{"id":"court_sdny_2074_2","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":2074,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2023-08-09","title":"SDNY ECF 2074","summary_zh":"破产上诉动议 —— 美国联邦破产法院（康涅狄格州）关于 Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Guo Wengui / Miles Guo) 第11章破产案，Case No. 22-50073，ECF #2074（2023年8月9日）。破产人申请上诉法院2023年7月26日的民事藐视法庭裁定，该裁定认定破产人因未能响应破产受托人的文件传票而违反法庭秩序，并驳回了其关于暂停执行的救济申请。","summary_en":"Motion for leave to appeal — United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, In re Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Guo Wengui, Miles Guo), Chapter 11, Case No. 22-50073, ECF #2074 (August 9, 2023). Debtor seeks to appeal the bankruptcy court's July 26, 2023 order holding him in civil contempt for failure to comply with document production subpoena issued by chapter 11 trustee and denying stay relief pending criminal proceedings.","body_en":"# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 1 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 1 of 63\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*<sup>1</sup>\n\n:\n\n: Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n Debtors. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n## **DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE APPEAL OF ORDER HOLDING DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, the debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\")<sup>2</sup> , by and through his undersigned counsel, respectfully moves for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's July 26, 2023 Memorandum of Decision and Order Holding Individual Debtor in Contempt of Court and Denying Motion for Stay of Order Compelling Production (Doc. No. 2035, the \"Contempt Order\"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Contempt Order holds the Individual Debtor in contempt for failing to produce documents in response to a Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 subpoena issued to the Debtor by the chapter 11 trustee, Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\"), and rejects the Debtor's invocation of his of Fifth Amendment rights against selfincrimination in response to the subpoena by finding that the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applies as a result of the Debtor's obligations to cooperate with the\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Debtor refers solely to the individual debtor Ho Wan Kwok.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 2 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 2 of 63\n\nTrustee pursuant to 11 USC §§ 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4). In support of his Motion for Leave to Appeal the Debtor respectfully states as follows.<sup>3</sup>\n\n## **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Debtor invoked his Fifth Amendment right protecting against selfincrimination, including under the Act of Production Doctrine, in response to numerous and exceedingly broad requests for the production of document included in a subpoena served upon him by the Trustee pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004. The Bankruptcy Court correctly held that the Act of Production Doctrine applies in this case because the Debtor's production of the documents demanded by the Trustee would be \"testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution.\" (Contempt Order, at 20). Notwithstanding its holding that the Act of Production Doctrine applies, the Bankruptcy Court held that the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine also applies, given the Debtor's obligation to cooperate with a trustee where, as here, one has been appointed. The Bankruptcy Court's ruling, if applied uniformly, would effectively eliminate any natural person debtor's ability to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights when a trustee has been appointed, and would mandate the production of materials in any case where a natural person is both a debtor and the subject of a criminal proceeding.\n\n<sup>3</sup> This appeal arises from the Debtor's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in response to document requests included in a subpoena, and the Bankruptcy Court holding the Debtor in contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena. Where, as here, a person to whom a subpoena is issued, including a party, fails to comply with the subpoena and is then held in contempt for that non-compliance the contempt order is a final order for purposes of appeal. *Del Carman Montan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (In re Aircrash at Belle Harbor)*, 490 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"To obtain appellate review, the subpoenaed person ordinarily 'must defy the district court's enforcement order, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order, which is regarded as final under § 1291.'\") (citations omitted). Because of the importance of the matter at issue to the Debtor, the Debtor files this Motion for Leave to Appeal to preserve his rights to seek interlocutory review in the event that the district court determines that the Contempt Order is not a final order.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 3 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 3 of 63\n\n2. Contrary to the Bankruptcy Court's ruling, the Required Records exception is a narrow limitation to the Act of Production Doctrine, applying to limited categories of documents which are required to be maintained by statute or regulation. The Bankruptcy Court's expansion of the Required Records exception effectively makes every record of a debtor's business dealings, assets and liabilities a required record under 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)—regardless of whether the record falls into a category of records that are required to be maintained by some other statute or regulation.\n\n3. There is no authority for such a substantial expansion of an exception to a Constitutional right, and the Debtor, who is awaiting an April 2024 trial on numerous criminal charges, is now faced with the choice of either (a) producing the sought-after documents over his valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights to purge his contempt, or (b) facing whatever sanctions the Bankruptcy Court decides are appropriate for the Debtor's continued assertion of those same rights. Under these circumstances, and because the Debtor meets the standard for an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's ruling, leave to appeal the question of whether sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code render the Act of Production Doctrine a nullity in bankruptcy cases in which a trustee is appointed based on the Required Records exception should be granted.\n\n#### **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**\n\n4. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby commencing the above-captioned bankruptcy case. The Trustee was appointed on July 7, 2022, (Doc. No. 514), and his appointment was approved by order dated July 8, 2022 (Doc. No. 523).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 4 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 4 of 63\n\n5. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his i) Motion for 2004 Examination of the Debtor (Doc. No. 636, the \"Debtor 2004 Motion\"), ii) Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (Doc. No. 637), and iii) Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Entities and Individuals Affiliated with the Debtor (Doc. No. 638) (collectively the \"July Rule 2004 Exam Motions\"). In the Debtor 2004 Motion the Trustee alleged, among other things, that \"[r]eports suggest that the Debtor … has a financial interest in myriad for-profit and not-for-profit entities,\" that the \"Debtor has an extensive network of shell companies he uses to pursue business interests and store his wealth,\" and that the \"Debtor … reportedly owns or controls 'more than 60 commercial, nonprofit and online groups' collectively referred to as the whistleblower movement.\" (Debtor 2004 Motion, ¶¶ 12, 13, 28).\n\n6. In the Debtor 2004 Motion, the Trustee made specific reference to, among other entities and individuals, GTV, GClubs, GMusic, the Rule of Law Society, the Rule of Law Foundation, Saraca Media Group, Inc., and the Debtor's family members.\n\n7. On August 5, 2022, the Debtor filed the Debtor's Limited Objection to Rule 2004 Motions (Doc. No. 703) to preserve certain rights, including the right to assert objections to the requests for the production of documents that would be served with the subpoena attached to the July Rule 2004 Exam Motions after the subpoena was actually served. By orders dated August 16, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court granted the July Rule 2004 Exam Motions.\n\n8. The Debtor was served with a Rule 2004 subpoena (the \"Rule 2004 Subpoena\") on August 19, 2022. The Rule 2004 Subpoena contained thirty requests for the production of\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 5 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 5 of 63\n\ndocuments, of which twenty include demands for documents relating to \"Associated Individuals\" and/or \"Associated Entities.\"\n\n9. An Associated Individual is defined in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, in relevant part, as \"individually and collectively, all individuals that (1) hold, control, have custody over, or discretion over assets owned, controlled, or enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family; or (2) have been employees, directors, or otherwise affiliated with one or more Associated Entities, together with the respective employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on behalf of any of the foregoing.\" The definition of Associated Individuals includes twenty-seven individuals, including Yanping Wang (\"Ms. Wang\") and Je Kin Ming (\"Mr. Je\") (who, as described below, would become the Debtor's co-defendants in the criminal prosecution, *see infra* ¶ 18).\n\n10. An Associated Entity is defined in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, in relevant part, as \"individually and collectively, all organizations or Entities of any type that (1) have been owned, controlled, or invested in by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family; or (2) have an interest, whether directly or indirectly, in any assets owned, controlled, or enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family, together with the respective employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on behalf of any of the foregoing.\" The definition of Associated Entity includes seventy-seven entities, including: GTV Media Group, Inc., G|Club Operations, LLC, G|MUSIC, Himalaya Exchange, Saraca Media Group, Inc., Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc., Rule of Law Foundation IV, Inc., Rule of Law Fund, Rule of Law Society, and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.\n\n11. The Debtor served timely objections to the Rule 2004 Subpoena document requests, asserting objections to certain of the enumerated Instructions and Definitions included with the requests for production, as well as objections to certain of the requests for production. The Debtor objected to the production of certain categories of documents, primarily documents related to the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 6 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 6 of 63\n\nassets of his \"family,\" which the Trustee defined to include \"the Debtor, the Debtor's Son, the Debtor's Daughter, and the Debtor's Purported Wife, and any other familial relation to the Debtor.\" The Debtor agreed to produce, and through his professionals and former professionals did produce, certain documents requested by the Trustee in the requests for production.\n\n12. On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling Individual Debtor, [and Others] to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 1046, the \"Motion to Compel\"). On November 14, 2022 the Debtor filed his Joint Objection of the [Individual] Debtor, Mei Guo, and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC to Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 1090). The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Motion to Compel on November 30, 2022, and on January 20, 2023 entered an order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 1353, the \"January 20 Order\"). The January 20 Order granted the Trustee's Motion to Compel as to the Debtor in full save for: i) setting a production date of June 1 2014 forward rather 2012 forward as advocated for by the Trustee and ii) the production of the Debtor's passport. (*Id.*, at 4).\n\n13. The January 20 Order required the Debtor to produce documents to the Trustee on or before January 31, 2023, and to file a sworn declaration on or before February 7, 2023, describing the document collection, search and review actions taken by him and his counsel in response to the Rule 2004 Subpoena. (January 20 Order, at 4). On February 1, 2023, the Debtor's counsel sent an email to the Trustee's counsel advising them that:\n\n> With respect to the Court's order on the Trustee's Motion to Compel, dated January 20, 2023, Doc. No. 1353, Mr. Kwok is asserting his rights under the 5th Amendment, including any rights under the Act of Production Doctrine.\n\n14. Thereafter, On February 7, 2023, the Debtor filed a sworn declaration stating:\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 7 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 7 of 63\n\nI am the Debtor in the above-captioned Chapter 11 case and am in receipt of the Court's order on the Trustee' s Motion to Compel, dated January 20, 2023, Doc. No . 1353. I hereby invoke my rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine, with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein.\n\n(February 7, 2023, Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok Concerning Invocation of Fifth Amendment Privilege in Regard to Rule 2004 Discovery (Exhibit A to Doc. No. 1444)).\n\n15. On February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed his Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Order to Show Cause Why Debtor … Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Failure to Comply with Order Compelling Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas and Sanctioned for Such Conduct (Doc. No. 1453, the \"Order to Show Cause\").\n\n16. On February 13, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order, (Doc. No. 1455), stating, among other things unrelated to the Debtor, that the court would set a briefing schedule on the Debtor's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege at the conclusion of a mediation that the Court had ordered and was then on-going. (*Id.*, at 2).\n\n17. On March 7, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the Debtor to respond to the Order to Show Cause by March 28, 2023. The Debtor's time to respond to the Order to Show Cause was subsequently extended to April 10, 2023, because on March 15, 2023, a twelve-count indictment was unsealed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging the Debtor, Mr. Je and *others known and unknown* with various federal crimes. (*United States v. Ho Wan Kwok et al.*, Southern District of New York Case Number S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT), Doc. No. 2). The Debtor was arrested by federal law enforcement authorities on March 15, 2023, and remains in federal custody. The government has stated that through the execution of search warrants it recovered cellphones, computers or laptops, and external media storage devices from premises that it asserts belong to or are controlled by the Debtor. (*Id*., Doc. No. 26).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 8 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 8 of 63\n\n18. On March 29, 2023, the government filed a Superseding Indictment. The Superseding Indictment names Ms. Wang as a co-defendant. The government alleges that the Debtor, Mr. Je, Ms. Wang and *others known and unknown* \"conspired to defraud thousands of victims of more than approximately \\$1 billion.\" (*Id*., Doc. No. 19, ¶ 1). The government further alleges that the Debtor, Mr. Je, Ms. Wang and \"their co-conspirators operated through a series of complex fraudulent and fictious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities, which allowed the defendants and their co-conspirators to solicit, launder, and misappropriate victim funds.\" (*Id)*. The government further alleges that the Debtor and Mr. Je \"transferred, and directed the transfer of, money into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the name of at least 80 different entities or individuals.\" (*Id.* ¶ 3). The government names some of such entities or individuals, including GTV, GClubs, GMusic, the Rule of Law Society, the Rule of Law Foundation, Saraca Media Group, Inc., and the Debtor's family members (Associated Entities and Associated Individuals listed in the Rule 2004 Subpoena), but the great majority of such \"dozens of interrelated entities\", \"80 different entities or individuals\" and \"approximately 500 accounts\" are not named or identified in the Superseding Indictment.\n\n19. Throughout the Superseding Indictment, the government alleges that the Debtor controlled various entities and individuals, some named and many not named. For example, the government alleges that the Debtor \"functionally owned and controlled\" GTV Media Group, Inc., \"although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title\" in that entity. (*Id*., ¶ 10). Furthermore, the government alleges that G|Clubs \"was functionally owned and controlled by [the Debtor] although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title\" at G|Clubs. (*Id.,* at ¶ 11). The government also alleges that \"[e]ntities functionally owned and controlled by [the Debtor], such as G|Clubs and G|Fashion, had purported business relationships with the Himalaya Exchange . . .\" and that the Debtor\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 9 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 9 of 63\n\n\"claimed to be the designer of its purported cryptocurrency, although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title at the Himalaya Exchange.\" (*Id.,* at ¶12). While in the Superseding Indictment the government refers to certain individuals and entities by name, the government refers repeatedly to \"others known and unknown\" that conspired with the Debtor in the alleged fraud, (*id*., ¶¶ 1, 13, 15-17, 22, 26-32), and unnamed co-conspirators. (*Id*., ¶¶ 1-3, 5, 13h and 14).\n\n20. On April 10, 2023, the Debtor filed his Objection to the Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should not be Held in Contempt (Doc. No. 1650, the \"Debtor's Contempt Objection\"), along with a motion seeking a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoena (Doc. No.1649, the \"Motion for Stay\").\n\n21. In the Debtor's Contempt Objection, the Debtor argued that he could not be held in contempt because he had complied with the January 20 Order by properly invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, including under the Act of Production Doctrine.\n\n22. The Trustee filed his Response to Debtor's Objection to Trustee's Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Held In Contempt on April 17, 2023, (Doc. No. 1670), and filed an objection to the Debtor's Motion for Stay on April 19, 2023. In the Trustee's April 17 Response he argued, among other things, that the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applied in bankruptcy cases, and as a result the Debtor could not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to the January 20 Order and was therefore in contempt.\n\n23. The Bankruptcy Court conducted several hearings on the Order to Show Cause and the Motion for Stay over a period of several months. During that time counsel for the Trustee and the Debtor's then Special Criminal Counsel resolved the Trustee's contention that the Debtor was required to specifically invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege on a question-by-question basis by\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 10 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 10 of 63\n\nthe Debtor invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege to 202 specific written questions posed to the Debtor by the Trustee, but issues remained for the Bankruptcy Court's decision.\n\n24. On July 26, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Contempt Order, holding that the Act of Production Doctrine applied, and then further holding that a sweeping exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applies in bankruptcy cases under the Required Records exception and as a result the Debtor is in contempt. The Contempt Order further held that the Debtor may purge himself of contempt by complying with the January 20 Order and engaging in the very act of production the Bankruptcy Court concluded would be \"testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution.\" (Contempt Order, at 20).\n\n## **III. THE DEBTOR RESPECTFULLY MOVES FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S CONTEMPT ORDER**\n\n## **a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED**\n\n## 25. The Debtor's appeal will raise the following question:<sup>4</sup>\n\nWhether the Bankruptcy Court erred in holding the Debtor in contempt because the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applies here.\n\n## **b. RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n26. The Debtor respectfully requests that the district court find that the Required Records exception does not vitiate the Act of Production Doctrine for debtor's in bankruptcy cases in which a trustee is appointed and therefore the Debtor properly invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to the January 20 Order and is not in contempt of that order.\n\n4 The Debtor reserves the right to alter, amend, add to, or otherwise change this question when he submits a statement of the issues presented in accordance with the applicable rules.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 11 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 11 of 63\n\n#### **c. REASONS FOR GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL**\n\n27. A party may seek an interlocutory appeal of orders and decrees of the bankruptcy court \"with leave of the [district] court\" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). \"The decision as to whether to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order of a bankruptcy court is committed to the discretion of the district court.\" *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). In exercising that discretion, district courts apply the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and look to whether \"the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.\" *Id.*, at 558. *See also Traversa v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.*, 386 B.R. 386, 388 (D. Conn. 2008) (\"In determining whether to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order from the bankruptcy court, the Court will apply the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).\"). In addition, \"appellants bear the burden of showing that exceptional circumstances exist that warrant an interlocutory appeal … .\" *Osuji*, at 557, (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n#### **i.** *The Order Involves A Controlling Question of Law*\n\n28. An order involves a controlling question of law where \"reversal of the bankruptcy court's order would (1) terminate the action or (2) materially affect the outcome of the litigation.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558. *See also*, *United States ex rel Minge v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.*), 13 Misc. 373 (PKC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, \\*13 (SDNY, Dec. 18, 2013) (\"A controlling question of law exists if: (1) reversal of the district court's opinion could result in dismissal of the action, (2) reversal of the district court's opinion, even though not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the conduct of the action, or (3) the certified issue has precedential value for a large number of cases.\") (citations omitted). \"In addition, the question of law must refer to a 'pure' question of law that the reviewing court could decide quickly and\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 12 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 12 of 63\n\ncleanly without having to study the record.\" *2178 Atl. Realty LLC v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.*, No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) (citation omitted).\n\n29. The question of law at the core of the Contempt Order, and this appeal, is undeniably \"pure\" and this Court can decide it \"quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.\" *2178 Atl. Realty LLC*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11. Indeed, the core legal issue here is whether the duty to cooperate with a bankruptcy trustee under 11 USC § 521(a)(3) and surrender to the trustee all property of the estate under 11 USC § 521(a)(4) is sufficient to overcome an individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under the Required Records exception, regardless of whether there is any statutory or regulatory obligation that compels the preservation of the sought-after records.\n\n30. \"[I]t is now settled that an individual may claim an act of production privilege [under the Fifth Amendment] to decline to produce documents, the contents of which are not privileged, where the act of production is, itself, (1) compelled, (2) testimonial, and (3) incriminating.\" *In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999*, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999). \"The required records exception . . . abrogates the protection of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege for a subset of those documents that must be maintained by law.\" *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)*, 741 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2013). As the Second Circuit has held:\n\n> The rationale behind the [Required Records] exception is twofold. First, if a person conducts an activity in which record-keeping is required by statute or rule, he may be deemed to have waived his privilege with respect to the act of production -- at least in cases in which there is a nexus between the government's production request and the purpose of the record-keeping requirement. Second, because the records must be kept by law, the record-holder \"admits\" little in the way of control or authentication by producing them.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 13 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 13 of 63\n\n*In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum*, 793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986). Thus, for example, the Required Records exception has been held to apply to records that must be maintained under FINCEN regulations, *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)*, 741 F.3d at, 348, New York state tax laws related to the purchase of alcohol for commercial purposes, *United States v. Doe (In re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury)*, 252 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176-177 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), and an attorney's contingency retention agreements and case closing statements. *In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum*, 793 F.2d 69, at 73.\n\n31. The FINCEN regulation at issue in *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)* is emblematic of the type of regulation that requires the retention of records and could lead to a finding that the Required Records exception is applicable to the production of those documents, as made clear by the applicable provisions of the United States Code:\n\n> Records of accounts required by § 1010.350 to be reported to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall be retained by each person having a financial interest in or signature or other authority over any such account. Such records shall contain the name in which each such account is maintained, the number or other designation of such account, the name and address of the foreign bank or other person with whom such account is maintained, the type of such account, and the maximum value of each such account during the reporting period. Such records shall be retained for a period of 5 years and shall be kept at all times available for inspection as authorized by law. In the computation of the period of 5 years, there shall be disregarded any period beginning with a date on which the taxpayer is indicted or information instituted on account of the filing of a false or fraudulent Federal income tax return or failing to file a Federal income tax return, and ending with the date on which final disposition is made of the criminal proceeding.\n\n31 CR 1010.420. The Bankruptcy Court did not focus its Contempt Order on discrete categories of documents that *an individual* is required to retain by statute or regulation, and therefore fall within the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine, such as those records at\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 14 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 14 of 63\n\nissue in *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)* or other Second Circuit cases that have applied the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine. Instead, the Bankruptcy Court held that *every* record related to the Debtor's financial affairs, assets, and liabilities is a required record under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code regardless of whether there is any other statutory or regulatory obligation to create or retain the record and despite the fact that neither of those sections of the Bankruptcy Code include any requirement to retain records.<sup>5</sup> In short, the Bankruptcy Court created an exception to the Act of Production Doctrine that swallows the rule and in the process committed reversible error.\n\n32. The question of law the Debtor seeks to appeal, *i.e.,* whether sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code render the Act of Production Doctrine a nullity in bankruptcy cases in which a trustee is appointed, is straight forward and the district court will not need to review the record to adjudicate this purely legal question.\n\n33. Adjudication of this narrow legal question at this point will not terminate the Debtor's bankruptcy case, but it could resolve the Debtor's obligations vis-à-vis the January 20 Order and provide greater clarity to the Debtor of the scope of his Fifth Amendment rights going forward in the Bankruptcy case. Specifically, under the existing Contempt Order, the Debtor is mandated to make a submission in his criminal proceeding—resolution of this issue would resolve that obligation.\n\n34. Lastly, because the legal issue is one of first impression, it could have precedential value for a large number of cases (and given the ongoing bankruptcy proceeding and related\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Debtor does not suggest that a debtor in bankruptcy is free to destroy records, but there is a fundamental difference between the obligation to avoid spoliation of records as part of a judicial proceeding and an affirmative statutory or regulatory obligation to retain records.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 15 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 15 of 63\n\nadversary proceedings, clarity even in this case). Therefore, the Contempt Order involves a controlling question of law and the first factor has been met.\n\n## *ii. There is A Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion*\n\n35. There is a substantial ground for difference of opinion \"where (1) there is conflicting authority on the issue, or (2) the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\n36. Research revealed no cases in the Second Circuit applying the Required Records exception through sections 521(a)(3) and/or (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Likewise, research revealed no Second Circuit cases applying the Required Records exception with the breadth applied by the Bankruptcy Court in this case. Thus, this appears to be a case of first impression in the Second Circuit.\n\n37. Thus, the second factor has been met. *See*, *Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.*), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, \\*15 (granting leave to file interlocutory appeal where the issues presented were of first impression and \"difficult, calling for complex statutory interpretation and addressing the intersections between different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Bankruptcy Code and the FCA, respectively\").\n\n## *iii. An Immediate Appeal Materially Advances the Efficiencies within the Bankruptcy Case*\n\n38. This prong, \"assessing whether an appeal would materially advance termination of the litigation, is satisfied where the appeal promises to advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n39. As noted above, the Contempt Order provides that the reasonable steps to be taken by the Debtor to purge himself of contempt include \"filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 16 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 16 of 63\n\nto allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the [ ] Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose.\" (Contempt Order, at 36). If the district court finds that the Contempt Order should not have been issued, the Debtor would not be required to file anything in his pending criminal case in the Southern District of New York seeking an order permitting him to produce documents provided to him by the government to the Trustee. Moreover, the Trustee is certain to be brought into any such motion practice, whether formally or informally, and will be forced to expand estate resources in a proceeding that if the Bankruptcy Court erred should never even occur.\n\n40. Likewise, an immediate appeal will provide the Debtor and the Trustee with greater certainty vis-à-vis their rights and obligations under the Contempt Order, and allow the Trustee to more expeditiously pursue discovery through other avenues if the Contempt Order is reversed and the Required Records exception is found inapplicable thereby advancing the bankruptcy case and brining it closer to completion.\n\n41. Thus, the third factor has also been met.\n\n#### *iv. Exceptional Circumstances Exist That Warrant An Interlocutory Appeal*\n\n40. This is an extraordinary situation. The Debtor is an individual, who has been charged with numerous crimes and faces that prospect of potential incarceration. Like any individual confronted with those consequences, he is guaranteed a constitutional right against selfincrimination. Now, however, the Debtor is forced to choose between refusing to comply with the January 20 Order and facing whatever contempt sanctions the Bankruptcy Court decides are appropriate, or seeking to produce documents even though the Bankruptcy Court has concluded that \"production in compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 17 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 17 of 63\n\ndocuments that have not been seized by the prosecution,\" (Contempt Order at 20), and even though the Contempt Order could ultimately be reversed on appeal. Of course, overturning the Contempt Order at the end of the bankruptcy case would be meaningless if the production made in the meantime resulted in production of these records over the valid invocation of the Debtor's Fifth Amendment rights.\n\n40. The Bankruptcy Court suggests that the Debtor would not be sacrificing his Fifth Amendment privilege if he moves in the criminal proceeding for an order permitting him to produce to the Trustee documents produced to him by the government that are responsive the Rule 2004 Subpoena because he would be making that motion \"under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production.\" (Contempt Order at 36). The Bankruptcy Court, however, is compelling the Debtor to engage in an act that the Bankruptcy Court itself determined was testimonial and potentially self-incriminating in a court proceeding, which is the paradigmatic example of what the Fifth Amendment was intended to prevent. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that the Debtor would not be foregoing his constitutional protection provides no guarantee that the Trustee or the government will not argue that the filing of such a motion constituted a waiver of the Debtor's Fifth Amendment Privilege. Moreover, although the Contempt Order focuses on the Debtor producing to the Trustee documents that the government produces to him in the criminal case, *(id.)*, the Contempt Order is not limited to that singular category of documents. (*Id.* (\"As the Individual Debtor's counsel has stated on the record, *reasonable steps include* filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking to allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the Individual Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose.\") (emphasis added). While it is unlikely that the Debtor would have any documents to produce in light of his\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 18 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 18 of 63\n\nongoing incarceration and the government's execution of search warrants, the Debtor's constitutional rights should not be made contingent on whether he has documents that could be produced.\n\n41. This case is fundamentally different form the cases cited *supra* where the government was moving to compel compliance with grand jury subpoenas. In those cases the government was obtaining the documents directly from the witness under a statutory or regulatory document retention requirement that triggered the Required Records exception. In this case the basis for the application of the Required Records exception is the Bankruptcy Code. Although the government cannot use the Bankruptcy Code to overcome the Debtor's Fifth Amendment rights, the Bankruptcy Court has effectively held that the Trustee can, without any additional protections. Given that the government has already served the Trustee with subpoenas, there is nothing that would stop the Government from doing so again to obtain records that would otherwise be protected by the Debtor's Fifth Amendment Privilege but have now been ordered to be produced to the Trustee by the Bankruptcy Court. As outlined above, the Debtor's constitutional rights are directly and immediately impacted by the Bankruptcy Court Order. Thus, exceptional circumstances exist warranting an immediate appeal.\n\n#### **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n42. For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court should grant the Debtor leave to appeal the Contempt Order.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 19 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 19 of 63\n\nDated: Bridgeport, Connecticut, August 9, 2023\n\n## THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK\n\nBy: */s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: ehenzy@zeislaw.com Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com His Attorneys\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 20 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 20 of 63\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 9th day of August, 2023, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n By: */s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849)\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 22 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 1 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 22 of 63\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF Nos. 1453 and 1649\n\n#### **APPEARANCES**\n\nLuc A. Despins (argued) Avram E. Luft G. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Cross-Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok*\n\nStephen R. Cook Brown Rudnick LLP 2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor Irvine, California 92612\n\nand\n\nStephen A. Best (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP 601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005\n\nand\n\nEric Henzy (argued) James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\nWilliam Baldiga (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\n*Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Movant Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor1*\n\n## **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER HOLDING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n## **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are the Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court (the \"Contempt Motion\"), (ECF No. 14532 ), filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), and the Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion,\" and together with the Contempt Motion, each a \"Cross-Motion\" and, collectively, the \"Cross-Motions\"), (ECF No. 1649), filed by the Individual Debtor. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"). (ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor cross-moves to stay the Order Compelling Production in light of the criminal action *United States v. Kwok*, Case No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.) (the \"Criminal Action\") pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"Criminal Court\"). For\n\n<sup>1</sup> The attorneys at Brown Rudnick LLP have withdrawn their appearances since these matters were argued. (ECF No. 2034.)\n\n<sup>2</sup> Various pleadings and orders discussed in this memorandum of decision were omnibus in nature. For the sake of clarity and coherence, the titles of pleadings and orders have been set forth only insofar as they concern the parties before the Court on the instant matters.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 24 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 3 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 24 of 63\n\nthe reasons stated below, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed the Motion for 2004 Examination of the [Individual] Debtor, (ECF No. 636), which motion the Court granted, (ECF No. 757), on August 16, 2022. On August 19, 2022, the Individual Debtor was served with the Rule 2004 subpoena. (*See, e.g.*, ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7.) On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order Compelling Individual Debtor to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena (the \"Motion to Compel\"). (ECF No. 1046.) On November 14, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 1090.) On November 30, 2022, a hearing was held on the Motion to Compel. The Court took the Motion to Compel under advisement. On January 20, 2023,3 the Court entered the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1353.)\n\n<sup>3</sup> Between November 16, 2022, and January 13, 2023, the Court was engaged with matters in an adversary proceeding related to these Chapter 11 cases styled *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023) (hereinafter the \"Social Media/Protest Adversary\"). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3), the Court was required to address the matters in that adversary proceeding \"at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character.\"\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 25 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 4 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 25 of 63\n\nOn February 7, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed a declaration in response to the Order Compelling Production (the \"Declaration\"). (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) In the Declaration, the Individual Debtor stated under penalty of perjury that he invoked his \"rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine[,] with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein.\" (*Id.* Ex. A.) On February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion, arguing that (i) the Individual Debtor needed to show cause why his invocation of the Fifth Amendment was proper and why he should not be held in contempt of court; (ii) even if the Individual Debtor's invocation was proper, he needed to assert it in response to each request for documents and information; and (iii) the Declaration did not comply with the Order Compelling Production because it did not detail the efforts undergone to search for documents and information responsive to the subpoenas. (ECF No. 1453.) On March 7, 2023, a hearing was held on the Contempt Motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court set a briefing schedule on the issues raised by the Contempt Motion.\n\nOn March 15, 2023, at the start of an evidentiary hearing in a related adversary proceeding, the Individual Debtor's counsel informed the Court that an indictment against the Individual Debtor had been unsealed in the Criminal Action and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the \"FBI\") had arrested the Individual Debtor earlier that morning. On March 22, 2023, the Court granted the Individual Debtor's motion for an extension of time to respond to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1585.)\n\nOn April 10, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1650.) The Individual Debtor's objection argues that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production because he has properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 26 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 5 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 26 of 63\n\nincrimination. (*Id.*) Contemporaneously, the Individual Debtor, through his counsel in the Criminal Action appearing in these Chapter 11 cases as his special (criminal) counsel, filed the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1649.) The Stay Motion argues that to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, this Court must stay the Order Compelling Production pending resolution of the Criminal Action. (*Id.*) On April 14, 2023, the Trustee filed a reply to the objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1670.) On April 19, 2023, the Trustee filed an objection to the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1680.)\n\nOn April 20, 2023, a hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. At the conclusion of argument, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor seemingly reached a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. However, on April 24, 2023, the parties filed competing proposed orders. (ECF Nos. 1698, 1699.) On April 27, 2023, a Status Conference on the Cross-Motions was held to discuss the competing orders. The parties agreed to proceed consensually where they could agree, but expressed disagreement as to the terms of the previous agreement. On May 1, 2023, the Court entered a consent order requiring the Individual Debtor to make individual invocations of his Fifth Amendment right to each of two-hundred two (202) questions posed by the Trustee. (ECF No. 1740.) Also on that date, the Individual Debtor filed a supplemental pleading in support of his interpretation of the April 20th agreement. (ECF No. 1737.)\n\nOn May 2, 2023, a second hearing was held on the Cross-Motions resulting in an impasse as to the terms of the April 20th agreement. The Trustee argued that the parties had agreed the Individual Debtor would file a motion in the Criminal Action seeking permission to share the prosecution's production to him with the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor argued that the parties had agreed that the Individual Debtor would seek,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 27 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 6 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 27 of 63\n\npotentially by motion, to have the prosecution agree to produce documents simultaneously to the Individual Debtor and the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. Citing the impasse, the Court concluded it had to rule on the Cross-Motions. However, the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy counsel asked the Court to wait before ruling on the Cross-Motions to allow the Individual Debtor time to appreciate the nature of the prosecution's production to him in the Criminal Action.\n\nGiven the serious nature of the issues involved, the Court waited. On June 13, 2023, a final hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. The Court inquired whether the parties had made any progress toward a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. The parties reported that the Individual Debtor had prepared a supplemental declaration (the \"Supplemental Declaration\"), wherein he invoked the Fifth Amendment on an individuated basis to each of the Trustee's questions. (*See Despins ex rel. Kwok v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1.) Beyond the Supplemental Declaration, however, the parties reported that the impasse remained and asked the Court to rule on the Cross-Motions. The Court took the Cross-Motions under advisement.\n\nThe Cross-Motions are ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). The Court concludes its exercise of\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 28 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 7 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 28 of 63\n\njurisdiction is not precluded by Constitutional concerns. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011). Moreover, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor have impliedly consented to this Court entering a final order on the Cross-Motions by filing dispositive motions without contesting this Court's authority to enter a final order. *See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015) (holding that parties may consent to entry of a final order by bankruptcy courts notwithstanding the holding in *Stern*); *True Traditions, LC v. Wu*, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that implied consent is given by filing a dispositive motion).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION4**\n\nThe Cross-Motions present serious issues. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in contempt for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. The Individual Debtor argues that the invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is compliance and must be protected by a stay of the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination does not apply under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. Therefore, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n#### **A. Is the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court?**\n\nThe Court first considers whether the Individual Debtor is in contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. This Court has the power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex*\n\n<sup>4</sup> The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which is made applicable to contested matters by Rule 9014(c).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 29 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 8 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 29 of 63\n\n*rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provide further authority to hold parties in contempt of an order compelling production of discovery materials.\n\nContempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires that \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995). The contemnor must also (4) have notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512.\n\n#### **1. Is the Order Compelling Compliance clear and unambiguous?**\n\nAn order is clear and unambiguous where \"'there is [no] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). A court generally applies an objective standard – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")). Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 30 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 9 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 30 of 63\n\nwho violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil\n\ncontempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing\n\n*McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S.\n\n787, 801 (1987)).\n\nThe Order Compelling production states, in pertinent part, the following:\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objection is **OVERRULED** as it relates to discovery requests directed to the [Individual] Debtor except as to the requests that seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and to the requests that seek the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s), to which extent the Objection is **SUSTAINED**, without prejudice to the Trustee to seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s) at a later date as the investigation proceeds upon cause shown. The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee:\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period that does not begin before June 1, 2014;\n\n(ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests as to both assets he acknowledges he owns and assets allegedly belonging to persons or entities other than the [Individual] Debtor, including without limitation his family members and associated entities; and\n\n(iii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests that are within his custody, possession, or control, including without limitation documents in the files of his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, unless such documents have already been produced by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors but without consideration of any potential future production by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors;\n\nand it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on February 7, 2023, file on the docket of this case a sworn declaration describing in detail the document collection, search, and review actions taken by him and his counsel in response to the subpoena, including without limitation a detailed description of the processes that he and his counsel performed to:\n\n(i) identify all of the [Individual] Debtor's electronic devices; all online document repositories to which he has access; all social media, email, and other accounts associated with electronic documents; all bank accounts and related\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 10 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 31 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 31 of 63\n\naccount statements; and all other potential sources of responsive hard copy and electronic documents that may exist; and\n\n(ii) search the foregoing sources for responsive documents, including without limitation for documents responsive to the requests related to expenses or money transfers, to assets or financial or business transactions or records related to the [Individual] Debtor's family or associated entities, and to business interests associated with the [Individual] Debtor . . .\n\n(ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor did not raise any argument in pleadings or during oral argument that there is \"a fair ground of doubt\" as to the meaning of the Order Compelling Production.5 The Court concludes the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as it relates to the Individual Debtor.6\n\n#### **2. Did the Individual Debtor comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nRegarding the second element, the Trustee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that because (i) the Individual Debtor has failed to produce documents or records and (ii) the Individual Debtor has failed to file a declaration identifying potential sources of documents or records as well as the efforts undertaken to search those sources, the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nIn response, the Individual Debtor makes two arguments. First, the Individual Debtor argues that it is impossible for him to comply because he is presently being detained pending trial without the possibility of pre-trial release. Second, the Individual Debtor argues that the\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of doubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. The Court considers this argument below in the discussion of whether the Individual Debtor has diligently attempted to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Court has previously held that the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as to other parties. (*See* ECF No. 1537.)\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 11 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 32 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 32 of 63\n\n\"act of production\" doctrine permits him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in response to requests for the production of documents and records. On this basis, the Individual Debtor asserts that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n#### **i. Is it impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply?**\n\nWhile the Individual Debtor is correct that \"[a] long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order,\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978), and that the proper time to assess impossibility of compliance is at the time of issuing the ruling on contempt, *United States v. Rylander*, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983), the Court concludes compliance remains possible for the Individual Debtor. While it is true that the prosecution has seized documents and records of the Individual Debtor in connection with the Criminal Action, the Individual Debtor has not established that (a) all of his documents and records have been seized and (b) he has no additional copies of the seized records. Moreover, based on the statements of his counsel, the Court understands the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor in the Criminal Action should begin soon – if it has not already. While it is (i) likely that the Trustee would have to become a signatory to and comply with confidentiality requirements and use restrictions in the Criminal Action and (ii) possible that production to the Trustee may be opposed by the prosecution or not allowed by the Criminal Court, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to petition the Criminal Court to allow production to the Trustee. Although, the Individual Debtor is presently detained pending trial, his attorneys are not. The Individual Debtor may produce documents through his attorneys and/or other agents. Therefore, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 12 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 33 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 33 of 63\n\n#### **ii. Has the Individual Debtor properly invoked the Fifth Amendment?**\n\n## **a. Does the act of production doctrine apply?**\n\nThe Individual Debtor's argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production relies on the \"act of production\" doctrine. In *Fisher v. United States*, which held that the act of production at issue in that case was not protected by the Fifth Amendment, the United\n\nStates Supreme Court nevertheless held that\n\nThe act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); *see United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000). In *Fisher*,\n\nthe Supreme Court held the test to determine if the act of production could be protected by the Fifth Amendment is whether the \"tacit averments\" involved in the act of production are both \"testimonial\" and \"incriminating\" under prevailing Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 425 U.S. at 410–11. In particular, the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding tacit averments as to: (i) the existence of the documents or records; (ii) the producing party's possession or control over the documents or records; and (iii) the producing party's belief that the documents and records were those requested by the subpoena. *Id.* The act of production doctrine does not protect the testimonial and incriminating contents of documents – it only protects testimonial and incriminating *production*. *Id.*; *Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 40–41.\n\nUnder binding precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the act of production *may* entail testimonial tacit averments \"(1) 'if the existence and location of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government'; or (2) where production would 'implicitly authenticate' the documents.\" *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 1\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 13 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 34 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 34 of 63\n\nF.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (hereinafter \"*Grand Jury 1993*\") (citing *United States v. Fox*, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983)). If the Trustee can show (1) the existence and location; and (2) the authenticity of the documents is a \"foregone\" conclusion or already established by other evidence, then the production is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Moreover, even if the tacit averments involved in production are testimonial under *Fox*, the Individual Debtor must also establish that revealing the existence, location, or authenticity of the documents or records is incriminating. *See Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951); *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 40; *In re Schick*, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); *cf. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona)*, 732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984).\n\nThe Individual Debtor's burden to establish that the act of production is testimonial and incriminating is less than a normal burden of proof: \"To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.\" *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. In determining whether the Individual Debtor may invoke the Fifth Amendment, the Court must use its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" as much as factual support submitted by the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 487. The act of production is incriminating if it could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 486.\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that producing documents and records under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial because the production could be construed as a tacit averment that he beneficially owns and/or controls various entities and assets and that he has authority over various persons. Such tacit averments, the Individual Debtor argues, would be incriminating because the present Criminal Action and an alleged investigation\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 14 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 35 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 35 of 63\n\ninto bankruptcy crimes involve allegations about the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership and control of entities and/or assets and the Individual Debtor's authority and/or control over certain individuals.\n\nThe Trustee raises numerous objections to the Individual Debtor's argument. The Trustee's primary objection is that the \"required records\" doctrine applies and is an exception to the act of production doctrine. In support of this argument, the Trustee asserts that the Individual Debtor, as a debtor in bankruptcy, cannot properly invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid production of documents and records relating to his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities as required by the Bankruptcy Code – whether or not the act of production is testimonial and incriminating. The Trustee's required records argument involving the Individual Debtor's duties in his bankruptcy case will be addressed below. The Court will first address the Trustee's various objections as to whether the Individual Debtor has met his burden of proof to show that compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be both testimonial and incriminating.\n\n#### *The Supplemental Declaration*\n\nThe Individual Debtor and the Trustee have reached a resolution regarding one of the Trustee's objections. Before the Contempt Motion was filed and the hearings on it were held, the Individual Debtor's Declaration made a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Trustee argued that this was improper because (a) such a blanket assertion did not evidence that the Individual Debtor had properly considered each of the Trustee's requests before invoking the Fifth Amendment; and (b) these Chapter 11 cases are civil proceedings, meaning that the Individual Debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment may, under proper circumstances, be admitted as evidence. However, the Individual Debtor has since provided the Supplemental Declaration pursuant to a consent order, wherein he answers each\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 15 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 36 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 36 of 63\n\nquestion posed by the Trustee on an individual basis and asserts his Fifth Amendment right in response to each of the two-hundred two (202) questions. Although the Individual Debtor has now properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to the Trustee's specific questions, issues related to the production of documents remain.\n\n#### *Pre-indictment invocation of the Fifth Amendment*\n\nOne of the Trustee's remaining objections to the Individual Debtor's proof of compliance with the Order Compelling Production is unpersuasive. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor was in contempt before the unsealing of the indictment against him and cannot now invoke the Fifth Amendment in light of the Criminal Action to avoid being held in contempt. However, the Individual Debtor is correct that the Fifth Amendment may be invoked prior to the commencement of a criminal action. *See United States v. Miranti*, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958) (allowing a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment where there was only a slight *possibility* of prosecution). Just as the Individual Debtor could assert his Fifth Amendment right during the evidentiary hearing in December 2022 and during his March 2023 deposition, he could do so in February 2023 so long as he had \"reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer\" and his Fifth Amendment right was otherwise applicable. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486.\n\n#### *Documents in possession of the prosecution*\n\nA second argument of the Trustee also fails. The Trustee argues that there is no harm to the Individual Debtor because the prosecution is already in possession of his documents and records. The Trustee is correct insofar as the existence and location of these documents is known and, hence, the first prong of the *Fox* test fails. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Nevertheless, whether the act of producing the Individual Debtor's documents and records\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 16 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 37 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 37 of 63\n\nalready in the possession of the prosecution would result in authenticating those documents and records remains an issue. *Id.* The Individual Debtor is concerned that his act of production would authenticate the documents. The Court has not seen these documents and records. Nor has the Trustee. The Court recognizes the Trustee is in a difficult position because he is not a party to the Criminal Action. Nevertheless, the Trustee has not shown that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic. Therefore, under the second prong of the *Fox* test, the tacit averment as to the authenticity of the documents and records in the possession of the prosecution may be testimonial. *Id.*\n\nMoreover, because the documents and records seized by the prosecution may be used in the Criminal Action to prosecute the Individual Debtor, the Court finds the Individual Debtor's argument that his implicit authentication of those documents and records could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute him is persuasive. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. Therefore, unless the Trustee can show that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic, the act of production doctrine applies to the documents held by the prosecution, unless an exception to the doctrine applies.\n\n#### *Documents not in the possession of the prosecution*\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that the entire universe of documents and records the Order Compelling Production compels him to produce have been seized by the prosecution. The Court does not agree and, therefore, continues its discussion. As the Trustee contends, the blanket assertion that the Individual Debtor has no documents or records in his possession, custody, or control because he is now incarcerated is not convincing. The FBI apparently seized many documents, records, and electronic devices at the Individual Debtor's residences despite previous representations that the Individual Debtor maintained almost no documents, records, and devices.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 17 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 38 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 38 of 63\n\nSimilarly, the Trustee is correct that there is no evidentiary basis to support the contention that there are no records within the Individual Debtor's possession, custody, or control that are not already among the documents and records seized by the prosecution. Given past descriptions of the efforts – or, as the case may be, the lack thereof – conducted by the Individual Debtor's counsel, the Individual Debtor has not established that a reasonably diligent search occurred. (*See* Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) For both of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor has not established that all potentially responsive documents and records have been seized by the prosecution.\n\nAs to documents and records that were not seized by the prosecution, the Trustee has not shown that the location, existence, or authenticity of these documents is a foregone conclusion. Therefore, if the Individual Debtor establishes that they are incriminating, the act of production doctrine would apply. *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 36. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden to establish that the requested documents and records are incriminating. The Trustee is correct that even with the Supplemental Declaration, the Individual Debtor has not established that each requested production would be incriminating.\n\nNevertheless, the Court is mindful of the lessened burden the Individual Debtor must meet. The Court is also mindful that it must rely on its own perception of the facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. Moreover, as the Individual Debtor's counsel notes, \"[t]he privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.\" *Id.* at 486. However, the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" includes the observation that the Individual Debtor\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 18 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 39 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 39 of 63\n\nhas obstructed lawful inquiry into his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs in addition to his avowed desire to avoid self-incrimination. *Id.* at 487. (*See, e.g.*, Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133.)\n\nThe indictment in the Criminal Action is not alone sufficient for the Individual Debtor to meet his burden with respect to the documents and records that the prosecution has *not* seized. The indictment alleges fraud going back to approximately 2018, whereas many of the assets of interest to the Trustee thus far – that certain yacht, the Lady May; the apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel; the Ace Decade Holdings Limited cause of action – were allegedly acquired prior to 2018. While some of these assets, *e.g.*, the Lady May, are discussed in the indictment, the Court cannot, with its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" and the Individual Debtor's scant evidentiary showing, hold that the Individual Debtor has sufficiently supported his blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of the Criminal Action. *Id.* at 487. The Individual Debtor has not established that all of his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs relate to the alleged fraud or may somehow present a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding the alleged fraud. *Id.* at 486.\n\nIn support of his argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production, the Individual Debtor also presented a subpoena directed at the Trustee relating to an alleged investigation into potential bankruptcy crimes committed in these Chapter 11 cases. (ECF No. 1719, at \\*80:20–81:8.) As noted above, it does not matter if prosecution due to this investigation is likely when determining if production of the documents is incriminating. *Miranti*, 253 F.2d at 139.\n\nTitle 18 of the United States Code, sections 152, 156, 157, 1519, and 3284 set forth crimes related to the concealment of assets in a bankruptcy case. Sections 152, 156, 157, and\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 19 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 40 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 40 of 63\n\n1519 require knowing, intentional, or fraudulent acts. Section 3284 requires \"concealment.\" The tacit averments that the Individual Debtor has possession or control over documents or records responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena and that such documents or records are authentic are not themselves incriminating because they do not establish that the Individual Debtor knowingly, intentionally, or fraudulently withheld assets – or documents and records pertaining to assets – from the Estate. Debtors routinely mistakenly overlook assets and liabilities and amend their statements and schedules and/or update their disclosures.\n\nNevertheless, the Court must consider whether such tacit averments are a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding a potential prosecution of the Individual Debtor for concealment of his assets from the Trustee, this Court, and his creditors. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. The Trustee alleges that the Individual Debtor has a multitude of business interests and should have commensurate documents and records. While the Individual Debtor denies these allegations, it is the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case,\" on the basis of prior findings of this and other courts, that the Individual Debtor has at least *some* business interests beyond those he presently admits. *See Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181; *E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021). (*See* ECF No. 1110; *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023), ECF Nos. 177, 221; Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133 ¶ 7.) The Court perceives that the Individual Debtor's production may be similarly expansive to the production at issue in *Hubbell*. *See* 530 U.S. at 40–43. Even though *Hubbell* was a case involving immunity granted to a party where the scope of the production was known and the burden had shifted to the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 20 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 41 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 41 of 63\n\nprosecution, it *may* be similarly necessary for the Individual Debtor \"to make extensive use of 'the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena\" and essentially create a map of his assets, liabilities, and business interests. *See id.* at 43. Regarding the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes, such a map may aid in discovery of evidence of knowledge, intent, or fraud. Using its perception of the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings, the Court finds that such admissions could be links in the chain of evidence because they could have a \"derivative use.\" *See id.* at 41–43.\n\n#### *The Individual Debtor's production is testimonial and incriminating*\n\nFor the above reasons, the Court concludes that production in compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution. *See Fisher*, 425 U.S. at 410–11. The Court notes, however, that the evidentiary record to date is not strong. If in the future the Trustee can (i) show that the location, existence, and authenticity of any document is a foregone conclusion; (ii) establish with regard to any document or category of documents that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden; or (iii) establish that he already has a map of the Individual Debtor's assets, liabilities, and business interests with respect to any documents or category of documents, this finding may be revisited upon a proper motion.\n\n#### **b. Does the 'required records' exception apply?**\n\nAlthough the act of production doctrine applies, that does not end the Court's analysis or necessarily determine the result of the Contempt Motion. As noted above, the Trustee's primary argument is that the required records doctrine applies on the specific facts and circumstances\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 21 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 42 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 42 of 63\n\nbefore the Court and presents an exception to the act of production doctrine. The Trustee therefore argues that it does not matter whether the act of production doctrine would allow the Individual Debtor to properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production because the required records exception applies in this case.\n\nIn support of his argument, the Trustee relies on *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight*, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). In *Bouknight*, the Supreme Court restated and reaffirmed the existence of the required records doctrine post-*Fisher*. 493 U.S. at 555–59. Under the required records doctrine, \"the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.\" *Id.* at 556; *see Grosso v. United States*, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968) (articulating factors to consider regarding required records doctrine); *Shapiro v. United* States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948) (originating the required records doctrine).\n\nThe Individual Debtor asserts *Bouknight* does not describe an exception to the act of production doctrine set forth in *Fisher* and that the required records doctrine does not provide for the compelled testimonial and incriminating production of documents and records. The Individual Debtor's assertion contradicts the clear text of *Bouknight* which states:\n\nThe possibility that a production order will compel testimonial assertions that may prove incriminating does not, in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist production. Even assuming that this limited testimonial assertion is sufficiently incriminating and \"sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege,\" Bouknight may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.\n\n*Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56 (discussing *Fisher*) (internal citations omitted). In addition to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit has also clearly rejected the Individual Debtor's assertion:\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 22 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 43 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 43 of 63\n\n\"[T]he required records doctrine is an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. As such, it necessarily overrides the privilege in instances in which the privilege would otherwise apply. *Fisher* was not concerned with required records and nothing in its analysis could be construed as weakening the required records exception.\"\n\n*United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013) (hereinafter\n\n\"*Grand Jury 2013*\") (quoting *Doe v. United States (In re Doe)*, 711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir.\n\n1983)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphatically stated \"[t]his Court has twice explicitly rejected the idea that the required records exception has been abrogated by the act of production doctrine.\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 346. This binding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent makes clear that the required records doctrine is an exception to the act of production doctrine.7 Therefore, if the required records exception applies in this case, the Individual Debtor has failed to comply with the Order Compelling Production regardless of the conclusion that such production would be testimonial and incriminating.\n\nIn determining whether the required records doctrine applies, the Second Circuit turns to the *Grosso* factors. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345. In *Grosso*, the Supreme Court applied the following factors: \"[F]irst, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least analogous to public documents.\" 390 U.S.\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Individual Debtor observes that one of the cases cited by the Trustee, *In re Ross*, 156 B.R. 272, 279 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), both found the production of the requested documents to be insufficiently testimonial and found that the required records doctrine applied. From this observation, the Individual Debtor concluded that the latter holding required the former. The Court concludes otherwise. The court in *Ross*, like many courts – particularly lower courts subject to review, advanced multiple bases for its conclusion that the debtor in that case could not properly invoke the Fifth Amendment. 156 B.R. at 281 (\"Fifth, *even if the act of production involved here was both testimonial and incriminating*, the nature of chapter 7 as a regulatory regime directed toward society as a whole, and not toward inherently suspect criminal classes, renders the act of production outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment.\") (emphasis added).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 23 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 44 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 44 of 63\n\nat 67–68. Here, the Trustee is seeking documents and records that the Order Compelling Production holds relate to \"the acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the [Individual Debtor], or to any matter which may affect the administration of the [Estate].\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b). Hence, the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce the documents and records the Trustee seeks under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4). Therefore, the issue is whether the documents and records the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are required records under the *Grosso* test.\n\n#### *What is the purpose of Bankruptcy Code sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)?*\n\nIn determining whether the first factor supports application of the required records doctrine, a court must consider whether the relevant \"legislation is not 'directed at the public at large' and concerns 'an area permeated with criminal statutes.'\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 347 (citing *Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.*, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)); *see Marchetti v. United States*, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968); *Haynes v. United States*, 390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968). A court must make this determination as to the specific statutory sections at issue, rather than in reference to the entire surrounding statutory context. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 348 (citing *California v. Byers*, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).\n\nSection 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is titled \"Debtor's duties.\" Sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) provide, respectively, that, where a bankruptcy trustee is serving in the case, as here, a debtor must cooperate with the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties and must surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate.\n\nSection 109 of the Bankruptcy Code allows individuals or entities to file for bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11, 11 Subchapter V, 12, or 13. In proceedings under Chapters 7, 12, and 13\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 24 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 45 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 45 of 63\n\nas well as Chapter 11 Subchapter V, a bankruptcy trustee is automatically appointed upon the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases are the most common among the general public and always involve a bankruptcy trustee to whom the debtor owes obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4).\n\nWhile in a Chapter 11 case the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee is an extraordinary remedy, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 1112, the effect of this extraordinary relief is that a dispossessed Chapter 11 debtor has the same obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) as a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 debtor. By operation of law, upon filing a Chapter 11 case a debtor is automatically deemed to be a debtor-in-possession and assumes the role of a bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). However, a debtor in a Chapter 11 case may be 'dispossessed' of the estate through appointment of a bankruptcy trustee \"for cause,\" provided it is in the best interest of the creditors and the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).\n\nChapter 11 is distinct because it is designed for debtors with complex business interests, assets, and liabilities, such as large corporations and high net worth individuals. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977). As such, Chapter 11 is guided by three basic presumptions: (i) debtors with substantial business interests and operations have more value as a continuing economic entity than divided up and liquidated, (ii) debtors with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities are better equipped than an appointed trustee to manage their own affairs for the benefit of creditors, and (iii) allowing debtors with substantial business interests and operations to reorganize preserves the interests of debtors, owners, employees, etc. in addition to the interests of creditors. *See id.* Ultimately, however, Chapter 11 is properly used wherever its specific provisions maximize the distribution to creditors. *See Toibb v. Radloff*, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991). Many of the enumerated examples of \"cause\" to appoint a bankruptcy trustee –\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 25 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 46 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 46 of 63\n\nor dismiss the case or convert the case to a proceeding under Chapter 7 – involve the rebuttal of the presumptions listed above or the debtor-in-possession's failure to comply with its obligations to manage the estate for the benefit of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023).\n\nWhen one is appointed, the bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323. The purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is to enable the bankruptcy trustee to administer the debtor's bankruptcy estate in accordance with the bankruptcy trustee's duties. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16. The administration of the bankruptcy estate requires the debtor's disclosure, surrender, and cooperation with the trustee because a case in bankruptcy is an all-encompassing action intended to equitably and finally resolve, adjust, or reorganize myriad debtor-creditor relationships. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5) (\"The trustee shall . . . examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper . . ..\"), 704(a)(7) (\"The trustee shall . . . furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest . . .\"), 704(a)(8) (\"The trustee shall . . . file with the court, with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such operations, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business . . ..\"), 1106(a)(3) (\"A trustee shall . . . investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and other matters relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan . . ..\"); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01 (\"The trustee's investigation and reporting duties provide a mechanism for full disclosure of the debtor's state of\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 26 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 47 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 47 of 63\n\naffairs so as to enable parties in interest to protect their rights and obtain the successful reorganization of the debtor.\").\n\nA debtor's failure to fulfill its obligations to (i) cooperate with the trustee, (ii) disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities, and (iii) surrender property of the bankruptcy estate and records relating thereto severely impedes a trustee's ability to administer the estate. *See United States v. Stone*, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960) (\"[T]he very purpose of the statement of affairs is to give dependable information without need of going further.\") (upholding conviction in criminal action prosecuting debtor for bankruptcy crimes related to failure to properly disclose loan information on statement of financial affairs in proceeding under former Bankruptcy Act). This failure causes expense and delay to the estate's creditors which are cognizable injuries. *See Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.)*, 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009).\n\nFurthermore, the broad and extraordinary nature of much of the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Code is premised upon proper disclosure and notice. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining adequate information for the disclosure statement that must be served before plan solicitation may commence); *Till v. SCS Credit Corp.*, 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004) (finding that the \"Bankruptcy Code's extensive disclosure requirements reduce the risk that the debtor has significant undisclosed obligations,\" undergirding a court's \"authority to modify the number, timing, or amount of the installment payments from those set forth in the debtor's original contract\"); *In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that failure to properly serve undisclosed known creditors with a sale motion rendered a sale order unenforceable against the creditors). A trustee, as the bankruptcy estate's representative, is the party tasked with; in the first instance, seeking much of this relief for: (i) the benefit of the estate, *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 352\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 27 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 48 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 48 of 63\n\n(1985); and (ii) the debtor who may receive, upon exiting the gauntlet, a \"fresh start,\" *see Grogan v. Garner*, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).\n\nThe Court concludes that sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are targeted at the general public. Bankruptcy trustees are automatically appointed in a wide range of cases. The duty to disclose and surrender property and records to the trustee is essential to the fundamental and required administrative duties of the trustee and the exercise of the trustee's powers under the bankruptcy code.\n\nThe remaining issue is whether sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are concerned with an area \"permeated with criminal statutes.\" *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 79. Title 18, sections 151 *et sequitur*, 1519, and 3284 of the United States Code criminalize certain actions taken in relation to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code. Among these \"bankruptcy crimes\" are several related to the concealment of assets of the bankruptcy estate to protect them from distribution to the estate's creditors. The issue before the Court is not, however, whether certain failures to fulfill a debtor's duty under sections 521(a)(3) and (4) leave a debtor vulnerable to criminal prosecution, but rather whether sections 521(a)(3) and (4) are \"directed at a 'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.'\" *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57.\n\nIn *Grosso* and *Marchetti*, the problem was not the criminal laws enforcing the statutory requirement to file tax returns, which are akin to the bankruptcy crimes enumerated above. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *see Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. Rather, in both cases the Supreme Court determined that the requirement to file a federal wagering tax return squarely targeted conduct already criminalized by state law, namely gambling. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. At issue in *Albertson* was the requirement that members of the Communist Party of America personally register with the Subversive Activities Control Board.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 28 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 49 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 49 of 63\n\n382 U.S. at 77–78. Affiliation with the Communist Party was criminalized at the time. *Id.* In *Haynes*, the issue was a requirement that persons who obtained firearms *other than in the normal course* – which the Supreme Court observed would be mostly persons acquiring firearms illegally – register their firearms. 390 U.S. at 95–97.\n\nThe facts before the Supreme Court in *Grosso*, *Marchetti*, *Albertson*, and *Haynes* are each dissimilar to the instant facts. First, all of those cases involved the creation of a new record rather than the production of existing documents and records. *Haynes*, 390 U.S. at 95–97; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57; *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 77–78. More importantly, the routine administration of a bankruptcy case does not as a matter of course implicate criminal activity. The administration of the estate is intended to be separate from issues of criminal liability. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 323 (the trustee is the party to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate with regards to civil litigation), 362(a)(1) (generally, civil actions against the debtor or the estate are stayed by the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition) *with*  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (criminal actions against the debtor are not stayed by the commencement of a case under Title 11). Debtors are generally not exposed to criminal liability for the disclosures they are required to make in their bankruptcy cases. The intent of disclosure requirements in bankruptcy proceedings is to lay bare *civil liability* to allow for the equitable and final resolution of all claims against the debtor. *See Byers*, 402 U.S. at 430–31 (finding that, while the California Vehicle Code involved some criminal statutes, \"it was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents\" and holding that the required records exception applied).\n\nTherefore, the purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is \"essentially regulatory,\" which supports the applicability of the required records exception to the production of documents by\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 29 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 50 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 50 of 63\n\nthe Individual Debtor compelled by the Order Compelling Production. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67– 68.\n\n#### *Are the purported required records customarily kept?*\n\nAs to the second factor, whether the purportedly required records are customarily kept, the Trustee is seeking, *e.g.*, financial and banking records, money transfer records, records relating to the Individual Debtor's business interests, etc. As the Second Circuit observed with respect to foreign bank account information, common sense dictates that persons and entities retain basic financial transaction and account information in order to manage their affairs and access their accounts. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350 (citing *M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation)*, 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Court finds this is especially true regarding individuals and entities with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities. Pointedly, the Second Circuit went on to say that although \"some individuals engaged in wrongdoing are advised not to keep even this basic information[,] . . . [w]e decline to look at the custom of only the miscreants . . ..\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350. Therefore, the Court concludes that the records required by sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are \"customarily kept.\" *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n#### *Did the purported required records assume 'public aspects?'*\n\nAs to the third factor, whether the purportedly required records have assumed 'public aspects,' the question is whether the overall regulatory context of section 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) – requires the particular records be kept. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 351–52.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code requires disclosure both at the outset of a case and as a case proceeds. Section 521(a)(1) requires any debtor – including the Individual Debtor – to file a list of creditors, statement of financial affairs, and schedules of, *inter alia*, the debtor's assets,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 30 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 51 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 51 of 63\n\nliabilities, income, and expenses. *See* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a] (\"The schedule is a statement of *all* property, both *real* and personal, within the broad definition of property of the estate under section 541(a), which includes 'all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.'\"), 521.06[3][b] (\"The scheduling of interests in property, both real and personal, is a very important duty.\"), 521.09 (\"The purpose of the requirement of filing a statement of financial affairs is to furnish the trustee and creditors with detailed information about the debtor's financial condition, thereby saving the expense and long and protracted examination for the purpose of soliciting information.\"). Section 341 requires any debtor to submit to an examination conducted by a trustee, in which its creditors may participate. *See* 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01.\n\nRegarding Chapter 11 in particular, section 1107 provides that while a Chapter 11 debtor is a debtor-in-possession, such a debtor, as a fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate, would have many of the same disclosure obligations of a trustee discussed above, including reporting requirements. *See* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]. A debtor's failure to properly disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities in a Disclosure Statement required to be filed in connection with a Chapter 11 Plan would prevent confirmation of that plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125; *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02 (\"Disclosure is the pivotal concept in reorganization practice under the Bankruptcy Code.\") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)), 1125.02[2]. Failures to make appropriate disclosures can and do constitute cause to convert a Chapter 11 reorganization case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case, dismiss the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f].\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 31 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 52 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 52 of 63\n\nMuch like the mother in *Bouknight*, the Individual Debtor assumed these obligations upon voluntarily commencing his Chapter 11 case, submitting himself to the *in personam*  jurisdiction of this Court, and submitting all of his legal and equitable interests in property – \"wherever located and by whomever held\" – to the *in rem* jurisdiction of this Court. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 559 (\"Bouknight submitted to the routine operation of the regulatory system and agreed to hold Maurice in a manner consonant with the State's regulatory interests and subject to inspection by BCDSS.\"). Moreover, as in *Bouknight*, where the mother was required to produce her child to the Baltimore City Department of Social Services upon cause shown, the Bankruptcy Code requires the Individual Debtor to produce documents and records relating to property of the estate to the Trustee, because cause was shown to appoint a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112; *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Because the Individual Debtor voluntarily filed his Chapter 11 case and became a debtor-in-possession, he assumed a bankruptcy trustee's duties to manage the Estate for the benefit of its creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). The Individual Debtor was a custodian of the Estate and its books and records while a debtor-in-possession. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Although his status as a debtor-inpossession ended upon the appointment of the Trustee, his resultant obligation to provide information to the Trustee did not.\n\nThe Court concludes that the records required to be produced by the Individual Debtor pursuant to sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) have assumed \"public aspects\" because the Individual Debtor's case is a voluntary Chapter 11 case and because the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings support this conclusion. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 32 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 53 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 53 of 63\n\n#### *The 'required records' exception applies*\n\nAll three factors of the *Grosso* test support the applicability of the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. 390 U.S. at 67–68; *see Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345; *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279–81; *In re Fairbanks*, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).\n\nApplication of the required records exception is also supported by Supreme Court precedent relating to the former Bankruptcy Act. *In re Harris*, 221 U.S. 274 (1911) (holding Fifth Amendment did not protect a debtor from producing its books and records to the receiver in bankruptcy). *Bouknight*, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, cited *Harris*  approvingly as an example of the required records doctrine, confirming the continuing vitality of *Harris* today despite the evolution of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence since *Harris* was decided. *Bouknight*, 439 U.S. at 556–57; *see Fisher*, 425 U.S. 411–13 (discussing *Harris* without calling into question its holding); *see also Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding that precedent under the Bankruptcy Act is not displaced unless there is a clear indication that Congress intended to do so); *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4] (\"[I]t is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.\"); *but see Butcher v. Bailey*, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding, pre-*Bouknight* and in an *involuntary* Chapter 7 case rather than a voluntary Chapter 11 case, that *Harris* was no longer good law after *Fisher* and section 521 did not require the production of documents to which the act of production doctrine applied).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 33 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 54 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 54 of 63\n\nThe Individual Debtor objects that, nevertheless, *Harris* and the required records exception do not reach Rule 2004 subpoenas under *McCarthy v. Arndstein*. 266 U.S. 34 (1924). However, the Supreme Court in *Arndstein* distinguished its prior opinion in *Harris* on the basis that *Harris* concerned the surrender of documents and records and *Arndstein* concerned the issue of compelled *testimony*. 266 U.S. at 41–42. The Trustee is not objecting to the Individual Debtor answering interrogatories or questions during deposition or in-court testimony by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the Trustee is objecting to the Individual Debtor invoking the Fifth Amendment in response to requests for the production of documents and records. Therefore, *Arndstein* is inapposite.\n\nThe Court concludes that, both under an analysis of the *Grosso* factors and by application of Supreme Court precedent under the Bankruptcy Act, the required records exception applies.\n\n#### **iii. The Individual Debtor did not comply with the Order Compelling Production**\n\nFor all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that (i) it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production and (ii) under the required records exception, the Individual Debtor may not properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. Therefore, the Trustee has established by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n## **3. Did the Individual Debtor diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe Trustee must also establish that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply in a reasonable manner with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has made no attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production. In response, the Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 34 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 55 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 55 of 63\n\ndoubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could properly assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that the Declaration and Supplemental Declaration represent his good faith efforts to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's operative mistake is a mistake of law – not fact. Namely, the Individual Debtor has mistakenly concluded that the required records exception to the act of production doctrine does not apply and that he may invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, whether producing each document or record would factually be testimonial and incriminating does not affect the outcome.\n\nGenerally, absent a requirement of willfulness or intention, mistake of law is not a defense to civil liability. *Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA*, 559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010). As noted above, \"[t]he absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\" *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 191. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor's mistake of law is not a defense to civil contempt. *Cf. Yellin v. United States*, 374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963) (holding mistake of law was no defense to contempt of Congress); *United States v. Remini*, 967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding mistake of law was no defense to criminal contempt of court). This conclusion accords with the Supreme Court's observation in *Taggert*  that \"a party's good faith, *even where it does not bar civil contempt*, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Trustee has established that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 35 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 56 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 56 of 63\n\n#### **4. Did the Individual Debtor have notice of the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe final element of civil contempt is notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512. The Declaration admits the Individual Debtor had notice of the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) This element of civil contempt has been established.\n\n#### **5. The Individual Debtor is in civil contempt of court**\n\nAll four elements having been established, the Contempt Motion is granted. The Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. As set forth in the decretal paragraphs below, the Individual Debtor will be afforded the opportunity to purge himself of contempt. In light of the serious nature of the circumstances facing the Individual Debtor and the good faith shown in answering the Trustee's two-hundred two (202) questions in his Supplemental Declaration, the Court will provide the Individual Debtor with ample time to purge himself of contempt. *Taggert*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. However, if the Individual Debtor does not purge himself of contempt, the Trustee may request appropriate sanctions.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's counsel are reminded that \"[c]ounsel have an obligation, as officers of the court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith responses to legitimate discovery requests.\" *McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles*, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990). To that end, the Individual Debtor's counsel are further reminded that this Court has already found that \"counsel to the [Individual Debtor and others] has not established that they were sufficiently diligent under the circumstances.\" (Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) The Individual Debtor was ordered to comply with the Order Compelling Production at or before 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, but did not do so. \"[N]either\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 36 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 57 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 57 of 63\n\n[counsel] nor [a party has] a unilateral right to decide whether or when to comply with discovery demands.\" *535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am.*, 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).\n\nThe Individual Debtor and his counsel are to take reasonable and diligent steps, whether or not this Court has articulated those steps directly, to bring the Individual Debtor into compliance with the Order Compelling Production. As the Individual Debtor's counsel has stated on the record, reasonable steps include filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking to allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the Individual Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose. In seeking to purge himself of contempt, the Individual Debtor would be acting under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production and, therefore, not waiving any Fifth Amendment right by moving in the Criminal Court to produce to the Trustee. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 561–62. In considering any sanctions motion, the Court will consider the diligence with which the Individual Debtor seeks relief in the Criminal Court.\n\n#### **B. Should the Order Compelling Production be stayed?**\n\nHaving ruled on the Contempt Motion, the Court turns to the Stay Motion. The Individual Debtor argues that the Order Compelling Production must be stayed pending the end of the Criminal Action in order to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In response, the Trustee argues that there is no basis to impose a stay of the Order Compelling Production and that such a stay would substantially injure the Trustee.\n\nThe Court first notes that while the Stay Motion was filed by the Individual Debtor and seems to only concern the Individual Debtor, the attached proposed order would stay the Order Compelling Production entirely, including the decretal paragraphs relevant to the Individual\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 37 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 58 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 58 of 63\n\nDebtor's daughter, Ms. Mei Guo, and the Individual Debtor's adjudged corporate *alter ego*, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC. To the extent that the Stay Motion seeks relief as to these additional parties, the Court denies the Stay Motion.\n\nTurning to the merits, the Court must determine whether to stay the Order Compelling Production within its sound discretion. *Kashi v. Grastos*, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986). There is no strict requirement that a court stay civil proceedings due to pending criminal proceedings. *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); *Kashi*, 790 F.2d at 1057. In considering whether to stay civil proceedings in light of criminal proceedings, courts consider, *inter alia*:\n\n1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest.\n\n*Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).\n\nThe Court first considers the private interests of the Estate in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to the Estate caused by delay. There is substantial prejudice to the Estate and the Individual Debtor's creditors in staying the Order Compelling Production. As discussed above, a debtor's disclosure of his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities is fundamental in bankruptcy proceedings. The Estate continues to incur enormous expense and delay because the Individual Debtor has not cooperated with and has instead obstructed the Trustee's investigation. Pursuant to section 521, the Trustee should have had all documents and records relating to the Individual Debtor's financial affairs, assets, liabilities, businesses, etc. immediately following his appointment more than a year ago. Instead, the Trustee has had to\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 38 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 59 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 59 of 63\n\nidentify other appropriate subpoena targets, issue countless subpoenas, and engage in ceaseless motion practice. While the Trustee's efforts have substantially benefitted the Estate, the Estate has also borne a heavy cost on account of these efforts.\n\nMoreover, these heavy costs are incurred in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. It is likely that there already is not enough money to satisfy the claims of creditors, and creditors are losing the time value of their ultimate recovery due to the ongoing, incomplete investigation into the Individual Debtor's affairs. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). Furthermore, Congress has determined that the ultimate goal of a Chapter 11 case – confirmation of a plan – must occur within a specified timeframe. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d). Delay in confirmation of a plan, which must provide for the ultimate realization of creditor's claims, results in substantial injury to creditors and the Estate. *See Andrews*, 414 B.R. at 7. The Trustee should not be forced to operate without the Individual Debtor's required cooperation and disclosures. *See Stone*, 282 F.2d at 553.\n\nThe Court next considers the private interests and burden on the Individual Debtor. There is no cognizable interest in delaying or obstructing these lawful bankruptcy proceedings. There is also no cognizable burden on the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, he cannot properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Moreover, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, the Supreme Court in *Bouknight* noted that\n\nThe State's regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating testimony nor aid a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment protections are not thereby necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the regulatory requirement after invoking the privilege and subsequently faces prosecution.\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62; *but see Johnson v. United States*, 228 U.S. 457 (1913) (holding, pre-*Fisher*, that books and records produced under *Harris* could be used in a criminal proceeding).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 39 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 60 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 60 of 63\n\nNext the Court considers the status of the pending criminal inquiries and the interest of the Criminal Court. There are two pending criminal inquiries to consider: the Criminal Action and the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes. The Individual Debtor has been indicted in the Criminal Action. There has been no evidence submitted to the Court that he has been indicted regarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes. These Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings do overlap with the Criminal Action – (a) many of the Individual Debtor's creditors are also his alleged victims in the Criminal Action, (b) some of the Individual Debtor's purported assets were alleged to have been bought with proceeds of the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action, and (c) some of the Individual Debtor's purported affiliates and corporate *alter egos* are alleged to be involved in the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action – but at the same time, there are incongruities – (d) there are creditors in these Chapter 11 cases that are not alleged fraud victims, (e) there are purported assets of the Estate that were purchased prior to the alleged fraud, and (f) there are purported affiliates and *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor *not* alleged to be involved in the fraud. However, any issue implicated by any investigation into bankruptcy crimes are directly related to these Chapter 11 cases.\n\nThe Court concludes this Order does not substantially interfere with the Criminal Court's interest in the orderly administration of the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor raises the specter that requiring the Individual Debtor to produce documents to the Trustee would damage the prosecution's case against him and cause litigation about evidence in the Criminal Court. This argument is unpersuasive. The Individual Debtor producing documents and records under compulsion in these proceedings does not change the reality that the prosecution apparently already possesses voluminous evidence. While, as the Individual Debtor argues, the prosecution *may* not be allowed to use the Individual Debtor's production to the Trustee as evidence of the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 40 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 61 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 61 of 63\n\nIndividual Debtor's control over or the authenticity of documents and records already in the prosecution's possession, the Individual Debtor's argument describes the *status quo*. Moreover, the Criminal Court will review and determine any motion to produce to the Trustee documents and records from the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor.\n\nRegarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes, because (a) there is no evidence that the Individual Debtor has been indicted and (b) there is no evidence that there are proceedings in relation to it in any court, the Court concludes that the interests of any such investigation should be given less weight. As stated above, the Bankruptcy Code does not exist for the purpose of creating bankruptcy crimes. It exists for the purpose of equitably and finally resolving, adjusting, and reorganizing the assets, liabilities, and financial affairs of a debtor for the benefit of all creditors and, ultimately, the debtor itself. It is not proper to hobble the Trustee's investigation into the affairs, assets, and liabilities of the Individual Debtor for the benefit of some speculative prosecution of the Individual Debtor for bankruptcy crimes. Bankruptcy crimes are an enforcement mechanism to promote proper disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings. If the Individual Debtor complies with the Order Compelling Production, he would remedy the harm the bankruptcy crimes exist to prevent, while also allowing these Chapter 11 cases to be administered appropriately.\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that the public's interest in \"the expeditious administration of bankruptcy cases is impaired by obstructing a trustee's efforts to collect, liquidate and distribute assets to creditors of the estate.\" *In re MGL Corp.*, 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001). The public has an interest in a well-functioning bankruptcy system. It benefits the economy, debtors, and creditors. Obstruction of that process and efforts at dilation of that process are not in the public interest. Moreover, as set forth above, the production of documents\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 41 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 62 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 62 of 63\n\nand records by the Individual Debtor in accordance with the Order Compelling Production does not offend the Fifth Amendment.\n\nHaving considered the equities, the Court concludes within its sound discretion that a stay of the Order Compelling Production is not warranted. Accordingly, the Stay Motion is denied.\n\n#### **C. Should monetary sanctions enter for discovery abuse?**\n\nFinally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D.\n\nConn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provides\n\n(C) *Payment of Expenses.* Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.\n\nUnder the specific facts and circumstances, the Court concludes an award of expenses is not\n\nwarranted at this time.\n\n## **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court (A) holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt\n\nof Court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production, and (B) denies the Stay\n\nMotion and declines in its sound discretion to stay the Order Compelling Production pending the\n\nresolution of the Criminal Action. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court holds Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\") in civil\n\ncontempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel\n\nCompliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"), ECF No. 1353; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Should the Individual Debtor fail to purge himself of contempt by failing to bring himself into full compliance with the Order Compelling Production on or before September 29, 2023, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\")\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 42 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 63 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 63 of 63\n\nfor the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of the Individual Debtor, may move for whatever sanctions are appropriate; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion\"), ECF No. 1649, is **DENIED**.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 26th day of July, 2023.\n\n![](_page_62_Picture_4.jpeg)","body_zh":"Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 1 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 1 of 63\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n事由：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等1\n\n:\n\n: 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。 : ____________________________________________:\n\n:\n\n____________________________________________ :\n债务人关于许可对裁定债务人蔑视法庭及驳回中止强迫调取文件裁定的动议提出上诉的动议\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 及 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004，债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（下称“债务人”）2由其下述署名律师代表，谨提请许可对破产法院 2023 年 7 月 26 日作出的《关于裁定个人债务人蔑视法庭及驳回中止强迫调取文件裁定的动议的决定备忘录与裁定》（文件编号 2035，下称“《蔑视法庭裁定》”）提出上诉，该裁定副本作为附件 A 附于本动议。该《蔑视法庭裁定》因个人债务人未能根据第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（下称“受托人”）向债务人送达的 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 传票提供文件而裁定其蔑视法庭，并驳回了债务人就应对该传票而援引的《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利，理由是根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) 和 521(a)(4)，由于债务人负有配合受托人的义务，因此“出示行为原则”的“法定记录例外”适用。\n\n1 这些第 11 章案件中的债务人包括 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 及 Miles Kwok，以及其他化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产受托人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于接收通知和通信）。\n\n2 本动议中的“债务人”仅指个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 2 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 2 of 63\n\n为支持其关于许可上诉的动议，债务人谨陈述如下。3\nI. 导言\n\n1. 针对受托人依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 向其送达的传票中包含的大量且极其宽泛的调取文件要求，债务人援引了其受《第五修正案》保护的反对自证其罪的权利（包括在“出示行为原则”下的权利）。破产法院正确地认定，“出示行为原则”在本案中适用，因为债务人出示受托人所要求的文件“无论对于检方已占有的文件还是检方尚未扣押的文件而言，均具有证言性和自证其罪性”。（《蔑视法庭裁定》，第 20 页）。尽管破产法院认定“出示行为原则”适用，但鉴于债务人在已指定受托人的情况下（如本案所示）负有配合受托人的义务，破产法院仍认定“出示行为原则”的“法定记录例外”亦适用。破产法院的这一裁决如果被普遍适用，将实质上剥夺任何自然人债务人在已指定受托人的情况下援引其《第五修正案》权利的能力，并将在任何自然人既是债务人又是刑事诉讼对象的所有案件中强制要求出示材料。\n\n3 本上诉源于债务人针对传票中所包含的文件调取要求援引其《第五修正案》权利，以及破产法院因债务人未能遵守该传票而裁定其蔑视法庭。在如本案这种情况下，传票被送达人（包括当事人）未能遵守传票并随后因该不遵守行为而被裁定蔑视法庭的，就上诉而言，该蔑视法庭裁定属于最终裁定。参见 Del Carman Montan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (In re Aircrash at Belle Harbor), 490 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2007)（“为获得上诉审查，受传票人通常‘必须抗拒地区法院的执行令，被裁定蔑视法庭，然后对根据第 1291 条被视为最终裁定的蔑视法庭裁定提起上诉。’”）（引文省略）。鉴于涉案事项对债务人的重要性，债务人提交本关于许可上诉的动议，以便在地区法院认定《蔑视法庭裁定》并非最终裁定的情况下，保留其寻求中间审查的权利。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 3 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 3 of 63\n\n2. 与破产法院的裁决相反，“法定记录例外”是“出示行为原则”的一项狭义限制，仅适用于法律或法规要求必须保存的有限类别的文件。破产法院对“法定记录例外”的扩大化解释，实际上使债务人的每一项商业往来、资产和负债记录都变成了 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) 和 521(a)(4) 项下的法定记录——无论该记录是否属于某项其他法律或法规要求必须保存的记录类别。\n\n3. 对于宪法权利之例外的如此大幅度扩张，没有任何法律依据；而正在等待 2024 年 4 月就多项刑事指控受审的债务人，现在面临着两种选择：要么 (a) 放弃其合法援引的《第五修正案》权利并出示所要求的文件以消除其蔑视法庭状态，要么 (b) 面对破产法院认为适合因债务人继续坚持主张该等权利而施加的任何制裁。在这些情况下，且鉴于债务人符合就破产法院的裁决提出中间上诉的标准，法院应当批准关于以下问题的上诉许可：《破产法》第 521(a)(3) 条和第 521(a)(4) 条是否基于“法定记录例外”，使得“出示行为原则”在指定了受托人的破产案件中归于无效。\nII. 事实与程序背景\n\n4. 2022 年 2 月 15 日，债务人根据《破产法》第 11 章提交了自愿救济申请书，从而开启了上述标题的破产案件。受托人于 2022 年 7 月 7 日被指定（文件编号 514），其任命于 2022 年 7 月 8 日由裁定予以批准（文件编号 523）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 4 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 4 of 63\n\n5. 2022 年 7 月 28 日，受托人提交了：i) 其《关于对债务人进行 2004 条款调查的动议》（文件编号 636，下称“《债务人 2004 动议》”），ii) 《第 11 章受托人关于根据破产规则第 2004 条及本地规则第 2004-1 条作出裁定授权就债务人的多名法律和财务顾问进行证据开示的总括动议》（文件编号 637），以及 iii) 《第 11 章受托人关于根据破产规则第 2004 条及本地规则第 2004-1 条作出裁定授权就与债务人关联的多家实体和多名个人进行证据开示的总括动议》（文件编号 638）（合称“《七月第 2004 条调查动议》”）。在《债务人 2004 动议》中，受托人除其他事项外声称，“有报告表明债务人……在众多营利性和非营利性实体中拥有财务利益”，“债务人拥有一个庞大的空壳公司网络，用以开展商业利益活动并存放其财富”，以及“据报道，债务人……拥有或控制被统称为‘爆料革命’的‘60 多个商业、非营利和网络组织’”。（《债务人 2004 动议》，第 12、13、28 段）。\n\n6. 在《债务人 2004 动议》中，受托人特别提到了 GTV、GClubs、GMusic、Rule of Law Society（法治社会）、Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金）、Saraca Media Group, Inc. 以及债务人的家庭成员等实体和个人。\n\n7. 2022 年 8 月 5 日，债务人提交了《债务人对第 2004 条动议的有限异议》（文件编号 703），以保留某些权利，包括在传票实际送达后，对附于《七月第 2004 条调查动议》的传票随附的文件调取要求提出异议的权利。破产法院于 2022 年 8 月 16 日作出裁定，批准了《七月第 2004 条调查动议》。\n\n8. 债务人于 2022 年 8 月 19 日被送达了第 2004 条传票（下称“《第 2004 条传票》”）。该《第 2004 条传票》包含三十项调取文件要求，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 5 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 5 of 63\n\n其中二十项包括索取与“关联个人”和/或“关联实体”相关文件的要求。\n\n9. “关联个人”在《第 2004 条传票》中的相关定义为：“单独及共同指所有满足以下条件的个人：(1) 持有、控制、保管由债务人或债务人家属拥有、控制或享用的资产，或对该等资产拥有处置权；或 (2) 曾是一处或多处关联实体的雇员、董事或以其他方式与其关联，连同前述任何主体的各自雇员、代理人、法律顾问、顾问或代表前述任何主体行事的任何人。”“关联个人”的定义包括二十七名个人，其中包括 Yanping Wang（王雁平，下称“Ms. Wang（王女士）”）和 Je Kin Ming（余建明，下称“Mr. Je（余先生）”）（如下文所述，二人将成为刑事起诉中债务人的共同被告，见下文第 18 段）。\n\n10. “关联实体”在《第 2004 条传票》中的相关定义为：“单独及共同指所有满足以下条件的任何类型的组织或实体：(1) 曾由债务人或债务人家属拥有、控制或投资；或 (2) 对由债务人或债务人家属拥有、控制或享用的任何资产直接或间接享有利益，连同前述任何主体的各自雇员、代理人、法律顾问、顾问或代表前述任何主体行事的任何人。”“关联实体”的定义包括七十七家实体，其中包括：GTV Media Group, Inc.、G|Club Operations, LLC、G|MUSIC、Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）、Saraca Media Group, Inc.、Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.、Rule of Law Foundation IV, Inc.、Rule of Law Fund（法治基金）、Rule of Law Society 以及 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.。\n\n11. 债务人就《第 2004 条传票》的文件调取要求及时送达了异议，对调取要求中列举的某些“指示”和“定义”提出了异议，并对某些调取要求提出了异议。债务人反对出示某些类别的文件，主要是与\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 6 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 6 of 63\n\n其“家属”资产相关的文件，受托人将该家属定义为包括“债务人、债务人之子、债务人之女以及债务人的声称妻子，以及与债务人的任何其他亲属关系”。债务人同意出示并通过其专业人士及前专业人士实际出示了受托人在调取要求中所索取的某些文件。\n\n12. 2022年10月28日，受托人提交了其《第11章受托人关于作出命令强制个人债务人[及其他人]遵守第2004条传票的动议》（Doc. No. 1046，即“强制动议”）。2022年11月14日，债务人提交了其《[个人]债务人、Mei Guo（郭美）及HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC对第11章受托人关于强制遵守第2004条传票动议的联合异议》（Doc. No. 1090）。破产法院于2022年11月30日就该强制动议举行了听证会，并于2023年1月20日作出了一份《部分准许关于强制遵守第2004条传票动议的命令》（Doc. No. 1353，即“1月20日命令”）。该1月20日命令除以下两项外，全盘准许了受托人针对债务人的强制动议：i）将文件提交起始日期设定为2014年6月1日及之后，而非受托人主张的2012年及之后；ii）提交债务人的护照。（同上，第4页）。\n\n13. 该1月20日命令要求债务人在2023年1月31日或之前向受托人提交文件，并在2023年2月7日或之前提交一份宣誓声明，说明其本人及律师为回应第2004条传票而采取的文件收集、检索和审查行动。（1月20日命令，第4页）。2023年2月1日，债务人的律师向受托人的律师发送电子邮件告知：\n\n> 关于法院于2023年1月20日就受托人的强制动议作出的命令（Doc. No. 1353），Kwok先生正在主张其在第五修正案下的各项权利，包括在出示行为法理（Act of Production Doctrine）下的任何权利。\n\n14. 此后，于2023年2月7日，债务人提交了一份宣誓声明，陈述如下：\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 7 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 7 of 63\n\n我是上述标题所示第11章案件中的债务人，并已收到法院于2023年1月20日就受托人的强制动议作出的命令（Doc. No. 1353）。关于2022年8月17日的传票整体，包括其中列出的所有文件和信息请求，我特此援引我在《美国宪法》第五修正案下的各项权利，包括出示行为法理下的权利。\n\n（2023年2月7日，Ho Wan Kwok先生关于就第2004条证据开示援引第五修正案特权的声明（Doc. No. 1444之附件A））。\n\n15. 2023年2月10日，受托人提交了其《第11章受托人关于要求裁定债务人…为何不应因未能遵守强制遵守第2004条传票命令而被认定藐视法庭并因此类行为受到制裁的陈述理由令动议》（Doc. No. 1453，即“陈述理由令”）。\n\n16. 2023年2月13日，破产法院发布了一份命令（Doc. No. 1455），除与债务人无关的其他事项外，该命令指出法院将在当时正在进行且由法院下令的调解结束时，就债务人主张其第五修正案特权一事设定书面申辩日程。（同上，第2页）。\n\n17. 2023年3月7日，破产法院命令债务人在2023年3月28日之前对陈述理由令作出答复。债务人对陈述理由令作出答复的时间随后被延长至2023年4月10日，原因是在2023年3月15日，United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）启封了一份包含十二项罪名的起诉书，指控债务人、Je先生以及已知和未知的其他人犯有多项联邦罪行。（United States v. Ho Wan Kwok et al.，纽约南区案件编号 S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)，Doc. No. 2）。债务人于2023年3月15日被联邦执法机关逮捕，目前仍处于联邦羁押中。政府方面表示，通过执行搜查令，其从据其主张属于债务人或由债务人控制的场所查获了手机、计算机或笔记本电脑以及外部介质存储设备。（同上，Doc. No. 26）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 8 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 8 of 63\n\n18. 2023年3月29日，政府提交了一份替代起诉书。该替代起诉书将Wang女士列为共同被告。政府指控债务人、Je先生、Wang女士以及已知和未知的其他人“共谋诈骗数千名受害者超过约10亿美元。”（同上，Doc. No. 19，¶ 1）。政府进一步指控债务人、Je先生、Wang女士及其“共谋者通过一系列复杂的欺诈性和虚构性业务及投资机会进行运作，这些业务和投资机会连接了数十个相互关联的实体，从而使被告及其共谋者得以招揽、洗钱和挪用受害者资金。”（同上）。政府还进一步指控债务人和Je先生“以至少80个不同实体或个人的名义，向超过约500个账户转移资金并指示向其转账及过桥转账。”（同上，¶ 3）。政府指名了部分此类实体或个人，包括GTV、GClubs、GMusic、Rule of Law Society（法治公会）、Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金）、Saraca Media Group, Inc.以及债务人的家庭成员（列于第2004条传票中的关联实体和关联个人），但此类“数十个相互关联的实体”、“80个不同实体或个人”和“约500个账户”中的绝大多数并未在替代起诉书中被指名或确认身份。\n\n19. 在整个替代起诉书中，政府均指控债务人控制着各种实体和个人，其中部分被指名，许多未被指名。例如，政府指控债务人“实际上拥有并控制”GTV Media Group, Inc.，“尽管[债务人]在该实体中并未担任正式职务或头衔”。（同上，¶ 10）。此外，政府指控G|Clubs“实际上由[债务人]拥有并控制，尽管[债务人]在G|Clubs并未担任正式职务或头衔”。（同上，¶ 11）。政府还指控“[由债务人]实际上拥有并控制的实体，例如G|Clubs和G|Fashion，与Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）存在所谓的业务关系……”，且债务人\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 9 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 9 of 63\n\n“声称是其所谓的加密货币的设计者，尽管[债务人]在Himalaya Exchange并未担任正式职务或头衔”。（同上，¶ 12）。虽然政府在替代起诉书中指名提及了某些个人和实体，但政府屡次提及在被指控的欺诈中与债务人共谋的“已知和未知的其他人”，（同上，¶¶ 1, 13, 15-17, 22, 26-32），以及未指名的共谋者。（同上，¶¶ 1-3, 5, 13h 和 14）。\n\n20. 2023年4月10日，债务人提交了其《对第11章受托人关于要求裁定债务人为何不应被认定藐视法庭的陈述理由令动议的异议》（Doc. No. 1650，即“债务人的藐视异议”），同时提交了一份寻求《部分准许关于强制遵守第2004条传票动议命令的有限暂缓执行动议》（Doc. No. 1649，即“暂缓动议”）。\n\n21. 在债务人的藐视异议中，债务人辩称其不应被认定藐视法庭，因为其已通过正当援引包括出示行为法理在内的第五修正案权利遵守了1月20日命令。\n\n22. 2023年4月17日，受托人提交了其《对债务人关于受托人要求裁定债务人为何不应被认定藐视法庭的陈述理由令动议之异议的答复》（Doc. No. 1670），并于2023年4月19日对债务人的暂缓动议提交了异议。在受托人4月17日的答复中，其辩称（除其他事项外）出示行为法理的法定记录例外（Required Records exception）适用于破产案件，因此债务人不能就1月20日命令援引其第五修正案特权，从而构成藐视法庭。\n\n23. 破产法院在数月期间就陈述理由令和暂缓动议举行了多次听证会。在此期间，受托人的律师与债务人当时的特别刑事律师解决了受托人关于债务人须按逐题方式具体援引其第五修正案特权的主张，方式为\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 10 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 10 of 63\n\n债务人对受托人向其提出的202个具体书面问题援引了其第五修正案特权，但相关问题仍留待破产法院裁决。\n\n24. 2023年7月26日，破产法院作出了《藐视法庭命令》，认定出示行为法理适用，但随后进一步认定在破产案件中，依据法定记录例外，出示行为法理存在广泛的例外适用，因此债务人构成藐视法庭。该藐视法庭命令进一步认定，债务人可通过遵守1月20日命令并实施该项出示行为来解除其藐视状态，而破产法院此前已认定该项出示行为本身“无论就检方占有的文件还是检方未扣押的文件而言，均具有证言性和自证其罪性”。（藐视法庭命令，第20页）。\n\nIII. 债务人谨提请准予就破产法院的藐视法庭命令提出上诉\n\na. 提请解决的问题\n\n25. 债务人的上诉将提出以下问题：4\n\n破产法院以法定记录例外在此适用为由认定债务人藐视法庭，是否构成错误。\n\nb. 请求的救济\n\n26. 债务人谨请求地区法院认定，在已指定受托人的破产案件中，法定记录例外并不使债务人的出示行为法理失效，因此债务人就1月20日命令正当援引了其第五修正案特权，且未藐视该命令。\n\n4 在债务人根据适用规则提交所提出问题的陈述书时，债务人保留对本问题进行修改、修正、补充或以其他方式变更的权利。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 11 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 11 of 63\n\nc. 准予上诉许可的理由\n\n27. 根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)，当事人可“经[地区]法院许可”就破产法院的命令和裁定提起中间上诉。“是否准予就破产法院的中间命令提起上诉的决定权属于地区法院的自由裁量范围。” Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A.，285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。在行使该自由裁量权时，地区法院适用 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 规定的标准，并审查“(1) 该命令是否涉及控制性法律问题，(2) 对该问题是否存在实质性的意见分歧理由，以及 (3) 立即就该命令提出上诉是否可能实质性地推进诉讼的最终终结。” 同上，第558页。亦见 Traversa v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.，386 B.R. 386, 388 (D. Conn. 2008)（“在确定是否准予就破产法院的中间命令提出上诉时，本法院将适用 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 规定的标准。”）。此外，“上诉人负有举证责任证明存在值得提起中间上诉的特殊情形……。” Osuji，第557页，（引文及引号省略）。\n\ni. 该命令涉及控制性法律问题\n\n28. 当“推翻破产法院的裁定将(1)终结诉讼或(2)对诉讼结果产生实质性影响”时，该裁定即涉及控制性法律问题。Osuji 案，285 F. Supp. 3d at 558。并见 United States ex rel Minge v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.) 案，13 Misc. 373 (PKC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, *13 (SDNY, Dec. 18, 2013)（“如果存在以下情形，即存在控制性法律问题：(1)推翻地方法院的意见可能导致诉讼被驳回；(2)推翻地方法院的意见即使不导致驳回，也可能对诉讼的进行产生重大影响；或者(3)经证明的问题对大量案件具有先例价值。”）（引文省略）。“此外，该法律问题必须是指‘纯粹’的法律问题，审查法院无需研读案卷记录即可迅速且利落地作出裁决。”2178 Atl. Realty LLC v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. 案，No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021)（引文省略）。\n\n29. 处于本《藐视法庭裁定》（Contempt Order）及本次上诉核心的法律问题无可否认是“纯粹”的，本院可以“无需研读案卷记录即可迅速且利落地作出裁决”。2178 Atl. Realty LLC 案，2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at *11。事实上，此处的根本法律争议在于：根据 11 USC § 521(a)(3) 与破产受托人合作的义务以及根据 11 USC § 521(a)(4) 向受托人移交全部破产财产的义务，是否足以依据“法定记录例外”（Required Records exception）压倒个人依据《第五修正案》（Fifth Amendment）享有的反对自证其罪特权，而不论是否存在强制保存所索取记录的任何法定或监管义务。\n\n30. “现已确立的规则是，当出示行为本身具有(1)受强迫性、(2)证言性且(3)自证其罪性时，个人可以主张出示行为特权（act of production privilege）[依据《第五修正案》]以拒绝出示其内容本身不享有特权的文件。”In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999 案，191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999)。“法定记录例外……废除了法律规定必须保存的一小部分文件所享有的[《第五修正案》]特权保护。”United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012) 案，741 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2013)。正如 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）所判定的：\n\n[法定记录]例外的法理依据包含两个层面。首先，如果某人从事了法律或规章要求进行记录保存的活动，则可视为其已就出示行为放弃了其特权——至少在政府的出示要求与记录保存要求的目的之间存在关联的情形下是如此。其次，由于这些记录依法必须予以保存，记录持有人通过出示这些记录在控制权或真实性认证方面“承认”的内容微乎其微。\n\nIn re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum 案，793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986)。因此，举例而言，法定记录例外已被认定适用于：依据 FINCEN（金融犯罪执法局）规章必须保存的记录，United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012) 案，741 F.3d at 348；涉及商业目的购买酒精饮料的 New York（纽约州）税法所规定的记录，United States v. Doe (In re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury) 案，252 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176-177 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)；以及律师的风险代理聘用协议和结案声明。In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum 案，793 F.2d 69, at 73。\n\n31. United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012) 案中所涉的 FINCEN 规章，正属于要求保存记录并可能导致认定法定记录例外适用于出示该等文件的情形之典型代表，正如 United States Code（《美国法典》）相关规定所明确指出的：\n\n根据 § 1010.350 规定须向 Commissioner of Internal Revenue（美国国税局局长）申报的账户记录，应由对任何该等账户拥有财务利益或签字权或其他权利的每个人予以保存。该等记录应载明开设每个该等账户所用的名称、该等账户的账号或其他标识、开设该等账户的外国银行或其他主体的名称和地址、该等账户的类型以及每个该等账户在申报期内的最高价值。该等记录应保存 5 年，并应随时备置以供依法授权的检查。在计算 5 年期限时，自纳税人因提交虚假或欺诈性联邦所得税申报表或未提交联邦所得税申报表而被起诉（indicted）或提起刑事指控（information instituted）之日起，至该刑事诉讼程序作出终局处置之日止的任何期间，均不计算在内。\n\n31 CR 1010.420。破产法院并未将其《藐视法庭裁定》聚焦于个人依据成文法或规章被要求保存并因此落入出示行为法理（Act of Production Doctrine）之法定记录例外的特定类别文件上，例如 United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012) 案或适用法定记录例外于出示行为法理的其他第二巡回上诉法院判例中所涉及的记录。相反，破产法院认定，与债务人的财务状况、资产和负债相关的每一份记录均属于 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法典》）第 521(a)(3) 条和 (a)(4) 条项下的法定记录，而不论是否存在创建或保存该记录的任何其他法定或监管义务，且尽管《破产法典》的该两项条款均未包含任何保存记录的要求。5 简而言之，破产法院创设了一项吞噬原则本身的“出示行为法理”例外，并在此过程中犯下了应予推翻的可撤销错误。\n\n32. 债务人寻求上诉的法律问题，即《破产法典》第 521(a)(3) 条和第 521(a)(4) 条是否会在指定了受托人的破产案件中导致出示行为法理归于无效，是非常明确直接的，地方法院无需审查案卷记录即可对这一纯粹的法律问题作出裁判。\n\n33. 在现阶段对这一狭窄的法律问题作出裁判虽然不会终结债务人的破产案件，但可以解决债务人针对 1月20日裁定（January 20 Order）所承担的义务，并使债务人在破产案件后续进程中对其《第五修正案》权利的范围获得更明确的指引。具体而言，根据现有的《藐视法庭裁定》，债务人被强制要求在其刑事诉讼程序中提交一份申请——对本问题的解决将免除该项义务。\n\n34. 最后，由于该法律问题属首例案件（first impression），它可能对大量案件具有先例价值（鉴于目前正在进行的破产程序和相关\n\n5 债务人并非主张破产案件中的债务人可以随意销毁记录，但在司法程序中避免证据灭失（spoliation of records）的义务，与积极的法定或监管记录保存义务之间存在根本区别。\n\n对抗性诉讼，即便在本案中也能提供明确性）。因此，《藐视法庭裁定》涉及一项控制性法律问题，第一项考量因素已经满足。\n\nii. 存在重大意见分歧之实质理由\n\n35. 当“(1)该问题上存在相互冲突的判例权威，或(2)该问题特别困难且对第二巡回上诉法院而言属于首次审理的案件”时，即存在重大意见分歧之实质理由。Osuji 案，285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n\n36. 法律检索未发现第二巡回上诉法院有任何通过《破产法典》第 521(a)(3) 和/或 (a)(4) 条适用法定记录例外的判例。同样，检索亦未发现第二巡回上诉法院有任何以破产法院在本案中适用的宽泛程度来适用法定记录例外的判例。因此，这在第二巡回上诉法院似乎属于首次审理的案件。\n\n37. 因此，第二项考量因素已经满足。见 Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.) 案，2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, *15（准予提起中间上诉的许可，因为所提出的问题属于首次审理且“难度大，需要进行复杂的法定解释，并分别涉及《破产法典》不同条款之间、《破产法典》与《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》之间以及《破产法典》与 FCA 之间的交叉重叠”）。\n\niii. 立即上诉实质性推进破产案件内部的效率\n\n38. 这一要件“评估上诉是否会实质性推进诉讼的终结；当上诉有望提前审判时间或缩短审判所需时间时，该要件即告满足”。Osuji 案，285 F. Supp. 3d at 558（引文及引述省略）。\n\n39. 如上所述，《藐视法庭裁定》规定，债务人为消除其藐视法庭状态所应采取的合理步骤包括“在刑事法院提出动议，请求允许向受托人出示检方向债务人出示的、符合 Rule 2004 传票要求的全部文件和记录，但须以受托人遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件为前提”。（《藐视法庭裁定》，第 36 页）。如果地方法院认定不应作出《藐视法庭裁定》，则债务人将无需在其正在 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）审理的刑事案件中提交任何文件以寻求允许其向受托人出示政府提供给他的文件的命令。此外，受托人势必会被卷入任何该等动议程序中（无论是正式还是非正式形式），并且如果破产法院确有错误，受托人将被迫把破产财产资源耗费在一场根本不应发生的程序中。\n\n40. 同样，立即上诉将使债务人和受托人对其在《藐视法庭裁定》项下的权利和义务获得更大的确定性，并且如果《藐视法庭裁定》被推翻且认定法定记录例外不适用，这将允许受托人更迅速地通过其他途径开展证据开示（discovery），从而推进破产案件并使其更接近完结。\n\n41. 因此，第三项考量因素也已满足。\n\niv. 存在准予中间上诉的特殊情形\n\n40. 这是一个不同寻常的情况。债务人是一名自然人，被控犯有多项罪行，并面临潜在监禁的前景。正如任何面临此类后果的个人一样，他享有宪法保障的不自证其罪的权利。然而，现在债务人被迫做出选择：要么拒绝遵守1月20日的裁定，并面临破产法院认为适当的任何藐视法庭制裁；要么设法提交文件，尽管破产法院已得出结论认为“遵守《强制作出裁定》而进行的提交，无论就检方占有的文件而言，还是就\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 17 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 17 of 63\n\n检方尚未扣押的文件而言，均构成证言性质且具有自证其罪性”（见《藐视法庭裁定》第20页），并且即便该《藐视法庭裁定》最终可能在上诉中被撤销。当然，如果在破产案件结束时撤销《藐视法庭裁定》，而在此期间进行的提交导致在债务人有效援引《第五修正案》权利的情况下仍提交了这些记录，那么撤销该裁定将毫无意义。\n\n40. 破产法院提出，如果债务人在刑事诉讼中提出动议，请求法院作出命令允许其向托管人提交政府向其提交且符合《规则 2004》传票要求的文件，债务人并不会因此牺牲其《第五修正案》特权，因为他是在“《强制作出裁定》的强迫下”提出该动议的。（见《藐视法庭裁定》第36页）。然而，破产法院正在强迫债务人在法庭诉讼中从事一项破产法院自身认定具有证言性质且可能自证其罪的行为，而这正是《第五修正案》旨在防止的典型范例。此外，破产法院关于债务人不会放弃其宪法保护的结论，并不能保证托管人或政府不会主张提交此类动议构成了对债务人《第五修正案》特权的放弃。此外，尽管《藐视法庭裁定》重点关注债务人向托管人提交政府在刑事案件中向其提交的文件（同上），但《藐视法庭裁定》并不局限于这一单一种类的文件。（同上（“正如个人债务人的律师在记录中所陈述的，合理步骤包括在刑事法院提出动议，请求允许向托管人提交检方向个人债务人提交且符合《规则 2004》传票要求的文件和记录，前提是托管人遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件。”）（强调为后加））。虽然鉴于债务人\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 18 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 18 of 63\n\n持续处于监禁状态以及政府执行搜查令的情况，债务人不太可能有任何文件可供提交，但债务人的宪法权利不应取决于他是否有可供提交的文件。\n\n41. 本案与前文引用的政府动议强制遵守大陪审团传票的案例存在根本不同。在那些案例中，政府是根据触发“法定记录”例外的法定或监管文件保存要求，直接从证人处获取文件。在本案中，适用“法定记录”例外的依据是《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）。尽管政府不能利用《破产法典》来压制债务人的《第五修正案》权利，但破产法院实际上认定托管人可以在没有任何额外保护的情况下做到这一点。鉴于政府已经向托管人送达了传票，没有任何规定能阻止政府再次这样做，以获取本应受债务人《第五修正案》特权保护、但现已被破产法院裁定必须向托管人提交的记录。如上所述，债务人的宪法权利直接且立即受到破产法院裁定的影响。因此，存在准予立即上诉的特殊情形。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n42. 基于上述所有理由，地区法院应准予债务人就《藐视法庭裁定》提起上诉的许可。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 19 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 19 of 63\n\n日期：康涅狄格州布里奇波特，2023年8月9日\n债务人：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n代表签署：/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy (ct12849)\nJames M. Moriarty (ct21876)\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮箱：ehenzy@zeislaw.com\nJmoriarty@zeislaw.com\n其代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 20 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 20 of 63\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年8月9日，前述文书的副本已通过电子方式归档。此归档通知将通过本法院电子归档系统的运行以电子邮件方式发送给所有当事人，或者按照《电子归档通知》所示，以邮寄方式发送给任何无法接受电子归档的人员。各当事人可通过本法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅此归档文件。\n\n代表签署：/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy (ct12849)\n\n附件 A\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 22 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 1 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 22 of 63\n\nUnited States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n\n涉及：ECF 编号 1453 及 1649\n\n出庭律师\n\nLuc A. Despins（出庭辩论）\nAvram E. Luft\nG. Alexander Bongartz\nDouglass Barron\nPaul Hastings LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka\nPatrick R. Linsey\nNeubert, Pepe & Montieth\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（出庭辩论）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议人及交叉被申请人 Luc A. Despins 先生（Ho Wan Kwok 先生破产财产之第11章托管人）之代理律师\n\nStephen R. Cook\nBrown Rudnick LLP\n2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor\nIrvine, California 92612\n\n以及\n\nStephen A. Best（出庭辩论）\nBrown Rudnick LLP\n601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20005\n\n以及\n\nEric Henzy（出庭辩论）\nJames M. Moriarty\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n10 Middle Street\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\nWilliam Baldiga（出庭辩论）\nBrown Rudnick LLP\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n被申请人及交叉动议人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（债务人1）之代理律师\n\n判定个人债务人藐视法庭并驳回中止强制作出裁定动议的决定备忘录及裁定\n\nJulie A. Manning，美国破产法官\n\nI. 引言\n\n现摆在法院面前的是由 Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生（即“个人债务人”）破产财产（即“破产财产”）之第11章托管人（即“托管人”）身份提起的《请求裁定要求说明为何不应判定债务人藐视法庭理由的动议》（即《藐视法庭动议》）（ECF No. 14532），以及由个人债务人提起的《请求有限度中止准予部分强制遵守动议之裁定的动议》（即《中止动议》，与《藐视法庭动议》各自称为“交叉动议”，合称为“各项交叉动议”）（ECF No. 1649）。托管人请求判决个人债务人因未遵守《准予部分强制遵守动议的裁定》（即《强制作出裁定》）（ECF No. 1353）而构成民事藐视法庭。个人债务人提出交叉动议，鉴于在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）（即“刑事法院”）审理中的刑事诉讼案件 United States v. Kwok，案件编号 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.)（即“刑事诉讼”），请求中止执行《强制作出裁定》。基于\n\n1 自这些事项进行法庭辩论以来，Brown Rudnick LLP 的律师已撤回其出庭代理。（ECF No. 2034。）\n\n2 本决定备忘录中讨论的各种诉状和裁定具有综合性质。为清晰和连贯起见，诉状和裁定的标题仅就其涉及本案在庭当事人的部分予以列出。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 24 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 3 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 24 of 63\n\n下文所述理由，本法院判定个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭，并驳回《中止动议》。\n\nII. 背景\n\n个人债务人于2022年2月15日向本法院提交了自愿第11章破产申请。（ECF No. 1。）个人债务人的案件与其两家关联公司的第11章案件合并审理。（ECF Nos. 970 和 1141。）基于其中阐明的理由，本法院于2022年6月15日作出一份决定备忘录及指定第11章托管人的裁定。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022年7月8日，Despins 先生被指定为托管人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\n2022年7月28日，托管人提交了《关于对［个人］债务人进行2004调查的动议》（ECF No. 636），法院于2022年8月16日准予了该动议（ECF No. 757）。2022年8月19日，《规则 2004》传票送达个人债务人。（参见，例如，ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7。）2022年10月28日，托管人提交了《请求裁定强制个人债务人遵守规则 2004 传票的动议》（即《强制动议》）。（ECF No. 1046。）2022年11月14日，个人债务人对《强制动议》提出异议。（ECF No. 1090。）2022年11月30日，就《强制动议》举行了听证会。法院将《强制动议》留待进一步审议。2023年1月20日3，法院作出了《强制作出裁定》。（ECF No. 1353。）\n\n3 在2022年11月16日至2023年1月13日期间，本法院正在处理与这些第11章案件相关的对抗性诉讼事项，案名为 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok)，案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼编号 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023)（以下简称“社交媒体/抗议对抗性诉讼”）。根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3)，法院被要求“在最早可行的时间处理该对抗性诉讼中的事项，其优先级高于除同类性质的更早事项的听证会之外的所有其他事项”。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 25 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 4 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 25 of 63\n\n2023年2月7日，个人债务人提交了一份针对《强制作出披露裁定》（Order Compelling Production）的声明（以下简称「《声明》」）。(ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) 在该《声明》中，个人债务人经伪证罪受罚警告陈述称，就「日期为2022年8月17日的传票整体，包括其中列出的所有文件和信息调取请求」，他援引了其「《美国宪法第五修正案》项下的权利，包括基于作出披露行为法则[,]（act of production doctrine）项下的权利」。(Id. Ex. A.) 2023年2月10日，受托人提交了《藐视法庭动议》（Contempt Motion），主张：(i) 个人债务人需要证明其援引第五修正案具有正当理由，并说明为何不应认定其藐视法庭；(ii) 即使个人债务人的援引是正当的，他也需要针对每一项文件和信息请求分别主张该权利；以及 (iii) 该《声明》未遵守《强制作出披露裁定》，因为其未详细说明为搜寻响应传票的文件和信息所作出的努力。(ECF No. 1453.) 2023年3月7日，法院就该《藐视法庭动议》举行了听证会。听证会结束时，法院就《藐视法庭动议》提出的各项争议问题设定了诉答文书提交时间表。\n\n2023年3月15日，在一项相关对抗性程序（adversary proceeding）的证据听证会开始时，个人债务人的律师通知法院，针对个人债务人的起诉书已在刑事诉讼案（Criminal Action）中解封，且 Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局，简称「FBI」）已于当天清晨逮捕了个人债务人。2023年3月22日，法院准许了个人债务人延长答复《藐视法庭动议》期限的动议。(ECF No. 1585.)\n\n2023年4月10日，个人债务人对《藐视法庭动议》提交了异议。(ECF No. 1650.) 个人债务人的异议主张，其已遵守《强制作出披露裁定》，因为其已正当援引了反对自证其罪的第五修正案权利。(Id.) 与此同时，个人债务人通过其在刑事诉讼案中的律师（该律师作为其特别（刑事）律师在这些第11章破产案件中出庭）提交了《中止诉讼动议》（Stay Motion）。(ECF No. 1649.) 该《中止诉讼动议》主张，为了保护个人债务人反对自证其罪的第五修正案权利，本法院必须在刑事诉讼案解决之前中止执行《强制作出披露裁定》。(Id.) 2023年4月14日，受托人对针对《藐视法庭动议》的异议提交了答辩意见。(ECF No. 1670.) 2023年4月19日，受托人对《中止诉讼动议》提交了异议。(ECF No. 1680.)\n\n2023年4月20日，法院就交叉动议（Cross-Motions）举行了听证会。辩论结束时，受托人与个人债务人看似就交叉动议达成了合意解决。然而，2023年4月24日，各方当事人提交了相互竞争的拟定裁定草案。(ECF Nos. 1698, 1699.) 2023年4月27日，法院就交叉动议举行了案情状态会议（Status Conference），以讨论这些相互竞争的裁定草案。各方当事人同意在能够达成一致的地方按合意方式推进，但对先前协议的条款表达了分歧。2023年5月1日，法院签署了一份合意裁定，要求个人债务人对受托人提出的两百零二（202）个问题中的每一个问题，单独援引其第五修正案权利。(ECF No. 1740.) 同日，个人债务人还提交了一份补充诉答文书，以支持其对4月20日协议的解释。(ECF No. 1737.)\n\n2023年5月2日，法院就交叉动议举行了第二次听证会，结果在4月20日协议的条款上陷入僵局。受托人主张，各方已达成一致，个人债务人将在刑事诉讼案中提交一项动议，请求许可向受托人分享检方向其披露的材料，前提是受托人遵守刑事诉讼案中发布的保护令、其他保密令以及使用限制。个人债务人则主张，各方已达成一致，个人债务人将争取（可能通过动议方式）让检方同意同时向个人债务人和受托人披露文件，前提是受托人遵守刑事诉讼案中发布的保护令、其他保密令以及使用限制。鉴于上述僵局，法院认定必须对交叉动议作出裁决。然而，个人债务人的破产律师请求法院在对交叉动议作出裁决前暂缓等待，以便给个人债务人时间去了解检方在刑事诉讼案中向其披露材料的性质。\n\n鉴于所涉问题的严重性质，法院进行了等待。2023年6月13日，法院就交叉动议举行了最终听证会。法院询问各方当事人在交叉动议的合意解决方面是否取得任何进展。各方当事人报告称，个人债务人已准备了一份补充声明（以下简称「《补充声明》」），其中他针对受托人的每一个问题分别援引了第五修正案。(参见 Despins ex rel. Kwok v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1.) 然而，除《补充声明》之外，各方当事人报告僵局依然存在，并请求法院对交叉动议作出裁决。法院将交叉动议留待进一步审议。\n\n交叉动议现已成熟，可予以裁决。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)，United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区联邦地方法院）对本案具有管辖权。依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及美国康涅狄格区联邦地方法院于1984年9月21日作出的《移送案件裁定》（Order of Reference），本法院有权审理并裁决本案。本案程序依成文法属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)。法院认定其行使管辖权不受宪法层面关切的阻碍。比较 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。此外，受托人与个人债务人通过提交终局性动议（dispositive motions）且未对本法院作出终局裁定的权力提出异议，已默示同意本法院就交叉动议作出终局裁定。参见 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015)（判定尽管存在 Stern 案的判决，当事人仍可同意由破产法院作出终局裁定）；True Traditions, LC v. Wu, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015)（判定提交终局性动议即构成默示同意）。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 及 1409，本司法辖区的审判地（Venue）是适当的。\n\nIV. 论述4\n\n交叉动议提出了严肃的问题。受托人寻求以个人债务人未遵守《强制作出披露裁定》为由判定其藐视法庭。个人债务人主张，援引其反对自证其罪的第五修正案权利即属于遵守裁定，并且必须通过中止执行《强制作出披露裁定》来予以保护。基于下述理由，法院认定，在法院面前的具体事实和情况下，反对自证其罪的第五修正案权利并不适用。因此，法院判定个人债务人藐视法庭，并驳回《中止诉讼动议》。\n\nA. 个人债务人是否构成民事藐视法庭？\n\n法院首先考虑个人债务人是否因未遵守《强制作出披露裁定》而构成藐视法庭。依据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 及 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020，本法院有权判定当事人藐视法庭。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019)；PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021)；Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。经 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 以及 D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) 和 2004-1(a) 适用之《联邦民事诉讼规则》第37(b)(1)条及第37(b)(2)(A)(vii)条，提供了进一步的法定权力，可判定当事人因违反强制披露证据开示材料的裁定而构成藐视法庭。\n\n4 以下内容构成法院依据《联邦破产诉讼规则》第7052条作出的事实认定和法律结论，该规则依据第9014(c)条适用于争议事项。\n\n寻求藐视法庭制裁的目的可以是「『强迫被告遵守』」法院裁定，或是「『就因不遵守法院裁定而造成的损失对申诉人予以赔偿』」。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)）。民事藐视法庭的认定要求满足以下条件：「(1) 藐视法庭者未遵守的裁定是明确且无歧义的，(2) 未遵守裁定的证据是清楚且有说服力的，以及 (3) 藐视法庭者未以合理方式勤勉尝试予以遵守。」King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995)。藐视法庭者还必须 (4) 获知相关裁定的通知。Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。\n\n1. 《强制遵守裁定》是否明确且无歧义？\n\n当「对被告行为的违法性『[不]存在合理怀疑理由』」时，该裁定即为明确且无歧义的。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)）。法院通常适用客观标准——「如果当事人的主观认知在客观上是不合理的，那么其认为自己正在遵守裁定的主观认知通常不能使其免受民事藐视法庭的追究。」Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（引用 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)（「不存在故意并不免除民事藐视法庭责任。」））。尽管如此，一方当事人的恶意可能证明「将『判令中任何不确定性的负担……置于违反法院裁定一方的肩上』」是正当的，并且「一方当事人的善意，即使其并不阻却民事藐视法庭的认定，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁措施。」Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（引用 McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 及 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)）。\n\n《强制作出披露裁定》在相关部分载明如下内容：\n\n裁定如下：就针对［个人］债务人（[Individual] Debtor）的证据开示请求而言，异议被驳回，但要求提供日期早于 2014年6月1日 的文件的请求以及要求提供［个人］债务人护照的请求除外；在上述例外范围内，异议被支持，且不影响信托受托人（Trustee）在调查推进过程中、经说明理由后在日后要求获取日期早于 2014年6月1日 的文件及［个人］债务人护照的权利。［个人］债务人应在 2023年1月31日 下午 5:00 之前，搜寻并向受托人提供：\n\n(i) 符合受托人请求且日期为 2014年6月1日 或之后的文件，除非某项具体请求明确指定了不早于 2014年6月1日 开始的其他时间段；\n\n(ii) 针对受托人请求所要求提供的、关于其承认其拥有的财产以及据称属于除［个人］债务人以外的个人或实体的财产（包括但不限于其家庭成员及关联实体）的文件；以及\n\n(iii) 符合受托人请求且在其保管、占有或控制之下的文件，包括但不限于其现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问卷宗中的文件，除非该等文件已由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问提交，但无需考虑其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问日后可能作出的任何提交；\n\n特此进一步\n\n裁定如下：［个人］债务人应在 2023年2月7日 下午 5:00 之前，在本案卷宗中提交一份宣誓声明，详细说明其本人及其律师为应对传票所采取的文件收集、检索和审查行动，包括但不限于详细说明其本人及其律师为实现以下目的所执行的流程：\n\n(i) 查明［个人］债务人的所有电子设备；其有权访问的所有在线文件存储库；与电子文件相关的所有社交媒体、电子邮件及其他账户；所有银行账户及相关\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 10 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 31 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 31 of 63\n\n对账单；以及可能存在的所有其他符合要求的纸质和电子文件的潜在来源；以及\n\n(ii) 在上述来源中搜寻符合要求的文件，包括但不限于符合与支出或资金转移相关的请求、与［个人］债务人家庭或关联实体相关的财产或财务或商业交易或记录相关的请求，以及与［个人］债务人相关的商业利益相关的请求的文件……\n\n(ECF No. 1353.) 个人债务人在诉状中或在口头辩论期间均未提出关于强制提供文件裁定（Order Compelling Production）的含义存在“合理怀疑理由”的任何抗辩。5 本法院认定，强制提供文件裁定就涉及个人债务人的部分而言是明确且毫无歧义的。6\n2. 个人债务人是否遵守了强制提供文件裁定？\n\n关于第二个构成要件，受托人必须以明确且有说服力的证据证明个人债务人未遵守强制提供文件裁定。King 案，65 F.3d at 1058。受托人主张，由于 (i) 个人债务人未能提供文件或记录，且 (ii) 个人债务人未能提交查明文件或记录潜在来源以及检索这些来源所做努力的声明，因此个人债务人未遵守强制提供文件裁定。\n\n作为回应，个人债务人提出了两点抗辩理由。第一，个人债务人主张其不可能遵守该裁定，因为他目前在审前被羁押且没有审前释放的可能性。第二，个人债务人主张\n\n5 个人债务人辩称，关于个人债务人是否可以针对强制提供文件裁定援引其《美国宪法第五修正案》（Fifth Amendment）反对强迫自证其罪的权利，存在合理的怀疑理由。本法院在下文关于个人债务人是否已勤勉尽责地尝试遵守强制提供文件裁定的讨论中审理该抗辩。\n\n6 本法院此前已裁定，强制提供文件裁定对其他各方而言是明确且毫无歧义的。（见 ECF No. 1537。）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 11 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 32 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 32 of 63\n\n“提供行为”（act of production）原则允许他在回应提供文件和记录的请求时，援引其《第五修正案》反对强迫自证其罪的权利。在此基础上，个人债务人坚称其已遵守了强制提供文件裁定。\ni. 个人债务人是否不可能遵守裁定？\n\n虽然个人债务人的说法是正确的，即“长期以来公认的针对民事藐视法庭指控的抗辩是被指控的个人无力遵守法院的裁定”，United States v. Wendy 案，575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)，且评估履行的不可能性之适当时机是在作出藐视法庭裁决之时，United States v. Rylander 案，460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983)，但本法院认定，对个人债务人而言，履行该裁定仍然是可能的。虽然控方确实因刑事诉讼（Criminal Action）扣押了个人债务人的文件和记录，但个人债务人尚未证明 (a) 其所有文件和记录均已被扣押，且 (b) 他没有被扣押记录的其他副本。此外，根据其律师的陈述，本法院了解到，控方在刑事诉讼中向个人债务人提供证据的程序应很快开始——如果尚未开始的话。虽然 (i) 受托人可能必须签署并遵守刑事诉讼中的保密要求和使用限制，且 (ii) 向受托人提供证据可能遭到控方的反对或不被刑事法院（Criminal Court）允许，但个人债务人请求刑事法院允许向受托人提供证据并非不可能。尽管个人债务人目前在审前被羁押，但他的律师并未被羁押。个人债务人可以通过其律师和/或其他代理人提供文件。因此，个人债务人并非不可能遵守强制提供文件裁定。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 12 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 33 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 33 of 63\nii. 个人债务人是否正当援引了《第五修正案》？\na. “提供行为”原则是否适用？\n\n个人债务人关于其已遵守强制提供文件裁定的抗辩依据的是“提供行为”原则。在 Fisher v. United States 案中，尽管该案认定涉案的提供行为不受《第五修正案》保护，但美国\n\n最高法院（United States Supreme Court）依然认定\n\n依传票提供证据的行为本身就具有沟通传意的性质，这完全独立于所提供文件自身的内容。对传票的遵守即默示承认了所要求文件的存在，以及纳税人对这些文件的占有或控制。这也表明纳税人认为这些文件就是传票中所描述的文件。\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)；见 United States v. Hubbell 案，530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000)。在 Fisher 案中，\n\n最高法院认定，判断提供行为是否受《第五修正案》保护的检验标准是，根据现行的《第五修正案》法理，提供行为中所包含的“默示陈述”（tacit averments）是否同时具有“证明性”（testimonial）和“自证其罪性”（incriminating）。425 U.S. at 410–11。最高法院特别对以下方面的默示陈述表达了关切：(i) 文件或记录的存在；(ii) 提供方对文件或记录的占有或控制；以及 (iii) 提供方认为该等文件和记录即传票所请求的文件和记录。同上。提供行为原则并不保护文件具有证明性和自证其罪性的内容——它仅保护具有证明性和自证其罪性的提供行为。同上；Hubbell 案，530 U.S. at 40–41。\n\n根据美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit）具有约束力的判例，在以下情况下，提供行为可能包含具有证明性质的默示陈述：“(1)‘如果政府不知晓传票所调取文件的存在和位置’；或 (2) 提供行为将‘默示鉴真’该等文件。”United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena) 案，1\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 13 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 34 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 34 of 63\n\nF.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993)（以下简称“Grand Jury 1993 案”）（引用 United States v. Fox 案，721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1983)）。如果受托人能够证明 (1) 文件的存在和位置；以及 (2) 文件的真实性已是“不争的”（foregone）定论或已由其他证据确立，则该提供行为不受《第五修正案》保护。Grand Jury 1993 案，1 F.3d at 93。此外，即使根据 Fox 案提供行为所涉及的默示陈述具有证明性，个人债务人还必须证明披露文件或记录的存在、位置或真实性具有自证其罪性。见 Hoffman v. United States 案，341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951)；Fox 案，721 F.2d at 40；In re Schick 案，215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)；比较 Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona) 案，732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984)。\n\n个人债务人证明提供行为具有证明性和自证其罪性的证明责任低于通常的证明责任标准：“要维持该特权，只需从问题的含义以及提出问题的背景中明显看出，对该问题作出正面回答或解释为何无法回答可能会带来危险，因为可能导致有害的披露。”Hoffman 案，341 U.S. at 486–87。在确定个人债务人是否可以援引《第五修正案》时，法院必须运用其“对本案特殊情况的个人感知”，正如参考个人债务人提交的事实依据一样。同上，第 487 页。如果提供行为可能构成用于起诉个人债务人的“证据链中的一环”，则该提供行为具有自证其罪性。同上，第 486 页。\n\n个人债务人主张，在强制提供文件裁定的强迫下提供文件和记录将具有证明性，因为该提供行为可能被解释为默示陈述其受益拥有和/或控制各类实体及财产，并且他对各类人员拥有支配权。个人债务人辩称，此类默示陈述将具有自证其罪性，因为当前的刑事诉讼以及一项据称针对\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 14 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 35 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 35 of 63\n\n破产犯罪的调查，均涉及关于个人债务人对实体和/或财产的实际拥有与控制，以及个人债务人对某些个人的支配权和/或控制权的指控。\n\n受托人（Trustee）对个人债务人（Individual Debtor）的主张提出了诸多异议。受托人的主要异议在于：“法定记录”原则（\"required records\" doctrine）适用，并且属于交付行为原则（act of production doctrine）的例外情形。为支持该主张，受托人坚称，作为破产案件中的债务人，个人债务人不得为了规避《破产法》（Bankruptcy Code）所要求的交付与其财务状况、资产及负债有关的文件和记录而援引《第五修正案》（Fifth Amendment）——无论该交付行为是否具有证明性且具自证其罪性质。受托人所主张的涉及个人债务人在其破产案件中法定义务的“法定记录”论点将在下文予以论述。本法院将首先审理受托人关于个人债务人是否已完成举证责任以证明履行《强令交付命令》（Order Compelling Production）既具有证明性又具自证其罪性质的各项异议。\n补充声明\n\n个人债务人与受托人已就受托人的其中一项异议达成解决。在提交藐视法庭动议（Contempt Motion）及就该动议举行听证会之前，个人债务人声明概括性地主张了其不受自证其罪的《第五修正案》权利。受托人辩称此举不当，因为：(a) 此类概括性主张并不能证明个人债务人在援引《第五修正案》之前已妥善考虑了受托人的每一项请求；以及 (b) 这些第11章案件属于民事程序，这意味着个人债务人援引《第五修正案》在适当情况下可被采纳为证据。然而，个人债务人此后已依据一项同意令（consent order）提供了《补充声明》（Supplemental Declaration），其中他针对受托人提出的每一项问题逐一进行了回答，并针对全部二百零二（202）个问题均主张了其《第五修正案》权利。尽管个人债务人目前已针对受托人的具体问题妥善援引了其《第五修正案》权利，但与文件交付相关的问题依然存在。\n起诉前援引《第五修正案》\n\n受托人针对个人债务人证明其履行《强令交付命令》所提出的其余异议之一缺乏说服力。受托人辩称，个人债务人在针对他的起诉书解封之前就已构成藐视法庭，现在不能鉴于刑事诉讼（Criminal Action）而援引《第五修正案》来避免被认定为藐视法庭。然而，个人债务人的主张是正确的，即《第五修正案》可在刑事诉讼开始之前援引。参见 United States v. Miranti 案，253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958)（允许证人在仅存在极微小被起诉可能性的情况下援引《第五修正案》）。正如个人债务人可以在2022年12月的证据听证会期间以及2023年3月的作证质询期间主张其《第五修正案》权利一样，只要他有“合理理由担心直接回答会带来危险”且其《第五修正案》权利在其他方面适用，他便可以在2023年2月这样做。Hoffman 案，341 U.S. at 486。\n检方占有的文件\n\n受托人的第二个论点同样不能成立。受托人辩称，由于检方已经占有了个人债务人的文件和记录，因此对个人债务人并无损害。受托人的说法在这些文件确实存在且存放地点已知这一点上是正确的，因此未能满足 Fox 案检验标准的第一项要件。Grand Jury 1993 案，1 F.3d at 93。尽管如此，交付已经由检方占有的个人债务人文件和记录的行为本身是否会导致对这些文件和记录的真实性予以确认，仍然是一个争议问题。同上。个人债务人担心其交付行为会确认这些文件的真实性。本法院尚未查阅这些文件和记录。受托人亦未查阅。本法院意识到受托人处于困难境地，因为他并非该刑事诉讼的一方当事人。然而，受托人尚未证明这些文件和记录的真实性属于必然结论。因此，根据 Fox 案检验标准的第二项要件，对检方所占有文件和记录真实性的默示陈述可能具有证明性。同上。\n\n此外，由于检方扣押的文件和记录可能会在刑事诉讼中用于起诉个人债务人，本法院认为个人债务人的下述论点具有说服力：即他对这些文件和记录的默示真实性确认可能会成为用于起诉他的“证据链条中的一环”。Hoffman 案，341 U.S. at 486。因此，除非受托人能够证明这些文件和记录的真实性属于必然结论，否则交付行为原则适用于检方持有的文件，除非该原则存在适用例外。\n非检方占有的文件\n\n个人债务人辩称，《强令交付命令》强令其交付的全部文件和记录均已被检方扣押。本法院不予认同，并因此继续展开论述。正如受托人所主张的那样，关于个人债务人因目前身陷囹圄而在其占有、保管或控制下已无任何文件或记录的概括性主张并无说服力。联邦调查局（FBI）显然在个人债务人的多处住所扣押了大量文件、记录和电子设备，尽管此前曾有陈述称个人债务人几乎未保留任何文件、记录和设备。\n\n同样，受托人的说法是正确的，即没有任何证据依据支持下述主张：在个人债务人占有、保管或控制下的记录中，没有尚未包含在检方已扣押文件和记录之中的记录。鉴于以往对个人债务人律师所做努力（或者视情况而言，缺乏此类努力）的描述，个人债务人未能确立其进行过合理勤勉的检索。（参见《强令交付命令》第9段。）基于这两点理由，本法院认定个人债务人未能证明所有潜在相关的响应性文件和记录均已被检方扣押。\n\n对于未被检方扣押的文件和记录，受托人尚未证明这些文件的存放地点、存在性或真实性属于必然结论。因此，如果个人债务人证明其具有自证其罪性质，交付行为原则将予以适用。Fox 案，721 F.2d at 36。受托人辩称，个人债务人未能履行其证明所请求文件和记录具有自证其罪性质的举证责任。受托人的说法是正确的，即即使提供了《补充声明》，个人债务人也未能证明所请求的每一次交付都具有自证其罪性质。\n\n尽管如此，本法院充分考虑到个人债务人所需承担的较轻举证责任。本法院亦充分考虑到，必须基于自身对这些第11章案件及相关民事附随诉讼（adversary proceedings）的事实和环境的理解。Hoffman 案，341 U.S. at 486–87。此外，正如个人债务人律师所指出的，“所赋予的特权不仅涵盖其本身即可支持依据联邦刑事成文法予以定罪的回答，同样涵盖那些可为起诉主张人犯有联邦罪行提供所需证据链条中一环的回答。”同上，第486页。然而，本法院对“案件特殊性的个人理解”还包括观察到个人债务人除了公开声明希望避免自证其罪外，还阻碍了对其资产、负债和财务状况的合法调查。同上，第487页。（参见例如社交媒体/抗议附随诉讼，ECF No. 133。）\n\n仅凭刑事诉讼中的起诉书（indictment），并不足以使个人债务人就检方未扣押的文件和记录完成其举证责任。起诉书指控了可追溯至大约2018年的欺诈行为，而受托人迄今感兴趣的诸多资产——特定游艇 Lady May（梅夫人号）；雪莉-尼德兰酒店（Sherry-Netherland Hotel）的公寓；Ace Decade Holdings Limited（源德控股有限公司）诉讼请求权——据称均是在2018年之前取得的。虽然其中部分资产（例如 Lady May 游艇）在起诉书中有所提及，但基于“对案件特殊性的个人理解”以及个人债务人微不足道的举证，本法院无法认定个人债务人已充分支持了其基于刑事诉讼而对《第五修正案》作出的概括性主张。同上，第487页。个人债务人未能证明其所有资产、负债和财务状况均与所指控的欺诈有关，或可能以某种方式构成有关所指控欺诈的“证据链条中的一环”。同上，第486页。\n\n为支持其已履行《强令交付命令》的主张，个人债务人还出示了一份向受托人发出的传票，该传票涉及对这些第11章案件中可能构成的潜在破产犯罪指控所展开的调查。（ECF No. 1719，第*80:20–81:8行。）如上所述，在判定交付文件是否具自证其罪性质时，因该项调查而导致被起诉是否具有可能性并不重要。Miranti 案，253 F.2d at 139。\n\n《美国法典》第18编（Title 18 of the United States Code）第152、156、157、1519及3284条规定了与在破产案件中隐匿资产相关的犯罪。第152、156、157和1519条要求明知、故意或欺诈行为。第3284条要求“隐匿”。关于个人债务人占有或控制响应《破产诉讼规则》第2004条传票（Rule 2004 subpoena）的文件或记录、以及此类文件或记录属实的默示陈述，其本身并不具有自证其罪性质，因为它们并不能证明个人债务人明知、故意或欺诈性地向破产财产（Estate）隐瞒了资产——或隐瞒了与资产有关的文件和记录。债务人通常会错误地遗漏资产和负债，并修改其财务状况表和资产负债表清单，以及/或者更新其披露内容。\n\n尽管如此，本法院必须考虑此类默示主张是否构成关于个人债务人可能因向受托人、本法院及其债权人隐匿其财产而被起诉的“证据链中的一环”。见 Hoffman 案，341 U.S. at 486。受托人指控个人债务人拥有众多商业利益，且应当拥有相应的文书和记录。虽然个人债务人否认了这些指控，但基于本法院及其他法院此前的认定，根据本法院“对本案特殊之处的亲自洞察”，个人债务人至少拥有超出其目前所承认的商业利益中的某些利益。参见 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan（太盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙 诉 郭文贵），Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022)，NYCEF No. 1181；E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC，Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021)。（参见 ECF No. 1110；HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023)，ECF Nos. 177, 221；社交媒体/抗议抗辩诉讼，ECF No. 133 ¶ 7。）本法院认为，个人债务人的出示可能与 Hubbell 案中涉及的出示具有相似的广泛性。参见 530 U.S. at 40–43。尽管 Hubbell 案是一起涉及向当事人授予豁免权、出示范围已知且举证责任已转移给控方的案件，但个人债务人可能同样需要“在识别符合传票要求的数百份文件时，广泛使用‘其自己大脑中的内容’”，并实质上绘制出其资产、负债和商业利益的图谱。参见同上，at 43。关于对破产犯罪的指控调查，此类图谱可能有助于发现关于知情、故意或欺诈的证据。结合本法院对这些第11章破产案及相关抗辩程序具体事实和情况的了解，本法院认定，此类承认可能构成证据链中的环节，因为它们可能具有“派生使用”价值。参见同上，at 41–43。\n\n个人债务人的出示行为具有证言性质且具有自证其罪性质\n\n基于上述理由，本法院得出结论：遵照《强令出示命令》进行出示，无论是关于检方占有的文件，还是关于尚未被检方扣押的文件，都将具有证言性质并具有自证其罪性质。参见 Fisher 案，425 U.S. at 410–11。然而，本法院指出，迄今为止的证据记录并不充分。如果受托人今后能够 (i) 证明任何文件的存放地点、存在性和真实性均已是不争之结论；(ii) 针对任何文件或文件类别证明个人债务人未尽到其举证责任；或 (iii) 证明其就已经掌握了涉及任何文件或文件类别的个人债务人资产、负债和商业利益图谱，则在提出正当动议后，可对本认定予以重新审查。\n\nb. “法定必备记录”例外是否适用？\n\n尽管出示行为原则适用，但这并未结束本法院的分析，也并不必然决定《蔑视法庭动议》的结果。如上所述，受托人的主要主张是：在呈交本法院的具体事实和情况下，法定必备记录原则适用，并构成了出示行为原则的例外。因此，受托人主张，出示行为原则是否允许个人债务人针对《强令出示命令》正当援引其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利并不重要，因为法定必备记录例外在本案中适用。\n\n为支持其主张，受托人援引了 Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight（巴尔的摩市社会服务局 诉 鲍奈特），493 U.S. 549 (1990)。在 Bouknight 案中，最高法院重申并再次确认了在 Fisher 案之后法定必备记录原则的存在。493 U.S. at 555–59。根据法定必备记录原则，“不得援引《第五修正案》特权来拒绝服从为实现与实施刑法无关的国家公共目的而构建的监管体系。”同上，at 556；参见 Grosso v. United States，390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968)（阐明关于法定必备记录原则应考虑的要素）；Shapiro v. United States，335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948)（首创法定必备记录原则）。\n\n个人债务人主张，Bouknight 案并未阐述 Fisher 案中所确立的出示行为原则的例外，且法定必备记录原则并不规定强制作出具有证言性质和自证其罪性质的文件与记录出示。个人债务人的主张与 Bouknight 案明确的裁判文书文本相抵触，该判决指出：\n\n出示命令可能强制作出或被证明具有自证其罪性质的证言性主张这一可能性，并非在所有情况下均构成援引特权以拒绝出示的正当理由。即使假定这一有限的证言性主张已足够具有自证其罪性质且“就特权目的而言已足够具有证言性质”，Bouknight 仍不得援引该特权来抗拒出示命令，因为她已经承担了与出示相关的保管职责，且出示是作为非刑事监管制度的一部分而被要求的。\n\nBouknight 案，493 U.S. at 555–56（讨论 Fisher 案）（内部引文省略）。除最高法院外，第二巡回法院亦明确驳回了个人债务人的主张：\n\n“法定必备记录原则是《第五修正案》特权的例外。因此，在该特权原本适用的情形下，该原则必然优于该特权。Fisher 案并不涉及法定必备记录，且其分析中的任何内容均不能被解释为削弱了法定必备记录例外。”\n\nUnited States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)，741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013)（以下简称“Grand Jury 2013 案”）（援引 Doe v. United States (In re Doe)，711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir. 1983)）。事实上，第二巡回法院明确强调指出，“本法院已两次明确驳回关于法定必备记录例外已被出示行为原则所废止的观点。”Grand Jury 2013 案，741 F.3d at 346。这一具有约束力的最高法院及第二巡回法院先例清楚表明，法定必备记录原则是出示行为原则的例外。7 因此，如果法定必备记录例外在本案中适用，则无论关于此类出示具有证言性质和自证其罪性质的结论如何，个人债务人均未能遵从《强令出示命令》。\n\n在确定法定必备记录原则是否适用时，第二巡回法院求助于 Grosso 案考量要素。Grand Jury 2013 案，741 F.3d at 345。在 Grosso 案中，最高法院适用了以下要素：“第一，美国的调查目的必须主要属于监管性质；第二，获取信息的方式是要求保存被监管方依惯例一直保存的同类记录；第三，记录本身必须已具备‘公共属性’，使其至少类似于公共文件。”390 U.S. at 67–68。在本案中，受托人所寻求的文件和记录，依据《强令出示命令》所认定，与“[个人债务人]的行为、作为或财产，或其负债和财务状况相关，或与可能影响[破产财产]管理的任何事项相关”。《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 2004(b) 条。因此，个人债务人有义务根据第 521(a)(3) 条和 (a)(4) 条出示受托人所寻求的文件和记录。所以，争议焦点在于个人债务人根据第 521(a)(3) 条和 (a)(4) 条有义务出示的文件和记录是否属于 Grosso 测试标准下的法定必备记录。\n\n第 7 号脚注：个人债务人注意到受托人引用的案例之一 In re Ross，156 B.R. 272, 279 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)，该案既认定所要求出示的文件不具备充分的证言性质，又认定法定必备记录原则适用。根据这一观察，个人债务人推断后一项裁决以前一项为前提。本法院得出相反的结论。Ross 案中的法院与许多法院（尤其是须接受上诉审查的下级法院）一样，为其关于该案债务人不能正当援引《第五修正案》的结论提出了多项依据。156 B.R. at 281（“第五，即使此处涉及的出示行为既具有证言性质又具有自证其罪性质，第7章作为一项面向整个社会而非面向固有可疑犯罪阶层的监管制度的性质，亦使出示行为排除在《第五修正案》的保护之外。”）（强调为后加）。\n\n《破产法典》第 521(a)(3) 条和第 521(a)(4) 条的立法目的是什么？\n\n在确定第一项要素是否支持适用法定必备记录原则时，法院必须考虑相关“立法是否并非‘针对广大公众’且涉及‘充斥着刑事法规的领域’”。Grand Jury 2013 案，741 F.3d at 347（援引 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.，382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)）；参见 Marchetti v. United States，390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968)；Haynes v. United States，390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968)。法院必须针对所涉及的具体法条作出此项判定，而非参照整个周边的成文法背景。Grand Jury 2013 案，741 F.3d at 348（援引 California v. Byers，402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)）。\n\n《破产法典》第 521 条的标题为“债务人的义务”。第 521(a)(3) 条和第 521(a)(4) 条分别规定，在案件中有破产受托人任职的情况下（如本案），债务人必须配合受托人履行受托人职责，并且必须向受托人移交所有破产财产以及与破产财产相关的任何记录信息，包括账簿、文件、记录和文书。\n\n《破产法典》第 109 条允许个人或实体根据第 7 章、第 11 章、第 11 章第 V 分章、第 12 章或第 13 章申请破产。在根据第 7 章、第 12 章和第 13 章以及第 11 章第 V 分章进行的程序中，破产受托人在案件启动时即被自动指定。11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302。第 7 章和第 13 章案件在社会公众中最为常见，且始终涉及一名破产受托人，债务人根据第 521(a)(3) 条和 (a)(4) 条对该受托人负有法定义务。\n\n虽然在第 11 章（Chapter 11）案件中指定破产受托人是一项非同寻常的救济措施，见 11 U.S.C. § 1112，但这种特殊救济的效果在于，被剥夺财产占有权的第 11 章债务人承担与第 7 章或第 13 章债务人根据第 521(a)(3) 条和第 521(a)(4) 条所规定的相同义务。根据法律规定，债务人在提出第 11 章破产申请时，即自动被视为占有中债务人（debtor-in-possession），并承担破产受托人的职责。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)。然而，在符合债权人和破产财产最佳利益的前提下，第 11 章案件中的债务人可因“正当理由”（for cause）通过被指定破产受托人而被“剥夺”对破产财产的占有。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)。\n\n第 11 章之所以与众不同，是因为它是为具有复杂商业利益、资产和负债的债务人（如大型企业和高净值个人）设计的。见 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977)。因此，第 11 章以三项基本推定为指导：(i) 具有庞大商业利益和运营的债务人，作为一个持续经营的经济实体比被拆分和清算具有更大的价值；(ii) 具有复杂财务状况、资产和负债的债务人，比起指定的受托人，更有能力为了债权人的利益管理自己的事务；以及 (iii) 允许具有庞大商业利益和运营的债务人进行重组，除了保护债权人的利益外，还保护了债务人、所有者、雇员等各方的利益。见同上出处。然而归根结底，只要第 11 章的具体条款能够最大化对债权人的分配，该章就能得到正当适用。见 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991)。许多列举的指定破产受托人——或驳回案件，或将案件转换为第 7 章下程序的“正当理由”情形，都涉及对上述推定的反驳，或者是占有中债务人未能履行其为债权人利益管理破产财产的义务。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)；见 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023)。\n\n在破产受托人获得指定时，该破产受托人即为债务人破产财产的代表。11 U.S.C. § 323。第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (a)(4) 条的目的在于使破产受托人能够按照其职责管理债务人的破产财产。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302；4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16。破产财产的管理需要债务人向受托人进行披露、移交财产并予以配合，因为破产案件是一项包罗万象的诉讼程序，旨在公平且终局性地解决、调整或重组无数的债权债务关系。见例如 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5)（“受托人应当……审查债权证明，并对任何不当债权的确认提出异议……”）、704(a)(7)（“受托人应当……根据利害关系方的请求，提供有关破产财产及财产管理的此类信息……”）、704(a)(8)（“受托人应当……向法院、美国受托人（United States trustee）以及负责征收或确定因该等运营而产生的任何税款的任何政府部门，提交有关该业务运营的定期报告和摘要……”）、1106(a)(3)（“受托人应当……调查债务人的行为、举止、资产、负债和财务状况，债务人业务的运营以及继续开展该业务的可取性，以及与案件或制定计划相关的其他事项……”）；7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01（“受托人的调查和报告职责提供了一种对债务人事务状况进行充分披露的机制，从而使利害关系方能够保护其权利并实现债务人的成功重组。”）。\n\n债务人若未能履行其 (i) 配合受托人、(ii) 披露财务状况、资产和负债，以及 (iii) 移交破产财产及与之相关记录的义务，将严重阻碍受托人管理破产财产的能力。见 United States v. Stone, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960)（“财务状况说明书的根本目的，就是提供可靠的信息而无需进一步调查。”）（在针对债务人因在前《破产法》（Bankruptcy Act）下的程序中未在财务状况说明书上妥善披露贷款信息而构成破产犯罪提起的刑事诉讼中，维持有罪判决）。这种不履行义务的行为会给破产财产的债权人造成费用增加和延误，属于法律上可认定的损害。见 Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.), 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009)。\n\n此外，《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）所规定的诸多广泛而特殊的救济措施，其性质是以适当的披露和通知为前提的。见例如 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)（定义了在开始招揽重组计划投票前必须送达的披露声明中的充分信息）；Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004)（认定“《破产法典》广泛的披露要求降低了债务人拥有重大未披露债务的风险”，构成了法院“修改债务人原始合同中规定的分期付款次数、时间或金额的权力”的基础）；In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016)（裁定未能妥善向未披露的已知债权人送达出售动议，导致出售命令对这些债权人无法执行）。受托人作为破产财产的代表，在第一线被赋予了为以下目的寻求此类救济的职责：(i) 为了破产财产的利益，Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n（商品期货交易委员会）v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985)；以及 (ii) 为了在走出困境后可能获得“重新开始”（fresh start）的债务人，见 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)。\n\n本法院认定，第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (a)(4) 条针对的是一般公众。在广泛的案件类型中，破产受托人都是被自动指定的。向受托人披露并移交财产和记录的义务，对于受托人履行基本且法定的行政管理职责以及行使《破产法典》赋予受托人的权力而言，至关重要。\n\n剩下的问题是，第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (a)(4) 条是否涉及一个“充斥着刑事法规”的领域。Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79。《美国法典》第 18 编第 151 条及其后各条、第 1519 条和第 3284 条将与《破产法典》项下程序相关的某些行为定为犯罪。在这些“破产犯罪”中，有数项与隐匿破产财产以防止其分配给破产财产债权人有关。然而，本法院面前的问题并非债务人未能履行第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (4) 条规定的义务是否会使债务人面临刑事起诉的风险，而是第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (4) 条是否“针对‘本身具有犯罪嫌疑的特定群体’”。Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。\n\n在 Grosso 案和 Marchetti 案中，问题并不在于强制执行提交纳税申报表法定要求的刑法，这些刑法类似于上述列举的破产犯罪。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65；见 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。相反，在这两起案件中，最高法院均认定，提交联邦赌博税申报表的要求直接针对的是已被州法律定为犯罪的行为，即赌博。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65；Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。Albertson 案中争议的问题是要求 Communist Party of America（美国共产党）成员亲自向 Subversive Activities Control Board（颠覆活动管制委员会）登记。382 U.S. at 77–78。在当时，加入共产党属于犯罪行为。同上出处。在 Haynes 案中，争议的问题是要求那些非循正常途径获取枪支的人——最高法院指出这些人绝大多数是非法获取枪支的人——对其枪支进行登记。390 U.S. at 95–97。\n\n最高法院在 Grosso、Marchetti、Albertson 和 Haynes 案中所面临的事实与本案事实均不相同。首先，所有这些案件涉及的都是制作新的记录，而非提交已有的文件和记录。Haynes, 390 U.S. at 95–97；Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65；Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57；Albertson, 382 U.S. at 77–78。更重要的是，破产案件的常规管理并不会自然而然地涉及犯罪活动。破产财产的管理旨在与刑事责任问题相分离。对比 11 U.S.C. §§ 323（在民事诉讼中，受托人是代表破产财产起诉和应诉的主体）、362(a)(1)（通常情况下，针对债务人或破产财产的民事诉讼会因自愿破产申请的提出而自动中止）与 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)（针对债务人的刑事诉讼不会因根据第 11 编启动案件而中止）。债务人通常不会因其在破产案件中被要求作出的披露而承担刑事责任。破产程序中披露要求的目的在于查明民事责任，以便公平且终局性地解决针对债务人的所有债权请求。见 Byers, 402 U.S. at 430–31（认定虽然《加利福尼亚州车辆法典》包含某些刑事法规，“但其目的并非促进刑事定罪，而是促进清偿因机动车事故产生的民事责任”，并裁定适用法定记录例外原则）。\n\n因此，第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (a)(4) 条的目的“本质上属于监管性质”，这支持了法定记录例外原则适用于由《强制提交令》（Order Compelling Production）所强制要求的 Individual Debtor（个人债务人）提交文件的情形。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n所主张的法定记录是否属于习惯性保存的记录？\n\n关于第二个要素，即涉案要求出示的记录是否通常予以保存，Trustee（受托人）正在寻求例如财务和银行记录、资金划转记录、与 Individual Debtor（个人债务人）商业权益相关的记录等。正如 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）就外国银行账户信息所指出的那样，常理表明，个人和实体均会保留基本财务交易和账户信息，以便管理自身事务和使用自身账户。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350（引用 M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)）。本法院认定，对于财务事务、资产及负债复杂的个人和实体而言，情况尤其如此。第二巡回上诉法院进一步明确指出，尽管“某些从事不法行为的个人被建议连这些基本信息也不要保留……但我们拒绝仅参考不法之徒的习惯……”。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350。因此，本法院认定，第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (a)(4) 条所要求的记录属于“通常予以保存”的记录。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n涉案要求出示的记录是否具有“公共属性”？\n\n关于第三个要素，即涉案要求出示的记录是否已具有“公共属性”，问题在于第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (a)(4) 条的整体监管背景是否要求保存特定记录。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 351–52。\n\nBankruptcy Code（《破产法典》）要求在案件启动时以及案件推进过程中均须进行披露。第 521(a)(1) 条要求任何债务人——包括个人债务人——提交债权人名册、财务状况说明书以及除其他事项外的债务人资产、负债、收入和支出明细表。参见 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a]（“该明细表是关于第 541(a) 条项下破产财产广泛定义范围内的全部财产（包括不动产和动产）的声明，其中包括‘债务人在案件开始时在财产中享有的全部合法权益或衡平权益’。”）、521.06[3][b]（“将不动产和动产财产权益列入明细表是一项极其重要的职责。”）、521.09（“要求提交财务状况说明书的目的，是向受托人和债权人提供有关债务人财务状况的详细信息，从而节省为了获取信息而进行昂贵且旷日持久的质询所产生的费用。”）。第 341 条要求任何债务人均须接受由受托人主持、债权人可以参加的质询。参见 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01。\n\n特别是就 Chapter 11（第11章）而言，第 1107 条规定，当第 11 章债务人属于 debtor-in-possession（自行管理的债务人）时，该债务人作为破产财产的受托人（fiduciary），承担上文所述受托人的诸多相同披露义务，包括报告要求。参见 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]。债务人若未能在就第 11 章重整计划所要求提交的 Disclosure Statement（披露声明）中妥善披露财务事务、资产和负债，将导致该计划无法获得确认。11 U.S.C. § 1125；参见 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02（“披露是《破产法典》项下重整实践的核心概念。”）（引用 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)）、1125.02[2]。未能作出适当披露可以且确实构成将第 11 章重整案件转换为 Chapter 7（第7章）清算案件、驳回第 11 章破产案件或指定第 11 章受托人的法定事由。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f)；参见 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f]。\n\n与 Bouknight 案中的母亲非常相似，个人债务人在自愿启动其第 11 章案件、使自身服从本法院的 in personam（对人）管辖权、并将自己在财产中享有的全部合法权益和衡平权益——“无论位于何处且由何人持有”——服从本法院的 in rem（对物）管辖权时，即承担了这些义务。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)；Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 559（“Bouknight 服从了监管体系的常规运作，并同意以符合州监管利益且接受 BCDSS 检查的方式监护 Maurice。”）。此外，正如在 Bouknight 案中，当有理由表明必要时该母亲被要求向 Baltimore City Department of Social Services（巴尔的摩市社会服务局）交出其孩子一样，《破产法典》要求个人债务人向受托人出示与破产财产相关的书证和记录，因为已有充分理由指定受托人。11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112；Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56。由于个人债务人自愿提交了其第 11 章案件并成为自行管理的债务人，他便承担了破产受托人为债权人利益管理破产财产的职责。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)。个人债务人在作为自行管理的债务人期间，是破产财产及其账簿和记录的保管人。参见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56。尽管他作为自行管理的债务人的身份在受托人被指定后即告终止，但他由此产生的向受托人提供信息的义务并未终止。\n\n本法院认定，个人债务人依据第 521(a)(3) 条和第 (a)(4) 条被要求出示的记录已具有“公共属性”，因为个人债务人的案件属于自愿申请的第 11 章案件，且这些第 11 章案件及相关 adversary proceedings（对抗性程序）的具体事实和情形均支持这一结论。参见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56；Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n“法定记录”例外适用\n\n在摆在本法院面前的具体事实和情形下，Grosso 检验标准的全部三项要素均支持对 Fifth Amendment（第五修正案）反对自证其罪特权适用法定记录例外。390 U.S. at 67–68；参见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56；Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 345；Ross, 156 B.R. at 279–81；In re Fairbanks, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991)。\n\n适用法定记录例外亦得到涉及前 Bankruptcy Act（《旧破产法》）的 Supreme Court（最高法院）先例的支持。In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911)（裁定第五修正案并不保护债务人免于向破产接管人出示其账簿和记录）。Bouknight 案在 Fisher 案之后维持法定记录例外时，赞同性地引用了 Harris 案作为法定记录原则的范例，确认了尽管自 Harris 案裁决以来第五修正案法理有所演变，Harris 案在今天依然具有持续的生命力。Bouknight, 439 U.S. at 556–57；参见 Fisher, 425 U.S. 411–13（在未质疑其裁决结论的情况下讨论了 Harris 案）；亦参见 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（裁定除非有明确迹象表明国会意图废止，否则《旧破产法》项下的先例不被取代）；Ross, 156 B.R. at 279；3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4]（“与其它证人不同，债务人能否以这种‘出示行为’本身可能具有自证其罪倾向为由，成功拒绝交出《法典》要求每位债务人向受托人移交的财产、账簿和记录，是存疑的。”）；但参见 Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985)（在 Bouknight 案之前且在非自愿申请的第 7 章案件而非自愿申请的第 11 章案件中裁定，在 Fisher 案之后 Harris 案已不再是有效判例，且第 521 条并不要求出示适用出示行为原则的文件）。\n\n个人债务人提出异议称，尽管如此，根据 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) 案，Harris 案及法定记录例外并不适用于 Rule 2004（第2004条）传票。然而，最高法院在 Arndstein 案中对其先前在 Harris 案中的意见进行了区分，其依据在于 Harris 案涉及的是移交文件和记录，而 Arndstein 案涉及的是强迫口头作证（testimony）的问题。266 U.S. at 41–42。受托人并未对个人债务人在作证陈述或庭审作证期间援引第五修正案回答质询或问题提出异议。相反，受托人异议的是个人债务人在回应出示文件和记录的请求时援引第五修正案。因此，Arndstein 案并不适用。\n\n本法院认定，无论依据对 Grosso 要素的分析，还是依据最高法院在《旧破产法》项下的先例，法定记录例外均予以适用。\n\niii. 个人债务人未遵守《强制出示命令》\n\n基于上述所有理由，本法院认定：(i) 个人债务人遵守 Order Compelling Production（《强制出示命令》）并非不可能；以及 (ii) 在法定记录例外项下，个人债务人不得在回应《强制出示命令》时正当援引其第五修正案反对自证其罪的权利。因此，受托人已以 clear and convincing evidence（明晰且有说服力的证据）证明个人债务人未遵守《强制出示命令》。\n\n3. 个人债务人是否曾勤勉尝试遵守《强制出示命令》？\n\n受托人还必须证明个人债务人未曾以合理方式勤勉尝试遵守《强制出示命令》。King, 65 F.3d at 1058。受托人主张个人债务人未作任何遵守《强制出示命令》的尝试。对此，个人债务人辩称，关于个人债务人是否可以正当主张其第五修正案反对自证其罪特权存在合理怀疑的根据，且 Declaration（《声明》）及 Supplemental Declaration（《补充声明》）体现了他为遵守《强制出示命令》所作出的善意努力。\n\n个人债务人所犯的根本错误是法律错误，而非事实错误。亦即，个人债务人错误地认定出示行为原则的法定记录例外不适用，且他可以在回应《强制出示命令》时援引第五修正案。基于上文所述理由，出示各项文件或记录在事实上是否具有口头作证性质及自证其罪性质，并不影响处理结果。\n\n一般而言，在没有故意或意图要求的情况下，法律认识错误不能成为民事责任的抗辩理由。Jerman 诉 Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA 案，559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010)。如上所述，“缺乏故意[原文如此]并不能免除民事藐视法庭责任。”McComb 案，336 U.S. at 191。因此，本法院认定，个人债务人的法律认识错误不能构成民事藐视法庭的抗辩理由。参考 Yellin 诉 United States 案，374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963)（裁定法律认识错误不能作为藐视国会的抗辩理由）；United States 诉 Remini 案，967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992)（裁定法律认识错误不能作为刑事藐视法庭的抗辩理由）。这一结论与联邦最高法院在 Taggert 案中的意见相符，即“当事人的善意，即使不能阻却民事藐视法庭的成立，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁措施。”139 S. Ct. at 1802（强调为后加）。因此，受托人已经证明，个人债务人并未尽职努力遵守《强制提供命令》。\n\n4. 个人债务人是否收到了《强制提供命令》的通知？\n\n民事藐视法庭的最后一项构成要件是对相关命令的知情通知。Gravel 案，6 F.4th at 512。《声明》承认个人债务人已知悉《强制提供命令》。（ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.）民事藐视法庭的这一要件已获确立。\n\n5. 个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭\n\n在所有四项要件均已确立的情况下，藐视法庭动议获得准许。本法院认定个人债务人因未遵守《强制提供命令》而构成民事藐视法庭。如下文判令段落所述，个人债务人将获得消除其藐视状态的机会。鉴于个人债务人所面临情况的严重性，以及其在《补充声明》中回答受托人二百零二（202）个问题时所表现出的善意，本法院将给予个人债务人充裕的时间来消除其藐视状态。Taggert 案，139 S. Ct. at 1802。然而，若个人债务人不消除藐视状态，受托人可申请适当的制裁措施。\n\n本法院提醒个人债务人的代理律师，“律师作为法院官员，有义务通过对合法的证据开示请求作出勤勉、善意的回应，来协助证据开示程序。”McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. 诉 Quarles 案，894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990)。为此，本法院进一步提醒个人债务人的代理律师，本法院此前已认定“该等[个人债务人及其他人]之代理律师未能证明其在当时情况下已足够勤勉。”（《强制提供命令》第 9 段。）个人债务人被命令于 2023年1月31日下午5:00 或之前遵守《强制提供命令》，但其并未照办。“无论是律师还是当事人，均无单方决定是否或何时遵守证据开示要求的权利。”535 Broadway Assocs. 诉 Com. Corp. of Am. 案，159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)。\n\n无论本法院是否已直接明确说明这些步骤，个人债务人及其代理律师均应采取合理且勤勉的措施，以使个人债务人遵守《强制提供命令》。正如个人债务人的代理律师在记录中所陈述的，合理措施包括向刑事法院提交动议，请求允许向受托人提供检方已向个人债务人提供且符合《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 2004 条传票要求的的文件和记录，前提是受托人须遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件。在寻求消除藐视状态的过程中，个人债务人是在《强制提供命令》的强制要求下行事，因此，向刑事法院提请向受托人提供文件并不构成对任何《第五修正案》权利的放弃。参见 Bouknight 案，493 U.S. at 561–62。在审议任何制裁动议时，本法院将考虑个人债务人向刑事法院寻求救济的勤勉程度。\n\nB. 是否应中止执行《强制提供命令》？\n\n在对藐视法庭动议作出裁决后，本法院转而审理中止动议。个人债务人主张，必须在刑事诉讼结束前中止执行《强制提供命令》，以维护个人债务人反对自证其罪的《第五修正案》权利。对此，受托人辩称，没有任何理由对《强制提供命令》施加中止令，且此类中止将对受托人造成实质性损害。\n\n本法院首先指出，虽然中止动议由个人债务人提交且看似仅涉及个人债务人，但所附的拟定裁定书将全面中止《强制提供命令》，包括涉及个人债务人之女 Mei Guo（郭美）女士以及已被判定为个人债务人公司人格否认化身（alter ego）的 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限公司）的相关判令段落。在中止动议寻求针对该等额外当事方的救济的范围内，本法院驳回该中止动议。\n\n转入实质问题，本法院必须在合理裁量权范围内判定是否中止《强制提供命令》。Kashi 诉 Grastos 案，790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986)。法律并未硬性规定法院必须因未决的刑事诉讼而中止民事诉讼程序。United States 诉 Kordel 案，397 U.S. 1 (1970)；Kashi 案，790 F.2d at 1057。在结合刑事诉讼考量是否中止民事诉讼程序时，法院会特别考虑以下因素：\n\n1）刑事案件与民事案件中提出的争议焦点的重叠程度；2）案件的审理阶段，包括被告是否已被起诉；3）原告迅速推进诉讼的私人利益与延误对原告造成的损害之间的权衡；4）被告的私人利益及负担；5）法院的利益；以及 6）公共利益。\n\nTrs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund 诉 Transworld Mech., Inc. 案，886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)。\n\n本法院首先考量破产财团迅速推进诉讼的私人利益与延误对破产财团造成的损害之间的权衡。中止执行《强制提供命令》将对破产财团及个人债务人的债权人造成实质性损害。如上所述，债务人披露其财务状况、资产和负债在破产程序中具有根本性意义。由于个人债务人未予配合反而阻碍受托人的调查，破产财团持续承受着巨额费用和延误。依照第 521 条，受托人在一年多前获任命后，本应立即获得与个人债务人的财务状况、资产、负债、业务等相关的所有文件和记录。相反，受托人不得不去确定其他合适传票对象，发出无数张传票，并陷入无休止的动议程序中。虽然受托人的努力为破产财团带来了实质利益，但破产财团也因这些努力承受了沉重的成本负担。\n\n此外，这些沉重成本是在破产程序的背景下发生的。目前的资金很可能已不足以清偿债权人的债权，且由于对个人债务人事务的调查持续且未完成，债权人正在失去其最终受偿款项的时间价值。11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)。而且，国会已明确规定，第 11 章案件的最终目标——重整计划的确认——必须在指定的时间框架内完成。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d)。重整计划确认的延误将导致债权人和破产财团受到实质性损害，而该计划必须为债权人债权的最终变现作出规定。参见 Andrews 案，414 B.R. at 7。受托人不应被迫在缺乏个人债务人法定配合和披露的情况下履职。参见 Stone 案，282 F.2d at 553。\n\n本法院接下来考量个人债务人的私人利益和负担。拖延或阻碍这些合法破产程序的行为并不存在任何受法律认可的利益。要求个人债务人遵守《强制提供命令》也不存在任何受法律认可的负担。基于上述理由，他无法正当地援引其反对自证其罪的《第五修正案》权利。此外，联邦最高法院在 Fisher 案之后的 Bouknight 案中维持“法定记录例外”时指出：\n\n在通常情况下，州的监管要求可能既不强迫提供自证其罪的证词，也不协助刑事起诉，但是，对于在援引特权后遵守监管要求并随后面临起诉的人而言，并不必然因此就无法享有《第五修正案》的保护。\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62；但对比 Johnson 诉 United States 案，228 U.S. 457 (1913)（在 Fisher 案之前裁定，根据 Harris 案提供的账簿和记录可用于刑事诉讼程序）。\n\n接下来，本法院考量未决刑事调查的现状及刑事法院的利益。目前有两项未决的刑事调查需要考量：刑事诉讼以及所指称的破产犯罪调查。个人债务人已在刑事诉讼中被起诉。目前尚未向本法院提交任何证明其因任何破产犯罪调查而被起诉的证据。这些第 11 章案件及相关的对抗性诉讼确实与刑事诉讼存在重叠——(a) 个人债务人的许多债权人同时也是其在刑事诉讼中所指称的受害者，(b) 个人债务人的部分所谓资产据称是用刑事诉讼中所指控的欺诈收益购买的，以及 (c) 个人债务人的部分所谓关联方及公司人格否认化身据称参与了刑事诉讼中所指控的欺诈行为——但与此同时，也存在不一致之处——(d) 这些第 11 章案件中存在并非所谓欺诈受害者的债权人，(e) 破产财团的所谓资产中有在所指控的欺诈发生之前购买的资产，以及 (f) 个人债务人的所谓关联方及化身中存在未被指控参与欺诈者。然而，任何针对破产犯罪调查所涉及的任何问题均与这些第 11 章案件直接相关。\n\n本法院认定，本命令不会对刑事法院有序审理刑事诉讼的利益造成实质性干扰。个人债务人提出一种令人担忧的可能性，即要求个人债务人向受托人出示文件会损害检方对其提起的指控，并引发在刑事法院就证据问题产生诉讼。该论点缺乏说服力。个人债务人在本案程序中被迫出示文件和记录，并不能改变检方显然已经掌握大量证据这一事实。虽然正如个人债务人所主张的，检方可能不被允许将个人债务人向受托人出示的文件作为证明个人债务人对检方已掌握的文件和记录具有控制权或其真实性的证据，但个人债务人的论点所描述的正是现状。此外，刑事法院将审查并裁定任何关于向受托人出示检方向个人债务人所出示之文件和记录的动议。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 40 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 61 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 61 of 63\n\n关于对破产犯罪的任何调查，由于(a) 没有证据表明个人债务人已被起诉，且 (b) 没有证据表明任何法院存在与之相关的诉讼程序，本法院认定任何此类调查的利益应被赋予较轻的权重。如上所述，《破产法》的存在并非为了制造破产犯罪。其存在是为了为了全体债权人以及最终债务人自身的利益，公正且终局地解决、调整和重组债务人的资产、负债和财务事务。为了某些对个人债务人涉嫌破产犯罪的推测性起诉之利益，而束缚受托人对个人债务人的事务、资产和负债进行调查是不妥当的。破产犯罪是一种旨在促进在破产程序中进行适当披露的执法机制。如果个人债务人遵守强制作出出示命令，他将补救破产犯罪旨在防止的损害，同时也有利于妥善管理这些第11章案件。\n\n最后，本法院认定，阻碍受托人为向破产财产债权人收集、清算和分配资产所作努力，会损害公众对“破产案件迅速审理”的利益。In re MGL Corp., 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)。公众在运转良好的破产体系中享有利益。它使经济、债务人和债权人受益。阻碍该进程以及拖延该进程的企图不符合公共利益。此外，如上所述，个人债务人按照强制作出出示命令出示文件和记录并不违反第五修正案。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 41 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 62 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 62 of 63\n\n在权衡衡平因素后，本法院在其合理自由裁量权范围内认定，对强制作出出示命令作出暂缓执行是不合理的。因此，中止动议被驳回。\n\nC. 是否应对滥用证据开示作出金钱制裁？\n\n最后，由康涅狄格区民事诉讼地方法规第37条（D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37）以及康涅狄格区破产诉讼地方法规第1001-1(a)(1)条和第2004-1(a)条（D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a)）适用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》第37(b)(2)(C)条（Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)）规定：\n\n(C) 费用的支付。替代或除上述命令外，法院必须命令不服从的当事人、向该当事人提供建议的律师或双方支付因不履行而造成的合理费用，包括律师费，除非该不履行具有实质上的正当理由，或其他情况使得判处费用显得不公正。\n\n在具体事实和情况下，本法院认定目前不宜判处费用。\n\nV. 结论与命令\n\n基于上述理由，本法院 (A) 判定个人债务人因未能遵守强制作出出示命令而构成民事藐视法庭，并且 (B) 驳回中止动议，并在其合理自由裁量权范围内拒绝在刑事诉讼解决前暂缓执行强制作出出示命令。据此，特此\n\n命令：本法院判定 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（即“个人债务人”）因未能遵守《关于部分准许强制遵守动议的命令》（即“强制作出出示命令”）（ECF No. 1353）而构成民事藐视法庭；并且进一步\n\n命令：如果个人债务人未能在2023年9月29日或之前完全遵守强制作出出示命令以消除其藐视法庭行为，Luc A. Despins 先生以个人债务人破产财产（即“破产财产”）的第11章受托人（即“受托人”）的身份，可动议提出任何适当的制裁；并且进一步\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 42 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 63 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 63 of 63\n\n命令：《关于有限暂缓执行部分准许强制遵守动议之命令的动议》（即“中止动议”）（ECF No. 1649）被驳回。\n\n2023年7月26日签署于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n[签名图片]","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":21118,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-09 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-09","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:27:59"}