{"id":"court_sdny_198_2","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":198,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"LETTER","filed_date":"2023-12-06","title":"EXHIBIT A ![](_page_1_Picture_1.jpeg)","summary_zh":"政府回应函（第一份动议附件） —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #198（2023年12月6日）。美国检察机关对喜马拉雅交易所客户代理人所提没收资产返还动议的答辩，主张联邦法第21编第853条(n)款为排他性救济渠道，反对基于《刑事诉讼规则》第41条(g)的返还请求，要求法院驳回动议。","summary_en":"Government's response letter (motion exhibit) — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #198 (filed December 6, 2023). Government argues that Title 21 U.S.C. Section 853(n) provides exclusive remedy for third-party forfeiture claimants, Rule 41(g) does not apply, and requests court deny motion for return of seized property from Himalaya Exchange.","body_en":"## EXHIBIT A\n\n![](_page_1_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n## **U.S. Department of Justice**\n\n*United States Attorney Southern District of New York*\n\n*The Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007*\n\nDecember 7, 2023\n\n## **VIA ECF**\n\nThe Honorable Analisa Torres United States District Judge Southern District of New York Daniel Patrick Moynihan U.S. Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312\n\n## **Re:** *United States v. Kwok, et al.***, S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nThe Government writes in response to the Motion for Return of Property, dated December 6, 2023 (Dkt. 186 (\"Motion\")). The Motion, which was filed by counsel for 3,345 purported customers (the \"Petitioners\") of the Himalaya Exchange (the \"Exchange\"), seeks the \"return of [Petitioners'] property seized by the United States\" in connection with the above-captioned case. (Motion at 1.) As alleged in the Indictment in the above-captioned case, the Exchange is an instrumentality of the charged fraud crimes, and the funds in question—which were seized by the Government in between 2022 and 2023 pursuant to judicially authorized seizure warrants—are listed in the Indictment as assets subject to forfeiture. (Superseding Indictment, Dkt. 19 at ¶¶ 12, 17-24, 55(j), (k), (m), (o), (p), (s).) For the reasons described herein, the Government respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion.\n\nThe Motion seeks the return of assets pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Courts have jurisdiction under Rule 41(g) only when (1) the movant has \"no adequate remedy at law\", and (2) \"the equities favor the exercise of jurisdiction.\" *De Almeida v. United States*, 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006). When assessing jurisdiction, the Second Circuit has advised district courts that \"[j]urisdiction under Rule 41 is to be exercised with great restraint and caution since it rests upon the court's supervisory power over the actions of federal law enforcement officials.\" *Id.* at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing *Floyd v. United States*, 860 F.2d 999, 1003 (10th Cir. 1988) and *Hunsucker v. Phinney*, 497 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1974)).\n\nHere, as a result of the Indictment's forfeiture allegations, which include the funds at issue, the Petitioners have an adequate remedy at law to resolve their claims—namely, the exclusive remedies available to claimants seeking to assert an interest in forfeitable property under Title 21, United States Code, Section 853. In particular, Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(n) provides the *exclusive* means by which a party may assert an interest in property subject to forfeiture. *DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States*, 496 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"It is . . . well settled that section 853(n) provides the exclusive means by which a third party may lay claim to forfeited assets—after the preliminary forfeiture order has been entered.\"); *see also United States*  *v. Rashid*, 373 F. App'x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2010). Consequently, there are no grounds to assert equitable jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 41(g). *See De Almeida*, 459 F.3d at 382.\n\nIt may well be that some, or all, of the Petitioners are entitled to the Government's seized funds at an appropriate time. But this is not that time. Following a conviction, a district court \"must determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute\" and \"promptly enter a preliminary order of forfeiture . . . without regard to any third party's interest in the property.\" F ed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). Criminal forfeiture proceedings pursuant to Sections 981 and 982, including any related judicial proceedings, are governed principally by 21 U.S.C. § 853. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1). After a court issues a preliminary order of forfeiture, a third party may petition the court for an ancillary hearing to \"adjudicate the validity of [the third-party's] alleged interest in [the criminally forfeited] property.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n); *see also United States v. Daugerdas*, 892 F.3d 545, 552 (2d Cir. 2018).\n\nIn any event, it is not clear to the Government that the Petitioners have satisfied threshold Article III standing requirements. The Government was first contacted by Petitioners' counsel yesterday. During a phone call, the Government requested that Petitioners' counsel provide information sufficient to demonstrate that the 3,345 Petitioners were all, in fact, customers of the Exchange. Counsel declined to provide any such information, claiming that doing so could, in sum and substance, jeopardize Petitioners' safety from the \"Chinese Communist Party.\" The Government further inquired how Petitioners' counsel himself had verified that all 3,345 of his clients were customers of the Exchange. Counsel responded that each Petitioner had provided him with a \"seven-digit unique identifier,\" which he then used to confirm the Petitioners' status as customers directly with counsel for the Exchange. However, Petitioners' counsel declined to share any of the information about the Petitioners with the Government, or to explain how he was able to verify their status as Exchange customers using such identifiers. Counsel also indicated that he has not yet obtained documentation in the Exchange's possession regarding his clients' Exchange accounts because, among other things, he did not want to be responsible for \"getting someone killed.\" When the Government offered to confer to find a way to address counsel's privacy concerns, counsel stated, in substance, that he would be filing the Motion to \"put the court on notice\" that \"there are people getting stomped on.\" Thus, the Government does not agree with Petitioners' counsel's certification that he \"conferred with counsel for the Government in an effort in good faith to resolve by agreement the issues raised by the motion without the intervention of the Court, and ha[s] been unable to reach agreement.\" (Dkt. 186 at 2.)\n\nTo be clear, and as explained above, the Government seized more than \\$600 million in proceeds of the charged crimes—including the Exchange funds in question—to preserve those funds for later disbursement and restitution to victims. When such distribution should occur, and the mechanism for doing so, will be determined after the completion of the pending criminal proceedings and as the law directs.\n\nCongress has determined that the forfeiture process is the exclusive means for persons claiming an interest in forfeitable property to assert those interests. To allow some third parties to subvert that process and \"jump the line\" may prejudice other third parties seeking to claim an interest in the property. Ancillary forfeiture proceedings are specifically designed to ensure an orderly and efficient process for resolving competing claims to forfeitable assets. Accordingly, the Government requests that the Court deny Petitioners' Motion.\n\nThe Government is available to address any questions the Court may have.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nB\n\nRyan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Micah F. Fergenson Justin Horton Assistant United States Attorneys (212) 637-6612 / 2314 / 2190 / 2276","body_zh":"附件 A\n\n美国司法部（U.S. Department of Justice）\n\n纽约南区联邦检察官（United States Attorney Southern District of New York）\n\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007\n\n2023年12月7日\n\n通过 ECF（VIA ECF）\n\n尊敬的 Analisa Torres（阿纳丽莎·托雷斯） 联邦地区法官 纽约南区（Southern District of New York） Daniel Patrick Moynihan 联邦法院 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312\n\n事由：United States v. Kwok, et al.（美国 诉 郭文贵等案），S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n政府特此致信，对日期为2023年12月6日的《返还财产动议》（Dkt. 186（“《动议》”））作出回应。该《动议》由 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）（“交易所”）据称的3,345名客户（“请愿人”）的代理律师提交，请求“返还美国在与上述案由案件相关的行动中扣押的[请愿人的]财产”。（《动议》第1页。）正如上述案由案件起诉书所指控的那样，交易所系所指控欺诈犯罪的工具，而涉案资金——系政府于2022年至2023年期间依据司法授权的扣押令予以扣押——已在起诉书中被列为应予没收的资产。（替代起诉书，Dkt. 19 第12、17-24、55(j)、(k)、(m)、(o)、(p)、(s)段。）基于本文所述理由，政府谨请法院驳回该《动议》。\n\n该《动议》依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第41(g)条请求返还资产。法院依据第41(g)条享有管辖权仅限于以下情形：(1) 动议人“没有充分的普通法救济途径”，且 (2) “衡平原则支持行使管辖权”。De Almeida v. United States, 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006)。在评估管辖权时，第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）曾告诫地区法院：“依据第41条行使管辖权应保持极大克制与谨慎，因为该管辖权建立在法院对联邦执法官员行为的监督权力之上。”同上引，第382页（内部引文省略）（援引 Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1003 (10th Cir. 1988) 以及 Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1974)）。\n\n在本案中，基于起诉书中包含涉案资金的没收指控，请愿人拥有充分的普通法救济途径以解决其主张——即寻求对根据《美国法典》第21篇第853条应予没收的财产主张权益的索赔人所享有的专属救济。具体而言，《美国法典》第21篇第853(n)条提供了一方当事人可对可没收财产主张权益的专属途径。DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States, 496 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2007)（“……第853(n)条提供了第三人在初步没收令作出后对已没收资产主张权利的专属途径，此点确立无疑”）；亦参见 United States v. Rashid, 373 F. App'x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2010)。因此，不存在依据第41(g)条主张衡平管辖权的理由。参见 De Almeida, 459 F.3d at 382。\n\n部分或全部请愿人完全有可能在适当时机有权获得政府扣押的资金。但现在并非该时机。在定罪后，地区法院“必须根据适用法规确定哪些财产应予没收”，并“在不考虑任何第三方对该财产权益的情况下，及时作出初步没收令……”。《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)条。依据第981条和第982条开展的刑事没收程序（包括任何相关司法程序）主要受《美国法典》第21篇第853条管辖。参见《美国法典》第18篇第982(b)(1)条。在法院作出初步没收令后，第三方可向法院请求举行附随听证会，以“裁决[第三方]对[被刑事没收的]财产所声称享有的权益的有效性”。《美国法典》第21篇第853(n)条；亦参见 United States v. Daugerdas, 892 F.3d 545, 552 (2d Cir. 2018)。\n\n无论如何，在政府看来，请愿人是否已满足《宪法》第三条（Article III）门槛性的诉讼资格要求尚不明确。政府昨日首次收到请愿人律师的联络。在一次电话交谈中，政府要求请愿人律师提供充分信息，以证明这3,345名请愿人确实全都是交易所的客户。该律师拒绝提供任何此类信息，声称这样做在实质上可能会危及请愿人免受“中国共产党”侵害的安全。政府进一步询问请愿人律师本人是如何核实其3,345名委托人全都是交易所客户的。该律师回答称，每位请愿人都向其提供了一个“七位数的唯一识别码”，然后他使用该识别码直接与交易所的代理律师确认了请愿人的客户身份。然而，请愿人律师拒绝与政府分享有关请愿人的任何信息，亦拒绝解释他是如何利用此类识别码来核实其作为交易所客户身份的。该律师还表示，他尚未获得交易所持有的关于其委托人在交易所账户的文件，原因包括他不希望为“导致某人丧命”承担责任。当政府提议进行协商以寻找解决该律师隐私顾虑的办法时，该律师在实质上表示，他将提交《动议》以“提请法院注意”“有人正在遭到践踏”。因此，政府不同意请愿人律师关于其“已本着诚信原则与政府律师协商，以期在无需法院介入的情况下通过协议解决动议所提出的问题，但未能达成协议”的证明陈述。（Dkt. 186 第2页。）\n\n需要明确的是，如上所述，政府扣押了所指控犯罪的逾6亿美元收益——包括涉案的交易所资金——以保全这些资金用于日后向受害者发放和支付赔偿。该等分配应于何时进行以及分配机制如何，将在未结刑事诉讼程序结束之后依法予以确定。\n\n国会已明确没收程序是对可没收财产主张权益之人主张该等权益的专属途径。允许某些第三方破坏该程序并“插队”，可能会损害其他寻求对该财产主张权益的第三方的利益。附随没收程序经过专门设计，旨在确保有一个有序且高效的程序来解决对可没收资产相互冲突的主张。因此，政府请求法院驳回请愿人的《动议》。\n\n政府随时听候法院解答可能存有的任何疑问。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS 联邦检察官\n\n由\n\nRyan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Micah F. Fergenson Justin Horton 助理联邦检察官 (212) 637-6612 / 2314 / 2190 / 2276","key_entities":["forfeiture","Je","853(n)","Rule 41(g)","Torres","Kwok","Analisa Torres","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Chinese Communist Party","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":186,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":1117,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-12-06 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-12-06","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:24:50"}