{"id":"court_sdny_197_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":197,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":"2023-12-15","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"被告 Yanping Wang 的庭前动议支持性法律意见书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #197（2023-12-15 立案）。Wang 的律师就禁止在其公寓中缉获的证据、禁止其被捕后的陈述、提供起诉特别说明、与共被告 Kwok 的审判分离等事项向法庭提出动议，主张指控内容差异重大、防御利益潜在冲突。","summary_en":"Pre-trial motions memorandum filed by Yanping Wang's counsel — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #197 (filed 2023-12-15). Wang's attorneys seek suppression of evidence seized from her apartment and post-arrest statements, demand a bill of particulars, and request severance from co-defendant Kwok's trial, arguing distinct charges and conflicting defense interests.","body_en":"## **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\n### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nYANPING WANG,\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT YANPING WANG'S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS**\n\nBrendan F. Quigley BAKER BOTTS LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 Tele: (212) 408-2520 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com\n\n*Attorney for Yanping Wang*\n\n|      |                                                                                                                | BACKGROUND 2                                                                                                                    |  |  |\n|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n| I.   | The Court Should Suppress the Evidence Seized in Ms. Wang's Apartment and<br>Any Evidence Derived Therefrom  2 |                                                                                                                                 |  |  |\n|      | A.                                                                                                             | Background  2                                                                                                                   |  |  |\n|      | B.                                                                                                             | Applicable Law  4                                                                                                               |  |  |\n|      | C.                                                                                                             | Discussion  5                                                                                                                   |  |  |\n| II.  |                                                                                                                | The Court Should Suppress Ms. Wang's Post-Arrest Statement  11                                                                  |  |  |\n|      | A.                                                                                                             | Background  11                                                                                                                  |  |  |\n|      | B.                                                                                                             | Applicable Law  11                                                                                                              |  |  |\n|      | C.                                                                                                             | Discussion  12                                                                                                                  |  |  |\n| III. | The Court Should Direct the Government to Provide a Bill of Particulars  13                                    |                                                                                                                                 |  |  |\n|      | A.                                                                                                             | Applicable Law  14                                                                                                              |  |  |\n|      | B.                                                                                                             | Discussion  15                                                                                                                  |  |  |\n| IV.  | The Court Should Sever Ms. Wang's Trial From Her Co-Defendant's  21                                            |                                                                                                                                 |  |  |\n|      | A.                                                                                                             | Applicable Law  21                                                                                                              |  |  |\n|      | B.                                                                                                             | Discussion  22                                                                                                                  |  |  |\n| V.   |                                                                                                                | Ms. Wang Joins in Co-Defendant Kwok's Motion to Dismiss Directed to the<br>Counts in the Indictment in Which She is Charged  26 |  |  |\n|      |                                                                                                                | CONCLUSION 26                                                                                                                   |  |  |\n\n| CASES                                                                                                                                             |        |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|\n| Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto,<br>677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012)                                                                 | 19, 20 |\n| Bruton v. United States,<br>391 U.S. 123 (1968)                                                                                                   | 21     |\n| Edwards v. Arizona,<br>451 U.S. 477 (1981)                                                                                                        | 11, 12 |\n| Illinois v. Gates,<br>462 U.S. 213 (1983)                                                                                                         | 4      |\n| Miranda v. Arizona,<br>384 U.S. 436 (1966)                                                                                                        | 11     |\n| Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd.,<br>561 U.S. 247 (2010)                                                                                     | 19     |\n| Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE,<br>763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014)                                                           | 20     |\n| Rhode Island v. Innis,<br>446 U.S. 291 (1980)                                                                                                     | 12     |\n| Sgro v. United States,<br>287 U.S. 206 (1932)                                                                                                     | 7      |\n| Stanford v. Texas,<br>379 U.S. 476 (1965)                                                                                                         | 5      |\n| U.S. v. Mahaffy,<br>446 F. Supp. 2d 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)                                                                                           | 17     |\n| United States v. An,<br>No. 1:22-cr-00460-KAM, ECF No. 9                                                                                          | 19     |\n| United States v. Aquart,<br>No. 3:06-cr-160 (PCD), 2006 WL 2684304 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2006)                                                      | 15, 17 |\n| United States v Aronov,<br>No. 19-cr-408 (MKB)                                                                                                    | 15     |\n| United States v. Barnes,<br>158 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by, United States v. Thomas, 274<br>F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001)14 |        |\n| United States v. Bertini,<br>No. 23 CR. 61 (PGG), 2023 WL 8258334 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2023) 4, 5                                                   |        |\n| United States v. Bortnovsky,<br>820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987)17                                                                                     |        |\n| United States v. Burke,<br>789 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 21                                                                                 |        |\n| United States v. Cioffi,<br>668 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 10                                                                                |        |\n| United States v. Clark,<br>638 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011)5                                                                                            |        |\n| United States v. Coreas,<br>419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005)4                                                                                          |        |\n| United States v. Crozzoli,<br>698 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 21                                                                                 |        |\n| United States v. Davidoff,<br>845 F. 2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1988)17                                                                                     |        |\n| United States v. Falkowitz,<br>214 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 18                                                                             |        |\n| United States v. Falso,<br>544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008)4                                                                                           |        |\n| United States v. Gallo,<br>668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) 22                                                                                    |        |\n| United States v. Galpin,<br>720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013)5                                                                                          |        |\n| United States v. Gilkeson,<br>431 F. Supp.2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 13                                                                               |        |\n| United States v. Gleason,<br>259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)22, 23                                                                               |        |\n| United States v. Gomez,<br>652 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) 5                                                                                     |        |\n| United States v. Griffith,<br>867 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 6, 8                                                                                 |        |\n| United States v. Heatley,<br>994 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)12                                                                                   |        |\n| United States v. Hill,<br>459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) 10                                                                                         |        |\n| United States v. Kahaner,<br>203 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd., 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.1963) 22                                               |        |\n| United States v. Kelly,<br>349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965)22                                                                                          |        |\n| United States v. Losada,<br>674 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1982)21                                                                                         |        |\n| United States v. Luna,<br>No. 3:05-cr-58 (SRU), 2006 WL 1668006 (D. Conn. May 17, 2006)15, 17                                                     |        |\n| United States v. Mitchell,<br>76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017) 13                                                                                      |        |\n| United States v. Moran,<br>349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) 6                                                                                  |        |\n| United States v. Nachamie,<br>101 F. Supp. 2d 134, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)21                                                                          |        |\n| United States v. Nachamie,<br>91 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 15, 17                                                                           |        |\n| United States v. Perez,<br>948 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 11                                                                                   |        |\n| United States v. Pinto-Thomaz,<br>352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 13                                                                          |        |\n| United States v. Rios,<br>881 F. Supp. 772 (D. Conn. 1995) 6                                                                                      |        |\n| United States v. Savin,<br>No. 00-cr-45 (RWS), 2001 WL 243533 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001) 15                                                          |        |\n| United States v. Shkreli,<br>260 F. Supp. 3d 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 22                                                                               |        |\n| United States v. Stewart,<br>770 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)11                                                                                   |        |\n| United States v. Upton,<br>856 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) 21, 23                                                                                |        |\n| United States v. Urso,<br>369 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 15                                                                                  |        |\n| United States v. Valenzuela,<br>596 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979) 5                                                      |        |\n| United States v. Vilar,<br>729 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2013)19                                                                                       |        |\n| United States v. Villanueva Madrid,<br>302 F. Supp. 2d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 22                                                                     |        |\n| United States v. Wey,<br>256 F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 5, 8, 9, 10                                                                          |        |\n| United States v. Yan,<br>704 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 12                                                                                     |        |\n| United States v. Zemlyansky,<br>945 F. Supp. 2d 438 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)8                                                                          |        |\n| Ybarra v. Illinois,<br>444 U.S. 85 (1979) 4                                                                                                       |        |\n| Zafiro v. United States,<br>506 U.S. 534 (1993) 21                                                                                                |        |\n| Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,<br>436 U.S. 547 (1978) 6                                                                                               |        |\n| OTHER AUTHORITIES                                                                                                                                 |        |\n\n|  |  |  | 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.6(a) (5th ed. |\n|--|--|--|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|  |  |  | 2012) 8                                                                                     |\n\nDefendant Yanping Wang respectfully submits this memorandum in support of her pretrial motions.\n\nFirst, as set forth below, the Court should suppress (i) evidence seized from Ms. Wang's apartment on March 15, 2023 and the fruits thereof, and (ii) statements law enforcement officers elicited from Ms. Wang after she invoked her right to counsel.\n\nThe search of Ms. Wang's apartment—which has already required the government to make a corrective disclosure based on a \"reinterview[]\" of the \"FBI agent who served as squad leader for the . . . search”<sup>1</sup>—was based on a warrant that manifestly lacked probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found in Ms. Wang's apartment. The warrant also failed to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement and, even setting aside the other probable cause issues, was overbroad. In addition, during the search, agents continued to ask Ms. Wang questions after she invoked her right to counsel, in clear violation of Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the Court should suppress the evidence seized from the apartment, Ms. Wang's post-arrest statements, and any fruits thereof.\n\nSecond, the Court should order the government to provide a bill of particulars as set forth below. If anything, the massive amount of discovery provided to date and the broadly worded allegations of the government's \"speaking\" indictment show why a bill of particulars is appropriate.\n\nThird, the Court should sever Ms. Wang's trial from her co-defendant's.\n\nFourth, Ms. Wang requests to join the portions of her co-defendant's motion to dismiss relating to the counts of the indictment in which Ms. Wang is charged.\n\n<sup>1</sup> *See* Letter from the Government to Hon. Robert W. Lehrburger, dated Apr. 17, 2023, ECF No. 47.\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\n# **I. The Court Should Suppress the Evidence Seized in Ms. Wang's Apartment and Any Evidence Derived Therefrom**\n\n### **A. Background**\n\nOn March 14, 2023, the government obtained a search warrant for 188 East 64th Street, Apartment 1601 (the \"East 64th Street Apartment\"), Ex.1, Warrant Affidavit, (filed under seal); Ex. 8, Warrant (filed under seal).<sup>2</sup> Wang lived at the East 64th Street Apartment at that time. *See* Ex. 4, Wang Affidavit at ¶ 1.\n\nThe FBI used the same affidavit to apply for warrants for both an apartment belonging to defendant Ho Wan Kwok, a/k/a “Miles Guo” (“Kwok”) (identified as “Subject Premises-1” in the affidavit) and the East 64th Street Apartment (identified as “Subject Premises-2” and collectively with the Kwok apartment, the \"Subject Premises\").\n\n![](_page_7_Figure_6.jpeg)\n\n<sup>2</sup> This document is being filed under seal because it was designated “Highly Confidential” by the government in discovery. The government initially obtained a search warrant for the East 64th Street Apartment on March 10, but its March 14 version corrected some formatting errors and redundant text.\n\n![](_page_8_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n—without providing any guidance to the\n\n| searching agents as to what or who those <span>[R]</span> were and <span>[R]</span>          |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| <span>[R]</span>                                                                             |\n| <span>[R]</span> ” again without providing any guidance to the searching agents as to how to |\n| determine, while rifling thought Ms. Wang's apartment, how an item had been <span>[R]</span> |\n| <span>[R]</span> Ex. 1 at USAO_00110339-40. The approved items                               |\n| to be seized included also <span>[R]</span>                                                  |\n| <span>[R]</span>                                                                             |\n| <span>[R]</span> , Ex. 1 at USAO_00110339-41, and <span>[R]</span>                           |\n| <span>[R]</span>                                                                             |\n| <span>[R]</span> . Ex. 1 at USAO_00110342.                                                   |\n\n## **B. Applicable Law**\n\nThe Fourth Amendment prohibits \"unreasonable searches and seizures,\" and requires that \"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath.\" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.A. As Judge Gardephe reiterated just weeks ago, \"a showing of probable cause must be premised on 'particularized facts' rather than irrelevant generalizations.\" *United States v. Bertini*, No. 23 CR. 61 (PGG), 2023 WL 8258334, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2023) (quoting *Ybarra v. Illinois*, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)); *United States v. Falso*, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that government must “gather ‘evidence *particularized to* the target of the search’ before the warrant application is made\") (emphasis in original) (quoting *United States v. Coreas*, 419 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2005)).\n\n In assessing a search warrant to search a premises such as an apartment, there must be probable cause—i.e., including \"particularized facts\"—\"that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in [that] *particular place*.\" *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). \"This required nexus between the items sought and the 'particular place' to be searched protects against the\n\nissuance of general warrants,\" one of the primary evils the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect against. *United States v. Clark*, 638 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Stanford v. Texas*, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965)). To further protect against \"general warrants\" and \"general, exploratory rummaging through a person's belongings,'\" the Fourth Amendment also requires that \"'the scope of the authorized search [be] set out with particularity.'\" *United States v. Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting *United States v. Galpin*, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013)).\n\n### **C. Discussion**\n\nHere, the warrant affidavit failed—on multiple levels—to establish probable cause that evidence of the Subject Offenses would be found at the East 64th Street Apartment on March 15, 2023, almost three years after both the GTV Private Placement and the only \"particularized facts\" arguably connecting Ms. Wang to any alleged criminal activity.\n\nCompounding these shortfalls, the warrant also lacked particularity, because it gave the searching agents essentially unfettered discretion, and (even setting aside the baseline probable cause issues identified above) was overbroad for Fourth Amendment purposes.\n\n## **1. The Warrant Application Failed to Provide Probable Cause to Search the East 64th Street Apartment**\n\n*First,* while the warrant application attaches the criminal complaint against Ms. Wang, charging her with four crimes relating to the GTV Private Placement, \"'the existence of probable cause to arrest will not necessarily establish probable cause to search.'\" *Bertini*, 2023 WL 8258334, at \\*5 (quoting *United States v. Gomez*, 652 F. Supp. 461, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)). Put another way, \"it cannot follow . . . simply from the existence of probable cause to believe a suspect guilty, that there is also probable cause to search his residence.\" *United States v. Valenzuela*, 596 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 441 U.S. 965 (1979) (internal quotation and citation omitted); *accord United States v. Rios*, 881 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D. Conn. 1995) (stating probable\n\ncause to arrest, standing alone, does not establish probable cause to search home). Instead, \"[t]he critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.\" *Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978); *United States v. Moran*, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 476 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (\"merely connecting [the defendant] to the . . . conspiracy is an insufficient basis for finding probable cause to search [her] residence\").\n\nHere, the warrant affidavit contains no particularized facts that evidence of a crime would be \"located on the property to which entry is sought.\" *Zurcher*, 436 U.S. at 556. Despite being (with attachments) 77-pages long, the application contains *no* information that criminal activity was afoot at the East 64th Street Apartment. There, is no claim in the warrant affidavit, much less the \"particularized facts\" required by the Fourth Amendment, for example, that the East 64th Street Apartment was used as an office for GTV, that it was used to store proceeds of the (by then, threeyear-old) alleged fraud, or that it was a location from which the GTV offering had been conducted.\n\n*Second*, relatedly, the warrant contained no basis to believe that evidence concerning the GTV Private Placement would still be at the East 64th Street Apartment, if it ever was there in the first place. \"[T]he freshness of the supporting evidence is critical\" to the probable cause assessment. *United States v. Griffith*, 867 F.3d 1265, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, the affidavit itself states that the GTV Private Placement\n\n”<sup>3</sup> in other words almost three years before FBI knocked on the door of the East 64th Street Apartment at 6 AM on March 15, 2023. *See generally Sgro v. United States*, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932) (\"[I]t is manifest that the proof must\n\n<sup>3</sup> Ex. 1 at USAO\\_00110322.\n\nbe of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.\"). Moreover, the warrant application contained no particularized facts relating to Ms. Wang *at all* since\n\n, Ex. 1 at USAO\\_00110391—again, almost three years before—a period in which our country went through and emerged from a global pandemic, changed Presidents, ended a war in Afghanistan and saw another one start in Ukraine, among many other things. In short, the facts concerning Ms. Wang's alleged criminal activity, to say nothing of alleged criminal activity at the East 64th Street Apartment, were anything but \"fresh[].\"\n\n*Third*, even the facts in the warrant application tying Ms. Wang herself to the East 64th Street Apartment are thin. The 77-page application contains exactly two substantive paragraphs dealing with the East 64th Street Apartment/\"Subject Premises-2,\" asserting that city records showed it\n\nand, again three years later,\n\n\"<sup>4</sup> Put another way, the search warrant affidavit simply indicated that\n\nIn short, the warrant application contained no particularized facts tying the East 64th Street Apartment to criminal activity, the facts it relied on to tie Ms. Wang to an alleged criminal scheme were three years old and unconnected in any way to the East 64th Street Apartment, and even the facts tying Ms. Wang to the East 64th Street Apartment in any way were remarkably thin. As such, the warrant application failed to establish probable cause for the search.\n\n4 Ex. 1 ¶¶ 19(a)-(b), at USAO\\_00110329.\n\n# **2. These Errors Were Compounded by the Warrant's Particularity and Overbreadth Issues**\n\nThese shortcomings were compounded by other issues with the warrant, which highlight the extent of the Fourth Amendment violation here, show why it was unreasonable for the agents to rely on the warrant, and further demonstrate why suppression is both appropriate and necessary. Specifically, the warrant failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement and also suffered from improper overbreadth deficiencies. *Cf. Griffith*, 867 F.3d at 1275 (\"The lack of probable cause to search [an] apartment . . . itself renders the warrant invalid under the Fourth Amendment\" but overbreadth and particularity deficiencies provided an \"additional reason\" for the warrant's invalidity.).\n\n\"'Courts implement the particularity requirement by insisting that warrants not leave to the unguided discretion of the officers executing the warrant as to what items may be seized.'\" *United States v. Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (quoting *United States v. Zemlyansky*, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).\n\nParticularity concerns are heightened where, as here, the property to be seized is \"hardly, by 'its particular character, contraband.'\" *Wey*, 256 F. Supp.3d at 385 (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, *Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment* § 4.6(a) (5th ed. 2012)).\n\nHere, the warrant gave the officers \"unguided discretion\" on several fronts.\n\n*First*, for example, while it allowed the agents to seize evidence concerning\n\n\" it also gave the agents authorization\n\nto seize evidence concerning\n\n5 Neither the\n\n5 Ex. 8 at USAO\\_00110312.\n\nwarrant nor the affidavit for that matter contained any indication of who these\n\n might be, instead improperly leaving it to \"unguided discretion,\" *Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 380, of the FBI search team to figure it out. *Second*, the warrant authorized the seizure of .\"<sup>6</sup> But—again—the warrant gives the agents no guidance on how to determine \"—hardly materials that are \"by [their] particular character, contraband\"7 — —which, again, allegedly started to occur almost three years earlier. Repeatedly, the warrant improperly left it to the agents to figure it out while allowing them to conduct a \"general rummaging\" through Ms. Wang's apartment.<sup>8</sup>\n\n*Third*, these concerns are \"exacerbated by the fact that the Warrant[] target[s], in significant measure, the contents of electronic devices, such as computers, internal and external hard drives, and smartphones.\" *Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 386-87. Indeed, the warrant authorized seizure of\n\n. . .\n\n6 Ex. 8 at USAO\\_00110312-13.\n\n<sup>7</sup> *Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 386.\n\n<sup>8</sup> *Cf. Application of Lafayette Acad., Inc.*, 610 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1979) (Fourth Amendment violated because \"the warrant purports to authorize not just a search and seizure of FISLP-related records as the government contends but a general rummaging for evidence of any type of federal conspiracy or fraud.\").\n\n.\"<sup>9</sup> Given the broad, un-particularized categories in the warrant, discussed above, the warrants thus improperly authorized an essentially \"limitless search of [Ms. Wang's] electronic media.\" *Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 387 (internal quotation omitted).\n\n*Finally*, the warrant is overbroad. \"'[Over]breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited to the probable cause on which the warrant is based.'\" *United States v. Cioffi*, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting *United States v. Hill*, 459 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)). Here, even setting aside the probable cause deficiencies discussed above, the warrant application contains **no** particularized facts tying Wang **or** the East 64th Street Apartment to G Club International Ltd.; G-CLUBS; G-Fashion, G News; G Music; Himalaya Exchange; or GETTR USA, Inc. Yet the warrant authorized the agents\n\n![](_page_15_Figure_3.jpeg)\n\nIn short, the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause that evidence of the \"Subject Offenses\" would be found in the East 64th Street Apartment at the time of the search, rendering the search illegal. The warrant also facially lacked particularity, because it gave the search team unfettered discretion to determine whether certain categories of items were, in fact, allowed to be seized under the warrant. It was facially overbroad as well, providing a further basis to show the search was illegal and that the agents' reliance on the warrant was unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court should suppress the evidence seized from the East 64th Street Apartment and any fruits thereof.\n\n<sup>9</sup> Ex. 8 at USAO\\_00110313 (emphasis added).\n\n<sup>10</sup> Ex. 8 at USAO\\_00110312.\n\n#### **II. The Court Should Suppress Ms. Wang's Post-Arrest Statement**\n\nThe Court should also suppress statements the FBI elicited from Ms. Wang after her arrest.\n\n#### **A. Background**\n\nOn March 15, 2023, Ms. Wang awoke to FBI agents pounding on her door. Ex. 4 at ¶ 2. When she opened the apartment door, she was taken out into the hallway, handcuffed, and asked if she wanted to make a statement. Ex. 4 at ¶¶ 4-5. She immediately stated she wanted to speak to a lawyer. Ex. 4 at ¶ 5. Soon thereafter, agent brought Ms. Wang into her bedroom, so that she could get dressed. Ex. 4 at ¶ 6. Throughout this time, agents continued to question Ms. Wang, including asking her about the locations of, and passwords for, electronic devices in the apartment. Ex. 4 at ¶ 6. During this process, agents again asked Ms. Wang if she wanted to make a statement. Ex. 4 at ¶ 7. Ms. Wang repeated that SHE wanted to speak to her lawyer. Ex. 4 at ¶ 7.\n\n#### **B. Applicable Law**\n\nThe Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination \"require[s] that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the putative defendant that [s]he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney.\" *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981) (citing *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966))).\n\nFurther, the right to counsel is particularly fiercely protected, such that when an individual in custody invokes it, interrogation by law enforcement must immediately cease and may not resume \"until counsel has been made available to [the suspect].\" *Edwards*, 451 U.S. at 484-85; *United States v. Stewart*, 770 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); *United States v. Perez*, 948 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (\"Upon [the suspect's] indication that he wished to stand on his rights, the agents were bound to scrupulously honor that assertion.\") (internal quotation and citation omitted).\n\n\"Interrogation\" in this context has been broadly defined. Post-invocation, law enforcement is barred \"not only . . . [from] express questioning, but . . . any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\" *Rhode Island v. Innis*, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980); *see also United States v. Heatley*, 994 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).\n\nEvidence that is obtained in violation of an individual's right to counsel must be suppressed. *See generally Edwards*, 451 U.S. at 479-80; *United States v. Yan*, 704 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting a motion to suppress on grounds of a Fifth Amendment *Edwards*  violation).\n\n#### **C. Discussion**\n\nHere, Ms. Wang's affidavit is clear that soon after being handcuffed and told she was under arrest, she invoked her right to counsel, but agents then continued asking her questions. Ex. 4 ¶¶ 4-6. If anything, the FBI reports of the search corroborate this sequence of events. The reports claim that\n\n. Ex. 3 at USAO\\_00111199.\n\nTherefore, there is no dispute that, within minutes of the FBI arriving at her door, Ms. Wang was in custody and unambiguously invoked her right to counsel.\n\n” Ex. 2 at USAO\\_00110620 (emphasis added). This is an explicit *Edwards*\n\nviolation of Ms. Wang's rights, with agents asking a direct question, i.e., a custodial interrogation, of Ms. Wang after she unambiguously invoked her rights.\n\nIf, as here, a person in custody \"invoked his right to counsel prior to being questioned concerning his iPhone passcode,\" it \"is an *Edwards* violation requiring suppression of the contents of the phone.\" *See United States v. Pinto-Thomaz*, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (ordering a suppression hearing to determine whether the suspect had, in fact, invoked his right to counsel) (citing *United States v. Gilkeson*, 431 F. Supp.2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); *United States v. Mitchell*, 76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017)).\n\nGiven that Ms. Wang was questioned after she invoked her right to counsel, the evidence obtained as a result of the violation—namely, the contents of the phones—must be suppressed.\n\n# **III. The Court Should Direct the Government to Provide a Bill of Particulars**\n\nThe Court should order the government to provide Ms. Wang with a bill of particulars.11\n\nSpecifically, Ms. Wang seeks an order requiring the government to particularize:\n\n- The businesses it alleges were \"fraudulent [or] fictitious\";12\n- the entities it alleges were \"interrelated\";13\n- the manner in which Ms. Wang allegedly \"enrich[ed]\" herself as a result of the alleged fraud;<sup>14</sup>\n\n<sup>11</sup> Ms. Wang has satisfied her meet and confer obligation under S.D.N.Y. Local Rule 16.1. On July 31, 2023, Ms. Wang's prior counsel wrote to the Government requesting particulars. *See* Ex. 5. On December 7, 2023, current counsel wrote to the Government confirming there had been no response to prior counsel's letter. The Government responded by declining to discuss the request. *See* Ex. 6.\n\n<sup>12</sup> *See* S1 Indictment ¶ 1.\n\n<sup>13</sup>*See* S1 Indictment ¶ 1.\n\n<sup>14</sup> *See* S1 Indictment ¶ 2.\n\n- the transfers it contends were illegal;15\n- the entities it contends were \"instrumentalities of the fraud,\" which Ms. Wang allegedly held titles in;<sup>16</sup>\n- how Ms. Wang \"conducted the GTV Private Placement\"17 and the securities \"purchase[s] and sale[s]\" it contends she was involved in or solicited;18\n- which proceeds of the GTV Private Placement were \"not used to develop and grow the GTV business\";19\n- how the wire transfer in paragraph 13(h) of the Superseding Indictment \"was contrary to the PPM representations to prospective GTV investors about how investments in GTV would be used\";20\n- the identity and any location of any purported victims of the scheme, and whether the government intends to call those individuals as trial witnesses.21\n\n# **A. Applicable Law**\n\nA defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars when the indictment fails \"to provide the defendant with sufficient detail to defend adequately the charges against him.\" *United States v. Barnes*, 158 F.3d 662, 665 (2d Cir. 1998), *abrogated on other grounds by*, *United States v. Thomas*, 274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001). Indeed, the bill of particulars \"must be granted . . . where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which\n\n17 S1 Indictment ¶ 36\n\n<sup>18</sup> *Id.*\n\n<sup>15</sup> *See* S1 Indictment ¶ 3.\n\n<sup>16</sup> *See* S1 Indictment ¶ 8.\n\n<sup>19</sup> SI Indictment ¶ 13.\n\n<sup>20</sup> S1 Indictment ¶ 13(h).\n\n<sup>21</sup> Ms. Wang reserves the right to seek further particulars if the Government obtains an additional superseding indictment.\n\nhe is accused.\" *United States v. Urso*, 369 F. Supp. 2d 254, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted).\n\nCourts in this District and in the Second Circuit more broadly have considered the following factors in whether to grant a bill of particulars. (i) the volume of the pre-trial disclosure; (ii) the number of co-conspirators; (iv) the duration and breadth of the alleged conspiracy; (iv) whether the government has otherwise provided adequate notice of particulars; (v) the potential danger to co-conspirators given the nature of the alleged criminal conduct; (vi) and the potential harm to the government's investigation. *United States v. Nachamie*, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); *see also United States v Aronov*, No. 19-cr-408 (MKB), Mem. & Order (Dkt. No. 181) (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2021); *United States v. Aquart*, No. 3:06-cr-160 (PCD), 2006 WL 2684304 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2006); *United States v. Luna*, No. 3:05-cr-58 (SRU), 2006 WL 1668006 (D. Conn. May 17, 2006); *United States v. Savin*, No. 00-cr-45 (RWS), 2001 WL 243533 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001).\n\n#### **B. Discussion**\n\nHere, each of these six factors favors ordering particulars.\n\nAs to the first two factors, the number of potential co-conspirators and the duration and breadth of the alleged conspiracy are vast: Count One alleges a five-year long conspiracy, \"from at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023,22 which allegedly involved \"dozens of interrelated entities.\"23\n\nSimilarly, the third and fourth factors—whether the government had otherwise provided adequate notice of the particulars and the volume of pretrial disclosure—also weigh in favor of\n\n<sup>22</sup> S1 Indictment ¶ 1\n\n<sup>23</sup> *See id.*\n\nparticulars. While the government will no doubt point to its \"speaking\" indictment and the voluminous discovery produced to date, those facts actually weigh against the government here. The speaking indictment is long on adjectives and qualifiers—\"*a series* of complex fraudulent and fictitious businesses\";24 \"*dozens* of\" entities25; the \"vast *majority* of the proceeds\"26 a \"*variety* of entities that were [allegedly] instrumentalities of the fraud27—but short on specifics. Ms. Wang is left to guess about what entities and business the government thinks are \"fraudulent and fictitious\" businesses and investment opportunities, which are not, and how so.\n\nMs. Wang is also left to guess about what proceeds the government claims were misappropriated from the GTV Private Placement. Indeed, Paragraphs 13(d)-(f) of the Indictment are full of qualifying language—both in the PPM itself and in the government's allegations. For example, as alleged, the PPM refers only to a \"'*contemplated* use of proceeds'\" which gives \"approximate\" values (which include \"other\" and \"working capital\").28 The government contends the \"vast majority of proceeds derived from investors in the GTV Private Placement were not used to develop and grow the GTV business\" but were—in a non-sequitur—\"instead \"deposited . . . into accounts held in the name of . . . GTV's parent company.”<sup>29</sup> As such, the indictment fails to give Ms. Wang \"sufficient particularity the nature of the charge pending against [her], [to] enabl[e] defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should\n\n<sup>25</sup> *Id.*\n\n<sup>24</sup> See *id.*\n\n<sup>26</sup> S1 Indictment ¶ 13(f)\n\n<sup>27</sup> S1 Indictment ¶ 8.\n\n<sup>28</sup> Indictment ¶ 13(d).\n\n<sup>29</sup> Indictment ¶ 13(e).\n\n[s]he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.\" *United States v. Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987).\n\nMoreover, the hundreds of thousands of pages of discovery, coupled with government provided data from extractions from (by counsel's count) close to 100 electronic devices seized from various people, do not help Ms. Wang prevent unfair surprise at trial. To the contrary, the government cannot merely rely on discovery as an \"adequate substitute for a straightforward identification in a bill of particulars.\" *United States v. Davidoff*, 845 F. 2d 1151, 1155 (2d Cir. 1988), and the government does not \"fulfill its obligation merely by providing mountains of documents to defense counsel.\" *Luna*, 2006 WL 1668006, at \\*1; *see also Aquart*, 2006 WL 2684304, at \\*2 (\"[A] large volume of discovery may warrant a bill of particulars if it obfuscates the allegedly unlawful conduct and unfairly inhibits the defendant's preparation for trial.\"); *U.S. v. Mahaffy*, 446 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (\"Perhaps the most frequent case in which particulars are warranted is where discovery is overwhelmingly extensive[.]\"); *Nachamie*, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (granting bill of particulars identifying unindicted co-conspirators where government had produced \"over 200,000 pieces of paper\"). This is particularly true in a case like this one, where the alleged crimes related to otherwise innocuous conduct—like people transferring money between bank accounts—and not inherently illegal activities like selling narcotics or engaging in crimes of violence.\n\nThe fifth and sixth factors—the nature of the charged conduct and the potential harm to the government's investigation—also weigh in favor of particularization. Neither Ms. Wang nor her co-conspirators are charged with any acts of violence. Additionally, this investigation began no later than early 2020, almost four years ago; the case was charged nine months ago; and trial is less than four months away. *United States v. Falkowitz*, 214 F. Supp. 2d 365, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)\n\n(\"[W]hen the trial date is imminent, as now, the Government's investigation presumably is close to completion. Thus, there is no indication that a bill of particulars will harm the progress of the investigation.\").\n\nFurther, apart from the six factors above, this case presents unique circumstances that make particularization of the government's theories and witnesses appropriate.\n\nFor one, as alleged in the Indictment itself, Kwok has \"hundreds of thousands of online followers,\"30 who may have had a variety of motivations, expectations, and beliefs about why they were investing in the GTV Private Placement. Indeed, the Indictment itself seems to acknowledge as much, hedging (again) by alleging that \"Investors participated in the GTV Private Placement based, *in part*, on the belief that their money would be invested into GTV to develop and grow that business . . . .” but that the “*vast majority*”—whether 60 percent or 75 percent or 98 percent—Ms. Wang is left to guess—was allegedly not so invested.31\n\nOn the flip side, Ms. Wang—in addition to Kwok—has known, powerful enemies given her association with anti-Chinese Communist Party activities. Indeed, just this week the government disclosed to counsel for the first time that\n\n<sup>32</sup> Further, as the government itself has alleged in other proceedings, the CCP has attempted to corrupt the U.S. judicial system by filing false lawsuits against dissidents. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. An*, No. 1:22-cr-00460-KAM, ECF No.\n\n<sup>30</sup> S1 Indictment ¶ 2.\n\n<sup>31</sup> S1 Indictment ¶¶ 13(e)-(f).\n\n<sup>32</sup> Ex. 7 (filed under seal).\n\n9 ¶ 40 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2022) (describing how Chinese operative filed a false civil lawsuit in New York state court to attempt to coerce target of Chinese intelligence to return to China). The high potential for witnesses to have ulterior motivations in testifying against Ms. Wang provides another reason why early particularization of the government's witnesses and theories is critical to a fair trial and to ensure adequate trial preparation.\n\nFinally, particulars are also warranted for another reason specific to Count Three, the securities fraud count against Ms. Wang, which charges her with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff (\"Section 10(b)\") and Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations § 240.10b-5 (\"Rule 10b-5\"), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. S1 Indictment, ECF No. 19, ¶ 35-36.\n\nSection 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the offense charged in Count Three, does not apply extraterritorially. *See Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd.*, 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010) (\"Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.\"); *United States v. Vilar*, 729 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying *Morrison* to hold Section 10(b) does not \"apply extraterritorially in criminal cases\").\n\nThus, for a defendant to be convicted of securities fraud, she must have \"engaged in fraud in connection with (1) a security listed on an American exchange, or (2) a security purchased or sold in the United States.\" *Vilar*, 729 F.3d at 67. As to the second prong, a security is \"purchased or sold in the United States\" \"if irrevocable liability is incurred or title passes within the United States.\" *Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto*, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012). Further, even if a securities transaction has some U.S. elements, that will not provide jurisdiction if the transaction is \"predominantly foreign.\" *Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE*, 763 F.3d 198, 216 (2d Cir. 2014)\n\nHere, the government has not alleged that the GTV shares were \"listed on a U.S. exchange.\" As such, the government must show Ms. Wang \"engaged in fraud\" in connection with a security for which \"if irrevocable liability is incurred or title passe[d] within the United States.\"\n\nBut Count Three itself contains no allegation of a domestic securities transaction, beyond boilerplate, plainly inapplicable references to a \"national securities exchange.\"33 The \"to wit\" clause refers only to the \"scheme being furthered through electronic communications and monetary transfers to and from the Southern District of New York.\" S1 Indictment ¶ 36. This provides no notice of the transactions for which the government alleges that \"irrevocable liability [was] incurred or title passe[d] within the United States.\" *Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd*, 677 F.3d at 67.\n\nAs such, the government should be required to particularize how Ms. Wang \"conducted the GTV Private Placement”<sup>34</sup> and the securities “purchase[s] and sale[s]” it contends she was involved in or solicited35.\n\n\\*\\*\\*\n\nAccordingly, the Court should order the government to provide the particulars requested above.\n\n<sup>33</sup> SI Indictment ¶ 36.\n\n<sup>34</sup> S1 Indictment ¶ 36\n\n<sup>35</sup> *Id.*\n\n### **IV. The Court Should Sever Ms. Wang's Trial From Her Co-Defendant's**\n\n#### **A. Applicable Law**\n\nRule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if joinder \"appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.\"\n\nThe movant must demonstrate that she will be \"substantially prejudiced\" if severance is not granted. *United States v. Crozzoli*, 698 F. Supp. 430, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing *United States v. Losada*, 674 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1982)). In making its determination, the courts may consider factors like: \"(1) the number of defendants; (2) the number of counts; (3) the complexity of the indictment; (4) the estimated length of trial; (5) disparities in the amount or type of proof offered against each defendant; (6) disparities in the degrees of involvement by each defendant in the overall scheme; (7) possible conflict between various defense theories or trial strategies; and (8) prejudice from evidence admitted against co-defendants which is inadmissible or excluded as to a particular defendant.\" *United States v. Upton*, 856 F. Supp. 727, 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Especially where more than one factor exists, the courts have been swayed to grant severance. *United States v. Nachamie*, 101 F. Supp. 2d 134, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying *Upton* in granting severance, given both the \"evidentiary issue\" and the \"mutually antagonistic defenses\" issue); *accord United States v. Burke*, 789 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399-400 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting severance where codefendant faced a \"significant\" risk of prejudicial spillover and severance served the interests of judicial economy, as the co-defendant's relatively minor charges would involve a quick trial with limited evidence); *United States v. Villanueva Madrid*, 302 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting severance to avoid a \"particularly acute\" danger of undue prejudice).\n\nIn a complex, lengthy case involving multiple defendants, the courts are particularly concerned with the \"disproportionality of evidence.\" *United States v. Gallo*, 668 F. Supp. 736, 750\n\n(E.D.N.Y. 1987); *accord United States v. Kelly*, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2d Cir. 1965). The court worries that jurors will not be able, \"as a practical matter,\" to properly isolate the evidence as applied to each defendant. *United States v. Kahaner*, 203 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), *aff'd.*, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.1963).\n\nAdditionally, severance is appropriate where individuals would not be able to mount effective defenses if tried as co-defendants. *See United States v. Shkreli*, 260 F. Supp. 3d 247, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (granting severance where the co-defendant's defense strategy was to position himself as \"another victim of [the movant's] [alleged] lies and deceitfulness\"); *cf. United States v. Gleason*, 259 F. Supp. 282, 283-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (granting severance where movant calling her co-defendant as a witness was \"essential\" to her defense).\n\nIn *United States v. Gatien*, for example, No. 96-CR-430, 1997 WL 661138, at \\*2-4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1997), the court granted severance to two co-defendants, finding the \"disparity in the nature and quantity of the evidence against [the movants] on one hand and [the coconspirators] on the other requires that [the] motions to sever be granted.\" This included the (1) \"disparity in the nature\" of the parties' \"involvement in the alleged conspiracy\"—with the coconspirators being the so-called \"mastermind\" and \"director\" of the conspiracy, compared with the \"incidental . . . involvement\" of the movants; (2) the \"extreme nature of the evidence\" that was anticipated to be introduced against the co-conspirators, which would make it \"exceedingly difficult\" for the jury to soberly \"appraise\" and distinguish; and (3) the lengthy trial anticipated for the co-conspirators, compared with the more efficient trial for the movants if severed. *Id.*\n\n### **B. Discussion**\n\nThis case involves extraordinarily voluminous discovery—over one million documents produced to date, by counsel's count—the overwhelming majority of which has nothing at all to do with the allegations against Ms. Wang. This is consistent with the Superseding Indictment itself,\n\nin which Ms. Wang's name appears only 37 times, while Kwok and Je are named 175 and 156 times, respectively. *See generally* S1 Indictment.\n\nApplying the *Upton* factors, the court should clearly grant severance of Ms. Wang's trial from that of Kwok.\n\n*First*, Ms. Wang is charged with only four out of twelve counts, namely, counts one, two, three, and eleven, all of which are related to GTV.\n\n*Second*, the complexity of the indictment. There is no serious question the indictment is complex. Indeed the government uses that word repeatedly in its charging language: alleging a there was \"a series of complex fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities,\" SI Indictment at ¶ 1, and that Kwok and Je allegedly misappropriated funds \"using, among other things, a complex web of entities and bank accounts.\" *Id.* at ¶ 16.\n\n*Third and fourth*, the Indictment suggests there will be vast disparities in the amount and type of direct evidence offered against Ms. Wang as opposed to Kwok and Je. For example:\n\n> Kwok and Je are accused of using over \\$300 million dollars from the alleged fraud for their own and their family's benefit. *Id.* at \b6 4. Kwok allegedly used investor money to buy himself and his relatives a New Jersey mansion, luxury cars, a yacht, a piano, and an expensive mattress, among other decadent purchases. *Id.* at \b6\b6 4, 14. Je is accused of having transferred some \\$10 million to his and his spouse's personal bank account. *Id.* at \b6\b6 4, 14(4)(iv). No such allegations of personal enrichment have been made against Wang, who throughout the period during which the alleged conspiracy is said to have occurred lived in a one-bedroom apartment.\n\n- Kwok is alleged to have appeared in numerous videos promoting multiple projects allegedly involved in the alleged conspiracies, including the GTV private placement video and subsequent promotional videos for GTV, *id.* at ¶¶ 13(a), 32(a), (d); a promotional video for the \"Himalaya Farm Alliance,\" *id.* at ¶¶ 14(c)-(d), 32(c); multiple promotional videos for G-CLUBS, *id.* at ¶¶ 15(a), (d), (f)(ii), 32(f); multiple promotional videos for the Himalaya Exchange, *id.* at ¶¶ 18, 20, 32(h). Conversely, no allegations have been made that Wang was ever involved in any promotional videos or public-facing content of any kind for any of the aforementioned programs.\n- In the section of the indictment enumerating the alleged \"overt acts\" taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, or conspiracies, Ms. Wang is named only once in relation to any of the numerous alleged overt acts, an allegation related only to GTV. *Id.* at ¶ 32(b).\n- Je is alleged to have been the \"author\" of the GTV private placement memorandum. *Id.* at ¶ 13(c).\n- Kwok is alleged to \"organized and promoted\" the \"Himalaya Farm Alliance.\" *Id.* at ¶ 14(a). Kwok and Je are alleged to have misappropriated some \\$150 million in funds from this \"Alliance.\" *Id.* at ¶ 14.\n- Kwok and Je are alleged to have committed fraud with respect to an online membership club, G-CLUBS, allegedly using this club \"as a mechanism to continue fraudulent private placement offerings.\" *Id.* at ¶ 15. Kwok and Je are alleged to have misappropriated a \"substantial portion\" of G-CLUBS membership fees for personal use, including allegedly paying the personal expenses for Kwok\n\nand his family, paying for extravagant purchases by Kwok, and being funneled to Je's personal bank account. *Id.* at ¶ 16.\n\n Kwok and Je are alleged to have marketed and promoted the Himalaya Exchange cryptocurrency ecosystem, including Kwok allegedly encouraging his followers on social media to participate in the Exchange; Je allegedly creating a false impression that the Exchange's currency was used to buy a Ferrari; and both men allegedly misrepresenting the strength of the Exchange's currency. *Id.* at ¶¶ 18-22. Kwok and Je are further alleged to have \"fraudulently obtained\" more than \\$262 million through the Himalaya Exchange. *Id.* at ¶ 17. This includes an alleged transfer of some \\$37 million to “cover the cost of [Kwok’s] luxury yacht.” *Id.* at ¶ 23.\n\nThe Indictment contains no allegations against Ms. Wang with respect to any of the above matters and no allegations at all that she used investor proceeds for personal gain or lived a luxurious lifestyle.\n\n*Fifth*, Ms. Wang may have conflicting defenses with Kwok that could impede her ability to vigorously defend herself in a joint trial. While the undersigned counsel's investigation is ongoing, the government has seemingly acknowledged as much, arguing in its attempt to disqualify Emil Bove as counsel for Ms. Wang that Mr. Bove's involvement in a separate investigation of Kwok \"might restrict Bove's ability to defend his client beyond what is waivable\" because he could not use information he learned during his time as an AUSA to help Ms. Wang. ECF No. 128 at 3 (asserting that the Court would have to \"wrestle with thorny issues during trial,\" including around \"cross-examining witnesses\").\n\nFinally, given, among other things, Kwok's “prolific online presence,”<sup>36</sup> and the government's apparent intent to introduce evidence of that presence, there is substantial potential for spillover over prejudice against Ms. Wang from Mr. Kwok's statements. To the extent the government argues in response to this argument that Mr. Kwok's statements are admissible against Ms. Wang as statements in furtherance of a conspiracy or agent admissions, it should be required to specify well before trial which statements it intends to introduce and why those statements are admissible on that basis.\n\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court should sever Ms. Wang's trial from Kwok's.\n\n# **V. Ms. Wang Joins in Co-Defendant Kwok's Motion to Dismiss Directed to the Counts in the Indictment in Which She is Charged**\n\nFinally, Ms. Wang joins in those portions of defendant Kwok's motion to dismiss, ECF\n\nNos. 193-195, directed at the counts in the indictment in which Ms. Wang is charged.\n\n# **CONCLUSION**\n\nThe Court should grant Ms. Wang's motions.\n\nDated: December 15, 2023 Respectfully submitted,\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nBAKER BOTTS LLP\n\n By:*/s/ Brendan F. Quigley*  Brendan F. Quigley 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 Tele: (212) 408-2500 Fax: (212) 408-2501 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com\n\n*Attorney for Yanping Wang*\n\n36 S1 Indictment ¶ 1.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n诉\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\n被告。\n支持被告 YANPING WANG（王雁平）审前动议之法律备忘录\n\nBrendan F. Quigley BAKER BOTTS LLP（贝克·博茨律师事务所） 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 电话：(212) 408-2520 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com\n\n王雁平的辩护律师\n背景 2\nI. 法院应压制在王女士公寓中扣押的证据以及由此衍生的任何证据 2\nA. 背景 2\nB. 适用法律 4\nC. 讨论 5\nII. 法院应压制王女士被捕后的陈述 11\nA. 背景 11\nB. 适用法律 11\nC. 讨论 12\nIII. 法院应指示政府提供具体罪状说明书 13\nA. 适用法律 14\nB. 讨论 15\nIV. 法院应将王女士的审判与其共同被告分离 21\nA. 适用法律 21\nB. 讨论 22\nV. 王女士加入共同被告 Kwok（郭文贵）针对起诉书中指控她的罪名项所提出的驳回起诉动议 26\n结论 26\n判例\nAbsolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012) 19, 20\nBruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) 21\nEdwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) 11, 12\nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 4\nMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 11\nMorrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) 19\nParkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014) 20\nRhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) 12\nSgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932) 7\nStanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) 5\nU.S. v. Mahaffy, 446 F. Supp. 2d 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 17\nUnited States v. An, No. 1:22-cr-00460-KAM, ECF No. 9 19\nUnited States v. Aquart, No. 3:06-cr-160 (PCD), 2006 WL 2684304 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2006) 15, 17\nUnited States v Aronov, No. 19-cr-408 (MKB) 15\nUnited States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by, United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001) 14\nUnited States v. Bertini, No. 23 CR. 61 (PGG), 2023 WL 8258334 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2023) 4, 5\nUnited States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) 17\nUnited States v. Burke, 789 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 21\nUnited States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 10\nUnited States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011) 5\nUnited States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005) 4\nUnited States v. Crozzoli, 698 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 21\nUnited States v. Davidoff, 845 F. 2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1988) 17\nUnited States v. Falkowitz, 214 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 18\nUnited States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 4\nUnited States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) 22\nUnited States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013) 5\nUnited States v. Gilkeson, 431 F. Supp.2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 13\nUnited States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 22, 23\nUnited States v. Gomez, 652 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) 5\nUnited States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 6, 8\nUnited States v. Heatley, 994 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 12\nUnited States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) 10\nUnited States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd., 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.1963) 22\nUnited States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965) 22\nUnited States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1982) 21\nUnited States v. Luna, No. 3:05-cr-58 (SRU), 2006 WL 1668006 (D. Conn. May 17, 2006) 15, 17\nUnited States v. Mitchell, 76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017) 13\nUnited States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) 6\nUnited States v. Nachamie, 101 F. Supp. 2d 134, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 21\nUnited States v. Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 15, 17\nUnited States v. Perez, 948 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 11\nUnited States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 13\nUnited States v. Rios, 881 F. Supp. 772 (D. Conn. 1995) 6\nUnited States v. Savin, No. 00-cr-45 (RWS), 2001 WL 243533 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001) 15\nUnited States v. Shkreli, 260 F. Supp. 3d 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 22\nUnited States v. Stewart, 770 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 11\nUnited States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) 21, 23\nUnited States v. Urso, 369 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 15\nUnited States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979) 5\nUnited States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2013) 19\nUnited States v. Villanueva Madrid, 302 F. Supp. 2d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 22\nUnited States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 5, 8, 9, 10\nUnited States v. Yan, 704 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 12\nUnited States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 8\nYbarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) 4\nZafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) 21\nZurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) 6\n其他权威资料\n2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.6(a) (5th ed. 2012) 8\n\n被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）谨此提交本备忘录，以支持其审前动议。\n\n首先，如下文所述，法院应压制 (i) 2023年3月15日从王女士公寓中扣押的证据及其衍生后果，以及 (ii) 执法人员在王女士主张其获得律师协助的权利后从其处获取的陈述。\n\n对王女士公寓的搜查——该搜查已要求政府根据对“担任……搜查小队队长的 FBI（联邦调查局）特工”的“重新面谈”做出更正性披露1——是基于一份明显缺乏合理根据证明王女士公寓内会发现犯罪证据的搜查令进行的。该搜查令亦未能满足第四修正案的明确性要求，且即使撇开其他合理根据问题不谈，其范围也过于宽泛。此外，在搜查过程中，特工在王女士主张其获得律师协助的权利后仍继续对其进行讯问，这公然违反了最高法院的判例。因此，法院应压制从公寓中扣押的证据、王女士被捕后的陈述以及由此衍生的任何后果。\n\n其次，法院应责令政府按如下所述提供具体罪状说明书。如果说有什么不同的话，迄今为止所提供的大量证据开示以及政府“叙述性”起诉书中措辞宽泛的指控恰恰表明了为何提供具体罪状说明书是适当的。\n\n第三，法院应将王女士的审判与其共同被告的审判予以分离。\n\n第四，王女士请求加入其共同被告驳回起诉动议中涉及起诉书指控王女士罪名项的部分。\n\n1 参见政府致 Robert W. Lehrburger（罗伯特·W·莱尔伯格）法官的信函，日期为 2023 年 4 月 17 日，ECF No. 47。\n背景\nI. 法院应排除在王女士公寓内扣押的证据以及由此衍生的任何证据\nA. 背景\n\n2023 年 3 月 14 日，政府取得了针对东 64 街 188 号 1601 室（“东 64 街公寓”）的搜查令，证据 1，搜查令宣誓书，（封存归档）；证据 8，搜查令（封存归档）。2 王当时居住在东 64 街公寓。参见证据 4，王宣誓书第 1 段。\n\nFBI（联邦调查局）使用同一份宣誓书，同时申请了针对被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”（“郭”）（在宣誓书中被确定为“目标场所-1”）所有的公寓以及东 64 街公寓（被确定为“目标场所-2”，并与郭的公寓统称为“目标场所”）的搜查令。\n\n![](_page_7_Figure_6.jpeg)\n\n2 本文件封存归档，因为政府在证据开示中将其指定为“高度机密”。政府最初于 3 月 10 日取得了针对东 64 街公寓的搜查令，但其 3 月 14 日的版本更正了一些格式错误和冗余文本。\n\n![](_page_8_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n——完全没有向执行搜查的特工提供任何指引，说明那些 [R] 是什么或何人，以及 [R]\n[R]\n[R] ”，同样没有向执行搜查的特工提供任何指引，说明在翻查王女士的公寓时，如何确定某项物品是如何被 [R]\n[R] 证据 1，USAO_00110339-40。获批扣押的物品还包括 [R]\n[R]\n[R] ，证据 1，USAO_00110339-41，以及 [R]\n[R]\n[R] 。证据 1，USAO_00110342。\nB. 适用法律\n\n第四修正案禁止“不合理的搜查和扣押”，并要求“除非基于根据宣誓支持的相当理由，否则不得签发搜查令”。U.S. CONST. amend. IV.A。正如 Gardephe（加德菲）法官几周前所重申的那样，“相当理由的证明必须以‘特定化的事实’为前提，而非无关的泛泛之谈。”United States v. Bertini, No. 23 CR. 61 (PGG), 2023 WL 8258334, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2023) (援引 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979))；United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008)（指出政府必须“在提出搜查令申请之前‘收集针对搜查目标的特定化证据’”）（原文强调）（援引 United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2005)）。\n\n在审查对诸如公寓等场所进行搜查的搜查令时，必须存在相当理由——即包括“特定化的事实”——以证明“违禁品或犯罪证据将在该特定地点被发现”。Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)。“所寻求的物品与要搜查的‘特定地点’之间所要求的这种关联性，防止了\n\n普遍搜查令的签发”，而这正是第四修正案旨在防范的主要危害之一。United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (援引 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965))。为了进一步防范“普遍搜查令”以及“对个人财物进行‘普遍性、探索性的乱翻’”，第四修正案还要求“‘授权搜查的范围应被特定化列明’”。United States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (援引 United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013))。\nC. 讨论\n\n在本案中，搜查令宣誓书在多个层面上均未能确立相当理由，以证明在 2023 年 3 月 15 日（距 GTV 私募以及将王女士与任何指控的犯罪活动相联系的唯一“特定化事实”均已过去近三年之后）会在东 64 街公寓发现涉案罪名的证据。\n\n加剧这些缺陷的是，该搜查令还缺乏特定性，因为它赋予了执行搜查的特工基本上不受约束的自由裁量权，并且（即便撇开上述确立的基本相当理由问题不谈）出于第四修正案的目的而言属于范围过宽。\n1. 搜查令申请未能提供搜查东 64 街公寓的相当理由\n\n第一，虽然搜查令申请附有针对王女士的刑事起诉书，指控其犯有与 GTV 私募相关的四项罪行，但“‘存在逮捕的相当理由并不必然确立搜查的相当理由。’”Bertini, 2023 WL 8258334, at *5 (援引 United States v. Gomez, 652 F. Supp. 461, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1987))。换言之，“不能仅仅……从存在相信嫌疑人有罪的相当理由，就推导出同样存在搜查其住所的相当理由。”United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979)（内部引文及引用省略）；亦见 United States v. Rios, 881 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D. Conn. 1995)（指出仅凭逮捕的相当\n\n理由本身，并不能确立搜查住所的相当理由）。相反，“合理搜查中的关键要素不是财产所有人被怀疑犯罪，而是有合理的理由相信要搜查和扣押的特定‘物品’位于寻求进入的财产上。”Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978)；United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 476 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)（“仅将[被告]与……共谋联系起来，是认定搜查[其]住所存在相当理由的不足依据”）。\n\n在本案中，搜查令宣誓书没有包含任何特定化的事实表明犯罪证据会“位于寻求进入的财产上”。Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556。尽管申请书（连同附件）长达 77 页，但其中不包含任何表明犯罪活动正在东 64 街公寓进行的信息。在搜查令宣誓书中没有任何指称，更不用说第四修正案所要求的“特定化事实”，例如表明东 64 街公寓被用作 GTV 的办公室、被用于存放（届时已有三年之久的）指控欺诈的收益，或者该处是进行 GTV 发行的地点。\n\n第二，与此相关的是，搜查令没有任何依据令人相信有关 GTV 私募的证据仍会在东 64 街公寓（如果最初曾存在于该处的话）。“支持性证据的新鲜度对于相当理由的评估至关重要”。United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2017)（内部引文及引用省略）。在此，宣誓书本身即陈述 GTV 私募\n\n”3 换言之，这发生在 FBI 于 2023 年 3 月 15 日早上 6 点敲响东 64 街公寓大门的近三年前。一般性参见 Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932)（“[显而易见]，证据所涉事实必须与搜查令签发的时间极其紧密相关，以证明在当时确立相当理由是正当的。”）。\n\n3 证据 1，USAO_00110322。\n\n此外，搜查令申请自\n\n，证据 1，USAO_00110391 以来，完全没有包含任何与王女士相关的特定化事实——同样是近三年之前——在这一时期内，我们的国家经历并走出了全球大流行病、更迭了总统、结束了阿富汗战争，并见证了乌克兰另一场战争的爆发，等等。简而言之，关于王女士被指控的犯罪事实，更不用说在东 64 街公寓被指控的犯罪活动，绝非“新鲜”。\n\n第三，甚至搜查令申请中将王女士本人与东 64 街公寓联系起来的事实也是单薄的。长达 77 页的申请书仅包含两个涉及东 64 街公寓/“目标场所-2”的实质性段落，声称市政记录显示其\n\n并且，同样在三年之后，\n\n”4 换言之，搜查令宣誓书仅表明\n\n简而言之，搜查令申请没有包含将东 64 街公寓与犯罪活动联系起来的特定化事实，其赖以将王女士与被指控的犯罪计划联系起来的事实已有三年之久，且与东 64 街公寓没有任何关联，甚至以任何方式将王女士与东 64 街公寓联系起来的事实也极其单薄。因此，搜查令申请未能确立搜查的相当理由。\n\n4 证据 1 第 19(a)-(b) 段，USAO_00110329。\n2. 搜查令在特定性和范围过宽方面的问题加剧了这些错误\n\n搜查令的其他问题加剧了这些缺陷，这些问题凸显了此处违反第四修正案的严重程度，表明了特工依赖该搜查令为何是不合理的，并进一步证明了为何排除证据既是恰当的也是必要的。具体而言，该搜查令未能符合第四修正案的特定性要求，并且同样存在不当的范围过宽缺陷。对照 Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1275（“缺乏搜查[某]公寓的相当理由……其本身就导致搜查令根据第四修正案无效”，但范围过宽和缺乏特定性的缺陷为搜查令的无效提供了“额外理由”。）。\n\n“‘法院通过坚持要求搜查令不得将可扣押何种物品留给执行搜查令的执法人员不受指引的自由裁量，来落实特定性要求。’”United States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (援引 United States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2013))。\n\n当拟扣押的财产像本案一样“按其特定性质而言很难说是违禁品”时，对特定性的关切就会加剧。Wey, 256 F. Supp.3d at 385 (援引 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.6(a) (5th ed. 2012))。\n\n在此，搜查令在多个方面赋予了执法人员“不受指引的自由裁量权”。\n\n第一，例如，虽然它允许特工扣押有关\n\n”的证据，但它同样授权特工\n\n扣押有关\n\n5 的证据。无论\n\n5 证据 8，USAO_00110312。\n\n搜查令还是宣誓书，就此而言均未包含任何关于这些\n\n可能是谁的说明，反而不当地将其留给 FBI 搜查小组“不受指引的自由裁量”，Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 380，自行去弄清楚。第二，搜查令授权扣押 。”6 但是——同样——搜查令没有向特工提供任何指引，说明如何确定 “——这绝非“按[其]特定性质而言属于违禁品”7 的材料—— ——再次指出，这据称发生在近三年前。搜查令一再不当地留给特工自行去弄清楚，同时允许他们对王女士的公寓进行“普遍乱翻”。8\n\n第三，这些关切因以下事实而“进一步加剧，即搜查令在很大程度上针对的是电子设备的内容，例如计算机、内置和外置硬盘以及智能手机。”Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 386-87。事实上，搜查令授权扣押\n\n. . .\n\n6 证据 8，USAO_00110312-13。\n\n7 Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 386。\n\n8 对照 Application of Lafayette Acad., Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1979)（违反第四修正案，因为“搜查令旨在授权的不仅仅如政府所主张的那样是对与 FISLP 相关的记录进行搜查和扣押，而是为了寻找任何类型的联邦共谋或欺诈证据而进行普遍乱翻。”）。\n\n。”9 鉴于上文讨论的搜查令中宽泛、未特定化的类别，搜查令从而不当地授权了对[王女士的]电子媒介进行基本上“无限制的搜查”。Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 387（内部引文省略）。\n\n最后，该搜查令过于宽泛。「『过分宽泛涉及搜查令的范围必须受限于确立该搜查令所依据的合理根据这一要求。』」United States v. Cioffi，668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)（纽约东区联邦地区法院）（援引 United States v. Hill，459 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)（联邦第九巡回上诉法院））。在此案中，即便抛开上述讨论的合理根据缺陷不谈，搜查令申请书也未包含任何将 Wang（王女士）或 East 64th Street Apartment（东64街公寓）与 G Club International Ltd.、G-CLUBS、G-Fashion、G News、G Music、Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）或 GETTR USA, Inc. 联系起来的特定事实。然而，搜查令却授权执法人员\n\n[图片]\n\n简而言之，搜查令宣誓书未能确立搜查时会在东64街公寓内发现「Subject Offenses（涉案罪行）」证据的合理根据，从而导致搜查违法。该搜查令在表面上亦缺乏特定性，因为它给予了搜查小组不受约束的自由裁量权，以确定某些类别的物品实际上是否被允许依据搜查令予以扣押。它在表面上也过于宽泛，进一步证明了搜查的违法性以及执法人员对搜查令的信赖是不合理的。因此，法院应当排除从东64街公寓扣押的证据及其任何衍生证据。\n\n9 证据 8，见 USAO_00110313（强调为后加）。\n\n10 证据 8，见 USAO_00110312。\n\nII. 法院应当排除王女士被捕后的供述\n\n法院亦应当排除联邦调查局（FBI）在逮捕王女士后从其处获取的陈述。\n\nA. 背景\n\n2023年3月15日，王女士被 FBI 探员的敲门声惊醒。证据 4 第 2 段。当她打开公寓门时，她被带到走廊上，戴上手铐，并被询问是否想做陈述。证据 4 第 4-5 段。她随即表示希望与律师通话。证据 4 第 5 段。不久之后，探员将王女士带入她的卧室，以便她穿好衣服。证据 4 第 6 段。在此期间，探员继续对王女士进行讯问，包括询问她公寓内电子设备的位置及密码。证据 4 第 6 段。在此过程中，探员再次询问王女士是否想做陈述。证据 4 第 7 段。王女士重申她希望与她的律师通话。证据 4 第 7 段。\n\nB. 适用法律\n\n第五修正案关于禁止强迫自证其罪的规定「要求在羁押审讯前，必须向拟被起诉的被告人告知其有权保持沉默，并且有权要求律师在场。」Edwards v. Arizona，451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981)（美国最高法院）（援引 Miranda v. Arizona，384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)）。\n\n此外，获得律师帮助的权利受到尤为严格的保护，以至于当被羁押的人员援引该权利时，执法人员的讯问必须立即停止，且在「该嫌疑人获得律师协助之前」不得恢复。Edwards，451 U.S. at 484-85；United States v. Stewart，770 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)（纽约南区联邦地区法院）；United States v. Perez，948 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)（「一旦[嫌疑人]表示希望坚持其权利，探员就有义务严格尊重该主张。」）（内部引文及引用省略）。\n\n在此语境下，「讯问」的定义十分宽泛。在援引该权利后，执法部门不仅被禁止「……进行明示提问，而且……禁止警方做出任何其应当知道合理可能引诱嫌疑人做出自罪陈述的言辞或行为。」Rhode Island v. Innis，446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980)；亦见 United States v. Heatley，994 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)。\n\n凡违反个人获得律师帮助的权利而获取的证据，均必须予以排除。参见 Edwards，451 U.S. at 479-80；United States v. Yan，704 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（以违反第五修正案 Edwards 规则为由准许排除证据动议）。\n\nC. 讨论\n\n在本案中，王女士的宣誓书明确表明，在被戴上手铐并被告知已被逮捕后不久，她便援引了获得律师帮助的权利，但探员随后仍继续向她提问。证据 4 第 4-6 段。如果说有什么不同的话，FBI 关于此次搜查的报告恰恰印证了这一事件经过。报告声称\n\n。证据 3，见 USAO_00111199。\n\n因此，毫无争议的是，在 FBI 到达她门前的几分钟内，王女士已处于羁押状态，并明确无误地援引了获得律师帮助的权利。\n\n」证据 2，见 USAO_00110620（强调为后加）。这构成了对王女士权利的显失 Edwards 规则的侵犯，即探员在王女士明确援引其权利后，对其进行了直接提问，即羁押讯问。\n\n如果如本案一样，被羁押人员「在就其 iPhone 密码接受讯问前援引了获得律师帮助的权利」，则「属于 Edwards 违规行为，须对手机内容予以排除。」参见 United States v. Pinto-Thomaz，352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)（命令举行证据排除听证会以确定嫌疑人实际上是否援引了获得律师帮助的权利）（援引 United States v. Gilkeson，431 F. Supp.2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)（纽约北区联邦地区法院）；United States v. Mitchell，76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017)（美国武装部队上诉法院））。\n\n鉴于王女士在援引获得律师帮助的权利后仍受到讯问，因该违法行为而获取的证据——即手机的内容——必须予以排除。\n\nIII. 法院应当责令政府提供具体罪状明细书\n\n法院应当命令政府向王女士提供具体罪状明细书（bill of particulars）。11\n\n具体而言，王女士请求法院下达命令，要求政府明确以下事项：\n\n- 其指控为「欺诈性[或]虚假」的企业；12\n- 其指控为「相互关联」的实体；13\n- 王女士据称因所指控的欺诈行为而「使自身致富」的方式；14\n\n11 王女士已履行了 S.D.N.Y. Local Rule 16.1（纽约南区联邦地区法院本地规则第16.1条）项下的会商义务。2023年7月31日，王女士的前任律师致函政府要求提供具体罪状明细。见证据 5。2023年12月7日，现任律师致函政府确认前任律师的信函未收到回复。政府回复拒绝就该请求进行讨论。见证据 6。\n\n12 见 S1 Indictment（第一替代起诉书）第 1 段。\n\n13 见 S1 起诉书第 1 段。\n\n14 见 S1 起诉书第 2 段。\n\n- 其主张非法的转账；15\n- 其主张作为「欺诈工具」、且王女士据称在其中担任职务的实体；16\n- 王女士如何「开展 GTV 私募」17 以及其主张王女士参与或招揽的证券「购买和出售」；18\n- GTV 私募收益中哪些款项「未用于发展和壮大 GTV 业务」；19\n- 替代起诉书第 13(h) 段中的电汇转账如何「违背了向 GTV 潜在投资者就 GTV 投资款将如何使用所作的 PPM 陈述」；20\n- 该计划任何据称受害者的身份及任何所在地点，以及政府是否打算传唤这些个人作为庭审证人。21\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n当起诉书未能「向被告人提供足够的细节以充分抗辩针对其的指控」时，被告人有权获得具体罪状明细书。United States v. Barnes，158 F.3d 662, 665 (2d Cir. 1998)（联邦第二巡回上诉法院），因其他理由被 United States v. Thomas，274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001) 废止。事实上，「……当起诉书的指控过于概括，以至于未能告知被告人其被指控的具体行为时，必须准许」提供具体罪状明细书。United States v. Urso，369 F. Supp. 2d 254, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)（内部引用和引文省略）。\n\n17 S1 起诉书第 36 段。\n\n18 同上。\n\n15 见 S1 起诉书第 3 段。\n\n16 见 S1 起诉书第 8 段。\n\n19 S1 起诉书第 13 段。\n\n20 S1 起诉书第 13(h) 段。\n\n21 若政府取得进一步的替代起诉书，王女士保留要求提供进一步具体明细的权利。\n\n本辖区法院及第二巡回区更广泛的法院在决定是否准许提供具体罪状明细书时，考虑了以下因素：(i) 审前证据披露的体量；(ii) 共谋者的数量；(iii) 所指控共谋的持续时间和广度；(iv) 政府是否已通过其他方式提供了充分的具体告知；(v) 鉴于所指控犯罪行为的性质对共谋者潜在的危险；(vi) 以及对政府调查的潜在危害。United States v. Nachamie，91 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)；亦见 United States v Aronov，案号 19-cr-408 (MKB)，备忘录与裁定（卷宗号 181）(E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2021)；United States v. Aquart，案号 3:06-cr-160 (PCD)，2006 WL 2684304 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2006)（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）；United States v. Luna，案号 3:05-cr-58 (SRU)，2006 WL 1668006 (D. Conn. May 17, 2006)；United States v. Savin，案号 00-cr-45 (RWS)，2001 WL 243533 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001)。\n\nB. 讨论\n\n在此案中，这六项因素中的每一项都支持责令提供明细。\n\n就前两项因素而言，潜在共谋者的数量以及所指控共谋的持续时间和广度是巨大的：第一项罪名指控了一起长达五年的共谋，「自至少约2018年起至至少约2023年3月止」，22 据称涉及「数十个相互关联的实体」。23\n\n同样，第三和第四项因素——即政府是否已通过其他方式充分告知了具体事实以及审前证据披露的体量——亦倾向于支持\n\n22 S1 起诉书第 1 段。\n\n23 见同上。\n\n提供明细。尽管政府无疑会指出其「叙述式」起诉书以及迄今为止已出示的大量证据开示材料，但这些事实在此恰恰对政府不利。叙述式起诉书充斥着形容词和限定词——「一系列复杂的欺诈性和虚假企业」；24 「数十个」实体25；收益的「绝大部分」26；据称属于欺诈工具的「各类」实体27——但在具体细节上却语焉不详。王女士只能去猜测政府认为哪些实体和企业属于「欺诈性和虚假」的企业及投资机会，哪些不是，以及具体如何构成。\n\n王女士同样只能去猜测政府指控从 GTV 私募中挪用了哪些款项。事实上，起诉书第 13(d)-(f) 段充斥着限定性语言——无论是在 PPM（私募集资备忘录）本身还是在政府的指控中均是如此。例如，正如所指控的那样，PPM 仅提及「『预期的款项用途』」，并给出了「概算」数值（其中包括「其他」和「营运资金」）。28 政府主张「从 GTV 私募投资者处获得的绝大部分收益未用于发展和壮大 GTV 业务」，而是——逻辑脱节地——「存入了……以 GTV 母公司名义开立的账户」。29 因此，起诉书未能向王女士提供关于「针对其未决指控性质的充分特定性，以使被告人能够准备庭审、防止突袭，并在其因同一罪行被第二次起诉时提出一事不再理的答辩。」United States v. Bortnovsky，820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987)。\n\n25 同上。\n\n24 见同上。\n\n26 S1 起诉书第 13(f) 段。\n\n27 S1 起诉书第 8 段。\n\n28 起诉书第 13(d) 段。\n\n29 起诉书第 13(e) 段。\n\n此外，数以万页计的证据开示，加之政府从（据律师统计）从各类人员处扣押的近100台电子设备中提取并提供的数据，并不能帮助Ms. Wang（王女士）防止在审判中遭遇不公之突袭。相反，政府不能仅仅将证据开示作为“诉状细节清单中直接明确指明的充分替代品”。United States v. Davidoff, 845 F. 2d 1151, 1155 (2d Cir. 1988)，且政府“仅仅向辩护律师提供堆积如山的文件，并不能履行其义务”。Luna, 2006 WL 1668006, at *1；亦见 Aquart, 2006 WL 2684304, at *2（“[如]大量的证据开示混淆了被指控的非法行为并对被告的审判准备造成不公阻碍，则可准予诉状细节清单。”）；U.S. v. Mahaffy, 446 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院） 2006)（“或许最常见准予细节清单的情况就是证据开示极其庞大之时[。]”）；Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 571（在政府已出示“超过200,000份文件”的情况下，准予要求指明未被起诉的共谋者的诉状细节清单）。在像本案这样的案件中尤其如此，本案所指控的罪行与原本无害的行为有关——例如人们在银行账户之间转账——而非贩卖毒品或从事暴力犯罪等本质上违法的活动。\n\n第五和第六项因素——所指控行为的性质以及对政府调查的潜在危害——同样支持予以具体明确。王女士及其共谋者均未被指控任何暴力行为。此外，该调查至迟始于2020年初，距今已近四年；本案于九个月前被起诉；距离开庭审理已不足四个月。United States v. Falkowitz, 214 F. Supp. 2d 365, 391 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院） 2002)\n\n（“[当]审判日期迫近，如现在这般，政府的调查推测已接近完成。因此，没有任何迹象表明诉状细节清单会损害调查的进展。”）。\n\n此外，除上述六项因素外，本案还存在特殊的具体情况，使得对政府的指控理论和证人予以具体明确是恰当的。\n\n其一，正如起诉书本身所指控的那样，Kwok（郭文贵）拥有“数十万在线追随者”，30 这些人对于他们为何投资GTV Private Placement（GTV私募）可能有各种不同的动机、期望和信念。事实上，起诉书本身似乎也承认了这一点，（再次）通过指控“投资者参与GTV私募是部分基于相信其资金将被投资于GTV以发展和壮大该业务……”，但“绝大多数”——无论是60%、75%还是98%——王女士只能去猜测——据称并未按此进行投资，以此进行模棱两可的表述。31\n\n另一方面，鉴于王女士参与了反对Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党/CCP）的活动，除了郭文贵之外，她还有已知的强大敌人。事实上，就在本周，政府首次向律师披露了\n\n32 此外，正如政府自身在其他诉讼程序中所指控的，CCP曾试图通过对异见人士提起虚假诉讼来腐化美国司法系统。参见例如 United States v. An, No. 1:22-cr-00460-KAM, ECF No.\n\n30 S1起诉书 ¶ 2。\n\n31 S1起诉书 ¶¶ 13(e)-(f)。\n\n32 证物 7（密封提交）。\n\n9 ¶ 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2022年10月7日)（描述中国特工如何在纽约州法院提起虚假民事诉讼，企图胁迫中国情报部门的目标返回中国）。证人在指证王女士时存在别有用心的极高可能性，提供了另一个理由说明为何尽早具体明确政府的证人和指控理论对于公正审判和确保充分的审判准备至关重要。\n\n最后，针对针对王女士的证券欺诈罪名项，即罪名项三（指控其违反15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b)和78ff（“Section 10(b)”）以及《联邦法规汇编》第17篇第240.10b-5条（“Rule 10b-5”）和《美国法典》第18篇第2条。S1起诉书, ECF No. 19, ¶ 35-36），亦基于另一项特定理由有必要提供细节清单。\n\n罪名项三所指控的罪行，即《证券交易法》第10(b)条，并不具有域外适用效力。参见 Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010)（“第10(b)条仅针对与在美国证券交易所上市的证券买卖相关的，以及在美国境内买卖任何其他证券相关的操纵性或欺诈性手段或计谋的运用。”）；United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2013)（适用Morrison案判例，认定第10(b)条“在刑事案件中不具有域外适用效力”）。\n\n因此，要使被告被判定犯有证券欺诈罪，其必须“实施了与以下各项相关的欺诈行为：(1) 在美国交易所上市的证券，或 (2) 在美国境内买卖的证券。” Vilar, 729 F.3d at 67。关于第二项要件，证券“在美国境内买卖”是指“如果在美利坚合众国境内产生了不可撤销的责任或所有权发生转移。” Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012)。此外，即使某项证券交易具有某些美国因素，如果该交易“主要发生在境外”，亦不能提供管辖权。Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 216 (2d Cir. 2014)\n\n在本案中，政府并未指控GTV股份“在美国交易所上市”。因此，政府必须证明王女士参与了与“不可撤销责任产生于或所有权转移于美国境内”的证券相关的“欺诈行为”。\n\n但是罪名项三本身并未包含关于国内证券交易的指控，除了对“全国性证券交易所”的样板化、明显不适用的提及之外。33 其“即（to wit）”条款仅提及“该方案通过往来于Southern District of New York（纽约南区）的电子通讯和货币转账得以推进”。S1起诉书 ¶ 36。这并未就政府指控的“不可撤销责任产生于或所有权转移于美国境内”的交易提供任何告知。Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd, 677 F.3d at 67。\n\n因此，应当要求政府具体明确王女士是如何“实施GTV私募”的 34 以及政府主张其卷入或招揽的证券“买入和卖出”35。\n\n***\n\n据此，法院应裁定政府提供上述要求的具体细节。\n\n33 S1起诉书 ¶ 36。\n\n34 S1起诉书 ¶ 36。\n\n35 同上。\n\nIV. 法院应将王女士的审判与其同案被告的审判予以分案\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第14(a)条规定，如果合并审理“显有损害被告或政府之虞，法院可裁定对罪名项分别审理、对被告的审判予以分案，或提供司法所需的任何其他救济。”\n\n动议提出人必须证明，若不准予分案，她将受到“实质性损害”。United States v. Crozzoli, 698 F. Supp. 430, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)（援引 United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1982)）。在作出裁决时，法院可考虑如下因素：“(1) 被告人数；(2) 罪名项数量；(3) 起诉书的复杂程度；(4) 预计审判时长；(5) 针对各被告所提出的证据数量或类型的差异；(6) 各被告在整体方案中参与程度的差异；(7) 各种辩护理论或审判策略之间可能存在的冲突；以及 (8) 因采纳针对同案被告的、但对特定被告不可采或排除的证据而造成的损害。” United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727, 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)。尤其是在存在多项因素的情况下，法院倾向于准予分案。United States v. Nachamie, 101 F. Supp. 2d 134, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)（适用Upton案准予分案，鉴于同时存在“证据问题”和“互相对立的辩护”问题）；一致意见 United States v. Burke, 789 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399-400 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)（准予分案，其中同案被告面临“重大”的不利溢出效应风险，且分案符合司法经济利益，因为该同案被告相对较轻的指控将涉及一次证据有限的快速审判）；United States v. Villanueva Madrid, 302 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)（准予分案以避免“特别尖锐”的不当损害危险）。\n\n在涉及多名被告的复杂、冗长案件中，法院尤其关注“证据的不成比例性”。United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 750\n\n(E.D.N.Y. 1987)；一致意见 United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2d Cir. 1965)。法院担忧陪审员“在实际操作中”无法正确地将适用于各被告的证据区分开来。United States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd., 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.1963)。\n\n此外，如果在作为同案被告共同受审时个人无法进行有效辩护，分案审理亦是恰当的。参见 United States v. Shkreli, 260 F. Supp. 3d 247, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)（准予分案，其中同案被告的辩护策略是将自己定位为“[动议提出人的][被指控的]谎言和欺骗的另一受害者”）；对比 United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282, 283-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)（准予分案，其中动议提出人传唤其同案被告作为证人对其辩护是“必不可少的”）。\n\n例如，在 United States v. Gatien 案中，No. 96-CR-430, 1997 WL 661138, at *2-4 (E.D.N.Y. 1997年10月20日)，法院准予两名同案被告分案，认定“一方面针对[动议提出人]与另一方面针对[共谋者]的证据在性质和数量上的差异，要求准予[该]分案动议。” 这包括 (1) 双方“在被指控的共谋中的参与程度”存在“性质上的差异”——共谋者是该共谋所谓的“主谋”和“指挥者”，相比之下动议提出人仅是“附带的……参与”；(2) 预计将针对共谋者提出的“证据的极端性质”，这将使陪审团“极其难以”冷静地“评估”和区分；以及 (3) 预计针对共谋者的审判耗时漫长，相比之下若予分案，针对动议提出人的审判将更为高效。同上。\n\nB. 讨论\n\n本案涉及极其庞大的证据开示——据律师统计，迄今已出示超过一百万份文件——其中绝大多数与针对王女士的指控毫无关联。这与替代起诉书本身是一致的，\n\n其中王女士的名字仅出现了37次，而郭文贵和Je的名字分别被提及175次和156次。详见 S1起诉书。\n\n适用Upton案的各项因素，法院显然应当准予将王女士的审判与郭文贵的审判予以分案。\n\n第一，在十二项罪名项中，王女士仅被指控四项，即罪名项一、二、三和十一，且全部与GTV相关。\n\n第二，起诉书的复杂性。毫无疑问，本案起诉书十分复杂。事实上，政府在控罪指控中反复使用该词：声称存在“一系列复杂的欺诈性和虚假业务及投资机会，将数十个相互关联的实体联系在一起”（参见 SI Indictment 第 1 段），且 Kwok（郭文贵）和 Je（余建明）涉嫌挪用资金，“其中包括利用了一个由实体和银行账户组成的复杂网络”。同上，第 16 段。\n\n第三和第四，起诉书表明，针对 Wang（王雁平）女士提出的直接证据与针对 Kwok 和 Je 提出的直接证据在数量和类型上将存在巨大差异。例如：\n\nKwok 和 Je 被控将涉嫌欺诈所得的逾 300 million 美元用于自己及家人的利益。同上，第 4 段。据称，Kwok 利用投资者的资金为自己和亲属购买了一栋 New Jersey（新泽西州）豪宅、豪车、一艘游艇、一架钢琴和一张昂贵的床垫等挥霍性物品。同上，第 4、14 段。Je 被控向自己及其配偶的个人银行账户转账约 10 million 美元。同上，第 4、14(4)(iv) 段。而起诉书对 Wang 并无此类谋取个人利益的指控，在据称发生共谋的整个期间，她一直居住在一处一居室公寓内。\n\n- 据称，Kwok 曾出现在大量视频中，宣传涉嫌共谋的多项计划，包括 GTV 私募视频及随后的 GTV 宣传视频，同上，第 13(a)、32(a)、(d) 段；“Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）”的宣传视频，同上，第 14(c)-(d)、32(c) 段；G-CLUBS 的多个宣传视频，同上，第 15(a)、(d)、(f)(ii)、32(f) 段；Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的多个宣传视频，同上，第 18、20、32(h) 段。相反，起诉书并未指控 Wang 曾参与上述任何项目的任何宣传视频或任何类型的面向公众的内容。\n- 在起诉书列举为推进共谋（或多个共谋）而实施的涉嫌“公开行为”的部分中，在众多涉嫌公开行为中提及 Wang 女士仅有一次，且该指控仅与 GTV 有关。同上，第 32(b) 段。\n- 据称，Je 是 GTV 私募备忘录的“撰写人”。同上，第 13(c) 段。\n- 据称，Kwok “组织并推广”了“Himalaya Farm Alliance”。同上，第 14(a) 段。据称，Kwok 和 Je 从该“联盟”挪用了约 150 million 美元的资金。同上，第 14 段。\n- 据称，Kwok 和 Je 就网络会员俱乐部 G-CLUBS 实施了欺诈，据称利用该俱乐部“作为继续进行欺诈性私募发行的机制”。同上，第 15 段。据称，Kwok 和 Je 挪用了 G-CLUBS 会员费的“很大一部分”供个人使用，包括据称支付 Kwok\n\n及其家人的个人开支、支付 Kwok 的奢侈采购费用，以及资金被输送至 Je 的个人银行账户。同上，第 16 段。\n\n据称，Kwok 和 Je 对 Himalaya Exchange 加密货币生态系统进行了营销和推广，包括据称 Kwok 在社交媒体上鼓励其粉丝参与该交易所；据称 Je 制造了该交易所货币被用于购买法拉利的假象；且两人据称歪曲了该交易所货币的实力。同上，第 18-22 段。据称，Kwok 和 Je 还通过 Himalaya Exchange “欺诈性获取”了超过 262 million 美元。同上，第 17 段。其中包括据称转账约 37 million 美元以“支付［Kwok 的］豪华游艇费用”。同上，第 23 段。\n\n起诉书未包含任何针对 Wang 女士有关上述任何事项的指控，也完全没有指控她将投资者收益用于个人利益或过着奢侈的生活。\n\n第五，Wang 女士可能与 Kwok 存在辩护冲突，这可能会妨碍她在联合审判中为自己全力辩护的能力。虽然下述签字律师的调查仍在进行中，但政府似乎已承认了这一点——在试图取消 Emil Bove 作为 Wang 女士辩护律师的资格时，政府辩称，Bove 先生参与对 Kwok 的另一项单独调查“可能会限制 Bove 辩护其当事人的能力，且超出可放弃权利的范围”，因为他无法使用其担任 AUSA（联邦助理检察官）期间获知的信息来帮助 Wang 女士。ECF No. 128 第 3 页（主张法院在审判期间将不得不“应对棘手问题”，包括围绕“交叉询问证人”的问题）。\n\n最后，鉴于（其中包括）Kwok “大量的网络曝光”，36 以及政府明显意图引入该网络曝光的证据，Mr. Kwok 的言论极有可能对 Wang 女士产生外溢性偏见。如果政府对此抗辩称 Mr. Kwok 的言论可作为为推进共谋所作的陈述或代理人自认而作为针对 Wang 女士的可采证据，则应要求政府在审判前尽早明确其意图引入哪些言论以及为何这些言论在此基础上具有可采性。\n\n因此，基于上述理由，法院应当将 Wang 女士的审判与 Kwok 的审判分案审理。\n五、Wang 女士加入同案被告 Kwok 针对起诉书中指控她的罪名项提出的驳回动议\n\n最后，Wang 女士加入被告 Kwok 的驳回动议（ECF\n\nNos. 193-195）中针对起诉书指控 Wang 女士的罪名项的部分。\n结论\n\n法院应当批准 Wang 女士的动议。\n\n日期：December 15, 2023 谨此提交，\n\n谨此提交，\n\nBAKER BOTTS LLP\n\n签署人：/s/ Brendan F. Quigley  Brendan F. Quigley 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 电话：(212) 408-2500 传真：(212) 408-2501 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com\n\nYanping Wang 的辩护律师\n\n36 S1 Indictment 第 1 段。","key_entities":["Kwok","GTV","Je","Himalaya","Yanping Wang","Himalaya Exchange","CIPA","Guo","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","GETTR","CCP","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":9,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":47,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":128,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":181,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":7874,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-12-15 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-12-15","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:10:56"}