{"id":"court_sdny_157_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":157,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-03-29","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"法院命令——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案关联被告王雅平（Yanping Wang）案由，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #157（2023-10-19 签发）。主审法官 Analisa Torres 就政府请求取消王雅平代理律师 Emil Bove（曾任 SDNY 联邦检察官办公室反恐与国际毒品股联合主管，该股此前调查过同案被告郭文贵）资格一事作出裁定：驳回政府的资格异议动议，同时批准 Bove 一方要求召开 Curcio 听证会以审查潜在利益冲突并征询王雅平是否知情弃权。","summary_en":"Court order — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), relating to co-defendant Yanping Wang, SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #157 (issued 2023-10-19). District Judge Analisa Torres rules on the government's motion to disqualify Wang's counsel Emil Bove — a former Co-Chief of the SDNY U.S. Attorney's Office's Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit, which had previously investigated co-defendant Ho Wan Kwok — denying the disqualification motion while granting Bove's request for a Curcio hearing to address the potential conflict of interest and obtain Wang's informed waiver.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nUSDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ DATE FILED: 10/19/2023\n\n-against-\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nYANPING WANG, **ORDER**\n\n# **ORDER**\n\nDefendant.\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\n\nThe Government moves to disqualify Emil Bove, Esq., former Co-Chief of the Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit (\"TIN\") of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (\"SDNY\"), from representing Defendant, Yanping Wang, in this action. Mot., ECF No. 120; *see* Reply, ECF No. 125. Bove requests that the Court hold a *Curcio*  hearing. Opp., ECF No. 124; Sur-Reply, ECF No. 127; *see United States v. Curcio,* 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982). For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED, and Bove's request for a *Curcio* hearing is GRANTED.\n\n# **BACKGROUND**<sup>1</sup>\n\n### I. Procedural History\n\nPursuant to an indictment dated March 29, 2023, Wang is charged with: (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering; (2) wire fraud; (3) securities fraud; and (4) unlawful monetary transactions. *See* S1 ¶¶ 1–3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 26–36, 51–52, ECF No. 19. Wang and two co-defendants, including Ho Wan Kwok, are charged with defrauding thousands of victims of more than \\$1 billion by using a series of fraudulent\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Court presumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this matter as detailed in prior orders, *see*  ECF No. 56 at 1–9; ECF No. 110 at 1–2, and, therefore, only summarizes those facts necessary for its decision here.\n\nbusinesses and investment opportunities; misappropriating victims' funds by laundering those funds through hundreds of bank accounts associated with at least eighty entities or individuals in several countries; and unlawfully using those funds to enrich themselves. *Id.* ¶¶ 1–3.\n\n On March 20, 2023, Alex Lipman and Priya Chaudhry entered their appearances as counsel for Wang. ECF Nos. 4–5. Four months later, on July 22, 2023, Bove filed a notice of appearance as lead counsel for Wang. ECF No. 112. By letter dated July 22, 2023, Bove stated that Wang \"retained [his] firm, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, to represent her in this matter in lieu of ChaudhryLaw PLLC.”<sup>2</sup> ECF No. 113. By letter dated July 28, 2023, the Government expressed its intention to move to disqualify Bove. ECF No. 117. The Government stated that, after Bove filed his notice of appearance, \"the Government advised [him] that it believes his proposed representation of Wang in this matter implicates the conflict-of-interest provisions of applicable rules of professional conduct.\" *Id.*\n\nThe Government filed its motion on August 4, 2023. Mot. On August 7, 2023, Chaudhry moved to withdraw as Wang's attorney. ECF No. 121; *see* ECF No. 122.\n\n#### II. Factual Background\n\nThe Government argues that Bove should be disqualified based on his tenure as Co-Chief of TIN from September 19, 2019, through December 20, 2021. Mot at 1; *see* Bove Decl. ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 124-1. While Bove served in that capacity, TIN investigated Kwok, one of Wang's codefendants,\n\n<sup>2</sup> Bove is now employed by a different firm, Blanche Law, but has affirmed his intent to continue representing Wang.\n\n(the \"TIN Matter\"). Mot. at 3.\n\n## A. TIN Matter\n\nKwok emigrated from China to the United States in 2015 and later filed an application for political asylum, claiming that he is subject to persecution by the Chinese Communist Party. Mot. at 2. The application remains pending. *Id.* From April 2018 to May 2019, Kwok periodically communicated with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") agent in the hopes of receiving assistance with his asylum application. *Id.* Bove did not play any role in those interactions. Opp. at 3; Bove Decl. ¶ 5.\n\nThe TIN Matter was opened in early September 2019, \"[e]leven days . . . [before] Bove was appointed Co-Chief of TIN.\" Mot. at 3. In late September 2019, the Assistant United States Attorneys (\"AUSAs\") working on the TIN Matter \"drafted, and obtained for the FBI, a warrant to search Kwok's residence at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel in Manhattan\" and a warrant to search \"Kwok's then-office[.]\" *Id.*3 The FBI executed the warrants on October 3, 2019, and seized, *inter alia*, \"more than 100 electronic devices and documents that were stored inside safes.\" *Id.* at 4.\n\n<sup>3</sup> This is the same location where Kwok was arrested in the instant action. Mot. at 4 n.3.\n\nWhen the search warrants were executed, Bove was participating in a trial in *United States v. Hernandez*, 15 Cr. 379 (S.D.N.Y). Opp. at 3; Bove Decl. ¶ 4. The trial ended on October 18, 2019. Opp. at 3. Bove did not review, edit, or authorize the applications for the Kwok search warrants. Bove Decl. ¶¶ 7–8. After the *Hernandez* trial ended, Bove was generally aware that the FBI was reviewing the contents of the seized materials in connection with the TIN Matter, but he does not recall discussing the specific contents of the seized items. *Id.* ¶ 9. Bove provided general supervision to the AUSAs working on the TIN Matter. *Id.* ¶ 11; Ravener Aff. ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No. 128-1; Hanft Aff. ¶ 10, ECF No. 128-2. Bove had access to non-public information. Ravener Aff. ¶¶ 8–11; Hanft Aff. ¶ 10.\n\n#### B. CFU Matter\n\nThe instant matter arises from a separate investigation, conducted by the Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit (\"CFU\") of the United States Attorney's Office for the SDNY, which opened around May 2020 (the \"CFU Matter\"). Mot. at 7. The indictment alleges that Kwok was the leader and director of the fraudulent scheme, and Wang was his \"chief of staff\" and held leadership positions at the entities used to perpetrate the fraud. S1 ¶¶ 6, 8. The CFU Matter and the TIN Matter involve different FBI agents, different AUSAs, and different alleged conduct and targeted offenses, although both matters concern investigations into Kwok and his activities. *See* Mot. at 6–8, 23; Opp. at 16. Although the Government states that Bove was aware of the CFU Matter, it does not allege that he had any supervisory responsibility for the CFU Matter or the AUSAs at its helm. Mot. at 8.\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\n#### I. Legal Standard\n\n\"The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'\" *Wheat v. United States*, 486 U.S. 153, 158 (1988) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI). \"[A]n element of this right is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent [her].\" *United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez*, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006). But the right to counsel of choice \"is circumscribed in several important respects.\" *Wheat*, 486 U.S. at 159. The Supreme Court has \"recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness.\" *Gonzalez-Lopez*, 548 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted). The Court also has an \"independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.\" *Wheat*, 486 U.S. at 160. Therefore, although \"the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom [s]he prefers.\" *Id.* at 159 (citations omitted).\n\nCourts have the authority to disqualify an attorney based on their \"inherent power to 'preserve the integrity of the adversary process.'\" *Streichert v. Town of Chester*, No. 19 Civ. 7133, 2021 WL 735475, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2021) (quoting *Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream*, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2005)). Disqualification is \"reserved for situations of prior representation, conflicts of interest, prosecutorial misconduct, and other\n\nunethical attorney behavior.\" *United States v. Stewart*, 294 F. Supp. 2d 490, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). \"Although courts look to state disciplinary rules which provide valuable guidance when considering motions for disqualification, a violation of those rules may not warrant disqualification.\" *United States v. Schulte*, No. 17 Cr. 548, 2020 WL 534508, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2020).\n\n\"Motions to disqualify are generally not favored,\" and, because they are \"often tactically motivated\" and \"tend to derail the efficient progress of litigation,\" parties moving for disqualification \"carry a heavy burden and must satisfy a high standard of proof.\" *Felix v. Balkin*, 49 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Parties cannot meet this burden by putting forth \"mere speculation\" or arguing in favor of the \"mere appearance of impropriety.\" *Streichert*, 2021 WL 735475, at \\*5 (cleaned up). Ultimately, a motion to disqualify an attorney \"is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.\" *Schulte*, 2020 WL 534508, at \\*4 (quoting *Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell*, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990)).\n\n#### II. Application\n\n#### A. Disqualification\n\nWhen the moving party is a former client of the adverse party's counsel as here, the challenged attorney may be disqualified if: (1) there is a \"substantial relationship between the subject matter of [his] prior representation of the moving party and the issues in the present lawsuit\"; and (2) he \"had access to, or was likely to have had access to, the relevant privileged information in the course of his prior representation of the client.\" *United States v. Prevezon*\n\n*Holdings Ltd.*, 839 F.3d 227, 239 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing *Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp.*, 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983)).\n\nThe Government fails to establish the first prong, that a \"substantial relationship\" exists between the TIN Matter and the CFU Matter. The parties point to different standards to be applied in determining whether the two matters are \"substantially related.\" Bove cites *Government of India v. Cook Industries, Inc.* for the proposition that the Government must establish that the matters are \"identical\" or \"essentially the same.\" Opp. at 15 (citing *Cook Industries*, 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978)). The Government cites *Prevezon*, for the proposition that a \"'substantial relationship' exists where facts pertinent to the problems underlying the prior representation are relevant to the subsequent representation.\" Mot. at 14 (citing 839 F.3d at 239). Courts are divided on how they apply the two \"substantial relationship\" standards. *See United States v. Huawei Techs. Co.*, No. 18 Cr. 457, 2020 WL 903007, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020) (collecting cases).\n\nBut, under either test, the TIN Matter is not \"substantially related\" to the CFU Matter. Both tests turn on \"whether the successive representations share common material factual issues.\" *Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co.*, 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 272–73 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); *see Revise Clothing, Inc. v. Joe's Jeans Subsidiary, Inc.*, 687 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"It is the congruence of factual matters, rather than areas of law, that establishes a substantial relationship between representations for disqualification purposes.\") (collecting cases). Subsequent representations are substantially related \"if the witnesses, testimony, and other evidence germane to one action are likely to be similar to the other.\" *New York v. Monfort Tr.*, No. 12 Civ. 3755, 2014 WL 5018607, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014) (citations omitted).\n\nHaving closely reviewed the parties' filings, including the *ex parte* and classified submissions, the Court concludes that the two matters do not share common material factual issues and that the \"witnesses, testimony, and other evidence germane\" to the TIN Matter are not \"likely to be similar\" to those in the CFU Matter. *Id.* As stated above, the two matters involve different investigative units, different FBI agents, different AUSAs, and different alleged conduct. *See* Mot. at 6–8, 23; Opp. at 16. The fact that Kwok was \"the *focus* of the TIN Matter,\" Mot. at 20, does not establish that the matters are \"substantially related\" where those two investigations concerned different conduct. Further, the fact that Kwok was the focus of two separate investigations is not enough to establish that the two matters are substantially related as to Wang. Nor is the fact that the two investigations briefly overlapped in time sufficient for a finding of substantial relatedness. *See* Mot. at 21. In fact, many of the entities controlled by Wang and her co-defendants did not exist at the time Bove supervised the TIN Matter. *See* S1 ¶¶ 13–23.\n\nThe Court also rejects the Government's argument that the matters are substantially related because \"the Government may offer evidence or call witnesses in its case-in-chief, or as part of a rebuttal case, related to the TIN Matter.\" Mot. 22. The Government contends that\n\nLikewise, the Government also argues that\n\nThe Court agrees with the Government that there is a potential conflict between Bove's tenure as Co-Chief of TIN and his current representation of Wang. But the Court disagrees that this potential conflict is a ground for disqualification. The Government's arguments are based on \"mere speculation,\" *Streichert*, 2021 WL 735475, at \\*5, and the mere possibility that evidence and witnesses from an unrelated investigation may be introduced in the instant matter is not enough to find that they are \"substantially related.\"<sup>4</sup> This is particularly true given that the Government does not explain\n\n\"matter.\"\n\nRather, for the reasons stated in more detail below, the potential conflict raised by the Government may be cured by a knowing and intelligent waiver at a *Curcio* hearing. 5 And similarly, for the reasons stated below, the Court also rejects the Government's argument that Bove should be disqualified because \"Wang will not be able adequately to waive any conflict created by Bove's role[, and a]s a result, any conviction would likely be vulnerable to an appeal or collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.\" Mot. at 26–27.\n\n<sup>4</sup> The cases cited by the Government which refer to the \"potential\" that confidential information could be shared, *see* Mot. at 13–14, are inapposite. The \"potential\" language in those cases does not apply to the \"substantial relation\" prong of the *Evans* test. *See, e.g.*, *Giambrone*, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 269; *Pergament v. Ladak*, No. Civ. 2011-2797, 2013 WL 3810188, at \\*3 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013); *see also United States v. James*, 708 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1983). <sup>5</sup> For substantially the same reasons, the Court concludes that Bove should not be disqualified under New York Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11(a)(2) or 18 U.S.C. § 207 because the TIN Matter and the CFU Matter are not the same\n\nThe Court finds that the Government has failed to \"carry [its] heavy burden and . . . satisfy a high standard of proof\" to justify disqualification. *Felix*, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 267. Accordingly, the Government's motion is DENIED.\n\n#### B. *Curcio* Hearing\n\n\"The right to effective assistance of counsel also includes the right to be represented by an attorney who is free from conflicts of interest.\" *United States v. Perez*, 325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003). \"When a district court is sufficiently apprised of even the possibility of a conflict of interest, the court first has an 'inquiry' obligation.\" *United States v. Levy*, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1994). A court informed of a possible conflict of interest must \"investigate the facts and details of the attorney's interest to determine whether the attorney in fact suffers from an actual conflict, a potential conflict, or no genuine conflict at all.\" *Id.* If the court determines that there exists a \"severe conflict—such that no rational defendant would knowingly and intelligently desire the conflicted lawyer's representation,\" the court is required to disqualify the attorney. *Id.*; *see also United States v. Fulton*, 5 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 1993). If the court determines that the attorney suffers from a \"lesser or only a potential conflict,\" the court should conduct a *Curcio* hearing and may accept a defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to conflict-free counsel and permit the defendant to be represented by the attorney of her choice. *Levy*, 25 F.3d at 153.\n\nA potential conflict of interest exists when \"the interests of the defendant may place the attorney under inconsistent duties at some time in the future\" that \"result[] in prejudice to the defendant.\" *Perez*, 325 F.3d at 125 (citation omitted); *see Levy*, 25 F.3d at 152. \"Where the right to counsel of choice conflicts with the right to an attorney of undivided loyalty, the choice\n\ns to which right is to take precedence must generally be left to the defendant and not be dictated\nby the government.” *Perez*, 325 F.3d at 125.\n\nHere, the Court concludes that a potential conflict of interest exists because “the interests\nof [Wang] may place [Bove] under inconsistent duties at some time in the future.” *Id*. (cleaned\nup). Therefore, a *Curcio* hearing is appropriate. As the Government contends, [redacted]\n\n![](_page_10_Figure_3.jpeg)\n\nconflict of interest. 6 But such a conflict can be knowingly and intelligently waived so that Wang can be represented by her attorney of choice. *Levy*, 25 F.3d at 153. “Although such a conflict might require a defendant to abandon a particular defense or line of questioning, [s]he can be advised as to what [s]he must forgo.” *Perez*, 325 F.3d at 127. In other words, so long as the attorney’s conflict does not “jeopardize[] the integrity of judicial proceedings,” courts “will not\n\n![](_page_10_Picture_5.jpeg)\n\n'assume too paternalistic an attitude in protecting the defendant from [her]self.'\" *Id.* at 125–26 (quoting *Curcio*, 694 F.2d at 25)).\n\nAt the *Curcio* hearing, the Court shall advise Wang that Bove's prior government service will bar him from advancing certain defense strategies, and that if Wang nonetheless elects to retain Bove, she must fully abandon certain defenses. *See id.*; *United States v. Sterritt*, No. 21 Cr. 193, 2021 WL 4237112, at \\*2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021) (conducting a *Curcio* hearing to advise the defendant that he must waive certain defenses if he chooses to keep his retained counsel, even if that \"limitation may impair [the attorney's] ability to give [the defendant] the full, vigorous defense that [he is] entitled to\"); *see also United States v. Arrington*, 941 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir. 2019) (\"[D]istrict courts must at least advise the defendant of the dangers arising from the particular conflict . . . [w]here, as here, those dangers include giving up . . . strategic advantages.\" (citation omitted)). 7 Specifically, the Court shall advise Wang that if she decides to retain Bove and make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his potential conflict, she will be precluded from (1) arguing as a defense that her alleged misconduct was in opposition to the Chinese Communist Party; and (2) arguing that she was acting at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\n\nFurther, the Court does not opine on whether Bove would be disqualified from representing Kwok, and that question is not before the Court. *Cf.* Reply at 6. However, counsel for Kwok has represented that Kwok intends to raise the defense that GTV, the social media\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Court makes the determination of potential conflicts \"not with the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pre-trial context\" where \"[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict.\" *Wheat*, 486 U.S. at 162. The Court is not required to wait until an actual conflict of interest before taking action; indeed, the *Curcio* hearing is designed to waive potential conflicts of interest. The Court's task is to \"alert the defendant[] to the substance of the dangers\" of the conflict \"in as much detail as the court's experience and its knowledge of the case will permit.\" *Curcio*, 680 F.2d at 888.\n\nplatform at issue in the indictment, ECF No. 19 ¶ 10, \"was founded to be a platform for anti- [Chinese Communist Party] activity.\" ECF No. 131 at 20. The Court shall not request that Kwok, who is not a party to this hearing, waive potential defenses to support Wang's retaining Bove as counsel. Therefore, the Court shall advise Wang that if she decides to retain Bove and make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his potential conflict, she must forfeit the option of entering a joint defense agreement with Kwok. *See Perez*, 325 F.3d at 127; *Arrington*, 941 F.3d at 43; *see* Reply at 7 (discussing a potential joint defense agreement between Wang and Kwok).\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Government's motion is DENIED, and Bove's request for a *Curcio* hearing is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 120 and 121. The Court shall address Chaudhry's motion to withdraw as Wang's attorney after the *Curcio* hearing.\n\nThe *Curcio* hearing is scheduled for **October 30, 2023**, at **10:00 a.m.** At the hearing, the Court shall proceed with questioning as outlined in this order. The Court also directs that the CJA attorney on duty on October 30, 2023, Louis Fasulo, shall be appointed to represent Wang at the *Curcio* hearing and shall be available to consult with Wang before and during the *Curcio* hearing. By **October 23, 2023**, the parties may submit, for the Court's consideration, proposed questions to be posed to Wang at the *Curcio* hearing.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: October 19, 2023 New York, New York\n\nIllegible Signature\n\n---","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\nUSDC SDNY（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）电子归档文件 案卷编号：_________________ 归档日期：10/19/2023\n\n-诉-\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），\n裁定\n\n裁定\n\n被告。\n\n地区法官 ANALISA TORRES（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）：\n\n政府方提请动议，请求取消前 United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦检察官办公室，简称“SDNY”）Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit（恐怖主义与国际毒品组，简称“TIN”）联席主管 Emil Bove（埃米尔·博夫）律师在本案中担任被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）辩护律师的资格。动议，ECF No. 120；参见答辩回复，ECF No. 125。Bove 请求法院举行 Curcio 听证。反对意见，ECF No. 124；二次答辩回复，ECF No. 127；参见 United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982)。基于下文所述理由，该动议被驳回（DENIED），Bove 举行 Curcio 听证的请求获准（GRANTED）。\n\n背景 1\n\nI. 诉讼历程\n\n根据日期为 2023 年 3 月 29 日的起诉书，Wang 被指控犯有：(1) 共谋电汇欺诈、证券欺诈、银行欺诈及洗钱罪；(2) 电汇欺诈罪；(3) 证券欺诈罪；以及 (4) 非法金钱交易罪。参见 S1 ¶¶ 1–3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 26–36, 51–52, ECF No. 19。Wang 及包括 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）在内的两名同案被告，被指控通过一系列欺诈性\n\n1 本法院推定知悉先前裁定中详述的本案事实及诉讼历程，参见 ECF No. 56 第 1–9 页；ECF No. 110 第 1–2 页，因此，在此仅概述本裁定所必需的事实。\n\n商业与投资机会，诈骗数千名受害者逾 $1 billion；通过与数个国家的至少八十个实体或个人关联的数百个银行账户清洗受害者资金以进行侵吞；并不法使用这些资金使自身牟利。同上 ¶¶ 1–3。\n\n2023 年 3 月 20 日，Alex Lipman（亚历克斯·利普曼）与 Priya Chaudhry（普里亚·乔杜里）作为 Wang 的辩护律师出庭应诉。ECF Nos. 4–5。四个月后，即 2023 年 7 月 22 日，Bove 提交了作为 Wang 首席辩护律师的出庭通知书。ECF No. 112。在日期为 2023 年 7 月 22 日的信函中，Bove 说明 Wang“聘请了[其]所在的 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 律师事务所代表其处理本案，以取代 ChaudhryLaw PLLC。”2 ECF No. 113。在日期为 2023 年 7 月 28 日的信函中，政府方表示其有意提请动议取消 Bove 的代理资格。ECF No. 117。政府方表示，在 Bove 提交出庭通知书后，“政府方已告知[其]，认为其拟在本案中代表 Wang 涉及适用职业操守规则中的利益冲突条款。”同上。\n\n政府方于 2023 年 8 月 4 日提交了动议。动议。2023 年 8 月 7 日，Chaudhry 提请动议辞任 Wang 的律师。ECF No. 121；参见 ECF No. 122。\n\nII. 事实背景\n\n政府方主张，鉴于 Bove 自 2019 年 9 月 19 日至 2021 年 12 月 20 日期间担任 TIN 联席主管的任职经历，应当取消其代理资格。动议第 1 页；参见 Bove 声明 ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 124-1。在 Bove 以该身份任职期间，TIN 曾对 Wang 的同案被告之一 Kwok 展开调查\n\n2 Bove 现任职于另一家律师事务所 Blanche Law，但已确认其继续代表 Wang 的意向。\n\n（简称“TIN 案件”）。动议第 3 页。\n\nA. TIN 案件\n\nKwok 于 2015 年从中国移民至美国，随后提交了政治庇护申请，声称其遭受中国共产党的迫害。动议第 2 页。该申请仍在审理中。同上。自 2018 年 4 月至 2019 年 5 月，Kwok 定期与一名 Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局，简称“FBI”）特别探员沟通，希望在其庇护申请方面获得协助。同上。Bove 在这些互动中未扮演任何角色。反对意见第 3 页；Bove 声明 ¶ 5。\n\nTIN 案件于 2019 年 9 月初立案，“在 Bove 被任命为 TIN 联席主管前……十一天”。动议第 3 页。2019 年 9 月下旬，办理 TIN 案件的 Assistant United States Attorneys（助理联邦检察官，简称“AUSA”）“为 FBI 起草并取得了搜查 Kwok 位于曼哈顿 Sherry-Netherland Hotel（雪莉-尼德兰酒店）住所的搜查令”以及搜查“Kwok 当时的办公室”的搜查令。同上 3。FBI 于 2019 年 10 月 3 日执行了上述搜查令，并扣押了包括“存放于保险箱内的 100 多台电子设备及文件”等物品。同上第 4 页。\n\n3 此处与 Kwok 在本案中被捕的地点相同。动议第 4 页脚注 3。\n\n在搜查令执行时，Bove 正在参与 United States v. Hernandez, 15 Cr. 379 (S.D.N.Y) 一案的庭审。反对意见第 3 页；Bove 声明 ¶ 4。该庭审于 2019 年 10 月 18 日结束。反对意见第 3 页。Bove 未审查、修改或批准针对 Kwok 的搜查令申请。Bove 声明 ¶¶ 7–8。在 Hernandez 案庭审结束后，Bove 大致知晓 FBI 正在就 TIN 案件审查所扣押材料的内容，但其不记得曾讨论过被扣押物品的具体内容。同上 ¶ 9。Bove 对承办 TIN 案件的 AUSA 进行了常规监督。同上 ¶ 11；Ravener 宣誓书 ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No. 128-1；Hanft 宣誓书 ¶ 10, ECF No. 128-2。Bove 有权限接触非公开信息。Ravener 宣誓书 ¶¶ 8–11；Hanft 宣誓书 ¶ 10。\n\nB. CFU 案件\n\n本案源于一项由 SDNY 联邦检察官办公室 Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit（复杂欺诈与网络犯罪组，简称“CFU”）开展的独立调查，该调查于 2020 年 5 月前后立案（简称“CFU 案件”）。动议第 7 页。起诉书指控 Kwok 是该欺诈计划的头目和指挥者，而 Wang 是其“幕僚长”并在用于实施欺诈的实体中担任领导职务。S1 ¶¶ 6, 8。CFU 案件与 TIN 案件涉及不同的 FBI 探员、不同的 AUSA 以及不同被指控行为和目标罪名，尽管两起案件均涉及对 Kwok 及其活动的调查。参见动议第 6–8, 23 页；反对意见第 16 页。尽管政府方指出 Bove 知晓 CFU 案件，但并未指控其对 CFU 案件或主持该案的 AUSA 负有任何监督职责。动议第 8 页。\n\n讨论\n\nI. 法律标准\n\n“《宪法》第六修正案保障‘在一切刑事指控中，被告人享有……获得律师协助为其辩护的权利。’”Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158 (1988)（引用 U.S. Const. amend. VI）。“该权利的一项要素是，不需要指定律师的被告人有权选择由谁来代表[她]。”United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006)。但选择律师的权利“在几个重要方面受到限制”。Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159。最高法院已“承认审判法院在平衡选择律师的权利与公正要求方面享有广泛的裁量权”。Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152（引文省略）。法院亦负有“确保刑事审判在专业职业道德标准内进行以及诉讼程序对所有旁观者显失公允的外观保障方面的独立利益”。Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160。因此，尽管“第六修正案包含选择并由自己首选的律师代表的权利，但该修正案的根本目的在于为每位刑事被告人保障一名有效的辩护人，而非确保被告人必定由[她]所偏好的律师代表。”同上第 159 页（引文省略）。\n\n基于其“维护对抗制程序完整性的固有权力”，法院有权取消律师的代理资格。Streichert v. Town of Chester, No. 19 Civ. 7133, 2021 WL 735475, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2021)（援引 Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2005)）。取消代理资格“专用于涉及先前代理、利益冲突、检察官不当行为以及其他\n\n不道德律师行为的情形。”United States v. Stewart, 294 F. Supp. 2d 490, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)。“尽管法院在审理取消资格动议时会参考提供宝贵指引的州纪律规则，但违反这些规则可能并不必然构成取消资格的根据。”United States v. Schulte, No. 17 Cr. 548, 2020 WL 534508, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2020)。\n\n“取消资格的动议通常不受青睐”，且因其“往往带有战术动机”且“倾向于扰乱诉讼的有效推进”，提出取消资格动议的当事人“承担沉重的举证责任，且必须满足严格的证明标准。”Felix v. Balkin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)（引号及引文省略）。当事人不能通过提出“单纯的推测”或主张“仅仅存在不当行为的外观”来完成该举证责任。Streichert, 2021 WL 735475, at *5（格式清理）。归根结底，取消律师代理资格的动议“属于地区法院合理自由裁量权范围内的事项。”Schulte, 2020 WL 534508, at *4（援引 Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990)）。\n\nII. 适用\n\nA. 取消代理资格\n\n当动议方系如本案中对方律师的前委托人时，在下列情形下可取消该受质疑律师的代理资格：(1) [其]先前对动议方的代理标的与本诉讼中的争议焦点之间存在“实质性关联”；以及 (2) 其在其先前代理该委托人的过程中“接触过或可能接触过相关的特权保密信息”。United States v. Prevezon\n\nHoldings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 239 (2d Cir. 2016)（引用 Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983)）。\n\n政府方未能确立第一项要件，即未能证明 TIN 案件与 CFU 案件之间存在“实质性关联”。在确定两起案件是否“实质相关”时，双方当事人援引了适用的不同标准。Bove 援引 Government of India v. Cook Industries, Inc.，主张政府方必须证明上述案件“相同”或“本质上相同”。反对意见第 15 页（引用 Cook Industries, 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978)）。政府方援引 Prevezon，主张“如果与先前代理基础问题相关的事实对于随后的代理具有关联性，则存在‘实质性关联’”。动议第 14 页（引用 839 F.3d at 239）。法院在如何适用这两种“实质性关联”标准上存在分歧。参见 United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 18 Cr. 457, 2020 WL 903007, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020)（汇集判例）。\n\n然而，无论依据何种检验标准，TIN 案件均与 CFU 案件不构成“实质相关”。两种检验标准均取决于“先后进行的代理是否涉及共同的重要事实问题”。Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 272–73 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)；参见 Revise Clothing, Inc. v. Joe's Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)（“出于取消资格之目的确立代理之间实质性关联的，是事实问题的一致性，而非法律领域的一致性。”）（汇集判例）。“如果与一起诉讼密切相关的证人、证言及其他证据很可能与另一起诉讼相似”，则随后的代理即构成实质相关。New York v. Monfort Tr., No. 12 Civ. 3755, 2014 WL 5018607, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014)（引文省略）。\n\n在仔细审查了当事各方的提交文件，包括单方（ex parte）及机密提交文件后，本法院认定，这两起案件并不具有共同的实质性事实争议，且与 TIN 案“有密切关系的证人、证言及其他证据”在 CFU 案中并非“可能相似”。同上。如上所述，这两起案件涉及不同的调查部门、不同的 FBI（联邦调查局）特别探员、不同的 AUSA（联邦助理检察官）以及所指控的不同行为。参见 Mot. 第 6–8、23 页；Opp. 第 16 页。即便 Kwok（郭文贵）是“TIN 案的焦点”（Mot. 第 20 页），在两项调查涉及不同行为的情况下，这一事实亦不能确立两案存在“实质关联”。此外，郭文贵是两项独立调查的焦点这一事实，不足以确立两起案件在针对 Wang（王雁平）方面存在实质关联。两项调查在时间上存在短暂重叠的事实，同样不足以作为认定实质关联性的依据。参见 Mot. 第 21 页。事实上，在 Bove（博夫）主管 TIN 案时，王雁平及其共同被告人控制的许多实体根本尚不存在。参见 S1 ¶¶ 13–23。\n\n本法院亦驳回政府方关于两案存在实质关联的主张，该主张认为“政府方可能在其实质案情举证阶段，或作为反驳案情举证的一部分，提出与 TIN 案相关的证据或传唤相关证人”。Mot. 第 22 页。政府方主张\n\n同样，政府方亦辩称\n\n本法院认同政府方关于博夫担任 TIN 联席主管的任职经历与其目前代理王雁平之间存在潜在利益冲突的意见。但本法院不认同该潜在冲突构成取消其代理资格的理由。政府方的论点建立在“纯粹的推测”之上，Streichert, 2021 WL 735475, at *5，且仅凭一项不相关调查中的证据和证人可能被引入本案的微小可能性，不足以认定它们存在“实质关联”。4 鉴于政府方并未解释这一点，情况尤其如此\n\n“案件”。\n\n相反，基于下文更详细说明的理由，政府方提出的潜在冲突可通过在 Curcio 听证会上的知情且明智的弃权得以解决。5 并且同样基于下文所述理由，本法院亦驳回政府方关于应取消博夫代理资格的主张，该主张认为“王雁平将无法充分放弃因博夫角色所造成的任何冲突，[并且]因此，基于律师协助无效的主张，任何定罪很可能在面临上诉或附随性攻击时不堪一击”。Mot. 第 26–27 页。\n\n4 政府方所引用的提及存在保密信息可能被共享之“潜在可能性”的案例（参见 Mot. 第 13–14 页）并不适用。这些案例中“潜在”的措辞不适用于 Evans 测试中的“实质关联”要件。参见例如 Giambrone, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 269；Pergament v. Ladak, No. Civ. 2011-2797, 2013 WL 3810188, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013)；另见 United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1983)。5 基于基本相同的理由，本法院认定不应依据《New York Rule of Professional Conduct（纽约州职业行为准则）》第 1.11(a)(2) 条或 18 U.S.C. § 207 取消博夫的代理资格，因为 TIN 案与 CFU 案并非同一\n\n本法院认定，政府方未能“承担其沉重举证责任并……达到严格的证明标准”以证明取消代理资格的合理性。Felix, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 267。因此，政府方的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n\nB. Curcio 听证会\n\n“获得有效律师协助的权利亦包括由不存在利益冲突的律师代表的权利。”United States v. Perez, 325 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2003)。“当地方法院充分知悉甚至存在利益冲突的可能性时，法院首先负有‘调查’义务。”United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1994)。获知可能存在利益冲突的法院必须“调查律师利益的事实和细节，以确定该律师实际上是否存在实际冲突、潜在冲突，抑或根本不存在真正的冲突。”同上。若法院认定存在“严重的冲突——以至于任何理性的被告人都不会知情且明智地希望由该存在冲突的律师代理”，则法院必须取消该律师的代理资格。同上；另见 United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 1993)。若法院认定该律师存在“较轻微或仅存在潜在的冲突”，法院应举行 Curcio 听证会，并可接受被告人对其获得无利益冲突律师代理之权利的知情且明智的弃权，允许被告人由其选择的律师代理。Levy, 25 F.3d at 153。\n\n潜在利益冲突是指“被告人的利益可能在未来某个时间使律师承担相互矛盾的职责”，并“导致对被告人产生偏见或损害”。Perez, 325 F.3d at 125（引用省略）；参见 Levy, 25 F.3d at 152。“在选择律师的权利与获得完全忠实律师的权利发生冲突时，\n\n哪项权利优先的选择权通常必须留给被告人，而不能由政府强加。”Perez, 325 F.3d at 125。\n\n在本案中，本法院认定存在潜在利益冲突，因为“王雁平的利益可能在未来某个时间使博夫承担相互矛盾的职责”。同上。（清理后引文）。因此，举行 Curcio 听证会是适当的。正如政府方所主张的，[已遮盖]\n\n利益冲突。6 但该等冲突可以被知情且明智地放弃，从而使王雁平能够由其选择的律师代理。Levy, 25 F.3d at 153。“尽管此类冲突可能要求被告人放弃特定的辩护策略或质问方向，但可就其必须放弃的事项向其提供告知建议。”Perez, 325 F.3d at 127。换言之，只要律师的冲突不“危害司法程序的公正性”，法院“在保护被告人不受自身影响方面就不会\n\n‘采取过于家长式的态度。’”同上，第 125–26 页（引自 Curcio, 694 F.2d at 25）。\n\n在 Curcio 听证会上，本法院应告知王雁平：博夫先前的政府公职经历将禁止其提出某些辩护策略，若王雁平仍选择聘请博夫，她必须完全放弃某些抗辩。参见同上；United States v. Sterritt, No. 21 Cr. 193, 2021 WL 4237112, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021)（举行 Curcio 听证会以告知被告人，若其选择保留其聘请的律师，则必须放弃某些抗辩，即使该“限制可能会削弱[该律师]向[被告人]提供[其有权获得的]全面、有力辩护的能力”）；另见 United States v. Arrington, 941 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir. 2019)（“[若]如本案所示，这些危险包括放弃……战略优势，……地方法院必须至少告知被告人因特定冲突而产生的危险。”（引用省略））。7 具体而言，本法院应告知王雁平，若她决定聘请博夫并就其潜在冲突作出知情且明智的弃权，她将被禁止：(1) 将其被指控的不当行为系出于反对中国共产党作为抗辩理由提出；以及 (2) 主张其系受 Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）指使行事。\n\n此外，关于博夫是否会被取消代理郭文贵的资格，本法院不予置评，且该问题并未提交本法院审理。比照 Reply 第 6 页。然而，郭文贵的辩护律师已陈述，郭文贵意图提出抗辩，主张起诉书（ECF No. 19 ¶ 10）中所涉社交媒体平台 GTV“成立的初衷是作为一个反[中国共产党]活动的平台”。ECF No. 131 第 20 页。郭文贵并非本次听证会的当事方，本法院不应要求其放弃潜在抗辩以支持王雁平聘请博夫担任律师。因此，本法院应告知王雁平，若她决定聘请博夫并就其潜在冲突作出知情且明智的弃权，她必须放弃与郭文贵达成共同防范协议（joint defense agreement）的选项。参见 Perez, 325 F.3d at 127；Arrington, 941 F.3d at 43；参见 Reply 第 7 页（讨论王雁平与郭文贵之间潜在的共同防范协议）。\n\n7 本法院认定潜在冲突“并非在审判发生后凭借后见之明，而是在更为模糊的审前背景下”，在此背景下“新生利益冲突的可能性和范围是出了名的难以预测”。Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162。本法院无需等到出现实际利益冲突后才采取行动；事实上，Curcio 听证会正是为了放弃潜在利益冲突而设计的。法院的任务是“在法院的经验及其对案件的了解所允许的范围内，尽可能详细地提醒被告人注意冲突危险的实质内容”。Curcio, 680 F.2d at 888。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，政府方的动议被驳回（DENIED），博夫关于举行 Curcio 听证会的请求被准予（GRANTED）。书记官长奉命终结 ECF Nos. 120 和 121 项下的动议。本法院将在 Curcio 听证会之后处理 Chaudhry（乔杜里）关于退出担任王雁平律师的动议。\n\nCurcio 听证会定于 2023年10月30日 上午 10:00 举行。在听证会上，本法院应按照本裁定所概述的内容进行讯问。本法院亦指示，任命 2023年10月30日 的 CJA（刑事司法法案）值班律师 Louis Fasulo（路易斯·法苏洛）在 Curcio 听证会上代表王雁平，并应可在 Curcio 听证会之前及进行期间供王雁平咨询。在 2023年10月23日 之前，当事各方可向本法院提交拟在 Curcio 听证会上向王雁平提出的拟议问题，供法院考量。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n日期：2023年10月19日 纽约州纽约市\n\n签名（字迹不可辨认）","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Chinese Communist Party","Yanping Wang","Ho Wan Kwok","Torres","Analisa Torres","GTV","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":56,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":110,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":112,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":113,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":117,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":120,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":121,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":122,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":124,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":125,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":127,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":128,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":3539,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-03-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-03-29","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:33:39"}