{"id":"court_sdny_124_5","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":124,"sub_number":5,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2023-08-07","title":"8 Page 1 of 28 ![](_page_0_Picture_3.jpeg)","summary_zh":"政府取消代理资格动议（参考案例） —— 美国诉华为案，EDNY 18 CR 457（2019年5月2日）。东区纽约检察官办公室要求取消律师 James M. Cole 的代理资格，主张其曾以美国司法部副部长身份监督相关调查，现代理被告企业存在重大利益冲突且冲突无法放弃。（本文件作为参考被列示于 SDNY Kwok 案 ECF #124。）","summary_en":"Government motion to disqualify counsel (reference case) — United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., et al., EDNY 18 CR 457 (May 2, 2019). The government moves to disqualify attorney James M. Cole from representing defendants, arguing his prior role as Deputy Attorney General overseeing a related investigation creates an unwaivable conflict of interest. (This document is included as a reference in SDNY Kwok case ECF #124.)","body_en":"Case 1:23-cr-00118-AT\n\n8 Page 1 of 28\n\n![](_page_0_Picture_3.jpeg)\n\nAAS:DKK *271 Cadman Plaza East*\n\nF. #2017R05903 *Brooklyn, New York 11201*\n\nBy ECF\n\nBy ECF May 10, 2019\n\nThe Honorable Ann M. Donnelly United States District Judge Eastern District of New York 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, NY 11201\n\n# Re: United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., et al. Criminal Docket No. 18-00457 (AMD)\n\nDear Judge Donnelly:\n\nAttached is a redacted, unclassified version of the government's Motion to Disqualify James M. Cole, Esq. The government will submit a separate letter under seal documenting the redactions.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nRICHARD P. DONOGHUE United States Attorney Eastern District of New York\n\nBy:\n\nBy: /s/ David K. Kessler\n\nAlexander A. Solomon Julia Nestor David K. Kessler Kaitlin T. Farrell Sarah M. Evans Assistant U.S. Attorneys\n\nDEBORAH L. CONNOR Chief Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice\n\nLaura M. Billings Christian J. Nauvel Trial Attorneys\n\nJAY I. BRATT Chief Counterintelligence and Export Control Section National Security Division U.S. Department of Justice\n\nThea D. R. Kendler David Lim Trial Attorneys\n\n[REDACTED]\n\nX\n\n•AAS:DKK/JN/SME/KTF F. #2017R05903\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- against -\n\n### - against - 18 CR 457 (S-2) (AMD)\n\nHUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD., et al.,\n\nDefendants.\n\n### X\n\n## THE GOVERNMENT'S REDACTED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JAMES M. COLE AS COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE\n\nRICHARD P. DONOGHUE United States Attorney Eastern District of New York 271 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201\n\nALEXANDER A. SOLOMON JULIA NESTOR DAVID K. KESSLER KAITLIN T. FARRELL SARAH M. EVANS Assistant U.S. Attorneys (Of Counsel)\n\n## DEBORAH L. CONNOR Chief\n\nMoney Laundering and Asset Recovery Section Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 1400 New York Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C., 20005\n\n## LAURA M. BILLINGS CHRISTIAN J. NAUVEL Trial Attorneys\n\nJAY I. BRATT Chief Counterintelligence and Export Control Section National Security Division U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C., 20530\n\nTHEA D. R. KENDLER DAVID LIM Trial Attorneys\n\n#### [REDACTED]\n\n#### TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n| (U) PRELIMINARY STATEMENT                                                                                                                                                        | 1  |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| (U) BACKGROUND                                                                                                                                                                   | 3  |\n| I. [REDACTED]                                                                                                                                                                    | 3  |\n| II. (U) Cole's Role in the [REDACTED] Investigation During His Tenure as DAG                                                                                                     | 3  |\n| III. (U) Cole's Representation of Huawei after Leaving the DOJ                                                                                                                   | 4  |\n| IV. [REDACTED]                                                                                                                                                                   | 7  |\n| (U) ARGUMENT                                                                                                                                                                     | 7  |\n| I. (U) Applicable Legal Framework                                                                                                                                                | 8  |\n| A. (U) An Attorney May Not Represent a Party Adverse to a Former Client If There Is a<br>Risk that the Attorney Could Use Client Confidences Against a Former Client             | 9  |\n| B. (U) Absent Full Knowledge, a Current Client Cannot Waive Any Actual or Potential<br>Conflict Involving that Attorney                                                          | 16 |\n| II. (U) Cole's Prior Representation Is Substantially Related to this Case                                                                                                        | 17 |\n| A. [REDACTED] Cole's Current Representation of Huawei Is Substantially Related to His<br>Prior Representation of the United States in Its [REDACTED] Investigation<br>[REDACTED] | 18 |\n| B. [REDACTED]                                                                                                                                                                    | 21 |\n| III. (U) The Government's Interest in a Fair Trial and Just Verdict Will Be Prejudiced by Cole's<br>Representation of the Defendants                                             | 22 |\n| (U) CONCLUSION                                                                                                                                                                   | 24 |\n\n### (U) PRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n[REDACTED] James M. Cole represented the United States in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General (\"DAG\") of the U.S. Department of Justice (\"DOr or \"the Department\"), the nation's second-highest-ranking law enforcement official, from 2010 until 2015. During his representation of the United States, Cole personally supervised and participated in aspects of a [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED]. Now in private practice, Cole has declared his intention to represent the defendants Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (\"Huawei Tech\") and Huawei Device USA, Inc. (\"Huawei USA\") (collectively, \"Huawei\") in this matter. Despite the obvious conflict of interest presented by Cole's representation of these entities in a prosecution by the United States when he previously represented the United States with respect to [REDACTED], Cole has refused to recuse himself from this matter. The government therefore submits this sealed classified memorandum of law in support of its motion for a ruling from this Court disqualifying Cole from representing any of the defendants in this case. The government will provide a redacted version of the motion to Cole and his counsel,' and attaches as Exhibit A a copy of the memorandum showing those redactions highlighted in yellow.2\n\n### <sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]\n\n<sup>2</sup> (U) The government respectfully requests that the original and highlighted versions of this motion be filed under seal because a public proceeding would result in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security. Should the Court deny the government's application to seal these documents, the government seeks permission to withdraw them. The redactions in the version of the memorandum provided to Cole and his counsel were made to avoid disclosing classified information for which Cole does not have a clearance and/or a need-to-know [REDACTED]. Should the Court subsequently order that information that currently is redacted be provided to Cole, the government seeks permission to discuss revised redactions with the Court and/or to withdraw this motion entirely.\n\n[REDACTED] As explained below, during the entire time that Cole was DAG, the government was conducting a [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED]. Cole was briefed about that investigation [REDACTED].\n\n[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED] are directly implicated in the current [REDACTED] case. [REDACTED].\n\n[REDACTED] Cole's continued representation of the defendants poses real and irresolvable conflicts of interest. First, the Court can have no confidence that Cole will not use, whether intentionally or not, information obtained in the [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED] against the government, his former client. In fact, not only did Cole have access to privileged (and classified) factual information as a Department attorney that would give him an improper advantage in representing his current clients, but he will also, in representing those clients, likely attack [REDACTED]. Both the law and ethics rules protect a former client against such conduct by a former attorney. [REDACTED]. The government has not consented, and does not consent.\n\n[REDACTED] Second, the government has an interest in a fair trial and obtaining a conviction that can be defended on appeal and from collateral attack. Those interests are at risk if Cole represents the defendants, because they cannot give the infat ned consent required to validly waive Cole's conflicts. Specifically, Cole cannot explain to his clients the numerous limitations on the kinds of information he can share and the actions he can take on behalf of Huawei in light of his prior work as DAG, [REDACTED], which the law and the rules of professional conduct governing attorneys prevent Cole from doing. Therefore, even if Huawei purported to waive any conflicts, a conviction or guilty plea in this matter would likely be vulnerable to a later claim of invalid waiver and ineffective assistance of counsel, to the government's prejudice.\n\n(U) Given the serious unwaived and unwaivable conflicts at issue with Cole's representation, and given that the defendants are represented by other skilled counsel without any apparent conflicts, the Court should not permit Cole's representation of Huawei to continue.3\n\n#### (U) BACKGROUND\n\nI. fREDACTED1\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\nII. (U) COLE'S ROLE IN THE [REDACTED] INVESTIGATION DURING HIS TENURE AS DAG\n\n(U) On December 29, 2010, Cole received a recess appointment to the position of DAG.\n\nThe United States Senate confirmed Cole in the position on June 28, 2011, and he resigned on\n\nJanuary 8, 2015,4\n\n<sup>3</sup> (U) The government does not presently seek to disqualify Cole's firm, Sidley Austin LLP (\"Sidley\"), from representing the defendants. However, because Cole's conflict is imputed to his firm, the firm is required to take steps to address that imputed conflict. See N.Y. Rules of Prof I Conduct 1.11(b). [REDACTED]\n\n<sup>4</sup> (U) According to the biography of Cole published on the Sidley website, Cole also served, among other roles, as the Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section and as Special Counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives Ethics Committee to conduct its investigation Of then-Speaker Newt Gingrich. See http (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).\n\n## [REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED] During Cole's tenure as DAG, the Department was conducting a [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED]. [REDACTED].\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n### III. (U) COLE'S REPRESENTATION OF HUAWEI AFTER LEAVING THE DOJ\n\n(U) In April 2017, [REDACTED] served a grand jury subpoena on one of Huawei's U.S. affiliates, Huawei Technologies USA, seeking documents related to conduct in sanctioned countries by Huawei or any of its U.S. affiliates, including Huawei USA. Sidley was retained to represent Huawei Technologies USA Inc., Huawei USA, and Futurewei Technologies in responding to that subpoena, and it made several productions of documents to [REDACTED]. The cover letters from those productions were signed by a different attorney at Sidley, Robert Tormson, and copied to Cole, as well as attorneys at the law firms Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Locke Lord. Cole also was copied on at least one email enclosing a production cover letter. In late July 2017, Sidley was informed by [REDACTED] that the matter had been transferred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York (\"USAO-EDNY\").\n\n(U) In October 2018, more than one year later, Cole contacted the USAO-EDNY to ask for a meeting to discuss the Huawei investigation. The meeting lasted approximately ten minutes, during which time Cole (1) asked two questions related to [REDACTED] which questions the\n\ngovernment answered—and (2) offered to answer questions the government might have. The government declined to ask questions at that time.\n\n(U) On January 15, 2019, Cole co-signed a letter to DAG Rod Rosenstein on behalf of Huawei Tech and Huawei USA, stating that he represented these clients in the USAO-EDNY investigation and requesting together with Huawei's counsel in the Western District of Washington (\"WDWA\")—extension of a statute of limitations tolling agreement in an investigation being conducted by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the WDWA. In this letter, Cole described a document production made by Huawei in response to the [REDACTED] grand jury subpoena, and noted the October 2018 meeting with USAO-EDNY.\n\n[REDACTED] On January 22, 2019, after the arrest of the Huawei Chief Financial Officer (\"CFO\") Wanzhou Meng in Canada and Cole's letter to the current DAG, the DOJ and FBI met with Cole. The DOJ informed Cole that he had a conflict of interest in this case [REDACTED]. The DOJ did not provide Cole with classified information at that meeting, but the parties agreed to a follow-up meeting that would be governed by an NDA.\n\n(U) On January 28, 2019, a superseding indictment was unsealed by this Court (the \"Superseding Indictment\") charging Huawei Tech with thirteen crimes occurring between November 2007 and the present. The conduct in part relates to Huawei Tech's activity in Iran and other sanctioned countries, including through Huawei's operation of an unofficial affiliate in Iran called Skycom. The charged conduct also relates to misrepresentations made by Huawei Tech and certain of its employees to financial institutions, including a U.S. financial institution. The charged conduct also includes a conspiracy to defraud the United States related to Huawei's efforts to deceive the United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control by, among other things, making misleading public statements before the House Permanent Select Committee\n\n5\n\non Intelligence in 2012. The indictment charges Huawei Tech and Huawei USA with conspiracy to obstruct the grand jury investigation in EDNY.\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n(U) On January 29, 2019, the DOJ and FBI again met with Cole to discuss his conflict of interest. Because Cole no longer holds a security clearance, and in order to have a fulsome discussion, DOJ and FBI had Cole sign an NDA giving him one-time access to certain classified information.\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n(U) The information the government provided to Cole in January was limited in order to prevent further use and disclosure of the privileged and classified information discussed herein without knowing if Cole would recuse himself from the case.\n\n[REDACTED] Cole indicated that he did not believe the information provided by the government at the meeting gave him a sufficient basis on which to determine whether he had a conflict of interest [REDACTED]. Cole also requested that he be permitted to consult with counsel about the conflict. The government agreed to provide one-time access to the same classified materials to Virginia Seitz, Sidley's general counsel and the attorney whom Cole selected to advise him. Cole and Seitz represented to the government that she would be walled off from representing the defendants.\n\n(U) On February 26, 2019, the DOJ and FBI met with Cole and Seitz, each of whom signed an NDA and reviewed the same classified materials provided in the previous meeting. The parties then discussed the contours of potential conflicts of interest.\n\n(U) On March 6, 2019, Cole declined to recuse himself, writing: \"We have carefully considered the material you showed us and were unable to determine that I need to be disqualified\n\n6\n\nbased on that information. We took the discussions seriously and are open to considering any further information you want to present that might relate to this issue.\"\n\n(U) On March 13, 2019, Cole filed a motion to appear in this matter pro hac vice. At the arraignment of Huawei Tech and Huawei USA on March 14, 2019, the government informed Cole it would not oppose his pro hac motion for purposes of the arraignment. At the first status conference on April 4, 2019, the government indicated it would not oppose Cole's motion for the time being (although it advised the Court and Cole that it was evaluating whether to bring the instant motion to disqualify). On April 5, 2019, the Court granted Cole's motion to appear in this matter pro hac vice.\n\n[REDACTED]\n\nIV. REDACTED [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]\n\n#### (U) ARGUMENT\n\n[REDACTED] Cole should be disqualified from representing Huawei Tech and Huawei USA in this case because of two different conflicts. First, having represented the government in his role as DAG in the DOJ' s [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED], Cole should not now be allowed to represent the defendants in a [REDACTED] matter brought by the DOJ that is substantially related in multiple respects to that [REDACTED] investigation. There is a significant risk that he will breach his duties of confidentiality and loyalty to the Department in the course of that representation. [REDACTED]. Cole's work on these related matters creates the real risk that\n\nhe will breach his duty of confidentiality to the DOJ by relying on information he obtained while representing the Department in the course of his representation of the defendants. Moreover, there is a risk that Cole will breach his duty of loyalty to the Department by making arguments on behalf of the defendants that contradict positions he previously took while representing the DOJ.\n\n[REDACTED] Second, Cole's representation of the defendants jeopardizes the government's interest in having a fair trial and obtaining a conviction that can sustain appeal and collateral attack. Because Cole cannot provide the defendants the classified and confidential facts related to the government's investigation [REDACTED], any waiver of Cole's conflicts by the defendants would not be sufficiently informed to withstand later scrutiny.\n\n# I. (U) APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK\n\n(U) The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment entails a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). Although a defendant generally may waive his Sixth Amendment right to an unconflicted attorney, \"the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.\" Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456, 461 (2d Cir. 1995).\n\n(U) When deciding motions for disqualification, the Court must balance a defendant's right to counsel of its choice and \"the interests of the courts in preserving the integrity of the process and the government's interests in ensuring a just verdict and a fair trial.\" United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1994); see United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2004) (\"[f]ederal\n\ncourts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them\").\n\n(U) There are two kinds of conflicts that create grounds for disqualification at issue here: a conflict between an attorney and his former client, and a conflict between an attorney and his current client. Both conflicts are implicated here, and both could impact the government's interest in a fair and just outcome to this prosecution.\n\n# A. LU) An Attorney May Not Represent a Party Adverse to a Former Client If There Is a Risk that the Attorney Could Use Client Confidences Against a Former Client\n\n(U) An attorney may not \"knowingly reveal a confidence of his client or use a confidence of his client to the disadvantage of the client.\" Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983). The risk that an attorney might use such confidences against his former client creates a \"disqualifying taint\" that a district court should remedy by disqualifying that attorney from a subsequent representation adverse to his former client. United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 241 (2d Cir. 2016).\n\n(U) In order to guard against this risk, the Second Circuit has held that disqualification of an adverse party's counsel is warranted where: \"(1) the moving party is a former client of the adverse party's counsel; (2) there is a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the counsel's prior representation of the moving party and the issues in the present lawsuit; and (3) the attorney whose disqualification is sought had access to, or was likely to have had access to, the relevant privileged information in the course of his prior representation of the client.\" Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F. 3d at 239 (citing Evans) (\"substantial relationship\" where attorneys intended to defend current client, alleged to have laundered the proceeds of a fraud scheme, by arguing that a former client had actually perpetrated the fraud, although attorneys had previously argued former client was a victim); accord United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 219 (2d Cir. 1987) (Evans\n\n9\n\ntest applies in criminal cases); see also N.Y. Rules of Prof I Conduct 1.9(a). The purpose of the \"substantial relationship\" test is to prevent an attorney from using information gained from a former client to the detriment of that client in a subsequent representation. Even where the test is not met, however, disqualification is still warranted where an attorney \"could use a [former] client's privileged information against that client.\" Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F. 3d at 241.\n\n(U) Subsequent representations are \"substantially related\" if, among other things, they \"involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if, under the circumstances, a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is otherwise a substantial risk that confidential factual information that would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter.\" N.Y. Rules of Prof 1 Conduct 1.9, cmt. 3; see, e.g., Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 239 (a \"substantial relationship\" exists \"where facts pertinent to the problems underlying the prior representation are relevant to the subsequent representation\"); see Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 272-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"[D]isqualification has been granted or approved recently only when the issues involved have been identical or essentially the same . . . . The inquiry does not turn on whether the legal claims or underlying theories are similar, but rather whether the successive representations share common material factual issues.\"); Hickman v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp.,371 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (\"If there is present a common factual question, the substantial relationship test is satisfied.\"); Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Micromuse, Inc., No. 04 CIV. 3090 (RWS), 2004 WL 2346152, at \\*11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2004) (\"Prior general business representation by the plaintiffs law firm of an entity related to the defendant on matters unrelated to the lawsuit at issue does not meet the high burden of establishing a conflict.\").\n\n(U) In determining whether a \"substantial relationship\" exists between two matters, courts have also considered, among other things, the breadth of the prior relationship, the extent to which the investigations are related, and the timing between the first and second matter. See, e.g., Hickman v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (\"Where an attorney's representation of a client is general in nature, he may be disqualified from representing an adverse party in later litigation, but only if the later litigation puts at issue the client's entire background.\"); United States v. Escobar-Orejuela, 910 F. Supp. 92, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (20-year \"hiatus between the two prosecutions, which as stated arose out of unrelated investigations, minimizes the likelihood that [former government attorney] has, or is likely to have, privileged government information that could now be of use [in representing criminal defendant].\").\n\n(U) Once a substantial relationship between two cases is established, the moving party need not prove that the former attorney had access to relevant privileged information. Instead, \"where the same individual lawyer participated in the prior and current representation, the movant is not required to make a specific showing that confidences were passed to counsel. Instead, the movant is entitled to the benefit of an irrebuttable [sic] presumption that confidences were shared.\" Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 240. In other words, the\n\n> substantial relationship test removes the need for courts to make direct inquiry into whether confidential information was actually transmitted. After finding a substantial relationship exists. . . [t]he Court will assume that during the course of the former representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire into their nature and extent. Only in this manner can the lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged communications be maintained.\n\nId. at 240-41. Indeed, disqualification has been warranted to avoid the \"risk [of] the chance\" that an attorney's \"unconscious impressions might be influenced by [his former client's] confidential\n\ninformation.\" TufAmerica, Inc. v. Codigo Music LLC, No. 11 CIV. 1434, 2013 WL 1903867, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013) (disqualification of attorney sustained regardless \"whether or not confidences were shared or either party recalls the confidences\" because the current and former matter were substantially related). On the other hand, if there is even a \"substantial risk\" that confidential factual information from the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter, the matters should be deemed \"substantially related.\" N.Y. Rules of Profl Conduct 1.9, cmt. 3. And demonstrating \"knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation.\" Id.\n\n(U) Courts in the Second Circuit have explicitly considered the relevant rules of professional conduct in analyzing whether an attorney should be disqualified because of the risk he might use confidences of his former client against that client in a subsequent representations. See, e.g., Evans, 715 F.2d at 791; United States v. Armaza, 280 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering New York State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct in evaluating whether to disqualify defense attorney who had previously represented witness in criminal prosecution). Here, Cole also is bound by the New York State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct (the \"NY Rules\") in this case for several reasons. I° First, \"[a]ttorneys arguing before this Court [the EDNY] must abide by\" the NY Rules.\n\nlo (U) Cole is admitted to the bar in the District of Columbia. Pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Bar of the District of Columbia (\"DC Rules\"), \"a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs.\" DC Rules § 8.5(a). As relevant to this matter, the DC Rules with respect to conflicts of interest are materially the same as the NY Rules. See, e.g., DC Rules § 1.9 (\"A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent.\").\n\nE.g., Pierce & Weiss, LLP v. Subrogation Partners LLC, 701 F. Supp. 2d 245,251 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Moreover, \"[for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise.\" DC Rules § (b)(1). Here, Cole's representation will be \"in connection with a matter pending before\" a tribunal in New York the EDNY and EDNY's local rules do not provide for Cole to be governed by rules of professional conduct other than New York's. As a result, although he may be subject to other rules of professional conduct, including those in the District of Columbia, Cole's conduct in this matter will be governed by the NY Rules.\n\n(U) Rule 1.9 of the NY Rules provides that \"[a] a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.\" NY Rules 1.9(a). Rule 1.11(a) applies that principal more specifically in the context of former government employees: \"a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government: (1) shall comply with Rule 1.9(c); and (2) shall not represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation.\" As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained with respect to a similar rule in the District, the limitations on foimer government lawyer's future representations are \"meant to induce a fonner government lawyer considering a representation to err well on the side of caution.\" In re Sofaer, 728 A.2d 625, 628 (D.C. 1999).\n\n(U) In addition, concerns about conflicts involving former government attorneys are particularly significant because \"the public is generally more concerned about government\n\nimproprieties than about private improprieties.\" United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2004). As a result, even the appearance of impropriety related to the former government attorney \"is more severe\" than for a non-government attorney \"because the public is likely to be more critical of this potential misuse of information.\" Id. Any \"alleged ethical violation is likely to come under particularly acute scrutiny\" in a case, such as this one, where there is \"public interest in both the subject matter of the case and the huge amount of resources devoted to the litigation.\" Id.\n\n(U) Rule 1.9(c) in turn requires that a “lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) use confidential infoimation of the former client protected by Rule 1.6 to the disadvantage of the former client, except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a current client or when the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal confidential information of the former client protected by Rule 1.6 except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a current client.\"\n\n(U) Rule 1.9 recognizes that \"[a]fter the termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest.\" NY Rules 1.9, cmt. 1. Under the rule, for example, \"a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of a former client,\" and a \"lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent that person in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction.\" Id.\n\n(U) Rule 1.6 governs the confidentiality of information, and applies \"not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client, which are protected by the attorney-client privilege, but also to all information gained during and relating to the representation, whatever its source.\" As a\n\n#### 14\n\nresult, a government lawyer has an obligation not to use or disclose what he or she learned while employed at the Department to the detriment of the United States.\n\n(U) As to the duty of loyalty, \"a lawyer shall not represent a client if a reasonable lawyer would conclude that . . . the representation will involve the lawyer in representing differing interests,\" including his own. NY Rules 1.7(a)(1). \"Concurrent conflicts of interest. . . can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or from a lawyer's own interests.\" Id., cmt. 1. The rule specifically contemplates that, in addition to concurrent conflicts, \"a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be adversely affected by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9. . . .\" Id., cmt. 9.\n\n(U) Finally, courts have recognized that an attorney cannot cure the kind of conflict of interest discussed herein by constructing an artificial barrier in his own head in order to avoid the risk of relying on information obtained during a prior representation. See NCK Org. Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1976) (\"Requiring attorneys to abstain from representation involving potential disclosure of former clients' confidences also frees lawyers from the difficult task of erecting Chinese walls in their own minds between what is confidential and what is not, and forwards 'the public's interest in maintaining the highest standards of professional conduct and the scrupulous administration of justice.'\"); cf. In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 15 CIV. 7488 (CM), 2017 WL 3613663, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2017) (quoting Auto-Kaps, LLC v. Clorox Co., No. 15 CIV. 1737 (BMC), 2016 WL 1122037, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,2016)) (\"An expert cannot build a Chinese wall in his own mind, despite his best efforts to do so.\"). Such a contention is particularly suspect when raised only in response to a challenge from the government. See Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (\"This\n\nCourt doubts whether any Chinese walls, which are meant to be preemptive, can ever function effectively when erected in response to a motion, and not prior to the arising of the conflict.\").\n\nB. (U) Absent Full Knowledge, a Current Client Cannot Waive Any Actual or Potential Conflict Involving that Attorney\n\n(U) Where a court determines that a conflict of interest exists between an attorney and his current client that is not so severe as to require disqualification automatically, a court may permit the attorney to continue representing that client only if the client makes a \"knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel.\" United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2004); accord United States v. Perez, 325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003). Informed consent \"requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances, including the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could adversely affect the interests of that client.\" Filippi v. Elmont Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 722 F. Supp. 2d 295, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). A client must be given sufficient information fully to understand that potential conflict before any waiver could be \"knowing and intelligent.\" See, e.g., United States v. Armedo-Saimiento, 524 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1975) (\"The district judge should fully explain to [defendants] the nature of the conflict. . .\"); see generally United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) (\"The first task of the trial court is to alert the defendants to the substance of the dangers of representation by an attorney having divided loyalties in as much detail as the court's experience and its knowledge of the case will permit.\"). If counsel cannot apprise his client of the full extent of the conflict because doing so would require divulging privileged or confidential information—then the client cannot make a \"knowing and intelligent waiver.\" United States v. Pappa, 37 F. App'x 551, 554 (2d Cir. 2002) (client could not make \"knowing and intelligent\" waiver where \"attorney-client privilege precluded [current defense counsel] from divulging all of the details of the conflicts . . . and because [defense counsel's] explanation of the conflict indicated there was 'more here than meets the eye\").\n\n16\n\n(U) A district court has \"substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest,\" not only \"in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial\" but also \"in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.\" Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-63. This discretion is necessary because \"[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict. . . . Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness of an attorney to obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an inverse relation to the care with which he conveys all the necessary information to them.\" Id.\n\n(U) Moreover, the government has an independent interest in ensuring that waivers of conflict of interest are sufficiently informed. Where defense counsel operates with a conflict of interest, the government's interest in a conviction that can withstand appellate scrutiny and collateral attack is prejudiced. An insufficient waiver can be the basis of a successful collateral attack on an otherwise valid conviction. See Levy, 25 F.3d at 152 (\"a defendant has suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. . . if his attorney has (1) a potential conflict of interest that resulted in prejudice to the defendant, or (2) an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected the attorney's performance\"). \"In the disqualification situation, any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification.\" Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).\n\n## II. (U) COLE'S PRIOR REPRESENTATION IS SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO THIS CASE\n\n[REDACTED] Cole cannot represent Huawei without compromising his duties of confidentiality and loyalty to his former client, the Department of Justice, because the instant prosecution of Huawei Tech and Huawei USA is [REDACTED] \"substantially related\" to [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED] in which Cole personally and substantially participated. NY Rules § 1.11(a)(2). Cole's current representation conflicts with two\n\n17\n\naspects of his prior work for the Department. First, the defendants' defenses, discovery requests, and strategy in this case already implicate aspects of the [REDACTED] investigation on which Cole was briefed during his tenure as DAG. [REDACTED]. Cole has privileged information [REDACTED] that he would not have but for his representation of the Department, which he can exploit to the defendants' advantage. [REDACTED].\n\n# A. TREDACTED] Cole's Current Representation of Huawei Is Substantially Related to His Prior Representation of the United States in Its [REDACTED] Investigation [REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED] Cole's prior representation of the Depai ment in the [REDACTED] investigation is substantially related to his current representation of [REDACTED] Huawei Tech and Huawei USA, in this case.\n\n#### [REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED] Obviously, Cole's knowledge and actions with respect to [REDACTED] during his five-year tenure as DAG—including about [REDACTED]—are substantially related to the selective prosecution defenses that Huawei intends to raise. In particular, there is a \"substantial risk\" that Cole could use \"confidential factual information\" obtained while serving as DAG to \"materially advance\" Huawei's current defense strategy. See, e.g., NY Rules § 1.9, cmt. 3 (\"substantial relationship\" applies where there is \"a substantial risk that confidential factual information that would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter\").\n\n[REDACTED] There are other examples of defense actions that are substantially related to Cole's prior representation. [REDACTED] Under the case law, there is a presumption that such requests, and similar follow-up requests or litigation, are influenced by information Cole learned\n\nduring his representation of the government in the [REDACTED] investigation.13 See Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 240 (\"[W]here the same individual lawyer participated in the prior and current representation. . . the movant is entitled to the benefit of an irrebuttable presumption that confidences were shared.\"). As a second example, Cole may seek to cross-examine law enforcement agents about actions taken during the time period in which he served as DAG [REDACTED]. See United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979) (disqualification of former government lawyer in part because \"privileged infolination obtained in the course of the former representation may be used to impeach of discredit important Government witnesses in a closely related matter\"). All of these defense actions squarely put at issue facts that Cole learned as DAG and were relevant to his representation of the United States in its investigation [REDACTED].\n\n(U) These examples also demonstrate, as the Second Circuit has recognized, that the harm to the government from Cole's continued representation of the defendants extends beyond the risk that he will \"overtly use[] confidences\" obtained from the government. See Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 238. There is also a risk that Cole, \"while not explicitly using confidences, may use such confidences to guide [his] defense of [Huawei] in other ways.\" Id. As the court held in Prevezon, that latter risk, alone, is grounds for disqualification. Id.\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n<sup>13</sup> The entire Cole Discovery Request raises concerns about Cole's representation of the Huawei entities, because there is no way to know whether its content was influenced by knowledge Cole collected during his prior representation of the United States as DAG.\n\n(U) The commentary to the applicable ethical rule counsels in favor of disqualification. Cases are \"substantially related\" where there is a \"substantial risk that confidential factual information that would normally be obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter.\"16 NY Rules § 1.9 cmt. 3. As examples, the commentary provides that \"a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce.\" Id. \"Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations. . . .\" Id. Those examples are particularly instructive because, in neither of those cases is there necessarily any overlap in the statutes, laws, or causes of action at issue in the \"matters,\" Rather, it is the obvious relevance of information obtained during the first matter to the second matter that compels disqualification.\n\n[REDACTED] Similarly, the substantial relationship between the [REDACTED] investigation and this case fits squarely in the set of cases in which an attorney has been disqualified given the risk of using information obtained from a former client. For example, in Prevezon\n\n<sup>16</sup> \"A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter,\" but where the former client does establish \"knowledge of [relevant] specific facts,\" that will \"ordinarily . . . preclude such a representation.\" NY Rules § 1.9, cmt. 3. This is because the \"substantial relationship\" test is not itself an ethical duty, but rather the rule established to protect the \"continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest.\" Id. cmt. 1. It follows, therefore, that where the former client can establish directly that its former counsel was actually exposed to relevant, confidential information, or will necessarily face a conflict of interest, it need not expose to view the precise factual relationship between the former and current matters to demonstrate the need for disqualification.\n\nHoldings, an attorney sought to defend an entity accused of fraud through a \"defense strategy\" of proving that a former client, whom he had previously characterized as a victim of the fraud, had committed the fraud. 839 F.3d at 241. The Second Circuit held that the attorney should have been disqualified because he was \"in a position where he could use [the former client's] privileged information against [the former client].\" Id. [REDACTED].\n\n[REDACTED] And the relationship between the [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED] and this case is far closer than in cases where disqualification was denied. [REDACTED] But here, [REDACTED] the government although not required to do so has identified specific confidential information from Cole's prior representation that Cole had and can use to the detriment of his former client.\n\n### [REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED] But here, Cole should be disqualified because he was personally and substantially involved in a [REDACTED] investigation [REDACTED] that exposed hffii to relevant, privileged factual information [REDACTED] and strategic information about that investigation. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained, the prohibition of a government attorney's involvement in a \"substantially related\" matter in private practice is \"meant to induce a former government lawyer considering a representation to err well on the side of caution.\" In re Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 628. Unfortunately, we are well past the point of caution, and the Court should disqualify Cole.\n\nB. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n## III. (U) THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN A FAIR TRIAL AND JUST VERDICT WILL BE PREJUDICED BY COLE'S REPRESENTATION OF THE DEFENDANTS\n\n(U) Separate and apart from the protection of its own privileged and classified infonnation, the government has an interest in \"ensuring a just verdict and a fair trial\" in this case. Levy, 25 F.3d at 155. That interest will be prejudiced if Cole represents the defendants, because the defendants will not be able adequately to waive any conflict created by Cole's role. As a result, any conviction would likely be vulnerable to an appeal or collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.\n\n(U) As explained above, Cole is in possession of information he learned as DAG that relates to his representation of his current clients but that he cannot reveal, let alone use, in that representation. This dynamic creates a conflict of interest given that Cole cannot give his clients his undivided loyalty. See NY Rules § 1.7(a)(2). The conflict could arguably be resolved by obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of any potential conflict from Huawei. See Jones, 381 F.3d at 119; see also NY Rules § 1.7(b)(4). Here, however, because of the classified nature of the conflict, Cole cannot provide his clients with more than the most cursory description of the conflict that he knows something related to his current representation of Huawei that he cannot share or use—because he is not authorized to share any more information with his clients.\n\n#### [REDACTED]\n\n(U) The limited information Cole could share is far short of what would be required for Cole's clients to waive the potential conflict at issue here knowingly and intelligently. See, e.g., Pappa, 37 F. App'x at 554 (statement by a Federal Defender representing defendant that the Federal\n\n22\n\nDefenders had previously represented a potential government witness, but not divulging \"all of the details of the conflicts,\" was insufficient to allow a knowing and intelligent waiver of a potential conflict); Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d at 593 (\"The district judge should fully explain to [defendants] the nature of the conflict . . .”) (emphasis added). Because Cole’s clients cannot knowingly and intelligently determine whether to waive their conflict, any representation by Cole would taint the trial process and any ultimate conviction, to the prejudice of the government. As a result, Cole should be disqualified.\n\nCase 1:18Case004237cAM0118-AT Document56124Filed Filed08/07/23 Page 228Pof28D #: 370\n\n### [REDACTED]\n\n#### (U) CONCLUSION\n\n(U) For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the Court grant its\n\nmotion to disqualify Cole.\n\nDated: Brooklyn, New York May 2, 2019\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nRICHARD P. DONOGHUE United States Attorney Eastern District of New York\n\nBy: /s/ David K. Kessler Alexander A. Solomon Julia Nestor David K. Kessler Kaitlin T. Farrell Sarah M. Evans Assistant U.S. Attorneys (718) 254-7000\n\n> Thea D. R. Kendler David Lim Trial Attorneys Counterintelligence and Export Control Section National Security Division\n\nLaura M. Billings Christian J. Nauvel Trial Attorneys Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section Criminal Division\n\n### cc: Clerk of the Court (AMD)","body_zh":"案号 1:23-cr-00118-AT\n\n8 第 1 页，共 28 页\n\n[图片]\n\nAAS:DKK 271 Cadman Plaza East\nF. #2017R05903 Brooklyn, New York 11201\n\n通过 ECF\n\n通过 ECF 2019年5月10日\n\n尊敬的 Ann M. Donnelly（安·M·唐纳利）美国联邦地区法官，Eastern District of New York（纽约东区），225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, NY 11201\n事由：United States（美国）诉 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.（华为技术有限公司）等，刑事涂改案卷号 18-00457 (AMD)\n\n尊敬的唐纳利法官：\n\n随函附上政府关于取消 James M. Cole（詹姆斯·M·科尔）律师代理资格动议的已涂黑、非机密版本。政府将另行提交一份附有涂黑说明的密封函件。\n\n此致，\n\nRICHARD P. DONOGHUE（理查德·P·多诺霍），纽约东区联邦检察官\n\n代表：\n\n代表：/签名/ David K. Kessler\n\nAlexander A. Solomon（亚历山大·A·所罗门）、Julia Nestor（茱莉亚·内斯特）、David K. Kessler（戴维·K·凯斯勒）、Kaitlin T. Farrell（凯特琳·T·法雷尔）、Sarah M. Evans（莎拉·M·埃文斯），助理联邦检察官\n\nDEBORAH L. CONNOR（黛博拉·L·康纳），主管，Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section（洗钱和资产追回处），Criminal Division（刑事司），U.S. Department of Justice（DOJ，美国司法部）\n\nLaura M. Billings（劳拉·M·比林斯）、Christian J. Nauvel（克里斯蒂安·J·诺威尔），出庭律师\n\nJAY I. BRATT（杰伊·I·布拉特），主管，Counterintelligence and Export Control Section（反间谍与出口管制处），National Security Division（国家安全司），美国司法部\n\nThea D. R. Kendler（西娅·D·R·肯德勒）、David Lim（戴维·林），出庭律师\n\n[已涂黑]\n\nX\n\n•AAS:DKK/JN/SME/KTF F. #2017R05903\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约东区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- 诉 -\n- 诉 - 18 CR 457 (S-2) (AMD)\n\nHUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD.（华为技术有限公司）等，\n\n被告。\nX\n政府关于取消 JAMES M. COLE 在本案中担任被告辩护律师资格的动议（已涂黑版）\n\nRICHARD P. DONOGHUE，纽约东区联邦检察官，271 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York 11201\n\nALEXANDER A. SOLOMON、JULIA NESTOR、DAVID K. KESSLER、KAITLIN T. FARRELL、SARAH M. EVANS，助理联邦检察官（特聘大律师）\nDEBORAH L. CONNOR，主管\n\n洗钱和资产追回处，刑事司，美国司法部，1400 New York Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C., 20005\nLAURA M. BILLINGS、CHRISTIAN J. NAUVEL，出庭律师\n\nJAY I. BRATT，主管，反间谍与出口管制处，国家安全司，美国司法部，950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C., 20530\n\nTHEA D. R. KENDLER、DAVID LIM，出庭律师\n[已涂黑]\n目录\n(U) 引言 1\n(U) 背景 3\nI. [已涂黑] 3\nII. (U) 科尔在担任 DAG 期间在[已涂黑]调查中的角色 3\nIII. (U) 科尔离开司法部后对华为的代理 4\nIV. [已涂黑] 7\n(U) 论证 7\nI. (U) 适用的法律框架 8\nA. (U) 如果存在律师可能利用委托人保密信息对抗前委托人的风险，则该律师不得代理与前委托人利益相对的一方 9\nB. (U) 在未完全知情的情况下，现委托人不能放弃涉及该律师的任何实际或潜在利益冲突 16\nII. (U) 科尔先前的代理与本案有实质关联 17\nA. [已涂黑] 科尔目前对华为的代理与其先前在美国[已涂黑]调查中对美国的代理有实质关联 [已涂黑] 18\nB. [已涂黑] 21\nIII. (U) 科尔代理被告将损害政府对公正审判和公正判决的利益 22\n(U) 结论 24\n(U) 引言\n\n[已涂黑] James M. Cole 从 2010 年至 2015 年以 U.S. Department of Justice（DOJ 或“司法部”）Deputy Attorney General（“DAG”，副总检察长/司法部副部长）的身份代表美国，他是全美排名第二的最高执法官员。在代表美国期间，科尔亲自监督并参与了一项[已涂黑]调查[已涂黑]的各个方面。如今从事私人执业的科尔已声明有意在本案中代表被告 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.（“华为技术”）和 Huawei Device USA, Inc.（“华为美国”）（统称“华为”）。尽管科尔曾就[已涂黑]代表美国，而如今在美国提起的起诉中代表这些实体存在显而易见的利益冲突，但科尔仍拒绝回避本案。因此，政府提交这份密封的机密法律备忘录，以支持其请求本院作出裁定、取消科尔在本案中代表任何被告的资格的动议。政府将向科尔及其律师提供该动议的涂黑版本，1 并附上该备忘录的副本作为附件 A，其中以黄色突出显示了这些涂黑部分。2\n1 [已涂黑]\n\n2 (U) 政府谨请求将本动议的原件和突出显示版本密封归档，因为公开程序将导致机密信息的未经授权披露，该披露可合理预期会对国家安全造成严重损害。若法院拒绝政府密封这些文件的申请，政府请求允许撤回这些文件。提供给科尔及其律师的备忘录版本中的涂黑处理，是为了避免披露科尔没有安全许可和/或没有知悉必要[已涂黑]的机密信息。若法院随后命令将目前已涂黑的信息提供给科尔，政府请求允许与法院讨论修订涂黑内容和/或完全撤回本动议。\n\n[已涂黑] 如下文所述，在科尔担任副部长的整个期间，政府一直在进行一项[已涂黑]调查[已涂黑]。科尔听取了关于该调查的汇报[已涂黑]。\n\n[已涂黑] 该[已涂黑]调查[已涂黑]直接牵涉到当前的[已涂黑]案。[已涂黑]。\n\n[已涂黑] 科尔继续代表被告带来了真实且无法解决的利益冲突。首先，法院无法确信科尔不会故意或非故意地使用在[已涂黑]调查[已涂黑]中获得的信息来对抗其前委托人政府。事实上，科尔不仅作为司法部律师接触到了特权（及机密）的事实信息，这些信息会使他在代表当前委托人时获得不正当的优势，而且他在代表这些委托人时，还可能会抨击[已涂黑]。法律和职业道德规则均保护前委托人免受前律师此类行为的侵害。[已涂黑]。政府过去没有同意，现在也不同意。\n\n[已涂黑] 其次，政府在获得公正审判以及获得经得起上诉和附随性审查的定罪方面享有利益。如果科尔代表被告，这些利益将面临风险，因为被告无法给予有效放弃科尔利益冲突所需的知情同意。具体而言，鉴于科尔之前担任副部长的工作[已涂黑]，科尔无法向其委托人解释他对可以分享的信息类型以及可以代表华为采取的行动所面临的诸多限制，而管辖律师的法律和职业行为准则禁止科尔这样做。因此，即使华为声称放弃任何冲突，本案中的定罪或认罪答辩也可能容易受到随后提出的无效弃权和律师无效协助的主张的影响，从而损害政府的利益。\n\n(U) 鉴于科尔的代理涉及严重的未放弃且不可放弃的冲突，并且鉴于被告由其他没有显见冲突的资深律师代表，法院不应允许科尔继续代表华为。3\n(U) 背景\n\nI. [已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\nII. (U) 科尔在担任 DAG 期间在[已涂黑]调查中的角色\n\n(U) 2010年12月29日，科尔获得了副部长职位的休会任命。\n\n美国参议院于2011年6月28日批准了科尔的该职位任命，他于\n\n2015年1月8日辞职。4\n\n3 (U) 政府目前并不寻求取消科尔所在的 Sidley Austin LLP（“盛德”）律师事务所代表被告的资格。但是，由于科尔的冲突被推定归属于其律师事务所，该律所须采取措施解决该推定归属的冲突。参见 N.Y. Rules of Prof I Conduct 1.11(b)。[已涂黑]\n\n4 (U) 根据盛德网站上发布的科尔生平介绍，科尔还曾担任过刑事司 Public Integrity Section（公共廉洁处）副处长，并曾担任 U.S. House of Representatives Ethics Committee（美国众议院道德委员会）特别法律顾问以调查时任议长 Newt Gingrich（纽特·金里奇）等职务。参见网址（最后访问时间为2019年1月31日）。\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑] 在科尔担任副部长期间，司法部正在进行一项[已涂黑]调查[已涂黑]。[已涂黑]。\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\n\n[已涂黑]\nIII. (U) 科尔离开司法部后对华为的代理\n\n(U) 2017年4月，[已涂黑]向华为的一家美国关联公司 Huawei Technologies USA 发送了大陪审团传票，索取与华为或其任何美国关联公司（包括华为美国）在受制裁国家的行为有关的文件。盛德受聘代表 Huawei Technologies USA Inc.、华为美国和 Futurewei Technologies（锦锐科技）回应传票，并向[已涂黑]进行了数次文件提供。这些文件提供的附信由盛德的另一位律师 Robert Tormson（罗伯特·托姆森）签署，并抄送给科尔以及 Kirkland & Ellis LLP（凯易律师事务所）和 Locke Lord（洛克律师事务所）的律师。科尔还被抄送在至少一封附有文件提供附信的电子邮件中。2017年7月下旬，盛德获[已涂黑]通知，该事项已移交给 U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York（“USAO-EDNY”，纽约东区联邦检察官办公室）。\n\n(U) 2018年10月，一年多以后，科尔联系了 USAO-EDNY，请求会面讨论华为调查案。会议持续了约十分钟，在此期间，科尔 (1) 提出了两个与[已涂黑]相关的问题——政府回答了这些问题——以及 (2) 表示愿意回答政府可能提出的问题。政府当时拒绝提问。\n\n(U) 2019年1月15日，科尔代表华为技术和华为美国共同签署了一封致副部长 Rod Rosenstein（罗德·罗森斯坦）的信函，声明他在 USAO-EDNY 的调查中代表这些委托人，并与华为在 Western District of Washington（“WDWA”，华盛顿西区）的律师一起请求延长由 WDWA 联邦检察官办公室开展的调查中的诉讼时效中止协议。在这封信中，科尔描述了华为为回应[已涂黑]大陪审团传票而进行的文件提供，并提及了2018年10月与 USAO-EDNY 的会面。\n\n[已涂黑] 2019年1月22日，在华为 Chief Financial Officer（“CFO”，首席财务官）Wanzhou Meng（孟晚舟）在加拿大被捕且科尔致信现任副部长之后，司法部和 FBI（联邦调查局）与科尔会面。司法部通知科尔，他在本案中存在利益冲突[已涂黑]。司法部在该次会议上未向科尔提供机密信息，但各方同意举行受保密协议管辖的后续会议。\n\n(U) 2019年1月28日，本法院解封了一份替代起诉书（以下简称「替代起诉书」），指控 Huawei Tech（华为技术有限公司）犯有发生于2007年11月至目前期间的十三项罪行。被指控的行为部分与华为技术有限公司在伊朗及其他受制裁国家的活动有关，包括通过华为在伊朗运营的一家名为 Skycom（星通科技）的非官方关联机构进行的活动。被指控的行为还涉及华为技术有限公司及其某些员工向金融机构（包括一家美国金融机构）作出的虚假陈述。被指控的行为还包括一项诈骗美国的合谋，涉及华为通过在2012年向 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence（众议院常设特别情报委员会）作出误导性公开陈述等方式，企图欺骗 United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control（美国财政部外国资产管制办公室）。该起诉书指控华为技术有限公司及 Huawei USA（华为美国公司）合谋妨碍 EDNY（纽约东区联邦地区法院）的大陪审团调查。\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n(U) 2019年1月29日，DOJ（美国司法部）与 FBI（联邦调查局）再次与 Cole（科尔）会面，以讨论其利益冲突问题。由于科尔不再持有安全许可，且为了能够进行充分的讨论，司法部与联邦调查局让科尔签署了一份保密协议，向其提供对某些机密信息的一次性查阅权限。\n\n[REDACTED]\n\n(U) 政府在1月份向科尔提供的信息是有限的，目的是在尚不知晓科尔是否会自行回避本案的情况下，防止本文所讨论的受特权保护及机密信息被进一步使用和披露。\n\n[REDACTED] 科尔表示，他不认为政府在会面上提供的信息为其提供了充分的依据来确定他是否存在利益冲突 [REDACTED]。科尔还请求允许他就不冲突事项咨询法律顾问。政府同意向 Virginia Seitz（弗吉尼亚·塞茨）提供查阅相同机密材料的一次性权限；塞茨是 Sidley（盛德律师事务所）的总法律顾问，也是科尔选定为其提供咨询的律师。科尔与塞茨向政府陈述并保证，塞茨将被设立道德墙隔离，不参与代表被告。\n\n(U) 2019年2月26日，司法部与联邦调查局与科尔及塞茨会面，他们两人均签署了保密协议，并审阅了上次会面中提供的相同机密材料。随后，各方讨论了潜在利益冲突的范围轮廓。\n\n(U) 2019年3月6日，科尔拒绝自行回避，其写道：「我们仔细审阅了你们向我们展示的材料，无法基于该信息判定我需要被取消代理资格。我们认真对待了这些讨论，并愿意考虑你们希望提出的、可能与该问题相关的任何进一步信息。」\n\n(U) 2019年3月13日，科尔提交了一份在本案中 pro hac vice（临时出庭代理）的动议。在2019年3月14日对华为技术有限公司和华为美国公司的传讯中，政府告知科尔，就传讯程序而言，政府不会反对其临时出庭代理动议。在2019年4月4日的第一次案情进展会议上，政府表示暂时不会反对科尔的动议（尽管政府已告知法院和科尔，其正在评估是否提出本项取消代理资格动议）。2019年4月5日，法院准许了科尔在本案中临时出庭代理的动议。\n\n[REDACTED]\n\nIV. REDACTED [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]\n(U) 辩论意见\n\n[REDACTED] 基于两种不同的利益冲突，应当取消科尔在本案中代表华为技术有限公司和华为美国公司的资格。第一，科尔曾作为 DAG（司法部副部长）在司法部的 [REDACTED] 调查中代表政府 [REDACTED]，如今他不应被允许在一件由司法部提起、且在多个方面与该 [REDACTED] 调查存在实质关联的 [REDACTED] 案件中代表被告。在代理过程中，他存在违反其对司法部所负保密与忠实义务的重大风险。[REDACTED]。科尔在这些相关事项上的工作带来了现实风险，即\n\n他将在代表被告的过程中，因依赖其代表司法部期间获取的信息而违反其对司法部的保密义务。此外，科尔还存在通过代表被告提出与其此前代表司法部期间所持立场相矛盾的抗辩意见，从而违反其对司法部的忠实义务的风险。\n\n[REDACTED] 第二，科尔对被告的代理危害了政府获得公正审判并获得能够经受上诉和附随审查附带救济挑战的定罪的利益。由于科尔无法向被告提供与政府调查相关的机密和保密事实 [REDACTED]，被告对科尔利益冲突的任何豁免都将因缺乏充分知情而无法经受后期的司法审查。\nI. (U) 适用法律框架\n\n(U) 《美国宪法》第六修正案赋予刑事被告获得律师协助为其辩护的权利。U.S. Const. amend. VI。第六修正案项下的获得律师辩护权包含一项相应的权利，即获得不受利益冲突影响的代理。Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)。尽管被告通常可以放弃其在第六修正案项下享有无冲突律师的权利，但「［第六］修正案的基本目的在于保证每名刑事被告获得有效的辩护人，而非确保被告必然由其偏好的律师代表。」Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); United States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456, 461 (2d Cir. 1995)。\n\n(U) 在裁决取消代理资格的动议时，法院必须在被告选择其心仪律师的权利与「法院维护司法程序廉洁性的利益以及政府确保公正裁决和公正审判的利益」之间进行平衡。United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1994)；参见 United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)（「联邦法院在确保刑事审判在职业道德标准内进行以及确保法律程序在所有旁观者看来均显公允方面具有独立利益」）。\n\n(U) 本案中构成取消资格事由的利益冲突有两种：律师与其前客户之间的冲突，以及律师与其现客户之间的冲突。本案同时涉及这两种冲突，且两者均可能影响政府在本次公诉中获得公正合理结果的利益。\nA. (U) 若存在律师可能利用客户秘密对抗前客户的风险，律师不得代理与前客户利益对立的当事人\n\n(U) 律师不得「故意泄露其客户的秘密，或为了客户的不利益而利用其客户的秘密。」Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983)。律师可能利用此类秘密对抗其前客户的风险造成了「取消资格的瑕疵污点」，地区法院应通过取消该律师后续不利于其前客户的代理资格来予以救济。United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 241 (2d Cir. 2016)。\n\n(U) 为防范此类风险，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）裁定，在下列情况下有理由取消对方当事人律师的代理资格：「(1) 动议方是对方当事人律师的前客户；(2) 律师此前代表动议方的事项标的与本诉讼中的争议焦点之间存在实质关联；并且 (3) 被请求取消资格的律师在先前代表该客户的过程中接触过、或很可能接触过相关的受特权保护信息。」Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F. 3d at 239（援引 Evans）（认定存在「实质关联」，因为律师企图通过主张前客户实际上实施了欺诈来为被指控洗钱欺诈所得的现客户辩护，尽管该批律师此前曾主张前客户是受害者）；一致意见见 United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 219 (2d Cir. 1987)（Evans 案标准适用于刑事案件）；亦见 N.Y. Rules of Prof l Conduct 1.9(a)（《纽约州职业行为规则》第1.9(a)条）。「实质关联」测试的目的在于防止律师在后续代理中利用从前客户处获取的信息损害该客户的利益。然而，即使未满足该测试标准，只要律师「可能利用［前］客户的受特权保护信息对抗该客户」，取消资格仍是有正当理由的。Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F. 3d at 241。\n\n(U) 后续代理如果（除其他情形外）「涉及相同的交易或法律争议，或者在特定情形下一个合理的律师会得出结论，认为存在保密事实信息将在后续事项中实质性推进该客户立场的重大风险，而此类信息通常会在先前的代理中获得」，则构成「实质关联」。N.Y. Rules of Prof l Conduct 1.9, cmt. 3；参见例如 Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 239（当「与先前代理的底层问题相关的事实与后续代理具有关联性」时，即存在「实质关联」）；参见 Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 272-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)（「近期仅在所涉争议焦点完全相同或基本相同时，取消资格的请求才获准许或认可……审查的重点不在于法律主张或底层理论是否相似，而在于先后两次代理是否共享共同的实质性事实争议焦点」）；Hickman v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)（「只要存在共同的事实问题，即满足实质关联测试」）；Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Micromuse, Inc., No. 04 CIV. 3090 (RWS), 2004 WL 2346152, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2004)（「原告律师事务所此前就与涉案诉讼无关的事项对与被告有关联的实体进行的常规商业代理，未能达到确立利益冲突的高度举证责任」）。\n\n(U) 在判定两起事项之间是否存在「实质关联」时，法院还考虑了（除其他因素外）先前关系的广度、各项调查之间的相关程度以及第一起与第二起事项之间的时间间隔。参见例如 Hickman v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)（「在律师对客户的代理属于一般性质的情况下，可取消其在日后诉讼中代表对立当事人的资格，但这仅限于日后的诉讼将该客户的全部背景作为争议焦点的情形」）；United States v. Escobar-Orejuela, 910 F. Supp. 92, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)（「两起源自无关调查的公诉之间相隔20年的间歇期，降至最低了［前政府律师］拥有或可能拥有目前可用于［代表刑事被告］的政府特权信息的可能性」）。\n\n(U) 一旦确立了两起案件之间的实质关联，动议方即无需证明前任律师曾接触过相关的受特权保护信息。相反，「在同一名个人律师参与了先前和当前的代理的情况下，动议方无需特别证明曾向该律师传递过保密信息。相反，动议方有权享有保密信息已被共享的不可反驳的推定利益。」Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 240。换言之，\n\n> 实质关联性审查标准使法院无需直接调查是否确实传递了机密信息。在认定存在实质关联后……法院将推定，在先前的代理过程中，已向律师披露了与代理事项标的相关的机密信息。法院不会对其性质和范围进行调查。唯有通过这种方式，才能强制执行律师绝对忠诚的义务，并维护有关特权沟通规则的精神。\n\n同上，第 240-41 页。事实上，为了避免律师的“下意识印象可能会受到[其前委托人的]机密信息影响”的“风险[与]可能性”，取消代理资格一直是正当合理的。TufAmerica, Inc. v. Codigo Music LLC, No. 11 CIV. 1434, 2013 WL 1903867, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013)（维持取消律师代理资格的决定，不论“是否分享了机密信息或任一方是否记得该机密信息”，因为当前事项与先前事项存在实质关联）。另一方面，如果存在即使是先前的代理中的机密事实信息会在随后的事项中实质性推进委托人立场的“重大风险”，则该等事项应被视为“实质关联”。《New York Rules of Professional Conduct（纽约州职业行为规则）》第 1.9 条附注 3。并且，证明具有“在先前的代理中获得的与争议事项相关的特定事实的知悉，通常将阻止此类代理”。同上。\n\n(U) 第二巡回区法院在分析是否应因律师可能在随后的代理中对前委托人使用其机密信息的风险而取消其代理资格时，已明确考虑了相关职业行为规则。参见，例如，Evans, 715 F.2d at 791；United States v. Armaza, 280 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2003)（在评估是否取消曾在刑事起诉中代表证人的辩护律师的代理资格时，考虑了纽约州律师协会职业行为规则）。在本案中，基于若干原因，Cole（科尔）在本案中同样受《New York State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct（纽约州律师协会职业行为规则）》（下称“《纽约州规则》”）的约束。首先，“在[EDNY（纽约东区联邦地区法院）]本院出庭辩护的律师必须遵守”《纽约州规则》。\n\n(U) 科尔拥有District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区）的律师执业资格。根据《Rules of Professional Conduct of the Bar of the District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区律师协会职业行为规则）》（下称“《特区规则》”），“获准在本管辖区执业的律师均受本管辖区的纪律管辖，不论该律师的行为发生于何处。”《特区规则》§ 8.5(a)。就与本事项相关而言，《特区规则》中关于利益冲突的规定在实体上与《纽约州规则》相同。参见，例如，《特区规则》§ 1.9（“先前曾在某一事项中代理委托人的律师，此后不得在相同或实质关联的事项中代理另一人，且该人的利益与前委托人的利益存在实质不利，除非前委托人给予知情同意。”）。\n\n例如，Pierce & Weiss, LLP v. Subrogation Partners LLC, 701 F. Supp. 2d 245, 251 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）2010)。此外，“[对于]与审判机构待决事项相关的行为，应适用的规则应为审判机构所在管辖区的规则，除非该审判机构的规则另有规定。”《特区规则》§ (b)(1)。在本案中，科尔的代理将“与纽约审判机构——纽约东区联邦地区法院——待决的事项相关”，且纽约东区联邦地区法院的本地规则并未规定科尔受纽约以外的职业行为规则管辖。因此，尽管他可能受其他职业行为规则（包括哥伦比亚特区的规则）约束，科尔在本事项中的行为仍将受《纽约州规则》管辖。\n\n(U) 《纽约州规则》第 1.9 条规定，“先前曾在某一事项中代理委托人的律师，此后不得在相同或实质关联的事项中代理另一人，且该人的利益与前委托人的利益存在实质不利，除非前委托人给予书面确认的知情同意。”《纽约州规则》1.9(a)。第 1.11(a) 条将该原则更具体地适用于前政府雇员的情形：“先前曾担任政府公职人员或雇员的律师：(1) 应遵守第 1.9(c) 条；及 (2) 不得就该律师作为公职人员或雇员亲自且实质性参与的事项代理委托人，除非相关政府机构对该代理给予书面确认的知情同意。”正如District of Columbia Court of Appeals（哥伦比亚特区上诉法院）就特区类似规则所阐释的那样，对前政府律师未来代理的限制“旨在促使考虑接受代理的前政府律师极力保持审慎”。In re Sofaer, 728 A.2d 625, 628 (D.C. 1999)。\n\n(U) 此外，涉及前政府律师的冲突担忧尤为重大，因为“公众通常对政府不当行为的担忧超过对私人不当行为的担忧”。United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44-45 (D.D.C.（哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院）2004)。因此，即使是与前政府律师相关的不当行为表象，“也比非政府律师的情形更为严重，因为公众可能会对这种潜在的信息滥用提出更严厉的批评”。同上。在诸如本案这般“案件事项标的关乎公共利益且投入诉讼的资源极其庞大”的案件中，任何“指控的职业道德违规行为都可能受到特别严苛的审查”。同上。\n\n(U) 《纽约州规则》第 1.9(c) 条进而要求：“先前曾在某一事项中代理委托人的律师，或其现有或先前律所先前曾在某一事项中代理委托人的律师，此后不得：(1) 使用受第 1.6 条保护的前委托人机密信息以损害前委托人的利益，但本规则就现有委托人所允许或要求的情形，或该信息已广为人知的情形除外；或 (2) 披露受第 1.6 条保护的前委托人机密信息，但本规则就现有委托人所允许或要求的情形除外。”\n\n(U) 第 1.9 条确认，“委托人与律师关系终止后，律师在保密和利益冲突方面仍负有特定的持续性义务。”《纽约州规则》1.9，附注 1。依据该规则，例如，“律师不得代表新委托人正当地寻求撤销代表前委托人起诉草拟的合同”，且“起诉过被指控人的律师，不得在该人随后就同一交易针对政府提起的民事诉讼中正当地代表该人”。同上。\n\n(U) 第 1.6 条管辖信息的保密性，并适用“不仅适用于委托人保密沟通的事项（受律师-委托人保密特权保护），还适用于在代理期间获得的以及与代理相关的所有信息，不论其来源如何”。因此，政府律师有义务不得使用或披露其在司法部任职期间获知的信息，以损害美国的利益。\n\n(U) 关于忠诚义务，“如果一名理性律师会得出结论认为……该代理将使该律师代表不同利益（包括其自身利益），则该律师不得代理委托人。”《纽约州规则》1.7(a)(1)。“同时存在的利益冲突……可能源于律师对另一委托人、前委托人或第三方的责任，或源于律师自身的利益。”同上，附注 1。该规则特别指出，除同时存在的冲突外，“律师的忠诚与独立义务可能会受到第 1.9 条项下对前委托人责任的不利影响……”同上，附注 9。\n\n(U) 最后，法院已确认，律师不能通过在自己脑海中设立人为壁垒来规避依赖先前代理期间获得的信息的风险，从而消除本文所述的此类利益冲突。参见 NCK Org. Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1976)（“要求律师回避涉及可能披露前委托人机密信息的代理，也使律师免于在自己脑海中在机密信息与非机密信息之间设立中国墙的艰难任务，并推进了‘公众对保持最高职业行为标准和严谨司法行政的利益’。”）；比较 In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 15 CIV. 7488 (CM), 2017 WL 3613663, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2017)（援引 Auto-Kaps, LLC v. Clorox Co., No. 15 CIV. 1737 (BMC), 2016 WL 1122037, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016)）（“专家即便竭尽全力，也无法在自己的脑海中建立中国墙。”）。当此类主张仅是在对政府的异议作出回应时才被提出时，尤为令人怀疑。参见 Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（“本院怀疑，任何旨在起到先发制人作用的中国墙，在为应对动议而非在冲突产生之前设立时，是否能够切实有效地发挥作用。”）。\n\nB. (U) 在缺乏全面知情的情况下，现有委托人无法豁免涉及该律师的任何实际或潜在冲突\n\n(U) 当法院认定律师与其当前委托人之间存在利益冲突、但该冲突尚不严重到需要自动取消代理资格的程度时，法院仅在委托人对其「无利益冲突的律师代理权作出知情且明智的放弃」的情况下，方可准许该律师继续代理该委托人。United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)；一致意见见 United States v. Perez, 325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003)。知情同意「要求每位受影响的委托人都知晓相关情况，包括该冲突可能对该委托人利益产生不利影响的实质性且可合理预见的方式。」Filippi v. Elmont Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 722 F. Supp. 2d 295, 311 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区） 2010)。委托人必须获得充分的信息以全面理解该潜在冲突，然后任何放弃方能称得上是「知情且明智的」。参见，例如，United States v. Armedo-Saimiento, 524 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1975)（「地区法官应当向［被告］充分解释该冲突的性质……」）；并通览 United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888 (2d Cir. 1982)（「审判法院的首要任务是在法院经验及其对案件了解所允许的范围内，尽可能详细地提醒被告注意由忠诚度分裂的律师进行代理的危险实质。」）。如果律师无法向其委托人告知该冲突的全部范围——因为这样做需要泄露特权或保密信息——那么委托人就无法作出「知情且明智的放弃」。United States v. Pappa, 37 F. App'x 551, 554 (2d Cir. 2002)（在「律师-委托人特权阻止［现任辩护律师］透露冲突的所有细节……且因为［辩护律师］对冲突的解释表明此处『另有隐情』」的情况下，委托人无法作出「知情且明智的」放弃）。\n\n(U) 地区法院在「拒绝利益冲突放弃方面享有充分的自由裁量权」，这不仅适用于「审前即可证明存在实际冲突的罕见案件」，也适用于「存在潜在冲突、且随着审理进行可能发展或不发展为实际冲突的更为常见的案件」。Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-63。这种自由裁量权是必要的，因为「新滋生的利益冲突的可能性和范围是众所周知极难预测的……观察到律师从其委托人处获得此类放弃的意愿，可能与其向他们传达所有必要信息的谨慎程度呈反比，这也是切中要害的。」同上。\n\n(U) 此外，政府在确保利益冲突的放弃充分知情方面享有独立的利益。在辩护律师带着利益冲突开展工作的情况下，政府在经得起上诉审查和附随攻击的有罪判决中所享有的利益就会受到损害。不充分的放弃可以成为对原本有效的定罪成功发起附随攻击的基础。参见 Levy, 25 F.3d at 152（「如果被告的律师 (1) 存在导致被告遭受损害的潜在利益冲突，或 (2) 存在对律师的表现产生不利影响的实际利益冲突……则被告遭受了无效律师协助」）。「在取消代理资格的情形中，任何疑问均应以有利于取消代理资格的方式解决。」Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975)。\n\nII. (U) COLE（科尔）先前的代理工作与本案存在实质关联\n\n[已删节] Cole 不能在不损害其对其前委托人 Department of Justice（司法部）的保密和忠诚义务的情况下代理 Huawei（华为），因为本案对 Huawei Tech（华为技术）和 Huawei USA（华为美国）的起诉与 Cole 亲自且实质性参与的 [已删节] 调查 [已删节]「存在实质关联」[已删节]。NY Rules § 1.11(a)(2)。Cole 当前的代理与其此前为司法部开展工作的两个方面发生冲突。首先，被告在本案中的辩护、证据开示请求和策略已经牵涉到 Cole 在担任 DAG（副总检察长）期间听取过简报的 [已删节] 调查的某些方面。[已删节]。Cole 掌握了特权信息 [已删节]，若非他曾代理司法部他是不会掌握这些信息的，而他可以利用这些信息为被告牟利。[已删节]。\n\nA. [已删节] Cole 当前对 Huawei 的代理与其此前在 [已删节] 调查中代表 United States（美国）存在实质关联 [已删节]\n\n[已删节] Cole 此前在 [已删节] 调查中代理司法部，与他当前在本案中代理 [已删节] Huawei Tech 和 Huawei USA 存在实质关联。\n\n[已删节]\n\n[已删节] 显而易见，Cole 在担任副总检察长的五年任期内关于 [已删节] 的知识和行为——包括关于 [已删节]——与 Huawei 意图提出的选择性起诉辩护存在实质关联。特别是，存在 Cole 可能利用在担任副总检察长期间获得的「保密事实信息」来「实质性推进」Huawei 当前辩护策略的「实质性风险」。参见，例如，NY Rules § 1.9, cmt. 3（在存在「通常会在先前的代理中获得的保密事实信息将实质性推进委托人在后续事项中的立场的实质性风险」时，适用「实质关联」）。\n\n[已删节] 还有其他辩护行为与 Cole 先前的代理存在实质关联的例子。[已删节] 根据判例法，存在一种推定，即此类请求以及类似的后续请求或诉讼，受到了 Cole 在 [已删节] 调查中代理政府期间获知的信息的影响。13 参见 Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 240（「在同一名律师参与了先前和当前的代理的情况下……动议方有权享有秘密已被共享的不可反驳的推定。」）。作为第二个例子，Cole 可能会寻求就他在担任副总检察长期间采取的行动交叉盘问执法人员 [已删节]。参见 United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979)（取消前政府律师的代理资格，部分原因是「在先前代理过程中获得的特权信息可能被用来弹劾或削弱紧密相关事项中的重要政府证人」）。所有这些辩护行为都直接将 Cole 在担任副总检察长时获知且与其代表美国进行调查 [已删节] 相关的事实置于争议之中。\n\n(U) 正如第二巡回法院所承认的，这些例子还表明，Cole 继续代理被告对政府造成的损害，超出了他将「公开使用」从政府处获得的「秘密」的风险。参见 Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d at 238。还存在一种风险，即 Cole「虽然没有明确使用秘密，但可能会以其他方式利用此类秘密来指导其对［Huawei］的辩护」。同上。正如法院在 Prevezon 案中所判决的那样，仅凭后一种风险本身就构成了取消代理资格的理由。同上。\n\n[已删节]\n\n13 整个 Cole 证据开示请求都引发了对 Cole 代理 Huawei 实体的担忧，因为无法知道其内容是否受到了 Cole 先前作为副总检察长代理美国期间收集的知识的影响。\n\n(U) 适用的职业道德规则评注支持取消代理资格。在存在「通常会在先前的代理中获得的保密事实信息将实质性推进委托人在后续事项中的立场的实质性风险」的情况下，案件即构成「实质关联」。16 NY Rules § 1.9 cmt. 3。作为示例，评注指出「代理过商人并获知关于该人的大量个人财务信息的律师，随后不得在寻求离婚诉讼中代理该人的配偶。」同上。「类似地，此前曾代理委托人获得建设购物中心的环境许可的律师，将被禁止代理寻求基于环境考量而反对该物业重新分区规划的邻居……」同上。这些例子特别具有启发性，因为在这两起案件中，涉及的「事项」在成文法、法律或诉因上并不一定存在任何重叠。相反，正是由于在第一项事务中获得的信息对第二项事务具有显而易见的关联性，才强制要求取消代理资格。\n\n[已删节] 同样，[已删节] 调查与本案之间的实质关联完全符合鉴于使用从前委托人处获得的信息的风险而取消律师代理资格的一系列案件。例如，在 Prevezon\n\n16 「前委托人无需披露律师所获知的保密信息，即可确立律师掌握用于后续事项的保密信息的实质性风险」，但当前委托人确实证明其「知晓［相关的］具体事实」时，通常「将……阻止此类代理。」NY Rules § 1.9, cmt. 3。这是因为「实质关联」标准本身并不是一项职业道德义务，而是为保护「关于保密和利益冲突的持续义务」而确立的规则。同上，cmt. 1。因此，当前委托人能够直接证明其前律师实际接触过相关的保密信息，或者将必然面临利益冲突时，无需将先前事项与当前事项之间精确的事实关系暴露出来，即可证明取消代理资格的必要性。\n\nHoldings 案中，一名律师试图通过证明其先前定性为欺诈受害者的前委托人实施了该欺诈的「辩护策略」，来为被指控欺诈的实体辩护。839 F.3d at 241。第二巡回法院裁定该律师本应被取消代理资格，因为他「处于可以利用［前委托人的］特权信息来对抗［前委托人］的处境」。同上。[已删节]。\n\n[已删节] 并且，[已删节] 调查 [已删节] 与本案之间的关系，远比那些拒绝取消代理资格的案件要紧密得多。[已删节] 但在此处，[已删节] 政府尽管没有被要求这样做，却指明了 Cole 在先前代理中掌握的、且可被 Cole 用来损害其前委托人利益的具体保密信息。\n\n[已删节]\n\n[已删节] 但在此处，Cole 应当被取消代理资格，因为他亲自且实质性地参与了一项 [已删节] 调查 [已删节]，该调查使他接触到了相关的、受特权保护的事实信息 [已删节] 以及关于该调查的策略信息。正如 District of Columbia Court of Appeals（哥伦比亚特区上诉法院）所解释的那样，禁止政府律师在私人执业中参与「实质关联」事项，其目的「是为了引导正在考虑代理的前政府律师充分本着审慎的原则行事」。In re Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 628。遗憾的是，我们早已远远超出了审慎的界限，法院应当取消 Cole 的代理资格。\n\nB. [已删节] [已删节] [已删节] [已删节]\n\n[已删节]\n\n[已删节]\n\n[已删节]\n\nIII. (U) COLE 对被告的代理将损害政府在公平审判和公正判决中的利益\n\n(U) 除了保护自身特权与机密信息之外，政府在本案中还具有“确保公正判决与公平审判”的利益。Levy，25 F.3d 第 155 页。如果由 Cole（科尔）代表被告，该利益将受到损害，因为被告将无法充分放弃因 Cole 的角色而产生的任何冲突。因此，任何有罪判决都可能因基于律师无效协助主张的上诉或附随审查而极易被推翻。\n\n(U) 如上所述，Cole 掌握着其担任 DAG（副司法部长）期间知悉的信息，这些信息与其对当前客户的代理工作相关，但他无法在该代理工作中予以披露，更遑论使用。鉴于 Cole 无法给予其客户全心全意的忠诚，这种动态造成了利益冲突。见 NY Rules（《纽约州职业行为准则》）§ 1.7(a)(2)。可以说，该冲突可以通过从 Huawei（华为）处获得一份对任何潜在冲突的知情且明智的弃权声明来解决。见 Jones，381 F.3d 第 119 页；另见 NY Rules § 1.7(b)(4)。然而在本案中，由于该冲突具有机密性质，Cole 向其客户提供的关于该冲突的说明至多只能是最草率的描述——即他知道某些与其当前代理 Huawei 相关的事务，但他无法分享或使用——因为他未获授权向其客户分享更多信息。\n[已涂黑]\n\n(U) Cole 所能分享的有限信息，远远达不到让 Cole 的客户对本案所涉潜在冲突做出知情且明智放弃的要求。见，例如，Pappa，37 F. App'x 第 554 页（代表被告的联邦公设辩护人陈述称，联邦公设辩护人此前曾代表一名潜在的政府证人，但未透露“冲突的所有细节”，这不足以允许对潜在冲突做出知情且明智的放弃）；Armedo-Sarmiento，524 F.2d 第 593 页（“地方法区法官应当向[被告]充分解释冲突的性质……”）（强调为后加）。由于 Cole 的客户无法知情且明智地决定是否放弃其冲突权益，Cole 的任何代理行为都将损害审判程序及任何最终的有罪判决，从而损害政府利益。因此，应取消 Cole 的代理资格。\n\nCase 1:18-cr-00457-AMD Document 561-4 Filed 08/07/23 Page 28 of 28 PageID #: 370\n[已涂黑]\n(U) 结论\n\n(U) 基于上述理由，政府谨请求法院批准其取消 Cole 代理资格的动议。\n\n日期：2019年5月2日，纽约州布鲁克林\n\n谨此提交，\n\nRICHARD P. DONOGHUE（理查德·P·多诺霍）\nUnited States Attorney（联邦检察官）\nEastern District of New York（纽约东区）\n\n签署人：/s/ David K. Kessler\nAlexander A. Solomon（亚历山大·A·所罗门）\nJulia Nestor（朱莉娅·内斯特）\nDavid K. Kessler（大卫·K·凯斯勒）\nKaitlin T. Farrell（凯特琳·T·法雷尔）\nSarah M. Evans（莎拉·M·埃文斯）\nAssistant U.S. Attorneys（联邦助理检察官）\n(718) 254-7000\n\nThea D. R. Kendler（西娅·D·R·肯德勒）\nDavid Lim（大卫·林）\nTrial Attorneys（审理律师）\nCounterintelligence and Export Control Section（反间谍与出口管制处）\nNational Security Division（国家安全局）\n\nLaura M. Billings（劳拉·M·比林斯）\nChristian J. Nauvel（克里斯蒂安·J·诺维尔）\nTrial Attorneys（审理律师）\nMoney Laundering and Asset Recovery Section（洗钱与资产追回处）\nCriminal Division（刑事局）\n\n抄送：Clerk of the Court (AMD)（法院书记官（AMD））","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Classified Information"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":50,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":7489,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:07:42"}