{"id":"court_sdny_124_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":124,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2023-08-07","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES,","summary_zh":"反对取消代理资格备忘录 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #124（2023年8月7日）。被告人 Yanping Wang 的律师 Emil Bove 反对政府要求取消其代理资格的动议，主张检察官先前以书面形式表述相关调查事项与本案无关、现行伦理规则和 Evans 测试均不支持取消资格、任何潜在冲突均可由被告人知情放弃。","summary_en":"Memorandum in opposition to government's motion to disqualify counsel — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Guo Wengui, Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #124 (August 7, 2023). Attorney Emil Bove opposes the government's motion to disqualify him from representing defendant Yanping Wang, arguing the government previously represented the prior matter was unrelated, applicable ethical rules and the Evans test do not support disqualification, and any potential conflicts are waivable with informed consent.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES,\n\nv.\n\nNo. 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nYANPING WANG,\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL**\n\n Emil Bove Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 11 Times Square, 34th Floor New York, NY 10036 (212) 324 7265 ebove@csglaw.com\n\n *Attorney for Yanping Wang*\n\n|      |                                                 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1                                                              |  |  |\n|------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n|      |                                                 | BACKGROUND  3                                                                         |  |  |\n| I.   |                                                 | PRIOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE  3                                                           |  |  |\n| II.  |                                                 | THE TIN MATTER  3                                                                     |  |  |\n| III. |                                                 | THE CFU PROSECUTION  4                                                                |  |  |\n|      |                                                 | APPLICABLE LAW  5                                                                     |  |  |\n| I.   |                                                 | SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CHOICE OF COUNSEL  5                                         |  |  |\n| II.  |                                                 | DISQUALIFICATION<br>MOTIONS<br>AND<br>CURCIO<br>PROCEEDINGS  5                        |  |  |\n| III. |                                                 | 18 U.S.C. § 207  6                                                                    |  |  |\n| IV.  |                                                 | NEW YORK ETHICAL RULES  6                                                             |  |  |\n| V.   |                                                 | THE EVANS TEST  7                                                                     |  |  |\n|      |                                                 | DISCUSSION  8                                                                         |  |  |\n| I.   | SECTION 207(a) AND RULE 1.11(a) DO NOT APPLY  8 |                                                                                       |  |  |\n|      | A.                                              | This Is Not The Same \"Matter\"  8                                                      |  |  |\n|      | B.                                              | There Was Not \"Personal And Substantial\" Participation  10                            |  |  |\n| II.  |                                                 | THE EVANS TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE DISQUALIFICATION  14                                  |  |  |\n|      | A.                                              | The Matters Are Not Substantially Related  15                                         |  |  |\n|      | B.                                              | The Heavily Redacted Huawei Disqualification Is Not<br>Persuasive  18                 |  |  |\n|      | C.                                              | The Prosecutors Have Not Established Access To Relevant<br>Privileged Information  19 |  |  |\n| III. |                                                 | THE POTENTIAL CONFLICTS ARE WAIVABLE  21                                              |  |  |\n|      | A.                                              | The TIN Matter  23                                                                    |  |  |\n|      | B.                                              | Mei Guo  26                                                                           |  |  |\n|      |                                                 | CONCLUSION  28                                                                        |  |  |\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n\"Unrelated.\" That is how the prosecutors described the \"TIN Matter\" that is the centerpiece of their disqualification motion in a March 2023 letter to the Court. Months later, the prosecutors seek to establish that the TIN Matter is \"substantially related\" to this case. So much so, they now say, that I must be disqualified from representing Ms. Wang—notwithstanding their prior representation to the Court and, more importantly, the Sixth Amendment.\n\nThe prosecutors bear a heavy burden on this motion. An unsworn brief relying on vague phrases like \"ensuing months\" (twice), \"[a]s a general practice,\" and \"likely signifies\" does not meet it. (Gov't Mem. at 5, 7, 21). Ambiguous hedging like \"may offer evidence\" and \"knowledge of, or access to\" (twice) does not suffice. (*Id.* at 5, 8, 11, 22). Not long after the underlying CFU investigation commenced, I—along with everyone in the world who had access to the *Wall Street Journal*—was \"at least aware of\" the investigation that gave rise to this case. (Gov't Mem. at 8; *see also* Ex. A). That is not a basis for disqualification.\n\nMy representation of Ms. Wang is also consistent with the ethics rules cited by the prosecutors: N.Y. Rule 1.11(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 207(a). These rules only prohibit successive representations by former government attorneys in the same \"matter.\" The TIN Matter is not the same \"matter\" as this case. These rules, including the two-year prohibition in § 207(a)(2), do not apply.\n\nThe prosecutors are therefore left to rely principally on civil cases applying inapposite ethics rules without the Sixth Amendment. These authorities require the prosecutors to establish that the issues involved in the TIN Matter and this case are \"identical,\" or \"essentially the same.\" As far as I know, the \"unrelated\" TIN Matter focused on one investigative step. Counterintelligence agents from the FBI executed searches in approximately October 2019.\n\n1\n\nThat\n\nmakes sense. The investigation that led to this case was separate. The prosecutors concede that it \"arose independently from and was conducted independently of the TIN Matter.\" (Gov't Mem. at 23). The investigation was run in a different unit, CFU. It was conducted by different prosecutors and agents. It focused on separate crimes. Therefore, consistent with their earlier representations, the prosecutors have not established that this case is \"substantially related\" to the TIN Matter.\n\nThe motion should be denied for the additional reason that the prosecutors have not established that my participation in the TIN Matter was substantial. This motion confronts a unique fact pattern. Although I was nominally a TIN supervisor at the time, I did not review or authorize the 2019 warrants in the TIN Matter because I was participating in a separate trial. I have no recollection of seeing the warrants or any other documents relating to the case, at any point. It appears that the prosecutors' evidence of my participation in the TIN Matter amounts to three emails and approximately two lines of unsworn text, redacted and submitted *ex parte*, summarizing conversations. I have not been permitted to review those materials in order to respond to this motion, but I trust that the Court will scrutinize them carefully.\n\nAt bottom, the Sixth Amendment right is entitled to much more respect than the prosecutors have assigned it. The fact that the representation is consistent with applicable ethics rules strongly suggests that my participation in the case would not call into question the integrity of these proceedings. While the prosecutors raise the specter of a *Strickland* claim, which would require a showing of prejudice, an erroneous violation of Ms. Wang's Sixth Amendment right would require automatic reversal. Often with the support of the government, defendants in this District are routinely permitted to waive potential conflicts arising from successive representations. The prosecutors have not explained why the confidential information allegedly at issue here is entitled to enhanced protections beyond that afforded to the confidences of private former clients. The disqualification motion should be denied, and the Court should hold a *Curcio* hearing.\n\n# **BACKGROUND**\n\n# **I. Prior Government Service**\n\nI was an Assistant United States Attorney at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York between approximately October 1, 2012 and approximately December 30, 2021. (Aug. 7, 2023 Declaration of Emil Bove (\"Bove Decl.\") ¶ 2).\n\nOn September 19, 2019, I was named one of two Co-Chiefs of the Office's Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit (\"TIN\"), which the Office now refers to as NSIN. (Bove Decl. ¶ 3). A second Co-Chief of TIN was named on the same day. (*Id.*). At the time of the announcement, I was spending substantially all of my time preparing for a trial in *United States v. Hernandez*, No. 15 Cr. 379 (S.D.N.Y.), which began on October 2, 2019. (*Id.* ¶ 4). I was effectively absent from TIN in light of my focus on trial preparation, and I remained absent during the *Hernandez* trial. (*Id.*). The *Hernandez* trial concluded on October 18, 2019. (*Id.*).\n\n# **II. The TIN Matter**\n\nBefore I became a supervisor, Ho Wan Kwok communicated periodically with an FBI agent between April 2018 and May 2019. (Gov't Mem. at 2). I played no role in those interactions. (Bove Decl. ¶ 5).\n\n(the \"TIN\n\nMatter\"). (Gov't Mem. at 2-3). I did not participate in the TIN Matter in any way prior to the conclusion of the *Hernandez* trial. (Bove Decl. ¶ 4). For example, I did not review, edit, or authorize the applications for search warrants that were executed in or about October 2019. (*See*  Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7-8).\n\nI do not think that I saw the warrant applications at any point after I \"returned to [my] fulltime responsibilities supervising TIN\" in late-October 2019. (Gov't Mem. at 4; Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7- 8). To the extent the prosecutors or FBI maintained a case file—classified or otherwise—I do not recall accessing it. (Bove Decl. ¶ 6). Although I was generally aware that the FBI was reviewing the contents of materials it had seized pursuant to the 2019 warrants, I do not recall discussing the specific contents of any particular seized item, and I have no recollection of any other investigative steps being taken in the TIN Matter. (*Id.* ¶ 9). Although it seems plausible to me that I discussed the TIN Matter with one or both of the assigned line AUSAs, I do not recall the substance of those conversations, which suggests to me that they were sporadic and limited. (*Id.* ¶ 11).\n\n# **III. The CFU Prosecution**\n\nThe separate CFU investigation that gave rise to the charges in this case began \"in or around May 2020,\" around the time that GTV Media Group, Inc. (\"GTV\") was created. (Gov't Mem. at 7). On July 8, 2020, the *Wall Street Journal* published a story titled \"FBI Probes Chinese Exile, Including Work With Former Trump Aide Steve Bannon.\" (Ex. A). The article appears to relate to the CFU investigation; it named Mr. Kwok and co-defendant Kin Ming Je, but not Ms. Wang. The *Wall Street Journal* published a related article on August 19, 2020. (Ex. B).\n\nOn March 15, 2023, Ms. Wang and Mr. Kwok were arrested and detained. In a bail submission relating to Mr. Kwok on the same day, the prosecutors argued that, \"in October 2019, in connection with an unrelated investigation of Kwok\" – *i.e.*, the TIN Matter – \"the FBI executed a search warrant on Kwok's New York City penthouse.\" (Dkt. No. 7 at 20).\n\nIn a March 15 press release, the Office touted the arrest of Mr. Kwok and the charges against Mr. Je, but did not mention Ms. Wang's arrest. (Ex. C). Understandably, the press release did not reference TIN or the TIN Matter. Instead, the Office accurately attributed the case to CFU. (*Id.*).\n\n# **APPLICABLE LAW**\n\n# **I. Sixth Amendment Right To Choice Of Counsel**\n\nThe Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel \"commands\" that \"a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel [s]he believes to be best.\" *United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez*, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006). This is the \"the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee,\" *id.* at 147-48, and it \"matters profoundly\" to defendants such as Ms. Wang, *Kaley v. United States*, 571 U.S. 320, 337 (2014). So much so that an erroneous deprivation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel is a \"structural error,\" which is not subject to harmless-error analysis. *Gonzalez-Lopez*, 548 U.S. at 150.\n\n# **II. Disqualification Motions And** *Curcio* **Proceedings**\n\n\"Disqualification motions . . . place a *heavy burden* on the *moving party* to demonstrate that disqualification is appropriate.\" *United States v. Schulte*, No. 17 Cr. 548, 2020 WL 534508, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2020). Your Honor has previously described the relevant standard: \"Motions to disqualify are generally not favored, and, because they are often tactically motivated and tend to derail the efficient progress of litigation, parties moving for disqualification carry a heavy burden and must satisfy a high standard of proof.\" *United States v. Shea*, No. 20 Cr. 412 (AT), 2022 WL 4298704, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022) (cleaned up).\n\n\"Where the right to counsel of choice conflicts with the right to an attorney of undivided loyalty, the choice as to which right is to take precedence must generally be left to the defendant and not be dictated by the government.\" *United States v. Perez*, 325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003). There is a \"very narrow category of cases\" in which attorney conflicts are unwaivable. *Id.* at 126. The exceedingly limited scope of this category is \"illustrated\" by *United States v. Fulton*, 5 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 1993), where a government witness implicated \"the defendant's trial counsel in related heroin importation.\" *Perez*, 325 F.3d at 126-27 (cleaned up).\n\n# **III. 18 U.S.C. § 207**\n\nSection 207(a)(1) prohibits former government attorneys from being adverse to the government in a \"particular matter,\" in which the attorney \"participated personally and substantially,\" and \"which involved a specific party or specific parties at the time of such participation.\" 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Section 207(a)(2) addresses \"two-year restrictions concerning particular matters under official responsibility.\" *Id.* § 207(a)(2). The provision is also limited to \"a particular matter.\" *Id.*\n\n# **IV. New York Ethical Rules**\n\nAlthough \"not every violation of a disciplinary rule will necessarily lead to disqualification,\" there is no dispute that New York's ethical rules are relevant to the prosecutor's motion. *Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream*, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2005).\n\nNew York's Rule 1.9 sets forth duties that lawyers owe to former private clients. The limitations in Rule 1.9 that restrict an attorney's ability to engage in successive representations apply to \"the same or a *substantially related matter*.\" Rule 1.9(a), (b) (emphasis added). When an attorney's prior public service is at issue, however, Rule 1.9 applies only \"to the extent required by Rule 1.11.\" Cmt. 1, Rule 1.9.\n\nRule 1.11(a) is narrower. Similar to § 207(a), the Rule prohibits former government attorneys from representing a private client in the *same* \"matter\" in which the lawyer previously \"participated personally and substantially\" as a government attorney. Rule 1.11(a)(1) incorporates Rule 1.9(c), only. Rule 1.9(c) restricts the use and disclosure of a prior client's confidential information; it does not prohibit successive representations.\n\n# **V. The** *Evans* **Test**\n\nRelying on references in Rule 1.9 and its predecessors to a \"substantially related matter\" which are inapposite—federal courts in this Circuit have developed a \"'substantial relationship' test\" for use in disqualification motions based on successive-representation issues in civil cases. *See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc.*, 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978). Based on *Evans v. Artek Systems Corp.*, 715 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1983), the prosecutors refer to this as the \"*Evans*  Test.\" (*See* Gov't Mem. at 13). The test requires the movant to establish three elements:\n\n(1) the moving party is a former client of the adverse party's counsel;\n\n(2) there is a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the counsel's prior representation of the moving party and the issues in the present lawsuit; and\n\n(3) the attorney whose disqualification is sought had access to, or was likely to have had access to, relevant privileged information in the course of his prior representation of the client.\n\n*Evans*, 715 F.2d at 791.\n\nEven in a civil case, the Court of Appeals has instructed that \"we must be solicitous of a client's right freely to choose his counsel.\" *Cook Indus.*, 569 F.2d at 739. This admonition and other considerations \"have resulted in honing the 'substantial relationship' test in this Circuit in practical application to granting disqualification only upon a showing that the relationship between issues in the prior and present cases is patently clear.\" *Id.* at 739-40 (cleaned up). Disqualification is appropriate \"only when the issues involved have been identical or essentially the same.\" *Id.* at 740. \"The fact that both matters share a common area of law . . . or that the cases involve . . . the same agency are not a sufficient basis upon which to find substantial relationship.\" *McBean v. City of New York*, No. 02 Civ. 5426, 2003 WL 21277115, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2003) (interpreting predecessor to Rule 1.11).\n\n# **DISCUSSION**\n\nThe government has previously argued to Your Honor that \"[d]isqualifying counsel is a drastic measure that is generally disfavored in this Circuit,\" that \"[g]eneralized allegations of misconduct and mere claims of impropriety are wholly inadequate,\" and that \"disqualification is usually only appropriate when there is an actual risk of prejudice.\" (Dkt. No. 277 at 28, *Shea*, No. 20 Cr. 412 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2022)). Because those assertions are accurate, and because the prosecutors have not met that burden, the Court should deny the motion and give Ms. Wang an opportunity to waive potential conflicts at a *Curcio* proceeding.\n\n# **I. Section 207(a) And Rule 1.11(a) Do Not Apply**\n\n# **A. This Is Not The Same \"Matter\"**\n\nMy representation of Ms. Wang in this case does not violate § 207(a) or Rule 1.11(a) because the TIN Matter and this case are not the same \"matter.\" The prosecutors conceded in March 2023 that the TIN Matter was \"unrelated,\" and they now acknowledge that this case \"arose independently from and was conducted independently of the TIN Matter.\" (Dkt. No. 7 at 20; Gov't Mem. at 23). Accordingly, the representation does not implicate these authorities.\n\nAlthough Rule 1.9(a) and 1.9(b) pertain to former-client conflicts \"in the same or a substantially related matter,\" these provisions do not apply. *See* Cmt. 1, Rule 1.9. (\"Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.\"). In contrast, § 207(a) and Rule 11.1(a) are limited to representations in the same \"matter.\" *See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig.*, No. 05 Civ. 1720, 2006 WL 6846702, at \\*6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2006) (\"[W]hereas private attorneys may not appear against a former client in the same or a substantially related matter in which the attorney played *any* role, the rule concerning former government attorneys only precludes subsequent representation in a\n\nmatter that is the same as one in which the attorney participated 'personally and substantially' while in the government's employ.\").1\n\nThe comparatively restricted scope of Rule 1.11(a) is intentional. The \"substantially related\" phrase has been excised from Rule 1.11 in order to \"represent[] a balancing of interests.\" Cmt. 4, Rule 1.11. \"[T]he rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. . . . A former government lawyer is therefore disqualified only from *particular matters* in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially.\" *Id.* (emphasis added). This is not such a matter.\n\nFor similar reasons, § 207(a) does not apply. *See United States v. Medico Indus. Inc.*, 784 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1986) (\"The parties, facts, and subject matter must coincide to trigger the prohibition of § 207(a).\"). In support of their argument that this case is part of a \"two-year ban,\" the prosecutors quote the definition of \"official responsibility\" for purposes of § 207(a)(2). (*See*  Gov't Mem. at 26 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 202(b)). While the TIN Matter meets that definition, this case does not because I never supervised it. Accordingly, the two-year restriction of § 207(a)(2) is not implicated.\n\nThe prosecutors' argument regarding the application of § 207(a) is based on an additional fundamental misconception about the scope of the statute. Seizing on the phrase \"involved a specific party,\" 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(C), they argue that the TIN Matter and this case are the \"same 'matter'\" because Mr. Kwok was a \"specific party\" in both. (Gov't Mem. at 25). The\n\n<sup>1</sup> *Accord* Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 133 cmt. e (2000) (explaining that rule governing former government attorneys \"is narrower than that governing former-client conflicts of interest\").\n\nprosecutors cite no authority for this expansive interpretation of the statute, which would eviscerate the plain meaning of the term \"particular matter.\" Because none exists. The modifying phrase \"involved a specific party\" further limits the statute's application by excluding \"[m]atters of general applicably\"—which are \"not covered\"—such as \"[l]egislation or rulemaking of general applicability and the formulation of general policies.\" 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(h)(2).2 To the extent any of this is susceptible to a contrary interpretation, the government itself has noted that \"the rule of lenity requires that any remaining ambiguity in [Section 207] be construed so as to narrow, not broaden, the statute's prohibitions.\" 25 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 120, 2001 WL 36209373, at \\*5 (June 20, 2001). For all of these reasons, neither Rule 1.11(a) nor § 207(a) prohibit my representation of Ms. Wang.\n\n# **B. There Was Not \"Personal and Substantial\" Participation**\n\nSection 207(a) is also limited to matters in which a former government attorney \"participated personally and substantially.\" The prosecutors emphasize that I was \"aware\" of the investigation in the CFU unit, which I never supervised, that led to the charges in this case. (Gov't Mem. at 6, 8, 23). So was the *Wall Street Journal*. (Exs. A, B). \"An employee does not participate in a matter merely because he had knowledge of its existence . . . .\" 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(i)(1). Thus, my general awareness of the separate investigation hardly requires disqualification.\n\n<sup>2</sup> \"Example 4\" to § 2641.201(h)(2) further illustrates the point: \"An employee in the legislative affairs office of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) drafted official comments submitted to Congress with respect to a pending immigration reform bill. After leaving the Government, he contacts DHS on behalf of a private organization seeking to influence the Administration to insist on certain amendments to the bill. This is not prohibited. Generally, legislation is not a particular matter involving specific parties. However, if the same employee had participated as a DHS employee in formulating the agency's position on proposed private relief legislation granting citizenship to a specific individual, this matter would involve specific parties, and the employee would be prohibited from later making representational contacts in connection with this matter.\"\n\nNor, contrary to the prosecutors' assertions, does a government employee \"participate in a matter merely . . . because it was pending under his official responsibility.\" 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(i)(1). I played no role in the October 2019 searches that constituted the central, and perhaps the only, investigative step that was taken in the TIN Matter (*see* Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7-9). *See Medico Indus. Inc.*, 784 F.2d at 843 (\"[I]f the matter was just within his job description, but he did not work on it himself, the officer would be free to represent a private party after leaving the government.\"). The term \"substantially . . . requires more than official responsibility, knowledge, perfunctory involvement, or involvement on an administrative or peripheral issue.\" 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(i)(3). \"[S]ubstantial participation is substantive in nature and directly affects the merits of the prior case.\" *Arroyo v. City of Buffalo*, No. 15 Civ. 753A, 2017 WL 3085835, at \\*12 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) (cleaned up). That did not happen here.\n\nIn an unsworn brief, the prosecutors rely on the fact that I \"was not recused from the TIN Matter\" to speculate that I was \"briefed, consulted, and provided advice regarding the case.\" (Gov't Mem. at 5). Their conclusion does not follow from that premise. The prosecutors contend that I \"had knowledge of, or access to, classified information\" relating to the TIN Matter because that \"is typical with TIN investigations.\" (*Id.*). The \"or access to\" hedge is telling, and I respectfully disagree with the contention. (*See* Bove Decl. ¶ 6).\n\nSetting aside these vague assertions, the prosecutors' proffer regarding my participation in the TIN Matter is limited to three emails and approximately two lines of redacted text—submitted to the Court *ex parte*—summarizing conversations I am said to have had with line AUSAs at times and regarding topics that were not disclosed to me in connection with this motion (Gov't Mem. at 5-6). *See United States v. Fisher*, No. 17 Cr. 73, 2021 WL 4227019, at \\*4 (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 2021) (\"The lack of specific recollections of [former government attorney's] involvement in the matter while with the USAO, together with the lapse of time, lends support to finding that [the attorney's] involvement in the . . . matter was simply not substantial.\"). The prosecutors bear the burden of demonstrating that disqualification is appropriate, and their motion is hardly a compelling showing. *See United States v. Haggard*, No. 08 Cr. 327, 2009 WL 5207263, at \\*3 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 29, 2009) (denying disqualification motion based on § 207 where, \"[a]side from these assertions in its brief, the Government has not produced an iota of evidence in support of its assertions\"); *United States v. Obendorf*, No. 15 Cr. 254, 2016 WL 1595347, at \\*4 (D. Id. Apr. 20, 2016) (denying disqualification motion based on § 207 where former government attorney \"had only two conversations about the Obendorf matter at the USAO and was not actively involved in investigating or litigating the case\").\n\nI do not recall these communications. (Bove Decl. ¶¶ 10-12).<sup>3</sup> It appears that in the first email, in October 2019, I performed the administrative task of requesting a case-tracking number. The prosecutors speculate about what the email \"likely signifies.\" (Gov't Mem. at 5). Absent more, their conjecture is insufficient. *See Fisher*, 2021 WL 4227019, at \\*3 (rejecting government's \"explanation of what the [asset forfeiture team] does generally by virtue of its standard operating procedure\").\n\nThe second and third emails are from July 1 and 8, 2020. My recollection is that one of the line AUSAs transferred to a different unit at the Office at some point, and that remote work necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in approximately March 2020 restricted my\n\n<sup>3</sup> It is not clear to me which \"Co-Chief\" is being referenced when the prosecutors assert that a TIN supervisor \"became conflicted from aspects of the TIN Matter.\" (Gov't Mem. at 7). I do not recall being notified of such a conflict. (Bove Decl. ¶ 13). Although the prosecutors assert that I \"continued receiving updates\" about the TIN Matter \"[i]n the ensuing months,\" they have not disclosed a specific timeframe to me. (Gov't Mem. at 7).\n\nability to communicate with members of TIN regarding classified information or \"sensitiv[e]\" aspects of any investigation. (Gov't Mem. at 5; Bove Decl. ¶ 10). The summary of the July 1, 2020 email suggests, in essence, that a press inquiry was forwarded to me and my Co-Chief, and I responded. (Gov't Mem. at 6). Approximately eight days later, FBI agents sent me and my Co-Chief a link to an article. (*Id.*). I do not recall the email, and the prosecutors have not suggested that I did anything with it. (*Id.*). Rather, my Co-Chief forwarded it to one of the TIN AUSAs. (*Id.*).\n\nOn the same day as the email, the *Wall Street Journal* published an article that appears to relate to the CFU investigation. (*See* Ex. A). The article discussed topics within the scope of the CFU investigation, including Mr. Kwok and co-defendant William Je, but not Ms. Wang. The following month, the *Journal* published a second article that also appears to relate to the CFU investigation. (*See* Ex. B). These articles demonstrate that there was a significant amount of information about the CFU investigation in the public domain shortly after the investigation was initiated, but they do not support the argument that I was \"personally and substantially involved\" in the TIN Matter.\n\nThis is a far cry from the quantity and quality of the evidence of participation in the cases cited by the prosecutors. In *United States v. James*, the prosecutors proceeded \"with affidavits.\" 708 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1983); *see also United States v. Miller*, f, 1199-1200 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing multiple \"affidavit[s]\" submitted in connection with disqualification motion);4 *Schulte*,\n\n<sup>4</sup> *Miller* is distinguishable for the additional reasons that (1) the trial judge found that the former government attorney had responsibility for the investigation that led to the case in question, and (2) the disqualification decision was based in part on a state-law advisory opinion that is no longer good law in New Jersey and inconsistent with N.Y. Rule 1.11(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 207(a). *See* 624 F.2d at 1200 (citing *In re Advisory Opinion on Professional Ethics No. 361*, 390 A.2d 118 (N.J. 1978)); *see also State v. Hudson*, 128 A.3d 739, 746-47 (App. Div. 2015) (describing \"sea change\"). The Ninth Circuit has declined to follow *Miller* based on \"grave doubts\" about the\n\n2020 WL 534508, at \\*1 (\"Manufactured hypothetical violations of different professional responsibility rules, without foundation in fact or law, do not meet the *heavy burden* required to demonstrate that disqualification is appropriate\"). Here, the prosecutors rely on \"discussions.\" (Gov't Mem. at 5 n.4). And the cases the prosecutors cite relating to former government attorneys involved more direct participation than the prosecutors have established:\n\n- *United States v. Philip Morris, Inc*., 312 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2004): former government attorney provided \"extensive and extended legal representation to the FDA,\" including \"work[ing] a total of 382 hours on the FDA Litigation.\"\n- *United States v. Smith*, 995 F.2d 662, 676 (7th Cir. 1993): former government attorney \"signed an immunity agreement for one of the government's major witnesses in this case.\"\n- *United States v. Brothers*, 856 F. Supp. 370, 373 (M.D. Tenn. 1992): former government attorney \"prepared the affidavit and search warrant from written reports, charts, and oral information given to him by the agents,\" and the fruits of the search were to be used against his client.\n- *United States v. Ostrer*, 597 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1979): former government attorney \"personally prosecuted two of [three cooperating witnesses against the current client], Barresi and Geller, and called the third, Brown, as a witness at Geller's trial.\"\n\nThe prosecutors have not demonstrated that I participated \"personally and substantially\" in the\n\nTIN Matter, and Rule 1.11(a) and § 207(a) do not apply because the TIN Matter was distinct and \"unrelated\" to this case.\n\n# **II. The** *Evans* **Test Does Not Require Disqualification**\n\nOnce the motion is stripped of meritless arguments regarding Rule 1.11(a) and § 207(a),\n\nthe prosecutors are left with the burden of demonstrating that disqualification is appropriate based solely on the *Evans* test, which was developed in civil cases involving private litigants with no Sixth Amendment rights. *See United States v. Castellano*, 610 F. Supp. 1137, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.\n\nanalysis in the opinion. *United States v. Washington*, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986).\n\n1985) (rejecting \"the government's reliance on the standard for disqualification enunciated in civil cases\"). In criminal cases, prosecutors have \"'an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek this assistance,'\" and \"[t]he government must 'honor' this right.\" *United States v. Stein*, 541 F.3d 130, 154 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting *Maine v. Moulton*, 474 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1985)). The prosecutors must be held to a \"principle of non-interference\"—because \"the right to counsel in an adversarial legal system would mean little if defense counsel could be controlled by the government or vetoed without good reason\"—and \"the government violates the Sixth Amendment when it intrudes on the attorney-client relationship.\" *Id.* at 154.\n\nThus, when courts look to *Evans* and its progeny in criminal cases, the three elements are applied stringently. *See United States v. Armaza*, 280 F. Supp. 2d 174, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (\"The substantial relationship test is strictly applied to avoid depriving clients of their chosen counsel . . . .). The disqualification motion is unable to withstand such scrutiny.\n\n# **A. The Matters Are Not Substantially Related**\n\nThe \"substantially related\" element of the *Evans* test requires the prosecutors to establish that issues involved are \"identical,\" or \"essentially the same.\" *Cook Indus.*, 569 F.2d at 740; *see also United States v. Rastelli*, No. 87 Civ. 2974, 1989 WL 5273, at \\*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1989) (\"The movant can meet this 'substantial relationship' requirement only by demonstrating that the issues involved in the past and present representations are 'identical' or 'essentially the same.'\" (quoting *Cook Indus.*, 569 F.2d at 740)); *CQS ABS Master Fund Ltd. v. MBIA Inc.*, No. 12 Civ. 6840, 2013 WL 3270322, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013) (\"The threshold of similarity is quite high: a relationship between issues is 'substantial' only if it is 'patently clear' and the issues are 'identical' or 'essentially the same.'\"). The prosecutors \"cannot meet this burden by putting forth mere speculation or arguing in favor of the mere appearance of impropriety.\" *Shea*, 2022 WL 4298704, at \\*6\n\n\"[I]n all the reported cases where counsel was disqualified, the former government attorney had some involvement with the investigation of the underlying prosecution.\" *United States v. Escobar-Orejuela*, 910 F. Supp. 92, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); *see also, e.g.*, *United States v. Uzzi*, 549 F. Supp. 979, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (reasoning that \"this prosecution arose directly out of that investigation\"). That is not the case here. As with Rule 1.11(a) and § 207(a), the analysis must begin with the prosecutors' March 2023 representation to the Court that the matters are \"unrelated.\" *See Schulte*, 2020 WL 534508, at \\*5 (applying \"particularly strict scrutiny because of defense counsel's shifting narratives\" in disqualification motion). That is true.\n\nThe TIN Matter started earlier, in a different unit, with different AUSAs and agents, and it related to different alleged conduct and different target offenses.\n\n (*See generally* Aug. 7, 2023 Sealed Declaration of Alex Lipman). This is not surprising, as GTV did not even exist at the time. Thus, the matters are not substantially related because \"the legal theories and facts are not the same.\" *Ferncliff Cemetery Association v. Town of Greenburgh, New York*, No. 18 Civ. 6411, 2019 WL 6878560, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019); *see also In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig.*, 2006 WL 6846702, at \\*14 (\"Where such material factual differences exist, the similarity of allegations, subject matter, defendants, or legal theory is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that two matters are the same.\").\n\nThe Court should reject the prosecutors' effort to expand the scope of the TIN Matter to include Mr. Kwok's earlier interactions with the FBI. (*See* Gov't Mem. at 2). I did not participate in those interactions. (Bove Decl. ¶ 5).\n\n[REDACTED] (*See Gov't Mem. at 3*). [REDACTED]\n[REDACTED]\n[REDACTED]\n[REDACTED] (*Id.*).\n\nMr. Kwok's alleged status as \"the *focus* of the TIN Matter,\" if true, is not a sufficient basis to disqualify me from representing Ms. Wang. (Gov't Mem. at 20). For example, in one of the cases cited by the prosecutors, the court reasoned: \"That the matters were '[Hurricane] Sandyrelated,' however, does not make them substantially related.\" *Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co.*, 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Thus, such general overlap does not require disqualification. Nor does the relationship between Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang, which was not central to the TIN Matter as far as I know. Commonalities relating to the background relationship between the defendants are not sufficient to require disqualification. (*See* Dkt. No. 289 at 28, *New York, et al., v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al.*, No. 19 Civ. 5434 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2019) (finding no substantial relationship between antitrust matters \"even if there surely will be some things in common or that can be deemed related\")).\n\nThe limited temporal overlap does not suffice. While the Superseding Indictment alleges that the conspiracy charged in Count One began in 2018, the bases for that allegation appear to be limited to: (1) Mr. Kwok's founding of the Rule of Law Foundation and the Rule of Law Society (Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 6(b)); and (2) Ms. Wang's opening of bank accounts (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 11(a)-(b)). The prosecutors have not alleged that any illicit transactions in furtherance of the charged schemes occurred prior to the summer of 2020.\n\nIn sum, \"[t]he gravamen of this case is completely different.\" *Doe 1 v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, No. 22 Civ. 10019, 2023 WL 3383724, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2023). A rule \"that\n\nuld disqualify a former government attorney from participating in any litigation that had any factual overlap with a matter on which the attorney had worked while in government service . . . is inconsistent with both settled law and the sound policy of avoiding undue disincentives to public service.” *In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig.*, 2006 WL 6846702, at *16*. Because that is not the law, the prosecutors have not established the requisite substantial relationship.\n\nThe prosecutors note that a court disqualified a former government attorney (“Attorney-1”) in *United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., et al.*, No. 18 Cr. 457 (E.D.N.Y.) (Gov't Mem. at 23). Indeed, the prosecutors lifted language from their EDNY colleagues' filing in ways that only serve to illustrate that their position in this case is much weaker:\n\n| Huawei (EDNY)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Wang (SDNY)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Attorney-1 \" <i>is in possession</i> of information he<br>learned as DAG that relates to his<br>representation of his current clients but that he<br>cannot reveal, let alone use, in that<br>representation.\" (Ex. D at 22 (emphasis<br>added)).                                                                                                                                                                    | \" <i>Bove may be in possession</i> of information he<br>learned when he supervised the TIN Matter,<br>including classified information that he<br>cannot reveal, let alone use, in this<br>representation.\" (Gov't Mem. at 27<br>(emphasis added)).                                                                                                            |\n| \" <i>[B]ecause of the classified nature of the<br/>conflict</i> , <i>[Attorney-1]</i> cannot provide his<br>clients with more than the most cursory<br>description of the conflict—that he knows<br>something related to his current representation<br>of Huawei that he cannot share or use—<br>because he is not authorized to share any<br>more information with his clients.\" (Ex. D at<br>22 (emphasis added)). | \" <i>[B]ecause Bove may be also aware of<br/>classified information</i> , Bove cannot provide<br>Wang with more than the most cursory<br>description of the conflict—that he knows<br>something related to his current representation<br>of Wang that he cannot share or use—because<br>he is not permitted to do so.\" (Gov't Mem. at<br>27 (emphasis added)). |\n\nPresuming that the *Huawei* team did not share classified and sealed information with the\nOffice, the prosecutors have no basis to compare this case to that one. The filings are heavily\nredacted, and it is nearly impossible to discern from the public record what facts led the court to\nconclude that disqualification was appropriate. However, the *Huawei* decision suggests that\n\nAttorney-1 was involved in \"the single act of approving or participation in a critical step.\" *Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd.*, 2020 WL 903007, at \\*6 (cleaned up). In contrast, the only critical step I am aware of in the TIN Matter involved the execution of the October 2019 search warrants, which I did not review, approve, or authorize. (*See* Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7-9).\n\n# **C. The Prosecutors Have Not Established Access To Relevant Privileged Information**\n\nFor the same reasons that the prosecutors have not established that I participated \"personally and substantially\" in the TIN Matter, *see* Part I.B, *supra*, they have not demonstrated that I had access to privileged information that warrants disqualification.\n\nNaked claims of a breach of confidential relations, or the attorney's receipt of confidential information, in a prior representation are not sufficient alone; the moving party must allege the type and nature of the confidences that were exchanged in the prior litigation that should subsequently disqualify the attorney in the latter representation.\n\n32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 160. It bears repeating, the prosecutors have proffered two lines of redacted text in an unsworn brief and three emails. Two of the emails related to media coverage of the CFU investigation.\n\nI do not recall any of these communications. (Bove Decl. ¶¶ 11-12). The prosecutors contend that my recollection is \"irrelevant.\" (Gov't Mem. at 24). To the contrary, \"it is a factor that indicates even less reason for concern.\" (Dkt. No. 289 at 28, *Deutsche Telekom*, No. 19 Civ. 5434 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2019)); *see also Haggard*, 2009 WL 5207263, at \\*3 (denying disqualification motion based in part on attorney affidavit stating he \"ha[d] no recollection of participating in any review, evaluation or recommendations regarding Defendant\"). I do not recall ever seeing the 2019 warrant materials. (Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7-8). But any attorney representing Ms. Wang will see them in connection with this case because the prosecutors have produced them. (Gov't Mem. at 21 n.12). \"Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying.\" Cmt. 3, Rule 1.9.\n\nPerhaps recognizing the paucity of their showing, the prosecutors repeatedly urge the Court to ignore their \"heavy burden\" and \"high standard of proof,\" *Shea*, 2022 WL 4298704, at \\*6, by applying an irrebuttable presumption that I accessed relevant privileged information. (Gov't Mem. at 15-16). The Court should reject the invitation to error because it reflects an improper disregard for Ms. Wang's constitutional rights.\n\nThe prosecutors cite only two district court cases that support their position: *Uzzi* and *Huawei*.<sup>5</sup> In addition to the differences identified above in Part II.B, the cases are distinguishable for important reasons not applicable to this motion. In *Uzzi*, disqualification of a former government attorney was sought in a \"prosecution [that] arose directly out of that investigation.\" 549 F. Supp. at 982. In *Huawei*, although the court applied the presumption, the prosecutors \"identified specific confidential information from [Attorney-1's] prior representation that [Attorney-1] had and can use to the detriment of his former client.\" (Ex. D at 21). To the extent a court could ever properly presume away an element of the test prosecutors must meet to overcome a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel, both of those considerations must be present. Presumptive access to relevant confidential information is more reasonable where it is established that the former government attorney participated in the same investigation that led to the charges against the current client. Moreover, as appears to have happened in *Huawei*, the prosecutors should be required to offer more than *ipse dixit* to justify disqualification when lesser measures—such as waiver—are available. They have not done so here, and the disqualification should be denied.\n\n<sup>5</sup> The prosecutors also cite *United States v. Smith*, but the court noted in that case that the \"presumption is rebuttable.\" 995 F.2d at 676. Similar to *Uzzi*, and as noted above, *Smith* is also a case where the former government attorney directly participated in the same investigation that gave rise to the charges.\n\n# **III. The Potential Conflicts Are Waivable**\n\nThe severe approach of disqualification is not warranted because Ms. Wang can waive the potential conflicts identified by the prosecutors following *Curcio* proceedings. As discussed below in Part III.A, it is not uncommon for defendants to waive potential conflicts implicating an attorney's duties of loyalty and confidentiality to a prior client, despite the fact that the attorney must honor the prior client's confidences when discussing the potential conflict with the current client. In this regard, the government's confidential information is not entitled to special treatment.\n\nThe prosecutors suggest that accepting a waiver would be imprudent because Ms. Wang could subsequently challenge these proceedings on that basis. We have no objection to *Curcio*  proceedings that require Ms. Wang to give up the right to bring such challenges, which is standard practice in this District. We are mindful that those waivers are enforceable. *See, e.g.*, *Baldeo v. United States*, No. 13 Cr. 125, 2018 WL 1116570, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018) (\"Such a valid waiver of right to conflict-free counsel cannot be defeated simply because the conflict subsequently affects counsel's performance.\" (cleaned up)).\n\nMoreover, even if it could reasonably be said that a *Curcio* proceeding would give rise to unwarranted appellate risk—and I submit that it cannot—so too would disqualification, in violation of Ms. Wang's Sixth Amendment right, on the basis of the record here. *See United States v. Perrone*, No. 05 Cr. 774, 2007 WL 1575248, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007) (\"And though the government asserts that, should he be convicted, [defendant] will have a ripe ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . , they fail to note that he will also have a ripe claim for denial of chosen counsel should the Court disqualify his attorneys.\" (cleaned up)). Whereas the potential legal challenges identified by the prosecutors would likely require a demonstration of prejudice by Ms. Wang should she elect to bring them at some point in the future, a meritorious challenge to the deprivation of her Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel would require automatic reversal. *See Gonzalez-Lopez*, 548 U.S. at 150 (\"We have little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as structural error.\"); *United States v. Liszewski*, No. 06 Cr. 130, 2006 WL 2376382, at \\*10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2006) (\"I must err on the side of nondisqualification, both because [defendant] has a constitutional right to counsel of his choice, and because to do otherwise would be to risk automatic reversal of any conviction that might ensue.\").6\n\nFinally, I am mindful of the Court's separate gatekeeping function, under *Curcio* and more generally, with respect to the integrity of these proceedings. I respectfully submit that my role in the separate TIN Matter does not call that integrity into question. As the Ninth Circuit has observed:\n\nIt is easy to express vague concerns about public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. It is quite a different matter to demonstrate that public confidence will in fact be undermined if criminal defendants are permitted to retain lawyers who worked for the government in the field of law implicated by an indictment. We are unwilling to sacrifice a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice on such an unsubstantiated premise. Indeed, for all we as judges know in a vacuum, the public very well may have greater confidence in the integrity of the judicial process assured that a criminal defendant's right to counsel of his choice will not be lightly denied.\n\n*United States v. Washington*, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986). Respecting Ms. Wang's choice\n\nof counsel, upon a knowing and intelligent waiver of potential conflicts, would be consistent with the discretion that the Court exercised in *United States v. Zuckerman*, where Your Honor accepted a defendant's *Curcio* waiver despite the fact that the defendant's current attorneys were \"potential witnesses\" against him and \"could potentially be compelled to testify against [him] at trial or in a\n\n<sup>6</sup> *Liszewski* serves as an example of the appropriate balancing of the Sixth Amendment right on a disqualification motion, and illustrates that the prosecutors have it backwards when they cite a civil decision for the proposition that \"'any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification.'\" (Gov't Mem. at 12 (quoting *Hull v. Celanese Corp.*, 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975))).\n\nrelated hearing.\" (Dkt. No. 21 at 8-9, No. 16 Cr. 194 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2016)). The risks that the Court accepted in that situation in order to honor the defendant's Sixth Amendment right were myriad. *See also, e.g.*, *Perez*, 325 F.3d at 128 (\"We also reject the contention that [counsel] had an unwaivable conflict of interest because he was a potential witness for the government at trial.\"). For the reasons set forth below, the potential conflicts at issue in this case do not rise to that level and are therefore waivable.\n\n# **A. The TIN Matter**\n\nThe prosecutors' argument that disqualification is necessary to \"avoid trial taint\" ignores the Office's longstanding practice of supporting defendants' knowing and voluntary waivers of potential conflicts faced by their attorneys that implicate duties of loyalty and confidentiality to former clients. (*See* Gov't Mem. at 26-27).\n\nThe prosecutors suggest that Ms. Wang cannot be advised of the risks associated with the potential conflict because I \"may be also aware of classified information.\" (Gov't Mem. at 27). I dispute that I am aware of classified information as a result of the TIN Matter, and the prosecutors have not established otherwise. (*See* Bove Decl. ¶ 6). Even if their speculation is to be indulged, the ethics rules cited by the prosecutors do not attribute special status to classified information. I am well aware that I may not disclose confidential government information, and I take that obligation seriously. But *Curcio* proceedings do not require an attorney to disclose a former client's confidences to the current client, whether or not that former client is the government.\n\nRather, the defendant must be instructed regarding the \"dangers\" of the potential conflict:\n\nAt such a hearing, the trial court (1) advises the defendant of his right to representation by an attorney who has no conflict of interest, (2) instructs the defendant as to the dangers arising from particular conflicts, (3) permits the defendant to confer with his chosen counsel, (4) encourages the defendant to seek advice from independent counsel, (5) allows a reasonable time for the defendant to make a decision, and (6) determines, preferably by means of questions that are likely to be answered in narrative form, whether the defendant understands the risk of representation by his present counsel and freely chooses to run them.\n\n*Jenkins*, 325 F.3d at 119. The fact that a defendant \"did not know the exact nature\" of the confidential information at issue \"does not render his waiver invalid.\" *United States v. Basciano*, No. 03 Cr. 929, 2008 WL 794945, at \\*8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008).\n\nDefendants are routinely permitted to waive potential conflicts involving situations where the defendant's attorney cannot disclose the confidences of a former client. To address any risks associated with that circumstance, prosecutors and courts make clear to the defendant in *Curcio*  proceedings that the attorney possesses information s/he cannot share. By way of example, in 2021, prosecutors argued to Your Honor that a potential conflict was waivable where a defendant's attorney had previously represented a co-defendant. They proposed the following *Curcio*  questions:\n\n- \"Do you understand that [your attorney] may have learned information from [former client] that he may be unable to share with you or use to defend you, in light of the duty of confidence he owes to [former client], even if the information would be helpful to you?\"\n- \"Do you understand that the restrictions on [your attorney's] ability to represent you may adversely affect his representation of you in this case in ways that we have not yet discussed? Do you understand that the greatest danger is the inability to foresee all the conflicts that may arise?\"\n\nDkt. No. 777 at 6, *United States v. Liu*, No. 15 Cr. 616 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2021) (emphases added).\n\nSimilarly, Judge Castel recently accepted a defendant's waiver where the attorney had previously represented two cooperating witnesses. The prosecutors' proposed *Curcio* questions included the following:\n\n- Are you aware that [your attorney] may have information from CW-1 and/or CW-2 that may be helpful in defending you, but that she is absolutely prohibited from using that information to defend you because of the attorney-client privilege?\n- Do you understand that, should CW-1 testify against you, [your attorney] may not use any information to cross-examine CW-1, even if [your attorney] believes that such cross-\n\nexamination would be helpful to you? Do you understand that, similarly, should CW-2 testify against you, [your attorney] may not use any information to cross-examine CW-2, even if [your attorney] believes that such cross-examination would be helpful to you?\n\nDkt. No. 517-1 at 2, *United States v. Hernandez*, No. 15 Cr. 379 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2023) (emphases added).\n\nConsistent with the sorts of questions proposed by prosecutors in *Liu* and *Hernandez*, Ms. Wang does not need access to confidential government information to validly waive any potential conflict. No case the prosecutors cite suggests that I would be required to violate my duty of loyalty relating to the TIN Matter, in a \"cursory\" fashion or otherwise, in order for Ms. Wang enter a waiver knowingly and intelligently. (Gov't Mem. at 27). In *United States v. Pappa*, defense counsel insisted that disqualification was necessary because they faced \"severe\" conflicts. 37 F. App'x 551, 554 (2d Cir. 2002). The opposite is true here. I believe the potential conflict is waivable, I have discussed with Ms. Wang the \"nature\" of the conflict and the associated \"danger[s],\" and I need not disclose confidences in order to do so effectively.\n\nIn *United States v. Schwarz*, the court concluded that the conflict was unwaivable where an attorney faced ethical and \"substantial\" financial incentives to curry favor with another current client to the detriment of the defendant. 283 F.3d 76, 96 (2d Cir. 2002). The court \"assume[d]\" that \"the distinct possibility existed that, at each point the conflict was felt, [the attorney] would sacrifice [the defendant's] interests for those of the [other current client].\" *Id.* at 96. Here, unlike the concurrent-representation conflict in *Schwarz*, the prosecutors do not appear to be suggesting that the potential conflict is unwaivable because of its pervasive nature. (*See* Gov't Mem. at 27 (\"The conflict could arguably be resolved by obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of any potential conflict from Wang.\")). Rather, they appear to argue that Ms. Wang cannot be adequately advised by the Court and counsel regarding the implications of the conflict so that she can make her own decision.\n\nGiven that position, the citation to *Armedo-Sarmiento* was an odd choice. (Gov't Mem. at 27). The case makes clear that Ms. Wang can be advised of the \"nature of the conflict\" without disclosing the government's confidences. 524 F.2d at 593. There, the Circuit reversed a trial court's disqualification of an attorney who had \"represented three individuals whom the Government planned to use as witnesses,\" where two of the witnesses \"were unwilling to waive their attorney-client privileges.” 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975).<sup>7</sup> Thus, the attorney could not discuss with the defendant confidential information relating to two clients, and he could not use those clients' confidences when cross-examining them at the defendant's trial. Finding that civil cases that \"do not involve the crucial factor of the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights\" were \"not controlling in the present case,\" the Court of Appeals remanded the case to allow the defendant to waive the conflicts. *Id.* at 593-94. *Armedo-Sarmiento* therefore supports Ms. Wang’s request for a *Curcio* hearing.\n\n# **B. Mei Guo**\n\nThe potential conflict arising from my colleagues' representation of Mei Guo in other proceedings is waivable and does not support the disqualification motion. My firm's representation of Ms. Guo predated my arrival by at least approximately a year. (Bove Decl. ¶ 14). When I arrived at the firm in January 2022, I was asked to assist in the matter. (*Id.*). I consulted\n\n<sup>7</sup> Because *Armedo-Sarmiento* makes clear that a *Curcio* waiver is permissible notwithstanding the former clients' lack of consent, the reasoning in *Huawei* to the contrary is not persuasive. *See Huawei*, 2020 WL 903007, at \\*6.\n\nthe then-Associate United States Attorney, and he asked me not to participate. (*See* Gov't Mem. at 8-9). I did what he asked. (Bove Decl. ¶ 14).\n\nIn approximately June 2023, I was asked to participate in the representation of Ms. Wang in these proceedings. (Bove Decl. ¶ 15). In response to the request, I reviewed the significant volume of public filings in this case, which were not available to me in January 2022 and included the March 15, 2023 letter in which the prosecutors described the TIN Matter as \"unrelated.\" (*See id.*). Prior to accepting the engagement, I also reviewed relevant ethics rules, consulted CSG Law's general counsel and other colleagues, and discussed the potential conflicts with Ms. Wang (without disclosing confidential government information). (*Id.*).\n\n My decision to comply with the Office's request relating to Ms. Guo is neither binding nor persuasive authority for purposes of the prosecutors' disqualification motion relating to Ms. Wang. I made that decision for two reasons. First, my firm's representation of Ms. Guo related to civil matters, and she had no Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel. Second, there were no public filings at the time, and I was not in a position to make an independent assessment of the potential conflict. In any event, the potential conflict is waivable. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Akhavan*, No. 20 Cr. 188, 2020 WL 2836825, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020).\n\n# **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the disqualification motion should be denied, and the Court should hold a *Curcio* hearing to give Ms. Wang an opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the potential conflicts presented.\n\nDated: New York, New York August 7, 2023\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Emil Bove\n\n Emil Bove Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 11 Times Square, 34th Floor New York, NY 10036 (212) 324 7265 ebove@csglaw.com\n\n *Attorney for Yanping Wang*\n\nCc: Counsel of Record (Via ECF)","body_zh":"United States District Court Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUnited States（美国）\n\n诉\n\n案号：No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nYanping Wang（王雁平），\n\n被告。\n\n反对政府取消辩护律师资格动议之备忘录\n\nEmil Bove（埃米尔·博夫）\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 律师事务所\n11 Times Square, 34th Floor\nNew York, NY 10036\n(212) 324 7265\nebove@csglaw.com\n\n王雁平的辩护律师\n\n前言 1\n背景 3\nI. 以往的政府任职经历 3\nII. TIN 事项 3\nIII. CFU 提起之控诉 4\n适用法律 5\nI. 依据第六修正案选择辩护律师的权利 5\nII. 取消资格动议与 Curcio 程序 5\nIII. 18 U.S.C. § 207 6\nIV. 纽约州职业道德规则 6\nV. Evans 案裁判标准 7\n论证 8\nI. 第 207(a) 条与规则 1.11(a) 均不适用 8\nA. 本案并非同一“事项” 8\nB. 不存在“个人且实质性”参与 10\nII. Evans 案裁判标准不要求取消资格 14\nA. 两项事项并无实质关联 15\nB. 经过大量涂黑的华为案取消资格裁定不具说服力 18\nC. 检察官未能证明曾接触相关特权信息 19\nIII. 潜在的利益冲突可予放弃 21\nA. TIN 事项 23\nB. 郭美 26\n结论 28\n\n前言\n\n“毫无关联”。在 2023 年 3 月致本法院的一封信函中，检察官正是这样描述如今作为其取消资格动议核心依据的“TIN 事项”的。数月之后，检察官却企图证明 TIN 事项与本案存在“实质关联”。他们如今声称，这种关联深到必须取消我代表王女士的代理资格——尽管他们此前曾向法院作出过上述陈述，而且更重要的是，这违背了《第六修正案》。\n\n检察官在此项动议中承担着举证重任。一份未宣誓签署的答辩状，仅仅依赖“随后的数月”（两次提及）、“根据通常做法”以及“可能意味着”等模糊字眼，根本无法满足这一举证要求。（政府备忘录第 5、7、21 页）。诸如“可能提供证据”以及“知悉或能够接触到”（两次提及）等模棱两可的搪塞之词也同样不够。（同上，第 5、8、11、22 页）。在作为基础的 CFU 调查启动后不久，我——与世界上每一位能读到 Wall Street Journal（《华尔街日报》）的人一样——“至少知晓”引发本案的调查。（政府备忘录第 8 页；亦参见附件 A）。这绝非取消律师资格的法定依据。\n\n我代表王女士进行辩护，亦符合检察官所引用的职业道德规则：N.Y. Rule 1.11(a)（《纽约州职业道德规则》第 1.11(a) 条）及 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)。这些规则仅禁止前政府律师在同一“事项”中接续代表当事人。TIN 事项与本案并非同一“事项”。包括 § 207(a)(2) 所规定的两年限制期在内的这些规则均不适用。\n\n因此，检察官只能主要依赖那些不涉及第六修正案、适用不相干道德规则的民事案件判例。这些判例权威要求检察官必须证明 TIN 事项与本案所涉争议是“完全相同”或“实质上相同”的。就我所知，那起“毫无关联”的 TIN 事项仅集中在单一的侦查步骤上。来自 FBI（联邦调查局）的反间谍特工在大约 2019 年 10 月执行了搜查。\n\n这合情合理。引发本案的调查是各自独立的。检察官也承认该调查是“独立于 TIN 事项产生并独立开展的”。（政府备忘录第 23 页）。该调查是由另一个部门 CFU 负责运作的，由不同的检察官和特工开展，针对的是截然不同的犯罪行为。因此，正如检察官早先所作的陈述一样，他们未能证明本案与 TIN 事项存在“实质关联”。\n\n本动议还应因另一理由予以驳回：检察官未能证明我对 TIN 事项的参与达到了实质性程度。本动议所面临的是一种极为特殊的事实情况。尽管我当时名义上是 TIN 的主管，但我并未审查或批准 TIN 事项中 2019 年的搜查令，因为当时我正在参与另一场庭审。我完全不记得曾在任何时间点见过这些搜查令或与该案相关的任何其他文件。看起来，检察官用以证明我参与了 TIN 事项的证据，充其量只有三封电子邮件以及约两行经过涂黑、单方面单方提交（ex parte）以总结对话内容的未宣誓文本。为了回应本动议，我甚至未被允许查阅那些材料，但我相信法院定会对其进行严密审查。\n\n归根结底，第六修正案所赋予的权利应当获得远比检察官所给予的更多的尊重。代理行为符合适用的职业道德规则这一事实，强烈表明我参与本案不会令人对本诉讼程序的公正性产生怀疑。虽然检察官搬出了 Strickland 案的主张作为威吓，但这本需要证明造成了损害后果；而对王女士第六修正案权利的错误剥夺将直接导致判决当然撤销。在本司法区，被告人通常在政府的支持下，被常规性地允许放弃由接续代理所引发的潜在利益冲突。检察官未能解释，为何本案中声称涉及的保密信息应当获得超越原私人客户保密信息所享有的更强保护。取消辩护律师资格的动议应当予以驳回，且法院应当举行 Curcio 听证会。\n\n背景\n\nI. 以往的政府任职经历\n\n大约在 2012 年 10 月 1 日至 2021 年 12 月 30 日期间，我曾在 U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦检察官办公室）担任助理联邦检察官。（2023 年 8 月 7 日 Emil Bove 声明（“博夫声明”）第 2 段）。\n\n2019 年 9 月 19 日，我被任命为该办公室 Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit（恐怖主义与国际毒品犯罪处，“TIN”，该办公室现称其为 NSIN）的两名联席处长之一。（博夫声明第 3 段）。TIN 的另一名联席处长也在同日获得任命。（同上）。在该任命宣布时，我几乎把全部时间都投入到了 United States v. Hernandez（美国诉埃尔南德斯案），案号 No. 15 Cr. 379 (S.D.N.Y.) 的庭审准备工作中，该案庭审于 2019 年 10 月 2 日开始。（同上，第 4 段）。鉴于我专注于庭审准备，我实际上脱离了 TIN 的日常事务，且在埃尔南德斯案庭审期间我一直未在岗。（同上）。埃尔南德斯案庭审于 2019 年 10 月 18 日结束。（同上）。\n\nII. TIN 事项\n\n在我成为主管之前，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）曾于 2018 年 4 月至 2019 年 5 月期间定期与一名联邦调查局特工进行沟通。（政府备忘录第 2 页）。我在这些交往中没有参与任何工作。（博夫声明第 5 段）。\n\n（即“TIN 事项”）。（政府备忘录第 2-3 页）。在埃尔南德斯案庭审结束前，我没有以任何方式参与过 TIN 事项。（博夫声明第 4 段）。例如，我没有审查、修改或批准过在 2019 年 10 月前后执行的搜查令申请。（参见博夫声明第 7-8 段）。\n\n在 2019 年 10 月下旬我“恢复了主管 TIN 的全职职责”之后的任何时间，我都不认为自己见过这些搜查令申请。（政府备忘录第 4 页；博夫声明第 7-8 段）。即便检察官或联邦调查局保留了案件卷宗——不论是涉密的还是非涉密的——我也不记得查阅过。（博夫声明第 6 段）。尽管我大体上知晓联邦调查局正在审查其根据 2019 年搜查令扣押的材料内容，但我不记得曾就任何特定扣押物品的具体内容进行过讨论，且对于在 TIN 事项中采取过的任何其他调查步骤，我亦毫无印象。（同上，第 9 段）。虽然我认为自己有可能曾与负责该案的一名或两名一线助理联邦检察官讨论过 TIN 事项，但我不记得这些交谈的实质内容，这向我表明此类交谈是偶发且有限的。（同上，第 11 段）。\n\nIII. CFU 提起之控诉\n\n导致本案指控的独立的 CFU 调查始于“2020 年 5 月前后”，大致在 GTV Media Group, Inc.（“GTV”）成立之时。（政府备忘录第 7 页）。2020 年 7 月 8 日，《华尔街日报》发表了一篇题为《联邦调查局调查中国流亡人士，包括其与特朗普前助手史蒂夫·班农的合作》的报道。（附件 A）。该报道似乎与 CFU 的调查有关；报道中提及了郭先生和同案被告人 Kin Ming Je（余建明），但未提及王女士。《华尔街日报》于 2020 年 8 月 19 日发表了相关报道。（附件 B）。\n\n2023 年 3 月 15 日，王女士和郭先生被捕并被羁押。在同日提交的关于郭先生的保释意见书中，检察官主张：“2019 年 10 月，在针对郭的一项无关调查中”——即 TIN 事项——“联邦调查局对郭在纽约市的顶层公寓执行了搜查令。”（案卷号第 7 号文件第 20 页）。\n\n在 3 月 15 日的新闻稿中，该办公室大肆宣传郭先生被捕以及对余先生的指控，但未提及王女士被捕。（附件 C）。可以理解的是，新闻稿中并未提及 TIN 或 TIN 事项。相反，该办公室准确地将本案归功于 CFU。（同上）。\n\n适用法律\n\nI. 依据第六修正案选择辩护律师的权利\n\n第六修正案赋予的选择辩护律师的权利“要求”必须“提供一项特定的公正保障——即被告人应由其认为最合适的律师进行辩护”。United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez，548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006)。这是“该宪法保障的核心要义”，同上，第 147-48 页，并且对诸如王女士这样的被告人来说“至关重要”，Kaley v. United States，571 U.S. 320, 337 (2014)。其重要程度使得对被告人第六修正案选择辩护律师权利的错误剥夺构成“结构性错误”，不适用无害错误分析。Gonzalez-Lopez，548 U.S. at 150。\n\nII. 取消资格动议与 Curcio 程序\n\n“取消律师资格动议……要求动议方承担沉重的举证责任，以证明取消资格是适当的。”United States v. Schulte，No. 17 Cr. 548, 2020 WL 534508, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2020)。审判长此前曾阐述过相关标准：“取消资格的动议通常不受支持，而且由于此类动议往往出于诉讼策略考量并容易打乱诉讼的高效推进，提出取消资格动议的当事人承担着沉重的举证责任，并且必须满足极高的证明标准。”United States v. Shea，No. 20 Cr. 412 (AT), 2022 WL 4298704, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022)（整理后引用）。\n\n“当选择辩护律师的权利与获得忠实无二的律师代理的权利发生冲突时，究竟以哪项权利为先，通常必须交由被告人自行抉择，而非由政府强加指令。”United States v. Perez，325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003)。只有在“极少数类别的案件”中，律师的利益冲突才属于不可放弃的情形。同上，第 126 页。此类案件极其有限的范围已由 United States v. Fulton，5 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 1993) 案“予以说明”，在该案中，一名政府证人指控“被告人的出庭律师参与了相关的海洛因走私活动”。Perez，325 F.3d at 126-27（整理后引用）。\n\nIII. 18 U.S.C. § 207\n\n第 207(a)(1) 条禁止前政府律师在自己曾“个人且实质性参与”、并且“在该等参与之时涉及特定一方或多方当事人”的“特定事项”中，站在政府的对立面。18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)。第 207(a)(2) 条对“官方职责管辖范围内的特定事项设定了为期两年的限制”。同上，§ 207(a)(2)。该条款同样仅限于“特定事项”。同上。\n\nIV. 纽约州职业道德规则\n\n尽管“并非每一次违反纪律规则都必然导致取消代理资格”，但无可争议的是，New York（纽约州）的职业道德规则与检察官的动议相关。*Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream*, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2005)。\n\n纽约州的第 1.9 条规则规定了律师对前私人当事人负有的义务。第 1.9 条规则中限制律师从事后续代理能力的规定适用于“同一事项或*实质相关的事项*”。第 1.9(a)、(b) 条规则（强调为后加）。然而，当争议涉及律师先前从事的公共服务时，第 1.9 条规则仅在“第 1.11 条规则所要求的范围内”适用。第 1.9 条规则评注 1。\n\n第 1.11(a) 条规则更为狭窄。与 § 207(a) 类似，该规则禁止前政府律师在自己此前作为政府律师“亲自且实质性参与”过的*同一*“事项”中代理私人当事人。第 1.11(a)(1) 条规则仅并入了第 1.9(c) 条规则。第 1.9(c) 条规则限制使用和披露前当事人的机密信息；它并不禁止后续代理。\n\nV. *Evans* 检验标准\n\n本巡回区内的联邦法院依据第 1.9 条规则及其前身中关于“实质相关事项”的表述（这些表述并不适用），发展出了一套“‘实质关系’检验标准”，用于基于民事案件中后续代理问题的取消代理资格动议。*参见* *Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc.*, 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)。基于 *Evans v. Artek Systems Corp.*, 715 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1983)，检察官将此称为“*Evans* 检验标准”。（*参见* 政府方备忘录第 13 页）。该检验标准要求动议方证明三个要素：\n\n(1) 动议方是对方当事人律师的前当事人；\n\n(2) 该律师先前代理动议方的事项标的与本案争议焦点之间存在实质关系；以及\n\n(3) 被请求取消代理资格的律师在先前代理该当事人的过程中，接触过或很可能接触过相关的受特免权保护的信息。\n\n*Evans*, 715 F.2d at 791。\n\n即使在民事案件中，上诉法院也已指示“我们必须关切当事人自由选择其律师的权利”。*Cook Indus.*, 569 F.2d at 739。这一告诫及其他考量“导致本巡回区在实际适用中对‘实质关系’检验标准进行了精简，仅在证明前案与本案争议焦点之间的关系显而易见时，才准予取消代理资格”。*同上*，第 739-40 页（文字已作清理）。仅当“所涉争议焦点相同或基本相同时”，取消代理资格才是适当的。*同上*，第 740 页。“两案具有共同的法律领域……或两案涉及……同一机构的事实，不足以认定存在实质关系”。*McBean v. City of New York*, No. 02 Civ. 5426, 2003 WL 21277115, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2003)（解释第 1.11 条规则的前身）。\n\n论证\n\n政府此前曾向法官阁下主张，“取消律师代理资格是一项严厉措施，在本巡回区通常不受支持”，“泛泛的不当行为指控和单纯的不当主张是完全不够的”，并且“取消代理资格通常仅在存在实际损害风险时才是适当的”。（Dkt. No. 277 at 28, *Shea*, No. 20 Cr. 412 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2022)）。由于这些论断是准确的，且由于检察官未能承担该举证责任，法院应驳回该动议，并在 *Curcio* 程序中给予 Wang（王）女士放弃潜在利益冲突的机会。\n\nI. 第 207(a) 条和第 1.11(a) 条规则不适用\n\nA. 本案并非同一“事项”\n\n本人在本案中代理王女士并不违反 § 207(a) 或第 1.11(a) 条规则，因为 TIN 事项与本案并非同一“事项”。检察官在 2023 年 3 月已承认 TIN 事项是“不相关的”，且他们现在承认本案“独立产生于 TIN 事项并独立于 TIN 事项开展”。（Dkt. No. 7 at 20；政府方备忘录第 23 页）。因此，本代理并不涉及这些法律渊源。\n\n尽管第 1.9(a) 和 1.9(b) 条规则涉及“在同一事项或实质相关事项中”的前当事人利益冲突，但这些条款并不适用。*参见* 第 1.9 条规则评注 1（“现任和前任政府律师必须在第 1.11 条规则所要求的范围内遵守本规则。”）。相比之下，§ 207(a) 和第 11.1(a) 条规则仅限于同一“事项”中的代理。*参见* *In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig.*, No. 05 Civ. 1720, 2006 WL 6846702, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2006)（“[然而]私人律师不得在律师发挥过*任何*作用的同一事项或实质相关事项中代表对方当事人出庭，而有关前政府律师的规则仅禁止在\n\n与律师在政府任职期间‘亲自且实质性’参与过的事项相同的事项中进行后续代理。”）。1\n\n第 1.11(a) 条规则相对受限的范围是有意为之。“实质相关”这一短语已从第 1.11 条规则中删除，以“体现利益的平衡”。第 1.11 条规则评注 4。“管辖目前或先前受雇于政府机构的律师的规则不应过于严苛，以免阻碍向政府流动或自政府离职的就业流动。……因此，前政府律师仅在其亲自且实质性参与过的*特定事项*中被取消代理资格。”*同上*（强调为后加）。本案并非此类事项。\n\n出于类似原因，§ 207(a) 亦不适用。*参见* *United States v. Medico Indus. Inc.*, 784 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1986)（“当事人、事实和标的事项必须重合，才能触发 § 207(a) 的禁止规定。”）。为了支持本案属于“两年禁令”一部分的主张，检察官引用了就 § 207(a)(2) 而言的“官方职责”定义。（*参见* 政府方备忘录第 26 页（引用 18 U.S.C. § 202(b)））。虽然 TIN 事项符合该定义，但本案不符合，因为本人从未监督过本案。因此，并不涉及 § 207(a)(2) 的两年限制。\n\n检察官关于适用 § 207(a) 的论点还基于对该成文法适用范围的另一根本性误解。他们抓住“涉及特定当事人”这一短语（18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(C)），主张 TIN 事项与本案是“同一‘事项’”，因为 Kwok（郭）先生在两案中都是“特定当事人”。（政府方备忘录第 25 页）。\n\n1 *一致参见* Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 133 cmt. e (2000)（解释称管辖前政府律师的规则“比管辖前当事人利益冲突的规则更为狭窄”）。\n\n检察官对该法条的这种扩张性解释没有引用任何权威依据，这种解释将剥夺“特定事项”一词的字面含义。因为根本不存在此类依据。修饰短语“涉及特定当事人”通过排除“不涵盖”的“具有普遍适用性的事项”（例如“具有普遍适用性的立法或规则制定以及一般政策的制定”），进一步限制了该法条的适用。5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(h)(2)。2 在任何此类内容可能产生相反解释的限度内，政府自身也已指出，“宽大处理规则要求将[第 207 条]中任何残存的含糊之处解释为缩小而非扩大该法条的禁止范围”。25 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 120, 2001 WL 36209373, at *5 (June 20, 2001)。基于所有这些理由，第 1.11(a) 条规则和 § 207(a) 均不禁止本人代理王女士。\n\nB. 不存在“亲自且实质性”参与\n\n§ 207(a) 也仅限于前政府律师“亲自且实质性参与”的事项。检察官强调，本人对 CFU 部门的调查是“知情的”，而本人从未监督过该部门，该调查导致了本案中的指控。（政府方备忘录第 6、8、23 页）。*Wall Street Journal*（《华尔街日报》）也是知情的。（证物 A、B）。“雇员不会仅仅因为知晓某一事项的存在而构成参与该事项……”。5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(i)(1)。因此，本人对该独立调查的一般性知情很难要求取消代理资格。\n\n2 § 2641.201(h)(2) 的“示例 4”进一步说明了这一点：“Department of Homeland Security（DHS，国土安全部）立法事务办公室的一名雇员就一项未决的移民改革法案起草了提交给国会的官方意见。离开政府后，他代表一家寻求影响政府坚持对该法案进行某些修正的私人组织与 DHS 联系。这并不被禁止。通常，立法不是涉及特定当事人的特定事项。但是，如果该雇员曾作为 DHS 雇员参与制定该机构对授予特定个人公民身份的拟议私人救济立法的立场，则该事项将涉及特定当事人，且该雇员随后将被禁止就该事项进行代理性质的联系。”\n\n与检察官的主张相反，政府雇员也不会仅仅“……因为某一事项在其官方职责范围内悬而未决”而“参与该事项”。5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(i)(1)。本人在 2019 年 10 月的搜查中未发挥任何作用，而该搜查构成了 TIN 事项中所采取的核心调查步骤，且可能是唯一的调查步骤（*参见* Bove 声明第 7-9 段）。*参见* *Medico Indus. Inc.*, 784 F.2d at 843（“[如果]该事项仅仅在其实际职务描述范围内，但他本人并未处理该事项，则该官员在离开政府后可以自由代理私人当事人。”）。“实质性……要求超出官方职责、知情、例行公事式参与，或就行政性或次要问题参与”的程度。5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(i)(3)。“[实质性]参与具有实体性质，并直接影响前案的实体审理结果”。*Arroyo v. City of Buffalo*, No. 15 Civ. 753A, 2017 WL 3085835, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017)（文字已作清理）。此处并未发生这种情况。\n\n在一份未附宣誓的非宣誓辩护状中，检察官依据本人“未从 TIN 事项中回避”这一事实，推测本人“听取了汇报、接受了咨询并就该案提供了建议”。（政府方备忘录第 5 页）。他们的结论并不能从该前提中得出。检察官主张，本人对与 TIN 事项相关的机密信息“知情或接触过”，因为这“在 TIN 调查中是典型的”。（*同上*）。“或接触过”这种留有退路的措辞说明了问题，而本人谨此对该主张表示异议。（*参见* Bove 声明第 6 段）。\n\n抛开这些含糊的主张不谈，检方就我参与 TIN 事务（TIN Matter）所提出的证据要旨，仅限于三封电子邮件以及大约两行被涂黑的文字——这些文字系向法院单方面（ex parte）提交——概述了据称我与基层联邦助理检察官（line AUSAs）进行的对话，但对话的时间以及相关主题在本次动议中均未向我披露（Gov't Mem. at 5-6）。参见 United States v. Fisher, No. 17 Cr. 73, 2021 WL 4227019, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 2021)（“由于缺乏对［前政府律师］在联邦检察官办公室（USAO）期间参与该事项的具体回忆，加之时间的流逝，支持了认定［该律师］对……该事项的参与根本不具实质性。”）。检方承担证明取消律师资格为正当的举证责任，而他们的动议几乎毫无说服力。参见 United States v. Haggard, No. 08 Cr. 327, 2009 WL 5207263, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 29, 2009)（驳回基于 § 207 提出的取消律师资格动议，因为“除了其答辩状中的这些主张外，政府没有提出丝毫证据来支持其主张”）；United States v. Obendorf, No. 15 Cr. 254, 2016 WL 1595347, at *4 (D. Id. Apr. 20, 2016)（驳回基于 § 207 提出的取消律师资格动议，因为前政府律师“在联邦检察官办公室仅就 Obendorf 案进行过两次交谈，并未积极参与该案的调查或诉讼”）。\n\n我不记得这些沟通。（Bove 声明第 10-12 段 [Bove Decl. ¶¶ 10-12]）。3 看来在 2019 年 10 月的第一封电子邮件中，我履行了请求案件追踪编号的行政任务。检方推测该邮件“可能意味着什么”。（Gov't Mem. at 5）。在没有更多证据的情况下，他们的推测是不充分的。参见 Fisher, 2021 WL 4227019, at *3（驳回政府“关于［资产没收小组］根据其标准操作程序通常做什么的解释”）。\n\n第二封和第三封电子邮件分别来自 2020 年 7 月 1 日和 8 日。我的回忆是，其中一名基层联邦助理检察官在某一时期调到了办公室的另一个部门，而且自 2020 年 3 月左右开始因 COVID-19 疫情而必须进行的远程办公，限制了我与 TIN 成员就机密信息或任何调查的“敏感”方面进行沟通的能力。（Gov't Mem. at 5; Bove Decl. ¶ 10）。2020 年 7 月 1 日电子邮件的摘要大意是，一份媒体问询被转发给我和我的联席主管（Co-Chief），我做出了回复。（Gov't Mem. at 6）。大约八天后，联邦调查局（FBI）探员向我和我的联席主管发送了一篇文章的链接。（Id.）。我不记得该邮件，检方也未表明我对该邮件采取了任何行动。（Id.）。相反，是我的联席主管将其转发给了一名 TIN 基层联邦助理检察官。（Id.）。\n\n3 当检方声称一名 TIN 主管“在 TIN 事务的某些方面产生利益冲突”时，我并不清楚指的是哪位“联席主管”。（Gov't Mem. at 7）。我不记得曾收到过此类利益冲突的通知。（Bove Decl. ¶ 13）。尽管检方声称我“在随后的几个月里”“继续收到有关 TIN 事务的最新进展”，但他们并未向我披露具体的时间范围。（Gov't Mem. at 7）。\n\n在收到该电子邮件的同一天，《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）发表了一篇似乎与 CFU 调查相关的文章。（参见附件 A [Ex. A]）。该文章讨论了 CFU 调查范围内的议题，包括 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）和同案被告 William Je（余建明），但没有涉及 Wang 女士（王雁平）。次月，《华尔街日报》发表了第二篇同样似乎与 CFU 调查相关的文章。（参见附件 B [Ex. B]）。这些文章表明，在 CFU 调查启动后不久，公共领域就存在大量关于该调查的信息，但它们并不支持我在 TIN 事务中“亲自且实质性地参与”的论点。\n\n这与检方所引用的先例中关于参与案件的证据数量和质量相去甚远。在 United States v. James 案中，检方是“凭借宣誓书”进行主张的。708 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1983)；亦见 United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (3d Cir. 1980)（描述就取消律师资格动议提交的多份“宣誓书”）；4 Schulte, 2020 WL 534508, at *1（“凭空捏造对不同职业责任准则的假想违规行为，缺乏事实或法律根据，无法达到证明取消资格属于正当所需的沉重举证责任”）。在此，检方所依据的仅是“讨论”。（Gov't Mem. at 5 n.4）。而且检方引用的涉及前政府律师的案例，所包含的直接参与程度远高于检方所证明的程度：\n\n4 Miller 案之所以可以区别，还在于以下补充理由：(1) 初审法官认定前政府律师对导致涉案案件的调查负有责任；(2) 取消资格的决定部分基于一项州法咨询意见，该意见在新泽西州已不再是有效法律，且与《纽约州职业行为规则》（N.Y. Rule）第 1.11(a) 条及 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) 不符。参见 624 F.2d at 1200（引用 In re Advisory Opinion on Professional Ethics No. 361, 390 A.2d 118 (N.J. 1978)）；亦见 State v. Hudson, 128 A.3d 739, 746-47 (App. Div. 2015)（描述“翻天覆地的变化”）。第九巡回上诉法院（Ninth Circuit）基于对该意见中分析的“严重怀疑”，拒绝遵循 Miller 案。United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986)。\n\n- United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2004)：前政府律师向美国食品药品监督管理局（FDA）提供了“广泛且长期的法律代理”，包括“在 FDA 诉讼中总共工作了 382 小时”。\n- United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 676 (7th Cir. 1993)：前政府律师“为本案政府的主要证人之一签署了豁免协议”。\n- United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 373 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)：前政府律师“根据探员向其提供的书面报告、图表和口头信息起草了宣誓书和搜查令”，且搜查所获成果将被用于指控其当事人。\n- United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1979)：前政府律师“亲自起诉了［针对当前当事人的三名配合证人中的］两名，即 Barresi 和 Geller，并在 Geller 的审判中传唤了第三名证人 Brown 作证”。\n\n检方未能证明我“亲自且实质性地”参与了 TIN 事务，且 Rule 1.11(a) 和 § 207(a) 不适用，因为 TIN 事务与本案有别且“无关”。\n\nII. Evans 检验标准并不要求取消律师资格\n\n一旦剥离该动议中关于 Rule 1.11(a) 和 § 207(a) 的无理主张，检方就只剩下完全依据 Evans 检验标准证明取消律师资格属正当的举证责任，而该标准是在涉及不享有《宪法第六修正案》（Sixth Amendment）权利的私人民事诉讼当事人的民事案件中形成的。参见 United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1137, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)（驳回“政府对民事案件中所阐述的取消资格标准的依赖”）。在刑事案件中，检察官负有“‘尊重并维护被告寻求此类协助之选择的积极义务’”，且“政府必须‘尊重’这一权利”。United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 154 (2d Cir. 2008)（援引 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1985)）。检察官必须恪守“不干涉原则”——因为“如果在对抗制法律体系中，辩护律师可以受政府控制或在无正当理由的情况下被否决，那么获得律师协助的权利将毫无意义”——且“当政府侵入律师与当事人的关系时，即违反了《第六修正案》”。Id. at 154。\n\n因此，当法院在刑事案件中参考 Evans 及其衍生先例时，这三项要素被严格适用。参见 United States v. Armaza, 280 F. Supp. 2d 174, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)（“实质关联检验标准被严格适用，以避免剥夺当事人选择其律师的权利……）。取消律师资格动议经不起此类严格审查。\n\nA. 两个事项之间没有实质关联\n\nEvans 检验标准中的“实质关联”要素要求检方证明所涉及的争议点是“相同的”或“实质上相同的”。Cook Indus., 569 F.2d at 740；亦见 United States v. Rastelli, No. 87 Civ. 2974, 1989 WL 5273, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1989)（“动议提出方只有在证明过去和目前的代理中所涉及的争议点是‘相同的’或‘实质上相同的’时，才能满足这一‘实质关联’要求。”（援引 Cook Indus., 569 F.2d at 740））；CQS ABS Master Fund Ltd. v. MBIA Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6840, 2013 WL 3270322, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013)（“相似性门槛相当高：只有在争议点之间的关系‘显而易见’且争议点‘相同’或‘实质上相同’时，该关系才具有‘实质性’。”）。检方“不能通过提出单纯的猜测或主张仅存在不当之外观来完成这一举证责任”。Shea, 2022 WL 4298704, at *6。\n\n“在所有取消律师资格的已判决案件中，前政府律师都曾以某种方式参与过对所涉起诉案件的调查。”United States v. Escobar-Orejuela, 910 F. Supp. 92, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)；亦见，例如 United States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)（认定“本起诉直接源于该调查”）。本案并非如此。与 Rule 1.11(a) 和 § 207(a) 一样，分析必须始于检方在 2023 年 3 月向法院作出的这些事项“无关”的陈述。参见 Schulte, 2020 WL 534508, at *5（因取消资格动议中“辩护律师前后叙述不一而适用特别严格的审查”）。事实确是如此。\n\nTIN 事务启动得更早，是在不同的部门，由不同的联邦助理检察官和探员负责，且涉及不同的被指控行为和不同的目标罪名。\n\n（整体参见 2023 年 8 月 7 日 Alex Lipman 的未拆封声明 [Aug. 7, 2023 Sealed Declaration of Alex Lipman]）。这并不令人意外，因为 GTV 当时甚至还不存在。因此，由于“法律理论和事实并不相同”，这些事项之间不存在实质关联。Ferncliff Cemetery Association v. Town of Greenburgh, New York, No. 18 Civ. 6411, 2019 WL 6878560, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019)；亦见 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 6846702, at *14（“在存在此类重大事实差异的情况下，指控、主题、被告或法律理论的相似性不足以作为得出两起事项相同的结论的依据。”）。\n\n法院应驳回检方试图扩大 TIN 事务范围以将 Kwok 先生早期与 FBI 的互动纳入其中的做法。（参见 Gov't Mem. at 2）。我并未参与那些互动。（Bove Decl. ¶ 5）。\n\n[REDACTED]（参见 Gov't Mem. at 3）。[REDACTED]\n[REDACTED]\n[REDACTED]\n[REDACTED]（Id.）。\n\nKwok先生（郭文贵）据称作为“TIN事项（TIN Matter）的焦点”的身份，即使属实，也不足以构成取消我代表Wang女士（王雁平）资格的充分依据。（Gov't Mem. at 20）。例如，在检方引用的判例之一中，法院论证道：“然而，这些事项均‘与[飓风]桑迪有关（[Hurricane] Sandy-related）’这一事实，并不能使其具有实质关联性。”Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 274 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院） 2015)。因此，此类普遍的重叠并不要求取消资格。Kwok先生与Wang女士之间的关系亦是如此，据我所知，该关系并非TIN事项的核心。与被告之间背景关系相关的共同点，不足以构成取消资格的要求。（参见 Dkt. No. 289 at 28, New York, et al., v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al.（纽约州等诉德意志电信公司等）, No. 19 Civ. 5434 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院） Nov. 26, 2019)（认定反垄断事项之间不存在实质关联，“即使它们必然存在某些共同之处或可被视为相关”）。）\n\n有限的时间重叠并不充分。虽然替代起诉书指控第一项罪名中所指控的共谋始于2018年，但该指控的依据似乎仅限于：(1) Kwok先生创立法治基金（Rule of Law Foundation）和法治社会（Rule of Law Society）（Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 6(b)）；以及(2) Wang女士开立银行账户（Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 11(a)-(b)）。检方并未指控在2020年夏季之前发生过任何推动所指控方案的非法交易。\n\n总而言之，“本案的核心要点完全不同。”Doe 1 v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.（无名氏1诉摩根大通银行）, No. 22 Civ. 10019, 2023 WL 3383724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2023)。一项“将取消前政府律师参与任何与其在政府任职期间曾处理过的事项存在任何事实重叠的诉讼的资格的规则……既与既定法律不符，也与避免对公共服务产生不当阻碍的合理政策不符。”In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig.（支付卡交换费及商户折扣反垄断诉讼案）, 2006 WL 6846702, at *16。由于那并非法律规定，检方未能确立所必需的实质关联。\n\n检方指出，在United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., et al.（美国诉华为技术有限公司等）, No. 18 Cr. 457 (E.D.N.Y.)案中，法院取消了一名前政府律师（“律师-1”）的资格（Gov't Mem. at 23）。事实上，检方直接搬用了其EDNY同事在法律文书中的措辞，其方式恰恰表明检方在本案中的立场要弱得多：\n华为案（EDNY）　王案（SDNY）\n律师-1“掌握着其担任副总检察长（DAG）期间获悉的、与其代理当前客户相关的信息，但他无法在该代理中披露这些信息，更不用说使用了。”（Ex. D at 22（后加下划线/强调））。\n“Bove（博夫）可能掌握着其在监督TIN事项期间获悉的信息，包括涉密信息，他无法在本次代理中披露这些信息，更不用说使用了。”（Gov't Mem. at 27（后加下划线/强调））。\n“[由]于冲突的涉密性质，[律师-1]无法向其客户提供超出对该冲突最草率描述的内容——即他知悉与其当前代理华为相关的某些情况，而他无法分享或使用——因为他未获授权向其客户分享更多信息。”（Ex. D at 22（后加下划线/强调））。\n“[由]于Bove可能也知晓涉密信息，Bove无法向Wang提供超出对该冲突最草率描述的内容——即他知悉与其当前代理Wang相关的某些情况，而他无法分享或使用——因为他不被允许这样做。”（Gov't Mem. at 27（后加下划线/强调））。\n\n假设华为案团队未向本检察官办公室（the Office）共享涉密及封存信息，检方就没有任何依据将本案与该案相提并论。那些文书被大量涂黑遮盖，从公开记录中几乎无法辨别究竟是哪些事实促使法院得出取消资格是适当的结论。然而，华为案的裁决表明，\n\n律师-1参与了“批准或参与关键步骤的单一行为”。Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd., 2020 WL 903007, at *6（已清理引文）。相比之下，据我所知TIN事项中唯一涉及的关键步骤是2019年10月搜查令的执行，而我并未对该搜查令进行审查、批准或授权。（参见 Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7-9）。\n\nC. 检方尚未确立曾接触相关特权信息\n\n正如检方尚未确立我“亲自且实质性地”参与了TIN事项一样，参见上文第一部分B，他们也未能证明我曾接触过足以导致被取消资格的特权信息。\n\n仅仅空口主张在先前的代理中存在违反保密关系的情况，或律师曾收到机密信息，本身并不充分；提出动议的一方必须指明在先前的诉讼中交流的保密信息的类型和性质，而该等信息应在后来的代理中使该律师失去资格。\n\n32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts（《美国法理学》联邦法院卷二）§ 160。必须重申的是，检方在一份未经宣誓的法律摘要中仅提供了两行被遮盖的文字以及三封电子邮件。其中两封电子邮件涉及媒体对CFU调查的报道。\n\n我不记得任何这些通信。（Bove Decl. ¶¶ 11-12）。检方辩称我的回忆是“无关紧要的”。（Gov't Mem. at 24）。相反，“这是一个表明更无理由令人担心的因素。”（Dkt. No. 289 at 28, Deutsche Telekom, No. 19 Civ. 5434 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2019)）；亦参见 Haggard, 2009 WL 5207263, at *3（部分基于律师宣誓书驳回取消资格动议，该宣誓书声明其“对参与涉及被告的任何审查、评估或建议毫无记忆”）。我不记得曾见过2019年的搜查令材料。（Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7-8）。但任何代表Wang女士的律师都会在涉及本案的过程中看到这些材料，因为检方已经出示了它们。（Gov't Mem. at 21 n.12）。“通常情况下，已向公众披露或向与前客户处于对抗地位的其他当事人披露的信息不会导致被取消资格。”Cmt. 3, Rule 1.9。\n\n或许是意识到了其举证的匮乏，检方通过主张适用我接触了相关特权信息的不可反驳的推定，反复敦促法院忽视其“沉重的举证责任”和“极高的证明标准”，Shea, 2022 WL 4298704, at *6。（Gov't Mem. at 15-16）。法院应当拒绝这一陷入错误的诱导，因为这反映了对Wang女士宪法权利的不当漠视。\n\n检方仅引用了支持其立场的两起地区法院判例：Uzzi案和华为案。5 除了上文第二部分B中指出的差异之外，这些案件具有显著区别，其重要原因并不适用于本动议。在Uzzi案中，要求取消前政府律师资格的诉求发生于一起“直接源于该项调查的刑事指控”中。549 F. Supp. at 982。在华为案中，尽管法院适用了该推定，但检方“指明了来自[律师-1]先前代理的特定机密信息，[律师-1]掌握该等信息并可能用以损害其前客户的利益”。（Ex. D at 21）。在法院可能正当推定免除检方为克服被告依据《第六修正案》（Sixth Amendment）享有的选择律师权而必须满足的检验标准的某个要件的限度内，这两项考量因素必须同时存在。在已确立前政府律师参与了直接导致对当前客户提起指控的同一调查的情况下，推定接触相关机密信息是更为合理的。此外，正如华为案中似乎发生的情况那样，当存在较轻微的措施（例如放弃/弃权）可用时，应当要求检方提供超出断言（ipse dixit）的更多依据来证明取消资格的正当性。检方在本案中并未做到这一点，取消资格的动议应当予以驳回。\n\n5 检方还引用了United States v. Smith（美国诉史密斯案），但法院在该案中指出该“推定是可反驳的”。995 F.2d at 676。与Uzzi案相似，且如上所述，Smith案也是一起前政府律师直接参与了引发指控的同一调查的案件。\n\nIII. 潜在利益冲突是可放弃的\n\n取消资格这一严厉手段是不具正当性的，因为Wang女士可以在举行Curcio程序（Curcio proceedings）后放弃检方所指出的潜在冲突。如下文第三部分A中所述，被告放弃涉及律师对前客户的忠实与保密义务的潜在冲突并不罕见，尽管律师在与当前客户讨论潜在冲突时必须保守前客户的机密。在这方面，政府的机密信息无权享有特殊优待。\n\n检方表示接受放弃将是轻率的，因为Wang女士随后可能以此为由对这些诉讼程序提出异议。我们对要求Wang女士放弃提出此类异议权利的Curcio程序没有任何异议，这是本司法管辖区的标准做法。我们深知这些放弃是具有执行力的。参见例如 Baldeo v. United States（巴尔迪奥诉美国）, No. 13 Cr. 125, 2018 WL 1116570, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018)（“放弃获得无利益冲突律师之权利的有效弃权，不能仅仅因为该冲突随后影响了律师的表现而告无效。”（已清理引文））。\n\n此外，即使可以合理地说Curcio程序会带来不当的上诉风险——我认为并不会——但在本案目前的记录基础上，侵犯Wang女士《第六修正案》权利的取消资格行为同样会带来上诉风险。参见 United States v. Perrone（美国诉佩罗内）, No. 05 Cr. 774, 2007 WL 1575248, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007)（“尽管政府坚称，一旦[被告]被定罪，他将拥有成熟的律师无效辩护主张……但他们未能指出，如果法院取消其律师的资格，他也将拥有成熟的被剥夺自选律师权的主张。”（已清理引文））。虽然检方指出的潜在法律异议若Wang女士选择在未来的某个时间提出，可能需要证明存在损害，但对其《第六修正案》选择律师权的剥夺所提出的成立的异议将要求自动撤销原判。参见 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150（“我们毫不费力地得出结论：错误剥夺自选律师权所带来的后果必然是无法量化且不确定的，无可置疑地属于结构性错误。”）；United States v. Liszewski（美国诉利谢夫斯基）, No. 06 Cr. 130, 2006 WL 2376382, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2006)（“我必须偏向于不取消资格，这既是因为[被告]享有获得其所选律师的宪法权利，也是因为若不这样做将面临随之而来的任何定罪被自动撤销的风险。”）。6\n\n最后，我铭记法院根据Curcio及更一般意义上针对本案诉讼程序完整性所承担的独立把关职能。我谨此提出，我在单独的TIN事项中的角色并没有使该完整性受到质疑。正如第九巡回上诉法院所观察到的：\n\n对公众对司法程序诚信度的信心表达模糊的担忧是容易的。如果要证明若允许刑事被告人聘请曾在起诉书涉及的法律领域为政府工作过的律师，公众信心实际上就会受到损害，则是完全另一回事。我们不愿在这样一种缺乏事实依据的前提下牺牲被告人受 Sixth Amendment（第六宪法修正案）保障的获得其所选律师辩护的权利。事实上，就我们作为法官在不掌握具体现实背景下所能知道的一切而言，当公众确信刑事被告人获得其所选律师辩护的权利不会被轻易剥夺时，他们对司法程序诚信度的信心很可能会更高。\n\nUnited States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986)。在王女士（Ms. Wang）知情且明智地放弃潜在冲突权利的情况下，尊重其对律师的选择，将与法院在 United States v. Zuckerman 案中所行使的自由裁量权相一致；在 Zuckerman 案中，尽管被告人现任律师是被告人的“潜在证人”，且“可能被迫在审判或\n\n6 Liszewski 案可作为在取消律师资格动议中适当权衡 Sixth Amendment 权利的范例，并说明了检方在引用一项民事判决以主张“‘任何疑虑均应作出有利于取消律师资格的认定’”时是本末倒置的。（Gov't Mem. at 12（援引 Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975)））。\n\n相关听证会上针对[他]作证”，法官阁下仍接受了被告人的 Curcio 放弃声明。（Dkt. No. 21 at 8-9, No. 16 Cr. 194 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2016)）。法院在那种情况下为了尊重被告人的 Sixth Amendment 权利而接受的风险是不计其数的。另见例如 Perez, 325 F.3d at 128（“我们亦驳回了关于[辩护律师]因系政府在审判中的潜在证人而存在不可放弃之利益冲突的主张。”）。基于下文所述的理由，本案中争议的潜在冲突并未上升至该等程度，因此是可以放弃的。\n\nA. TIN 事项\n\n检方关于取消律师资格系“避免审判受到污染”所必需的主张，忽视了该办公室（Office）长期以来的惯例，即支持被告人在其律师面临涉及对前客户的忠实和保密义务的潜在冲突时，知情且自愿地作出放弃。（见 Gov't Mem. at 26-27）。\n\n检方暗示不能就与潜在冲突相关的风险向王女士提供建议，因为我“可能也知悉机密信息”。（Gov't Mem. at 27）。我不认可自己因 TIN 事项而知悉机密信息，且检方亦未能确立相反的事实。（见 Bove Decl. ¶ 6）。即使纵容他们的推测，检方引用的职业道德规则也并未赋予机密信息特殊地位。我深知自己不得披露机密的政府信息，我也高度重视该项义务。但在 Curcio 程序中，并不要求律师向现有客户披露前客户的秘密，无论该前客户是否为政府。\n\n相反，必须就被告人面临的潜在冲突的“危险”对其进行告诫：\n\n在进行此类听证会时，初审法院 (1) 向被告人告知其有权获得不存在利益冲突的律师的代理，(2) 就特定冲突所产生的危险向被告人进行告诫，(3) 允许被告人与其所选律师进行商商谈，(4) 鼓励被告人向独立律师寻求建议，(5) 给被告人留出合理的时间作出决定，以及 (6) 主要通过可能以叙述形式回答的问题，确定被告人是否理解由其现任律师代理的风险并自愿选择承担这些风险。\n\nJenkins, 325 F.3d at 119。被告人“不了解争议保密信息的确切性质”这一事实，“并不会导致其放弃无效”。United States v. Basciano, No. 03 Cr. 929, 2008 WL 794945, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008)。\n\n在涉及被告人律师无法披露前客户秘密的情形中，被告人通常被允许放弃潜在冲突。为应对与该情况相关的任何风险，检察官和法院在 Curcio 程序中会向被告人明确说明律师掌握其无法分享的信息。举例而言，在 2021 年，检方向法官阁下主张，在被告人律师此前曾代理过一名同案被告人的情况下，潜在冲突是可以放弃的。他们提议了如下 Curcio 提问：\n\n- “鉴于[您的律师]对[前客户]负有保密义务，您是否理解[您的律师]可能从[前客户]处获知了某些信息，但他可能无法与您分享或将其用于为您辩护，即使该信息对您有利？”\n- “您是否理解，对[您的律师]代理能力的限制可能会以我们尚未讨论的方式，对他在本案中对您的代理产生不利影响？您是否理解，最大的危险在于无法预见可能出现的所有冲突？”\n\nDkt. No. 777 at 6, United States v. Liu, No. 15 Cr. 616 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2021)（强调为后加）。\n\n同样，Castel 法官最近在律师此前曾代理过两名配合证人的案件中接受了被告人的放弃声明。检方提议的 Curcio 提问包括如下内容：\n\n- 您是否知悉，[您的律师]可能掌握来自 CW-1 和/或 CW-2 的可能有助于为您辩护的信息，但由于律师-委托人特权，绝对禁止她使用该信息为您辩护？\n- 您是否理解，如果 CW-1 出庭作证指控您，[您的律师]不得使用任何信息对 CW-1 进行交叉询问，即使[您的律师]认为此类交叉\n\n询问会对您有利？您是否理解，同样地，如果 CW-2 出庭作证指控您，[您的律师]不得使用任何信息对 CW-2 进行交叉询问，即使[您的律师]认为此类交叉询问会对您有利？\n\nDkt. No. 517-1 at 2, United States v. Hernandez, No. 15 Cr. 379 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2023)（强调为后加）。\n\n与检方在 Liu 案和 Hernandez 案中提议的问题相一致，王女士无需接触机密政府信息即可有效放弃任何潜在冲突。检方引用的任何判例均未表明，为了让王女士知情且明智地作出放弃，我会被要求以“粗略”的方式或其他方式违反我关于 TIN 事项的忠实义务。（Gov't Mem. at 27）。在 United States v. Pappa 案中，辩护律师坚称取消其资格是必要的，因为他们面临着“严重的”冲突。37 F. App'x 551, 554 (2d Cir. 2002)。而在本案中情况恰恰相反。我认为该潜在冲突是可以放弃的，我已经与王女士讨论了该冲突的“性质”以及相关的“危险”，而且我无需披露保密信息即可有效做到这一点。\n\n在 United States v. Schwarz 案中，法院认定，当一名律师面临职业道德上以及“重大的”经济诱因去讨好另一名现有客户而损害被告人利益时，该冲突是不可放弃的。283 F.3d 76, 96 (2d Cir. 2002)。法院“假定”，“存在着明显的可能性，即在每次感受到冲突时，[该律师]都会为了[另一名现有客户]的利益而牺牲[被告人]的利益。”Id. at 96。在此处，与 Schwarz 案中的同时代理冲突不同，检方似乎并未暗示该潜在冲突因其普遍性而不可放弃。（见 Gov't Mem. at 27（“通过从王女士处获得对其知情且明智地放弃任何潜在冲突的声明，该冲突可以说能够得到解决。”））。相反，他们似乎主张王女士无法获得法院和律师关于该冲突之影响的充分建议，以使其能够自行作出决定。\n\n鉴于这一立场，引用 Armedo-Sarmiento 案是一个奇怪的选择。（Gov't Mem. at 27）。该案明确表明，无需披露政府的秘密即可就“冲突的性质”向王女士提供建议。524 F.2d at 593。在该案中，巡回法院推翻了初审法院对一名律师取消资格的裁定，该律师曾“代理过政府计划用作证人的三名个人”，而其中两名证人“不愿放弃其律师-委托人特权”。524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1975)。7 因此，该律师无法与被告人讨论涉及两名客户的保密信息，且他在被告人的审判中对这两名客户进行交叉询问时也无法使用这些客户的秘密。上诉法院认定，“不涉及刑事被告人 Sixth Amendment 权利这一关键因素”的民事案件“在本案中不具有约束力”，因此发回本案以允许被告人放弃冲突。Id. at 593-94。因此，Armedo-Sarmiento 案支持王女士举行 Curcio 听证会的请求。\n\nB. Mei Guo（郭美）\n\n由于我的同事在其他程序中代理 Mei Guo（郭美）而产生的潜在冲突是可以放弃的，并不支持取消律师资格动议。我所在的律所对郭女士的代理早于我加入该所至少约一年。（Bove Decl. ¶ 14）。当我在 2022 年 1 月加入该律所时，我被要求协助处理该事项。（Id.）。我咨询了\n\n7 由于 Armedo-Sarmiento 案明确表明，尽管前客户未予同意，但 Curcio 放弃仍是允许的，因此 Huawei 案中相反的推理并不具有说服力。见 Huawei, 2020 WL 903007, at *6。\n\n时任 Assistant United States Attorney（美国助理检察官），他要求我不要参与。（见 Gov't Mem. at 8-9）。我按他的要求做了。（Bove Decl. ¶ 14）。\n\n大约在 2023 年 6 月，我被要求参与在本程序中对王女士的代理。（Bove Decl. ¶ 15）。针对该请求，我审阅了本案中大量的公开案卷材料，这些材料在 2022 年 1 月时对我而言是无法获取的，其中包括 2023 年 3 月 15 日的信函，检察官在信中将 TIN 事项描述为“不相关的”。（见 id.）。在接受委托之前，我还审阅了相关的职业道德规则，咨询了 CSG Law 的总法律顾问和其他同事，并与王女士讨论了潜在的冲突（未披露机密的政府信息）。（Id.）。\n\n我遵从该办公室关于郭女士的请求的决定，就检方关于王女士的取消律师资格动议而言，既不具有约束力也不构成有说服力的先例。我作出该决定基于两个理由。第一，我所在律所对郭女士的代理涉及民事事项，且她没有受到 Sixth Amendment 保障的对律师的选择权。第二，当时没有任何公开的案卷材料，我无法对潜在冲突作出独立评估。无论如何，该潜在冲突是可以放弃的。见例如 United States v. Akhavan, No. 20 Cr. 188, 2020 WL 2836825, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020)。\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，取消律师资格动议应予驳回，且法院应举行 Curcio 听证会，给予王女士知情且明智地放弃所呈现的潜在冲突的机会。\n\n日期：New York, New York（纽约州纽约市） 2023 年 8 月 7 日\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Emil Bove\n\nEmil Bove Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 11 Times Square, 34th Floor New York, NY 10036 (212) 324 7265 ebove@csglaw.com\n\nYanping Wang（王雁平）的辩护律师\n\n抄送：在案记录律师（通过 ECF）","key_entities":["CIPA","Je","Kwok","Guo","Classified Information","Yanping Wang","GTV","Ho Wan Kwok","Kin Ming Je","William Je","Kaley","forfeiture"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":7,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":21,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":277,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":289,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":517,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":777,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":9284,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:12:50"}