{"id":"court_sdny_160_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":160,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2023-10-19","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"政府反对强制执行动议备忘录 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）等案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #160（2023年10月19日）。被告 Kwok 要求政府提供与美国证券交易委员会（SEC）及破产受信人的通讯记录；政府反对，主张 SEC 和受信人均未参与起诉策略制定，政府与两方的协调属常规且恰当行为，不存在坏信问题，并指控 Kwok 的共谋者在起诉被公开后篡改了涉案房产 Mahwah Mansion。","summary_en":"Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Compel — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Miles Guo, Miles Kwok, Guo Wengui, Brother Seven, The Principal), Kin Ming Je (a/k/a William Je), and Yanping Wang (a/k/a Yvette), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #160 (filed Oct. 19, 2023). Defendant Kwok sought discovery of Government communications with the SEC and the bankruptcy Trustee; the Government opposed, arguing that neither entity participated in prosecutorial decisions or strategy development, and that information sharing with both was routine and unexceptional, evidencing no bad faith. The Government also alleged that Kwok's co-conspirators tampered with the Mahwah Mansion property after the indictment's allegations were unsealed.","body_en":"## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\"\n\nKIN MING JE, a/k/a \"William Je,\" and\n\nYANPING WANG, a/k/a \"Yvette,\"\n\nDefendants.\n\n**S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\n## **THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL**\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York One St. Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys *Of Counsel*\n\n| BACKGROUND  1                                                               |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| I. The Mahwah Mansion  1                                                    |\n| II. Kwok's Bankruptcy Stay Motion  5                                        |\n| III. The Instant Motion  7                                                  |\n| ARGUMENT  7                                                                 |\n| I. Kwok Has Failed to Establish a Valid Basis For His Discovery Requests  7 |\n| A. Applicable Law  7                                                        |\n| B. Discussion  13                                                           |\n| 1. Kwok's Request for SEC Communications Should Be Denied  14               |\n| 2. Kwok's Request for Trustee Communications Should Be Denied  19           |\n| CONCLUSION  25                                                              |\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nKwok's motion seeking beyond-Rule-16 discovery—the Government's communications with the Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\") and with Kwok's bankruptcy trustee (\"Trustee\")—is wholly unfounded. At best, Kwok's extraordinary discovery request is based on facts that are decidedly ordinary. The Government and the SEC conducted parallel investigations, and Kwok identifies nothing unusual about the Government's interactions with the SEC whatsoever, much less the substantial showing of bad faith required to receive the sort of discovery that Kwok seeks. So too with the Trustee. It is common—indeed, it is a best practice—for criminal prosecutors to coordinate and reach agreements with trustees where, as here, there are forfeitable assets that may also fall within the trustee's estate. Kwok's claims of spoliation with respect to the property located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 (the \"Mahwah Mansion\") are borderline frivolous. That is particularly true in view of the undisputed fact that Kwok's co-conspirators and associates, following Kwok's arrest and the unsealing of the Indictment's allegations regarding the Mahwah Mansion, tampered with the condition of the Mahwah Mansion to bolster Kwok's defense in this case—that is, they have fabricated evidence to obstruct justice in this very case. Kwok's other claims, regarding invasion of privilege (which has not happened, and simply would not happen) and a purported joint prosecution with the Trustee (for which there is no basis at all), are equally unfounded. There is simply nothing in the record indicative of any bad faith on the part of the Government. Kwok's motion should be denied without a hearing.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n#### <span id=\"page-2-1\"></span><span id=\"page-2-0\"></span>**I. The Mahwah Mansion**\n\nThe Mahwah Mansion was purchased, renovated, and furnished with proceeds of the fraud\n\ncharged in the Indictment—specifically, G|CLUBS membership funds that were funneled through bank accounts in other entities' names. (Dkt. 19 (\"Indictment\") ¶¶ 4, 16(b)-(c)). As alleged in the Indictment, Kwok and his conspirators used G|CLUBS to defraud victims by falsely promising them purportedly highly valuable stock in GTV (*i.e.*, using G|CLUBS as a vehicle to continue the unlawful private placement offering after the SEC intervened to stop the GTV offering) and falsely promising them \"a full spectrum of services\" once they became G|CLUBS \"members.\" (*Id*. ¶ 15). The Mahwah Mansion and furnishings that were purchased with misappropriated G|CLUBS membership funds were identified as specific property subject to forfeiture in the Indictment. (*Id.*  ¶ 55(v)).\n\nAs previously described (*see* Dkt. 148, at 2-4), on March 15, 2023, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") executed a search warrant at the Mahwah Mansion. Multiple FBI photographers meticulously documented the premises and its contents, taking over 2,000 photographs during the search, which photographs have been produced to the defendants in discovery. The FBI also conducted aerial surveillance of the Mahwah Mansion prior to the search, which photographs and videos have been produced to the defendants. The Government also seized voluminous physical evidence from the Mahwah Mansion, including, for example, electronic devices, Kwok's personal items (*e.g.*, custom-designed Brioni suits embroidered with Kwok's name), and certain of the extravagant furnishings purchased with misappropriated G|CLUBS membership funds.\n\nSubsequent to the Government's public filing of the Indictment, which associated Kwok with the Mahwah Mansion, the defendants' associates and co-conspirators began to occupy the Mahwah Mansion. For example, on April 9, 2023, dozens of the defendants' associates went to the Mahwah Mansion to protest the defendants' detention, and on May 5, 2023, the defendants'\n\nassociates hosted another large gathering at the Mahwah Mansion. These activities threatened to diminish the value of the Mahwah Mansion.\n\nOn or about June 28, 2023, the Trustee advised the Government that he had concluded that the Mahwah Mansion is property of Kwok's chapter 11 estate; accordingly, the Trustee and the Government conferred regarding the possible disposition of the Mahwah Mansion. Unlike chattel or funds in a bank account, the Government generally cannot seize real property with a forfeiturebased seizure warrant prior to a final order of forfeiture—which order would come only after a criminal conviction, at the conclusion of the subsequent ancillary forfeiture proceeding. Given that the defendants' associates were actively using the Mahwah Mansion (itself purchased with fraud proceeds), and that their occupation of the Mahwah Mansion threatened to dissipate the property's substantial value to both the Bankruptcy creditors and the victims of Kwok's fraud in the Government's criminal case, on July 6, 2023, the Government provided the Trustee with 12 photographs taken during the Government's March 15, 2023 search, illustrating that Kwok used the Mahwah Mansion as a *personal* residence.\n\nOn July 13, 2023, the Government and the Trustee executed a stipulation that would permit the Trustee to secure the value of the Mahwah Mansion during the pendency of the criminal case. *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 23-05017 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM), Dkt. 24, Ex. 1; *see also id.* at Dkt. 53, 56. The stipulation further provided that the net proceeds from any sale of the Mahwah Mansion (less certain fees and administrative costs and a deemed expense of \\$1 million to be used to satisfy claims of allowed Bankruptcy creditors who are also victims in the criminal case) would serve as substitute *res* for the Mahwah Mansion.\n\nOn July 11, 2023, the Trustee filed an *ex parte* motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction regarding Kwok's associates' access to the Mahwah Mansion. *In re*  *Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 23-05017, Dkt. 4 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM). On August 1, 2023, Judge Manning granted the order in part. *See id.*, Dkt. 17. On August 31, 2023, following additional briefing and hearings, Judge Manning granted the Trustee's motion and issued a modified preliminary injunction to restrict access to the Mahwah Mansion to: (a) the Security Services (as defined in the Preliminary Injunction); (b) the Trustee and his representatives and/or professionals; (c) the United States Department of Justice and its employees and representatives; (d) the FBI and its employees and representatives; (e) other federal, New Jersey state, or Mahwah municipal law enforcement agencies and their employees and representatives; (f) any other persons expressly authorized by the Trustee in writing (which can include email); and (g) any other person expressly authorized by the United States District Court for the Southern District for New York or the bankruptcy court. *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 23-05017, Dkt. 58 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM).\n\nOn September 1, 2023, the Trustee conducted a walkthrough of the Mahwah Mansion, which was video-recorded and photographed. Following an August 30, 2023 motion filed by Kwok that sought to \"preserv[e] the status quo\" of the Mahwah Mansion (Kwok Br. 3), on September 12, 2023, the Trustee provided the Government with six photographs from the Trustee's September 1, 2023 walkthrough. Significantly, those photographs illustrate that the defendants' associates and co-conspirators have been tampering with the interior of the property in an apparent effort to obstruct this criminal case by modifying the Mahwah Mansion to suit a defense narrative. Specifically, the defendants' co-conspirators posted placards at room entrances that appear to suggest that the rooms of Kwok's Mahwah Mansion are, in fact, NFSC and/or G|CLUBS offices or rooms, as shown in the photographs below:\n\n![](_page_6_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\nThese after-the-fact placards were not present as of March 15, 2023, when the Government searched the Mahwah Mansion pursuant to a search warrant issued in this case.\n\n#### <span id=\"page-6-0\"></span>**II. Kwok's Bankruptcy Stay Motion**\n\nPrior to the filing of the instant motion, on August 30, 2023, Kwok filed a motion in this Court to stay the bankruptcy proceedings that Kwok voluntarily initiated in February 2022 (the \"Bankruptcy Stay Motion\"). (Dkt. 131 (\"Bankr. Stay Mot.)). In the event the Court denied his request for a stay, the Bankruptcy Stay Motion also sought alternative relief. (Bankr. Stay Mot. 1, 28-30). The alternative relief sought by Kwok included requests related to the Mahwah Mansion. In particular, Kwok requested that his \"defense team\" have continued, unchaperoned access to the Mahwah Mansion and sought to prevent the sale of the property in bankruptcy proceedings. The alternative relief also included a request for an order that the Government not solicit or receive Kwok's privileged information or records from the Trustee.\n\nOn September 21, 2023, the Government filed its response. (Dkt. 148). Whereas the Trustee filed a brief opposing a stay of the bankruptcy, the Government took no position. (Dkt. 148, at 1). With respect to Kwok's alternative requests, the Government explained first that \"Kwok's request regarding potentially privileged materials should be denied as moot,\" because the Government \"has neither solicited nor received Kwok's potentially privileged information or records from the Trustee.\" (Dkt. 148, at 2). Further, the Government advised that it did not \"presently intend to do so, and will not do so absent agreement from Kwok's counsel (or the appropriate holder) or an order of this Court finding that such materials are not privileged and/or subject to the crime-fraud exception.\" (Dkt. 148, at 2). Regarding Kwok's request for unfettered access to the Mahwah Mansion, the Government set forth the background also described above relating to the condition of the Mahwah Mansion. (Dkt. 148, at 2-4). In light of that, the Government explained, it was \"*Kwok* and his associates who appear to have been doing what Kwok claims to seek to prevent, by materially altering the Mahwah Mansion to serve a defense narrative.\" (Dkt. 148, at 4). Moreover, Kwok already had \"voluminous documentation—comprising *thousands* of photographs, as well as videos—of the Mahwah Mansion.\" (Dkt. 148 at 5). In that regard, \"Kwok's attempt to analogize the circumstances\" of the Mahwah Mansion \"to thwarting access to a material witness is baseless.\" (Dkt. 148 at 5). Nevertheless, the Government stated it would not object to Kwok's or Wang's criminal defense attorneys conducting a site visit to the Mahwah Mansion. (Dkt. 148 at 5).\n\nOn October 5, 2023, Kwok filed a reply to the Government's response. (Dkt. 152). Kwok made several arguments in reply, none of which have merit. Most significant, however, was what Kwok did *not* argue about or dispute. Specifically, Kwok did *not* dispute that, since his arrest and the unsealing of the Indictment's allegations regarding the misappropriation of G|CLUBS funds to purchase, renovate, and furnish the Mahwah Mansion, Kwok's followers had materially altered the Mahwah Mansion by creating and posting placards suggesting that the Mahwah Mansion was a G|CLUBS facility. That is, nowhere did Kwok deny that the evidence he was purportedly seeking to maintain had, in reality, already been tampered with by his co-conspirators to suit a defense narrative.\n\n#### <span id=\"page-8-0\"></span>**III. The Instant Motion**\n\nBefore the Government filed its opposition to Kwok's Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok filed the instant motion seeking discovery—beyond the discovery provided for in criminal law or procedure—of communications between the Government and the Trustee, and between the Government and the SEC. (Dkt. 143 (\"Br.\")).\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n### <span id=\"page-8-2\"></span><span id=\"page-8-1\"></span>**I. Kwok Has Failed to Establish a Valid Basis For His Discovery Requests**\n\n#### <span id=\"page-8-3\"></span>**A. Applicable Law**\n\n### **1.** *Brady* **and Joint Prosecutions**\n\n\"Under *Brady* and its progeny, the government has an affirmative duty to disclose favorable evidence known to it.\" *United States v. Payne*, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995). This duty extends to the prosecution team. In other words, a prosecutor \"is presumed . . . to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with his office's investigation of the case and indeed 'has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.'\" *United States v. Avellino*, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)); *accord United States v. Hunter*, 32 F.4th 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2022).\n\nThe Government's duty to obtain and produce Rule 16 and *Brady* material is limited to material in the possession of the prosecution team. *Hunter*, 32 F.4th at 36 (\"We have long rejected the notion that 'knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of th[e] prosecutor.'\" (quoting *United States v. Quinn*, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971))); *Avellino*,\n\n136 F.3d. at 255 (\"[T]he imposition of an unlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor's office would inappropriately require us to adopt a monolithic view of government that would condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.\"); *United States v. Bonventre*, No. 10 Cr. 228 (LTS), 2014 WL 3673550, at \\*22 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014), *aff'd in part*, 646 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (*Brady* is \"not a discovery doctrine that c[an] be used to compel the Government to gather information for the defense.\").\n\nAlthough \"[t]he Second Circuit has not yet articulated a test to decide when knowledge of *Brady* material may be imputed from one agency to another,\" *United States v. Velissaris*, No. 22 Cr. 105 (DLC), 2022 WL 2392360, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2022), the Circuit has provided guidance, and courts within this District have articulated a number of factors for determining the scope of the prosecution team and whether a joint investigation occurred. The Circuit counsels that \"the relevant inquiry [for determining whether a person is a member of the prosecution team] is what the person did, not who the person is.\" *United States v. Stewart*, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006). \"Individuals who perform investigative duties or make strategic decisions about the prosecution of the case are considered members of the prosecution team, as are police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation.\" *United States v. Barcelo*, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). \"At bottom,\" the determination of who constitutes the prosecution team, \"involves a question of agency law: should a prosecutor be held responsible for someone else's actions?\" *United States v. Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), *aff'd sub nom. United States v. Pierce*, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir. 2015). \"Generally, a principal is responsible for the knowledge of an agent when that agent has a duty to give the principal information or when the agent acts on his knowledge regarding a matter that is within his power to bind the principal. An agent's duty to disclose is thus linked to\n\nhis power to bind the principal.” *Id.* In the context of a criminal investigation and prosecution, the individuals empowered to bind the prosecutor consist generally of those who \"actively investigate[] the case, act[] under the direction of the prosecutor, or aid[] the prosecution in crafting trial strategy.\" *Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 442; *see also United States v. Barcelo*, No. 13 Cr. 38 (RJS), 2014 WL 4058066, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014) (\"To determine whether someone is a member of the prosecution team—in other words, whether the prosecution can be deemed to have constructive knowledge of information held by that individual—the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, including whether the individual actively investigates the case, acts under the direction of the prosecutor, or aids the prosecution in crafting trial strategy.\"), *aff'd*, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015).\n\nApplying these principles, the Second Circuit and courts in this District have consistently rejected efforts to impose discovery obligations on the Government related to information held by entities that do not act as agents of the prosecution, including cooperating witnesses, expert witnesses for the Government, other government agencies, and even separate components of the Justice Department. *See, e.g.*, *Barcelo*, 628 F. App'x at 38 (holding that a cooperating witness was not a part of the prosecution team where he \"played no role in the investigation or in determining investigation or trial strategy,\" and \"did no more than provide information to the government and testify at trial\"); *Stewart*, 433 F.3d at 299 (holding that a civilian employee of the Secret Service who testified as an expert witness for the Government was not a member of the \"prosecution team\" for Giglio purposes); *United States v. Hutcher*, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that for Giglio and Jencks Act purposes, the Government had no discovery obligation related to information filed in an unrelated bankruptcy proceeding); *United States v. Locascio*, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the reports made by FBI agents in the course of investigations unrelated to the defendants' prosecutions were not possessed by the prosecution team); *Pina v. Henderson*, 752 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a prosecutor's constructive knowledge did not extend to a parole officer who \"did not work in conjunction with either the police or the prosecutor\"); *United States v. Quinn*, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971) (rejecting \"completely untenable position that 'knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of this prosecutor'\"); *United States v. Morgan*, 302 F.R.D. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (\"[T]he prosecution team does not include federal agents, prosecutors, or parole officers who are not involved in the investigation.\"); *Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (\"[I]n most cases, cooperating witnesses should not be considered part of the prosecution team.\"); *United States v. Merlino*, 349 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Government not required to obtain prison calls of cooperating witness to satisfy disclosure obligations).\n\nCourts in this Circuit have held that the prosecutor's duty extends to reviewing the materials in the possession, custody or control of another agency for *Brady* evidence only where the Government conducts a \"joint investigation\" with another state or federal agency. *United States v. Rigas*, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court opinion holding that there was \"no joint investigation with the SEC\" and therefore the Government did not need to produce documents in the custody of the SEC); *SEC v. Stanard,* No. 06 Civ. 7736 (GEL), 2007 WL 1834709, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007) (finding it was \"clear that the investigations, while they may have overlapped, were not conducted jointly\" in denying the defendant's request for the Court to require the SEC to access and review FBI interview notes that were not in the SEC's possession, custody, or control); *United States v. Finnerty*, 411 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the Government and the NYSE, even if it were a state actor, did not conduct a joint investigation related to the policies of the NYSE); *Ferreira v. United States*, 350 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that cooperation between the Government and NYPD was \"not sufficient to make the Government and the state prosecutor members of the same prosecutorial team\"); *United States v. Upton*, 856 F. Supp. 727, 749-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the Government and FAA did not conduct a \"joint investigation\" even though the FAA provided two inspectors to assist the criminal investigation); *United States v. Guerrerio*, 670 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying Rule 16 discovery request for grand jury minutes at the Bronx District Attorney's Office where there was no joint investigation with the Government and the Government had no control over the material).\n\nTo determine whether the criminal prosecution conducted a \"joint investigation\" with another agency, such that the other agency should be considered part of the prosecution team, courts consider a number of factors, including whether the other agency \"(1) participated in the prosecution's witness interviews, (2) was involved in presenting the case to the grand jury, (3) reviewed documents gathered by or shared documents with the prosecution, (4) played a role in the development of prosecutorial strategy, or (5) accompanied the prosecution to court proceedings.\" *United States v. Middendorf*, 18 Cr. 36 (JPO), 2018 WL 3956494, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018) (citing *United States v. Blaszczak*, 308 F.Supp.3d 736, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)); *see also United States v. Collins*, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding no joint investigation where SEC and Government participated in some joint interviews); *United States v. Chow*, No. 17 Cr. 667 (GHW), ECF No. 69, at 87 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2018) (finding no joint investigation where agencies shared information but made their own determinations regarding what documents to obtain and what facts to ask a witness); *Stanard*, 2007 WL 1834709, at \\*3 (FBI and SEC did not conduct a joint investigation despite participating in joint interviews during which only FBI took notes); *United States v. Rigas*, No. 02 Cr. 1236 (LBS), 2008 WL 144824, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008) (finding that parallel civil and criminal investigations were not \"joint\").\n\n### **2. Discovery Beyond** *Brady* **or Rule 16**\n\nIt has never been the case that any and all records or information in the Government's possession fall within the scope of its discovery obligations. Rather, \"[t]he prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose evidence favorable to an accused when such evidence is material to guilt or punishment.\" *United States v. Coppa*, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). Similarly, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) requires the Government to produce, upon defense request, items \"within the government's possession, custody, or control\" that are \"material to preparing the defense.\" An item is \"material to preparing the defense\" under Rule 16 \"if it could be used to counter the Government's case or bolster a defense.\" *United States v. Stevens*, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180–81 (2d Cir. 1993). In other words, as the Supreme Court has said, Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i), authorizes production only of items that tend to \"refute the Government's arguments that the defendant committed the crime charged.\" *United States v. Armstrong*, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996); *see also United States v. Rigas*, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (\"Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) entitles a defendant to documents or other items that are material to preparing arguments in response to the prosecution's case-in-chief.\"); *United States v. Allen*, No. 14 Cr. 272 (JSR), 2016 WL 315928, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016) (relying in part on *Armstrong* to deny a request for discovery to support a *Kastigar* claim).\n\nMoreover, the mere fact that an item may be \"useful\" to the defense does not render it \"material\" under Rule 16. *Rigas*, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307; *see also United States v. Parnas*, No. 19-CR-725 (JPO), 2021 WL 2981567, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021) (denying motion under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) for documents that \"may contain evidence relevant to [defendant's] selective prosecution claim\" because defendant had \"failed to make the requisite showing for such a claim\"). \"There must be some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would . . . enable[ ] the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor.\" *United States v. Maniktala*, 934 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The defendant must make a prima facie showing of materiality, *United States v. Finnerty*, 411 F.Supp.2d 428, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), and must \"offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material,\" *Rigas*, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307.\n\nWhile Rule 16 does not authorize the production of materials that the defense seeks to \"challenge the prosecution's conduct of the case,\" *Armstrong*, 517 U.S. at 462, courts sometimes authorize discovery on those issues. Before doing so, however, they require that the defendant make a substantial threshold showing that improper Government conduct in fact occurred. *See Wade v. United States*, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (defendant claiming that Government's refusal to file a 5K motion was based on an unconstitutional motive must make a \"substantial threshold showing\" before he can obtain discovery); *United States v. Berrios*, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant seeking discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must provide \"some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense\" before discovery authorized); *United States v. Sanders*, 211 F.3d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 2000) (same in the context of a claim of vindictive prosecution).\n\n#### <span id=\"page-14-0\"></span>**B. Discussion**\n\nKwok's requests are baseless. To obtain discovery beyond what the criminal law provides, Kwok must make a substantial showing of bad faith. Kwok has merely identified commonplace, routine interactions between the Government and a regulatory agency with a parallel investigation or a trustee administering assets that are also criminally forfeitable, and has come nowhere close <span id=\"page-15-0\"></span>to satisfying his burden. Kwok's motion should be denied without a hearing.\n\n## **1. Kwok's Request for SEC Communications Should Be Denied**\n\nKwok's request for the Government's communications with the SEC is unfounded, and his\n\nmotion to compel such discovery should be denied.\n\n# **a. The Government and the SEC Conducted Parallel Investigations**\n\nAs an initial matter, while Kwok has not formally moved for a finding that the Government and the SEC conducted a joint investigation, that contention undergirds his discovery request and is equally meritless. The SEC is not part of the Government's prosecution team. Although the Government and the SEC at times conducted joint interviews for the convenience of witnesses, most aspects of the Government's investigation were conducted without any involvement of the SEC:\n\n- the SEC played no role in the Government's charging decisions or the development of the Government's prosecutorial strategy;\n- likewise, the Government played no role in the SEC's charging decisions or the development of the SEC's litigation strategy;\n- no one from the SEC was designated a special Assistant U.S. Attorney to work on the criminal investigation;\n- at jointly conducted interviews, the SEC did not take notes during the interviews and does not have any notes from joint interviews;\n- at jointly conducted interviews, witnesses were told that the agencies' investigations were separate, that the interviews were conducted together only as a matter of convenience, and that, if there were to be a proffer agreement, the witness would enter into a separate agreement with each agency;\n- the SEC was not involved in presenting this case to the grand jury and did not receive grand jury transcripts;\n- the SEC did not participate in the execution of search warrants or the responsiveness reviews of materials obtained pursuant to search warrants;\n- the SEC did not obtain materials produced to the Government pursuant to grand jury subpoenas; and\n- the SEC has not accompanied the Government to Court.\n\n(*See* Ex. A (\"Murray Decl.\") ¶ 2). *See Collins*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 242 (citing many of these factors in support of a finding that the SEC and the Government did not conduct a joint investigation); *United States v. Alexandre*, No. 22 CR. 326 (JPC), 2023 WL 416405, at \\*6–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023) (same). These factors, considered together, weigh heavily in support of a finding that the Government and the SEC engaged in separate investigations, notwithstanding their focus on overlapping subject material.\n\nEven though the SEC is not part of the prosecution team, the Government has voluntarily requested from the SEC all documents that the SEC obtained from third parties, and has already turned over these documents to the defense. In the event the SEC produces additional documents to the Government that it received from third parties, the Government will promptly produce those documents to defense counsel.\n\nNone of the facts cited by Kwok establish the existence of a joint investigation in this case. Rather, Kwok seeks to paint as unusual or suspect facts that are routine in the parallel investigation context, such as the Government and the SEC bringing charges on the same date (Br. 21). *See, e.g.*, *SEC v. Shkreli*, No. 15 Civ. 7175 (KAM), 2016 WL 1122029, at \\*7 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016) (\"The court finds no fault in the SEC's commencement of the civil action at or around the time the criminal indictment was unsealed, given the SEC's independent mandate to enforce the securities laws and the need to commence an action before expiration of the statute of limitations.\"). Kwok also points to the fact that the Government obtained documents and information from the SEC that was cited in the Government's affidavits supporting search warrants (Br. 20), but that is entirely normal and appropriate. The Government routinely obtains documents\n\nand information from any number of individuals and entities in its investigations, and the Government is aware of no authority for the proposition that that bare fact transforms those sources of information into members of the prosecution team. To the contrary, courts have specifically rejected that proposition. *See, e.g.*, *Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46 (holding that cooperating witness was not a member of the prosecution team); *United States v. Barcelo*, 628 F. App'x 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2015) (same); *Stewart*, 433 F.3d at 298-99 (holding that an expert witness who analyzed evidence, assisted the prosecution in preparing cross-examination questions, participated in a mock examination, and testified at trial was not a member of the prosecution team). Indeed, it would be highly unusual if the SEC refused to provide information to the Government in connection with an ongoing criminal inquiry into a massive fraud, such as the one perpetrated by Kwok. \"Moreover, 'there is no general rule' prohibiting a civil enforcement agency such as the SEC from 'sharing . . . evidence acquired through civil discovery with criminal prosecutors.'\" *United States v. Rhodes*, No. 18 Cr. 887 (JMF), 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (quoting *United States v. Fiore*, 381 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2004)). \"Indeed, because '[s]ecurities fraud is a proper subject of both administrative and criminal investigations . . . SEC enforcement officials and prosecutors all expect coordination at some investigative level and perceive the various proceedings as integral to each other.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3 (quoting *Fiore*, 381 F.3d at 94). Kwok fails to cite any authority for the proposition that an independent agency becomes part of the prosecution team simply by complying with a voluntary information request.\n\nLikewise, the fact that the Government and the SEC—both tasked with enforcing antifraud laws and protecting victims, and both investigating the same conduct perpetrated by the same individuals against the same victims—may have shared certain evidence and informed each other of anticipated investigative or enforcement steps is wholly unremarkable and routine. Such \"coordination and sharing between the lawyers and agents on the criminal prosecution team, on the one hand, and [a civil enforcement authority], on the other, is, in itself, unexceptional and unproblematic.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3.\n\nIn short, applying these facts and circumstances to well-settled legal standards makes plain that the SEC conducted a parallel investigation and was not part of the Government's prosecution team.\n\n#### **b. Kwok's Discovery Request Is Meritless**\n\nIn light of the foregoing, Kwok's request for internal communications between the Government and the SEC is baseless. No rule of criminal discovery mandates the production of materials simply because the defense speculates that the materials may be useful in making a defense motion. To the contrary, courts in this District have specifically rejected such requests. *See, e.g.*, *Parnas*, 2021 WL 2981567, at \\*8 (denying motion under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) for documents that \"may contain evidence relevant to [defendant's] selective prosecution claim\" because defendant had \"failed to make the requisite showing for such a claim\").\n\nKwok's reliance on *Rhodes* is particularly misplaced. *Rhodes* directly rejected the defense suggestion made here that it is unusual or problematic for criminal and civil authorities to share information, instead holding that such \"coordination and sharing between the lawyers and agents on the criminal prosecution team, on the one hand, and [a civil enforcement authority], on the other, is, in itself, unexceptional and unproblematic.\" 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3. Judge Furman explained that such coordination is only problematic if it is done in \"bad faith,\" such as where a government authority \"made affirmative misrepresentations or conducted a civil investigation solely for purposes of advancing a criminal case.\" *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Stringer*, 535 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2008), and also citing *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) and *United States v. LaSalle National Bank*, 437 U.S. 298 (1978)).\n\nIn light of the \"unexceptional and unproblematic\" nature of coordination in parallel proceedings, *Rhodes* held that a criminal defendant is not entitled as a matter of course to internal communications between criminal and civil authorities. Rather, in order to obtain \"even limited discovery\" regarding a claim of improper coordination between civil and criminal authorities, a defendant must \"make a substantial preliminary showing of bad faith.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*4 (quoting *United States v. Gel Spice Co*., 773 F.2d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 1985)). Judge Furman determined that the defendant in *Rhodes* had failed to make that showing, and therefore denied his discovery request, a fact that Kwok omits from his brief. S*ee Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*5.\n\nKwok falls far short of satisfying his burden of making \"a substantial preliminary showing of bad faith.\" Indeed, Kwok has failed to point to *any* facts tending to show that the coordination between criminal and civil authorities was exceptional or problematic. As discussed above, the coordination in this case was wholly routine. Kwok notes that Judge Furman required the Government in *Rhodes* to submit an affidavit concerning coordination with civil authorities, but that stemmed from an unusual fact uniquely present in the *Rhodes* case: the SEC did not bring parallel charges against the defendant in *Rhodes* despite issuing him a subpoena for documents (to which the defendant responded), and the fruits of that subpoena were used in the parallel criminal case. In other words, it was the *absence* of a simultaneous and parallel civil enforcement action that Judge Furman found unusual, and which led him to require an affidavit from the Government. By contrast, this case involves the standard fact pattern of parallel criminal and civil actions being filed at the same time, which undermines any assertion that the SEC action was brought solely for purposes of advancing a criminal case. In any event, this opposition is an accompanied by an affidavit from a member of the prosecution team. (*See* Murral Decl.).\n\nIn sum, Kwok has failed to articulate even a facially plausible theory of bad faith under the relevant legal standards. That is unsurprising given that any coordination between the SEC and the Government in this case was, at all times, \"unexceptional and unproblematic.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, Kwok's motion for discovery concerning the Government's communications with the SEC should be denied.\n\n#### **2. Kwok's Request for Trustee Communications Should Be Denied**\n\n<span id=\"page-20-0\"></span>Kwok's arguments with respect to the Trustee are equally meritless. Kwok's strained attempts to discern Government misconduct through unexceptional interactions with a bankruptcy trustee are contrary to the record and the law. Kwok comes nowhere close to meeting his burden to establish a \"substantial preliminary showing of bad faith.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*4.\n\n*First*, Kwok has failed to show any basis for a claim of spoliation. Simply put, there is absolutely no risk of spoliation of evidence due to the Settlement Agreement between the Government and the Trustee concerning the Mahwah Mansion. Far from spoliating evidence of the Mahwah Mansion's condition, the Government has produced thousands of photographs of the Mahwah Mansion, from March 2023 and September 2023, as well as voluminous video surveillance recorded at various times between August 2022 and September 2023, as well as voluminous video of the Mahwah Mansion's interior from September 2023. Kwok does not explain how that voluminous documentary record of the Mahwah Mansion's condition on multiple dates—which is in Kwok's possession—has been, or would be, somehow spoliated; nor does Kwok explain why a site visit by his criminal defense attorneys of record would be somehow insufficient to satisfy any further defense needs.<sup>1</sup> Instead, Kwok simply asserts here, as in the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, that \"the existing state of the Mahwah [Mansion] must be maintained.\" (Br. 16). But two problems with that assertion remain. The first is that, in reality, Kwok's coconspirators are altering the state of Mahwah Mansion. They are attempting to obstruct justice in this case by tampering with the property's condition—following Kwok's arrest and the unsealing of the Indictment's allegations regarding the Mahwah Mansion—to make Mahwah Mansion look like a G|CLUBS facility. Indeed, Kwok could not and did not even dispute, in connection with the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, that his followers had tampered with the state of the Mahwah after the Government's allegations about the Mahwah Mansion became known. (*See* Dkt. 152). The second problem is that, as noted, Kwok does not explain why the voluminous evidence in his possession (including photographs and videos) documenting the Mahwah Mansion on particular dates has not \"maintained\" the state of the Mahwah Mansion. Kwok fails to address these points because this motion, like the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, is in fact an attempt for Kwok to obtain control over the Mahwah Mansion for the conspiracy's *continued* use. (*See* Br. 17-18 (\"evidence showing how the property was configured and used prior to Mr. Kwok's arrest *and how it continues to be used*—*barring the Trustee's interference*—in service to the Chinese prodemocracy dissident movement constitutes exculpatory evidence that Mr. Kwok is entitled to present to the jury.\" (emphasis added))). This Court should reject Kwok's attempts, reflected in\n\n<span id=\"page-21-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> In his reply to Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok asserts that having supervision for such a site visit is \"tantamount to condoning a government spy in the defense camp.\" (Dkt. 152 at 8). Rhetoric aside, the Government is willing to meet and confer with Kwok regarding the appropriate safeguards to ensure that there is no further tampering with the Mahwah Mansion by Kwok's associates and co-conspirators. As already noted in the Government's response to the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok's attorneys did not contact the Government regarding a site visit to the Mahwah Mansion prior to filing either of his motions. They still have not done so.\n\nthis motion and in the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, to have this Court greenlight the tampering of evidence—tampering that is being done to obstruct justice in this criminal case and to further a global conspiracy that already stole over a billion dollars from Kwok's followers.\n\nRelatedly, there is nothing exceptional or improper about the Government's settlement agreement with the Trustee regarding the Mahwah Mansion. The Government has worked with the Trustee to try to efficiently allocate resources to secure and recover some of the more than a billion dollars that Kwok and his co-conspirators stole or misappropriated. The Government intends to return the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash and property that it has seized to victims of the defendants' crimes—an action that necessarily implicates the Trustee's responsibilities regarding claims to those assets by Kwok's bankruptcy creditors. With respect to the Mahwah Mansion in particular, the Government and the Trustee maintain potentially competing claims to that property, and the agreement will allow the value of that property to be preserved—ceasing, among other things, the modifications made to the property by the defendant's co-conspirators and associates in an effort to impede justice—pending resolution of issues related to forfeiture, restitution, and the bankruptcy estate.<sup>2</sup> There is absolutely nothing unusual about the Government working with a trustee regarding forfeitable assets in which the trustee also has an interest. The many precedents for such coordination—which the Trustee referenced during the bankruptcy court hearing that Kwok quotes repeatedly in his motion, albeit in a portion of the transcript that Kwok omits from his exhibit [3](#page-22-1)—go back years in multiple\n\n<span id=\"page-22-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> In his reply to the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok states the Government sought improperly to “circumvent this Court” by entering the agreement with the Trustee. (*See* Dkt. 152 at 7–8). That is not just hyperbolic. It is false. The agreement merely preserves the value of this forfeitable asset, and this Court will address forfeiture issues, including with respect to the Mahwah Mansion, following trial and conviction, as in every case.\n\n<span id=\"page-22-1\"></span><sup>3</sup> See pages 28-29 of the complete transcript, attached as Exhibit B.\n\njurisdictions.<sup>4</sup> For example, in the criminal case against Marc Dreier, Judge Rakoff approved of various settlement agreements involving the Government and bankruptcy trustees, including a \"Coordination Agreement\" between the Government and the Chapter 11 Trustee in that case. *United States v. Dreir*, 09 Cr. 86 (JSR), Dkt. 141 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010). As another example, in the massive Bernie Madoff fraud, the Government worked *extensively* with the court-appointed trustee who oversaw the liquidation of Madoff's company under the Securities Investor Protection Act (\"SIPA\").[5](#page-23-1) In fact, that same trustee—who has also overseen Madoff's personal bankruptcy\n\n<span id=\"page-23-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> *See, e.g.*, *In re Maresca*, No. 20-11483 (KHK), Dkt. 244 (E.D. Va. Bankr. Sept. 9, 2021) (bankruptcy trustee's motion for approval of a Coordination and Settlement Agreement with the Government, which had forfeiture and restitution claims, regarding a property that was \"the only significant asset of th[e] estate\"); *United States v. Merrill*, No. 14-40028 (TSH), Dkt. 367 (D. Mass. July 11, 2017) (restitution order \"provid[ing] for administration and payment of restitution to victims by the Trustee in the related Chapter 11 cases\"); *In re Rothstein*, No. 09-34791 (RBR), Dkt. 5704 (S.D. Fla. Bankr. July 14, 2014) (motion to approve settlement between Government and bankruptcy trustee regarding forfeiture and restitution); *In re Goldberg*, No. 09-23370 (ASD), Dkt. 424 (D. Conn. Bankr. May 31, 2011) (motion for bankruptcy trustee to administer restitution in criminal case); *id.* at Dkt. 462 (order granting motion); *United States v. Brandau*, No. 99-8215 (DMM), Dkt. 734 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2000) (agreement between Government and bankruptcy trustee regarding the sale and maintenance of assets identified for forfeiture); *id.* at Dkt. 759 (order approving agreement).\n\n<span id=\"page-23-1\"></span><sup>5</sup> In Wang's letter supporting the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, she cites a letter filed by the Government in an SEC action against Madoff. (*See* Dkt. 135 at 4). While it is true that the DOJ opposed the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings for Madoff's estate in that case, Wang's letter omits a critical point. Specifically, Wang omits the fact that the Government's letter concluded by noting that \"[t]his Office also continues to work with the SIP[A] Trustee to maximize recovery for victims,\" and that \"[g]iven this ongoing effort,\" the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings \"is particularly inapt.\" *SEC v. Madoff*, No. 08 Civ. 10791, Dkt. 50 at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009). Indeed, two months after the Government's letter, the personal bankruptcy estate of Madoff was consolidated into the SIPA proceeding being administered by the SIPA trustee who has coordinated so closely and effectively with the Government regarding forfeiture and restitution. *See Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC*, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009), available at [http](http)\n\nestate since June 9, 2009[6](#page-24-0)—was even simultaneously appointed as a Special Master in the criminal case \"to oversee the process of remission or mitigation under the forfeiture laws.\" DOJ, *Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement to Recover \\$7.2 Billion for Victims of Bernard L. Madoff's Ponzi Scheme from Estate of Jeffry M. Picower* (Dec. 17, 2010).[7](#page-24-1) In connection with \"the largest single forfeiture in U.S. history,\" of approximately \\$7.2 billion, to take one example, relevant settlement agreements stipulated that the trustee would administer approximately \\$5 billion of the funds \"through the SIPA liquidation proceedings,\" while administering approximately \\$2.2 billion through DOJ's remission or mitigation process. *Id.* Precedent also refutes Kwok's suggestion here, and in the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, that there is something untoward about the Trustee's receipt of fees for his work recovering assets on behalf of Kwok's creditors.Like a bankruptcy trustee, a SIPA trustee's fees are compensated and, to date, the SIPA trustee in *Madoff* has received over \\$2.2 billion in fees (while recovering over \\$14.6 billion in assets). *See* The Madoff Recovery Initiative, *Recoveries to Report Fees Ratio: December 11, 2008 to September 20, 2023*.[8](#page-24-2) Far from being improper or unusual, the Government coordinating with trustees, like the Trustee in Kwok's bankruptcy, is a best practice that prevents needless fighting over assets and results in maximal recovery in the aftermath of rampant frauds.[9](#page-24-3)\n\n<span id=\"page-24-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> *See Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC*, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009), available at [http](http)\n\n<span id=\"page-24-1\"></span><sup>7</sup> Available at http\n\n<span id=\"page-24-2\"></span><sup>8</sup> Available at http\n\n<span id=\"page-24-3\"></span><sup>9</sup> Nor is there anything improper about the Government providing a set of photographs to the courtappointed Trustee here. In his Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok attempted to suggest that the Government violated the protective order in doing so (Kwok Br. 3, 21), but, as already explained in the Government's response (Dkt. 148, at 3 n.2), Kwok is wrong. Moreover, the photographs were responsive to the Government's search warrant executed at the Mahwah Mansion. As an\n\n*Second*, Kwok's argument regarding a supposed need to protect his privileged information residing with the Trustee is meritless. The Government has already explained that it has neither sought or received such information, and would do so only under appropriate circumstances. (Dkt. 148, at 2).[10](#page-25-0)\n\n*Third*, the interactions between the Government and the Trustee are unexceptional. Kwok's suggestion that the Trustee could be a member of the prosecution team is baseless based on the circumstances:\n\n- the Government initiated its investigation independent of the Trustee, years before Kwok voluntarily filed for bankruptcy and the Trustee was even appointed;\n- the Trustee played no role in the Government's charging decisions or the development of the Government's prosecutorial strategy;\n- the Trustee has not participated in any of the Government's interviews;\n- the Trustee was not involved in presenting this case to the grand jury and did not receive grand jury transcripts;\n- the Trustee did not participate in the execution of search warrants or the responsiveness reviews of materials obtained pursuant to search warrants;\n- the Trustee did not obtain materials produced to the Government pursuant to grand jury subpoenas; and\n- the Trustee has not accompanied the Government to Court.\n\n(Murray Decl. ¶ 3).\n\nanalogy, materials responsive to search warrants are regularly shared with regulatory agencies engaged in parallel investigations, and such sharing is entirely proper and, indeed, commonplace.\n\n<span id=\"page-25-0\"></span><sup>10</sup> Kwok's reply in connection with the Bankruptcy Stay Motion argues that the Government's inclusion, in its description of appropriate circumstances where it could obtain the privileged information of Kwok, of agreement from Kwok \"or the appropriate holder [of the privilege]\" had created some kind of \"loophole.\" (Dkt. 152 at 8). Kwok is wrong. The Government included that parenthetical addition merely to encompass circumstances in which Kwok is not, in fact, the appropriate holder of the privilege, such as when a corporate entity, rather than an individual, actually holds the privilege.\n\nTo be clear, Kwok does not actually claim that the Trustee is part of the prosecution team. He seeks communications to \"fully investigate whether the Trustee\" is part of the prosecution team. (Br. 19). But, as set forth above, that is not a basis for obtaining discovery beyond what criminal law and procedure provides. Kwok identifies \"coordination\" and \"information sharing\" between the Government and the Trustee, but such coordination between the Government and another party is wholly \"unexceptional and unproblematic\" and provides no basis for the extraordinary discovery that Kwok seeks. *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3; *see also Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42 (\"Interacting with the prosecution team, without more, does not make someone a team member.\").\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\n<span id=\"page-26-0\"></span>It is plain that neither the SEC nor the Trustee are members of the prosecution team in this case. And in order to obtain discovery beyond what the criminal rules provide, a defendant must make a substantial showing of bad faith on the part of the Government. Kwok has not made that showing, because he cannot make that showing. The Government's interactions with the SEC and the Trustee have not only been in good faith, but such interactions are routine and unexceptional. To the extent there is anything exceptional about the circumstances presented here, it is that Kwok has filed two motions at least partly in pursuit of allowing his co-conspirators and associates to further obstruct justice and perpetuate his massive fraud by retaking possession of the Mahwah Mansion. Kwok's motion should be denied.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_*/s/*\n\n Micah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys 212-637-2190/-6612 /-2314","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”、“Miles Kwok”、“Guo Wengui”、“七哥”、“校长”，\n\nKIN MING JE（余建明），又名“William Je”，以及\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”，\n\n被告人。\n\nS1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n政府反对强迫披露动议之法律备忘录\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯），United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦检察官），One St. Andrew's Plaza, New York, New York 10007\n\nMicah F. Fergenson、Ryan B. Finkel、Juliana N. Murray，Assistant United States Attorneys（助理联邦检察官），顾问律师\n背景  1\nI. 马瓦豪宅  1\nII. 郭文贵的破产中止动议  5\nIII. 本动议  7\n辩论  7\nI. 郭文贵未能为其证据开示请求确立有效依据  7\nA. 适用法律  7\nB. 论述  13\n1. 郭文贵索取 SEC 通信记录的请求应予驳回  14\n2. 郭文贵索取受托人通信记录的请求应予驳回  19\n结论  25\n初步陈述\n\n郭文贵寻求超出《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第16条范围的证据开示——即政府与 Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，简称“SEC”）以及与郭文贵的破产受托人（“受托人”）之间的通信记录——的动议完全毫无根据。充其量，郭文贵这项非同寻常的证据开示请求所依据的事实完全是普通寻常的。政府与 SEC 进行了平行调查，而郭文贵完全没有指出政府与 SEC 之间的互动有任何异常之处，更不用说达到获得郭文贵所寻求的那类证据开示所必需的大量恶意行径证明了。受托人方面亦是如此。当存在如本案这般可能亦属于受托人破产财产的可没收资产时，刑事检察官与受托人进行协调并达成协议是极为普遍的——事实上，这是一项最佳实践。郭文贵关于位于 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 的房产（“马瓦豪宅”）存在证据灭失的主张近乎荒谬。鉴于以下不争的事实，这一点尤为确凿：在郭文贵被捕以及起诉书中关于马瓦豪宅的指控解封之后，郭文贵的共犯及同伙篡改了马瓦豪宅的状况，以支持郭文贵在本案中的辩护——也就是说，他们伪造了证据，企图在眼前这起案件中妨碍司法公正。郭文贵的其他主张，即关于侵犯特权（这从未发生，也根本不可能发生）以及声称与受托人联合起诉（对此完全没有任何依据），同样毫无根据。记录中根本没有任何表明政府方面存在恶意的迹象。郭文贵的动议应在不举行听证的情况下直接予以驳回。\n背景\nI. 马瓦豪宅\n\n马瓦豪宅系使用起诉书所指控的欺诈收益购买、装修及配备家具——具体而言，即通过其他实体名下的银行账户转移的 G|CLUBS 会员资金。（Dkt. 19（“起诉书”）¶¶ 4, 16(b)-(c)）。正如起诉书中所指控的那样，郭文贵及其共犯利用 G|CLUBS 对受害者实施欺诈，向他们虚假承诺提供据称极具价值的 GTV 股票（即在 SEC 介入叫停 GTV 发行后，利用 G|CLUBS 作为继续进行非法私募发行的工具），并虚假承诺他们一旦成为 G|CLUBS“会员”即可获得“全方位服务”。（同上 ¶ 15）。使用挪用的 G|CLUBS 会员资金购买的马瓦豪宅及其家具在起诉书中被认定为应予没收的特定财产。（同上 ¶ 55(v)）。\n\n正如先前所述（见 Dkt. 148，第2-4页），2023年3月15日，Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局，简称“FBI”）探员在马瓦豪宅执行了搜查令。多名 FBI 摄影师对该处房产及其内部物品进行了详尽细致的记录，在搜查过程中拍摄了2,000多张照片，这些照片已在证据开示中向各被告人出示。FBI 在搜查前还对马瓦豪宅进行了空中监控，这些照片和视频也已向各被告人出示。政府还从马瓦豪宅扣押了大量实物证据，包括例如电子设备、郭文贵的个人物品（例如绣有郭文贵名字的定制 Brioni 西装），以及使用挪用的 G|CLUBS 会员资金购买的部分奢华家具。\n\n在政府公开提交将郭文贵与马瓦豪宅关联起来的起诉书之后，被告人的同伙和共犯开始进驻马瓦豪宅。例如，2023年4月9日，数十名被告人的同伙前往马瓦豪宅抗议对被告人的拘押；2023年5月5日，被告人的同伙又在马瓦豪宅举办了另一场大型聚会。这些活动构成了贬损马瓦豪宅价值的威胁。\n\n2023年6月28日或前后，受托人告知政府，其已认定马瓦豪宅属于郭文贵破产法第11章破产财产；因此，受托人与政府就马瓦豪宅的可能处置事宜进行了磋商。与动产或银行账户中的资金不同，在作出最终没收裁定之前，政府通常不能依据基于没收的扣押令扣押不动产——而该裁定只有在刑事定罪之后、在随后的附随没收程序结束时才会作出。鉴于被告人的同伙当时正在积极使用马瓦豪宅（该豪宅本身系用欺诈收益购买），且他们对马瓦豪宅的占有有可能损耗该财产对于破产债权人以及政府刑事案件中郭文贵欺诈受害者的重大价值，2023年7月6日，政府向受托人提供了政府于2023年3月15日搜查期间拍摄的12张照片，以证明郭文贵将马瓦豪宅用作个人住所。\n\n2023年7月13日，政府与受托人签署了一项约定协议，允许受托人在刑事案件审理期间保全马瓦豪宅的价值。见 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., 案号 23-05017 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM), Dkt. 24, 附件 1；另见该案 Dkt. 53, 56。该约定协议进一步规定，出售马瓦豪宅所得的净收益（扣除某些费用和管理成本，以及用于清偿同时作为刑事案件受害者的获准破产债权人债权的100万美元视同支出后）将作为马瓦豪宅的替代标的物。\n\n2023年7月11日，受托人就郭文贵同伙进出马瓦豪宅一事提交了一份单方临时限制令及初步禁令动议。见 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., 案号 23-05017, Dkt. 4 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM)。2023年8月1日，Manning 法官部分批准了该命令。见该案 Dkt. 17。2023年8月31日，在进一步的诉状交换和听证之后，Manning 法官批准了受托人的动议，并签发了一项修改后的初步禁令，将进出马瓦豪宅的权限限制为：(a) 安保服务人员（定义见初步禁令）；(b) 受托人及其代表和/或专业人员；(c) 美国司法部及其雇员和代表；(d) FBI 及其雇员和代表；(e) 其他联邦、新泽西州或马瓦市政执法机构及其雇员和代表；(f) 经受托人书面（可包括电子邮件）明确授权的任何其他人；以及 (g) 经美国纽约南区联邦地区法院或破产法院明确授权的任何其他人。见 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., 案号 23-05017, Dkt. 58 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM)。\n\n2023年9月1日，受托人对马瓦豪宅进行了实地勘查，并进行了全程录像和拍照。在郭文贵于2023年8月30日提交旨在“维持马瓦豪宅现状”的动议（郭文贵答辩状第3页）之后，2023年9月12日，受托人向政府提供了受托人在2023年9月1日实地勘查中拍摄的六张照片。值得注意的是，这些照片表明，被告人的同伙和共犯一直在篡改该房产的内部构造，企图通过改造马瓦豪宅以迎合辩方的陈述说辞，显然是在试图妨碍本起刑事案件。具体而言，被告人的共犯在房间入口处张贴了标牌，似乎试图表明郭文贵马瓦豪宅的房间实际上是 NFSC（新中国联邦）和/或 G|CLUBS 的办公室或房间，如下列照片所示：\n\n[此处为图片：_page_6_Picture_1.jpeg]\n\n截至2023年3月15日政府依据本案签发的搜查令搜查马瓦豪宅时，这些事后张贴的标牌并不存在。\nII. 郭文贵的破产中止动议\n\n在提交本动议之前，2023年8月30日，郭文贵向本院提交了一项动议，请求中止其于2022年2月自愿发起的破产程序（“破产中止动议”）。（Dkt. 131（“破产中止动议”））。在法院驳回其中止请求的情况下，破产中止动议还寻求了备位救济。（破产中止动议第1、28-30页）。郭文贵寻求的备位救济包括与马瓦豪宅相关的请求。具体而言，郭文贵请求允许其“辩护团队”继续不受陪同地进出马瓦豪宅，并试图阻止在破产程序中出售该财产。备位救济还包括请求下达一项命令，禁止政府向受托人索取或从受托人处接收郭文贵的受特权保护的信息或记录。\n\n2023年9月21日，政府提交了答辩意见。（Dkt. 148）。鉴于受托人提交了反对中止破产的答辩状，政府不持立场。（Dkt. 148，第1页）。关于郭文贵的备位请求，政府首先解释称，“郭文贵关于潜在受特权保护材料的请求应作为已无实际意义而予以驳回”，因为政府“既未向受托人索取，也未从受托人处接收郭文贵的潜在受特权保护的信息或记录”。（Dkt. 148，第2页）。此外，政府表示其“目前无意这样做，且在未获得郭文贵律师（或适格权利人）的同意，或本院作出裁定认定此类材料不受特权保护和/或适用罪行-欺诈例外之前，不会这样做”。（Dkt. 148，第2页）。关于郭文贵提出的不受限制进出马瓦豪宅的请求，政府陈述了上文亦已描述的关于马瓦豪宅状况的背景情况。（Dkt. 148，第2-4页）。鉴于此，政府解释称，正是“郭文贵及其同伙似乎一直在做郭文贵声称试图阻止的事情，即通过实质性改变马瓦豪宅来服务于辩方的陈述说辞”。（Dkt. 148，第4页）。此外，郭文贵已经掌握了“关于马瓦豪宅的浩繁记录——包括数千张照片以及视频”。（Dkt. 148，第5页）。在这方面，“郭文贵企图将马瓦豪宅的情况类比为阻碍接触重要证人，这是毫无根据的”。（Dkt. 148，第5页）。尽管如此，政府表示不反对郭文贵或王雁平的刑事辩护律师对马瓦豪宅进行实地走访。（Dkt. 148，第5页）。\n\n2023年10月5日，Kwok（郭文贵）就政府的回应提交了答复意见。（Dkt. 152）。郭文贵在答复中提出了若干论点，但无一成立。然而，最关键的在于郭文贵“未曾”争辩或提出异议的内容。具体而言，起诉书中指控挪用 G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）资金用于购买、翻修和装修 Mahwah Mansion（马 Wah 庄园），郭文贵对其被捕以及该指控解封以来，其追随者通过制作并张贴暗示马 Wah 庄园系 G 俱乐部设施的标牌对该庄园进行实质性改动一事，“未提出异议”。也就是说，郭文贵从未否认他声称寻求保全的证据在现实中早已被其共犯篡改，以迎合辩方的陈述说辞。\n\nIII. 本动议\n\n在政府就郭文贵的破产中止动议提交反对意见之前，郭文贵提交了本动议，寻求在刑事法律或程序所规定的证据开示范围之外，获取政府与 Trustee（破产受托人）之间以及政府与 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）之间的通信记录。（Dkt. 143（“Br.”））。\n\n论证\n\nI. 郭文贵未能为其证据开示请求确立有效依据\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n1. Brady 规则与联合起诉\n\n“根据 Brady 规则及其衍生先例，政府负有主动披露其知悉的有利证据的法定义务。”United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995)。该义务延伸至起诉团队。换言之，推定检察官“……知悉与其所在机构对该案调查相关的全部收集到的信息，且确有‘义务了解代表政府处理该案的其他人（包括警方）所知悉的任何有利证据’。”United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998)（援引 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)）；一致判决见 United States v. Hunter, 32 F.4th 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2022)。\n\n政府调取并出示 Rule 16（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第16条）及 Brady 材料的义务仅限于起诉团队所持有的材料。Hunter, 32 F.4th at 36（“我们长期以来一直否定‘政府任何部门的知情均等同于起诉检察官知情’这一观点。”（援引 United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971)））；Avellino,\n\n136 F.3d. at 255（“[若]对检察官课以向未与其办公室开展合作的其他机构进行查询的无限义务，将不当地要求我们采纳一种大一统的政府观，从而使刑事案件的起诉陷入瘫痪状态。”）；United States v. Bonventre, No. 10 Cr. 228 (LTS), 2014 WL 3673550, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014), aff'd in part, 646 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016)（Brady 规则“并非可用于强迫政府为辩方收集信息的证据开示学说。”）。\n\n尽管“Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）尚未明确制定一套用于判定 Brady 材料的知情何时可从一个机构推定至另一机构的检验标准”，United States v. Velissaris, No. 22 Cr. 105 (DLC), 2022 WL 2392360, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2022)，但巡回法院已提供了指导意见，并且 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）辖区内的法院也阐明了用于确定起诉团队范围以及是否发生联合调查的多项考量因素。巡回法院指出，“[在确定某人是否属于起诉团队成员时]相关的审查重点在于该人的实际作为，而非该人的身份头衔。”United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006)。“履行侦查职责或对案件起诉作出战略决策的人员被视为起诉团队的成员，服从检察官指挥并参与调查的警官和联邦执法人员亦同。”United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015)（简要命令）。“归根结底”，对谁构成起诉团队的认定，“涉及代理法的问题：检察官是否应当对他人的行为承担责任？”United States v. Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir. 2015)。“通常，当代理人有义务向被代理人提供信息，或者代理人根据其知悉的信息就其有权使被代理人受约束的事项采取行动时，被代理人应当对代理人的知情承担责任。因此，代理人的披露义务与其使被代理人受约束的权力直接关联。\n\n”同前。在刑事侦查与起诉的语境下，有权约束检察官的人员通常包括那些“积极调查案件、在检察官指挥下行事，或协助控方制定庭审策略”的人员。Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 442；另见 United States v. Barcelo, No. 13 Cr. 38 (RJS), 2014 WL 4058066, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014)（“为了确定某人是否属于起诉团队成员——换言之，控方是否可被视为对该人员持有的信息具有推定知情——法院综合考量案情全貌，包括该人是否积极调查案件、是否在检察官指挥下行事，或是否协助控方制定庭审策略。”），aff'd, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015)。\n\n适用上述原则，第二巡回法院及本区法院一贯驳回试图就非控方代理人的实体所持有的信息强加给政府证据开示义务的主张，包括配合调查的证人、政府方的专家证人、其他政府机构，乃至 Justice Department（司法部）的独立组成部门。参见例如 Barcelo, 628 F. App'x at 38（认定配合调查的证人不属于起诉团队的一部分，因为其“在调查中或在确定调查或庭审策略方面未发挥任何作用”，且“仅仅是向政府提供信息并在庭审中作证”）；Stewart, 433 F.3d at 299（认定代表政府出庭作证的 Secret Service（特勤局）文职雇员就 Giglio 规则而言不属于“起诉团队”成员）；United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1980)（认定就 Giglio 规则和 Jencks Act（詹克斯法案）而言，政府对不相关破产程序中归档的信息不承担任何证据开示义务）；United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993)（认定 FBI（联邦调查局）特工在与被告人的起诉无关的调查过程中所作的报告不由起诉团队持有）；Pina v. Henderson, 752 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1985)（认定检察官的推定知情并不延伸至“未与警方或检察官协同工作”的假释官）；United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971)（驳回“‘政府任何部门的知情均等同于该起诉检察官知情’这一完全站不住脚的立场”）；United States v. Morgan, 302 F.R.D. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（“[起诉团队]不包括未参与调查的联邦特工、检察官或假释官。”）；Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 444（“在大多数情况下，配合调查的证人不应被视为起诉团队的一部分。”）；United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2003)（认定政府无需调取配合调查证人的监狱通话记录以履行披露义务）。\n\n本巡回区内的法院判定，仅当政府与另一州或联邦机构开展“联合调查”时，检察官的义务才延伸至审查该另一机构所占有、保管或控制的材料中是否存在 Brady 证据。United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009)（维持地区法院认定“不存在与 SEC 的联合调查”，因此政府无需出示由 SEC 保管的文件的意见）；SEC v. Stanard, No. 06 Civ. 7736 (GEL), 2007 WL 1834709, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007)（在驳回被告要求法院责令 SEC 调取并审查非 SEC 占有、保管或控制的 FBI 讯问记录的请求时，认定“显而易见，虽然各项调查可能存在重合，但并非联合开展”）；United States v. Finnerty, 411 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)（认定政府与 NYSE（纽约证券交易所）（即使其属于国家行为体）并未就纽约证券交易所的政策开展联合调查）；Ferreira v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)（认定政府与 NYPD（纽约市警察局）之间的合作“不足以使政府与州检察官成为同一公诉团队的成员”）；United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727, 749-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)（认定政府与 FAA（联邦航空管理局）并未开展“联合调查”，即便 FAA 派出了两名检查员协助刑事调查）；United States v. Guerrerio, 670 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)（在政府未与 Bronx District Attorney's Office（布朗克斯区地方检察官办公室）开展联合调查且政府无法控制该材料的情况下，驳回依第16条开示其大陪审团会议记录的请求）。\n\n为了确定刑事起诉部门是否与另一机构开展了“联合调查”以致该另一机构应被视为起诉团队的一部分，法院会考量多项因素，包括该另一机构是否“(1) 参与了控方的证人讯问，(2) 参与了向大陪审团呈交案情，(3) 审查了控方收集的文件或与控方共享了文件，(4) 在起诉策略的制定中发挥了作用，或 (5) 陪同控方出席法庭程序。”United States v. Middendorf, 18 Cr. 36 (JPO), 2018 WL 3956494, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018)（援引 United States v. Blaszczak, 308 F.Supp.3d 736, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)）；另见 United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)（在 SEC 与政府参与了部分联合讯问的情况下，认定不存在联合调查）；United States v. Chow, No. 17 Cr. 667 (GHW), ECF No. 69, at 87 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2018)（在各机构共享信息但对获取哪些文件以及向证人询问哪些事实各自作出决定的情况下，认定不存在联合调查）；Stanard, 2007 WL 1834709, at *3（尽管参与了仅由 FBI 记录笔记的联合讯问，但 FBI 与 SEC 并未开展联合调查）；United States v. Rigas, No. 02 Cr. 1236 (LBS), 2008 WL 144824, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008)（认定平行的民事与刑事调查不属于“联合”调查）。\n\n2. 超出 Brady 规则或第16条范围的证据开示\n\n政府持有的任何及所有记录或信息，绝非一概属于其证据开示义务的范围。相反，“检方负有宪法义务，在对定罪或量刑具有实质性意义的情况下，披露对被告有利的证据。”United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)（引用 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)）。同样，《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 条要求政府在辩方提出请求时，出示“在政府占有、保管或控制范围内”且“对准备辩护具有实质性意义”的物品。根据第 16 条，如果某项物品“可用于反驳政府的指控或加强辩护”，则该物品“对准备辩护具有实质性意义”。United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180–81 (2d Cir. 1993)。换言之，正如最高法院所述，第 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 条仅授权出示倾向于“反驳政府关于被告犯有被指控罪行之主张”的物品。United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996)；另见 United States v. Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)（“第 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 条赋予被告获得对准备反驳控方主案辩论具有实质性意义的文件或其他物品的权利。”）；United States v. Allen, No. 14 Cr. 272 (JSR), 2016 WL 315928, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016)（部分依据 Armstrong 判例驳回为支持 Kastigar 主张而提出的开示请求）。\n\n此外，某项物品可能对辩方“有用”这一单纯事实，并不能使其在第 16 条下构成“实质性”。Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307；另见 United States v. Parnas, No. 19-CR-725 (JPO), 2021 WL 2981567, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021)（驳回依据第 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 条要求获取“可能包含与［被告的］选择性起诉主张相关之证据”的文件动议，因为被告“未能就此类主张作出必要的证明”）。“必须有某种迹象表明，在审前披露争议证据将……使被告能够显著改变有利于自己的证明力度。”United States v. Maniktala, 934 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1991)（引文省略）。被告必须对实质性作出初步证明（prima facie showing），United States v. Finnerty, 411 F.Supp.2d 428, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)，并且必须“提供超出所请求证据具有实质性这一结论性指控的依据”，Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307。\n\n尽管第 16 条并未授权出示辩方用于“质疑检方案件办理行为”的材料，Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462，但法院有时会就这些问题批准开示。然而，在批准之前，法院要求被告作出实质性的初步门槛证明，证明确实存在不当的政府行为。参见 Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)（声称政府拒绝提交 5K 动议是基于违宪动机的被告，在获得证据开示之前必须作出“实质性的门槛证明”）；United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)（就被选择性起诉主张寻求证据开示的被告，在开示获批前必须提供“倾向于表明存在该辩护要件的某些证据”）；United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 2000)（在报复性起诉主张的背景下同理）。\n\nB. 讨论\n\nKwok（郭文贵）的请求毫无根据。要获得超出刑法规定范围的证据开示，郭文贵必须对恶意进行实质性证明。郭文贵仅仅指出了政府与开展平行调查的监管机构之间、或与管理同样可依刑事没收之资产的受托人之间的司空见惯、例行公事的互动，根本未达到其举证责任的要求。郭文贵的动议应在不举行听证的情况下予以驳回。\n\n1. 郭文贵要求获取 SEC 通信的请求应予驳回\n\n郭文贵要求获取政府与 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）通信的请求缺乏根据，其强迫开示此类证据的动议应予驳回。\n\na. 政府与 SEC 开展了平行调查\n\n首先，尽管郭文贵尚未正式动议认定政府与 SEC 开展了联合调查，但该主张构成了其证据开示请求的基础，且同样毫无根据。SEC 并非政府控方团队的成员。虽然政府与 SEC 有时为了方便证人而进行联合询问，但政府调查的大多数方面均在没有任何 SEC 参与的情况下进行：\n\n- SEC 在政府的起诉决定或政府控诉策略的制定中未发挥任何作用；\n- 同样，政府在 SEC 的指控决定或 SEC 诉讼策略的制定中未发挥任何作用；\n- SEC 没有人被指派为特别联邦助理检察官参与刑事调查；\n- 在联合进行的询问中，SEC 在询问期间未做笔录，也没有任何联合询问的笔记；\n- 在联合进行的询问中，证人被告知两家机构的调查是分开的，联合询问仅仅出于便利，而且如果达成预备陈述协议（proffer agreement），证人将与每个机构分别签署协议；\n- SEC 未参与向大陪审团呈交本案，也未收到大陪审团的庭审记录；\n- SEC 未参与执行搜查令，也未参与根据搜查令获取材料的相关性审查；\n- SEC 未获得根据大陪审团传票向政府提交的材料；以及\n- SEC 未陪同政府出庭。\n\n（参见附件 A（Murray 声明）第 2 段）。参见 Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 242（引用其中许多因素以支持 SEC 与政府未开展联合调查的认定）；United States v. Alexandre, No. 22 CR. 326 (JPC), 2023 WL 416405, at *6–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023)（同理）。将这些因素综合考量，有力地支持了政府与 SEC 开展了独立调查的认定，尽管两者的重点在涉案标的上存在重合。\n\n尽管 SEC 不是控方团队的一部分，但政府已自愿向 SEC 索取了 SEC 从第三方获得的所有文件，并将这些文件移交给了辩方。万一 SEC 向政府出示其从第三方收到的额外文件，政府将立即向辩方律师出示这些文件。\n\n郭文贵引用的任何事实都不能确立本案存在联合调查。相反，郭文贵试图将平行调查背景下司空见惯的事实描绘为不同寻常或可疑，例如政府和 SEC 在同一天提出指控（辩护状第 21 页）。例如，参见 SEC v. Shkreli, No. 15 Civ. 7175 (KAM), 2016 WL 1122029, at *7 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016)（“鉴于 SEC 拥有执行证券法的独立授权，且需要在诉讼时效届满前提起诉讼，本院认为 SEC 在刑事起诉书解封之时或前后提起民事诉讼并无不当。”）。郭文贵还指出政府从 SEC 获得了文件和信息并在政府支持搜查令的宣誓书中引用（辩护状第 20 页），但这完全属于正常和恰当的。政府在其调查中经常从任何数量的个人和实体获取文件和信息，并且据政府所知，没有任何判例支持这一单纯事实会将这些信息来源转变为控方团队成员的观点。相反，法院明确驳回了这一观点。例如，参见 Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46（裁定配合证人不是控方团队的成员）；United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2015)（同理）；Stewart, 433 F.3d at 298-99（裁定分析证据、协助控方准备交叉质询问题、参与模拟质询并在审判中作证的专家证人不是控方团队的成员）。事实上，如果 SEC 在针对重大欺诈（如郭文贵所实施的欺诈）的持续刑事调查中拒绝向政府提供信息，那反而是极不寻常的。“此外，‘并不存在普遍规则’禁止诸如 SEC 之类的民事执法机构‘与刑事检察官分享……通过民事证据开示获得的证据’。”United States v. Rhodes, No. 18 Cr. 887 (JMF), 2019 WL 3162221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019)（引用 United States v. Fiore, 381 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2004)）。“确实，因为‘证券欺诈既是行政调查的正当标的，也是刑事调查的正当标的……SEC 执法官员和检察官都预期在某种调查层面上进行协调，并将各项程序视为彼此不可分割的整体。’”Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3（引用 Fiore, 381 F.3d at 94）。郭文贵未能引用任何权威判例来支持独立机构仅因遵守自愿信息请求即成为控方团队一部分的主张。\n\n同样，政府和 SEC——两者均负有执行反欺诈法律和保护受害者的职责，且两者都在调查由相同个人对相同受害者实施的相同行为——可能分享了某些证据并就预期的调查或执法步骤相互通报，这一事实完全不足为奇且属常规操作。这种“刑事控方团队的律师和特工一方面与［民事执法机构］另一方面之间的协调与共享，其本身是寻常且不存在问题的。”Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3。\n\n简而言之，将这些事实和情况应用于成熟确立的法律标准，可以清楚地表明 SEC 开展的是平行调查，并非政府控方团队的一部分。\n\nb. 郭文贵的证据开示请求毫无根据\n\n鉴于上述情况，郭文贵要求获取政府与 SEC 之间内部通信的请求毫无根据。没有任何刑事证据开示规则强制要求仅因辩方推测材料可能对提出辩护动议有用就必须出示该材料。相反，本法院区的法院已明确驳回此类请求。例如，参见 Parnas, 2021 WL 2981567, at *8（驳回依据第 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 条要求获取“可能包含与［被告的］选择性起诉主张相关之证据”的文件动议，因为被告“未能就此类主张作出必要的证明”）。\n\nKwok（郭文贵）对 Rhodes 案的依赖尤其是不恰当的。Rhodes 案直接驳回了辩方在此提出的“刑事当局与民事当局共享信息是不寻常或成问题的”这一主张，反而裁定“一方面是刑事检察团队的律师与执法人员，另一方面是[民事执法机关]，两者之间的此类协调与共享本身并不例外，也不成问题。”2019 WL 3162221, at *3。Furman 法官解释称，此类协调只有在“出于恶意”进行时才成问题，例如政府机构“作出了积极的虚假陈述，或者纯粹出于推进刑事案件的目的而进行民事调查”。同上（援引 United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2008)，并同时参引 United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) 以及 United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978)）。\n\n鉴于平行程序中协调行为具有“不例外且不成问题”的性质，Rhodes 案认定刑事被告人无权当然获得刑事与民事机构之间的内部通讯。相反，为了就民事与刑事机构之间存在不当协调的指控获得“哪怕是有限的证据开示”，被告人必须“对存在恶意作出实质性的初步证明”。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *4（援引 United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 1985)）。Furman 法官认定 Rhodes 案中的被告人未能作出该项证明，因此驳回了其证据开示请求，而郭文贵在其案情摘要中忽略了这一事实。参见 Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *5。\n\n郭文贵远未达到证明“对恶意作出实质性初步证明”的举证责任。事实上，郭文贵未能指出任何倾向于表明刑事与民事机构之间的协调属于例外或存在问题的证据。如上所述，本案中的协调完全是常规性的。郭文贵指出，Furman 法官在 Rhodes 案中要求政府提交一份关于与民事机构协调情况的宣誓书，但那是源于 Rhodes 案中唯一存在的一个不寻常事实：SEC（美国证券交易委员会）尽管向 Rhodes 案中的被告人发出了调取文件的传票（被告人对此作出了回应），却并未对该被告人提起平行的指控，且该传票的成果被用于平行刑事案件中。换言之，正是这种同时且平行的民事执法行动的“缺失”，被 Furman 法官认为是不寻常的，并导致其要求政府提供宣誓书。相比之下，本案属于刑事诉讼与民事诉讼同时提起的标准事实模式，这否定了任何关于 SEC 诉讼纯粹是为推进刑事案件而提起的断言。无论如何，本反对书均附有检控团队一名成员的宣誓书。（参见 Murral 声明）。\n\n总而言之，郭文贵根据相关法律标准甚至未能阐明一个表面上合理的恶意理论。这并不奇怪，因为本案中 SEC 与政府之间的任何协调在任何时候都是“不例外且不成问题的”。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3。因此，基于上述理由，郭文贵关于就政府与 SEC 的沟通进行证据开示的动议应予驳回。\n2. 郭文贵索取破产受托人通讯记录的请求应予驳回\n\n郭文贵关于受托人的论点同样毫无根据。郭文贵试图通过与破产受托人之间无可厚非的互动来强行推断政府的不当行为，这与案卷记录和法律相悖。郭文贵根本未达到确立“对恶意作出实质性初步证明”的举证责任。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *4。\n\n第一，郭文贵未能证明存在灭失证据指控的任何依据。简而言之，由于政府与受托人就 Mahwah Mansion（马鞍山庄园）达成的和解协议，绝对不存在证据灭失的风险。政府远未灭失关于马鞍山庄园状况的证据，反而提供了来自 2023年3月 和 2023年9月 的数千张马鞍山庄园照片、2022年8月 至 2023年9月 期间不同时间段录制的大量监控视频，以及 2023年9月 拍摄的马鞍山庄园内部的大量视频。郭文贵并未解释这些由其持有的、记录了马鞍山庄园在多个日期的状况的大量书证记录是如何被灭失或将如何以某种方式被灭失的；郭文贵也未解释为何其正式在案的刑事辩护律师进行的实地考察会以某种方式不足以满足辩方的任何进一步需求。1 相反，郭文贵在此仅像在《破产中止动议》中那样主张“必须维持马鞍山庄园的现有状态”。（摘要第 16 页）。但该主张仍存在两个问题。第一个问题是，实际上，郭文贵的同谋者正在改变马鞍山庄园的状态。在郭文贵被捕以及起诉书中关于马鞍山庄园的指控被解封后，他们企图通过篡改该房产的状况来使马鞍山庄园看起来像一个 G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）设施，以此在本案中妨碍司法公正。事实上，在涉及《破产中止动议》时，郭文贵甚至无法且并未反驳其追随者在政府关于马鞍山庄园的指控公开后篡改了马鞍山庄园的状态。（参见 ECF 编号 152）。第二个问题是，如前所述，郭文贵并未解释为何其持有的记录特定日期马鞍山庄园的大量证据（包括照片和视频）没有“维持”马鞍山庄园的状态。郭文贵未能回应这些观点，因为本动议与《破产中止动议》一样，实际上是郭文贵企图为该阴谋集团的“持续”使用而获取对马鞍山庄园的控制权。（参见摘要第 17-18 页（“显示在郭先生被捕前该房产是如何配置和使用的，以及在不受托人干涉的情况下该房产如何继续被用于服务于中国支持民主的异见人士运动的证据，构成了郭先生有权向陪审团出示的开脱罪责证据。”（强调为后加）））。本法院应驳回郭文贵在本动议及《破产中止动议》中体现出的、企图让本法院为篡改证据开绿灯的企图——这种篡改是为了在本刑事案件中妨碍司法公正，并为了推进一个已经从郭文贵追随者手中窃取了超过十亿美元的跨国阴谋。\n\n1 在对《破产中止动议》的答复中，郭文贵坚称对这种实地考察进行监督“无异于纵容政府间谍进入辩方阵营”。（ECF 编号 152 第 8 页）。撇开修辞不谈，政府愿意就适当的保障措施与郭文贵进行磋商，以确保郭文贵的同伙和同谋者不再对马鞍山庄园进行进一步的篡改。正如政府在对《破产中止动议》的回应中已经指出的那样，郭文贵的律师在提交其任何一项动议之前均未就实地考察马鞍山庄园一事联系政府。他们至今仍未这样做。\n\n与此相关的是，政府与受托人就马鞍山庄园达成的和解协议没有任何异常或不当之处。政府与受托人进行了合作，试图有效分配资源，以保全和追回郭文贵及其同谋者盗窃或挪用的超过十亿美元中的部分资金。政府打算将扣押的数亿美元现金和财产返还给被告人犯罪行为的受害者——这一行动必然涉及受托人就郭文贵破产债权人对这些资产的主张所承担的职责。特别是关于马鞍山庄园，政府和受托人对该房产持有潜在的竞争性权利主张，而该协议将允许在该房产的价值得以保全的同时——除其他事项外，停止被告人的同谋者和同伙为阻碍司法公正而对该房产进行的改动——等待与没收、赔偿和破产财团相关问题的解决。2 政府与同样对可没收资产享有利益的受托人开展合作，绝对没有任何不寻常之处。这种协调的许多先例——受托人在郭文贵在其动议中反复引用的破产法院听证会上曾提及这些先例，尽管郭文贵在其物证中遗漏了该部分笔录 3——在多个司法管辖区可追溯至多年前。4 例如，在针对 Marc Dreier 的刑事案件中，Rakoff 法官批准了涉及政府与破产受托人的各项和解协议，包括该案中政府与第 11 章受托人之间的“协调协议”。United States v. Dreir, 09 Cr. 86 (JSR), Dkt. 141 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区） Feb. 5, 2010)。再如，在 Bernie Madoff（伯尼·麦道夫）的巨额欺诈案中，政府与法院指定的、根据《证券投资者保护法案》（“SIPA”）监督麦道夫公司清算的受托人进行了“广泛”合作。5 事实上，正是同一位受托人——该受托人同时负责监管麦道夫的个人破产\n\n2 在对《破产中止动议》的答复中，郭文贵称政府通过与受托人达成协议不当地试图“规避本法院”。（参见 ECF 编号 152 第 7–8 页）。这不仅是夸大其词，更是虚假的。该协议仅保全了这一可没收资产的价值，本法院将在审判和定罪后处理没收问题（包括涉及马鞍山庄园的问题），正如在每起案件中一样。\n\n3 参见作为物证 B 附上的完整笔录第 28-29 页。\n\n4 参见，例如，In re Maresca, No. 20-11483 (KHK), Dkt. 244 (E.D. Va. Bankr.（弗吉尼亚东区破产法院） Sept. 9, 2021)（破产受托人就与拥有没收和赔偿主张的政府达成关于某项属于“该破产财团唯一重要资产”的房产的协调与和解协议申请批准的动议）；United States v. Merrill, No. 14-40028 (TSH), Dkt. 367 (D. Mass.（马萨诸塞区） July 11, 2017)（“规定由相关第 11 章案件中的受托人向受害者管理和支付赔偿金”的赔偿命令）；In re Rothstein, No. 09-34791 (RBR), Dkt. 5704 (S.D. Fla. Bankr.（佛罗里达南区破产法院） July 14, 2014)（批准政府与破产受托人之间关于没收与赔偿的和解协议的动议）；In re Goldberg, No. 09-23370 (ASD), Dkt. 424 (D. Conn. Bankr.（康涅狄格区破产法院） May 31, 2011)（申请破产受托人在刑事案件中执行赔偿的动议）；同上，Dkt. 462（批准动议的命令）；United States v. Brandau, No. 99-8215 (DMM), Dkt. 734 (S.D. Fla.（佛罗里达南区） Apr. 25, 2000)（政府与破产受托人之间关于出售和维护确定没收资产的协议）；同上，Dkt. 759（批准协议的命令）。\n\n5 在 Wang（王）支持破产中止动议的信函中，她引用了政府在 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）对 Madoff（麦道夫）提起的诉讼中提交的一封信函。（见 Dkt. 135 第 4 页）。虽然 DOJ（美国司法部）在该案中确实反对针对麦道夫的破产财产启动破产程序，但王的信函遗漏了一个关键点。具体而言，王遗漏了政府信函在结尾处指出的事实，即“本办公室亦继续与 SIPA（证券投资者保护法）受托人合作，以最大限度地为受害者追回财产”，且“鉴于这一正在进行的努力”，启动破产程序“尤为不当”。SEC v. Madoff, No. 08 Civ. 10791, Dkt. 50 第 5 页 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009)。事实上，在政府发出该信函两个月后，麦道夫的个人破产财产被并入了由 SIPA 受托人管理的 SIPA 程序中，该受托人在没收和赔偿方面与政府进行了极其密切且有效的协调。见 Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009)，可查阅于 http\n\n自 2009年6月9日起管理该破产财产——甚至在刑事案件中同时被指定为特别主事官，“以监督没收法律下的减免程序”。DOJ，《曼哈顿联邦检察官宣布达成协议，从 Jeffry M. Picower 的遗产中为 Bernard L. Madoff 庞氏骗局的受害者追回 72 亿美元》（2010年12月17日）。举例来说，在涉及“美国历史上单笔金额最大的没收”（约 72 亿美元）的相关和解协议中约定，受托人将“通过 SIPA 清算程序”管理约 50 亿美元的资金，同时通过司法部的减免程序管理约 22 亿美元。同上。先例也驳斥了 Kwok（郭文贵）在此处以及破产中止动议中的暗示，即受托人因代表郭的债权人追回资产的工作而收取费用存在不当之处。与破产受托人一样，SIPA 受托人的费用是有报酬补偿的，迄今为止，麦道夫案中的 SIPA 受托人已收到超过 22 亿美元的费用（同时追回了超过 146 亿美元的资产）。见 The Madoff Recovery Initiative，《追回款项与报告费用比例：2008年12月11日至2023年9月20日》。政府与受托人（如郭破产案中的受托人）进行协调绝非不当或反常，而是一种最佳实践做法，既能防止对资产进行不必要的争夺，又能在猖獗的欺诈发生后实现最大程度的追回。\n\n6 见 Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009)，可查阅于 http\n\n7 可查阅于 http\n\n8 可查阅于 http\n\n9 政府在此向法院指定的受托人提供一组照片也并无任何不妥。在其破产中止动议中，郭试图暗示政府这样做违反了保护令（郭主张书 3, 21），但正如政府在答复中已解释的那样（Dkt. 148，第 3 页脚注 2），郭是错误的。此外，这些照片符合政府在 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅）执行搜查令所要求调取的材料。类比而言，\n\n其次，郭关于据称需要保护由受托人持有的其特权信息的主张毫无根据。政府已经解释过，其既未寻求也未收到此类信息，并且仅会在适当的情况下这样做。（Dkt. 148，第 2 页）。\n\n第三，政府与受托人之间的互动完全属于常规情况。基于案件事实，郭关于受托人可能是检控团队成员的说法毫无根据：\n\n- 政府独立于受托人启动了调查，比郭自愿申请破产以及受托人被指定还要早数年；\n- 受托人在政府的指控决定或政府检控策略的制定中没有发挥任何作用；\n- 受托人未参与任何政府询问；\n- 受托人未参与向大陪审团呈交本案的工作，亦未收到大陪审团的庭审记录；\n- 受托人未参与搜查令的执行，也未参与根据搜查令获取材料的相关性审查；\n- 受托人未获取依据大陪审团传票向政府出示的材料；以及\n- 受托人未陪同政府出庭。\n\n（Murray 声明 ¶ 3）。\n\n符合搜查令要求的材料经常会与参与平行调查的监管机构共享，这种共享完全正当，而且实际上屡见不鲜。\n\n10 郭在与破产中止动议相关的答辩中辩称，政府在描述其可获取郭的特权信息的适当情形时，包含了获得郭“或特权的适当持有者”的同意，这造成了某种“漏洞”。（Dkt. 152 第 8 页）。郭是错误的。政府加入该括号内的补充说明，仅仅是为了涵盖郭实际上并非特权的适当持有者的情形，例如当实际持有特权的是法人实体而非个人时。\n\n需要明确的是，郭实际上并未声称受托人是检控团队的一部分。他寻求获取通信记录是为了“全面调查受托人是否”属于检控团队的一部分。（主张书 19）。但是，如上所述，这并非获取超出刑法和刑事诉讼程序规定范围的证据开示的理由。郭指出了政府与受托人之间的“协调”和“信息共享”，但政府与另一方之间的此类协调完全是“常规且不存在问题的”，并未为郭所寻求的非常规证据开示提供依据。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3；亦见 Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42（“仅与检控团队互动，并不能使某人成为团队成员”）。\n\n结论\n\n显而易见，SEC 和受托人均不是本案检控团队的成员。为了获得超出刑事规则规定范围的证据开示，被告人必须充分证明政府存在恶意。郭未能作出该等证明，因为他根本无法作出该等证明。政府与 SEC 以及受托人的互动不仅出于善意，而且此类互动是例行且合乎常规的。如果在目前呈现的情况中存在任何特殊之处，那就是郭提出这两项动议，至少部分是为了让他的同谋和关联方能够通过重新占有马瓦豪宅，以进一步妨碍司法公正并延续其庞大的欺诈行为。郭的动议应予驳回。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n联邦检察官\n\n签署人：___________________/s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJuliana N. Murray\n联邦助理检察官\n212-637-2190/-6612 /-2314","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CIPA","forfeiture","Brady","Ho Wan Kwok","Murray","Guo","Fergenson","Finkel","GTV","Giglio","Miles Guo","Yanping Wang","Kin Ming Je","William Je","Jencks"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":4,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":17,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":24,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":53,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":58,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":69,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":135,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":141,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":143,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":148,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":152,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":244,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":367,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":424,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":462,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":734,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":759,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":5704,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":8198,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-10-19 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-10-19","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:08:54"}