{"id":"court_sdny_135_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":135,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"LETTER","filed_date":null,"title":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC","summary_zh":"律师函——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵/Guo Wengui/Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #135。系共同被告 Yanping Wang 的代理律师 Emil Bove（Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC）于2023年9月1日致联邦法官 Analisa Torres 的信函，声明附议郭文贵此前提出的、要求中止其破产案（In re Ho Wan Kwok, No. 22-50073, 美国康涅狄格州破产法院）相关程序直至本刑事案了结的动议；信中以第五修正案不自证其罪权、破产受托人（Trustee）主张郭文贵律师-委托人特免权可能连带损及其权益等为由，主张对 Wang 而言中止程序同样必要。","summary_en":"Attorney letter — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #135. Filed September 1, 2023 by Emil Bove of Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, counsel for co-defendant Yanping Wang, to U.S. District Judge Analisa Torres, the letter joins Kwok's earlier motion to stay proceedings in the related bankruptcy case (In re Ho Wan Kwok, No. 22-50073, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, D. Conn.) pending resolution of the criminal case. It argues a stay is independently warranted for Wang on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds and because the bankruptcy Trustee's assertion of Kwok's attorney-client privilege could prejudice her position.","body_en":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n**CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC**\n\n11 TIMES SQUARE, 34TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10036\n\ncsglaw.com\n\n**EMIL BOVE**  ebove@csglaw.com (O) 212.324.7265\n\nSeptember 1, 2023\n\nVia ECF The Honorable Analisa Torres U.S. District Judge Southern District of New York\n\n## **Re: United States v. Yanping Wang, et al., No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nDefendant Yanping Wang respectfully submits this letter joining in the August 30, 2023 motion by co-defendant Ho Wan Kwok to stay proceedings in *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, No. 22- 50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) pending resolution of this case. As noted by Mr. Kwok, a stay is necessary to protect the integrity of these proceedings and because of recent developments in the bankruptcy proceedings. Ms. Wang adopts Mr. Kwok's arguments, and respectfully submits that a stay is appropriate for the additional reasons set forth below.\n\n*Fifth Amendment.* Like Mr. Kwok, Ms. Wang is a criminal defendant facing serious charges of, among other things, securities fraud and money laundering, which are based on allegations that overlap significantly with the claims that the Trustee is pressing in the bankruptcy case. (*See* Dkt. No. 131, Kwok Mem. at 17, 24). As a result, even though Ms. Wang is not the debtor in the bankruptcy, she is a potential non-party witness in many of the matters the Trustee is pursuing. The bankruptcy proceedings therefore present Fifth Amendment concerns and risks of related prejudice that are personal to Ms. Wang and that imperil her constitutional rights. *See, e.g.*, *In re Kowalski*, 633 B.R. 822, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021) (\"[I]t is important to note that a non-party witness, like anyone else, is entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment.\"); *In re Zinnel*, No. 12 Civ. 1541, 2013 WL 2449546, at \\*6 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2013) (finding stay appropriate where, *inter alia*, \"it is conceivable that [civil] discovery may touch on the Fifth Amendment rights of witnesses who are not parties to the bankruptcy appeal but who may be targets of the criminal investigation\"); *In re Garsia*, No. 09-22233, 2011 WL 1045295, at \\*5 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2011) (finding stay appropriate where, *inter alia*, \"certain witnesses for the Defendant may also seek Fifth Amendment protections, further limiting [the Defendant's] ability to disprove the fraud allegations\"). For example notwithstanding the obvious Fifth Amendment implications—on July 21, 2023, counsel to the Trustee inquired about deposing Ms. Wang in connection with an adversarial proceeding related to the Chapter 11 case, *Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn.). Moreover, the bankruptcy court has suggested that Ms. Wang's status as a criminal defendant subject to pretrial detention is not sufficient to obviate the need to seek to collect documents from her. (*See* Dkt. No. 2036 at 5, *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Bankr. D. Conn. July 28, 2023) (\"[W]hile Ms. Wang is presently detained pending trial, Hudson Diamond Holding LLC did not establish that it cannot contact her – through counsel if necessary.\")). As a result—and, once again, notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment implications counsel for third parties in adversarial proceedings such as *HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.* have contacted the undersigned in an effort to obtain documents from Ms. Wang. To the extent Ms. Wang possesses responsive materials, the requests implicate, at minimum, her act-of-production privilege. Because Ms. Wang is not the debtor, the bankruptcy court's application of the requiredrecords doctrine does not apply to her. (*See* Dkt. No. 131, Kwok Mem. at 8-9).\n\n*Attorney-Client Privilege.* Although Ms. Wang does not control Mr. Kwok's attorney-client privilege, Ms. Wang faces prejudice from the Trustee's overbroad and unnecessary waivers of Mr. Kwok's privilege with respect to subjects that are relevant to this case.\n\nOf significance . . . is the fact that the Trustee and the Debtors are in an adversarial relationship. As a consequence, the Trustee's assumption of the Debtor's attorneyclient privilege could potentially cause the Debtors a great deal of harm, as the Trustee's sole purpose for seeking to waive the Debtors' attorney-client privilege is to use that information directly against them. (*i.e.*, to revoke the Debtors' bankruptcy discharge). Furthermore, when one also considers that such information could potentially be used against the Debtors if they are ultimately prosecuted for criminal violations of the Bankruptcy Code, the potential for harm against the Debtors becomes particularly acute.\n\n*In re Miller*, 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000); *In re Bame*, 251 B.R. 367, 377 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (\"As to . . . questions . . . going to activities giving rise to potential criminal prosecution, the balance would probably tip in favor of sustaining assertion of the privilege, in which case the trustee would have the opportunity to raise the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.\"). For example, the bankruptcy court's September 2022 privilege-waiver order states that the Trustee controls \"any interests\" of Mr. Kwok \"in any common interest or joint defense privilege alleged to be held with other parties.\" (Dkt. No. 130-12, Kwok Ex. 12 at 2 ¶ 2). The privilegewaiver order does not afford Ms. Wang an opportunity to be heard in connection with privilege waivers that could prejudice her in this case. (*See id.* at 4-5 at ¶¶ 7-8).\n\nThe Trustee is currently seeking to serve a Rule 2004 subpoena on Victor Cerda, an attorney who has participated in a joint-defense meeting with Ms. Wang, presumably to obtain evidence for use in the bankruptcy case and its related adversarial proceedings. (*See* Dkt. No. 125-1). The Trustee's efforts to obtain otherwise-privileged materials could result in a situation where the prosecutors have access to materials that they ordinarily would not be permitted to obtain. *See*  Justice Manual § 9-13.410 (\"Because of the potential effects upon an attorney-client relationship that may result from the issuance of a subpoena to an attorney for information relating to the\n\nattorney's representation of a client, the Department exercises close control over such subpoenas\"), *available at* http\n\n*Brady and Spoliation*.The prosecutors' agreement with the Trustee relating to the liquidation of the Mahwah Facility implicates Ms. Wang's due process rights and the prosecutors' obligations to make exculpatory evidence available to the defense. Specifically, evidence from the Mahwah Facility will undercut the prosecutors' claim that the proceeds of the GTV offering were used at the Facility in a manner inconsistent with the offering documents. (*See* Dkt. No. 131, Kwok Mem. at 20). In a \"Stipulation\" bearing this Court's caption—but not its approval—the prosecutors agreed (1) to \"not oppose\" the Trustee's \"effort[s]\" to \"obtain control of and/or sell\" the Mahwah Facility; (2) to \"execute promptly any documents which may be required to convey clear title to the [Mahwah Facility] and complete the sale of the [Mahwah Facility]\"; and (3) to permit the Trustee to deduct from sale proceeds \"any costs of seizure, maintenance, marketing and sale of the Subject Property, including legal fees of Paul Hastings . . . .\" (Dkt. No. 130-5, Kwok Ex. 5 at 22, 24 ¶¶ 1, 3, 6). The July 13, 2023 \"stipulation\" is the product of \"extensive\" negotiations between the prosecutors and the Trustee. (*Id.* at 7 ¶ 12, 8 ¶ 14). However, \"the Government's loss of evidence may deprive a defendant of the right to a fair trial.\" *United States v. Rahman*, 189 F.3d 88, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). \"[T]he only way to protect *Brady* material before the defendant requests it is to require the government to safeguard potentially exculpatory evidence.\" *United States v. Bakhtiar*, 994 F.2d 970, 975 (2d Cir. 1993).2 Indeed, the day after the Trustee notified the bankruptcy judge of Mr. Kwok's stay motion, the bankruptcy judge modified the preliminary injunction concerning the Mahwah Facility to further restrict access to the Facility. (*See* Dkt. No. 2158, *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 30, 2023); Dkt. No. 58, *Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC, et al.*, No. 23-5017 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2023)). Accordingly, a stay is necessary in order to prevent evidence at the Mahwah Facility from being lost or destroyed.\n\n*Forfeiture and Restitution.* The Trustee's operations in the bankruptcy proceedings are rapidly depleting assets and property that one would expect the prosecutors to seek to preserve in the event that forfeiture or restitution becomes appropriate in this case. Even the bankruptcy judge has characterized these expenses as a \"heavy cost\" and \"enormous.\" *In re: Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), 2023 WL 4772420, at \\*18 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 26, 2023). And \"there are creditors in these Chapter 11 cases that are not alleged fraud victims.\" *Id.* at \\*19. Under these circumstances, it\n\n<sup>1</sup> Under Section 9-13.410, federal prosecutors are required to obtain approval from the Assistant Attorney General or a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division to issue a subpoena to an attorney, and the \"principles\" that are relevant to such approval include: \"The information sought shall not be protected by a valid claim of privilege.\"\n\n<sup>2</sup> *Accord Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States*, 204 F.R.D. 277, 285 (E.D. Va. 2001) (\"The destruction of evidence can lead to manifest unfairness and injustice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause of action and can increase the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct the destroyed evidence or to develop other evidence that may be less persuasive, less accessible or both.\").\n\nis not clear why the prosecutors and the Trustee are as \"aligned\" as they appear to be. (Dkt. No. 130-5, Kwok Ex. 5 at 5 ¶ 6).\n\nHaving elsewhere touted the seizure of \"\\$634 million from 21 different bank accounts,\"3 the prosecutors have elected not to seize other assets that are tied up in the bankruptcy and subject to extensive fees based on the Trustee's activities. In *HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.*, the Trustee is seeking to bring more than \\$35 million into the bankruptcy estate, and he acknowledges that the funds are related to this case. (*See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 23-5013 ¶¶ 4, 39, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023)). As noted, the prosecutors have also consented to the Trustee's fees being paid from the proceeds of any sale of the Mahwah Facility rather than preserving important evidence at the property, which the prosecutors have alleged is forfeitable. (*See* Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 55(v); Dkt. No. 38 ¶ w).\n\nThe prosecutors' decision to permit the Trustee to proceed against assets that could be subject to forfeiture and restitution, and to incur the attendant costs, is not consistent with the tone of their \"Motion For Victim Rights.\" (*See* Dkt. No. 10). In 2009, the same U.S. Attorney's Office opposed the imposition of a bankruptcy trustee in connection with an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Bernard Madoff on the basis that \"[t]he movants . . . suggest incorrectly that a bankruptcy action is the appropriate forum for the marshalling and distribution of assets to victims of the fraud.\" (Dkt. No. 50 at 2, *SEC v. Madoff, et al.*, No. 08 Civ. 10791 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009); *see also id.* (\"Under the well-established relation-[b]ack doctrine, the Government's interest in forfeitable property vests at the time of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture . . . .\")). The Office argued that \"the motion, if granted, would risk detracting from recovery to victims because funds otherwise available for return to victims by way of forfeiture would unnecessarily be used to pay the fees of a bankruptcy trustee.\" (*Id.* at 1; *see also id.* at 5 (arguing that imposition of a trustee \"would both drain fees from the total recovery available to the victims of this offense and delay the recovery of victim funds . . .\")). The Office had it right in 2009, and these principles further support a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\n<sup>3</sup> DOJ, Ho Wan Kwok, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" Arrested For Orchestrating Over \\$1 Billion Dollar Fraud Conspiracy (Mar. 15, 2023), http\n\nIn sum, Ms. Wang joins Mr. Kwok's motion for a stay of the proceedings in *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Dkt. No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.). Such a stay is necessary and appropriate, under the All Writs Act and the Court's inherent supervisory authority, for the reasons set forth herein, in Mr. Kwok's motion papers, and in the prosecutors' letter seeking a stay in *SEC v. Kwok*, No. 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.). (*See* Dkt. No. 130-7).\n\n/s/\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nEmil Bove\n\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC\n\nAlex Lipman Lipman Law PLLC\n\n *Attorneys for Yanping Wang*\n\nCc: Counsel of Record (Via ECF)","body_zh":"CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC（基耶萨·沙希尼安与吉安托马西律师事务所）\n\n11 TIMES SQUARE, 34TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NY 10036\n\ncsglaw.com\n\nEMIL BOVE（埃米尔·博夫） ebove@csglaw.com (O) 212.324.7265\n\n2023年9月1日\n\n通过 ECF 送达\nHonorable Analisa Torres（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯阁下）\nU.S. District Judge（美国联邦地区法官）\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）\n\n关于：United States v. Yanping Wang, et al.（美国诉王雁平等人案），案号 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）谨以此信加入共同被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）于2023年8月30日提交的动议，请求在审理 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.（郭文贵破产重整案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn.，康涅狄格区联邦破产法院）期间中止相关程序，直至本案结案。正如郭先生所指出，鉴于破产程序的最新进展，为维护本案诉讼程序的完整性，中止审理是必要的。王女士采纳郭先生的主张，并基于下述附加理由谨呈中止审理实属恰当。\n\n第五修正案权利。与郭先生一样，王女士作为刑事被告，面临包括证券欺诈和洗钱在内的严重指控，这些指控所依据的事实指称与受托人（Trustee）在破产案中主张的索赔存在重大重叠。（参见 Dkt. No. 131，郭方备忘录第 17、24 页）。因此，尽管王女士并非破产案中的债务人，但她是受托人所追查的多项事务中的潜在非当事人证人。故此，破产程序带来了涉及王女士个人的第五修正案关切及相关损害风险，并危及她的宪法权利。参见，例如，In re Kowalski, 633 B.R. 822, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021)（“必须指出，非当事人证人与其他人一样享有第五修正案的保护。”）；In re Zinnel, No. 12 Civ. 1541, 2013 WL 2449546, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2013)（裁定中止审理是恰当的，其中指出，“可以想象，［民事］证据开示可能会触及破产上诉非当事人但可能是刑事调查目标的证人的第五修正案权利”）；In re Garsia, No. 09-22233, 2011 WL 1045295, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2011)（裁定中止审理是恰当的，其中指出，“被告的某些证人也可能寻求第五修正案的保护，从而进一步限制［被告］反驳欺诈指控的能力”）。例如，尽管存在显而易见的第五修正案影响——受托人的代理律师仍于2023年7月21日就与破产法第11章案件相关的对抗性诉讼 Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.（德斯平斯诉HCHK技术有限公司等人案），对抗性诉讼案号 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn.) 对王女士进行宣誓录供一事进行了询问。此外，破产法院曾表示，王女士处于审前羁押状态的刑事被告身份，不足以消除向其调取文件的必要性。（参见 Dkt. No. 2036 第 5 页，In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.，案号 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 28, 2023)（“虽然王女士目前处于审前羁押中，但 Hudson Diamond Holding LLC（哈德逊钻石控股有限公司）并未证明其无法——在必要时通过律师——与她取得联系。”））。因此——并且再次无视第五修正案的影响——诸如 HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al. 等对抗性诉讼中的第三方律师已与下签人联系，试图从王女士处获取文件。在王女士持有应答材料的范围内，这些要求至少涉及她的“提供文件行为特权（act-of-production privilege）”。由于王女士不是债务人，破产法院对“法定备查记录原则（required-records doctrine）”的适用并不适用于她。（参见 Dkt. No. 131，郭方备忘录第 8-9 页）。\n\n律师-委托人保密特权。虽然王女士并不控制郭先生的律师-委托人保密特权，但受托人就与本案相关的事项对郭先生的保密特权作出过宽且不必要的弃权，使王女士面临受到不利损害的风险。\n\n至关重要的是……受托人与债务人之间处于对抗关系。因此，受托人承接债务人的律师-委托人保密特权可能会给债务人造成巨大的损害，因为受托人寻求放弃债务人律师-委托人保密特权的唯一目的就是直接将该信息用于针对他们（即撤销债务人的破产免责）。此外，如果再考虑到此类信息如果最终因违反《破产法典》的刑事罪行被起诉时可能会被用来指控债务人，那么债务人面临的潜在损害就会变得尤为严峻。\n\nIn re Miller, 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)；In re Bame, 251 B.R. 367, 377 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000)（“至于……涉及可能引发刑事起诉的行为的问题……利益平衡可能倾向于支持主张保密特权，在这种情况下，受托人将有机会提出针对该特权的犯罪欺诈例外。”）。例如，破产法院2022年9月的特权放弃裁定载明，受托人控制郭先生“在据称与其他当事人共同拥有的任何共同利益或共同辩护特权中的任何权益”。（Dkt. No. 130-12，郭方证据 12 第 2 页第 2 段）。该特权放弃裁定并未向王女士提供就可能在本案中对其造成不利损害的特权放弃陈述意见的机会。（参见同上，第 4-5 页第 7-8 段）。\n\n受托人目前正试图根据第2004条规则（Rule 2004）向 Victor Cerda（维克托·塞达）律师送达传票，该律师曾参与王女士的共同辩护会议，受托人此举大概是为了获取用于破产案及其相关对抗性诉讼的证据。（参见 Dkt. No. 125-1）。受托人试图获取其他受特权保护材料的举动，可能导致检方获得其通常不被允许获取的材料。参见 Justice Manual（《司法手册》）§ 9-13.410（“鉴于向律师发出传票调取与其代表客户相关的信息可能会对律师-委托人关系产生潜在影响，司法部对此类传票实行严格控制”），可查阅于 http\n\n布雷迪规则与证据灭失。检方与受托人就清算 Mahwah Facility（马瓦设施）达成的协议，涉及王女士的正当程序权利以及检方向辩方提供开脱罪责证据的法定义务。具体而言，来自马瓦设施的证据将削弱检方关于 GTV 发行收益在马瓦设施的使用方式与发行文件不符的主张。（参见 Dkt. No. 131，郭方备忘录第 20 页）。在载有本法院案头抬头——但未经本法院批准——的“约定事项（Stipulation）”中，检方同意：(1) “不反对”受托人为“获取控制权和/或出售”马瓦设施所作的“努力”；(2) “及时签署转让［马瓦设施］清晰产权及完成［马瓦设施］出售所可能需要的任何文件”；以及 (3) 允许受托人从出售收益中扣除“查封、维护、营销及出售标的财产的任何费用，包括 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）的律师费……”（Dkt. No. 130-5，郭方证据 5 第 22、24 页第 1、3、6 段）。2023年7月13日的“约定事项”是检方与受托人之间“广泛”谈判的产物。（同上，第 7 页第 12 段，第 8 页第 14 段）。然而，“政府对证据的丢失可能剥夺被告获得公正审判的权利。”United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)。“在被告提出请求之前保护 Brady（布雷迪）材料的唯一方法，就是要求政府妥善保管潜在的开脱罪责证据。”United States v. Bakhtiar, 994 F.2d 970, 975 (2d Cir. 1993)。事实上，在受托人就郭先生的中止审理动议通知破产法官的次日，破产法官便修改了关于马瓦设施的初步禁令，以进一步限制进入该设施。（参见 Dkt. No. 2158，In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.，案号 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 30, 2023)；Dkt. No. 58，Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC, et al.，案号 23-5017 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2023)）。因此，为了防止马瓦设施中的证据丢失或毁损，中止审理是必要的。\n\n没收与赔偿。受托人在破产程序中的运作正在迅速耗尽资产和财产，而在本案若出现适于没收或赔偿的情况时，人们本期望检方会寻求对这些资产进行保全。甚至连破产法官也已将这些开支定性为“沉重代价”且“极其巨大”。In re: Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM), 2023 WL 4772420, at *18 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 26, 2023)。而且“在这些第11章案件中，存在并非涉嫌欺诈受害者的债权人。”同上，at *19。在这些情况下，\n\n第1条尾注：根据第 9-13.410 节，联邦检察官在向律师发出传票前必须获得刑事司助理总检察长或副助理总检察长的批准，与该批准相关的“原则”包括：“所寻求的信息不得受有效的特权主张保护。”\n\n第2条尾注：一致判例 Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 285 (E.D. Va. 2001)（“毁灭证据可能导致显失公平和不公，因为它增加了在基础诉因实体问题上做出错误判决的风险，并且随着当事人试图重构被毁灭的证据或形成其他可能不具说服力、不易获得或两者兼具的证据，还可能增加诉讼成本。”）。\n\n尚不清楚为何检方与受托人表现得如此“步调一致”。（Dkt. No. 130-5，郭方证据 5 第 5 页第 6 段）。\n\n检方此前曾在其他场合吹嘘查封了“来自21个不同银行账户的6.34亿美元”，却选择不查封卷入破产案件中且因受托人活动而产生巨额费用的其他资产。在 HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al. 案中，受托人正试图将超过3500万美元追入破产财产中，且受托人承认这些资金与本案相关。（参见，例如，Dkt. No. 23-5013 第 4、39 段，Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023)）。如前所述，检方还同意从出售马瓦设施的任何收益中支付受托人的费用，而不是保全该物业中据检方指称应予没收的重要证据。（参见 Dkt. No. 19 第 55(v) 段；Dkt. No. 38 第 w 段）。\n\n检方允许受托人（Trustee）针对可能予以没收和赔偿的资产采取行动并产生随之而来的费用的决定，与其“受害者权利动议”（Motion For Victim Rights）的基调并不一致。（参见 Dkt. No. 10）。2009年，同一个美国联邦检察官办公室（U.S. Attorney's Office）在针对 Bernard Madoff（伯纳德·麦道夫）的非自愿破产清算申请中，反对指派破产受托人，理由是“[动]议提出人……错误地认为破产诉讼程序是向欺诈案受害者归集和分配资产的适当审判地。”（Dkt. No. 50 第2页，SEC v. Madoff, et al.，No. 08 Civ. 10791 (S.D.N.Y. 2009年4月10日)；另见同前引文（“根据确立已久的回溯原则[relation-back doctrine]，政府对可没收财产的权益自引发没收的违法行为发生之时即已归属……”））。该办公室辩称，“该动议若获批准，将有可能减损受害者的追偿额，因为本可通过没收途径返还给受害者的资金，将不必要地被用于支付破产受托人的费用。”（同前引文第1页；另见同前引文第5页（辩称指派受托人“既会从该罪行受害者可获得的追偿总额中抽走费用，又会延误受害者资金的追回……”））。该办公室在2009年的主张是正确的，而这些原则进一步支持中止破产程序。\n\n* * *\n\n3 美国司法部（DOJ），Ho Wan Kwok，又名“Miles Guo”，因策划逾10亿美元欺诈共谋被捕（2023年3月15日），http\n\n综上所述，Wang（王）女士支持并加入 Kwok（郭）先生在 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.（案号：Dkt. No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.)）一案中提出的中止诉讼程序动议。根据《全令状法》（All Writs Act）及法院固有的监督权力，基于本文、Kwok 先生的动议文件以及检方在 SEC v. Kwok 案（No. 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.)）中请求中止的信函中所阐述的理由，作出此类中止是必要且适当的。（参见 Dkt. No. 130-7）。\n\n/s/\n\n谨此提交，\n\nEmil Bove\n\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC\n\nAlex Lipman Lipman Law PLLC\n\nYanping Wang 的代理律师\n\n抄送：记录在案的代理律师（通过 ECF）","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Je","forfeiture","Yanping Wang","HCHK","Guo","Despins","Torres","Brady","Miles Guo","Analisa Torres","GTV","Paul Hastings","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":10,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":22,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":23,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":38,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":58,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":125,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":130,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":2036,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":2158,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":2096,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:28:39"}