{"id":"court_sdny_186_1","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":186,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":"2023-12-06","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"支持返还财产动议的法律备忘录——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #186（2023年12月6日提交）。喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）客户方代理律师（Myer and Scher LLP、Bradford Geyer）就同日提交的第41(g)条返还财产动议提交详细论证，涵盖扣押经过、交易所运营及客户准入合规审查（AML/KYC）、司法管辖与登记、财务审计等事实背景，主张扣押未对客户造成损失、赎回未受影响，并援引美国政府过往数据泄露事件（指向中国国家背景黑客）对政府要求解密客户账户信息提出信息安全方面的担忧，请求法院下令允许相关资金的清算、释放与赎回。","summary_en":"Memorandum in support of the motion for return of property — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 186 (filed 2023-12-06). Counsel for the purported Himalaya Exchange customer-movants (Myer and Scher LLP; Bradford Geyer) submit the substantive brief accompanying the same-day Rule 41(g) motion, covering the factual background of the seizure, the Exchange's operations and customer-onboarding compliance (AML/KYC), jurisdiction and registration, and financial audits, arguing customers suffered no loss and redemptions were unaffected. It also raises information-security concerns—citing a past U.S. government data breach attributed to Chinese state-linked hackers—about compelling decryption of customer account data, and asks the court to order the clearing, release, and redemption of the funds.","body_en":"## **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\n## **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**\n\n**S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\n**v.**\n\n**HO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\" KIN MING JE, a/k/a \"William Je,\" and YANPING WANG, a/k/a \"Yvette,\" Defendants.**\n\n**MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY**\n\n| I.   | Introduction3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |  |\n|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| II.  | Factual Background<br>4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |  |\n|      | A. The Seizure<br>4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |  |\n|      | B. The Himalaya Exchange<br>5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |  |\n|      | 1. Overview………………………………………………………………………5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |  |\n|      | 2. Customer Onboarding Compliance, AML, and KYC Checks………………….8                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  |\n|      | 3. Customer Base………………………………………………………………… 9                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |\n|      | 4. Jurisdiction and Registration………………………………………………….10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |\n|      | 5. Financial and Audits…………………………………………………………10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  |\n|      | a.<br>Coin Price Harmed By Seizure…………………………………10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |\n|      | b.<br>Audit Reports and Financial Analysis……………………………12                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |  |\n|      | c.<br>No Loss to Customers or Redemptions………………………….12                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |\n| III. | Suspicious Actors………………………………………………………………………13                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |  |\n|      | A.<br>Adverse Social Media………………………………………………….…………….13                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |  |\n|      | B.<br>False Complaints to Regulators……………………………………………………14                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |  |\n|      | C.<br>The United States Department of State Report………………………………………14                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |  |\n| IV.  | Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to Federal Rule Of Criminal Procedure 41(g)15                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |  |\n|      | A.<br>The Equities Require Return Without Further Delay………………………………16<br>B.<br>Petitioners Have Distinct, Identifiable Interest in the Forfeited Funds and Were Not<br>Given Proper Notice of the Seizure………………………………………………….16<br>C.<br>Confidentiality is Imperative to Petitioners………………………………………….17<br>D.<br>Procedures for Reasonable Conditions to Protect Access to the Property |  |\n| V.   | are available under Rule 41(g)……………………………………………………….17<br>Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………19                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |  |\n|      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |  |\n\n## Table of Contents\n\n## **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nUndersigned counsel represents in excess of 3,345 customers of the Himalaya Exchange (\"the Exchange\"), who hold Himalaya Dollar (HDO) and Himalaya Coin (HCN) cryptocurrency (“petitioners”).[1](#page-2-0) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), petitioners move for return of their property seized by the United Stares in *United States v. Kwok et al,* 23 CR 118 (SDNY). The petitioners have a distinct, identifiable third-party interest in the forfeited property. In the GOVERNMENT'S MOTION PURSUANT TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 3771 filed in March 2023, the United States characterizes the petitioners as \"victims\" of the Defendants. As outlined in this Motion, the seizure of the assets in this case has made them \"victims\" of the seizure by the United States.\n\nFrom its inception, the Himalaya Exchange has performed extensive due diligence in its establishment of a safe customer base and has consistently met stringent audit and compliance standards. At the date of the seizure the reserve was at 100%. Based on an analysis of financial records of the Exchange and Himalaya International Reserves Limited, key findings are as follows:\n\n- The operating activity of the Himalaya Entities demonstrates an active business with highly vetted customers and has generated sufficient revenue to meet its operation cost without recourse to any customer funds.\n- Customers were able to redeem \\$100,000 HDO per month back to USD into their accounts. All redemptions were honored unless they did not comply with specific compliance and/or AML rules. The Petitioner's deposits, current balances of HDO, HCN and redemptions indicate a properly run and actively traded exchange.\n- The Petitioners have not experienced any misrepresentation, fraud or loss of funds from the Exchange.\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> <http> Undersigned counsel estimates the number of Exchange customers will increase by thousands as word of mouth reaches other victims who until now have never received notification from the Government about their funds being seized and it becomes clear that our intentions are authentic and genuine. Among the challenges that exist, many Exchange customers are fearful and ironically assume the U.S. government action may be a stalking horse for other governments.\n\n# **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n# **A. THE SEIZURE**\n\nPages 35-36 of the Superseding Indictment in *United States v. Kwok* has conclusory allegationsregarding the Defendants'use of the Himalayan Exchange to perpetrate a fraud scheme. From the perspective of Exchange customers, these allegations have little or no connection or relevance to the forfeiture plight involving their funds held in constructive trust by the Himalaya Exchange. It then contains the relevant forfeiture allegations on pages 35-36 ¶ 55 j, k, m, o, p and s allowing the United States to seize millions of dollars in accounts of the Himalayan Exchange: [2](#page-3-0)\n\nj. \\$4,643,744.70 in United States currency formerly on deposit in Account Number 7801000590 at FV Bank held in the name of \"Himalaya International Reserves, Ltd.,\" seized by the Government on or about September 20, 2022;\n\nk. \\$14,599,257.25 in United States currency formerly on deposit in Account Number 7801000254 at FV Bank held in the name of \"Himalaya International Clearing, Ltd.,\" seized by the Government on or about September 20, 2022;\n\nm.. \\$10,008,284.04 in United States currency formerly on deposit in Account Number MBil 0133-0000 at Mercantile Bank International held in the name of \"Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.,\" seized by the Government between on or about October 16, 2022 and on or about March 10, 2023;\n\no. \\$272,350,313.76 in United States currency formerly on deposit in Account Number MBI10138-0000 at Mercantile Bank International held in the name of \"Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.,\" seized by the Government between on or about October 16, 2022 and on or about March 10, 2023;\n\np. \\$310,594.31 in United States currency formerly on deposit in Account Number MBI10139-0000 at Mercantile Bank International held in the name of \"Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.,\" seized by the Government between on or about October 16, 2022 and on or about March 10, 2023;\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> This is also outlined in the Government's Bill of Particulars (Docket 38)with the addition of paragraph l. \\$7,715.00, in United States currency formerly on deposit in Account Number 7801000589 at FV Bank held in the name of \"Himalaya International Financial Group, Ltd.,\" seized by the Government on or about September 20, 2022. There also seems to be discrepancy between the amount seized and the audit reports reviewed by counsel. Counsel suspects this is a result of banking transfers and activity that are not in the public record. For purposes of this filing, the money contained in hard currency contained in licensed bank accounts is held now by the U.S. government.\n\ns. \\$161,809.47 in United States currency formerly on deposit in Account Number MBI10183-0000 at Mercantile Bank International held in the name of \"Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.,\" seized by the Government on or about October 16, 2022.\n\nThe seizure by the United States of these accounts comprises of the majority of the stable coin reserve of which the Exchange customers and current petitioners are the beneficiaries. The Exchange at all times since its launch has maintained the stable coin reserve at 100%. Hence, all the stable coins issued were backed 1HD in the bank. The reserve was at 100% at the date of seizure from the Exchange account. There has been no fraudulent use of or misappropriation of customer funds at any time. In fact, as outlined below, the Exchange had an external audit of the stable coin reserve twice, the last being shortly before the seizure date. These audits confirmed the reserve was fully intact.\n\n## **B. THE HIMALAYA EXCHANGE**\n\n## **1. OVERVIEW**\n\nThe Himalaya Exchange (\"Exchange\") is a British Virgin Islands (\"BVI\") registered company named Himalaya International Clearing Limited, trading as Himalaya Exchange. It operates a user-to-user, centralized cryptocurrency exchange platform that consists of an engine that operates a continuously matched order book in respect to virtual asset products. It is a platform for clients to trade, store and manage the Himalaya cryptocurrencies, namely the Himalaya Coin (\"HCN\") and the Himalaya Dollar (\"HDO\"). HCN is the Exchange's trading coin, a cryptocurrency priced by supply and demand. HDO is a stable coin, structured with the aim of maintaining its value at 1:1 to the US Dollar. Exchange customers can redeem HDO to US Dollars from their HDO balance in accordance with the exchange redemption terms outlined below. HCN\n\nis issued by Himalaya International Financial Group Limited. HDO are issued by Himalaya International Reserves Limited.\n\nThe Exchange was launched to bring financial freedom to everyone in the world as well as to help those who are wrongly persecuted, including those having their assets taken illegally, or held for ransom with the threat of it being taken by the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\") without any justified reason. Exchange customers have no connection to Defendants. The Exchange is extremely popular among non-Americans, in particular those with Chinese ethnicity, as they rely on the Exchange being professionally and securely managed and the Exchange will not compromise any personal information to foreign governments, other than what is legally required. It also allows politically persecuted people a tool for financial security of their legitimate money (e.g. those people attending peaceful demonstration in Hong Kong have their bank accounts shut down and in general those targeted/persecuted/intimidated by the CCP that have had their assets confiscated). The Exchange is seen by the CCP as a threat which undermines their power to confiscate assets (illegally) and control the Chinese economy. Included in the affected group whose funds were seized by the United States are non-Americans whom the Chinese government views as being dissident.\n\nThe launch of the Exchange followed a staged process. Phase 1 client registration was launched in April 2021. This was pre-launch registration of private participation customers. Onboarding was in line within permitted jurisdictions only (non-US and others) and fully complied with \"Know Your Customer\" (KYC) procedures.\n\nTo sign up, the Petitioners had to undergo a formal on-boarding procedure and KYC and anti-money laundering (AML) checks. The onboarding process with KYC and AML checks is set out in more detail below. Once approved by the compliance officials the Petitioners had access to their Himalaya Exchange account and deposited US dollars to purchase HDO Credits upon launch of the Exchange with US Dollars on a 1:1 ratio.\n\nThe Whitepaper,[3](#page-6-0) which is discussed in the Superseding Indictment, explains that the HDO would only be available to members of the Exchange. Members of the Exchange were able to participate in an issuance of the Himalaya Dollar through purchase of HDO Credits through the Exchange. The Whitepaper also explains that in order to provide liquidity support for HDO Credits, and as a safeguard against price volatility, a reserve would be established by the Issuer (Himalaya International Reserves Limited). The Reserve was managed with the aim of maintaining its value at a level equal in value in US Dollars to the value of HDO in circulation.\n\nIn July 2021, during Phase 2, the Exchange launched two cryptocurrencies: HCN and HDO. Both coins are Ethereum-based tokens with backwards compatibility with the ERC- 20 standard. The HDO is issued by Himalaya International Reserves and pegged to the US Dollar. HCN is not pegged to the value of any fiat currency and so its value is subject to supply and demand in the secondary market. This is the trading coin on the Exchange. Members are able to trade HCN Credits on the Exchange. Users who had registered with the Exchange were allowed to purchase pre-allocated HCN just before launch at the initial HCN issuance price of US \\$0.10 per HCN using HDO credits. The opening price for the HCN at launch was \\$0.10 per HCN.\n\nOn November 1, 2021, Phase 3 involved the full launch of the Himalaya Exchange. Registered users were now able to trade in HCN using HDO to purchase HCN and receive HDO on sales. Customer registration continued for those who applied to the Exchange with the same onboarding requirements outlined below.\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> [http](http)\n\nIn January 2022, Phase 4 involved the launch of Himalaya Pay (\"HPay\"). This app, available in some permitted jurisdictions to existing Exchange members, allows peer to peer transfers of HDO and HCN for Exchange members only. The app also allows gift card purchases using HDO for use with Exchange approved merchants to purchase goods, again in some permitted jurisdictions. The app is not available for use in the US or for US residents.\n\nThe HDO is multi-functional and allows members to purchase the trading coin HCN and purchase gift cards which can be used to purchase goods from approved Exchange ecosystem merchants. Merchant purchases using gift cards can be undertaken by members via HPay, which also allows peer-to-peer transfers between Exchange customers.\n\nAs discussed below, the stable coin audit reports conducted on December 15, 2021 and July 31, 2022 show that the Exchange maintained a 100% reserve in US dollars with the ratio of equivalent 1 HDO to \\$1. The last audit report was done just prior to the seizure where the reserves were at 100%.\n\n#### 2. **CUSTOMER ONBOARDING COMPLAINCE, AML AND KYC CHECKS**\n\nThe Exchange operates strict onboarding procedures. As discussed above, these procedures include rigorous AML and KYC checks as part of the Exchange's on-boarding process. The compliance process also involves customer registration, identification and verification, name screening, risk assessment, and ongoing due diligence. The extensive AML and compliance procedures include enhanced due diligence (EDD), Sanction and Politically Exposed Person (PEP) screening, periodic account checks and reviews, and transaction monitoring.\n\nWhen applying to register for an Exchange account, Petitioners were first required complete a KYC and AML questionnaire with a number of questions including, but not limited to, their personal details including their country of residence and source of funds. As a further\n\nsafeguard, before they submitted their registration, they were required to declare that they were not residents of the US, Canada or Japan. These are not the only jurisdictions which are prohibited but these three countries were further highlighted with a check box for the customer to declare they are not a resident in those jurisdictions. Petitioners were also required to verify their identity and provide official identity documentation. They were directed to identity verification software provided by Jumio, which provides artificial intelligence (AI) facial recognition checks against the ID submitted.\n\nSome Petitioners experienced their paperwork being assessed by compliance officers and further review was undertaken before their account was approved. Some were asked to provide additional bank statements, source of wealth information, and source of funds information. Petitioners also experienced ongoing reviews of their accounts and transaction monitoring and they were asked for further financial or other documentation. Further, as part of their own AML and compliance procedures, the Exchange's banking partners also required customers' KYC and other information in order to allow deposits and redemptions from each customer. This shows the high standards the Exchange maintained as well as additional financial safeguards through the banks, who are independent.\n\n#### **3. CUSTOMER BASE**\n\nThe Exchange customers are comprised of independent investors who reside in countries where it is permissible to invest in a stable coin/trading coin exchange. They range from small business owners to executives, people in the education and health care industries--pretty much any vocation you would associate with a given population. They are non-Americans with some level of disposable wealth to engage in speculative investments. The Exchange customers have no association with organized crime or illicit trade anymore that this can be alleged against customers of the New York Stock Exchange. While many customers of Chinese ethnicity and are aligned philosophically with the pro-democracy movement in China, this is not true for all the investors who merely saw the Exchange as a good investment opportunity.\n\n#### **4. JURISDICTION AND REGISTRATION**\n\nIt is clear from the onboarding process outlined above that the Exchange prohibited onboarding of U.S. residents. The Exchange does not offer any of its products or services in those excluded jurisdictions. In order to register as a user of the Exchange, the prospective user is required to indicate their personal details including their country of residence. Anyone in an excluded jurisdiction is automatically rejected as the Country does not appear in the drop-down menu to select. The U.S. is one of the prohibited and excluded jurisdictions. Petitioners are required to notify the Exchange if they move jurisdictions in which they are resident, so the Exchange can assess whether they can continue to provide services in the new Country.\n\n#### **5. FINANCIALS AND AUDITS**\n\nEach Petitioner and customer of the Exchange is able to log into their own account and see all their records which includes HCN and HDO balances, deposits, trades, redemptions and HPay activity. Each Petitioner signed a consent Form for their information to be provided by the Exchange to their lawyer. This includes their deposits, redemptions, HDO and HCN balances. This was requested from the Exchange and has been provided.\n\n#### **a) Coin Price Harmed By Seizure**\n\nExchange customers control their accounts and are able to buy and sell HCN. If they buy HCN they will use the HDO to purchase and if they sell they will receive HDO for the sale. This is reflected in their account trading activity and HCN and HDO balances. HCN is valued by supply and demand, which causes its trading price to fluctuate daily. Further, HCN is exclusive to the\n\nExchange and cannot be transferred to other Exchanges. Petitioners only have the ability to retain and realize their assets in the Exchange. The value of the HCN is an important asset to the Petitioners who have purchased the HDO with USD and used the HDO to purchase the HCN. The price of one HCN at the time of seizure was around 24 HDO equivalent to \\$24. The current price is fluctuating around 14HDO equivalent to \\$14USD.\n\nThe HCN price has dropped significantly as a result of the seizure and redemptions are now unavailable. This is because the Department of Justice has seized the reserve from which the Exchange paid out customer redemptions. Redemptions were paused by the Exchange as result. The value of the HCN just prior to seizure compared to the current value reflects an HCN devaluation of approximately \\$136M USD. If the Exchange crashes and the HCN plumets or the Exchange has to cease doing business, due to the seizures and lack of long-term reserves, then the Petitioners will lose their entire HCN assets with no recourse. It seems little consideration has been given to the substantial loss which will be caused to the Petitioners by the seizures. The Department of Justice has claimed that seizing the funds will protect the \"victims.\" Unfortunately, the effect is the opposite and the consequences of their actions will cause catastrophic losses to the Petitioners and many other customers of the Exchange who will be irreparably harmed.\n\nExchange customers supremely value trust and the herculean efforts the Exchange has endured to protect customer information, which to many customers is considered a \"life or death\" matter because of the human rights issues and other threats of persecution for a certain class of Exchange customers as stated above. There is no other reason for this protection of data, and in particular protection of their personal details. Since all customers of the Exchange have been vetted.\n\n#### **b) Audit reports and Financial Analysis**\n\nStable coin audits undertaken by independent auditors concluded that all HDO are 100% backed by currency. They further expressed the opinion that Himalaya International Reserves Limited's financial reporting was accurate and complete. As noted above, at the date of the seizure the reserve was at 100%.\n\n#### **c) No Loss to Customers or Redemptions**\n\nExchange records provided with the consent of the Petitioners show that no customer had any losses as a result of the initial HCN coin offering and those that did trade the initial coins in fact made profits. Some customers then requested redemptions of those profits which the Exchange processed in accordance with the redemption policy. Further, those that did not trade the initial HCN or part of their HCN also had no losses as the value of the HCN coin increased since issuance and has not dropped below the initial purchase price of \\$0.10 per coin. Subsequent trading of HCN between customers has been carried out at the current market price as would be expected from a trading.\n\nRedemptions are the process where a customer makes a request to convert their HDO back into USD paid directly into the customer's named bank account. It is clear from their records that numerous Petitioners received redemptions from the Exchange. This process involved the customer requesting the redemption by logging into their account. The Exchange set the limit of \\$100k per month. The records received clearly indicate that the Petitioners were given many redemptions and the total figure is substantial in value. This again supports the fact that the Petitioners have not been defrauded and is indicative of a properly run Exchange. Further, from the information it is clear that there are not substantial losses as stated in the indictment but that there are substantial profits and gains made by the Petitioners.\n\n#### **III. SUSPICIOUS ACTORS**\n\nThe Petitioners believe that they, and the Exchange itself, have been the target of a CCP operation, designed to harm them and the Exchange. These efforts seem to have been designed to undermine the credibility and reputation of the Exchange resulting in serious damage. There have also been efforts to discover who the Exchange customers are and this has resulted in anxiety and fear in the customers.\n\n#### **A. Adverse False Social Media Attacks:**\n\n The Exchange has seen a prolonged campaign of defamatory statements on social media in particular on Twitter (now X) as well as online and in other media articles. On examination of these posts several of the social media accounts involved show a prolonged defamatory campaign bearing the hallmarks of bot accounts created for this purpose. Bots have been used to spread adverse tweets. They use the Chinese language and the wording of messages by the different social media posts, adverse media articles and the nature of the complaints to the banking partners and regulators bear striking similarities with consistent themes. There are a large number of potentially \"fake\" Twitter (now X) accounts being used to distribute negative messages regarding the Exchange.\n\n There are also YouTube videos and accounts, images, exposure of Exchange employees and customers, exposure of regulatory notices, encouragement to report the Himalaya Exchange to regulators and other law enforcement bodies and alerting the FBI, SEC, UKSFO and ActionFraud UK by adding them to the message thread. The general messaging of these posts refer to scams, frauds, financial crimes, money laundering, criminal organization and other negative commentary. This social media attack appears to have commenced around the time of the pre-registration phase of the Exchange, when the Exchange had not even launched and trading had not even commenced.\n\n## **B. False Complaints to Regulators**\n\nThe Exchange was subject to cautionary notices posted on individual regulator websites that then appeared on twitter. Some twitter messages actively provided the regulator links and encouraged others to complain. The notices were in the jurisdictions of New Zealand, British Columbia (Canada), Bahamas, Portugal, Italy and Hungary. The Petitioners understand that all of these notices are now removed. It is apparent from the removal of the notices that regulators in each jurisdiction would have investigated and found no wrongdoing and decided to remove the cautionary notices.[4](#page-13-0)\n\n## **C. The United States Department of State Report**\n\nThe United States Department of State's report \"*[2022 Country Reports on Human Rights](http)  [Practices: China \\(Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet\\),](http)*[5](#page-13-1) described some of the circumstances where Chinese dissidents have been targeted outside of China. It is understood that the CCP and its agents engaged in acts to intimidate or took reprisal against dissidents (amongst other groups)\n\n• IOSCO (Global) caution list;\n\n- FMA (New Zealand) caution list;\n- CONSOB (Italy) caution list;\n- Securities Commission (Bahamas) caution list; and\n- MNB (Hungary) caution list.\n\nThese notices have now been removed..\n\n<span id=\"page-13-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> The following are the dates upon each notice was issued:\n\n<sup>•</sup> BCSC (Canada) caution list & CSA (Central regulator Canada);\n\n<sup>•</sup> CMVM (Portugal) caution list;\n\n<span id=\"page-13-1\"></span><sup>5</sup> <http>\n\noutside of China. For example, Foreign Policy reported on March 29, 2022 on the government targeting of the Chinese diaspora, particularly \"*Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Chinese dissidents, in countries such as the United Kingdom and Morocco. They reported threatening calls, cyberattacks, and harassment, including of family members in the PRC.*\"[6](#page-14-0)\n\n# **IV. MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41(g)**\n\n# **A. The Equities Require Return Now Without Further Delay**\n\nRule 41(g) provides:\n\nA person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings.\n\nRule 41(g) motion is an equitable remedy that is available only when there is no adequate remedy at law and the equities favor the exercise of jurisdiction. *De Almeida v. United States,* 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also U.S. (Drug Enforcement Agency) v. One 1987 Jeep Wrangler Automobile,* 972 F.2d 472, 479 (2d Cir. 1992). A third-party claimant contesting a criminal forfeiture may lack an adequate remedy at law if the claimant faces months or years of delay before the claimant may seek an ancillary proceeding in the criminal forfeiture action. *De Almeida,* 459 F.3d at 382. In this matter, the trial is not scheduled to commence until April 8, 2024. The equities favor resolution of this matter now rather than continued delay that will irreparably harm petitioners. Through no fault of their own, petitioners are unable to liquidate their holdings in the Exchange.\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> <http> See also, [http](http)[silence;](http) <http>\n\n## **B. Petitioners Have Distinct, Identifiable Interest in the Forfeited Funds and Were Not Given Proper Notice of the Seizure**\n\nThe petitioners have a distinct, identifiable third-party interest in the forfeited property pursuant to 21 U.S. Code § 853(n). Despite the government's claim that the notice was not practicable[7](#page-15-0), the Exchange maintains confidential information about the customers of the Exchange. The government could have worked with the Exchange to make viable notice and execute a speedy confidential return of the seized funds. As the United States understands, the customers of the Exchange are ALL foreign nationals. Publication on the SDNY website was insufficient to reach them in their given languages. Customers who contacted undersigned counsel expressed fear and frustration about how little information was available about the condition of their funds and they had no idea when or if they would ever receive their funds back. There is a suspicion within the community, ill-founded no doubt, that the U.S. Government is working with the CCP to expose Exchange customers who are viewed by the CCP as dissidents. The undersigned counsel is not a risk assessment expert in this area and has no position regarding the credibility of these concerns, but it is impossible not to notice that this is a strong inference that has been drawn by the community and its clients.\n\n<span id=\"page-15-0\"></span><sup>7</sup> The cases cited to the Court in its Motion Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3771 (Docket 10) are distinguishable from this case. For example, *See, e.g., United States v. Brown*, 20 Cr. 524 (KPF) \"Upon the motion of the United States of America dated January 23, 2023, it is found that: (a) there are over one hundred thousand potential individual victims in this case; (b) there is no readily available up-to-date compilation of such individuals; and (c) it is impracticable to accord all of the potential victims notice.\" In this case, there are a limited number of victims, there is an up to date, though confidential, list of the victims, and thus the Government could have notified the victims upon seizure by working with the Exchange.\n\n### **C. Confidentiality is Imperative to Petitioners**\n\nFurther, as noted above, confidentiality is imperative to members of the Exchange because of the potential for political persecution. Counsel certifies under penalty of perjury that based upon information he has been provided, the petitioners have right, title and interest in the seized property and can provide additional information confidentially to support petitioners' claims.\n\n## **D. Procedures for Reasonable Conditions to Protect Access to the Property are Available under Rule 41(g)**\n\nA variety of reasonable conditions are available for the speedy and confidential return of the petitioners seized funds in this matter. See Department of Justice Manual 9-111.125 - Trustees and Monitors in Forfeiture Cases.[8](#page-16-0) Because of the meticulous compliance procedures followed by the Exchange, this confidential and speedy return of the funds to petitioners who are completely innocent parties, can be effectuated with minor cooperation between a designate from the United States Attorney's Office and undersigned counsel, through a controlled and protected procedure, that can also be subject to approval by this Court *in camera*. Because the petitioners have already endured punishment in the form of confiscated funds and loss of significant returns on their investment, we request that the Honorable Court refrain from the appointment of a trustee, monitor receiver[9](#page-16-1) because this will exacerbate their injury and further diminish the corpus of their investment.\n\n<span id=\"page-16-1\"></span>9 The purpose of the trustee and monitor policy is to provide guidance for the appointment of trustees and monitors in Department of Justice federal forfeiture cases involving complex assets or business enterprises. The key distinction between a monitor and a trustee is that only a *trustee* has the authority to manage an enterprise. A *monitor* observes and reports. A *receiver* is a fiduciary who is responsible only to the court, and a *custodian* takes actual custody of the assets and may be recommended where a number of assets are located in a foreign country. In this case, all the details about investor identity and investment activity is meticulously organized, protected and preserved by the Exchange and all the information relevant to the Government's obligation to release the funds can be readily obtained, provided and reviewed.\n\n<span id=\"page-16-0\"></span><sup>8</sup> [http](http) [forfeitureseizure#:~:text=The%20selection%20and%20appointment%20of,of%20a%20trustee%20or%20monitor.](http)\n\nOne of the aspects of the seizure that caused outright alarm by certain customers of the Exchange was the rumor that the U.S. Department of Justice had attempted to seize the customer lists of the Exchange. It is clear that their information cannot be protected even with strict compliance protections.[10](#page-17-0) With lives at stake, petitioners implore the Court not to entrust personally identifiable information involving third-party investors, with no known connection to the alleged criminal conduct, to the Government.\n\nFurther, the forfeiture statutes do not preclude, as a matter of law, the imposition of a constructive trust to protect these victims from further injury. *See United States v. \\$4,224,958.57* (Boylan), 392 F.3d 1002, 1003–1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that victims of a large, fraudulent investment scheme established a sufficient legal interest in the seized proceeds through a constructive trust to confer on them standing to contest the forfeiture); *see also Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States*, 652 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2011). Such a constructive trust should be ordered by the Court to allow for the clearing, release, and redemption of the Petitioners funds.\n\n<span id=\"page-17-0\"></span><sup>10</sup> Many of the attorneys and staff assigned to this matter at the U.S. Attorney's office may sympathize with undersigned counsel's expressions of concern about information security since many of us (undersigned counsel as a former DOJ employee) have had had our clearance files compromised. See [Office of Personnel Management data](http)  breach - [Wikipedia;](http) [Final notices going out this week to the 21 million people whose data was stolen in the security](http)  clearance breach - [The Washington Post,](http) The Office of Personnel Management data breach was a 2015 data breach targeting Standard Form 86 (SF-86) U.S. government security clearance records retained by the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM). One of the largest breaches of government data in U.S. history, the attack was carried out by an advanced persistent threat based in China, widely believed to be the Jiangsu State Security Department, a subsidiary of China's Ministry of State Security spy agency. Approximately 22.1 million records were affected, including records related to government employees, other people who had undergone background checks, and their friends and family. The breach included personally identifiable information such as Social Security numbers, as well as names, dates and places of birth, and addresses. State-sponsored hackers working on behalf of the Chinese government carried out the attack.\n\nIn this matter it would be serious concern if Government ever were to consider it to be a good idea to obtain all account information from thousands of vulnerable Exchange customers who are located outside the United States requiring the Himalaya Exchange to unencrypt it and provide it to the US Government, when the US Government has a terrible track record of protecting such information.\n\n## **V. CONCLUSION**\n\nBased on the foregoing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), petitioners move for return of their property seized by the United Stares in *United States v. Kwok,* 23 CR 18 SDNY), and as that the Court adopt the aforementioned procedure for the confidential and speedy return of their property.\n\n> /s/ Jamie Scher Jamie Scher NY 2488435 Myer and Scher LLP 377B South Oyster Bay Road Plainview, NY 118013 Jamie@myerandscher.com (516) 713-0655\n\n/s/ Brad Geyer Bradford L. Geyer, PHV pending NJ 022751991 Suite 141 Route 130 S., Suite 303 Cinnaminson, NJ 08077 [Brad@FormerFedsGroup.Com](mailto:Brad@FormerFedsGroup.Com) (856) 607-5708\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on December 6, 2023, a true and accurate copy of the forgoing was electronically filed and served through the ECF system of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.\n\n> /s/ Brad Geyer Bradford L. Geyer, PHV pending NJ 022751991 Suite 141 Route 130 S., 303 Cinnaminson, NJ 08077 Brad@FormerFedsGroup.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\nS1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”、“Miles Kwok”、“Guo Wengui”、“七哥”、“校长”，KIN MING JE（余建明），又名“William Je”，以及 YANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”，被告。\n\n支持发还财产动议之备忘录\nI. 导言 3\nII. 事实背景\nA. 查封\nB. 喜马拉雅交易所\n1. 概述………………………………………………………………………5\n2. 客户入驻合规、反洗钱与了解你的客户审查………………….8\n3. 客户群体………………………………………………………………… 9\n4. 管辖权与注册………………………………………………….10\n5. 财务与审计…………………………………………………………10\na. 币价因查封受损…………………………………10\nb. 审计报告与财务分析……………………………12\nc. 客户无损失或赎回正常………………………….12\nIII. 可疑行为人………………………………………………………………………13\nA. 负面社交媒体信息………………………………………………….…………….13\nB. 向监管机构虚假投诉……………………………………………………14\nC. 美国国务院报告………………………………………14\nIV. 依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 41(g) 条提出的发还财产动议 15\nA. 衡平原则要求毫不迟延地予以发还………………………………16\nB. 请愿人对被没收资金享有明确、可识别的权益，且未获关于查封的正当通知………………………………………………….16\nC. 保密对请愿人至关重要………………………………………….17\nD. 第 41(g) 条下设有设定合理条件以保护对财产访问的程序……………………………………………………….17\nV. 结论……………………………………………………………………………19\n\n目录\nI. 导言\n\n下述署名律师代表 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所，简称“该交易所”）的 3,345 名以上客户，他们持有 Himalaya Dollar（喜马拉雅美元，HDO）和 Himalaya Coin（喜马拉雅币，HCN）加密货币（“请愿人”）。[1](#page-2-0) 依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 41(g) 条，请愿人动请发还在 United States v. Kwok et al, 23 CR 118 (SDNY)（美国诉郭等案，纽约南区）中被美国查封的财产。请愿人对涉案被没收财产享有明确、可识别的第三方权益。在 2023 年 3 月提交的《政府依据美国法典第 18 编第 3771 条提出的动议》中，美国将请愿人定性为各被告的“受害者”。如本动议所述，本案中对资产的查封已使他们沦为美国查封行为的“受害者”。\n\n自成立伊始，喜马拉雅交易所为建立安全的客户基础进行了广泛的尽职调查，并始终符合严格的审计和合规标准。在查封之日，储备率为 100%。根据对该交易所和 Himalaya International Reserves Limited（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）财务记录的分析，主要调查结论如下：\n\n- 喜马拉雅各实体的运营活动表明其业务活跃，客户均经过严格审查，且已产生足够收入以支付其运营成本，无需动用任何客户资金。\n- 客户每月能够将 100,000 HDO 赎回为美元并存入其账户。所有赎回均得到承兑，除非不符合特定的合规和/或反洗钱规则。请愿人的充值存款、HDO 和 HCN 的当前余额以及赎回情况表明，该交易所运营规范且交易活跃。\n- 请愿人未曾遭遇来自该交易所的任何不实陈述、欺诈或资金损失。\n\n下述署名律师估计，随着口耳相传到达其他受害者——他们迄今从未收到过政府关于其资金被查封的通知，并且随着我们的意图显露出真实和真诚——交易所客户的数量还将增加数千人。在现存的各项挑战中，许多交易所客户心怀恐惧，并具有讽刺意味地认为美国政府的行动可能是其他政府的马前卒。\n\nII. 事实背景\nA. 查封\n\nUnited States v. Kwok 案超级起诉书第 35-36 页载有关于被告利用喜马拉雅交易所实施欺诈计划的结论性指控。从交易所客户的角度来看，这些指控与涉及其由喜马拉雅交易所拟制信托持有的资金所面临的没收困境之间几乎没有任何联系或关联。随后，起诉书在第 35-36 页第 55 段 j、k、m、o、p 和 s 项中包含了相关的没收指控，允许美国查封喜马拉雅交易所账户中的数百万美元：[2](#page-3-0)\n\nj. 原存放于 FV Bank（FV银行）账号为 7801000590、户名为“Himalaya International Reserves, Ltd.”（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）的账户中的 4,643,744.70 美元法定货币，由政府于 2022 年 9 月 20 日前后查封；\n\nk. 原存放于 FV Bank 账号为 7801000254、户名为“Himalaya International Clearing, Ltd.”（喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司）的账户中的 14,599,257.25 美元法定货币，由政府于 2022 年 9 月 20 日前后查封；\n\nm. 原存放于 Mercantile Bank International（商业国际银行）账号为 MBil 0133-0000、户名为“Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.”的账户中的 10,008,284.04 美元法定货币，由政府于 2022 年 10 月 16 日前后至 2023 年 3 月 10 日前后之间查封；\n\no. 原存放于 Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10138-0000、户名为“Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.”的账户中的 272,350,313.76 美元法定货币，由政府于 2022 年 10 月 16 日前后至 2023 年 3 月 10 日前后之间查封；\n\np. 原存放于 Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10139-0000、户名为“Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.”（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）的账户中的 310,594.31 美元法定货币，由政府于 2022 年 10 月 16 日前后至 2023 年 3 月 10 日前后之间查封；\n\n2 这在政府的《详述书》（案卷号 38）中亦有概述，并补充了 l 项：原存放于 FV Bank 账号为 7801000589、户名为“Himalaya International Financial Group, Ltd.”的账户中的 7,715.00 美元法定货币，由政府于 2022 年 9 月 20 日前后查封。查封金额与律师审查的审计报告之间似乎也存在差异。律师怀疑这是未列入公开记录的银行转账和交易活动所致。就本申请而言，存放在持牌银行账户中的硬通货资金现由美国政府持有。\n\ns. 原存放于 Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10183-0000、户名为“Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.”（喜马拉雅货币清算私人有限公司）的账户中的 161,809.47 美元法定货币，由政府于 2022 年 10 月 16 日前后查封。\n\n美国对这些账户的查封构成了稳定币储备的大部分，而交易所客户及本案请愿人正是该储备的受益人。该交易所自上线以来的任何时候均保持 100% 的稳定币储备。因此，发行的所有稳定币均有银行中的 1HD 支撑。在从交易所账户查封之日，储备率为 100%。在任何时候均不存在对客户资金的欺诈性使用或挪用。事实上，如下文所述，该交易所对稳定币储备进行了两次外部审计，最后一次是在查封日期前不久。这些审计证实储备完全完好无损。\n\nB. 喜马拉雅交易所\n1. 概述\n\n喜马拉雅交易所（“该交易所”）是一家在 British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛，BVI）注册名为 Himalaya International Clearing Limited 的公司，以喜马拉雅交易所名义开展业务。它运营着一个用户对用户的中心化加密货币交易平台，该平台包含一个针对虚拟资产产品运行持续撮合订单簿的撮合引擎。它是供客户交易、存储和管理喜马拉雅加密货币即 Himalaya Coin（“HCN”）和 Himalaya Dollar（“HDO”）的平台。HCN 是该交易所的交易币，是由供求关系定价的加密货币。HDO 是一种稳定币，其结构旨在维持与美元 1:1 的价值。交易所客户可以根据下述交易所赎回条款，将其 HDO 余额中的 HDO 赎回为美元。HCN 由 Himalaya International Financial Group Limited 发行。HDO 由 Himalaya International Reserves Limited 发行。\n\n该交易所的成立旨在为全世界每个人带来财务自由，并帮助那些受到不公正迫害的人，包括那些资产被非法剥夺、或在面临 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党，简称“中共”）毫无正当理由剥夺其资产的威胁下被敲诈勒索的人。交易所客户与各被告没有任何关联。该交易所在非美国人中极受欢迎，特别是在华裔人群中，因为他们信赖该交易所受到专业且安全的管理，且除法律要求外，该交易所不会向外国政府妥协透露任何个人信息。它还为遭受政治迫害的人提供了一种保障其合法资金财务安全的工具（例如，那些参加香港和平示威的人银行账户被关闭，以及通常那些被中共针对/迫害/恐吓且资产被没收的人）。该交易所被中共视为一种威胁，削弱了其（非法）没收资产和控制中国经济的权力。在资金被美国查封的受影响群体中，包括被中国政府视为异见人士的非美国人。\n\n交易所（The Exchange）的上线经历了一个分阶段的过程。第 1 阶段客户注册于 2021 年 4 月启动。这是针对私募参与客户的上线前注册。入驻仅在合规管辖区域（非美国等地区）内进行，并完全符合“了解你的客户”（Know Your Customer，简称 KYC）程序。\n\n为进行注册，请愿人（Petitioners）必须完成正式的入驻程序以及 KYC 和反洗钱（anti-money laundering，简称 AML）审查。包含 KYC 和 AML 审查的入驻流程在下文有更详细的阐述。经合规官员批准后，请愿人即可访问其喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）账户，并在交易所上线时以 1:1 的比例存入美元以购买 HDO 积分（HDO Credits）。\n\n替代起诉书（Superseding Indictment）中论及的《白皮书》（Whitepaper）[3](#page-6-0) 说明，HDO 仅向交易所成员提供。交易所成员能够通过在交易所购买 HDO 积分参与喜马拉雅美元（Himalaya Dollar）的发售。《白皮书》还解释称，为了向 HDO 积分提供流动性支持并防范价格波动，发行人（Himalaya International Reserves Limited，喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）将设立储备金。该储备金的管理目标是使其价值维持在与流通中 HDO 价值相等的美元价值水平。\n\n2021 年 7 月第 2 阶段期间，交易所推出了两种加密货币：HCN 和 HDO。这两种代币均是基于以太坊（Ethereum）的代币，并向后兼容 ERC-20 标准。HDO 由喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司发行并与美元挂钩。HCN 未与任何法定货币的价值挂钩，因此其价值取决于二级市场的供求关系。这是交易所上的交易代币。成员能够在交易所上交易 HCN 积分。在交易所注册的用户获准在上线前夕以每枚 HCN 0.10 美元的初始 HCN 发行价使用 HDO 积分购买预分配的 HCN。上线时 HCN 的开盘价为每枚 HCN 0.10 美元。\n\n2021 年 11 月 1 日，第 3 阶段涵盖了喜马拉雅交易所的全面上线。注册用户自此能够进行 HCN 交易，使用 HDO 购买 HCN 以及在出售时获得 HDO。对于向交易所提出申请的用户，客户注册依照下文概述的相同入驻要求继续进行。\n\n3 [http](http)\n\n2022 年 1 月，第 4 阶段涵盖了 Himalaya Pay（“HPay”）的推出。该应用程序在某些合规管辖区域向现有交易所成员开放，仅限交易所成员之间进行 HDO 和 HCN 的点对点转账。该应用程序还允许使用 HDO 购买礼品卡，以便在交易所认可的商家处购买商品，此功能同样仅在某些合规管辖区域内开放。该应用程序不向美国境内或美国居民开放使用。\n\nHDO 具有多项功能，允许成员购买交易代币 HCN，并购买可用于从认可的交易所生态系统商家处购买商品的礼品卡。成员可通过 HPay 使用礼品卡进行商家消费，该软件亦允许交易所客户之间进行点对点转账。\n\n如下文所述，于 2021 年 12 月 15 日和 2022 年 7 月 31 日进行的稳定币审计报告显示，交易所保持了 100% 的美元储备，比例相当于 1 HDO 兑 1 美元。最后一份审计报告是在扣押前夕完成的，当时储备金处于 100% 水平。\n\n2. 客户入驻合规、反洗钱与 KYC 审查\n\n交易所执行严格的入驻程序。如上所述，这些程序包括作为交易所入驻流程一部分的严密 AML 和 KYC 审查。合规流程还涵盖客户注册、身份识别与核实、名单筛查、风险评估以及持续尽职调查。广泛的 AML 和合规程序包括强化尽职调查（enhanced due diligence，简称 EDD）、制裁与政治敏感人物（Politically Exposed Person，简称 PEP）筛查、定期账户审查以及交易监控。\n\n申请注册交易所账户时，请愿人首先被要求填写一份包含多项问题的 KYC 和 AML 调查问卷，包括但不限于其居住国和资金来源等个人详细信息。作为进一步的安全防范措施，在提交注册之前，他们被要求声明自己并非美国、加拿大或日本居民。这些并非仅有的受禁管辖区，但该三个国家通过复选框被进一步重点突出，以供客户声明其并非上述管辖区的居民。请愿人还被要求核实身份并提供官方身份证明文件。他们被引导使用由 Jumio 提供的身份核验软件，该软件依据提交的身份证件进行人工智能（artificial intelligence，简称 AI）人脸识别核对。\n\n部分请愿人的文件材料由合规官员进行了评估，并在其账户获得批准前接受了进一步审查。部分人员被要求提供额外的银行对账单、财富来源信息以及资金来源信息。请愿人还经历了对其账户的持续审查和交易监控，并被要求提供进一步的财务或其他文件材料。此外，作为其自身 AML 和合规程序的一部分，交易所的合作银行同样要求获取客户的 KYC 和其他信息，以允许每位客户进行存入和赎回。这表明了交易所维持的高标准，以及通过独立银行获得的额外财务保障。\n\n3. 客户群体\n\n交易所客户由独立投资者组成，他们居住在允许投资稳定币/交易代币交易所的国家。他们的范围涵盖小企业主到管理层高管、教育和医疗卫生行业的从业人员——几乎涵盖了特定人群所关联的任何职业。他们是非美国人，拥有一定程度的可支配财富来从事投机性投资。交易所客户与有组织犯罪或非法交易毫无关联，其关联度绝不会高于对纽约证券交易所（New York Stock Exchange）客户所能提出的此类指控。尽管许多客户为华裔且在理念上认同中国的民主运动，但这并不适用于所有仅将交易所视为良好投资机会的投资者。\n\n4. 管辖权与注册\n\n从上述入驻流程可以清楚看出，交易所禁止美国居民入驻。交易所不在这些受排除的管辖区提供其任何产品或服务。为注册成为交易所用户，意向用户必须注明其个人详细信息，包括其居住国。由于受排除国家不会出现在下拉菜单中供选择，因此任何处于受排除管辖区的人员都会被自动拒绝。美国属于受禁及受排除的管辖区之一。请愿人如果变更居住管辖区，必须通知交易所，以便交易所评估能否继续在新国家提供服务。\n\n5. 财务与审计\n\n每位请愿人及交易所客户均能够登录自己的账户并查看其全部记录，包括 HCN 和 HDO 余额、存款、交易、赎回以及 HPay 活动记录。每位请愿人均签署了一份同意书，允许交易所将其信息提供给其律师。这包括其存款、赎回、HDO 和 HCN 余额。该信息已向交易所索取并已由其提供。\n\na) 扣押对代币价格造成的损害\n\n交易所客户控制其自身账户并能够买卖 HCN。如果他们购买 HCN，他们将使用 HDO 进行购买；如果他们出售，他们将在出售时收到 HDO。这反映在他们的账户交易活动以及 HCN 和 HDO 余额中。HCN 的价值由供求关系决定，这导致其交易价格每日波动。此外，HCN 为交易所专有，无法转移至其他交易所。请愿人仅能在本交易所保留和变现其资产。HCN 的价值对于使用美元购买了 HDO 并使用 HDO 购买了 HCN 的请愿人而言是一项重要资产。扣押时一枚 HCN 的价格约为 24 HDO，相当于 24 美元。当前价格在 14 HDO（相当于 14 美元）左右波动。\n\n由于扣押，HCN 价格大幅下跌，且目前无法进行赎回。这是因为司法部（Department of Justice）扣押了交易所用于向客户支付赎回款项的储备金。结果导致交易所暂停了赎回。扣押前夕的 HCN 价值与当前价值相比，反映出 HCN 贬值约 1.36 亿美元。如果由于扣押和缺乏长期储备导致交易所崩盘且 HCN 暴跌，或者交易所不得不停止营业，请愿人将失去其全部 HCN 资产而无法求偿。看来对于扣押将给请愿人造成的巨大损失几乎未予考虑。司法部声称扣押资金将保护“受害者”。遗憾的是，其效果恰恰相反，他们的行为后果将给请愿人以及交易所的许多其他客户造成灾难性损失，使其遭受无法弥补的损害。\n\n交易所客户极其看重信任，以及交易所为保护客户信息所付出的艰苦努力，由于上述某些类别交易所客户所面临的人权问题及其他迫害威胁，这种信息保护对许多客户而言被视为“生死攸关”的大事。对数据进行此类保护、尤其是对其个人详细信息进行保护，并无其他原因。因为交易所的所有客户均已接受严格审查。\n\nb) 审计报告与财务分析\n\n独立审计师进行的稳定币审计得出结论，所有 HDO 均有 100% 的货币背书。他们进一步发表意见认为，喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司的财务报告准确且完整。如上所述，截至扣押之日，储备金处于 100% 水平。\n\nc) 客户或赎回未遭受损失\n\n经请愿人同意提供的交易所记录显示，没有客户因首次 HCN 代币发售而遭受任何损失，且那些确实交易了初始代币的人实际上获得了利润。随后部分客户要求对该等利润进行赎回，交易所已按照赎回政策予以处理。此外，那些未交易初始 HCN 或部分 HCN 的人亦未遭受任何损失，因为 HCN 代币的价值自发行以来有所上涨，且未曾跌破每枚 0.10 美元的初始购买价。随后客户之间进行的 HCN 交易一直按照现行市场价格进行，符合正常交易的预期。\n\n赎回是指客户提出请求将其HDO兑换回美元，并直接支付到客户实名银行账户的流程。从其记录中可以清楚看出，众多请愿人从交易所收到了赎回款项。该流程包括客户通过登录其账户提出赎回请求。交易所设定了每月10万美元的上限。收到的记录明确表明，请愿人获得了多次赎回，且总金额价值巨大。这再次支持了请愿人并未受骗的事实，并表明交易所运营正常。此外，从这些信息中可以清楚看出，并不存在起诉书中所述的巨额损失，相反，请愿人获得了可观的利润和收益。\n\nIII. 可疑行为人\n\n请愿人认为，他们以及交易所本身一直是CCP（中国共产党）行动的目标，旨在损害他们和交易所的利益。这些举措似乎旨在破坏交易所的信誉和声誉，从而造成严重损害。此外，还有人企图查明交易所客户的身份，这导致客户产生焦虑和恐惧。\n\nA. 负面虚假的社交媒体攻击：\n\n交易所遭受了在社交媒体（特别是在Twitter，现为X）以及网络和其他媒体文章上旷日持久的诽谤性言论攻击。在审查这些帖子时，涉及的若干社交媒体账户显示出具有为此目的创建的机器人账户特征的长期诽谤行动。机器人已被用于传播负面推文。它们使用中文，不同社交媒体帖子、负面媒体文章的信息措辞，以及向银行合作伙伴和监管机构投诉的性质，都具有惊人的相似性和一致的主题。有大量潜在的“虚假”Twitter（现为X）账户被用于散布关于交易所的负面消息。\n\n此外，还有YouTube视频和账户、图片、曝光交易所员工和客户、曝光监管公告、鼓励向监管机构和其他执法机构举报Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所），并通过在消息串中添加FBI（联邦调查局）、SEC（证券交易委员会）、UKSFO（英国严重欺诈办公室）和ActionFraud UK（英国国家欺诈和网络犯罪举报中心）来引起其注意。这些帖子的总体信息涉及骗局、欺诈、金融犯罪、洗钱、犯罪组织和其他负面评论。这种社交媒体攻击似乎始于交易所的预注册阶段前后，当时交易所甚至尚未上线，交易也尚未开始。\n\nB. 向监管机构进行虚假投诉\n\n交易所曾受到发布在个别监管机构网站上随后出现在Twitter上的警告公告的影响。一些Twitter消息主动提供监管机构链接并鼓励他人进行投诉。这些公告涉及新西兰、British Columbia (Canada)（加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚省）、巴哈马、葡萄牙、意大利和匈牙利的司法管辖区。请愿人获悉，所有这些公告现已被撤除。从撤除这些公告可以显而易见地看出，各司法管辖区的监管机构应当已经进行了调查，未发现任何不当行为，并决定撤除警告公告。4\n\nC. 美国国务院报告\n\nUnited States Department of State（美国国务院）的报告《2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)（2022年各国人权实践报告：中国（包括香港、澳门和西藏））》5描述了中国异见人士在中国境外成为目标的若干情况。据了解，中共及其代理人从事了恐吓或报复异见人士（及其他群体）的行为\n\n• IOSCO（国际证监会组织，全球）警示名单；\n\n- FMA（新西兰金融市场管理局）警示名单；\n- CONSOB（意大利全国公司及证券交易委员会）警示名单；\n- Securities Commission（巴哈马证券委员会）警示名单；以及\n- MNB（匈牙利国家银行）警示名单。\n\n这些公告现已被撤除。\n\n4 以下是各项公告发布的日期：\n\n• BCSC（加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚证券委员会）警示名单与CSA（加拿大证券管理机构，加拿大中央监管机构）；\n\n• CMVM（葡萄牙证券市场委员会）警示名单；\n在中国境外。例如，《Foreign Policy（外交政策）》于2022年3月29日报道了政府针对海外华人，特别是“英国和摩洛哥等国家的香港人、维吾尔人、藏人和中国异见人士。他们报告了威胁电话、网络攻击和骚扰，包括对其在PRC（中华人民共和国）境内家庭成员的骚扰”。6\n\nIV. 根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第41条(g)款提出的返还财产动议\n\nA. 衡平原则要求立即返还，不得进一步拖延\n\n第41条(g)款规定：\n\n因非法搜查和扣押财产或因财产被剥夺而遭受侵害的人，可以动议要求返还该财产。动议必须在扣押财产的地区提出。法院必须就裁决动议所需的任何事实问题接受证据。如果批准该动议，法院必须将财产返还给动议人，但可以施加合理条件以保护对该财产的获取及其在后续诉讼中的使用。\n\n第41条(g)款动议是一种衡平法救济，仅在普通法上没有充分救济且衡平原则支持行使管辖权时才可适用。De Almeida v. United States, 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006)；另见 U.S. (Drug Enforcement Agency) v. One 1987 Jeep Wrangler Automobile, 972 F.2d 472, 479 (2d Cir. 1992)。如果对刑事没收提出异议的第三方权利人在能够于刑事没收诉讼中寻求附随程序之前面临数月或数年的拖延，则该权利人可能缺乏普通法上的充分救济。De Almeida, 459 F.3d at 382。在本案中，审判预定于2024年4月8日才开始。衡平原则支持现在解决此事，而不是继续拖延，从而对请愿人造成不可挽回的损害。非因自身过错，请愿人无法清算其在交易所的持仓。\n\n另见，http [silence;]\n\nB. 请愿人对被没收的资金享有明确、可识别的利益，且未收到妥当的扣押通知\n\n根据 21 U.S. Code § 853(n)，请愿人对被没收的财产享有明确、可识别的第三方利益。尽管政府声称通知并不切实可行7，但交易所保留有关于交易所客户的保密信息。政府本可以与交易所合作进行有效通知，并对扣押资金执行迅速且保密的返还。正如美国政府所知，交易所的客户全部为外国国民。在SDNY（纽约南区）网站上发布公告不足以使用其特定语言传达给他们。联系签名下署律师的客户对有关其资金状况的信息如此之少表示恐惧和沮丧，他们完全不知道何时或者是否能够拿回自己的资金。社区内部存在一种毫无根据的怀疑，认为美国政府正与中共合作，企图曝光被中共视为异见人士的交易所客户。签名下署律师不是该领域的风险评估专家，对这些担忧的可信度不持立场，但无法不注意到这是社区及其客户所做出的强烈推断。\n\n7 在依据 18 U.S.C. § 3771 提出的动议（Docket 10）中向法院引用的判例与本案有所区别。例如，参见 United States v. Brown, 20 Cr. 524 (KPF)，“根据美利坚合众国于2023年1月23日提出的动议，认定：(a) 本案中存在超过十万名潜在的个人受害者；(b) 没有现成的此类人员最新汇总名单；以及 (c) 向所有潜在受害者发出通知是不切实际的。”在本案中，受害者人数有限，有一份最新但保密的受害者名单，因此政府本可以在扣押时通过与交易所合作来通知受害者。\n\nC. 保密性对请愿人至关重要\n\n此外，如上所述，由于存在遭受政治迫害的可能性，保密性对交易所成员至关重要。律师根据其获得的信息在承担伪证罪处罚的条件下证明，请愿人对被扣押的财产享有权利、所有权和利益，并可以保密方式提供补充信息以支持请愿人的主张。\n\nD. 根据第41条(g)款可采取合理条件程序以保护对财产的获取\n\n在本案中，有多种合理条件可用于迅速且保密地返还请愿人被扣押的资金。参见《司法部手册》9-111.125 - 没收案件中的受托人与监督员。8 由于交易所遵循严格的合规程序，在United States Attorney's Office（美国联邦检察官办公室）指定代表与签名下署律师之间进行少量合作的情况下，即可通过受控且受保护的程序实现向完全无辜当事人的请愿人保密且迅速地返还资金，该程序亦可报请本法院进行不公开审理（in camera）批准。由于请愿人已经承受了资金被没收以及失去投资重大回报形式的惩罚，我们请求尊敬的法院不要指定受托人、监督员或接管人9，因为这将加剧他们的损害并进一步削减其投资本金。\n\n9 受托人和监督员政策的目的是为涉及复杂资产或商业企业的Department of Justice（司法部）联邦没收案件中受托人和监督员的指定提供指导。监督员与受托人之间的关键区别在于，只有受托人有权管理企业。监督员负责观察并报告。接管人是对法院负责的信托人，而保管人负责实际保管资产，在大量资产位于外国的情况下可被建议使用。在本案中，有关投资者身份和投资活动的所有细节均由交易所精心组织、保护和保存，与政府释放资金义务相关的所有信息均可随时获取、提供和审查。\n\n8 http [forfeitureseizure#:~:text=The%20selection%20and%20appointment%20of,of%20a%20trustee%20or%20monitor.]\n\n扣押事件中引起交易所某些客户彻底恐慌的方面之一是有传言称美国司法部曾试图扣押交易所的客户名单。显而易见的是，即使有严格的合规保护措施，他们的信息也无法得到保护。10 在生命攸关的情况下，请愿人恳请法院切勿将涉及与涉嫌犯罪行为没有任何已知关联的第三方投资者的个人身份信息交由政府掌握。\n\n此外，在法律层面上，没收法规并不妨碍设立拟制信托以保护这些受害者免受进一步侵害。参见 United States v. $4,224,958.57 (Boylan), 392 F.3d 1002, 1003–1005 (9th Cir. 2004)（裁定大型欺诈性投资计划的受害者通过拟制信托对被扣押收益确立了充分的合法权益，从而赋予其对没收提出异议的诉讼主体资格）；亦见 Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2011)。法院应当裁定设立此类拟制信托，以允许对请愿人（Petitioners）的资金进行清算、释放和赎回。\n\n10 负责本案的 U.S. Attorney's office（美国联邦检察官办公室）的许多检察官及工作人员可能对下述签字律师所表达的信息安全担忧感同身受，因为我们中的许多人（下述签字律师作为前 DOJ（美国司法部）雇员）的安全审查档案都曾遭到泄露。参见维基百科词条“美国人事管理局数据泄露事件”；《华盛顿邮报》“本周向安全审查泄露事件中数据被盗的2100万人发出最终通知”。Office of Personnel Management（美国人事管理局，OPM）数据泄露事件是2015年发生的一起针对由美国人事管理局保留的美国政府 Standard Form 86（标准表格86，SF-86）安全审查记录的数据泄露事件。作为美国历史上最大规模的政府数据泄露事件之一，该攻击由一个设在中国的所谓高级持续性威胁组织实施，被广泛认为是隶属于中国国家安全部间谍机构的江苏省国家安全厅。约2210万份记录受到影响，包括与政府雇员、其他接受过背景调查的人员及其亲友相关的记录。泄露内容包括社会安全号码等个人身份信息，以及姓名、出生日期和地点、地址。代表中国政府行事的国家支持黑客实施了此次攻击。\n\n在本案中，如果政府认为从位于美国境外的数千名脆弱的交易所客户处获取全部账户信息是一个好主意，并要求 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）对其解密并提供给美国政府，这将是一个极其令人担忧的问题，尤其是考虑到美国政府在保护此类信息方面的记录极其糟糕。\n\nV. 结论\n\n基于前述理由，依据 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》）第 41(g) 条，请愿人提请动议，请求归还美国政府在 United States v. Kwok, 23 CR 18 SDNY 案中扣押的其财产，并请求法院采纳上述程序，以便保密、迅速地归还其财产。\n\n/s/ Jamie Scher\nJamie Scher\nNY 2488435\nMyer and Scher LLP\n377B South Oyster Bay Road\nPlainview, NY 118013\nJamie@myerandscher.com\n(516) 713-0655\n\n/s/ Brad Geyer\nBradford L. Geyer, PHV pending（待决临时出庭资格）\nNJ 022751991\nSuite 141 Route 130 S., Suite 303\nCinnaminson, NJ 08077\nBrad@FormerFedsGroup.Com\n(856) 607-5708\n\n送达证明\n\n我特此证明，于 2023年12月6日，前述文件的真实准确副本已通过 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）的 ECF 系统以电子方式提交并送达。\n\n/s/ Brad Geyer\nBradford L. Geyer, PHV pending\nNJ 022751991\nSuite 141 Route 130 S., 303\nCinnaminson, NJ 08077\nBrad@FormerFedsGroup.Com","key_entities":["Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","forfeiture","Je","CCP","Kwok","Geyer","Rule 41(g)","CIPA","Guo","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Yanping Wang","Kin Ming Je","William Je","Chinese Communist Party","853(n)"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":5632,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-12-06 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-12-06","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:05:36"}