent (“FBI Agent-1”).\nSee Classified Supplement Part I.1\n\n1 The Government has prepared and will submit a sealed, ex parte classified supplement.\n\n---\n\n---\n\n4\nStreet.3\n\n The FBI executed the warrants on October 3, 2019, and seized, among other evidence,\nmore than 100 electronic devices and documents that were stored inside safes.\n\nAt the time that the search warrants were executed, Bove was participating in a trial, which\nended on October 18, 2019.  Following trial, Bove returned to his full-time responsibilities\nsupervising TIN and all of its matters, including the TIN Matter.\n\n3 The Sherry-Netherland was where Kwok was arrested in the case before this Court.  The day of\nKwok’s arrest, the FBI executed a search warrant at that same apartment and located dozens of\nelectronic devices, valuables, and documents.\n\n---\n\n5\nBove was not recused from the TIN Matter and thus was briefed, consulted, and provided\nadvice regarding the case.  As is typical with TIN investigations, Bove had knowledge of, or access\nto, classified information relating to the investigation.\nAs an example of Bove’s general supervision of the TIN Matter, on October 31, 2019—\nshortly after his trial ended—Bove sent the TIN Matter AUSAs an email titled “Guo.”  The body\nof the email requested that the TIN AUSAs pass along the internal case tracking number for the\nTIN Matter.  (Ex. A (Oct. 31, 2019 email).)  This email likely signifies that Bove was drafting a\ncase update regarding the TIN Matter to send to the Office’s executive leadership.  As a general\npractice, case updates contain both public and non-public information including, for example,\nstrategy, short and long-term goals of an investigation, individuals whom the Office may be\nproffering and seeking to cooperate, and discussions about possible future investigative actions\n(such as search warrants or arrests) which may (or may not) happen.  In the TIN Unit, drafting\ncase updates for the Office’s executive management was the responsibility of the unit supervisors\nand necessarily required the unit supervisors to have knowledge of each of their unit’s cases.\nOver the next several months, the TIN Matter AUSAs kept Bove and his Co-Chief\nregularly updated on the progress of the TIN Matter.  Given the sensitivity of aspects of the\ninvestigation, those updates were often oral.4  Among other things, the AUSAs discussed with\nBove\n\n.\n\n4 These facts are based on the Government’s discussions with the AUSAs assigned to the TIN\nMatter.\n\n---\n\n6\nOn July 1, 2020, Bove and his TIN Co-Chief received an email from the Office’s Criminal\nDivision Chief regarding a press inquiry into a potential SDNY investigation “related to the source\nof funds that\n received through his work with Chinese businessman Miles Guo and\nhis associate, William Je.”  ((Ex. B [July 1, 2020 email).)  Approximately 16 minutes later, Bove\nresponded to the email with the following message, copying in one of the TIN Matter AUSAs:\nI copied in [TIN AUSA], who is working with FBI on a [TIN] investigation of Guo\nin which\n.  [TIN AUSA] and FBI executed\npremises warrants targeting Guo in the fall, which led him to retain [a particular\nattorney (“Attorney-1”)5] to convey\n\n.  The team is working still reviewing the warrant take (they seized a\nlot of media) and following up on leads.  [TIN AUSA] is also aware of a [Complex\nFrauds and Cybercrime Unit (“CFU”)] investigation being run by [a particular CFU\nAUSA] that involves Guo and relates to cryptocurrency investments.\n\n(Id.)  Thus, in this email, Bove responded to a question about Kwok and another co-defendant in\nthis case, William Je, by referencing an interaction the Office had with Kwok’s then-counsel.\nIndeed, Bove offered an opinion about the counsel’s outreach.  Bove also was aware of, and\nreferenced, the CFU investigation—which is the investigation that led to the charges in the case\nbefore this Court.6\nOn July 8, 2020, Bove and his TIN Co-Chief received an email from FBI agents with a\nlink to an article that referenced Kwok\n.  (Ex. C (July 8-9,\n2020 email chain).)  The next day, Bove’s Co-Chief forwarded that message, copying Bove, and\nwrote, “In case you haven’t seen it” to one of the TIN AUSAs assigned to the TIN Matter.  (Id.)\n\n5 Attorney-1 represented Kwok throughout the Government’s fraud investigation.  On the day of\nKwok’s arrest, the Government spoke with Attorney-1’s partner and understood that Attorney-1\nwould be representing Kwok in this case.  However, it appears that changed and ultimately Kwok\nhired different attorneys.\n6 The CFU AUSA named by Bove is presently the Deputy Chief of CFU and is supervising this\ncase.\n\n---\n\n7\nThat AUSA, in turn, forwarded the message to the particular CFU AUSA then working on the\ninstant case.  (Id.)\nIn the ensuing months, Bove’s Co-Chief became conflicted from aspects of the TIN Matter,\nmeaning as a practical matter that Bove became the only supervisor of the matter.  As the sole\ndirect supervisor of the TIN Matter, Bove continued receiving updates on the investigation and\nwas consulted about the case.\nC. The Current Case\nThe CFU investigation resulting in the case before this Court was opened in or around May\n2020.  As this Court is aware, Kwok, Wang, and Je are charged with conspiring to defraud\nthousands of victims of more than $1 billion through several interrelated schemes (the “Fraud”).\nThe proceeds of the fraud were then laundered and misappropriated.  Kwok is the leader of, and\ndirected, the Fraud.  Je is the financial architect and key money launderer for the Fraud.  Wang\noperated as Kwok’s “chief of staff” and managed the day-to-day operations of the entities used to\nperpetrate the fraud.  The investigation has revealed that Wang’s relationship with Kwok extends\nback many years including during the time of the TIN search warrants.  Indeed, in this case,\nKwok’s counsel has represented that Wang was a translator for Kwok including during\nconversations with Attorney-1.\n\n---\n\n---\n\n---\n\n10\nand Proposed Order of Substitution of Counsel, signed by Wang and her counsel of record,\nrequesting to substitute Bove for Wang’s lead counsel, Priya Chaudhry.  (Dkt. 113.)  Alex Lipman,\nmeanwhile, was set to remain as additional counsel to Wang.9  On July 24, 2023, the Government\nadvised the Court that it was considering potential conflict issues associated with Bove’s\nrepresentation of Wang and requested that the Court stay its consideration of the Proposed Order\nof Substitution of Counsel to permit the Government and Bove to discuss potential conflict issues.\n(Dkt. 114.)\nThe AUSAs presently assigned to the instant case spoke with Bove on July 24, 2023.\nDuring the call, Bove confirmed he was a supervisor of TIN while that unit was investigating\nKwok.  But Bove said, in sum and substance, that he had no real recollection of the TIN Matter,\nand was on trial when the TIN search warrant was executed, so was not involved in it.  The AUSAs\nalso noted that Bove’s firm represents Kwok’s daughter, Mei Guo, in the Connecticut bankruptcy\nproceedings and in a parallel Securities and Exchange Commission case before the Honorable Paul\nG. Gardephe in this District.  Bove stated that he was not personally working on the Mei Guo\nrepresentation but that both Mei Guo and Wang had waived any conflict, and Bove stated that a\nCurcio hearing regarding that potential conflict would be appropriate.\n  Days after that conversation, the Associate United States Attorney discussed the matter\nwith Bove and advised him that representing Wang implicated conflict-of-interest restrictions in\n18 U.S.C. § 207, as well as applicable rules of professional conduct.  Bove disagreed.  The\nAssociate United States Attorney subsequently emailed Bove to memorialize his determination.\n\n9 Despite the proposed substitution, Chaudhry appears to continue to represent Wang.  On July 31,\n2023, Chaudhry sent the Office an eight-page letter requesting a Bill of Particulars.\n\n---\n\n11\n ARGUMENT\nI.   Because Bove Previously Supervised a Federal Criminal Investigation of Kwok, Bove\nShould Be Disqualified from Representing Kwok’s Co-Defendant\n\nTo safeguard the United States’s confidential information, ensure fairness, and protect the\nintegrity of the adversary process, Bove should be disqualified from representing a defendant in\nthis prosecution.  Bove directly supervised the TIN Matter—one of this Office’s investigations of\nKwok—concurrently with the investigation of Kwok that led to the charges in this case.  As a\nresult, Bove had knowledge of, or access to, confidential and classified factual matters that are\npotentially relevant to this prosecution. These circumstances plainly call for Bove’s\ndisqualification under Second Circuit precedent, ethical rules, and statutory prohibitions.\nMoreover, Bove’s proposed client, Wang, cannot knowingly waive Bove’s conflicts, because Bove\nis restricted from informing Wang of material facts of his prior representation of the United States\nin connection with its investigation of Kwok.  That inability risks tainting the trial, to the prejudice\nof the Government, should it obtain a conviction.  Conversely, Wang will not be prejudiced by\nBove’s disqualification, as the Government has sought his disqualification promptly, minimizing\nany potential delay, and Wang will retain her other lawyer in all events. For these reasons, the\nCourt should disqualify Bove.\nA.   Applicable Law\n  The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel.\nU.S. Const. amend. VI.  The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment entails a correlative right\nto representation that is free from conflicts of interest.  Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981).\nWhile a defendant generally may waive her Sixth Amendment right to an unconflicted attorney,\n“the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal\ndefendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom\n\n---\n\n12\nhe prefers.”  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d\n456, 461 (2d Cir. 1995).  A “defendant’s right to counsel of his choice is not an absolute\none.” United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).\nWhen deciding motions for disqualification in criminal cases, the court must balance a\ndefendant’s right to counsel of her choice and “the interests of the courts in preserving the integrity\nof the process and the government’s interests in ensuring a just verdict and a fair trial.”  United\nStates v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1994); see United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d\nCir. 2004) (“Federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are\nconducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to\nall who observe them.”).  The power to disqualify an attorney derives from a court’s “inherent\npower to preserve the integrity of the adversary process,” Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Incorporated\nVillage of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2005), and “is a matter committed to the\nsound discretion of the district court.”  Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1994).\nBecause disqualification motions may cause delay and “are often tactically motivated,”\nthey are “generally not favored.”  United States v. Shea, 20 Cr. 412-4 (AT), 2022 WL 4298704, at\n*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022) (quotations omitted); see id. (“Disqualification is reserved for\nsituations of prior representation, conflicts of interest, prosecutorial misconduct, and other\nunethical attorney behavior.” (quotations omitted)).  Nevertheless, courts in the Second Circuit\n“have not hesitated to disqualify counsel when the circumstances warranted it.”  Evans v. Artek\nSystems Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983).  In such a situation, “any doubt is to be resolved\nin favor of disqualification.”  Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).\n\n---\n\n13\n1.   The Evans Test\n\nWhen a former client seeks to disqualify an adverse party’s counsel, the applicable test in\nthe Second Circuit is well established.  Specifically, the Second Circuit has held that\ndisqualification of an adverse party’s counsel is warranted where: “(1) the moving party is a former\nclient of the adverse party’s counsel; (2) there is a substantial relationship between the subject\nmatter of the counsel’s prior representation of the moving party and the issues in the present\nlawsuit; and (3) the attorney whose disqualification is sought had access to, or was likely to have\nhad access to, the relevant privileged information in the course of his prior representation of the\nclient.”  United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 239 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Evans,\n715 F.2d at 791 and N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.9(a)).10  The Evans test “focuses on identifying\nsituations in which there exists the potential that confidential information obtained during\nrepresentation of an adverse party could be used in the present action.”  Giambrone v. Meritplan\nIns. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (emphasis in original); accord Pergament v.\nLadak, No. CV 2011-2797 ARR MDG, 2013 WL 3810188, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (“The\ncentral concern underlying disqualification based on successive representation is the possibility\nhowever slight, that confidential information acquired from a client during a previous relationship\nmay subsequently be used to the [former] client’s disadvantage.” (quotations omitted) (emphasis\n\n10 Rule 1.9 of the New York Rule of Professional Conduct provides that “[a] lawyer who has\nformerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same\nor a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the\ninterests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in\nwriting.”  N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.9(a).  Subsequent representations are “substantially\nrelated” if, among other things, they “involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if, under the\ncircumstances, a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is otherwise a substantial risk that\nconfidential factual information that would normally have been obtained in the prior representation\nwould materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.”  N.Y. Rules of Prof’l\nConduct 1.9, cmt. 3.\n\n---\n\n14\nadded)).  Thus, “‘disqualification motions should be granted where the attorney in question is\npotentially in a position to use privileged information obtained during prior representation of the\nmovant.’” United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v.\nCunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added); accord Bd. of Educ. v.\nNyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979) (disqualification is warranted “where an attorney is\nat least potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side through\nprior representation” (emphasis added)).\nWith respect to the test’s second prong, a “‘substantial relationship’ exists where facts\npertinent to the problems underlying the prior representation are relevant to the subsequent\nrepresentation.”  Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 839 F.3d at 239.  The inquiry turns not on “whether the\nlegal claims or underlying theories are similar, but rather whether the successive representations\nshare common material fact issues.”  Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 272-\n73 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Revise Clothing, Inc. v. Joe’s Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 381,\n392 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is the congruence of factual matters, rather than areas of law, that\nestablishes a substantial relationship between representations for disqualification purposes.”)\n(quoting U.S. Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1460 n.6\n(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases)).  In determining whether a “substantial\nrelationship” exists between two matters, courts have considered, among other things, the breadth\nof the prior relationship, the extent to which the matters are related, and the timing between the\nfirst and second matter.  See, e.g., Hickman v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 225,\n230 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).\nOnce a substantial relationship between two cases is established, the moving party need\nnot prove that the former attorney had access to relevant privileged information.  Instead, “where\n\n---\n\n15\nthe same individual lawyer participated in the prior and current representation, the movant is not\nrequired to make a specific showing that confidences were passed to counsel.  Instead, the movant\nis entitled to the benefit of an irrebuttable presumption that confidences were shared.”  Prevezon\nHoldings, Ltd., 389 F.3d at 240.  In other words, the substantial relationship test removes the need\nfor courts to make direct inquiry into whether confidential information was actually transmitted.\nId. at 241.  After finding that a substantial relationship exists,\nThe Court will assume that during the course of the former\nrepresentation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on\nthe subject matter of the representation.  It will not inquire into their\nnature and extent. Only in this manner can the lawyer’s duty of\nabsolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to\nprivileged communications be maintained.\nEmle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting T.C. Theatre\nCorp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).  Indeed,\ndisqualification has been warranted to avoid the “risk [of] the chance” that an attorney’s\n“unconscious impressions might be influenced by [his former client’s] confidential information.”\nTufAmerica, Inc. v. Codigo Music LLC, No. 11 Civ. 1434, 2013 WL 1903867, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.\nMay 7, 2013) (disqualification of attorney sustained regardless “whether or not confidences were\nshared or either party recalls the confidences” because the current and former matters were\nsubstantially related).\n2.   Ethical and Criminal Prohibitions Specific to Former Government Attorneys\n\n“Public service is a public trust.”  5 C.F.R. § 2635.101.  The above standards—and others\ndiscussed below—apply to former Department of Justice attorneys who seek to represent private\nclients in matters related to their government service, and courts have consistently given close\nscrutiny to situations involving “side switching” government attorneys.  See, e.g., United States v.\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 2004) (court “must be especially careful” in\n\n---\n\n16\nsuch situations).  Considerations that weigh in favor of disqualification in situations involving\nformer government attorneys include:\n[t]he treachery of switching sides; the safeguarding of confidential\ninformation from future use against the government; the need to\ndiscourage\ngovernment\nlawyers\nfrom\nhandling\nparticular\nassignments in such a way as to encourage their own future\nemployment in regard to those particular matters after leaving\ngovernment service; and the professional benefit derived from\navoiding the appearance of evil.\nUnited States v. Escobar-Orejuela, 910 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting United States v.\nBrothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)).\nNew York Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11 applies the principle of Rule 1.9 more\nspecifically in the context of former government employees: a former government lawyer\n“(1) shall comply with Rule 1.9(c); and (2) shall not represent a client in connection with a matter\nin which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee,”\nabsent consent of the appropriate government agency.  N. Y. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.11(a)(2).  As the\nDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals explained with respect to a similar rule in that District, the\nlimitations on former government lawyers’ future representations are “meant to induce a former\ngovernment lawyer considering a representation to err well on the side of caution.”  In re Sofaer,\n728 A.2d 625, 638 (D.C. 1999).  “Substantially” has been interpreted to mean “substantively,” not\n“extensively”—requiring some involvement, but not necessarily direct responsibility.  See, e.g.,\nUnited States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that an attorney’s role as\nimmediate supervisor of the attorney in charge of an investigation that was intertwined with the\ninvestigation and prosecution at issue were sufficient for the district court to conclude that the\nattorney had “substantial involvement” with the investigation and thus was presumed to have\n“received confidential information.”); United States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)\n\n---\n\n17\n(disqualifying law firm of former AUSA, despite former AUSA being walled-off at the firm, and\ndespite the former AUSA having “never had administrative or supervisory responsibilities for the\ninvestigation and had no recollection of any substantive aspect of the case” (quotations omitted)).\nThe term “matter” has been given a broad definition, being satisfied when “the former government\nattorney may have had access to information legally relevant to, or otherwise useful in, the\nsubsequent representation.”  Brown v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A.2d\n37, 49-50 (D.C. 1984) (en banc) (recognizing that this standard “broadened the scope of the\n‘substantially related’ test for revolving door purposes”).\nFormer Department of Justice attorneys are also subject to statutory prohibitions relating\nto conflicts of interest.  Title 18, United States Code, Section 207 prohibits certain acts by former\ngovernment employees that “involve, or may appear to involve, the unfair use of prior Government\nemployment.”  5 C.F.R. § 2641.101 (explaining the scope and content of 18 U.S.C. § 207 as it\napplies to former government employees).  The post-employment restrictions under Section 207\nvary depending on, among other factors, the nature of the individual’s involvement in a prior\nmatter.  Former Department of Justice attorneys are permanently barred from appearing as private\nattorneys “in connection with a particular matter” if: (a) the United States “is a party,” (b) “the\nperson participated personally and substantially” in the matter as a Government employee, and\n(c) the matter “involved a specific party or specific parties at the time of such participation.”  18\nU.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  A “particular matter” includes “any investigation, application, . . . or judicial\nor other proceeding.”  18 U.S.C. § 207(i)(3).  “The term ‘participated’ means an action taken as\nan officer or employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of\nadvice, investigation, or other such action.”  18 U.S.C. § 207(i)(2).\n\n---\n\n18\nEven where a former government supervisor did not “participate” in a prior matter, the\nformer supervisor may be subject to a two-year cooling-off period.  Specifically, a former\ngovernment attorney is restricted from appearing before any court in connection with a particular\nmatter involving specific parties for a period of two years when “such person knows or reasonably\nshould know [the matter] was actually pending under his or her official responsibility as\nsuch officer or employee within a period of 1 year before the termination of his or her service or\nemployment.”  18 U.S.C. 207(a)(2).  “[O]fficial responsibility” is defined as “the direct\nadministrative or operating authority, whether intermediate or final, and either exercisable alone\nor with others, and either personally or through subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or otherwise\ndirect Government action.”  18 U.S.C. § 202(b).\n3.   Knowing Waivers of Conflicts\nWhere a court determines that a conflict of interest exists between an attorney and his\ncurrent client that is not so severe as to require disqualification automatically, a court may permit\nthe attorney to continue representing that client only if the client makes a “knowing and intelligent\nwaiver of his right to conflict-free counsel.” United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.\n2004); accord United States v. Perez, 325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003).  Informed consent\n“requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances, including the material\nand reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could adversely affect the interests of that client.”\nFilippi v. Elmont Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 722 F. Supp. 2d 295, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).\nA client must be given sufficient information to fully understand that potential conflict before any\nwaiver can be “knowing and intelligent.”  See, e.g., United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d\n591, 593 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The district judge should fully explain to [defendants] the nature of the\nconflict . . . .”); see generally United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The first\n\n---\n\n19\ntask of the trial court is to alert the defendants to the substance of the dangers of representation by\nan attorney having divided loyalties in as much detail as the court's experience and its knowledge\nof the case will permit.”).  If counsel cannot apprise his client of the full extent of the conflict—\nbecause doing so would require divulging privileged or confidential information—then the client\ncannot make a “knowing and intelligent waiver.”  United States v. Pappa, 37 F. App’x 551, 554\n(2d Cir. 2002) (client could not make “knowing and intelligent” waiver where “attorney-client\nprivilege precluded [current defense counsel] from divulging all of the details of the\nconflicts . . . and because [defense counsel’s] explanation of the conflict indicated there was ‘more\nhere than meets the eye’”).\nA district court has “substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest,” not\nonly “in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial” but also “in\nthe more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into\nan actual conflict as the trial progresses.”  Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-63.  This discretion is necessary\nbecause “[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to\npredict.  . . . Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness of an attorney to obtain such waivers\nfrom his clients may bear an inverse relation to the care with which he conveys all the necessary\ninformation to them.”  Id.\nMoreover, the Government has an independent interest in ensuring that waivers of conflict\nof interest are sufficiently informed.  Where defense counsel operates with a conflict of interest,\nthe Government's interest in a conviction that can withstand appellate scrutiny and collateral attack\nis prejudiced.  An insufficient waiver can be the basis of a successful collateral attack on an\notherwise valid conviction.  See I&Yy, 25 F .3d at 152 (“a defendant has suffered ineffective\nassistance of counsel . . . if his attorney has (1) a potential conflict of interest that resulted in\n\n---\n\n20\nprejudice to the defendant, or (2) an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected the attorney's\nperformance”).  “In the disqualification situation, any doubt is to be resolved in favor of\ndisqualification.”  Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).\nB.   Discussion\nBove should be disqualified to preserve the legitimate interests of the United States in the\nconfidentiality of its privileged information, internal deliberations, and classified information, and\nto preserve the fairness and integrity of this criminal prosecution.  Specifically, Bove should be\ndisqualified on at least three grounds.  First, disqualification is warranted under the Second\nCircuit’s Evans test.  Second, the ethical rules and statutory prohibitions applicable to former\ngovernment attorneys bar Bove’s representation and require his disqualification.  Third, Bove\nshould be disqualified to avoid tainting the trial, as Wang cannot knowingly waive Bove’s\nconflicts.\n1.   Bove Should Be Disqualified Under the Evans Test\n\nApplication of the Evans test calls for Bove’s disqualification.  See Evans, 715 F.2d at 791.\nThere can be no dispute that the first requirement is satisfied: the moving party, the United States,\nis Bove’s former client.  And since the third requirement (access to confidential information) is\npresumed from the second, Bove’s disqualification turns on the second requirement, namely\nwhether there is a “substantial relationship” between the TIN Matter and this case.  Prevezon\nHoldings, Ltd., 389 F.3d at 240.  Because “facts pertinent to” issues in the TIN Matter “are relevant\nto” this criminal prosecution of Kwok and Wang—Kwok’s long-time deputy, including at the time\nof the TIN investigation—such a “substantial relationship” exists.  Id.\nFirst, Kwok—the leader of the criminal enterprise charged in this case—was not a\nperipheral figure in the TIN Matter.  Kwok was the focus of the TIN Matter.  Wang worked for\n\n---\n\n21\nKwok at the time, serving as his effective chief of staff and at times as his translator.  And the TIN\nMatter directly overlapped with the time period of the charged offenses in this case.  The\nIndictment alleges that the offense conduct began in or about 2018 and continued at least through\nthe defendants’ arrests; the TIN Matter began in the fall of 2019 and continued during Bove’s\nentire tenure as a TIN supervisor.  Notably, in October 2019, the TIN investigation executed search\nwarrants at Kwok’s office and penthouse residence, during which approximately 252 electronic\ndevices were recovered.  Over the ensuing months, Bove supervised the TIN investigation as it,\namong other things, processed the results of that search and reviewed evidence.\nBased on these points alone,11 there can be no question that the TIN Matter that Bove\nsupervised involved facts that are potentially relevant to the criminal case against Kwok and Wang.\nIndeed, months before Bove’s notice of appearance, the Government had already relied on “facts\npertinent to” the TIN Matter in its detention memorandum in this case.  (See Dkt. 7, at 20 (“[I]n\nOctober 2019, in connection with an unrelated investigation of Kwok, the FBI executed a search\nwarrant on Kwok’s New York City penthouse.  During that judicially-authorized search, the FBI\nrecovered approximately 252 electronic devices (i.e., cellphones, hard drives, flash drives,\ncomputers, routers, audio pens, and voice recorders, among other devices), including\napproximately 96 cellphones, approximately 44 of which were located inside Faraday bags in\nsafes. Another approximately six iPhones were maintained in a Faraday bag inside a desk\ndrawer.”)).12  Moreover, the penthouse that was subject to a search warrant in the TIN Matter in\n\n11 Facts overlap in other ways.  For example, based on review of one of Wang’s cellphones\nobtained as a result of a search warrant in this case, Wang conducted an internet search for FBI\nAgent-1 on February 16, 2023—approximately one month before her arrest.\n12 The Government has provided the NSIN investigation’s search warrant affidavits and the search\ninventories to the defendants in this case as part of its Rule 16 discovery.\n\n---\n\n---\n\n23\n(2d Cir. 1983) (affirming disqualification because “interrogation stemming from confidential\ncommunications . . . would give the defendants an advantage that is unfair” and would create an\nunacceptable “arrangement so open to violation of significant interests” of fairness).\nMoreover, to the extent that Wang seeks to blame Kwok for her activities, Bove could be\nin a position to utilize information he obtained as a Government employee investigating Kwok to\nadvance Wang’s interest.  On the other hand, to the extent Wang and her counsel enter a joint\ndefense agreement with Kwok and others—through which information is shared among defendants\nand/or subjects, and which is not uncommon in cases with multiple defendants and/or subjects14—\nconfidential information from Bove’s government service supervising the TIN Matter could be\nused improperly for the benefit of others besides Wang.  Applicable statutes and rules prohibit\nthese possibilities for good reason.\nThird, the TIN Matter that Bove supervised existed concurrently with the investigation that\nled directly to the charges in this case.  While the investigation that led to the case before this\nCourt, which began in the summer of 2020, arose independently from and was conducted\nindependently of the TIN Matter, that is not determinative of whether there exists a “substantial\nrelationship” between the two matters, such that the TIN Matter involved confidential facts\nrelevant to this case.   As the supervisor of an investigation of Kwok, Bove was at a minimum\n“aware” of this fraud investigation of Kwok and his co-conspirators, including Wang.  (See Ex. B\n(July 1, 2020 email).)  Access to such information raises the concerns that call for disqualification.\nSee United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 18 Cr. 457 (AMD), 2020 WL 903007 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.\n25, 2020) (disqualifying the former Deputy Attorney General of the United States based on his\n\n14\n\n---\n\n24\naccess to relevant confidential information during service in government, which he had left five\nyears prior); United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202 (3d Cir. 1980) (opining, in a case where\na former AUSA testified that he had no direct involvement in the preparation of the prosecution at\nissue, that “[i[f the court’s hypothetical private citizen were to view the present case, he would see\nthat [the former AUSA] had some involvement in almost all criminal tax cases in the U.S.\nAttorney’s office, including Strike Force cases.  The citizen would see little to assure himself that\n[the former AUSA] had not utilized his position to obtain confidential information or to serve\nconflicting loyalties.”).\nFourth, see classified supplement part II.\nFinally, it is irrelevant that Bove may not at this time recall the details of the Kwok\ninvestigations from his time in the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  Indeed, even if Bove does not now\nrecall certain details, his participation in the case may refresh his memory at any point.  See, e.g.,\nUnited States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979, 981–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (disqualifying the law firm of a\nformer AUSA, notwithstanding the facts that the former AUSA was walled-off from the case at\nthe law firm, and the former AUSA “could barely remember even discussing the case” with the\nline prosecutor while at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, reasoning in part that “[m]emory is not so fixed\nand absolute that we can say with confidence: [the former AUSA] has forgotten everything”);\nHuawei Techs. Co., 2020 WL 903007, at *5 (“The fact that [the former Deputy Attorney General\nof the United States] currently has ‘no recollection of the matters’ (ECF No. 51-1) does not change\nthe analysis.”).\n\n---\n\n25\n2.   Bove Should be Disqualified Under New York Rule of Professional Conduct\n1.11(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 207\nBove should also be disqualified because the ethical and statutory standards set forth,\nrespectively, in New York Rule of Professional 1.11(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C § 207(a)(1)-(2), bar his\nrepresentation of Wang.\nFirst, for the same reasons that the TIN investigation and this case are substantially related,\nthey qualify as the same “matter” for purposes of Rule 1.11(a)(2).  So too under Section 207, as\n“matter” there includes an investigation or judicial proceeding, and at the time of Bove’s\nparticipation the TIN investigation involved a specific party: Kwok, the same party being\nprosecuted in this case by the same prosecutor’s office, and the co-defendant of Bove’s proposed\nclient.  And as noted above, the record makes clear that Bove had received information relating to\nthe CFU investigation of Kwok, which led to the charges in this case.\nSecond, Bove participated personally and substantially in the TIN Matter under both\nprovisions.  Bove supervised the TIN Matter as Co-Chief of the TIN Unit.15  He was privy to the\nfruits of the search warrants executed against Kwok and the United States’s assessments of that\nevidence.  He received confidential information and updates, was briefed and consulted by the line\nAUSAs, and provided advice and guidance.  That amply satisfies the applicable standards for\nformer government attorneys.  See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 675-76 (7th Cir.\n1993) (concluding that an attorney’s role as immediate supervisor of the attorney in charge of an\ninvestigation that was intertwined with the investigation and prosecution at issue were sufficient\nfor the district court to conclude that the attorney had “substantial involvement” with the\n\n15 This Office has long taken the view that, unless recused, unit chiefs participate personally and\nsubstantially in all matters within their unit.\n\n---\n\n26\ninvestigation and thus was presumed to have “received confidential information”); United States\nv. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (disqualifying law firm of former AUSA, despite former\nAUSA being walled-off at the firm, and despite the former AUSA having “never had\nadministrative or supervisory responsibilities for the investigation and had no recollection of any\nsubstantive aspect of the case,” because the former AUSA informally consulted on the\ninvestigation) (quotations omitted); United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)\n(disqualifying former AUSA who assisted in the drafting and filing of a search warrant and a\nseizure warrant as a courtesy to an out-of-district investigation).\nThird, even assuming, arguendo, that Bove’s involvement in the TIN investigation did not\nrise to the level of substantial participation, Bove is still within the two-year ban for matters that\nwere “actually pending under his . . . official responsibility . . . within a period of 1 year before”\nhe left the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2).  As Co-Chief of the TIN Unit, Bove\nsupervised the TIN investigation, so he exercised “direct administrative or operating authority,\nwhether intermediate or final, and either exercisable alone or with others, and either personally or\nthrough subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct Government action.”  18 U.S.C.\n§ 202(b).  Bove held his position as Co-Chief until December 2021, and the TIN investigation was\npending when Bove left the Office.  Accordingly, Bove’s participation in this matter is proscribed\nby 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) until at least December 2023.\n3.   Bove Should Be Disqualified to Avoid Trial Taint\n\nThe Government has an interest in “ensuring a just verdict and a fair trial” in this case.\nLevy, 25 F.3d at 155.  That interest will be prejudiced if Bove represents Wang, because\nWang will not be able adequately to waive any conflict created by Bove’s role. As a result,\n\n---\n\n27\nany conviction would likely be vulnerable to an appeal or collateral attack based on a claim\nof ineffective assistance of counsel.\nBove may be in possession of information he learned when he supervised the TIN Matter,\nincluding classified information that he cannot reveal, let alone use, in this representation.\nThis dynamic creates a conflict of interest given that Bove cannot give his clients his undivided\nloyalty. See N. Y. R. Prof’l Conduct l.7(a)(2).  The conflict could arguably be resolved by\nobtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of any potential conflict from Wang. See Jones, 381\nF.3d at 119; see also N. Y. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7(b)(4). Here, however, because Bove may be also\naware of classified information, Bove cannot provide Wang with more than the most cursory\ndescription of the conflict—that he knows something related to his current representation of Wang\nthat he cannot share or use—because he is not permitted to do so.  The limited information Bove\ncould share is far short of what would be required for Wang to waive the potential conflict at\nissue here knowingly and intelligently. See, e.g., Pappa, 37 F. App’x at 554 (statement by a\nFederal Defender representing defendant that the Federal Defenders had previously represented a\npotential government witness, but not divulging “all of the details of the conflicts,” was insufficient\nto allow a knowing and intelligent waiver of a potential conflict); Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d\nat 593 (“The district judge should fully explain to [defendants] the nature of the conflict.”);\nUnited States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 95 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating conviction and ordering a new\ntrial due to conflicted counsel, notwithstanding the defendant’s waiver at a Curcio hearing).\nBecause Wang cannot knowingly and intelligently determine whether to waive the conflict, any\n\n---\n\n28\nrepresentation by Bove may taint the trial process and any ultimate conviction, prejudicing the\nGovernment and wasting judicial resources. As a result, Bove should be disqualified.\n CONCLUSION\nThe Government does not make this motion lightly. This motion was specifically\nauthorized, reviewed, and approved by the Chief of the Criminal Division and the Associate United\nStates Attorney, who is the Ethics Advisor for the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  The application of the\nfacts to the law is clear:  Bove is not permitted to represent a defendant in this case.  In 2022, Bove\nrecognized that prior Government employment barred him from representing an individual\nassociated with Kwok (Mei Guo) because, as a Government employee, he supervised an\ninvestigation of Kwok.  But eighteen months later, Bove has changed his position, and seeks to\nrepresent Kwok’s chief of staff in this criminal case.  The Government now asks this Court to\nsafeguard the United States’s confidential information, ensure fairness, and protect the integrity of\nthis matter by disqualifying Bove from representing Wang.\nAccordingly, the Government’s motion should be granted.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n\nUnited States Attorney\n\n      By:\n\n/s/\n\n Julianna N. Murray\n Ryan B. Finkel\n\n Micah F. Fergenson\n\n Assistant United States Attorneys\n\n 212-637-2314 / -6612 / -2190","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n            诉\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），\n     又名“Yvette”\n\n                                          被告。\n\nS1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n美利坚合众国支持其取消 EMIL BOVE（埃米尔·博夫）代理资格动议的\n部分封存及单方\n法律备忘录\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\n\nUnited States Attorney for the\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区联邦检察官）\n\nOne St. Andrew’s Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nJuliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）\nRyan B. Finkel（瑞安·B·芬克尔）\nMicah F. Fergenson（米卡·F·弗根森）\nAssistant United States Attorneys（助理联邦检察官）\n\nOf Counsel（参审律师）\n\n---\n\n目录\n\n背景 ............................................................................................................................ 2\n论证 ................................................................................................................................ 11\nI. 鉴于博夫此前曾监督过对郭的一项联邦刑事调查，博夫代理郭的共同被告之资格应予取消 ......................................................................................................................... 11\nA. 适用法律 ................................................................................................................ 11\n1. 埃文斯测试（The Evans Test） .................................................................................... 13\n2. 专门针对前政府律师的职业道德与刑事禁止性规定 ................................................ 15\n3. 对利益冲突的知情放弃 ............................................................................................. 18\nB. 讨论 ........................................................................................................................ 20\n1. 依据埃文斯测试，博夫的代理资格应予取消 ............................................................ 20\n2. 依据《纽约州职业行为准则》（New York Rule of Professional Conduct）第 1.11(a)(2) 条及 18 U.S.C. § 207，博夫的代理资格应予取消 ................................................................. 25\n3. 为避免审判受到污染，博夫的代理资格应予取消 ...................................................... 26\n结论 ............................................................................................................................. 28\n\n---\n\n初步陈述\n本法院应取消埃米尔·博夫代理王雁平的资格。\n自 2019年9月19日 至 2021年12月20日，博夫曾担任 United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦检察官办公室，下称“本办公室”）Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit（恐怖主义与国际毒品犯罪科，下称“TIN”）的联席主管。在此任职期间，博夫亲自监督了 TIN 对 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）的调查——郭文贵是王雁平的同案被告、被指控的犯罪共谋头目，也是王雁平的长期雇主。如今，在离开本办公室从事私人执业不到两年的时间里，博夫正试图在由美国对王雁平和郭文贵提起的本案起诉中代理王雁平。\n关于利益冲突的适用法规、职业道德规则及第二巡回法院先例，要求基于两大主要理由取消博夫在本案中的代理资格。首先，本法院无法确信博夫不会（无论故意与否）将在担任政府律师期间获取的信息用于对抗政府。博夫的代理行为因此将损害其前委托人美利坚合众国的利益，并动摇公众对“公职人员必须为公共利益而非其自身私人利益工作”这一理念的信任。其次，政府在享有公正审判以及获取经得起上诉和附带性救济挑战的定罪方面享有合法利益。如果博夫代理王雁平，这些利益将受到威胁，因为王雁平无法作出有效放弃博夫利益冲突所需的知情同意。具体而言，鉴于博夫此前担任助理联邦检察官（AUSA）的工作背景，博夫无法向王雁平解释其在可分享的信息类型以及可代表王雁平采取的行动方面所受到的诸多限制，因为此类解释将需要泄露机密、特权和保密信息，而法律以及规范律师的职业行为准则禁止博夫这样做。因此，法院应取消博夫代理王雁平的资格。\n\n---\n背景\nA. 博夫在联邦检察官办公室的任职经历\n博夫自大约 2012年10月 至 2021年12月20日 期间担任本办公室的助理联邦检察官。2019年9月19日，博夫被任命为本办公室 TIN 科的主管。博夫一直担任该职位，直至其于 2021年12月 离开本办公室。主管级助理联邦检察官对其监督下的任何及所有案件均“亲自且实质性地”参与。参见 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)。在担任 TIN 主管期间，博夫负责监督 TIN 科内的所有事项，包括就案件向助理联邦检察官提供咨询、听取事实情况简报、审阅助理联邦检察官的工作成果、提供建议和指导，以及指挥侦查步骤和其他政府行动。主管们通常还会就选定事项向本办公室的执行管理层作简报，并在适当时（包括在案件存在交叉重叠时）与其他科的主管进行沟通协调。\nB. TIN 对郭的调查\n郭于大约 2015年 从中国移民至美国。2017年9月6日 左右，郭提交了针对中国共产党的政治庇护申请，该申请目前仍在审理中。（案卷编号 10 第 1-2 页。）自 2018年4月 至 2019年5月，郭自愿向 Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局，下称“FBI”）提供信息，以期在其美国移民身份方面获得协助。通常情况下，郭与一名特定的 FBI 探员（下称“FBI 探员-1”）会面。\n参见《涉密补充材料第一部分》。1\n\n1 政府已准备并将提交一份密封的、单方的涉密补充材料。\n\n街。3\n\nFBI 于 2019年10月3日 执行了搜查令，并扣押了包括存放在保险箱内的 100 多台电子设备和文件在内的证据。\n\n在执行搜查令时，博夫正在参加一场庭审，该庭审于 2019年10月18日 结束。庭审结束后，博夫恢复了其全职职责，监督 TIN 及其所有事项，包括该 TIN 案件。\n\n3 雪莉-尼德兰酒店（The Sherry-Netherland）系郭在本法院审理的案件中被捕的地点。在郭被捕当天，FBI 在同一套公寓执行了搜查令，并查获了数十台电子设备、贵重物品和文件。\n\n---\n\n博夫并未在该 TIN 案件中回避，因此听取了关于该案的简报、接受了咨询并提供了建议。与 TIN 调查的通常情况一样，博夫知悉或有权接触与该调查相关的机密信息。\n作为博夫对该 TIN 案件进行全面监督的一个例证，在 2019年10月31日——即其庭审结束不久后——博夫向该 TIN 案件的助理联邦检察官发送了一封题为“Guo”（郭）的电子邮件。邮件正文要求 TIN 的助理联邦检察官转交该 TIN 案件的内部案件跟踪编号。（附件 A（2019年10月31日电子邮件）。）该邮件很可能表明博夫当时正在起草一份关于该 TIN 案件的案件进展更新，以便发送给本办公室的执行领导层。按照通常做法，案件进展更新包含公开和非公开信息，例如调查策略、调查的短期和长期目标、本办公室可能正在接洽并寻求合作的人员，以及关于可能（或可能不会）发生的未来侦查行动（如搜查令或逮捕）的讨论。在 TIN 科，为本办公室执行管理层起草案件进展更新是科主管的职责，并且必然要求科主管了解其科内每一宗案件的情况。\n在接下来的数月里，该 TIN 案件的助理联邦检察官定期向博夫及其联席主管汇报该 TIN 案件的进展。鉴于调查某些方面的敏感性，这些汇报通常以口头形式进行。4 除其他事项外，助理联邦检察官与博夫讨论了\n\n。\n\n4 这些事实基于政府与指派负责该 TIN 案件的助理联邦检察官的讨论。\n\n---\n\n2020年7月1日，博夫及其 TIN 联席主管收到了来自本办公室刑事部主管的一封电子邮件，内容涉及媒体关于纽约南区可能正在进行的调查的询问，“该调查与\n通过与中国商人 Miles Guo（郭文贵）及其合伙人 William Je（余建明）合作所获得的资金来源有关”。（附件 B（2020年7月1日电子邮件）。）大约 16 分钟后，博夫回复了该邮件并抄送了该 TIN 案件的其中一名助理联邦检察官，内容如下：\n我抄送了[TIN 助理联邦检察官]，他正与 FBI 合作对郭开展一项[TIN]调查，其中\n。[TIN 助理联邦检察官]和 FBI 在秋季执行了针对郭的住所搜查令，这促使他聘请了[一名特定律师（下称“律师-1”）5]以转达\n\n。团队目前仍在审查搜查令查获的物品（他们扣押了大量介质材料）并跟进线索。[TIN 助理联邦检察官]也知悉[Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit（复杂欺诈与网络犯罪科，下称“CFU”）]由[一名特定 CFU 助理联邦检察官]负责的一项涉及郭且与加密货币投资相关的调查。\n\n（同上。）因此，在这封电子邮件中，博夫通过提及本办公室与郭当时律师的一次互动，回应了关于郭以及本案另一名共同被告余建明的提问。事实上，博夫对该律师的接触行为发表了意见。博夫还知悉并提及了 CFU 的调查——而该调查正是导致本法院审理的本案提起指控的调查。6\n2020年7月8日，博夫及其 TIN 联席主管收到了来自 FBI 探员的电子邮件，其中包含一篇提及郭的报道链接\n。（附件 C（2020年7月8日至9日电子邮件链）。）次日，博夫的联席主管转发了该邮件并抄送博夫，对指派负责该 TIN 案件的其中一名 TIN 助理联邦检察官写道：“以防你还没看过”。（同上。）\n\n5 律师-1 在政府的欺诈调查全程中均代表郭。在郭被捕当天，政府与律师-1 的合伙人进行了交谈，并获悉律师-1 将在本案中代表郭。然而，情况似乎发生了变化，郭最终聘请了不同的律师。\n6 博夫点名的该 CFU 助理联邦检察官目前担任 CFU 的副主管，并正在监督本案。\n\n---\n\n该助理联邦检察官随后将该信息转发给了当时负责本案的特定 CFU 助理联邦检察官。（同上。）\n在随后的数月内，博夫的联席主管因该 TIN 案件的某些方面而产生利益冲突回避，这在实际上意味着博夫成为了该案件的唯一主管。作为该 TIN 案件唯一的直接主管，博夫继续接收调查的进展汇报，并就该案接受咨询。\nC. 当前案件\n导致本法院审理案件的 CFU 调查于 2020年5月 左右启动。正如本法院所知，郭、王和余被指控通过数个相互关联的骗局合谋诈骗数千名受害者逾 10 亿美元（下称“欺诈案”）。随后，欺诈所得款项被洗钱和侵吞。郭是该欺诈案的头目并指挥了欺诈行为。余是该欺诈案的财务架构师和关键洗钱者。王作为郭的“幕僚长”运作，并管理用于实施欺诈的实体的日常运营。调查显示，王与郭的关系可追溯至多年前，包括在 TIN 执行搜查令期间。事实上，在本案中，郭的辩护律师已陈述王曾担任郭的翻译，包括在与律师-1 交谈期间。\n\n以及由 Wang（王）及其在案记录律师签署的《拟议变更辩护律师裁定》，请求由 Bove（鲍夫）替换王的主任辩护律师 Priya Chaudhry（普里亚·乔杜里）。(Dkt. 113.) 与此同时，Alex Lipman（亚历克斯·利普曼）拟继续担任王的附加律师。9 2023年7月24日，Government（政府方）告知 Court（法院），其正在考量与鲍夫代理王相关的潜在利益冲突问题，并请求法院中止对《拟议变更辩护律师裁定》的审议，以允许政府方与鲍夫就潜在利益冲突问题进行讨论。(Dkt. 114.)\n\n目前被指派负责本案的 Assistant United States Attorneys（联邦助理检察官，简称 AUSA）于2023年7月24日与鲍夫进行了通话。在通话中，鲍夫确认在 TIN 部门调查 Kwok（郭文贵）期间，他曾是该部门的主管。但鲍夫大意表示，他对 TIN 案件已无实质记忆，且在执行 TIN 搜查令期间他正在出庭受审其他案件，因此未参与其中。联邦助理检察官们还指出，鲍夫所在的律师事务所正在 Connecticut（康涅狄格区）破产程序以及本 District（司法区）由 Honorable Paul G. Gardephe（保罗·G·加德菲法官）审理的一起平行的 Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会）案件中代理郭的女儿 Mei Guo（郭美）。鲍夫表示他个人并未参与郭美的代理工作，但郭美和王均已放弃对任何利益冲突的主张，且鲍夫表示就该潜在冲突举行一次 Curcio 听证会是适当的。\n\n在上述谈话后的几天，Associate United States Attorney（联邦助理检察长）与鲍夫讨论了该事项，并告知他代理王牵涉 18 U.S.C. § 207 中的利益冲突限制以及适用的职业行为准则。鲍夫表示不予认同。联邦助理检察长随后向鲍夫发送电子邮件，以书面记录其认定结果。\n\n9 尽管提出了变更申请，乔杜里似乎仍继续代理王。2023年7月31日，乔杜里向本检察官办公室发送了一封长达八页的信函，请求提供一份《罪状明细表》（Bill of Particulars）。\n\n---\n辩论意见\n\nI. 因鲍夫此前曾主管对郭的联邦刑事调查，故应取消鲍夫代理郭之同案被告人的资格\n\n为了维护 United States（美国）的保密信息、确保公平并保护对抗制程序的完整性，应取消鲍夫在本起公诉中代理被告人的资格。鲍夫曾直接主管 TIN 案件——即本办公室对郭的调查之一——该调查与导致本案指控的对郭之调查是同时进行的。因此，鲍夫知悉或有权接触可能与本公诉相关的保密及涉密事实事项。在 Second Circuit（第二巡回区）先例、职业道德规则及法定禁止性规定的约束下，这些情况显然要求取消鲍夫的任职资格。此外，鲍夫拟代理的委托人王无法在知情的情况下放弃鲍夫的利益冲突，因为鲍夫受限而无法向王告知其此前代表美国就调查郭相关事宜的实质性事实。若政府方获得有罪判决，该无法告知的情况将有玷污审判的风险，从而损害政府方的利益。相反，取消鲍夫的资格不会对王造成损害，因为政府方已及时申请取消其资格，最大限度地减少了任何潜在的拖延，且王在任何情况下都将保留其另一名律师。基于这些理由，法院应取消鲍夫的任职资格。\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n《第六修正案》赋予刑事被告人获得律师协助的权利。U.S. Const. amend. VI。《第六修正案》下的律师辩护权必然包含获得无利益冲突代理的相应权利。Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)。虽然被告人通常可以放弃其在《第六修正案》下由无利益冲突律师代理的权利，但“〔第六〕修正案的根本目的在于确保每名刑事被告人都能获得有效的辩护人，而非确保被告人必然能由其偏好的律师代理。” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)；United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456, 461 (2d Cir. 1995)。“被告人选择其意向律师的权利并非一项绝对权利。” United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979)（引文省略）。\n\n在裁决刑事案件中的取消资格动议时，法院必须在被告人选择其意向律师的权利与“法院维护程序完整性的利益以及政府确保公正裁决和公平审判的利益”之间进行权衡。United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1994)；参见 United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)（“联邦法院在确保刑事审判在行业职业道德准则内进行、以及确保法律程序在所有观察者看来均属公正方面，享有独立的利益。”）。取消律师资格的权力源自法院“维护对抗制程序完整性的固有权力”，Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2005)，且“属于交由地方法院合理自由裁量的事项。” Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1994)。\n\n由于取消资格的动议可能导致延误且“往往出于诉讼策略考量”，因此它们“通常不受青睐”。United States v. Shea, 20 Cr. 412-4 (AT), 2022 WL 4298704, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022)（引文省略）；参见同上（“取消资格仅适用于既往代理、利益冲突、检察官不当行为以及其他不符合律师职业道德之行为的情况。”（引文省略））。尽管如此，第二巡回区各法院“在情况需要时，毫不犹豫地取消了律师的资格。” Evans v. Artek Systems Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983)。在此类情况下，“任何疑问均应作出有利于取消资格的裁定。” Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975)。\n\n---\n\n1. Evans 检验标准\n\n在前委托人寻求取消相对方律师的资格时，第二巡回区适用的检验标准已十分确立。具体而言，第二巡回区裁定，在满足以下条件时，有理由取消相对方律师的资格：“(1) 动议方是相对方律师的前委托人；(2) 律师此前代表动议方的事项标的与本案诉讼中的争议焦点之间存在实质关联；以及 (3) 被请求取消资格的律师在其此前代理该委托人的过程中接触过、或有可能接触过相关的受特权保护的信息。” United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 239 (2d Cir. 2016)（援引 Evans, 715 F.2d at 791 以及 N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.9(a)）。10 Evans 检验标准“侧重于查明是否存在在代理相对方期间所获得的保密信息可能在本案诉讼中被使用的潜在可能。” Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)（原文强调）；一致意见参见 Pergament v. Ladak, No. CV 2011-2797 ARR MDG, 2013 WL 3810188, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013)（“基于先后连续代理而取消资格的根本关注点在于，此前在代理关系中从委托人处获得的保密信息，无论可能性多么微小，随后可能被用于对该〔前〕委托人不利的情形。”（引文省略）（后加强调））。\n\n10 《纽约州职业行为准则》第 1.9 条规定：“曾在某一事项中代理过委托人的律师，此后不得在同一事项或实质关联的事项中代理他人，且该人的利益与前委托人的利益存在实质性对立，除非前委托人给予经书面确认的知情同意。” N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.9(a)。后续代理如果（除其他情形外）“涉及相同的交易或法律争议，或者在具体情况下，一位理性律师会得出结论认为存在其他实质性风险，即在先代理中通常会获得的保密事实信息将在后续事项中实质性地推进委托人的立场”，则属于“实质关联”。N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.9, cmt. 3。\n\n---\n\n因此，“‘当涉案律师有可能使用在先代理动议方期间所获得的受特权保护的信息时，应准予取消资格的动议。’” United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1983)（援引 United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1982)）（后加强调）；一致意见参见 Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)（“当律师至少有可能通过在先代理使用涉及对方的受特权保护的信息时”，有理由取消其资格（后加强调））。\n\n关于该检验标准的第二个要素，“当与在先代理所依据的问题相关的事实同后续代理具有关联性时，即存在‘实质关联’。” Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 839 F.3d at 239。该审查所关注的并非“法律主张或潜在法理是否相似，而是先后代理是否具有共同的实质事实问题。” Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 272-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)；Revise Clothing, Inc. v. Joe’s Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)（“正是事实事项的一致性，而非法律领域的重合，确立了出于取消资格目的而在各代理之间存在的实质关联。”）（援引 U.S. Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1460 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)（原文强调）（汇总判例））。在判定两起事项之间是否存在“实质关联”时，法院已综合考虑了诸如在先关系的广泛程度、事项之间的关联程度以及第一起与第二起事项之间的时间间隔等因素。参见例如 Hickman v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)。\n\n一旦确立了两起案件之间的实质关联，动议方无需证明前律师曾接触过相关的受特权保护的信息。相反，“在……\n\n同一名律师同时参与了前次代理和当下的代理，动议提出方无需具体证明保密信息已传递给该律师。相反，动议提出方有权享受保密信息已被共享的不可反驳的推定。”Prevezon Holdings, Ltd.（普雷维宗控股有限公司）案，389 F.3d at 240。换言之，实质关联性审查标准使法院无需直接调查保密信息是否确实已被传递。同上，at 241。在认定存在实质关联后，\n法院将推定在先前的代理过程中，已向律师披露了与代理事项相关的保密信息。法院不会对其性质和范围进行调查。唯有通过这种方式，才能强制执行律师绝对忠诚的义务，并维护与特权通信相关规则的精神。\nEmle Industries, Inc.（埃姆勒工业公司）诉 Patentex, Inc.（帕滕泰克斯公司）案，478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973)（援引 T.C. Theatre Corp.（T.C.剧院公司）诉 Warner Bros. Pictures（华纳兄弟影业公司）案，113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）1953)）。事实上，为了避免律师的“下意识印象可能会受到[其前客户的]保密信息的影响”这一“偶然风险”，取消代理资格是正当合理的。TufAmerica, Inc.（塔夫美利坚公司）诉 Codigo Music LLC（科迪戈音乐有限责任公司）案，No. 11 Civ. 1434, 2013 WL 1903867, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2013年5月7日)（鉴于当下事项与先前事项存在实质关联，不论“是否共享了保密信息，抑或任何一方是否记得该保密信息”，维持取消律师代理资格的裁定）。\n\n2. 针对前政府律师特有的职业道德与刑事禁止规定\n\n“公职即公众信任。”5 C.F.R. § 2635.101。上述标准——以及下文论述的其他标准——适用于试图在与其政府任职相关的事项中代表私人客户的前 Department of Justice（美国司法部）律师，且法院历来对涉及“倒戈转换阵营”的前政府律师的情形予以严格审查。参见如 United States（美国）诉 Philip Morris, Inc.（菲利普莫里斯公司）案，312 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D.D.C.（哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院）2004)（法院在此类情形下“必须格外审慎”）。在涉及前政府律师的情形中，支持取消代理资格的考量因素包括：\n转换阵营的背信弃义；保护保密信息以防日后被用于对付政府；遏制政府律师以谋求离开政府部门后在特定事项上获得未来雇佣为目的来处理特定任务的必要性；以及避免产生不当表象所带来的职业利益。\nUnited States 诉 Escobar-Orejuela（埃斯科瓦尔-奥雷胡埃拉）案，910 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）1995)（援引 United States 诉 Brothers（布拉瑟斯）案，856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn.（田纳西中区联邦地区法院）1992)）。\n\nNew York Rule of Professional Conduct（《纽约州职业行为准则》）第1.11条将第1.9条的原则更具体地适用于前政府雇员的情形：前政府律师在未经相关政府机构同意的情况下，“(1) 应遵守第1.9(c)条的规定；且 (2) 不得就该律师作为公职人员或政府雇员曾亲自且实质性参与的事项代表客户。”N. Y. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.11(a)(2)。正如 District of Columbia Court of Appeals（哥伦比亚特区上诉法院）就该特区类似规则所阐释的那样，对前政府律师未来代理行为的限制旨在“促使考虑接受代理的前政府律师极力保持审慎行事”。In re Sofaer（索费尔案），728 A.2d 625, 638 (D.C. 1999)。“实质性”（Substantially）已被解释为意味着“实体实质上”（substantively），而非“广泛深入地”（extensively）——即要求有一定程度的参与，但不一定要求负有直接责任。参见如 United States 诉 Smith（史密斯）案，995 F.2d 662, 675-76 (7th Cir.（第七巡回法院）1993)（认定一名律师作为负责某项调查的律师的直接主管，而该项调查与本案所涉的调查及起诉交织在一起，这足以使地方法院认定该律师对调查有“实质性参与”，从而推定其“收到了保密信息”）；United States 诉 Uzzi（乌齐）案，549 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)（裁定取消前 AUSA（助理联邦检察官）所在律师事务所的代理资格，尽管该前助理联邦检察官在该律所已被设立利益冲突信息隔离墙，且尽管该前助理联邦检察官“从未对调查负有行政或主管职责，也记不得该案件的任何实质性方面”（引文省略））。\n\n“事项”（matter）一词被赋予了宽泛的定义，只要满足“前政府律师可能接触到在后续代理中具有法律相关性或在其他方面有用的信息”即可。Brown（布朗）诉 District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment（哥伦比亚特区区划调整委员会）案，486 A.2d 37, 49-50 (D.C. 1984) (en banc)（承认该标准“出于限制旋转门的目的扩大了‘实质关联’审查标准的适用范围”）。\n\n前司法部律师还须遵守关于利益冲突的法定禁止性规定。《美国法典》第18篇第207条（Title 18, United States Code, Section 207）禁止前政府雇员从事“涉及或可能看似涉及不当利用先前政府任职经历”的特定行为。5 C.F.R. § 2641.101（解释适用于前政府雇员的 18 U.S.C. § 207 的范围和内容）。第207条项下的离职后限制根据个人在先前事项中的参与性质等因素而有所不同。前司法部律师若符合以下条件，则被永久禁止作为私人律师在“与特定事项有关”的程序中出庭：(a) 美国“为一方当事人”，(b) 该人作为政府雇员“亲自且实质性参与了”该事项，且 (c) 该事项“在其实质性参与时涉及特定的一方或多方当事人”。18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)。“特定事项”包括“任何调查、申请、……或司法程序或其他程序”。18 U.S.C. § 207(i)(3)。“‘参与’一词是指作为公职人员或雇员通过作出决定、批准、否决、提出建议、提供意见、开展调查或其他此类行动而采取的作为。”18 U.S.C. § 207(i)(2)。\n\n即便前政府主管人员未在先前的某项具体事项中“参与”，该前主管人员也可能受到为期两年的冷却期限制。具体而言，当“该人知悉或合理应当知悉[该事项]在其离职或终止任职前1年内实际上属于其作为此类官员或雇员的法定官方职责管辖范围内”时，该前政府律师在两年内被限制在涉及特定当事人的特定事项中在任何法院出庭。18 U.S.C. 207(a)(2)。“法定官方职责”（official responsibility）被定义为“无论是处于中级还是终局阶段，无论是单独还是与他人共同行使，无论是亲自还是通过下属行使的，用于批准、否决或以其他方式指示政府行动的直接行政或运作权力。”18 U.S.C. § 202(b)。\n\n3. 知情放弃利益冲突\n\n当法院认定律师与其当前客户之间存在利益冲突，但该冲突尚未严重到必须自动取消代理资格的程度时，法院唯有在客户对其“享有无利益冲突律师代理的权利作出知情且明智的放弃”的情况下，方可允许该律师继续代表该客户。United States 诉 Jones（琼斯）案，381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)；一致意见见 United States 诉 Perez（佩雷斯）案，325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003)。知情同意“要求每位受影响的客户均知悉相关情况，包括该利益冲突可能对该客户的利益造成不利影响的实质性且可合理预见的方式。”Filippi（菲利皮）诉 Elmont Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ.（埃尔蒙特公立联合自由学区教育委员会）案，722 F. Supp. 2d 295, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)。在任何放弃能够达到“知情且明智”之前，必须向客户提供充足的信息以使其完全理解该潜在冲突。参见如 United States 诉 Armedo-Sarmiento（阿尔梅多-萨米恩托）案，524 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1975)（“地区法院法官应向[各被告人]充分解释该冲突的性质……”）；通论参见 United States 诉 Curcio（库尔乔）案，680 F.2d 881, 888 (2d Cir. 1982)（“初审法院的首要任务是在法院的经验和对案情的了解所允许的范围内，尽可能详尽地向被告人提醒由忠诚分裂的律师代理所带来的危险实质。”）。如果法律顾问无法向其客户告知冲突的全部范围——因为这样做需要泄露特权信息或保密信息——那么该客户就无法作出“知情且明智的放弃”。United States 诉 Pappa（帕帕）案，37 F. App’x 551, 554 (2d Cir. 2002)（在“律师-客户特权阻止了[现任辩护律师]泄露冲突的所有细节……且辩护律师对冲突的解释表明此处‘另有隐情’”的情况下，客户无法作出“知情且明智的”放弃）。\n\n地区法院在“拒绝利益冲突放弃方面拥有相当大的自由裁量权”，不仅适于“审判前即可证明存在实际冲突的罕见案件”，而且适于“存在潜在冲突、且随着审判进行可能发展为也可能不会发展为实际冲突的更为常见的案件”。Wheat（惠特案），486 U.S. at 162-63。这种自由裁量权是必要的，因为“初生利益冲突的可能性和范围是出了名的难以预测。……指出律师从其客户处获取此类放弃的意愿，可能与其向客户传达所有必要信息时的谨慎程度成反比，这也并无不当。”同上。\n\n此外，政府在确保利益冲突的放弃具有充分知情性方面具有独立的利益。在辩护律师带着利益冲突开展工作的情况下，政府在确保定罪能够经受住上诉审查和附随附随攻击方面的利益会受到损害。不充分的放弃可能会成为对原本有效的定罪进行成功附随攻击的依据。参见 Levy（利维案），25 F.3d at 152（“如果被告人的律师 (1) 存在导致被告人受到损害的潜在利益冲突，或 (2) 存在对律师的表现产生不利影响的实际利益冲突……则该被告人遭受了无效的律师协助”）。“在取消资格的情形下，任何疑问均应作有利于取消资格的解释。”Hull（赫尔）诉 Celanese Corp.（塞拉尼斯公司）案，513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975)。\n\nB. 论述\n\n应取消 Bove（博夫）的代理资格，以维护美国对其特权信息、内部审议和机密信息的保密性的合法利益，并维护本起刑事起诉的公正与廉洁。具体而言，应至少基于三项理由取消博夫的代理资格。首先，根据 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）确立的 Evans（埃文斯）审查标准，取消其代理资格是正当合理的。其次，适用于前政府律师的职业道德准则和法定禁止性规定禁止博夫进行代理，并要求取消其资格。第三，由于 Wang（王）无法在知情的情况下放弃博夫的利益冲突，取消博夫的资格是必要的，以避免玷污审判程序。\n\n1. 根据埃文斯审查标准应取消博夫的代理资格\n\n适用 Evans 测试标准要求取消 Bove 的代理资格。参见 Evans, 715 F.2d at 791。第一项要求已满足，这一点毫无争议：动议方 United States（美国政府）是 Bove 的前客户。并且由于第三项要求（接触机密信息）可由第二项要求推定得出，因此取消 Bove 的代理资格取决于第二项要求，即 TIN Matter（TIN 案事项）与本案之间是否存在「实质性关联」（substantial relationship）。Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 389 F.3d at 240。因为 TIN 案事项中涉及各争议点的「相关事实」「关联于」本案对 Kwok（郭文贵）和 Wang（王雁平，郭文贵的长期副手，包括在 TIN 调查期间）的刑事指控，故存在此类「实质性关联」。同前引判例。\n\n首先，郭文贵——即本案所指控的犯罪集团的头目——在 TIN 案事项中并非边缘人物。郭文贵是 TIN 案事项的核心焦点。王雁平当时为郭文贵工作，实际担任其幕僚长，并不时担任其翻译。并且 TIN 案事项在时间段上与本案被指控犯罪行为的时间段直接重合。起诉书指控犯罪行为始于 2018 年前后，并至少持续至各被告人被捕；TIN 案事项始于 2019 年秋季，并在 Bove 担任 TIN 主管的整个任期内持续进行。值得注意的是，2019 年 10 月，TIN 调查组在郭文贵的办公室及其顶层公寓住所执行了搜查令，期间查获了约 252 部电子设备。在接下来的数月里，Bove 主管了 TIN 调查，该调查其中包括处理该搜查的结果并审查证据。\n\n仅凭这些要点，11 毫无疑问，Bove 所主管的 TIN 案事项涉及对郭文贵和王雁平刑事案件具有潜在关联的事实。事实上，在 Bove 提交出庭通知书的数月之前，政府就已在本案的羁押备忘录中援引了与 TIN 案事项「相关的事实」。（参见 Dkt. 7, at 20（「2019 年 10 月，在针对郭文贵的一项无关调查中，FBI 执行了对郭文贵位于纽约市顶层公寓的搜查令。在该次经司法授权的搜查中，FBI 查获了约 252 部电子设备（即手机、硬盘、U盘、电脑、路由器、录音笔以及录音机等设备），其中包括约 96 部手机，其中约 44 部放置在保险箱内的法拉第电磁屏蔽袋中。另有约六部 iPhone 保存在书桌抽屉内的法拉第电磁屏蔽袋中。」））。12 此外，在 TIN 案事项中被执行搜查令的顶层公寓……\n\n11 事实在其他方面也存在重合。例如，根据对本案搜查令所查获的王雁平一部手机的审查，王雁平于 2023 年 2 月 16 日（即其被捕前约一个月）在互联网上搜索了 FBI Agent-1（联邦调查局 1 号特工）。\n12 作为 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》）Rule 16 证据开示的一部分，政府已向本案各被告人提供了 NSIN 调查的搜查令宣誓书和搜查物品清单。\n\n(2d Cir. 1983)（确认取消代理资格的裁定，理由是「源于机密通信的质询……将给予被告不公平的优势」，并将造成一种无法接受的、「极易侵犯」公平「重大法益的安排」）。\n\n此外，如果王雁平试图将其行为归咎于郭文贵，Bove 可能会利用其作为政府雇员调查郭文贵时获取的信息来推进王雁平的利益。另一方面，如果王雁平及其辩护律师与郭文贵等人达成共同辩护协议——通过该协议各被告人和/或调查对象之间可以共享信息，这在涉及多个被告人和/或调查对象的案件中屡见不鲜14——那么 Bove 在政府任职主管 TIN 案事项期间获得的机密信息可能会被不当地用于使王雁平以外的其他人获益。适用成文法及规则禁止这些可能性是有充分理由的。\n\n第三，Bove 所主管的 TIN 案事项与直接导致本案指控的调查是同时并存的。虽然导致本法院审理的案件的调查始于 2020 年夏季，该调查是独立于 TIN 案事项发起并独立进行的，但这并不能决定两起事项之间是否存在「实质性关联」（即 TIN 案事项是否涉及与本案相关的机密事实）。作为对郭文贵调查的主管人员，Bove 至少对这项针对郭文贵及其包括王雁平在内的共犯的欺诈调查是「知情的」。（参见 Ex. B（2020 年 7 月 1 日电子邮件）。）能够接触此类信息引发了要求取消代理资格的关切。参见 United States v. Huawei Techs. Co.（美国诉华为技术有限公司案）, No. 18 Cr. 457 (AMD), 2020 WL 903007 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020)（因 former Deputy Attorney General of the United States（前美国司法部副部长）在政府任职期间接触过相关机密信息而取消其代理资格，尽管其离开政府已有五年之久）；United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202 (3d Cir. 1980)（在一名前 AUSA（助理联邦检察官）作证称自己未直接参与涉案公诉准备工作的案件中，法院发表意见认为：「如果法院设想的普通公民来看待本案，他会看到［该前助理联邦检察官］几乎参与了 U.S. Attorney’s Office（联邦检察官办公室）的所有涉税刑事案件，包括打击犯罪特别工作组的案件。该公民几乎无法确信［该前助理联邦检察官］没有利用其职位获取机密信息或服务于冲突的忠实义务。」）。\n\n第四，参见涉密补充材料第二部分。\n\n最后，即使 Bove 目前可能无法回忆起其在联邦检察官办公室任职期间有关郭文贵调查的细节，这也与本案无关。事实上，即使 Bove 目前未能忆及某些细节，他参与本案也可能在任何时候唤醒其记忆。参见例如 United States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979, 981–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)（取消了一名前助理联邦检察官所在律师事务所的代理资格，尽管该前助理联邦检察官在律所已对本案设立利益冲突防火墙，且该前助理联邦检察官在联邦检察官办公室任职期间「几乎记不得曾与一线检察官讨论过该案」，其部分裁判理由为：「记忆并非如此固定和绝对，以至于我们可以确信地说：［该前助理联邦检察官］已经把一切都遗忘了」）；Huawei Techs. Co., 2020 WL 903007, at *5（「［前美国司法部副部长］目前『对这些事项毫无记忆』（ECF No. 51-1）这一事实并不改变分析结果。」）。\n\n2. 根据 New York Rule of Professional Conduct（《纽约州职业行为规则》）Rule 1.11(a)(2) 及 18 U.S.C. § 207，应当取消 Bove 的代理资格\n\nBove 也应当被取消代理资格，因为《纽约州职业行为规则》Rule 1.11(a)(2) 和 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)-(2) 分别规定的职业道德及法定标准禁止其代表王雁平。\n\n首先，基于 TIN 调查与本案存在实质性关联的相同理由，就 Rule 1.11(a)(2) 而言，两者构成同一「事项」（matter）。在 Section 207 项下亦是如此，因为该条中的「事项」包括调查或司法程序，且在 Bove 参与期间，TIN 调查涉及特定当事人：郭文贵，即本案中被同一检察官办公室起诉的同一当事人，亦是 Bove 拟代理的客户的同案被告人。如上所述，记录清楚表明 Bove 曾收到与针对郭文贵的 CFU 调查相关的信息，而该调查直接导致了本案的指控。\n\n其次，根据这两项规定，Bove 均个人且实质性地参与了 TIN 案事项。Bove 作为 TIN Unit（TIN 部门）的联合主管负责监督 TIN 案事项。15 他知悉针对郭文贵执行搜查令所取得的成果以及美国政府对该证据的评估。他接收了机密信息与最新进展通报，听取了一线助理联邦检察官的汇报并接受咨询，并提供了建议和指导。这充分满足了适用于前政府律师的标准。参见例如 United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1993)（认定一名律师作为负责某项调查的律师的直接主管，且该调查与涉案调查及起诉交织在一起，这一角色足以使地区法院认定该律师对该调查具有「实质性参与」，从而被推定为「接收了机密信息」）；\n\n15 本办公室长期以来的立场是，除非回避，否则部门主管对其部门内的所有事项均具有个人且实质性的参与。\n\nUnited States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)（取消了一名前助理联邦检察官所在律师事务所的代理资格，尽管该前助理联邦检察官在律所已设立防火墙，且尽管该前助理联邦检察官「从未对该调查承担行政或监督职责，也对该案的任何实质方面没有记忆」，因为该前助理联邦检察官曾非正式地就该调查提供咨询）（引文省略）；United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)（取消了一名前助理联邦检察官的代理资格，该检察官曾出于同行协助性质帮助辖区外的一项调查起草并提交了搜查令和扣押令）。\n\n第三，即使退一步假设 Bove 在 TIN 调查中的参与未达到实质性参与的程度，就其离开联邦检察官办公室「之前 1 年期限内实际上处于其……官方职责管辖之下」的事项而言，Bove 仍处于两年的执业禁止期内。18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2)。作为 TIN 部门的联合主管，Bove 监督了 TIN 调查，因此他行使了「直接的行政或操作职权（无论是中间性的还是终局性的，无论是单独行使还是与他人共同行使，无论是亲自执行还是通过下属执行），以批准、不予批准或以其他方式指示政府行动」。18 U.S.C. § 202(b)。Bove 担任联合主管职务直至 2021 年 12 月，且在 Bove 离开办公室时 TIN 调查仍在进行中。因此，根据 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2)，至少在 2023 年 12 月之前，均禁止 Bove 参与本事项。\n\n3. 应当取消 Bove 的代理资格以避免审判受到污染\n\n政府在本案中享有「确保公正裁决和公平审判」的利益。Levy, 25 F.3d at 155。如果 Bove 代表王雁平，该利益将受到损害，因为王雁平将无法充分放弃由 Bove 的角色所造成的任何利益冲突。因此，\n\n任何定罪都可能因基于律师无效协助的主张而在上诉或附随申诉中变得不堪一击。\n\nBove（博夫）可能掌握其在监督 TIN Matter（TIN 案件）时获悉的信息，包括他在本次代理中不得披露更不得使用的机密信息。鉴于博夫无法给予其客户全心全意的忠诚，这种局面造成了利益冲突。见 N. Y. R. Prof’l Conduct l.7(a)(2)。可以认为，该冲突本可通过从 Wang（王）处获得对任何潜在冲突的知情且明智的弃权来解决。见 Jones, 381 F.3d at 119；亦见 N. Y. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7(b)(4)。然而，在本案中，由于博夫可能还知悉机密信息，博夫对王所能提供的关于该冲突的说明仅能是最粗浅的描述——即他知悉与其目前代理王相关的某些事宜，但他不能分享或使用——因为他不被允许这样做。博夫所能分享的有限信息，远远达不到王对本案所涉潜在冲突作出知情且明智的弃权所要求的程度。见例如 Pappa, 37 F. App’x at 554（代表被告的联邦公共辩护律师声明联邦公共辩护律师此前曾代表过一名潜在的政府证人，但未透露“冲突的所有细节”，不足以实现对潜在冲突的知情且明智的弃权）；Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d at 593（“地区法官应当向[被告]充分解释冲突的性质。”）；United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 95 (2d Cir. 2002)（尽管被告在 Curcio 听证会上放弃了权利，但由于律师存在冲突，撤销定罪并下令重审）。因为王无法知情且明智地决定是否放弃该冲突的权利，所以博夫的任何代理行为都可能损害审判程序及任何最终定罪，损害政府利益并浪费司法资源。因此，应当取消博夫的代理资格。\n\n结论\n\n政府提出本动议并非草率之举。本动议经由 Criminal Division（刑事司）司长以及身为 U.S. Attorney’s Office（联邦检察官办公室）道德顾问的副联邦检察官专门授权、审查并批准。将事实适用于法律的结果是明确的：博夫不被允许在本案中代表被告。2022年，博夫认识到其先前的政府任职经历禁止其代表与 Kwok（郭）（Mei Guo（郭美））相关联的个人，因为作为一名政府雇员，他曾监督对郭的调查。但十八个月后，博夫改变了他的立场，并试图在本次刑事案件中代表郭的幕僚长。政府现请求本法院通过取消博夫代表王的资格，以维护美国的机密信息、确保公平并保护本案的正直性。\n\n相应地，政府的动议应当予以准许。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\n联邦检察官\n\n签署人：\n\n/s/\n\nJulianna N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）\nRyan B. Finkel（赖安·B·芬克尔）\nMicah F. Fergenson（迈卡·F·费根森）\n助理联邦检察官\n212-637-2314 / -6612 / -2190","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":7259,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-04 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-04","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:07:17"}