{"id":"court_sdny_232_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":232,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":"2024-01-18","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"检方法律备忘录 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #232（2024年1月18日立案）。由纽约南区联邦检察官办公室（署名检察官 Damian Williams 及多名助理检察官）提交，反对被告王燕萍提出的公寓搜查证据排除、被捕后陈述排除、要求检方提供详情说明书以及与郭文贵分案审理等一揽子审前动议，主张搜查令有相当理由支持且未失特定性、被捕后陈述系合法取得、详情说明书与分案请求均无必要，请求法院悉数驳回。","summary_en":"Government memorandum of law — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #232 (filed January 18, 2024). Filed by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (U.S. Attorney Damian Williams and several Assistant U.S. Attorneys) in opposition to defendant Yanping Wang's pretrial motions, arguing that the search warrant for her apartment was supported by probable cause and was not overbroad, that her post-arrest statements should not be suppressed, and that her requests for a bill of particulars and severance from co-defendant Ho Wan Kwok should be denied.","body_en":"## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nv.\n\nYANPING WANG a/k/a \"Yvette,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n**THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT YANPING WANG'S PRETRIAL MOTIONS**\n\n> DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York One St. Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007\n\nJustin Horton Juliana N. Murray Ryan B. Finkel Micah F. Fergenson Assistant United States Attorneys *Of Counsel*\n\n**S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\n| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1                                                        |  |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| STATEMENT OF FACTS  1                                                           |  |\n| I. The Search of the Defendant's Apartment was Lawful  1                        |  |\n| A. Background  1                                                                |  |\n| B. Applicable Law  4                                                            |  |\n| 1. Deference to Judicial Findings of Probable Cause  4                          |  |\n| 2. Overbreadth in Complex Investigations  7                                     |  |\n| 3. Particularity in Complex Investigations  8                                   |  |\n| 4. Good-Faith Reliance on Judicially Authorized Warrants  10                    |  |\n| C. Discussion  11                                                               |  |\n| 1. The Judicially Authorized Search Warrant Was Supported by Probable Cause  12 |  |\n| 2. The Search Warrant Was Neither Unparticularized nor Overbroad  17            |  |\n| 3. In the Alternative, the Agents Relied in Good Faith on the Search Warrant 21 |  |\n| II. The Defendant's Post-Arrest Statement Should Not be Suppressed  22          |  |\n| A. Applicable Law  23                                                           |  |\n| B. Discussion  25                                                               |  |\n| III. The Defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars Should Be Denied  29      |  |\n| A. Applicable Law  29                                                           |  |\n| B. Discussion  32                                                               |  |\n| IV. A Severance Is Not Warranted  40                                            |  |\n| A. Applicable Law  40                                                           |  |\n| B. Discussion  43                                                               |  |\n| CONCLUSION  46                                                                  |  |\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to the motions to suppress, motion for a bill of particulars, and motion for severance filed by defendant Yanping Wang (\"Wang Mot.\").[1](#page-2-2) (Dkt. 196). For the reasons set forth below, Wang's motions should be denied in their entirety.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n#### <span id=\"page-2-0\"></span>**I. The Search of the Defendant's Apartment was Lawful**\n\n#### <span id=\"page-2-1\"></span>**A. Background**\n\nOn March 6, 2023, a grand jury returned a sealed indictment (the \"Original Indictment\") charging Ho Wan Kwok (\"Kwok\") and Kin Ming Je (\"Je\") with crimes arising out of a wideranging conspiracy to defraud thousands of victims out of more than \\$1 billion \"through a series of complex fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities.\" (Dkt. 2 ¶ 1). The Original Indictment charged Kwok, Je \"and others known and unknown\" with a conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering \"from at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023.\" (*Id*. ¶ 1). The Original Indictment went on to describe the first interrelated scheme of that conspiracy: the GTV Private Placement, an illegal private stock offering in a purported media venture that occurred between in or about April 2020 and in or about June 2020. (*See id.* ¶ 12). The Original Indictment proceeded to describe other arms of the overarching fraud conspiracy from at least in or about June 2020 through at least in or about March 2023 that followed from, and related back to, the GTV Private Placement: the Farm Loan Program, (*see id.* ¶ 13), G|CLUBS,\n\n<span id=\"page-2-2\"></span><sup>1</sup> Wang joined in co-defendant Kwok's motion to dismiss the S1 Indictment, which the Court has denied as moot in light of the S2 Indictment. (Dkt. 230 at 1 n.1).\n\n(*see id.* ¶¶ 14-15), and the Himalaya Exchange, (*see id.* ¶¶ 16-22). The Original Indictment charged Kwok and Je with, among other things, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering, and repeatedly emphasized that Kwok and Je had acted with others to execute the sprawling and sophisticated fraud scheme.\n\nFour days later, on March 10, 2023, Judge Gorenstein signed the Complaint charging Wang with the same wire fraud and securities fraud conspiracy, which spanned from \"in or about 2018 up to and including at least in or about March 2023.\" (Compl. ¶ 1). Wang was also charged with some of the same substantive offenses as Kwok and Je, including wire fraud and securities fraud offenses arising out of the GTV Private Placement. (*See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 10). The Complaint referred to Kwok as one of Wang's co-conspirators (under the name of \"CC-1\") and indicated that the Original Indictment charged Kwok \"in connection with\" the conduct for which Wang was being charged in the Complaint. (*See id.* ¶ 10.a n.1). The Complaint alleged, among other things, that Wang was identified as an Executive Director of, and \"key personnel\" for, GTV in promotional communications made and disseminated by, among others, Kwok. (*See id.* ¶ 10.a- .d). The Complaint also alleged \"that WANG has had a close personal relationship with [Kwok],\" \"has worked for [Kwok] and [Kwok's] family for several years, since at least in or about 2018,\" and \"is the President, Treasurer, and Secretary of an entity that manages [Kwok's] purportedly vast personal wealth.\" (*Id.* ¶ 10.e). While much of the Complaint focused on the GTV Private Placement and related events in 2020, the Complaint also alleged that Wang participated in a conspiracy that persisted through at least in or about March 2023. (Compl. ¶ 1). It also referenced a precursor to the Himalaya Exchange by alleging, among other things, that Wang opened bank accounts in 2018 held in the name of \"Saraca Media Group DBA Himalaya Dollar.\" (*See id.* ¶ 11.a, .b). And the Complaint also alleged that \"WANG well knew that the funds raised from the GTV Private Placement could not be,\" but were, \"invested in a high-risk hedge fund for the benefit of [Kwok's] close relative,\" (*id.* ¶ 13.h), who is identified as CC-1 in the Original Indictment.\n\nFour days after signing the Complaint, Judge Gorenstein signed a search and seizure warrant for Wang's apartment (the \"Wang Apartment\") and certain items expected to be found therein, including electronic devices. (*See* Dkt. 199, Def. Ex. 8 (the \"Wang Apartment and Devices Warrant\" or the \"Warrant\")). Like the Complaint, the affidavit for the Wang Apartment and Devices Warrant (*see* Dkt. 199, Def. Ex. 1 (the \"Wang Apartment and Devices Affidavit\" or the \"Affidavit\")) was submitted and sworn by FBI Special Agent Nicholas DiMarino. The Affidavit set forth probable cause to believe that, from in or about 2018 to the present, Wang, Kwok, and Je executed a scheme to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations and to launder and misappropriate victim funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 (conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud); 1343 (wire fraud); 1344 (bank fraud); 1956 (money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering); 1957 (unlawful monetary transactions); 371 (conspiracy to commit wire, bank and securities fraud and money laundering), and 2 (aiding and abetting); and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78ff, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (securities fraud) (the \"Subject Offenses\").\n\nThe Affidavit attached the Original Indictment and Complaint and incorporated them by reference, (*see* Aff. ¶¶ 7-8), but its section for probable cause to believe that Wang, Kwok, and Je committed the Subject Offenses consisted of 18 additional paragraphs and subparagraphs of evidence about the \"Fraud Scheme\" that \"pertains to several companies that are owned or operated by, or otherwise affiliated with, KWOK, [Je], and other Target Subjects\"—*i.e.*, the same 2018 through March 2023 wire fraud and securities fraud conspiracy in the Original Indictment and the Complaint. (*See id.* ¶ 9). This additional probable cause evidence, offered in addition to the attached and incorporated charging instruments, included that \"WANG is the New York-based functional head of the various KWOK-affiliated entities that have operated the Fraud Scheme,\" (*id.* ¶ 9), that Wang was identified as GTV's executive director in the fraudulent private placement offering document (*see id.* ¶ 11.a), that there were chat messages \"among KWOK, JE, WANG, and others . . . regarding, among other things, business and other arrangements relating to various of the fraud-related ventures, including GTV and G|Fashion\" (*see id.* ¶ 16.b), and that \"KWOK, JE, WANG, and other Target Subjects primarily communicated\" through a particular messaging application (*see id.*).\n\nThe Affidavit also set forth probable cause to believe that Wang resided in the Wang Apartment during the time of the Fraud Scheme, and that electronic devices and other specified items found there would constitute or contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses. (*See* Aff. ¶¶ 20-24).\n\n#### <span id=\"page-5-0\"></span>**B. Applicable Law**\n\n#### **1. Deference to Judicial Findings of Probable Cause**\n\n<span id=\"page-5-1\"></span>A judge's finding of probable cause is afforded significant deference. \"A reviewing court must accord substantial deference to the finding of an issuing judicial officer that probable cause exists . . . . The reviewing court's determination should be limited to whether the issuing judicial officer had a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause.\" *United States v. Wagner*, 989 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (reversing suppression order).[2](#page-5-2)\n\nMoreover, \"[p]robable cause 'is not a high bar.'\" *District of Columbia v. Wesby*, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting *Kaley v. United States*, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). \"A judge's probable-\n\n<span id=\"page-5-2\"></span><sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations omit internal quotation marks, citations, alterations, and footnotes.\n\ncause determination is not overly strict. Presented with a warrant application, the judge must 'simply . . . make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the \"veracity\" and \"basis of knowledge\" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.\"' *United States v. Martin*, 426 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). \"The quanta of proof necessary to establish probable cause is 'only the probability, and not a *prima facie* showing, of criminal activity.'\" *Wagner*, 989 F.2d at 72 (quoting *Gates*, 462 U.S. at 235). Neither is there any \"bright-line rule for staleness.\" *Walczyk v. Rio*, 496 F.3d 139, 162 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"[A] magistrate is expected to consider the age of the facts in light of the conduct at issue with a view toward ensuring that probable cause exists at the time the warrant is to be executed, not simply at some past time.\"). And, \"in circumstances of continuing or ongoing conduct, as contrasted with isolated illegal acts, 'the passage of time between the last described act and the presentation of the application becomes less significant.'\" *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Martino*, 664 F.2d 860, 867 (2d Cir. 1981)).\n\nMoreover, \"[p]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.\" *Martin*, 426 F.3d at 74 (quoting *Gates*, 462 U.S. at 232). Thus, \"[i]n assessing probabilities, a judicial officer must look to 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.\"' *Walczyk*, 496 F.3d at 156 (quoting *Gates*, 462 U.S. at 231). \"[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.\" *United States v. Smith*, 9 F.3d 1007, 1012 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting *United States v. Ventresca*, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).\n\nSuch determinations must be approached in a practical way, because \"probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.\" *Gates,* 462 U.S. at 231-32, *Texas v. Brown*, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Additionally, the training and experience of law enforcement agents bear significantly on probable cause determinations. *Gates*, 462 U.S. at 232. Inferences drawn by law enforcement agents based on facts known to them, the totality of the circumstances, and their training and experience can all support a probable cause finding. *Id.* at 231-32.\n\nOnce a warrant has been issued by a judge and executed, the duty of a court reviewing a magistrate judge's probable cause determination on a motion to suppress is far more limited: its task is \"simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed.\" *Gates*, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting *Jones v. United States,* 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). The issuing magistrate's decision is \"entitled to substantial deference, and doubts should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.\" *United States v. Rosa*, 11 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 1993). Indeed, the magistrate's \"finding of probable cause is itself a substantial factor tending to uphold the validity of [the] warrant.\" *United States v. Travisano*, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983). \"Such deference derives not only from the law's recognition that probable cause is 'a fluid concept' that can vary with the facts of each case, but also from its 'strong preference' for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.\" *United States v. Clark*, 638 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Gates*, 462 U.S. at 232, 236). Thus, as described in *Clark*, the \"task of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 'totality of the circumstances' afforded the magistrate 'a substantial basis' for making the requisite probable cause determination.\" *Clark*, 638 F.3d at 93 (quoting *Gates*, 462 U.S. at 238).\n\n#### **2. Overbreadth in Complex Investigations**\n\n<span id=\"page-8-0\"></span>With respect to overbreadth specifically, \"a warrant is overbroad if its 'description of the objects to be seized . . . is broader than can be justified by the probable cause upon which the warrant is based.'\" *United States v. Lustyik*, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting *United States v. Galpin*, 720 F.3d 436, 446 (2nd Cir. 2013)); *see also United States v. Hernandez*, No. 09 Cr. 625 (HB), 2010 WL 26544, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010) (framing the overbreadth inquiry as \"whether the magistrate judge authorized search warrants that were constitutionally overbroad because they provided for the seizure of specific items for which there is no probable cause\").\n\nThe more complex the crimes under investigation, the broader the categories of documents and records that may properly be seized. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Pinto-Thomaz*, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (\"The level of specificity required depends on the nature of the crime and its level of complexity.\"); *United States v. Jacobson*, 4 F. Supp. 3d 515, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that breadth of warrant, which contained no timeframe limitation, was justified because \"the crimes under investigation were complex and concerned a long period of time, not simply one or two dates of criminal activity\"); *United States v. Levy*, No. S5 11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at \\*7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013), aff'd, 803 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that broad warrant with no time limitation was justified by scope and complexity of fraud described in affidavit); *United States v. Dupree*, 781 F. Supp. 2d 115, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing how \"[t]he nature of the crime . . . may require a broad search,\" including where \"complex financial crimes are alleged\")).\n\n#### **3. Particularity in Complex Investigations**\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span>\"Although somewhat similar in focus, particularity and overbreadth are two distinct legal issues.\" *Lustyik*, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (quoting *United States v. Zemlyansky*, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). While \"the overbreadth inquiry asks 'whether the warrant authorized the search and seizure of items as to which there is no probable cause,'\" the particularity inquiry requires a court to assess \"whether the warrant 'enable[s] the executing officer to ascertain and identify with reasonable certainty those items that the magistrate has authorized him to seize.'\" *Id*. A search warrant must be \"sufficiently specific to permit the rational exercise of judgment by the executing officers in selecting what items to seize.\" *United States v. Shi Yan Liu*, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000). \"To be sufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must satisfy three requirements.\" *United States v. Ulbricht*, 858 F.3d 71, 99 (2d Cir. 2017). It must (i) \"identify the specific offense for which the police have established probable cause,\" (ii) \"describe the place to be searched,\" and (iii) \"specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes.\" *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Galpin*, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013)). \"The Fourth Amendment does not require a perfect description of the data to be searched and seized . . . .\" *Id*. at 100. Indeed, \"[w]here, as here, complex financial crimes are alleged, a warrant properly provides more flexibility to the searching agents,\" *Dupree*, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 149, and \"it may be appropriate to use more generic terms to describe what is to be seized,\" *United States v. Gotti*, 42 F. Supp. 2d 252, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). \"[A] search warrant does not necessarily lack particularity simply because it is broad.\" *Ulbricht*, 858 F.3d at 100. When a search warrant limits the scope of the search to evidence of particular federal crimes, and gives an \"illustrative list of seizable items,\" the search warrant is sufficiently particular. *United States v. Riley*, 906 F.2d 841, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing *United States v. Young*, 745 F.2d 733, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985)); *see also United States v. Ables*, 167 F.3d 1021, 1034 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding warrant over overbreadth challenge when it \"supplied sufficient examples of the items that the IRS was authorized to seize . . .\"); *Lustyik*, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 227 (\"The inclusion of an illustrative list of seizable items brings the Warrants within the Fourth Amendment's particularity parameters.\"); *United States v. Jacobson*, 4 F. Supp. 3d 515, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (\"The reference to particular offenses and the use of an illustrative list of items to seize sufficiently particularized the warrants.\"); *United States v. D'Amico*, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"Attachment A provides an exemplary list of records and other items falling within the scope of the Warrant, thereby enabling the executing agents to identify with reasonable certainty what they were authorized to seize.\").\n\nThe requirement is satisfied if the warrant, including its attachments, enables the executing officer to ascertain and identify with reasonable certainty those items that the magistrate judge has authorized them to seize. *See Groh v. Ramirez*, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004); *Rosa*, 626 F.3d at 58. This does not mean that the warrant must leave nothing to the discretion of the executing officer. To the contrary, \"[o]nce a category of seizable papers has been adequately described, with the description delineated in part by an illustrative list of seizable items, the Fourth Amendment is not violated because the officers executing the warrant must exercise some minimal judgment as to whether a particular document falls within the described category.\" *Riley*, 906 F.2d at 845. \"[A] warrant authorizing seizure of records of criminal activity permits officers to examine many papers in a suspect's possession to determine if they are within the described category. But allowing some latitude in this regard simply recognizes the reality that few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked 'drug records.'\" *Id.*\n\nMoreover, \"[c]ourts tend to tolerate a greater degree of ambiguity where law enforcement agents have done the best that could reasonably be expected under the circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive facts which a reasonable investigation could be expected to cover, and have insured that all those facts were included in the warrant.\" *Young*, 745 F.2d 733 at 759 (2d Cir. 1984). Indeed, \"where a particularly complex scheme is alleged to exist, it may be appropriate to use more generic terms to describe what is to be seized.\" *Gotti*, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (citing *United States v. Regan*, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (\"The degree to which a warrant must state its terms with particularity varies inversely with [the] complexity of the criminal activity investigated.\")); *see also Pinto-Thomaz*, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 304-05 (\"The level of specificity required depends on the nature of the crime and its level of complexity.\").\n\n#### **4. Good-Faith Reliance on Judicially Authorized Warrants**\n\n<span id=\"page-11-0\"></span>Even if a warrant lacks probable cause, is insufficiently particular, or is overbroad, \"[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.\" *Herring v. United States*, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009). \"To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.\" *Id.* at 144; *see also Rosa*, 626 F.3d at 64, 66. As a result, exclusion should be a \"last resort\" rather than a \"first impulse.\" *Rosa*, 626 F.3d at 64 (quoting *Herring*, 555 U.S. at 140). Thus, suppression will generally not be warranted where the evidence at issue was \"obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.\" *United States v. Leon*, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). Although the burden is on the Government to establish good faith, \"[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.\" *Id.*; *see also Golino v. City of New Haven*, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the \"issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate, which depends on a finding of probable cause, creates a presumption that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that there was probable cause\"). Accordingly, considering this exception, \"the Supreme Court [has] strongly signaled that most searches conducted pursuant to a warrant would likely fall within [the] protection\" of the good faith exception. *Clark*, 638 F.3d at 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing *Leon*, 468 U.S. at 922).\n\nIndeed, there are only four narrow circumstances in which the good-faith exception does not apply: (1) where the issuing magistrate has been knowingly misled; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) where the application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient that reliance upon it is unreasonable. *Id.*\n\n#### <span id=\"page-12-0\"></span>**C. Discussion**\n\nWang asserts that the judicially authorized Warrant was based on insufficient probable cause to search the Wang Apartment, was overbroad, and was insufficiently particularized. In support, Wang contends that the Affidavit furnished insufficient grounds to conclude that evidence of the Subject Offenses would be found at the Wang Apartment, that the Warrant's scope exceeded the probable cause on which it was issued, and that certain of its items to be seized gave the executing agents insufficient guidance. These arguments are meritless. The Affidavit set forth extensive probable cause that Wang conspired with Kwok, Je, and others to execute a sprawling fraud that included the GTV Private Placement and extended from there to three related arms of a single scheme. That evidence came not only in the form of the two incorporated charging instruments (through which a grand jury and a magistrate judge had found probable cause to believe that Wang and her co-conspirators executed the Fraud Scheme), but from additional evidence that further explained Wang's role and the conspirators' means and methods. The result of that Affidavit was a judicially authorized Warrant that identified the conduct and criminal offenses for which evidence was being sought, described the premises to be searched, and specified the items to be seized as evidence of the listed offenses. Nothing more was required, and there is no basis to disturb the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause or to suppress the fruits of this lawful search.\n\n#### **1. The Judicially Authorized Search Warrant Was Supported by Probable Cause**\n\n<span id=\"page-13-0\"></span>The Affidavit provided substantial evidence of Wang's participation in the Subject Offenses through means that made it reasonably likely that evidence of those crimes would be found at the apartment where she lived during the Fraud Scheme. Under these circumstances, there is no basis to disturb the \"substantial deference,\" *Rosa*, 11 F.3d at 326, owed to the issuing judge's probable cause determination.\n\nThe Affidavit began by describing and incorporating the two charging instruments through which a grand jury and a magistrate judge had found probable cause to believe that Wang, Kwok, Je, and their co-conspirators had executed the sprawling Fraud Scheme. (*See* Aff. ¶¶ 7-8). While neither Kwok's nor Wang's then-sealed charging documents referenced the other conspirator by name, reading the charging instruments together as they were presented to Judge Gorenstein makes clear the interrelation of their allegations and the presence of both coconspirators in each charging instrument. Indeed, the Affidavit made clear that Kwok, Je, and Wang all conspired together in the Fraud Scheme. (Aff. ¶ 9 (\"KWOK is the leader of, and directed, the Fraud Scheme. JE is the financial architect and key money launderer for the Fraud Scheme. WANG is the New York-based functional head of various of the KWOK-affiliated entities that have operated the Fraud Scheme\")). The Original Indictment alleged that the Fraud Scheme was executed \"through a series of complex fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities,\" (Dkt. 2 ¶ 1), and that it included the GTV Private Placement, (*see id.* ¶ 12), and three interrelated schemes, which were all part of the same conspiracy (*see id.* ¶¶ 13-15, 16-22). The Original Indictment charged Kwok and Je with, among other things, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering, and repeatedly emphasized that Kwok and Je had acted with others to execute the sprawling and sophisticated fraud scheme. The Complaint referred to Kwok as one of Wang's co-conspirators (under the name of \"CC-1\") and indicated that the Original Indictment charged Kwok \"in connection with\" the conduct for which Wang was being charged in the Complaint. (*See* Compl. ¶ 10.a n.1). The Complaint then alleged, among other things, that Wang was identified as the Executive Director of, and \"key personnel\" for, GTV in promotional communications made and disseminated by Kwok. (*See id.* ¶ 10.a-.d). The Complaint also described how \"WANG has had a close personal relationship with [Kwok],\" \"has worked for [Kwok] and [Kwok's] family for several years, since at least in or about 2018,\" and \"is the President, Treasurer, and Secretary of an entity that manages [Kwok's] purportedly vast personal wealth.\" (*Id.* ¶ 10.e). And while much of the Complaint focused on the GTV Private Placement and related events in 2020, the Complaint also alleged that in 2018, Wang identified herself as the President of Saraca Media Group—a Kwok-controlled entity beneficially owned by Kwok's son—while opening two bank accounts that referenced a separate leg of Kwok's Fraud Scheme. (*See id.* ¶ 11.a, .b (alleging, among other things, that Wang opened bank accounts held in the name of \"Saraca Media Group DBA Himalaya Dollar\")). The Complaint also alleged that \"WANG well knew that the funds raised from the GTV Private Placement could not be,\" but were, \"invested in a high-risk hedge fund for the benefit of [Kwok's] close relative.\" (*Id.* ¶ 13.h).\n\nWang's characterization that the Affidavit established probable cause \"primarily\" through these incorporated charging instruments, (Wang Mot. at 3), is misplaced. Establishing that there is probable cause to believe crimes were committed from 2018 through March 2023 through incorporated charging documents is itself sufficient. Nonetheless, the Affidavit did more. It included 18 paragraphs and subparagraphs of additional probable cause about the \"Fraud Scheme\" that \"pertains to several companies that are owned or operated by, or otherwise affiliated with, KWOK, [Je], and other Target Subjects.\" (Aff. ¶ 9). That evidence included that \"WANG is the New York-based functional head of the various KWOK-affiliated entities that have operated the Fraud Scheme,\" (*see id.*), and went on to allege that Wang was identified as GTV's executive director in the fraudulent private placement offering document (*see id.* ¶ 11.a), that there were chat messages \"among KWOK, JE, WANG, and others . . . regarding, among other things, business and other arrangements relating to various of the fraud-related ventures, including GTV and G|Fashion\" (*see id.* ¶ 16.b), and that \"KWOK, JE, WANG, and other Target Subjects primarily communicated\" through a particular messaging application (*see id.*).\n\nThe Affidavit set forth probable cause to believe that Wang lived at the Wang Apartment, including because Wang's name appeared on purchase records for the apartment in February 2020—that is, during the period of the Fraud Scheme and shortly before the GTV Private Placement—and because mail records indicated that Wang had received a package at the apartment at the other end of the period of the Fraud Scheme, in February 2023. (*See* Aff. ¶¶ 19.a-.b). The Affidavit also supplied probable cause to believe that electronic devices and other specified items likely to be found in the Wang Apartment would constitute or contain\n\nevidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Subject Offenses, including by referring back to the evidence that Kwok, Wang, and others \"primarily communicated\" through a device-based messaging application, and that probable cause was supplemented with the agent's training and experience with the kinds of evidence that is found on electronic devices used in furtherance of criminal activity. (*See id.* ¶¶ 20-24; *see also, e.g.*, *Ray*, 541 F. Supp. 3d at 406 (denying suppression motion where premises warrant's affidavit included evidence that defendant \"used electronic devices in the commission of the Subject Offenses\" and that agent's training and experience suggested that \"individuals who engage in the Subject Offenses commonly use electronic devices to communicate with co-conspirators\")).\n\n\"[A] sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activities and the place to be searched 'does not require direct evidence and may be based on reasonable inference from the facts presented based on common sense and experience.'\" *United States v. Gatto*, 313 F. Supp. 3d 551, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting *United States v. Singh*, 390 F.3d 168, 182 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Affidavit's evidence that Wang \"is the New York-based functional head of various of the KWOK-affiliated entities,\" that Wang resides at the Wang Apartment, that she and her coconspirators \"primarily communicated\" about \"business and other arrangements relating to various of the fraud-related ventures\" through an electronic messaging application, (*see* Aff. ¶ 16.b), and that Wang personally participated in the receipt, transfer, and misappropriation of the Fraud Scheme's proceeds, (*see id.* ¶¶ 11-12), provided ample grounds for the issuing judge to \"reasonably infer, based on common sense, that [Wang] has used electronic devices and encrypted applications to communicate with [her] coconspirators while at home.\" *United States v. Yu*, No. 22 Cr. 208 (CBA), 2023 WL 4687970, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2023); *see also, e.g.*, *United States v. Brown*, 676 F. Supp. 2d 220, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing \"common sense\" conclusion that \"an individual engaged in a conspiracy may have evidence of that conspiracy, including telephone numbers and other contact information, located in his or her residence\").\n\n*Yu* illustrates the point that no more particularized nexus between specific devices and specific locations is necessary for a premises warrant to issue. There, warrants were obtained in April and May 2022, *see id.* at \\*2, that sought evidence of a \"conspiracy that spanned multiple months—from August 2018 to February 2019—and involved at least five coconspirators,\" *see id.* at \\*3. *Yu*'s warrant affidavits, like the one at issue here, \"describe[d] extensively the conspirators' use of various electronic devices . . . as well as their practice of hiding payments through corporate financial transfers.\" *Id.* at \\*4. Accordingly, the district judge rejected a challenge to the judicially authorized premises warrant over challenges similar to Wang's, because \"[g]iven this context, the kind of evidence that would be relevant includes corporate documents, copies of communications between the conspirators on electronic devices, records contained within applications such as [a messaging application], or records of financial transactions between the conspirators, among others,\" which types of evidence are \"those likely 'stored in secure locations, under the control of the owner, for long periods of time.'\" *Id.* at \\*4 (quoting *United States v. Russo*, 483 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)); *see also, e.g.*, *Ray*, 541 F. Supp. 3d at 405 (\"The magistrate judge can authorize law enforcement to seize an item of evidence that there is probable cause to believe would be at one of a number of different locations without establishing the existence of probable cause that it currently is present at any one of the locations.\").\n\nWang also argues that the Affidavit provided \"no basis to believe that evidence concerning the GTV Private Placement would still be at the [Wang Apartment], if it ever was there in the first place\"—that is, that its probable cause was stale. (Wang Mot. at 6). The argument ignores that the Complaint and Original Indictment charged a conspiracy that continued through March 2023. It is common sense that the functional head of Kwok's entities would retain documents and electronics about those entities in her apartment. And to the extent that Wang contends the *Complaint*, read in isolation, focused only on Wang's involvement with one facet of a broader conspiracy that occurred in 2020, the *Affidavit* provides clear probable cause that Wang conspired with Kwok to commit the broader Fraud Scheme \"from in or about 2018 through the present,\" (Aff. ¶ 6). What is more, the \"factors relevant to a staleness inquiry\"—in particular, \"the nature of the alleged illegal activity\" and \"the nature of the evidence being sought\"—undermine Wang's assertion. *United States v. Salomon-Mendez*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting *United States v. McGrath*, 622 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1980)). The items sought by the warrant—consisting largely of financial records and communications about prior commercial dealings—were \"property of a more permanent nature that is likely to be maintained in one place for longer periods of time, such as business records.\" *Salomon-Mendez*, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 348; *see also, e.g.*, *Paul*, 692 F. Supp. at 193 (\"[I]t is reasonable to infer that an individual like [the defendant] would keep bank statements, safe deposit box information or keys and other financial records or instruments in his house over an extended period of time…\"). And even if \"certain categories of items . . . were stale,\" \"this staleness [need] not defeat the [Warrant's] probable cause to search the apartment.\" *United States v. Disla Ramos*, No. 22 Cr. 431 (LJL), 2022 WL 17830637, at \\*14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2022).\n\n#### **2. The Search Warrant Was Neither Unparticularized nor Overbroad**\n\n<span id=\"page-18-0\"></span>Wang's particularity argument relies almost exclusively on *United States v. Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), which concerned warrants fundamentally incomparable to the Warrant at issue here. \"[B]oth Warrants [in *Wey*] fail[ed] to set forth the crimes under investigation. . . . [T]hey neither cite[d] criminal statutes nor in any way describe[d] any criminal conduct.\" *Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 384. What is more, the *Wey* warrants effectively authorized the agents to seize *all items* related to the owner of the premises. *Id.* at 386.\n\nBut for warrants like the one at issue here—tied to specific crimes committed during a specific time period, and authorizing the seizure and search of specific categories of materials that relate to those time-bounded offenses—Wang's effort to import *Wey*'s language falls far short of the mark. First, Wang asserts that, after naming nine specific entities involved in the Fraud Scheme, the Warrant problematically permitted the seizure of documents relating to \"other entities and/or individuals involved in the commission of the Subject Offenses.\" (Wang Mot. at 8-9). Notwithstanding that \"[t]he nature of the crime . . . may require a broad search\" where \"complex financial crimes are alleged,\" *United States v. Dupree*, 781 F. Supp. 2d 115, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), the items complained of here are tightly connected to specific information about the articulated offenses. The purportedly broad language of \"other entities and/or individuals\" is cabined both by their \"involve[ment] in the commission of the Subject Offenses,\" and by their implied relationship to the nine specific entities that preceded the broader language in this particular category. (Warrant at 7). Wang also seeks to borrow *Wey*'s concern that the warrants in that case \"target[ed], in significant measure, the contents of electronic devices, such as computers, internal and external hard drives, and smartphones.\" (Wang Mot. at 9 (citing *Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 386-87)). That language in *Wey* is inseparable from its connection to warrants that cited *no* connection to *any* articulated crimes. But where, as here, a warrant's affidavit \"supplied probable cause to believe that electronic devices and cellphones were used to communicate to cohorts, ensnare victims, and generally to prepare and orchestrate criminal conduct\" and \"identified the [electronic-device] items to be searched and seized and linked them to the suspected criminal activity,\" the \"case is easily distinguishable from [*Wey*].\" *Ray*, 541 F. Supp. 3d at 391-92 (denying suppression motion for warrant with comparable language about electronic devices).\n\nWang's other particularity objection is to the Warrant's authorization to seize items that, by their nature, may have been purchased using funds originally sourced from proceeds derived from the Subject Offenses. (Wang Mot. at 9). Left out was that this item's breadth was cabined by its inclusion in a category of \"evidence concerning the possession, receipt, use, transfer, or laundering of funds obtained in connection with the Subject Offenses\"—a category with a substantial basis in the Complaint's detailed allegations, incorporated into the Affidavit, that Wang \"received and transferred fraud proceeds\" from at least the time she opened two bank accounts including the name of two different Kwok-related entities from at least in or about 2018, (*see* Compl. ¶¶ 11.a, .b), through a period after her critical role in 2020 in misappropriating \\$100 million of fraud proceeds into an investment vehicle whose ultimate beneficial owner was Kwok's son (*see id.* ¶¶ 12.a-.c).\n\nIgnoring this clear connection to the Affidavit's probable cause, Wang relies instead on an inapposite First Circuit case. In *Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc.*, 610 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979), an affidavit set forth probable cause to believe an organization had defrauded a specific federal student-loan program (the FISLP) before its warrant authorized \"not just a search and seizure of FISLP-related records . . . but a general rummaging for evidence of any type of federal conspiracy or fraud.\" *Id.* at 3-4. The warrant at issue here, by contrast, did exactly what the *Lafayette Academy* court said was necessary: stating \"the precise nature of the fraud and conspiracy offenses for evidence of which the search was authorized.\" *Id.*; 9*see also* Warrant, Attachment-2, at II.A (linking \"items to be seized\" to \"a scheme to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false pretenses and misrepresentations and to launder and misappropriate victim funds from in or about 2018 through the present\")).\n\nTellingly, Wang's particularity argument fails to explain how any of the \"three components of the particularity requirement\" were not \"satisfied on the face of the warrant\" (or even engage with this clear case law). *See United States v. Margulies*, No. 17 Cr. 638 (JSR), 2019 WL 3080848, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2019) (citing *United States v. Galpin*, 720 F.3d 436, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2013)). The warrant satisfied all three: it identified the specific offenses for which agents had probable cause, it described the place to be searched, and it specified the items to be seized by their relation to the designated crimes. \"Nothing more was required.\" *Margulies*, 2019 WL 3080848, at \\*1.\n\nWang's short overbreadth argument—which relies on no cases other than those that set out general standards—is that the Affidavit provided an insufficient basis to authorize the seizure of evidence relating to certain entities (namely, \"G Club International Ltd.; G-CLUBS; G-Fashion, G News; G Music; Himalaya Exchange; or GETTR USA, Inc.\"). (Wang Mot. at 10). In fact, the Affidavit described the web of known and unknown entities connected to the Fraud Scheme and laid out for the issuing judge specifically why evidence relating to them should be seized: based on probable cause that Wang and her co-conspirators executed a Fraud Scheme \"that pertains to several companies that are owned or operated by, or otherwise affiliated with,\" Kwok, Je, and others (Aff. ¶ 9), that Kwok and others \"represented that G|CLUBS membership would be a mechanism to obtain stock in KWOK-affiliated companies, including GTV and a company called G|FASHION,\" (*id.* ¶ 11.c), and that \"[Wang] is the New York-based functional head of various of the [Kwok]-affiliated entities that have operated the Fraud Scheme,\" (*see id.*; *see also id.* ¶ 16.b (chat messages showing that Wang, Kwok, Je, and others discussed \"business and other arrangements relating to various of the fraud-related ventures, including GTV and G|Fashion\"). *See Andresen v. Maryland*, 427 U.S. 463, 480 n.10 (1976) (approving of warrant's breadth in investigation of \"complex real estate scheme whose existence could be proved only by piecing together many bits of evidence\" and where \"[l]ike a jigsaw puzzle, the whole 'picture' of [the] scheme . . . could be shown only by placing in the proper place the many pieces of evidence that, taken singly, would show comparatively little\").\n\nThe Warrant satisfied the three components of particularity, and each of its categories of authorized seizures were related back to the particular crimes for which the executing agents had probable cause that was amply laid out for the issuing judge.\n\n#### **3. In the Alternative, the Agents Relied in Good Faith on the Search Warrant**\n\n<span id=\"page-22-0\"></span>Wang challenges a detailed warrant that incorporates and substantially builds on two related charging instruments that had been filed four and eight days before the Warrant was issued, laying out a long-running, wide-reaching, and interrelated set of schemes to defraud. The Warrant was signed by the same magistrate judge who issued the related Complaint, and the two documents were sworn by the same agent. Wang's motion makes no meaningful effort to overcome the goodfaith exception that avoids suppression where the evidence at issue was \"obtained in objectively reasonable reliance\" on a warrant that may later be determined to have legal flaws. *Leon*, 468 U.S. at 922. That is not surprising. Even if the Court accepted certain of Wang's arguments about the Warrant—and it should not—this case does not fit into any of the four narrow circumstances that void the good-faith exception: where the issuing judge was knowingly misled or where he wholly abandoned his judicial role, or where reliance is unreasonable because the application so lacks indicia of probable cause or the warrant is so facially deficient. *See Clark*, 638 F.3d at 100 (citing\n\n*Leon*, 468 U.S. at 922). Wang does not allege that the Government \"knowingly misled\" the issuing judge, or that the issuing judge \"wholly abandoned\" his judicial role. Her motion states breezily and in passing, with no citation to any purportedly analogous cases, that \"other issues with the warrant . . . show why it was unreasonable for the agents to rely on the warrant,\" (Wang Mot. at 8), and that the warrant's purported overbreadth \"provid[es] a further basis to show . . . that the agents' reliance on the warrant was unreasonable,\" (*id.* at 10). While it is the Government's burden to establish good faith, \"[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.\" *Leon*, 468 U.S. at 922. Indeed, the \"issuance of [the] warrant by a neutral magistrate . . . creates a presumption that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that there was probable cause.\" *Golino*, 950 F.2d at 870.\n\nMoreover, there is no dispute that \"[t]he agents complied with the terms of the warrant,\" whose \"same terms were included in numerous cases in this Court approving search warrants for electronic devices and financial records.\" *Ray*, 541 F. Supp. 3d at 395.\n\nThe Court should deny Wang's motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrant that was supported by two related charging instruments and substantial additional probable cause. While the Court need not reach the issue of good faith, there is no question that the executing agents had ample bases reasonably to rely on the Warrant's terms and that this good faith would suffice independently to deny suppression.\n\n### <span id=\"page-23-0\"></span>**II. The Defendant's Post-Arrest Statement Should Not be Suppressed**\n\nWang's next motion asks the Court to \"[s]uppress [M]s. Wang's [p]ost-[a]rrest [s]tatement\" that concerned only \"the locations of, and passwords for, electronic devices in the apartment\" for which the agents had a judicially authorized warrant. (Wang Mot. at 11). In the motion's final sentence, citing no law, Wang broadens the request to suppress \"the evidence obtained as a result of the violation—namely, the contents of the phones.\" (*Id.* at 13). To the extent Wang seeks to suppress her statements of her phones' locations and passcodes, the motion is moot, because the Government does not intend to offer those statements in its case-in-chief. Wang's much broader, last-sentence request has no basis in law, and should be denied. There is no controlling or persuasive authority (and Wang cites none) for the suppression of the contents of phones seized and searched pursuant to a warrant because an agent asked for their passcodes.\n\n#### <span id=\"page-24-0\"></span>**A. Applicable Law**\n\nIn *Miranda*, the Supreme Court \"adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right from the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.\" *Maryland v. Shatzer*, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has extended *Miranda* to provide that, \"when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation . . ., [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him.\" *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). This \"second layer of prophylaxis,\" *McNeil v. Wisconsin*, 501 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1991), \"is designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted *Miranda* rights\" and protects \"a suspect's voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer's presence.\" *Montejo v. Louisiana*, 556 U.S. 778, 787 (2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the police do subsequently initiate interrogation in the absence of counsel, \"the suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial.\" *McNeil*, 501 U.S. at 177. The U.S. Supreme Court has \"frequently emphasized that the *Edwards* rule is not a constitutional mandate, but judicially prescribed prophylaxis.\" *Id*. at 105.\n\nWhile a violation of the *Edwards* rule will normally result in the suppression of *statements*  made by the defendant, this prophylactic rule does not extend beyond the defendant's statements. The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis does not apply to statements taken in violation of the *Miranda* rules. *See Oregon v. Elstad*, 470 U.S. 298, 304–09 (1985) (\"*Miranda* requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made\"). A violation of the prophylactic *Miranda* rule does not require \"suppression of the [nontestimonial] physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements.\" *United States v. Patane*, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (plurality opinion); *id.* at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\"nontestimonial\"). The same holds true for a violation of the prophylactic *Edwards* rule: when the evidence seized is \"physical, nontestimonial evidence, an *Edwards* violation itself would not justify suppression.\" *United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia*, 708 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2013). As the Supreme Court explained in *Patane*, 542 U.S. at 636, \"the *Miranda* rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self–Incrimination Clause. The Self-Incrimination Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement. Accordingly, there is no justification for extending the *Miranda* rule to this context.\"\n\nA defendant's statements are \"not automatically involuntary merely because his *Miranda* rights were violated.\" *Gonzalez-Garcia*, 708 F.3d at 688. Thus, unless the agents, in violation of the Due Process Clause, coerced a defendant into making statements that led to the discovery of physical evidence, the physical evidence itself is admissible. *United States v. Hallford*, 816 F.3d 850 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing *Chavez v. Martinez*, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality opinion)). \"In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.\" *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (factors include youth of accused, lack of education, low intelligence, lack of any advice of his constitutional rights, length of detention, repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and use of physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep); *Berghuis v. Thompkins*, 560 U.S. 370, 387 (2010) (evidence of coercion may include \"an incapacitated and sedated suspect, sleep and food deprivation, and threats.\").\n\n#### <span id=\"page-26-0\"></span>**B. Discussion**\n\nThe search of Wang's phone was conducted in good faith by FBI agents pursuant to a judicially authorized warrant. The issue raised by Wang, then, is merely whether using the passcode Wang provided, after invoking silence, to access certain phones requires suppression of the content of those phones. It does not. Wang cites no controlling or persuasive authority to the contrary in support of her request to suppress phone contents on *Miranda* grounds. Instead, the law is clear that a purported *Miranda* violation does not permit \"suppression of the [nontestimonial] physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but *voluntary* statements.\" *United States v. Patane*, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Even if Wang's statement of her phones' passcodes was obtained inconsistently with *Miranda*'s guidance—and the Government does not concede the point, nor is it necessary to resolve in order to dispose of Wang's motion—her motion still fails because it does not establish that the statements regarding the passcode were involuntary, that the \"contents of [her] phones\" are their \"fruits,\" or that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine even applies to purported *Miranda* violations (it does not).\n\nFirst, Wang's affidavit does not even attempt to assert that her provision of her phones'\n\npasscodes was involuntary. *United States v. Taylor*, 745 F.3d 15, 23-24 (2d Cir. 2014) (\"voluntariness inquiry should examine 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including the accused's characteristics, the conditions of interrogation, and the conduct of law enforcement officials.')); *cf. Gonzalez-Garcia*, 708 F.3d at 688 (5th Cir. 2013) (defendant's statements \"not automatically involuntary merely because his *Miranda* rights were violated\"). It alleges nothing about Wang's characteristics or the agents' conduct to suggest that Wang's \"will was overborne,\" *Schneckloth*, 412 U.S. at 226, nor presents any evidence of coercion above and beyond the fact that she was in custody (a threshold requirement necessary for any *Miranda* claim), *Berghuis*, 560 U.S. at 387. Indeed, Wang's affidavit points in the *opposite* direction: by clarifying that she knew how to invoke her rights and remain silent (in response to invitations to make more general statements) and when, instead, to provide certain limited information about items that the agents had warrants to search and seize, Wang's characterization only underscores the voluntariness of her statements about the phones' passcodes. *Cf. United States v. Pinto-Thomaz*, 357 F. Supp. 2d 324, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (denying suppression, including because defendant \"exhibited awareness that he could refuse to answer questions or provide information when he repeatedly refused to provide the passcode to his phone, while answering other questions\"). Wang does not allege that she was forced to answer questions, incarcerated for days, subjected to torture, mentally incapable or offered promises such that her will was overborne. *Taylor*, 745 F.3d at 24 (noting that *United States v. Salameh*, 152 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1998), \"rejected a claim that a statement was involuntary, even though the accused claimed that prior to being taken into U.S. custody, he had been incarcerated in Egypt and tortured for ten days.\"). Wang alleges nothing close to involuntary coercion—just that \"agents asked me multiple questions . . . about the locations of, and passwords for, electronic devices, in the apartment,\" and that she answered. (*See*  Dkt. 199, Def. Ex. 4 ¶ 6). This should end the inquiry, because without a finding that the passcode statements were involuntary, there can be no suppression. *Patane*, 542 at 634.\n\nSecond, Wang assembles language from a different opinion in *United States v. Pinto-Thomaz*, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), for the purported rule that \"if, as here, a person in custody 'invoked his right to counsel prior to being questioned concerning his iPhone passcode,' it 'is an *Edwards* violation requiring suppression of the contents of the phone.'\" (Wang Mot. at 13 (citing *Pinto-Thomaz*, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 310-11)). But Judge Rakoff's opinion *declined to decide* the question. Instead, the court simply noted that one judge in the Northern District of New York, and one panel of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (\"relying in part on the Military Rules of Evidence\"), had so held. *See Pinto-Thomaz*, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 311. Contrary to those decisions, and as explained above, the law is clear that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis does not apply to voluntary statements taken in violation of the *Miranda* rules. *See Elstad*, 470 U.S. at 304–09. And in fact, more recently, Judge Rakoff—*Pinto-Thomaz*'s author—has stated the law in a manner fatal to Wang's motion: \"*Miranda* does not require the exclusion of physical evidence based on a suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements. Further still, even if one assumes that [the defendant's] divulging his password was not just unwarned but also coerced, that would still likely not require suppression. . . . [T]he Court holds the view that being made to produce a phone password—at least, where, as here, there is no real dispute that the person in fact owns the phone and knows its password—does not violate the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incriminating testimony.\" *United States v. Smith*, No. 22 Cr. 352 (JSR), 2023 WL 3358357, at \\*2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2023) (citing *Patane*, 542 U.S. at 637-42 (plurality opinion); *id.* at 644-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); *Fisher v. United States*, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)); *see also, e.g.*, Yale Kamisar, *Postscript: Another Look at* Patane *and* Seibert*, the 2004*  Miranda *\"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases*, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 97, 113 (2004) (\"[T]he most plausible reading\" of *Miranda*'s progeny is that \"the physical fruits of a *Miranda*-deficient statement are always admissible.\").\n\nFinally, Wang's motion simply assumes its predicate that the contents of her phones were the \"fruits\" of her providing their passcodes to the agents. But even if this were the relevant inquiry—and, as explained above, it is not—Wang's motion would fail for reasons she neglects to mention or take issue with. The Court can conclude, based on the Warrant already in the record and without need for an evidentiary hearing, that the Government would inevitably have discovered the phones in the confined space of her Manhattan condominium and likewise would have gained access to the contents of those phones because, as the issuing Magistrate approved, the Warrant authorized the agents to compel Wang's use of the phones' biometrics, *see* Warrant at 9. Indeed, the Government could compel Wang to \"press the fingers, including thumbs, of: . . . WANG to the Touch ID sensor of any device(s) found in [the Wang Apartment], or to instruct WANG to remain still, with eyes looking forward at the Face ID sensor of the device(s), . . . for the purpose of attempted to unlock the device(s) via biometric features in order to search the contents as authorized by the warrants.\" (Aff. at 22 ¶ 35; *see also id.* at 22 n.5 (citing *United States v. Adams*, No. 15 Cr. 410 (ECF No. 56) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015) (Kaplan, J.) (denying motion to quash grand jury subpoena commanding defendant to appear so that a phone seized from his person and equipped with a facial recognition lock may be unlocked by placing the phone next to his face and activating the facial recognition function))). *See United States v. Eldarir*, No. 20 Cr. 243 (LDH), 2023 WL 4373551, at \\*9 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 6, 2023) (collecting cases and denying suppression on alternatively sufficient ground that \"the evidence Defendant seeks to suppress would have been discovered even if, as Defendant argues, he had not been compelled to\n\nunlock the phone\"). So too do tools employed by the FBI, which are sometimes able to access cellphones without passcodes.\n\nWang does not allege that her provision of her phones' passcodes was involuntary, and she cites no authority for the proposition that *Miranda*'s progeny provides a basis to suppress the contents of phones seized and searched pursuant to a warrant. Her motion to suppress her statement of the passcodes is moot as described above, and her motion to suppress the contents of the phones should be denied.\n\n#### <span id=\"page-30-0\"></span>**III. The Defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars Should Be Denied**\n\nThe defendant moves for a number of particulars. Consistent with established law, the Indictment and discovery materials provide the defendant with more than enough factual information to adequately defend against the charges. The motion, which constitutes an improper demand for a preview of the Government's trial evidence and a method to cabin the Government's trial presentation, should be summarily rejected.\n\n### <span id=\"page-30-1\"></span>**A. Applicable Law**\n\nThe proper scope and function of a bill of particulars is to provide sufficient information about the nature of the charge to enable a defendant to prepare for trial, to avoid unfair surprise, and to preclude a second prosecution for the same offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f); *United States v. Torres*, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by *United States v. Marcus*, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2010); *United States v. Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). \"A bill of particulars should be required only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.\" *Torres*, 901 F.2d at 234.\n\nIf the information the defendant seeks \"is provided in the indictment or in some acceptable alternate form,\" no bill of particulars is required. *Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d at 574. In exercising its broad discretion to determine whether the charges are \"so general\" that they require supplementing, the Court should consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also the discovery and other filings by the Government. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Kazarian,* No. 10 Cr. 895 (PGG), 2012 WL 1810214, at \\*25 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (noting the \"enormous amount of discovery material\" which \"provide [the defendant] with much of the information sought in the request for a bill of particulars\"); *United States v. Monserrate*, No. 10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) (denying request for bill of particulars where discovery materials and indictment were \"sufficient to apprise the defendant of the charge against him\" and to allow him to prepare for trial); *United States v. Samsonov*, No. 07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) (denying bill of particulars request where indictment, discovery letters, and discovery materials gave defendant adequate information to prepare for trial).\n\nIn other words, the defense cannot use a bill of particulars as a general investigative tool, *United States v. Morales*, 280 F. Supp. 2d 262, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), or as a device to compel disclosure of the Government's evidence prior to trial. *United States v. Triana-Mateus*, No. 98 Cr. 958 (SWK), 2002 WL 562649, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2002) (citing *United States v. Gottlieb*, 493 F.2d 987, 994 (2d Cir. 1974)); *see also United States v. Strawberry*, 892 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Supplying evidentiary detail is not the function of the bill of particulars. *Torres*, 901 F.2d at 234. Accordingly, the Government is not required to: (a) \"particularize all of its evidence,\" *United States v. Cephas*, 937 F.2d 816, 823 (2d Cir. 1991); (b) disclose the precise manner in which the crimes charged in the indictment were committed, *see Torres*, 901 F.2d at 233-34; or (c) provide the defendant with a preview of the Government's case or legal theory, *see*  *United States v. Muyet*, 945 F. Supp. 586, 598-599 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The ultimate test is whether the information sought is *necessary*, not whether it is helpful. *See United States v. Conley*, No. 00 Cr. 0816 (DAB), 2002 WL 252766, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2002); *United States v. Trippe*, 171 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); *United States v. Taylor*, 707 F. Supp. 696, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); *United States v. Persico*, 621 F. Supp. 842, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).\n\nThere are good reasons why bills of particulars are warranted only where the allegations in an indictment, as supplemented by discovery and otherwise, are so general as to render it impossible to prepare a defense. Because a bill of particulars \"confines the Government's proof to particulars furnished,\" it can \"restrict unduly the Government's ability to present its case.\" *United States v. Feola*, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). \"The [G]overnment's presentation of evidence at trial is limited to the particulars contained in the bill, so care must be taken not to overly restrict the government's proof while still protecting the defendant from unfair surprise.\" *United States v. Mahabub*, No. 13 Cr. 908, 2014 WL 4243657, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014); *see also Samsonov*, 2009 WL 176721, at \\*3 (bill of particulars \"must not be misused . . . to foreclose the Government from using proof it may develop as the trial approaches\").\n\nMoreover, the Government's provision of particulars tantamount to an itemized preview of its proof creates the very real danger that a defendant will \"tailor [] testimony to explain away the Government's case.\" *Henry*, 861 F. Supp. at 1197 (citing *United States v. Cimino*, 31 F.R.D. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)); *United States v. Sindone*, 01 Cr. 517, 2002 WL 48604, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2002) (\"The stakes in a criminal case are high, and temptations of perjury, subornation and intimidation are ever present. Accordingly, the government is not required to turn over information that will permit a defendant to preview the government's case and tempt him to tailor proof to explain it away, or see to it that the government's proof is not presented.\").\n\nApplying these principles, courts in this district routinely deny motions for bills of particulars that are, at bottom, demands for additional details of the manner in which the offense was committed or how the Government intends to prove its case at trial. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Mitlof*, 165 F. Supp. 2d 558, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying request for bill of particulars identifying \"each act of 'fraud, neglect, connivance, misconduct, and violation of law' upon which the Government will base its case,\" and noting that Government may not be compelled to disclose manner in which it will prove charges, manner in which defendant committed the crime charged, or a preview of Government's evidence or legal theories); *United States v. Leonelli*, 428 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rejecting request for bill of particulars regarding the names, dates and places for the entire case as \"an attempt to discover the minutia of the Government's case\").\n\n#### <span id=\"page-33-0\"></span>**B. Discussion**\n\nThe defendant does not need a bill of particulars to defend this case and is not entitled to one as a matter of law. Indeed, much of what the defendant seeks amounts to a request for a presentation of the Government's proof, and much of it is already contained in the Government's disclosures, which the defendant has ample time to review. Rather, it appears the defendant is seeking particulars concerning four topics to improperly \"lock the government into its proof,\" *United States v. Rigas*, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). That is not a proper purpose and, in short, the defendant's requests do not represent an appropriate use of Rule 7(f), and should therefore be denied.\n\n*First*, several of the defendant's requests for particulars are meritless in light of the operative S2 Indictment (the \"Indictment\"). For instance:\n\n> • Wang seeks particulars regarding the fraudulent and fictitious businesses that were interrelated and instrumentalities of the fraud. (Wang Mot. 13-14 (seeking particulars for \"[t]he businesses [the S1 Indictment] allege[d] were 'fraudulent [or] fictitious\"; \"the entities [the S1 Indictment] allege[d] were 'interrelated'\"; \"the\n\nentities [the S1 Indictment] contend[ed] were 'instrumentalities of the fraud.\" The operative Indictment specifically names over 40 entities and organizations that were part of the Kwok Enterprise. (Indictment ¶ 3.a; *see also id.* ¶ 1).\n\n• Wang also seeks particulars regarding how she enriched herself. (Wang Mot. 13). The operative Indictment alleges that Wang \"was paid at least approximately \\$500,000 per year, was gifted an approximately \\$1.1 million-dollar Manhattan condominium, and was promised millions of dollars' worth of a purported cryptocurrency.\"[3](#page-34-0) (Indictment \b6 5).[4](#page-34-1)\n\nThe 49-page, thirteen-count speaking Indictment describes the charged fraud schemes in great detail. It explains how Kwok led a criminal organization (the \"Enterprise\") that defrauded thousands of victims of more than \\$1 billion from at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023, through acts of racketeering activity that include wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and securities fraud offenses. (Indictment, Dkt. 215 at ¶ 1). The Indictment describes that the Enterprise perpetrated the fraud using a series of complex fraudulent businesses and fictitious investment opportunities associated with dozens of interrelated entities controlled by Kwok, 44 of which are specifically named in the Indictment. (Indictment ¶ 3.a). The Indictment alleges that Wang operated as the \"chief of staff\" for the Enterprise. (Indictment ¶ 11). It further alleges that Kwok, Wang, and their co-conspirators laundered their fraud proceeds through foreign and domestic bank accounts and entities, layering the fraud proceeds to conceal their source, as well as using the fraud proceeds to further promote the ongoing fraud, (Indictment ¶¶ 4, 20), and that they also misappropriated victim funds for their own personal use and for the use of family members, including for personal investments and the purchase of luxury residences, vehicles, and goods. (Indictment ¶¶ 5, 16.h, 17.f, 18.h). Wang's requests should be denied based on the\n\n<span id=\"page-34-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> Wang's allocation of cryptocurrency was, furthermore, the subject of bail submissions. (*See* Dkt. 42 at 2-3 (discussing evidence indicating Wang was allocated HCN)).\n\n<span id=\"page-34-1\"></span><sup>4</sup> The Complaint charging Wang also described how Wang wired herself over \\$30,000 of GTV Private Placement fraud proceeds as a \"Director Fee.\" (Compl. ¶ 13.d).\n\nIndictment (not to mention the extensive discovery and other filings in this case).\n\n*Second*, the requests for particulars relating to the GTV Private Placement are likewise meritless. The requested evidentiary detail includes: (1) how the defendant \"conducted the GTV Private Placement,\" (2) the \"purchase[s] and sale[s]\" the defendant was involved in or solicited in connection with the GTV Private Placement, (3) which proceeds of the GTV Private Placement were \"not used to develop and grow the GTV business,\" and (4) how the specific \\$100 million wire transfer cited in the Indictment \"was contrary to the PPM representations to prospective GTV investors about how investments in GTV would be used.\" (Wang Mot. at 20). Wang does not need—and is certainly not legally entitled to—a bill of particular for any of this information. As described in the Indictment, Wang was Kwok's chief of staff, exercising control over entities within the Enterprise, including GTV, of which Wang was named as an Executive Director. (Indictment ¶¶ 11, 13, 16.c). As detailed in the Indictment and Complaint, Wang controlled the bank accounts (held in the name of Saraca) into which GTV investor funds were deposited. (Indictment ¶ 16.f (noting deposits to Saraca, which is beneficially owned by Kwok's family member, Relative-1); Compl. ¶ 11 (describing Wang's control of Saraca bank accounts that received incoming wires referencing the GTV Private Placement from victim investors)). As further described in the Indictment and Complaint, Wang and her co-conspirators misappropriated \\$100 million of those GTV investor funds. (Indictment ¶ 16.h); Compl. ¶ 12). The Indictment explains that, contrary to representations in the GTV Private Placement memorandum regarding how funds raised through the offering would be spent, the \\$100 million investment of GTV funds into Fund-1 \"was not made 'to strengthen and grow' GTV's business or to benefit GTV, but rather was made for the benefit of Saraca and Relative-1.\" (Indictment ¶ 16.h). The Indictment's specific allegations—further detailed through the Complaint (and other filings) and discoveryneed not be supplemented by a bill of particulars.\n\nTo the extent Wang seeks a line-by-line specification of bank transfers (*i.e.*, stock purchases) involving thousands of victims and hundreds of millions of dollars, such \"evidentiary minutiae\" is not a proper basis for a bill of particulars—and, in any event, is contained in the bank and financial records produced in discovery and already in the defendant's possession.[5](#page-36-0) *United States v. Levy*, 11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at \\*4, 13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) (in case charging stock manipulation through false representations by corrupt brokers, request for bill of particulars recounting \"each specific misrepresentation and omission alleged\" denied as \"simply a request to compel the production of the very type of evidentiary minutiae that is not appropriate in a bill of particulars\") (citation and quotation marks omitted); *see also, e.g.*, *Bonventre*, 2013 WL 2303726, at \\*5-\\*7 (in case involving largest Ponzi scheme in U.S. history, which spanned decades, denying request for bill of particulars identifying, among other things, all \"allegedly false records upon which the Government intends to rely to prove its case,\" \"the specific entries [in specific books and records] that the Government alleges [the defendants] knew were false,\" \"the specific arbitrage trades in which [a defendant] was involved that the Government alleges are fraudulent,\" the \"dates and stock names for all alleged backdated transactions,\" and \"all unnamed clients and allegedly fake trades referred to in\" a particular count). Wang's suggestion that such particulars are justified due to extraterritoriality concerns (*see* Wang Mot. 19-20) is baseless; the conduct and financial transactions took place in the United States. (*See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 11 (detailing receipt\n\n<span id=\"page-36-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Relatedly, Wang seeks particulars regarding \"the transfers\" the Indictment \"contends were illegal,\" citing the S1 Indictment's paragraph 3, which is (in substance) now the S2 Indictment's paragraph 4. (Wang Mot. 14 & n.15). That paragraph of the Indictment refers to the laundering of over a billion dollars through over \"500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals.\" (Indictment ¶ 4). As noted above, a bill of particulars for such voluminous financial record evidence is plainly unwarranted.\n\nand transfer of fraud proceeds via bank headquartered in Manhattan)). To the extent Wang seeks merely to try to restrict the Government's presentation of evidence at trial, that likewise is not a proper basis for a bill of particulars. *See, e.g.*, *Mitlof*, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569; *Mahabub*, 2014 WL 4243657, at \\*2; *Samsonov*, 2009 WL 176721, at \\*3.\n\nAs numerous courts have found, where specific examples are offered, as here, the Government need not produce a bill of particulars containing an inventory of every act it plans to prove that constituted part of the fraud.\n\n*Third*, the defendant's request for particulars regarding the identities and locations of victims, *including whether those victims will be trial witnesses*, is plainly improper. (*See* Wang Mot. 14). Details regarding victims are not properly within the scope of a bill of particulars, particularly where, as here, the discovery materials already contain that information. *See, e.g., United States v. Russo*, 483 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (identification of particular \"investors\" referenced in the indictment was beyond the scope of a bill of particulars); *United States v. Fea*, No. 10 CR. 708 (PKC), 2011 WL 2119708, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2011) (denying bill of particulars request seeking identities of victims in loansharking case, where discovery materials already contained victim information); *United States v. Gall*, No. 95 Cr. 98 (AHN), 1996 WL 684404, at \\*7 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 1996) (denying bill of particulars request demanding identities of insurance fraud victims and \"the manner in which the financial statements [the defendant] submitted to insurance companies and state agencies were false\"). Further, a bill of particulars is clearly not a mechanism to obtain early disclosure of the Government's witness list, regarding victims or any other potential witnesses. This request is improper and should be rejected.\n\n*Finally*, the defendant's argument that the volume of discovery favors a bill of particulars is without merit. In fact, the opposite is true. As an initial matter, comprehensive discovery has often been cited by courts in denying motions for a bill of particulars because the discovery provides defendants with more than sufficient information to prepare for trial. *See Kazarian,* 2012 WL 1810214, at \\*25; *Monserrate*, 2011 WL 3480957, at \\*4; *Samsonov*, 2009 WL 176721, at \\*4; *United States v. Mandell*, 710 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (the \"mere existence of a 'mountain of documents' does not entitle\" a defendant to a bill of particulars).\n\nWhile the Government has produced a significant amount of material to the defendants, it is not an unusual quantity of discovery in a fraud case such as this one and, as noted above, the defendant has ample time to review it. Indeed, while the defendant points out that the Government produced the contents of approximately 100 or more electronic devices, she omits the fact that approximately 50 of those devices are her own electronic devices. Courts in this Circuit have routinely denied motions for a bill of particulars premised on the fact that discovery is voluminous, especially in situations where the defendants have had (or will have) many months to review it. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Wey*, No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651, at \\*21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (\"[T]he discovery volume alone simply does not necessitate a bill of particulars.\"); *Levy*, 2013 WL 664712, at \\*13 (denying request for bill of particulars based on amount of discovery and noting that \"[w]hile the Court may sympathize with counsel's task of reviewing a large quantity of materials that continue to be produced by the Government, the applicable Indictment was filed almost eight months ago, and counsel has had the opportunity to review discovery materials as the Government has produced them\"). This case is no different.\n\nThe authorities relied upon by the defendants compelling the Government to identify particular transactions or false representations contained in voluminous discovery are inapposite. For example, the defendant relies on *Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d at 575, a RICO insurance fraud case in which the Government did not identify before trial which of the fifteen burglaries and four thousand documents were alleged to have been fabricated. At trial the Government ultimately alleged that only four burglaries and only three of four thousand documents were false. The Second Circuit found that, under these circumstances, the burden had impermissibly shifted to the defendants, who were \"forced to explain the events surrounding eight actual burglaries and to confront numerous documents unrelated to the charges pending.\" *Id.* at 574-75. Not so here. This is not a case where the Government intends to prove that only certain discrete transactions were fraudulent but fails to identify such transactions, creating a needle-in-a-haystack problem for the defendant. In addition to conspiracy charges, for which bills of particular are routinely denied,[6](#page-39-0) the Government has charged four related fraud schemes (relating to GTV, the Farm Loan Program,\n\n<span id=\"page-39-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> \"[D]emands for particular information with respect to where, when, and with whom the Government will charge the defendant with conspiring are routinely denied.\" *Trippe*, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (collecting cases); *see, e.g., United States v. Barrera*, 950 F. Supp. 2d 461, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to receive details of the government's conspiracy allegations in a bill of particulars.\"); *United States v. Wilson*, 493 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same, denying motion for a bill of particulars as to the dates on which the defendant and his co-conspirators joined the charged conspiracy); *Rivera*, 2017 WL 1843302, at \\*3 (citing *Torres*, 901 F.2d at 233-34 (affirming denial of bill of particulars about when defendant was \"alleged to have joined\" the conspiracy, the identities of co-conspirators and the \"precise dates and locations\" of overt acts)); *United States v. Nachamie*, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (defendant not entitled to particulars regarding his participation in submission of false Medicare claims, including manner in which he caused such claims to be submitted); *United States v. Mittal*, No. 98 Cr. 1302, 1999 WL 461293, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1999) (\"[C]ourts have consistently rejected demands for particulars as to the formation of a conspiracy or the entry into the conspiracy of a particular defendant or confederate.\") (citing cases); *United States v. Johnson-Guzman*, No. 98 CR. 350 (RWS), 1998 WL 730327, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1998) (\"With respect to conspiracy charges in particular, since the Government is not required to prove exactly when or how a conspiracy was formed or when or how a particular defendant joined the scheme, and as the circumstantial proof on which the government usually relies to prove the existence of a scheme often does not reveal such details, the courts have consistently rejected demands for particulars as to the formation of a conspiracy or the entry into the conspiracy of a particular defendant or confederate.\"); *United States v. Perez*, 940 F. Supp. 540, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (government not required to specify particular acts in which defendants alleged to have \"participated in, had knowledge of, or are being held responsible for\") (citations omitted).\n\nG|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange) in a lengthy speaking Indictment and produced detailed discovery regarding those schemes.\n\nEqually unhelpful to the defendant is *United States v. Savin*, No. 00 Cr. 45 (RWS), 2001 WL 243533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), which is also cited by the defendant. In *Savin*, the indictment alleged that an investment advisor had misappropriated client funds over a six-year period through \"an unspecified series of 'intercompany transfers' without identifying the amounts, dates, means, corporate entities, or co-conspirators involved.\" *Id.* at \\*3. Because the Government had produced voluminous documents evidencing fund transfers without specifying which transfers were alleged to be improper, the court granted in part a bill of particulars request. *Id.* at \\*2. By contrast, here the Government has identified specific fund transfers that it alleges constitute misappropriation, including by date, entity involved, beneficiary, and items purchased with the funds. (*See, e.g.*, Indictment ¶¶ 4, 5, 16.h, 17.f, 18.h, 24, 25). Other authorities cited by the defendants are of the same ilk, and thus not on point here. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Davidoff*, 845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988) (bill of particulars should have been ordered to identify the companies defendant was alleged to have extorted as part of a RICO scheme, when he was indicted for extortionate schemes directed at one company but confronted at trial with evidence of extortions aimed at entirely different companies).\n\nSimply put, the defendant has before her extensive information about the alleged fraud scheme and how it will be proven. Courts routinely find such information and discovery is sufficient for defendants to prepare for trial, and the defendant has a substantial amount of time to review it. In these circumstances, a burdensome bill of particulars effectively seeking disclosure of the Government's trial evidence is neither necessary nor appropriate.\n\n#### <span id=\"page-41-0\"></span>**IV. A Severance Is Not Warranted**\n\nFar from rebutting the strong and well-settled presumption that defendants indicted together should be tried together, Wang's motion to sever rests on a misapprehension of the evidence and the Government's allegations concerning her conduct. It is not correct that \"the overwhelming majority of [discovery] has nothing at all to do with the allegations against Ms. Wang.\" (Wang Mot. at 22). To the contrary, the Government's investigation, the produced discovery, and as the Government will prove at trial, Wang was intimately involved in every aspect of the charged offenses. (*See* Indictment ¶ 11 (\"WANG has held titles in, and exercised control over, a variety of entities that were part of the Kwok Enterprise and instrumentalities of the fraud described herein.\"); *id*. (\"WANG has worked for KWOK . . . and has operated as a \"chief of staff\" for KWOK and the Kwok Enterprise\")). Indeed, the trial evidence and witnesses against Kwok and Wang are virtually identical. It was Wang who implemented Kwok's directions and ensured the Kwok Enterprise operated for Kwok's, and her own, benefit. Wang was a part of all aspects of the Kwok Enterprise—severing trial would severely undermine judicial economy, require witnesses and victims to testify twice, and provide one defendant an unjust advantage of going second. Because the defendant has not overcome the presumption in favor of joinder—a presumption that is especially strong here because \"the defendants are alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme\"—her motion for severance should be denied. *United States v. Fazio*, 770 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting *United States v. Salameh*, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998)).\n\n### <span id=\"page-41-1\"></span>**A. Applicable Law**\n\nRule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part:\n\n(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or\n\ntransaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.\n\n(b) Joinder of Defendants. The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count.\n\nRule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits severance of properly joined charges\n\nor defendants, at the discretion of the trial court, to avoid prejudice to a defendant or the Government.\n\nUnder Rule 8, \"[t]here is a preference . . . for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.\" *Salameh*, 152 F.3d at 115 (quoting *Zafiro v. United States*, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993)); *see United States v. Miller*, 116 F.3d 641, 679 (2d Cir. 1997). \"This preference is particularly strong where . . . the defendants are alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme.\" *See Salameh*, 152 F.3d at 115; *United States v. Cardascia*, 951 F.2d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 1991); *United States v. Turoff*, 853 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d Cir. 1988). As the Supreme Court has explained:\n\n> Many joint trials—for example, those involving large conspiracies to import and distribute illegal drugs—involve a dozen or more co-defendants. . . . It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system to require . . . that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. . . . Even apart from these tactical considerations, joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.\n\n*Richardson v. Marsh*, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987); *see also United States v. Zafiro*, 945 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1991) (joint trials reduce not only litigation costs but also \"error costs,\" *i.e.*, the costs associated from depriving the jury of making its determinations based on \"the full picture\"), *aff'd*, 506 U.S. 534 (1993).\n\nSimply put, there is a strong and well-settled presumption that defendants who are indicted together will be tried together. *See, e.g.*, *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 537; *United States v. Blount*, 291 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2002); *United States v. Diaz*, 176 F.3d 52, 102 (2d Cir. 1999). Given this presumption, the \"prejudice\" standard is difficult to satisfy. Indeed, if a particular defendant is somehow prejudiced by joinder, that prejudice must be \"sufficiently severe [as] to outweigh the judicial economy that would be realized by avoiding lengthy multiple trials.\" *United States v. Lanza*, 790 F.2d 1015, 1019 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting *United States v. Panza*, 750 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1984)). Thus, under the Supreme Court's decision in *Zafiro*, a discretionary severance should be granted \"only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.\" 506 U.S. at 539.\n\nIn conspiracy cases, the Court's evaluation of the potential for substantial prejudice must take into account that once a defendant is a member of a conspiracy, \"all the evidence admitted to prove that conspiracy, even evidence relating to acts committed by co-defendants, is admissible against the defendant.\" *Salameh*, 152 F.3d at 111. As such, the mere fact that evidence may be admitted concerning acts, even violent acts, committed by joined defendants is not, standing alone, sufficient to warrant severance. \"The fact that one of several codefendants is tried for a crime not committed by another codefendant does not, without more, create the sort of miscarriage of justice that would require [severance].\" *United States v. Hernandez*, 85 F.3d 1023, 1029 (2d Cir. 1996); *United States v. Rittweger*, 524 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"[T]he fact that evidence may be admissible against one defendant but not another does not necessarily require a severance.\") (quoting *United States v. Carson*, 702 F.2d 351, 367 (2d Cir. 1983)). Further, even when the \"risk of prejudice is high . . . less drastic measures––such as limiting instructions––often suffice as an\n\nalternative to granting a Rule 14 severance motion.\" *United States v. Feyrer*, 333 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2003); *see also Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 538-39 (\"Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion.\").\n\nBecause of the preference for joint trials of defendants indicted together, and the discretion afforded to district courts in addressing any potential prejudice, a defendant seeking review of denial of severance under Rule 14 bears an \"extremely difficult burden,\" *United States v. Casamento*, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149-50 (2d Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted), of showing that he was so prejudiced by the joinder that he suffered a \"miscarriage of justice\" or was denied a constitutionally fair trial. *See United States v. Locascio*, 6 F.3d 924, 947 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"A motion for severance is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and its disposition is virtually unreviewable on appeal.\").\n\n#### <span id=\"page-44-0\"></span>**B. Discussion**\n\nWang and Kwok are charged in the same eleven counts of the same indictment for participating in the same racketeering enterprise—the Kwok Enterprise—and committing the same massive fraud against the same victims and concealing the same proceeds through the same money laundering conspiracy.[7](#page-44-1) At trial, the Government intends to prove their guilt by relying on much of the same evidence introduced through many of the same witnesses. It follows that a single trial preserves judicial resources, avoids the expense and inconvenience to witnesses who would otherwise have to testify twice, avoids the inequity of allowing one defendant to preview the\n\n<span id=\"page-44-1\"></span><sup>7</sup> The S2 Indictment contains thirteen counts. Wang is charged in Counts One through Ten and Twelve. Kwok is charged in Counts One through Twelve. The only counts that Wang is not charged in are Count Eleven (relating to the Himalaya Exchange wire fraud) and Count Thirteen (charging Je with obstruction of justice).\n\nGovernment's case, and \"serve[s] the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.\" *Richardson*, 481 U.S. at 210; *see also Zafiro*, 945 F.2d at 886.\n\nTo the extent that Wang's motion suggests otherwise, her arguments either rely on a nowoutdated indictment or misapprehend the evidence. But even under the prior superseding indictment, and certainly under the now-operative Indictment, Wang was involved in every aspect of the Kwok Enterprise including, for example, the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange. Indeed, even though not charged with the substantive wire fraud charge pertaining to the Himalaya Exchange, the Government will show at trial that Wang's involvement in the conspiracy included interviewing personnel for the Himalaya Exchange, among other acts in furtherance of the Kwok Enterprise. Simply put, Wang is an integral part of the Kwok operation and to prove that is so, the Government will introduce much of the same witnesses and the same evidence against both Kwok and Wang. If Wang and Kwok were to be tried separately, much of this evidence establishing the existence and operations of the Kwok Enterprise would be presented twice, to two different juries, resulting in needless duplication and inefficiencies—a wasting of resources that would be especially acute given that trial is anticipated to last approximately two months.\n\nWang contends a severance is appropriate because she received fewer personal benefits than Kwok. The Indictment does allege that Wang financially benefited from the Kwok Enterprise, (Indictment ¶ 5), but even if Wang had received no financial benefits, that discrepancy would still fall far short of carrying the heavy burden of establishing that Wang \"will be so severely prejudiced by a joint trial that it would in effect deny h[er] a fair trial.\" *United States v. An-Lo,* 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting *United States v. Rucker,* 586 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1978)).\n\nNext, Wang contends that she may suffer \"spill over prejudice\" because of Kwok's \"prolific online presence.\" (Wang Mot. at 26). This claim misses the mark. Kwok's statements (and Wang's) are evidence that is properly introduced against both Kwok and Wang as coconspirator statements.[8](#page-46-0) Moreover, there is no spillover prejudice. Both Kwok and Wang are changed with the same basic conduct: perpetrating a massive fraud against the same victims. This is not a situation where Kwok's conduct is any more sensational than Wang's—they both committed the same financial fraud. There is no risk of spill over prejudice.\n\nFinally, Wang posits that she \"may\" have conflicting defenses from Kwok at trial, but Wang does not state what the conflicting defenses are. Thus, this argument is nothing more than speculative. Even if it were not, a defendant is \"not entitled to severance [under Rule 14] merely because [he] may have a better chance of acquittal in [a] separate trial[].\" *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 540.[9](#page-46-1) Nor is a defendant entitled to severance simply because the evidence against a co-defendants is more damaging or voluminous than the evidence against them. *See, e.g.*, *Spinelli*, 352 F.3d at 55. Indeed, \"joint trials involving defendants who are only marginally involved alongside those heavily involved are constitutionally permissible.\" *Locascio*, 6 F.3d at 947. In any event, under well-established precedent, the fact that the trial will involve evidence of Kwok statements that\n\n<span id=\"page-46-0\"></span><sup>8</sup> Wang's assertion that all such statements must be specified \"well before trial\" is a backdoor attempt at a bill of particulars—which, as discussed above, is meritless. Moreover, a great many of Kwok's statements are cited in the Indictment, and other legal process provided to the defendants. And all such statements have been produced in discovery.\n\n<span id=\"page-46-1\"></span><sup>9</sup> The premise that a joint trial is more prejudicial to a less culpable defendant is not a universal truth. *See Marsh*, 481 U.S. at 210 (1987) (\"Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative culpability – advantages which sometimes operate to the defendant's benefit.\").\n\nwere in furtherance of the conspiracy in which Wang actively participated with a leadership role\n\n<span id=\"page-47-0\"></span>does not even approach the level of potential prejudice that would support severance.[10](#page-47-1)\n\n# **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Wang's motions.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy: */s/*\n\nJustin Horton Juliana N. Murray Ryan B. Finkel Micah F. Fergenson Assistant United States Attorneys 212-637-2276/-2314/-6612/-2190\n\n<span id=\"page-47-1\"></span><sup>10</sup> Wang's attempt to use the Government's motion to disqualify her former counsel as evidence of conflicting defenses fails. That conflict was about the former counsel's possession of confidential Government information. That is of no moment, as that lawyer is no longer Wang's counsel and her current counsel has no such conflict.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\nv.（诉）\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n政府反对被告王雁平审前动议的法律备忘录\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）联邦检察官\nOne St. Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\nRyan B. Finkel\nMicah F. Fergenson\n助理联邦检察官\n特派律师\n\nS2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n初步陈述 1\n事实陈述 1\nI. 对被告公寓的搜查是合法的 1\nA. 背景 1\nB. 适用法律 4\n1. 对法官关于相当理由认定的尊重 4\n2. 复杂调查中的过宽范围 7\n3. 复杂调查中的特定性 8\n4. 对司法授权令状的善意信赖 10\nC. 论证 11\n1. 经司法授权的搜查令具有相当理由支持 12\n2. 搜查令既非未予特定化亦非过宽 17\n3. 备选情形下，执法人员善意信赖了该搜查令 21\nII. 被告被捕后的陈述不应被排除 22\nA. 适用法律 23\nB. 论证 25\nIII. 被告关于提供具体罪状说明书的动议应予驳回 29\nA. 适用法律 29\nB. 论证 32\nIV. 不应予分案审理 40\nA. 适用法律 40\nB. 论证 43\n结论 46\n\n初步陈述\n\n政府谨此提交本法律备忘录，反对被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）提交的排除证据动议、要求提供具体罪状说明书的动议以及要求分案审理的动议（“Wang Mot.”）[1]（Dkt. 196）。基于下文所述理由，王雁平的各项动议均应被全盘驳回。\n\n论证\nI. 对被告公寓的搜查是合法的\nA. 背景\n\n2023年3月6日，大陪审团作出了一份封存起诉书（“Original Indictment”（原始起诉书）），指控 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，“Kwok”）和 Kin Ming Je（余建明，“Je”）犯有源于一项广泛共谋的罪行，该共谋“通过一系列连接数十个关联实体的复杂欺诈及虚假业务和投资机会”，从数千名受害者手中骗取超过 10 亿美元。（Dkt. 2 ¶ 1）。原始起诉书指控郭文贵、余建明“以及其他已知和未知人员”在“至少自 2018 年前后起至至少 2023 年 3 月前后止”，共谋实施电汇欺诈、证券欺诈、银行欺诈和洗钱。（同上，¶ 1）。原始起诉书接着描述了该共谋的第一个关联计划：GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募），即在 2020 年 4 月前后至 2020 年 6 月前后期间，在一家所谓媒体合资企业中进行的非法私人股票发售。（见同上，¶ 12）。原始起诉书进而描述了自至少 2020 年 6 月前后至至少 2023 年 3 月前后整个总体欺诈共谋的其他分支，这些分支源自并关联到 GTV 私募：Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目），（见同上，¶ 13），G|CLUBS，\n\n1 王雁平加入了共同被告郭文贵驳回 S1 起诉书的动议，鉴于 S2 起诉书的出台，法院已将该动议作为已失去实际意义而予以驳回。（Dkt. 230 第 1 页注 1）。\n\n（见同上，¶¶ 14-15），以及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所），（见同上，¶¶ 16-22）。原始起诉书指控郭文贵和余建明犯有（其中包括）共谋实施电汇欺诈、证券欺诈、银行欺诈和洗钱罪，并反复强调郭文贵和余建明曾与他人共同实施这一庞大且精密的欺诈计划。\n\n四天后，即 2023年3月10日，Gorenstein 法官签署了指控王雁平犯有相同电汇欺诈和证券欺诈共谋的刑事诉状，该共谋跨越“自 2018 年前后起直至并包括至少 2023 年 3 月前后”。（Compl. ¶ 1）。王雁平还被指控犯有与郭文贵和余建明相同的部分实质性罪行，包括因 GTV 私募引起的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈罪行。（见例如 Compl. ¶ 10）。该刑事诉状将郭文贵列为王雁平的共谋人之一（以“CC-1”为化名），并指出原始起诉书指控郭文贵的内容与刑事诉状中指控王雁平的涉案行为“相关联”。（见同上，¶ 10.a n.1）。刑事诉状（其中包括）指控，在郭文贵等人制作和传播的宣传通讯中，王雁平被确定为 GTV 的执行董事和“关键人员”。（见同上，¶ 10.a-.d）。刑事诉状还指控，“王雁平与[郭文贵]保持着密切的个人关系”，“自至少 2018 年前后起为[郭文贵]及[郭文贵]的家族工作了数年”，并且“是一家管理[郭文贵]据称数额庞大的个人财富的实体的总裁、财务主管兼秘书”。（同上，¶ 10.e）。尽管刑事诉状的大部分内容集中于 GTV 私募及 2020 年的相关事件，但刑事诉状亦指控王雁平参与了一项持续至至少 2023 年 3 月前后的共谋。（Compl. ¶ 1）。刑事诉状还提到了喜马拉雅交易所的前身，指控（其中包括）王雁平在 2018 年以“Saraca Media Group DBA Himalaya Dollar”的名义开设了银行账户。（见同上，¶ 11.a, .b）。刑事诉状还指控，“王雁平明知从 GTV 私募筹集的资金不能”，但实际上却“投资于一只高风险对冲基金，以使[郭文贵]的近亲属获益”，（同上，¶ 13.h），该近亲属在原始起诉书中被指明为 CC-1。\n\n在签署刑事诉状四天后，Gorenstein 法官签署了针对王雁平公寓（“Wang Apartment”（王雁平公寓））以及预计在其中发现的某些物品（包括电子设备）的搜查和扣押令。（见 Dkt. 199，Def. Ex. 8（“Wang Apartment and Devices Warrant”（王雁平公寓及设备令状）或“Warrant”（令状）））。与刑事诉状一样，王雁平公寓及设备令状的宣誓书（见 Dkt. 199，Def. Ex. 1（“Wang Apartment and Devices Affidavit”（王雁平公寓及设备宣誓书）或“Affidavit”（宣誓书）））由 FBI（联邦调查局）特别探员 Nicholas DiMarino 提交并宣誓。宣誓书陈述了有相当理由相信自 2018 年前后至今，王雁平、郭文贵和余建明实施了一项计划，通过虚假陈述和不实说明欺诈性地从受害者处获取资金，并清洗和挪用受害者资金，违反了 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349（共谋实施银行和电汇欺诈）；1343（电汇欺诈）；1344（银行欺诈）；1956（洗钱及共谋实施洗钱）；1957（非法货币交易）；371（共谋实施电汇、银行和证券欺诈及洗钱）以及 2（协助和教唆）；以及 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78ff 和 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5（证券欺诈）（合称“Subject Offenses”（标的罪行））。\n\n宣誓书附上了原始起诉书和刑事诉状并将其援引纳入其中，（见 Aff. ¶¶ 7-8），但其关于有相当理由相信王雁平、郭文贵和余建明犯有标的罪行的部分，包含了 18 个额外的段落和分段证据，这些证据涉及“涉及由郭文贵、[余建明]及其他目标对象拥有、运营或以其他方式关联的数家公司的‘欺诈计划’”，即原始起诉书和刑事诉状中指控的自 2018 年至 2023 年 3 月的同一起电汇欺诈和证券欺诈共谋。（见同上，¶ 9）。这些在所附并纳入的指控文书之外额外提供的相当理由证据包括：“王雁平是运营该欺诈计划的各个郭文贵关联实体驻纽约的实际负责人”，（同上，¶ 9）；王雁平在欺诈性私募发售文件中被列为 GTV 的执行董事（见同上，¶ 11.a）；存在“郭文贵、余建明、王雁平及其他人之间……关于（其中包括）涉及包括 GTV 和 G|Fashion 在内的各个与欺诈相关的合资企业的业务及其他安排”的聊天信息（见同上，¶ 16.b）；以及“郭文贵、余建明、王雁平及其他目标对象主要通过”某一特定即时通讯应用程序进行沟通（见同上）。\n\n宣誓书还陈述了有相当理由相信王雁平在欺诈计划期间居住于王雁平公寓，且在其中发现的电子设备和其他指定物品将构成或包含标的罪行的证据、收益及犯罪工具。（见 Aff. ¶¶ 20-24）。\n\nB. 适用法律\n1. 对法官关于相当理由认定的尊重\n\n法官关于相当理由的认定应得到极大程度的尊重。“审查法院必须对签发令状的司法官员关于存在相当理由的认定予以高度尊重……审查法院的判定应仅限于签发令状的司法官员对相当理由的认定是否具有实质性依据。”United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1993)（内部引用省略）（推翻排除证据裁定）。[2]\n\n此外，“相当理由‘并非高门槛’。”District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018)（引用 Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)）。“法官对相当\n\n2 除非另有说明，所有引文均省略内部引号、引证、改动和脚注。\n\n理由的判定并不过分严苛。面对令状申请，法官必须‘仅仅……根据呈交其面前的宣誓书中所陈述的所有情况，包括提供传闻信息人员的“真实性”和“知识基础”，作出实事求是的、常识性的决定，判断违禁品或犯罪证据是否有相当概率在特定地点被发现。’”United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2005)（引用 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)）。“确立相当理由所需的证明分量‘仅为犯罪活动的可能性，而非表面成立（prima facie）的证明。’”Wagner, 989 F.2d at 72（引用 Gates, 462 U.S. at 235）。关于时效性失效亦不存在任何“明晰界限规则”。Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 162 (2d Cir. 2007)（“[依常理]治安法官应当结合涉案行为考量事实发生的久远程度，以确保在令状执行时存在相当理由，而不仅仅是在过去的某一时间存在相当理由。”）。并且，“在存在连续或持续行为的情况下，与孤立的非法行为相比，‘在最后描述的行为与提交申请之间流逝的时间变得不再那么重要。’”Id.（引用 United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 867 (2d Cir. 1981)）。\n\n此外，“相当理由是一个流动的概念——取决于在特定事实语境下对概率的评估——不能轻易、甚至难以有益地归结为一套整齐划一的法律规则。”Martin, 426 F.3d at 74（引用 Gates, 462 U.S. at 232）。因此，“在评估概率时，司法官员必须考虑‘合理和审慎之人而非法律技术专家据以行事的日常生活中的事实和实际考量。’”Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 156（引用 Gates, 462 U.S. at 231）。“在该领域中对存疑或边缘案件的裁决，应主要由给予令状的优先倾向来决定。”United States v. Smith, 9 F.3d 1007, 1012 (2d Cir. 1993)（引用 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)）。\n\n对此类认定的审查必须采取务实的方式，因为“相当理由是一个灵活的、基于常识的标准”。Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)。此外，执法人员的培训和经验对相当理由的认定具有重大影响。Gates, 462 U.S. at 232。执法人员根据其已知事实、案件的整体情况以及自身的培训和经验所作出的推论，均可支持相当理由的认定。Id. at 231-32。\n\n搜查令一旦由法官签发并执行，法院在排除证据动议中审查治安法官关于相当理由认定的职责范围就要受限得多：其任务“仅仅是确保治安法官拥有‘认定存在相当理由的实质依据’”。Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39（援引 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)）。签发令状的治安法官的裁决“应获得实质性尊重，如有疑义，应作有利于维持搜查令有效性的认定”。United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院）1993)。事实上，治安法官“对相当理由的认定本身就是倾向于维持［该］搜查令有效性的实质性因素”。United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983)。“这种尊重不仅源于法律承认相当理由是‘一个流动概念’、可随各个案件事实而变化，而且源于法律对依据搜查令进行搜查的‘强烈偏好’”。United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2011)（援引 Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 236）。因此，正如 Clark 案中所述，审查法院的“任务仅仅是确保‘整体情况’为治安法官作出必要的相当理由认定提供了‘实质依据’”。Clark, 638 F.3d at 93（援引 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238）。\n\n2. 复杂调查中的过度宽泛性\n\n具体就过度宽泛性而言，“如果搜查令‘对拟扣押物品的描述……超出了作为该搜查令基础的相当理由所能证明合理的范围’，则该搜查令即属过度宽泛”。United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2014)（援引 United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 446 (2nd Cir. 2013)）；亦见 United States v. Hernandez, No. 09 Cr. 625 (HB), 2010 WL 26544, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010)（将过度宽泛性审查表述为“治安法官批准的搜查令是否因规定扣押缺乏相当理由的特定物品而在宪法上过度宽泛”）。\n\n被调查的犯罪越复杂，可被正当扣押的文件和记录的类别就越广泛。参见例如 United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)（“所需具体明确程度取决于犯罪的性质及其复杂程度”）；United States v. Jacobson, 4 F. Supp. 3d 515, 526 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）2014)（认定未载明时间范围限制的搜查令之宽泛性具有正当理由，因为“受调查的犯罪性质复杂且涉及较长时期，而非仅仅一两天的犯罪活动”）；United States v. Levy, No. S5 11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013), aff'd, 803 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2015)（阐明未设时间限制的宽泛搜查令因宣誓书中所述欺诈行为的范围与复杂性而具有正当理由）；United States v. Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d 115, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)（阐述“犯罪的性质……可能要求进行广泛的搜查”，包括在“指控存在复杂金融犯罪”的情形）。\n\n3. 复杂调查中的具体明确性\n\n“尽管关注点有某种相似之处，但具体明确性与过度宽泛性是两个不同的法律问题”。Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 228（援引 United States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)）。虽然“过度宽泛性审查探究‘搜查令是否授权搜查和扣押缺乏相当理由的物品’”，但具体明确性审查要求法院评估“搜查令是否‘使执行人员能够合理确定地查明并辨认出治安法官授权其扣押的物品’”。Id. 搜查令必须“足够具体，以便执行人员在选择扣押何种物品时能够合理解析并运用判断力”。United States v. Shi Yan Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000)。“要在 Fourth Amendment（第四修正案）下具备充分的具体明确性，搜查令必须满足三项要求”。United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 99 (2d Cir. 2017)。它必须：(i)“指明警方已确立相当理由的特定犯罪”，(ii)“描述拟搜查的场所”，以及 (iii)“根据与指定犯罪的关系具体列明拟扣押的物品”。Id.（援引 United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013)）。“第四修正案并不要求对拟搜查和扣押的数据做出完美无瑕的描述……”。Id. at 100。确实，“当如本案这样指控存在复杂金融犯罪时，搜查令应当适度给予搜查人员更大的灵活性”，Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 149，并且“使用更具概括性的用语来描述拟扣押物品可能是适当的”，United States v. Gotti, 42 F. Supp. 2d 252, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)。“搜查令并不必然仅仅因为宽泛就缺乏具体明确性”。Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 100。当搜查令将搜查范围限定在特定联邦犯罪的证据，并给出了“可扣押物品的示范清单”时，该搜查令即具备充分的具体明确性。United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1990)（援引 United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985)）；亦见 United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1034 (6th Cir.（第六巡回上诉法院）1999)（在搜查令“提供了 IRS（美国国税局）获准扣押物品的充分示例……”的情况下，驳回对其过度宽泛性的质疑并维持搜查令有效）；Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 227（“列入可扣押物品的示范清单使搜查令符合第四修正案的具体明确性参数要求”）；United States v. Jacobson, 4 F. Supp. 3d 515, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)（“提及特定犯罪并使用拟扣押物品的示范清单，使搜查令具备了充分的具体明确性”）；United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)（“附件 A 提供了属于搜查令范围内的记录和其他物品的示例清单，从而使执行人员能够合理确定地辨认出其获授权扣押的内容”）。\n\n如果搜查令（包括其附件）使执行人员能够合理确定地查明并辨认出治安法官授权其扣押的物品，则该要求即告满足。参见 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004)；Rosa, 626 F.3d at 58。这并不意味着搜查令必须完全不留任何自由裁量空间给执行人员。相反，“一旦某类可扣押文件已被充分描述，且该描述部分由可扣押物品的示范清单所界定，则第四修正案不会因为执行令状的执法人员必须运用某些最低限度的判断来确定某特定文件是否属于所述类别而受到侵犯”。Riley, 906 F.2d at 845。“授权扣押犯罪活动记录的搜查令允许执法人员审查嫌疑人持有的大量文件，以确定它们是否在所述类别之内。在此方面给予一定宽容度，仅仅是承认了这样一个现实：极少有人会把犯罪交易的文件存放在标有‘毒品记录’的文件夹中”。Id.\n\n此外，“在执法人员已尽到在当时情况下可合理预期的最大努力、已获取合理调查所能涵盖的所有描述性事实、并已确保将所有这些事实纳入搜查令的情况下，法院往往会容忍更大程度的模糊性”。Young, 745 F.2d 733 at 759 (2d Cir. 1984)。确实，“在指控存在特别复杂的犯罪方案时，使用更具概括性的用语来描述拟扣押物品可能是适当的”。Gotti, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 274（援引 United States v. Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（“搜查令条款表述所需具备的具体明确程度与所调查犯罪活动的复杂程度成反比”））；亦见 Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 304-05（“所需具体明确程度取决于犯罪的性质及其复杂程度”）。\n\n4. 对司法授权搜查令的善意信赖\n\n即使搜查令缺乏相当理由、不够具体明确或过度宽泛，“发生了违反第四修正案的事实……也并不必然意味着适用非法证据排除规则”。Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009)。“要触发排除规则，警察行为必须具有充分的蓄意性，以使排除证据能够对其产生实质威慑，并且具有充分的应受谴责性，以使这种威慑值得司法系统为此付出代价”。Id. at 144；亦见 Rosa, 626 F.3d at 64, 66。因此，排除证据应当是“最后手段”而非“第一反应”。Rosa, 626 F.3d at 64（援引 Herring, 555 U.S. at 140）。因此，如果争议证据是“基于对随后被认定无效的搜查令的客观合理信赖而获得的”，则通常不支持排除证据。United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)。尽管确立善意的举证责任在政府方，但“依据搜查令进行的搜查极少需要对合理性进行深度探究，因为由治安法官签发的搜查令通常足以证明执法人员在执行搜查时是出于善意”。Id.；亦见 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)（指出“中立治安法官基于对相当理由的认定而签发搜查令，产生了一种推定，即执法人员相信存在相当理由是客观合理的”）。因此，考虑到这一例外，“Supreme Court（最高法院）明确示意，绝大多数依据搜查令进行的搜查都可能落入善意例外的保护范围”。Clark, 638 F.3d at 100 (2d Cir. 2011)（援引 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922）。\n\n事实上，仅在四种狭窄情形下不适用善意例外：(1) 签发令状的治安法官被蓄意误导；(2) 签发令状的治安法官完全放弃了其司法角色；(3) 申请材料严重缺乏相当理由的表征，以至于对它的信赖是不合理的；以及 (4) 搜查令在形式上存在如此明显的缺陷，以至于对它的信赖是不合理的。Id.\n\nC. 讨论\n\nWang（王雁平）主张，经司法授权的搜查令缺乏对王公寓（Wang Apartment）进行搜查的相当理由（probable cause），具有过泛性（overbroad），且未达到充分具体化（insufficiently particularized）的要求。为支持该主张，王辩称宣誓书（Affidavit）未能提供充分理由以认定在王公寓会发现涉案罪名（Subject Offenses）的证据，搜查令的范围超出了据以签发的相当理由，且其拟扣押的某些物品未向执行探员提供充分指引。这些论点均不能成立。宣誓书列明了大量相当理由，证明王与Kwok（郭文贵）、Je（余建明）及其他人合谋实施了一项规模庞大的欺诈案，其中包括GTV私募（GTV Private Placement），并由此延伸至同一方案下的三个相关分支。该证据不仅来自于合并引用的两份控告文书（charging instruments，大陪审团和治安法官据此认定有相当理由相信王及其共谋者实施了欺诈方案（Fraud Scheme）），还来自于进一步阐明王的作用以及共谋者手段与方法的补充证据。该宣誓书促成了一份经司法授权的搜查令，该搜查令明确了据以搜寻证据的行为和刑事罪名，描述了拟搜查的场所，并具体指明了拟作为所列罪名证据予以扣押的物品。法律未要求更多内容，不存在推翻治安法官关于相当理由的认定或排除此次合法搜查成果的依据。\n\n1. 经司法授权的搜查令具有相当理由支持\n\n宣誓书提供了实质性证据，证明王通过使其极有可能在欺诈方案实施期间居住的公寓中发现相关犯罪证据的方式参与了涉案罪名。在此情况下，没有任何理由推翻对签发法官关于相当理由的判定所应给予的“高度尊重”（substantial deference），见Rosa案，11 F.3d at 326。\n\n宣誓书首先描述并合并引用了由大陪审团和治安法官据以认定有相当理由相信王、郭文贵、余建明及其共谋者实施了该庞大欺诈方案的两份控告文书。（见Aff. ¶¶ 7-8）。尽管郭文贵与王在当时处于封存状态的控告文件中均未指名提及对方共谋者，但在向Gorenstein（戈伦斯坦）法官呈递时，将两份控告文书结合研读即可清楚看出其指控的相互关联性，以及两份控告文书中均存在两名共谋者的事实。事实上，宣誓书明确指出郭文贵、余建明和王均在欺诈方案中共同合谋。（Aff. ¶ 9（“KWOK是欺诈方案的头目并指挥该方案。JE是该欺诈方案的财务架构师和关键洗钱者。WANG是运营该欺诈方案的各KWOK关联实体的纽约实际负责人” [New York-based functional head]））。原起诉书指控该欺诈方案是通过“一系列连接数十个相互关联实体的复杂欺诈及虚假业务和投资机会”实施的（Dkt. 2 ¶ 1），且包括GTV私募（见同上 ¶ 12）以及同属一个共谋的三个相互关联的方案（见同上 ¶¶ 13-15, 16-22）。原起诉书指控郭文贵和余建明犯有合谋实施电汇欺诈、证券欺诈、银行欺诈和洗钱等罪名，并反复强调郭文贵和余建明曾与他人共同实施该庞大而复杂的欺诈方案。起诉状（Complaint）将郭文贵列为王的共谋者之一（代号为“CC-1”），并指出原起诉书指控郭文贵所涉行为与起诉状中指控王的行为“存在关联”。（见Compl. ¶ 10.a n.1）。随后，起诉状还指控王在郭文贵制作并传播的宣传交流材料中被指定为GTV的执行董事和“关键人员”。（见同上 ¶ 10.a-.d）。起诉状还描述了“WANG与[Kwok]保持着密切的个人关系”，“至少从2018年左右起已为[Kwok]及[Kwok]家族工作数年”，并且“是一家管理[Kwok]据称极其庞大的个人财富的实体的总裁、财务主管兼秘书”。（同上 ¶ 10.e）。尽管起诉状的大部分内容聚焦于2020年的GTV私募及相关事件，但起诉状还指控在2018年，王在开设涉及郭文贵欺诈方案另一分支的两个银行账户时，表明自己是Saraca Media Group（萨拉卡媒体集团，一家由郭文贵控制、由郭文贵之子享有实际受益所有权的实体）的总裁。（见同上 ¶ 11.a, .b（指控包括王开设了以“Saraca Media Group DBA Himalaya Dollar”名义持有的银行账户））。起诉状还指控“WANG深知从GTV私募中筹集的资金不得”，但事实上却“投资于一家高风险对冲基金，以使[Kwok]的近亲属获益”。（同上 ¶ 13.h）。\n\n王关于宣誓书“主要”通过这些合并引用的控告文书确立相当理由的定性（王动议第3页）是不当的。通过合并引用的控告文件确立有相当理由相信在2018年至2023年3月期间实施了犯罪，这本身就已足够。尽管如此，宣誓书所做的远不止于此。它包含了18个段落和子段落的补充相当理由，涉及该“欺诈方案”，“该方案涉及由KWOK、[Je]及其他目标调查对象（Target Subjects）拥有、经营或以其他方式关联的数家公司”。（Aff. ¶ 9）。该证据包括“WANG是运营该欺诈方案的各KWOK关联实体的纽约实际负责人”（见同上），并进而指控王在欺诈性私募发售文件中被指定为GTV的执行董事（见同上 ¶ 11.a），存在“KWOK、JE、WANG及其他人之间……涉及包括GTV和G|Fashion在内的各项涉欺诈风险投资的业务及其他安排等内容的”聊天消息（见同上 ¶ 16.b），以及“KWOK、JE、WANG及其他目标调查对象主要通过”某一特定即时通讯应用程序进行交流（见同上）。\n\n宣誓书列明了有相当理由相信王居住在王公寓，其依据包括王的姓名出现在2020年2月该公寓的购买记录上——即在欺诈方案实施期间以及GTV私募前夕——且邮寄记录显示王在欺诈方案实施期的尾声（即2023年2月）曾在该公寓接收包裹。（见Aff. ¶¶ 19.a-.b）。宣誓书还提供了相当理由以认定可能在王公寓中发现的电子设备及其他指定物品将构成或包含涉案罪名的证据、收益及犯罪工具，包括援引郭文贵、王及其他人“主要通过”基于设备的即时通讯应用程序进行交流的证据，且该相当理由结合了探员就用于推进犯罪活动的电子设备上所发现证据类型的培训与经验。（见同上 ¶¶ 20-24；另见如Ray案，541 F. Supp. 3d at 406（驳回排除证据动议，其中搜查场所令的宣誓书包含被告“在实施涉案罪名时使用了电子设备”的证据，且探员的培训与经验表明“从事涉案罪名的个人通常使用电子设备与共谋者交流”））。\n\n“指控的犯罪活动与拟搜查地点之间的充分关联‘并不需要直接证据，而是可以基于常识和经验从所陈述的事实中作出合理解释和推论。’”United States v. Gatto案，313 F. Supp. 3d 551, 558 (S.D.N.Y. [纽约南区联邦地区法院] 2018)（引自United States v. Singh案，390 F.3d 168, 182 (2d Cir. [联邦第二巡回上诉法院] 2004)）。宣誓书关于王“是各KWOK关联实体的纽约实际负责人”、王居住在王公寓、她与其共谋者“主要通过”电子通讯应用程序就“涉及各项涉欺诈风险投资的业务及其他安排”进行交流（见Aff. ¶ 16.b），以及王亲自参与了欺诈方案收益的接收、转移和挪用（见同上 ¶¶ 11-12）的证据，为签发法官提供了充分依据，以“基于常识合理推断[王]曾在家中使用电子设备和加密应用程序与其共谋者进行交流”。United States v. Yu案，No. 22 Cr. 208 (CBA), 2023 WL 4687970, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. [纽约东区联邦地区法院] Jul. 21, 2023)；另见如United States v. Brown案，676 F. Supp. 2d 220, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)（描述了“符合常识的”结论，即“参与共谋的个人可能会在其住所中留有该共谋的证据，包括电话号码和其他联系方式”）。\n\nYu案阐明了这一观点，即签发场所搜查令无需在特定设备与特定地点之间建立更为具体的特定关联。在Yu案中，搜查令于2022年4月和5月取得，见同上 at *2，旨在搜寻“跨越数月——从2018年8月至2019年2月——且涉及至少五名共谋者的共谋”的证据，见同上 at *3。Yu案中的搜查令宣誓书与本案争议的宣誓书一样，“广泛描述了共谋者对各种电子设备的使用……以及他们通过公司财务转账隐匿付款的做法。”同上 at *4。因此，地区法官驳回了针对经司法授权的场所搜查令提出的质疑（该质疑与王提出的类似），因为“鉴于这一背景，相关的证据类型包括公司文件、电子设备中共谋者之间的通讯记录副本、包含在[即时通讯应用程序]等应用程序中的记录，或共谋者之间财务交易的记录等”，这些证据类型“很可能是‘长期保存在所有者控制下的安全场所中的’”。同上 at *4（引自United States v. Russo案，483 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)）；另见如Ray案，541 F. Supp. 3d at 405（“治安法官有权授权执法人员扣押有相当理由相信存在于多个不同地点之一的证据物品，而无需确立有相当理由证明该物品目前存在于任何特定地点。”）。\n\nWang（王雁平）还辩称，《宣誓书》（Affidavit）“没有依据使人相信有关 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）的证据仍会留在［王雁平公寓］（Wang Apartment），即使该等证据最初确实曾在该处”——即其合理根据已失效（stale）。（《王雁电动议》，第 6 页）。该论点忽略了《刑事起诉书》（Complaint）与《原始起诉书》（Original Indictment）所指控的共谋一直持续至 2023 年 3 月。Kwok（郭文贵）旗下实体的实际负责人会在其公寓内保留有关这些实体的文件和电子设备，这是基本常识。并且，即便王雁平主张孤立来看《刑事起诉书》仅聚焦于她参与 2020 年发生的某一更广泛共谋的单一环节，《宣誓书》亦提供了明确的合理根据，证明王雁平与郭文贵共谋实施了更广泛的欺诈计划（Fraud Scheme），“从 2018 年前后直至目前”，（《宣誓书》第 6 段）。此外，“与失效审查相关的考量因素”——特别是“被指控违法行为的性质”以及“所搜寻证据的性质”——削弱了王雁平的主张。United States v. Salomon-Mendez, 992 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院） 2014)（援引 United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院） 1980)）。搜查令所搜寻的物品——主要由财务记录和关于先前商业交易的通讯往来组成——属于“更具永久性质、可能会在某一处所保存较长时间的财产，例如商业记录”。Salomon-Mendez, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 348；另见例如 Paul, 692 F. Supp. at 193（“[可以]合理论断，像［被告］这样的人会在其住宅中长期保存银行对账单、保管箱信息或钥匙以及其他财务记录或票据……”）。并且即使“某些类别的物品……已失效”，“该失效［并不必然］推翻搜查该公寓的［搜查令］的合理根据”。United States v. Disla Ramos, No. 22 Cr. 431 (LJL), 2022 WL 17830637, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2022)。\n\n2. 搜查令既未缺乏特定性，亦未过度宽泛\n\n王雁平关于特定性的论点几乎完全依赖于 United States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 一案，而该案涉及的搜查令与本案所涉搜查令存在根本不可比性。“［Wey 案中的］两份搜查令均未能列明受调查的罪行。……它们既未援引刑事法条，亦未以任何方式描述任何犯罪行为。”Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 384。此外，Wey 案的搜查令实际上授权执法人员扣押与涉案处所所有人相关的所有物品。同上，第 386 页。\n\n但对于像本案所涉的搜查令——其与在特定时间段内实施的特定犯罪紧密挂钩，并授权扣押和搜查与这些具有时间界限的罪行相关的特定类别材料——王雁平试图引入 Wey 案措辞的做法完全不着边际。首先，王雁平声称，在列举了卷入欺诈计划的九个具体实体之后，搜查令却存在问题地允许扣押与“参与实施涉案罪行（Subject Offenses）的其他实体及/或个人”相关的文件。（《王雁电动议》，第 8-9 页）。尽管在“指控复杂金融犯罪”的情况下，“犯罪的性质……可能要求进行广泛的搜查”，United States v. Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d 115, 149 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院） 2011)，但此处被质疑的物品与所陈述罪行的具体信息紧密相连。所谓“其他实体及/或个人”的宽泛措辞，既受到其“参与实施涉案罪行”这一限定条件的约束，也受到其与在该特定类别中先于该宽泛措辞出现的九个具体实体之间隐含关系的约束。（《搜查令》，第 7 页）。王雁平还试图借用 Wey 案中的关切，即该案中的搜查令“在很大程度上针对计算机、内置和外置硬盘以及智能手机等电子设备的内容”。（《王雁电动议》，第 9 页（援引 Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 386-87））。Wey 案中的该等措辞与其所针对的完全未指明与任何所列罪行存在任何关联的搜查令密不可分。然而，若案件与本案一样，搜查令的宣誓书“提供了合理根据，使人相信电子设备和手机被用于与同伙通讯、诱骗受害者，并大体用于筹划和策划犯罪行为”，且“明确了拟搜查和扣押的［电子设备］物品，并将其与涉嫌的犯罪活动相联系”，则该“案件极易与［Wey 案］区分开来”。Ray, 541 F. Supp. 3d at 391-92（驳回针对含有关于电子设备之类似措辞的搜查令提出的排除证据动议）。\n\n王雁平关于特定性的另一异议是针对搜查令授权扣押就其性质而言可能系使用源自涉案罪行所得收益的资金所购买的物品。（《王雁电动议》，第 9 页）。该异议遗漏了该项物品的范围受到了其被归入“与持有、接收、使用、转移或洗钱与涉案罪行相关所得资金有关的证据”这一类别的限制——该类别在《刑事起诉书》详尽的指控中具有实质依据，并已被纳入《宣誓书》，指控显示王雁平至少从 2018 年前后其开设包含两个不同郭文贵关联实体名称的两个银行账户之时起，（参见《刑事起诉书》第 11.a、.b 段），直至她在 2020 年将 1 亿美元欺诈所得侵吞并转入最终受益所有人为郭文贵之子的投资工具这一关键行为发生后的一段时期，持续“接收并转移欺诈所得”（参见同上，第 12.a-.c 段）。\n\n王雁平忽略了与《宣誓书》中合理根据的这一明确关联，转而依赖于一个不适用的第一巡回上诉法院判例。在 Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.（第一巡回上诉法院） 1979) 一案中，宣誓书阐述了合理根据，使人相信某机构诈骗了某项特定的联邦学生贷款项目（FISLP），随后其搜查令授权的“不仅是对 FISLP 相关记录的搜查和扣押……而是对任何类型的联邦共谋或欺诈证据的全面搜寻”。同上，第 3-4 页。相比之下，本案所涉搜查令恰恰做到了 Lafayette Academy 法院认为必须做到的事情：载明“获授权搜查以获取证据的欺诈和共谋罪行的精确性质”。同上；另见《搜查令》附件 2 第 II.A 节（将“拟扣押物品”与“自 2018 年前后至今通过虚假托词和虚假陈述向受害者骗取资金并对受害者资金进行洗钱和侵吞的计划”相挂钩）。\n\n值得注意的是，王雁平关于特定性的论点未能解释“特定性要求的三个组成要素”中的任何一项何以在“搜查令表面未得到满足”（甚至未能涉及这一明确的判例法）。参见 United States v. Margulies, No. 17 Cr. 638 (JSR), 2019 WL 3080848, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2019)（援引 United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2013)）。该搜查令完全满足了全部三项要素：它指明了执法人员具有合理根据的特定罪行，描述了拟搜查的处所，并根据拟扣押物品与指定罪行的关联明确了该等物品。“无需其他任何条件。”Margulies, 2019 WL 3080848, at *1。\n\n王雁平关于过度宽泛的简短论点——除阐述一般标准的判例外未依赖任何判例——是《宣誓书》未能提供充分依据以授权扣押与某些实体（即“G Club International Ltd.；G-CLUBS；G-Fashion，G News；G Music；Himalaya Exchange；或 GETTR USA, Inc.”）相关的证据。（《王雁电动议》，第 10 页）。事实上，《宣誓书》描述了与欺诈计划相关的已知和未知实体网络，并向签发法官具体阐明了为何应扣押与这些实体相关的证据：基于合理根据，证明王雁平及其共谋者实施了“涉及由郭文贵、Je（余建明）等人拥有或运营、或以其他方式关联的数家公司”的欺诈计划（《宣誓书》第 9 段），郭文贵等人“声称 G|CLUBS 会员资格将是获得郭文贵关联公司（包括 GTV 及一家名为 G|FASHION 的公司）股份的途径”，（同上，第 11.c 段），以及“［王雁平］是运营该欺诈计划的各个［郭文贵］关联实体的纽约实际负责人”，（参见同上；另见同上，第 16.b 段（聊天记录显示王雁平、郭文贵、余建明等人讨论了“与各类欺诈相关项目相关的商业及其他安排，包括 GTV 和 G|Fashion”））。参见 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 n.10 (1976)（在针对“唯有通过拼凑多项零散证据方能证明其存在的复杂房地产计划”的调查中认可搜查令的宽泛性，且在调查中“如同拼图游戏一样，［该］计划的完整‘全貌’……唯有通过将诸多单看证明力相对较小的证据放置于恰当位置方能展现”）。\n\n该搜查令满足了特定性的三项要素，且其所授权扣押的每一类别均可溯及至执行执法人员具有合理根据的特定罪行，该等根据已向签发法官作了充分阐述。\n\n3. 退一步讲，执法人员善意信赖了搜查令\n\n王雁平对一份详尽的搜查令提出质疑，该搜查令纳入并在实质上建立在搜查令签发前四天和八天提交的两份相关控告文书之上，该等文书阐述了一套长期运行、涉及广泛且相互关联的欺诈计划。该搜查令由签发相关《刑事起诉书》的同一位助理法官签署，且两份文件由同一名执法人员宣誓。王雁平的动议未作出任何有实质意义的努力以克服善意例外（good-faith exception），该例外规定，若涉案证据系“基于对随后可能被判定存在法律瑕疵的搜查令在客观上合理的信赖而取得”，则不予排除。Leon, 468 U.S. at 922。这并不令人意外。即便法院采纳王雁平关于搜查令的某些论点——而法院不应采纳——本案亦不符合导致善意例外无效的四种狭窄情形中的任何一种：签发法官被明知地误导，或签发法官完全放弃其司法职责，抑或因申请书极度缺乏合理根据的迹象或搜查令在表面上极度存在缺陷以致信赖该搜查令属于不合理。参见 Clark, 638 F.3d at 100（援引 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922）。王雁平并未指控政府“明知地误导”签发法官，或签发法官“完全放弃”其司法职责。其动议仅是轻描淡写且顺带提及，在未援引任何所谓类似判例的情况下声称“搜查令的其他问题……表明为何执法人员信赖该搜查令是不合理的”，（《王雁电动议》，第 8 页），以及搜查令所谓过度宽泛“提供了进一步的依据以表明……执法人员对搜查令的信赖是不合理的”，（同上，第 10 页）。虽然确立善意属于政府的举证责任，但“依照搜查令进行的搜查极少需要对合理性进行任何深入审查，因为由助理法官签发的搜查令通常足以确立执法人员在执行搜查时是出于善意”。Leon, 468 U.S. at 922。事实上，“由中立助理法官签发［该］搜查令……即推定执法人员相信存在合理根据在客观上是合理的”。Golino, 950 F.2d at 870。\n\n此外，毫无争议的是，“特工遵守了搜查令的条款”，而“本法院在批准针对电子设备和财务记录的搜查令的诸多案件中，均包含了相同的条款”。Ray, 541 F. Supp. 3d at 395。\n\n法院应当驳回 Wang（王）排除依据搜查令所获证据的动议，该搜查令有两份相关控告文书以及大量额外的相当理由作为支持。虽然法院无需审理善意（good faith）问题，但执行搜查的特工毫无疑问具有充分的合理依据信赖搜查令的条款，且该善意本身即足以作为驳回排除动议的独立理由。\n\nII. 被告被捕后的陈述不应予以排除\n\n王的下一项动议请求法院“排除王女士被捕后的陈述”，该陈述仅涉及特工持有司法授权搜查令的“公寓内电子设备的位置及密码”。（Wang Mot. at 11）。在动议的最后一句话中，王在未引用任何法律依据的情况下，将该请求扩大为排除“因该违法行为而获得的证据——即手机的内容”。（Id. at 13）。在王试图排除其关于手机位置和密码的陈述这一范围内，该动议已无实际意义（moot），因为政府方无意在控方主案（case-in-chief）中提出这些陈述。王在最后一句话中提出的更为宽泛的请求毫无法律依据，应当予以驳回。对于因特工索要密码而排除依照搜查令查扣并搜查的手机内容的主张，没有任何具有约束力或说服力的先例支持（且王亦未引用任何先例）。\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n在 Miranda 案中，最高法院“采取了一套预防性措施，以保护嫌疑人的第五修正案权利免受羁押讯问固有的强制压力”。Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010)（引文省略）（内部引号省略）。最高法院对 Miranda 规则进行了扩展并规定，“当被指控人在羁押讯问期间主张其要求律师在场的权利时……在向其提供律师之前，当局不得对其进行进一步讯问”。Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)。这一“第二层预防机制”，McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1991)，“旨在防止警察通过纠缠迫使被告放弃其此前主张的 Miranda 权利”，并保护“嫌疑人在其律师不在场时不予陈述的自愿选择”。Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 787 (2009)（引文省略）（内部引号省略）。如果警方随后确实在没有律师在场的情况下主动发起讯问，“则推定该嫌疑人的陈述为非自愿的，因此不得作为审判中的实体证据采信”。McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177。美国最高法院“屡次强调，Edwards 规则并非宪法强制性要求，而是司法设定的预防性措施”。Id. at 105。\n\n虽然违反 Edwards 规则通常会导致排除被告所作的陈述，但这一预防性规则的适用范围并不超出被告陈述本身。毒树之果（fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree）分析不适用于违反 Miranda 规则所获取的陈述。参见 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304–09 (1985)（“Miranda 要求未获告知权利的自认必须予以排除，但在这些情况下，任何后续陈述的可采性应完全取决于其是否系明知且自愿作出”）。违反预防性的 Miranda 规则并不要求“排除嫌疑人未获告知权利但自愿作出的陈述所产生的[非供述性]实物成果”。United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004)（多数意见）；id. at 645（Kennedy（肯尼迪）法官附同意见）（“非供述性”）。违反预防性的 Edwards 规则同样如此：当查扣的证据属于“实物、非供述性证据时，违反 Edwards 规则本身并不能证明排除证据具有正当性”。United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia, 708 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2013)。正如最高法院在 Patane, 542 U.S. at 636 中所阐述的那样，“Miranda 规则是用以防止侵犯不得自证其罪条款（Self-Incrimination Clause）的预防性机制。然而，将自愿陈述的实物成果采纳为证据并不涉及不得自证其罪条款。因此，没有理由将 Miranda 规则扩展至此种情形。”\n\n被告的陈述“并不会仅因其 Miranda 权利受到侵犯而自动成为非自愿陈述”。Gonzalez-Garcia, 708 F.3d at 688。因此，除非特工违反正当程序条款（Due Process Clause），强迫被告作出导致发现实物证据的陈述，否则该实物证据本身是具有可采性的。United States v. Hallford, 816 F.3d 850 (D.C. Cir. 2016)（引用 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003)（多数意见））。“在确定某一特定案件中被告的意志是否屈服时，法院评估了所有周围情状的整体——包括被指控人的特征和讯问的细节”。Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)（考量因素包括被指控人年轻、缺乏教育、智力低下、未获得关于其宪法权利的任何告知、拘留时间长短、讯问的重复和旷日持久性质，以及使用剥夺食物或睡眠等肉体惩罚）；Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387 (2010)（强迫的证据可包括“嫌疑人丧失行为能力且处于镇静状态、剥夺睡眠和食物，以及威胁。”）。\n\nB. 讨论\n\nFBI（联邦调查局）特工依据司法授权的搜查令，出于善意对王的手机进行了搜查。因此，王提出的问题仅仅是：在主张保持沉默之后，使用王提供的密码进入某些手机，是否需要排除这些手机的内容。答案是不需要。王未引用任何相反的具有约束力或说服力的判例来支持其基于 Miranda 理由排除手机内容的主张。相反，法律明确规定，主张的违反 Miranda 规则行为并不允许“排除嫌疑人未获告知权利但自愿作出的陈述所产生的[非供述性]实物成果”。United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004)（多数意见）（强调为原文所加）。即使王提供其手机密码的陈述是在不符合 Miranda 指引的情况下获得的——政府方并不承认这一点，且解决王的主张也无需就此定论——她的动议依然不能成立，因为该动议未能证明关于密码的陈述是非自愿的，未能证明其“手机的内容”属于该陈述的“成果”，也未能证明毒树之果原则适用于所谓的违反 Miranda 规则行为（该原则并不适用）。\n\n首先，王的宣誓书甚至根本没有试图主张她提供手机密码的行为是非自愿的。United States v. Taylor, 745 F.3d 15, 23-24 (2d Cir. 2014)（“自愿性审查应审查‘所有周围情状的整体，包括被指控人的特征、讯问条件以及执法人员的行为。’”）；比较 Gonzalez-Garcia, 708 F.3d at 688 (5th Cir. 2013)（被告的陈述“并不会仅因其 Miranda 权利受到侵犯而自动成为非自愿陈述”）。该宣誓书未提出任何关于王的特征或特工行为的主张以表明王的“意志屈服”，Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226，除其处于羁押状态这一事实（这是提出任何 Miranda 主张所必需的门槛要件）之外，亦未提出任何胁迫证据，Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 387。事实上，王的宣誓书指向了相反的方向：通过阐明她知晓如何主张自己的权利并保持沉默（在面对作出更广泛陈述的邀请时），以及在何时相反地提供关于特工持有搜查和查扣令的物品的某些有限信息，王的描述仅进一步凸显了她关于手机密码陈述的自愿性。比较 United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 357 F. Supp. 2d 324, 340 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）2019)（驳回排除请求，理由包括被告“在回答其他问题的同时，一再拒绝提供其手机密码，这表明其意识到自己可以拒绝回答问题或提供信息”）。王并未声称她被强迫回答问题、被监禁数日、遭受酷刑、精神无行为能力，或被给予承诺以致其意志屈服。Taylor, 745 F.3d at 24（指出 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1998)“驳回了关于陈述系非自愿的主张，即使被指控人声称在被移交给美国羁押之前，他曾在埃及被监禁并遭受了十天的酷刑”）。王所主张的内容完全与非自愿胁迫不沾边——仅仅是“特工问了我多个问题……关于公寓内电子设备的位置和密码”，并且她作出了回答。（见 Dkt. 199, Def. Ex. 4 ¶ 6）。审查至此应当终结，因为在未能认定密码陈述系非自愿的情况下，绝不可能予以排除。Patane, 542 at 634。\n\n其次，王拼凑了来自 United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 中另一份意见书的文字，用以主张所谓的规则，即“如果像本案一样，处于羁押中的人在‘就其 iPhone 密码接受讯问前主张了其获得律师协助的权利’，则‘构成 Edwards 违规，需要排除手机的内容’”。（Wang Mot. at 13（引用 Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 310-11））。但 Rakoff（拉科夫）法官的意见书拒绝就该问题作出裁决。相反，该法院仅指出 Northern District of New York（纽约北区）的一名法官以及 Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces（武装部队上诉法院）的一个合议庭（“部分依赖于《军事证据规则》”）曾作出过如此认定。参见 Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 311。与这些裁判相反，且如上文所述，法律明确规定毒树之果分析不适用于违反 Miranda 规则所获取的自愿陈述。参见 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304–09。事实上，更近时期，作为 Pinto-Thomaz 判词作者的 Rakoff 法官对法律作出了对王的动议而言具有决定性不利影响的阐述：“Miranda 并不要求基于嫌疑人未获告知权利但自愿作出的陈述而排除实物证据。更进一步而言，即使假定[被告]透露其密码不仅未获告知权利而且受到胁迫，这也极可能仍不需要予以排除。……本法院认为，被要求提供手机密码——至少在像本案这样，对于该人实际上拥有该手机并知晓其密码并无实质争议的情况下——并不违反第五修正案关于反对自证其罪作证的保障。”United States v. Smith, No. 22 Cr. 352 (JSR), 2023 WL 3358357, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2023)（引用 Patane, 542 U.S. at 637-42（多数意见）；id. at 644-45（Kennedy 法官附同判决意见）；Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)）；亦参见例如 Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda \"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 97, 113 (2004)（“对 Miranda 衍生判例‘最合理的解读’是‘缺乏 Miranda 告知的陈述所产生的实物成果始终具有可采性’。”）。\n\n最后，Wang（王）的动议只是想当然地预设了其前提，即她手机中的内容是她向执法人员提供密码的“果实”。但即便这是相关的审查要点——且正如上文所述，事实并非如此——王的动议也会因为她忽略提及或未提出质疑的理由而无法成立。根据记录中已有的搜查令，法院无需举行证据听证会即可得出结论：政府在其位于曼哈顿的公寓这一封闭空间内必然会发现这些手机，并且同样会获取这些手机中的内容，因为正如签发搜查令的治安法官所批准的那样，搜查令授权执法人员强制王使用手机的生物识别功能，参见 Warrant（搜查令）第 9 页。事实上，政府可以强制王“将：……王的手指（包括拇指）按压在[王公寓]内发现的任何设备的触控 ID 传感器上，或者指示王保持静止、双眼直视设备的面容 ID 传感器，……以便尝试通过生物特征解锁设备，从而按搜查令的授权搜查其内容。”（宣誓书第 22 页第 35 段；亦参见同上第 22 页注 5（引用 United States v. Adams，案号 No. 15 Cr. 410 (ECF No. 56) (S.D.N.Y. 2015年12月22日) (Kaplan 法官)（驳回撤销大陪审团传票的动议，该传票命令被告到场，以便将从其身上扣押且配备面部识别锁的手机放置在其面部旁并激活面部识别功能来解锁手机）））。参见 United States v. Eldarir，案号 No. 20 Cr. 243 (LDH), 2023 WL 4373551，第 *9 页 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区）2023年7月6日)（汇总先例，并基于足以作为替代依据的理由驳回非法证据排除申请，即“即使如被告所主张的那样他没有被强制解锁手机，被告寻求排除的证据也本来就会被发现”）。联邦调查局（FBI）所使用的工具也是如此，这些工具有时能够在没有密码的情况下访问手机。\n\n王并未指控她提供手机密码是非自愿的，并且她没有引用任何判例支持 Miranda（米兰达）案衍生规则可作为排除依据搜查令扣押和搜查的手机内容的论点。如上所述，她要求排除其提供密码陈述的动议已无实际意义，而她要求排除手机内容的动议应当予以驳回。\n\nIII. 应驳回被告要求提供诉状详据的动议\n\n被告动议要求提供若干具体细节。根据既定判例，起诉书和证据开示材料向被告提供了绰绰有余的事实信息，以充分针对指控进行辩护。该动议构成了对政府审判证据进行提前预览的不当要求，也是一种限制政府审判举证的方式，应当被简要驳回。\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n诉状详据的正当范围和功能在于提供关于指控性质的充分信息，使被告能够为审判做准备、避免不公平的突袭，并防止因同一罪行受到二次起诉。Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f)；United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990)，因其他理由被 United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2010) 废止；United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987) (全庭审理)。“只有在起诉书的指控过于概括，以至于未能告知被告其被指控的具体行为时，才应当要求提供诉状详据。”Torres，901 F.2d 第 234 页。\n\n如果被告所寻求的信息“已在起诉书中或以某种可接受的替代形式提供”，则无需诉状详据。Bortnovsky，820 F.2d 第 574 页。在行使其广泛的自由裁量权以确定指控是否“过于概括”而需要补充时，法院不仅应当考虑起诉书的文本，还应当考虑政府的证据开示和其他提交的文件。参见例如 United States v. Kazarian，案号 No. 10 Cr. 895 (PGG), 2012 WL 1810214，第 *25 页 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）2012年5月18日)（指出“大量的证据开示材料”“向[被告]提供了诉状详据请求中所寻求的大部分信息”）；United States v. Monserrate，案号 No. 10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957，第 *4 页 (S.D.N.Y. 2011年8月4日)（在证据开示材料和起诉书“足以告知被告对其提出的指控”并允许其为审判做准备的情况下，驳回对诉状详据的请求）；United States v. Samsonov，案号 No. 07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721，第 *4 页 (S.D.N.Y. 2009年1月23日)（在起诉书、证据开示函和证据开示材料已向被告提供充分信息以备审的情况下，驳回诉状详据请求）。\n\n换言之，辩方不能将诉状详据用作一般性的调查工具，United States v. Morales, 280 F. Supp. 2d 262, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)，也不能将其作为在审判前强行披露政府证据的手段。United States v. Triana-Mateus，案号 No. 98 Cr. 958 (SWK), 2002 WL 562649，第 *5 页 (S.D.N.Y. 2002年4月15日)（引用 United States v. Gottlieb, 493 F.2d 987, 994 (2d Cir. 1974)）；亦参见 United States v. Strawberry, 892 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)。提供证据细节不是诉状详据的功能。Torres，901 F.2d 第 234 页。因此，政府无需：(a)“详细列举其所有证据”，United States v. Cephas, 937 F.2d 816, 823 (2d Cir. 1991)；(b) 披露实施起诉书中所指控犯罪的确切方式，参见 Torres，901 F.2d 第 233-34 页；或 (c) 向被告提供政府案情或法律理论的预先披露，参见 United States v. Muyet, 945 F. Supp. 586, 598-599 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)。终极检验标准在于所寻求的信息是否必要，而不在于其是否有帮助。参见 United States v. Conley，案号 No. 00 Cr. 0816 (DAB), 2002 WL 252766，第 *4 页 (S.D.N.Y. 2002年2月21日)；United States v. Trippe, 171 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)；United States v. Taylor, 707 F. Supp. 696, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)；United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)。\n\n诉状详据仅在起诉书中的指控（经证据开示及其他方式补充后）过于概括以致无法进行辩护准备时才被准许，这有着充分的理由。因为诉状详据“将政府的举证局限于所提供的具体细节”，它可能会“不当地限制政府陈述案情的能力”。United States v. Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)。“政府在审判时的证据陈述受限于详据中所载的具体细节，因此必须注意不要过分限制政府的举证，同时仍保护被告免受不公平的突袭。”United States v. Mahabub，案号 No. 13 Cr. 908, 2014 WL 4243657，第 *2 页 (S.D.N.Y. 2014年8月26日)；亦参见 Samsonov，2009 WL 176721，第 *3 页（诉状详据“不得被滥用……以阻止政府使用其随着审判临近可能掌握的证据”）。\n\n此外，政府提供相当于其证据逐项预告的具体细节，会产生非常现实的危险，即被告将“量身定制证词以搪塞政府的指控”。Henry，861 F. Supp. 第 1197 页（引用 United States v. Cimino, 31 F.R.D. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)）；United States v. Sindone，案号 01 Cr. 517, 2002 WL 48604，第 *1 页 (S.D.N.Y. 2002年1月14日)（“刑事案件利害攸关，伪证、唆使伪证和恐吓的诱惑始终存在。因此，政府无需交出能让被告预览政府案情并诱使其量身定制证据以进行搪塞、或设法阻止政府证据被呈庭的信息。”）。\n\n适用这些原则，本地区的法院常规性地驳回诉状详据动议，这些动议实质上是在要求提供犯罪实施方式或政府打算如何在审判中证明其案情的额外细节。参见例如 United States v. Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d 558, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)（驳回要求提供确定“政府案情所依据的每一起‘欺诈、玩忽职守、纵容、不当行为及违法’行为”的诉状详据请求，并指出不得强制政府披露其证明指控的方式、被告实施被指控犯罪的方式，或预先披露政府的证据或法律理论）；United States v. Leonelli, 428 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)（驳回就全案姓名、日期和地点要求提供诉状详据的请求，认为其是“企图探听政府案情细枝末节的尝试”）。\n\nB. 论述\n\n被告无需诉状详据来就本案进行辩护，且在法律上无权获得该详据。事实上，被告所寻求的大部分内容相当于要求政府展示证据，且其中大部分已包含在政府的披露材料中，被告有充裕的时间进行审查。相反，被告寻求有关四个主题的具体细节，似乎是为了不当地“将政府限制在其证据范围内”，United States v. Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)。这不是正当的目的，简言之，被告的请求不代表对 Rule 7(f)（联邦刑事诉讼规则第 7(f) 条）的正当使用，因此应予驳回。\n\n第一，鉴于现行生效的 S2 Indictment（S2 起诉书，即“起诉书”），被告关于诉状详据的若干请求均不能成立。例如：\n\n• 王寻求有关构成欺诈关联方和工具的欺诈性及虚假企业的具体细节。（Wang Mot. 13-14（寻求有关“[S1 起诉书]指控为‘欺诈性[或]虚假’的企业”；“[S1 起诉书]指控为‘相互关联’的实体”；“[S1 起诉书]主张为‘欺诈工具’的实体”的具体细节）。现行起诉书明确列出了属于 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）一部分的 40 多个实体和组织。（起诉书第 3.a 段；亦参见同上第 1 段）。\n\n• 王还寻求有关她如何使自己获利的具体细节。（Wang Mot. 13）。现行起诉书指控王“每年获得至少约 500,000 美元的报酬，获赠一套价值约 110 万美元的曼哈顿公寓，并被许诺获得价值数百万美元的所谓加密货币。”[3](#page-34-0)（起诉书第 6 页第 5 段）。[4](#page-34-1)\n\n这份长达49页、包含13项罪名项的详述起诉书（speaking Indictment）极其详细地描述了被指控的欺诈方案。它解释了Kwok（郭文贵）如何领导一个犯罪组织（即“犯罪集团/Enterprise”），在至少约2018年至至少约2023年3月期间，通过包括电汇欺诈、银行欺诈、洗钱和证券欺诈犯罪在内的勒索敲诈活动（racketeering activity）行为，从数千名受害者手中骗取了超过10亿美元。（起诉书，Dkt. 215 第1段）。起诉书描述了该犯罪集团利用一系列复杂的欺诈性业务以及与郭控制的数十个相互关联的实体相关的虚假投资机会来实施欺诈，其中44个实体在起诉书中被明确点名。（起诉书第3.a段）。起诉书指控Wang（王雁平）担任该犯罪集团的“参谋长（chief of staff）”。（起诉书第11段）。它进一步指控郭、王及其共谋者通过境内外银行账户和实体对其欺诈收益进行洗钱，对欺诈收益进行多层分流（layering）以隐瞒其来源，并使用欺诈收益进一步推进正在进行的欺诈，（起诉书第4、20段），并且他们还将受害者资金挪作个人及家庭成员使用，包括用于个人投资以及购买豪华住宅、车辆和商品。（起诉书第5、16.h、17.f、18.h段）。基于起诉书（更不用说本案中大量的证据开示和其他案卷文件），王的请求应当被驳回。\n\n3 此外，王的加密货币分配也是保释意见书的主题。（参见 Dkt. 42 第2-3页（讨论表明王被分配了HCN的证据））。\n\n4 指控王的刑事诉状（Complaint）还描述了王如何将超过30,000美元的GTV私募欺诈收益作为“董事费”电汇给自己。（诉状第13.d段）。\n\n第二，关于GTV私募（GTV Private Placement）的诉状细节说明清单（particulars）请求同样毫无根据。所请求的证据细节包括：(1) 被告如何“进行GTV私募”，(2) 被告在GTV私募中涉及或招揽的“购买和出售”，(3) GTV私募的哪些收益“未用于开发和发展GTV业务”，以及 (4) 起诉书中引用的特定1亿美元电汇如何“与私募集资备忘录（PPM）向潜在GTV投资者作出的关于如何使用GTV投资的陈述相违背”。（Wang Mot. 第20页）。王不需要——而且在法律上也绝无权利获得——关于上述任何信息的诉状细节说明清单（bill of particulars）。正如起诉书中所述，王是郭的参谋长，对该犯罪集团内的实体行使控制权，其中包括GTV，王被任命为GTV的执行董事。（起诉书第11、13、16.c段）。正如起诉书和刑事诉状中详述的那样，王控制着存放GTV投资者资金的银行账户（以Saraca名义持有）。（起诉书第16.f段（指出存入Saraca的款项，Saraca由郭的家庭成员Relative-1实益拥有）；诉状第11段（描述了王对Saraca银行账户的控制，这些账户收到了受害投资者注明GTV私募的汇入款项））。正如起诉书和诉状进一步描述的那样，王及其共谋者挪用了这些GTV投资者资金中的1亿美元。（起诉书第16.h段；诉状第12段）。起诉书解释称，与GTV私募集资备忘录中关于如何使用通过发行筹集的资金的陈述相反，将1亿美元的GTV资金投资于Fund-1“并非为了‘加强和发展’GTV的业务或为了GTV的利益，而是为了Saraca和Relative-1的利益”。（起诉书第16.h段）。起诉书的具体指控——通过诉状（及其他案卷文件）和证据开示得到了进一步详述——无需通过诉状细节说明清单来补充。\n\n在王寻求对涉及数千名受害者和数亿美元的银行转账（即股票购买）进行逐行明细说明的范围内，此类“细枝末节的证据（evidentiary minutiae）”并非要求诉状细节说明清单的正当依据——而且，在任何情况下，这些内容均包含在证据开示中出示并已由被告掌握的银行和财务记录中。5 United States v. Levy（美国诉利维案）, 11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at *4, 13 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2013年2月25日)（在指控腐败经纪人通过虚假陈述操纵股票的案件中，要求提供详述“被指控的每项具体失实陈述和遗漏”的诉状细节说明清单的请求被驳回，理由是“这纯粹是要求强迫出示根本不适合包含在诉状细节说明清单中的细枝末节的证据”）（引用及引号省略）；亦参见例如 Bonventre案, 2013 WL 2303726, at *5-*7（在美国历史上历时数十年的最大庞氏骗局案中，驳回了要求提供诉状细节说明清单的请求，该请求要求指明政府拟赖以证明其案情的全部“据称虚假的记录”、政府指控被告明知为虚假的“特定账簿和记录中的具体分录”、被告参与的被政府指控为欺诈性的“具体套利交易”、所有据称倒签交易的“日期和股票名称”，以及特定罪名项中提及的“所有未具名客户和据称的虚假交易”）。王关于因域外适用性考量而有理由要求此类细节的说法（参见 Wang Mot. 19-20）是毫无根据的；相关行为和金融交易均发生在美国境内。（参见例如 诉状第11段（详述了通过总部位于Manhattan（曼哈顿）的银行接收和转移欺诈收益））。在王仅仅试图限制政府在审判中出示证据的范围内，这也同样不是要求诉状细节说明清单的正当依据。参见例如 Mitlof案, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569；Mahabub案, 2014 WL 4243657, at *2；Samsonov案, 2009 WL 176721, at *3。\n\n5 相关地，王针对起诉书“主张系非法”的“转账”寻求细节说明，引用了S1起诉书的第3段，该段（在实质上）现为S2起诉书的第4段。（Wang Mot. 14 & n.15）。起诉书的该段涉及通过“以至少80个不同实体或个人名义持有的500多个账户”对超过10亿美元进行洗钱。（起诉书第4段）。如上所述，针对如此庞大的财务记录证据要求提供诉状细节说明清单显然是没有根据的。\n\n正如众多法院所认定的那样，在提供了具体事例的情况下（如本案），政府无需出具一份包含其计划证明构成欺诈一部分的每一项行为的清单的诉状细节说明清单。\n\n第三，被告关于受害者身份和地点的细节说明请求（包括这些受害者是否将作为庭审证人）显然是不正当的。（参见 Wang Mot. 14）。关于受害者的详细信息并不属于诉状细节说明清单的合理范围，特别是当证据开示材料中已经包含该等信息时更是如此（如本案）。参见例如 United States v. Russo（美国诉卢索案）, 483 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)（起诉书中提及的具体“投资者”的身份识别超出了诉状细节说明清单的范围）；United States v. Fea（美国诉菲亚案）, No. 10 CR. 708 (PKC), 2011 WL 2119708, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011年5月24日)（驳回了在高利贷案件中要求提供受害者身份的诉状细节说明清单请求，因为证据开示材料已包含受害者信息）；United States v. Gall（美国诉加尔案）, No. 95 Cr. 98 (AHN), 1996 WL 684404, at *7 (D. Conn.（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）1996年8月12日)（驳回了要求提供保险欺诈受害者身份以及“被告提交给保险公司和州机构的财务报表在何种方式上是虚假的”诉状细节说明清单请求）。此外，诉状细节说明清单显然不是提前获取政府证人名单（无论是关于受害者还是任何其他潜在证人）的机制。这一请求是不正当的，应当予以驳回。\n\n最后，被告关于证据开示体量巨大有利于支持出具诉状细节说明清单的论点毫无价值。事实上，情况恰恰相反。首先，法院在驳回关于诉状细节说明清单的动议时经常引用全面的证据开示，因为证据开示为被告提供了绰绰有余的信息以备审判。参见 Kazarian案, 2012 WL 1810214, at *25；Monserrate案, 2011 WL 3480957, at *4；Samsonov案, 2009 WL 176721, at *4；United States v. Mandell（美国诉曼德尔案）, 710 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)（“仅仅存在‘堆积如山的文件’并不能使被告有权获得”诉状细节说明清单）。\n\n虽然政府已向被告出示了大量材料，但这在此类欺诈案件中并不是不寻常的证据开示数量，而且如上所述，被告有充裕的时间进行审查。事实上，虽然被告指出政府出示了大约100台或更多电子设备的内容，但她忽略了其中大约50台设备是她自己的电子设备这一事实。本巡回区（Second Circuit / 第二巡回区）的法院一贯驳回以证据开示庞大为由提出的诉状细节说明清单动议，特别是在被告已经（或将要）有数月时间进行审查的情况下。参见例如 United States v. Wey（美国诉韦案）, No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2017年1月18日)（“仅凭证据开示的数量根本不需要出具诉状细节说明清单。”）；Levy案, 2013 WL 664712, at *13（基于证据开示数量驳回了诉状细节说明清单的请求，并指出“尽管法院对辩护律师审查政府持续出示的大量材料的任务表示理解，但适用的起诉书是在近八个月前提交的，辩护律师已有机会在政府出示证据开示材料时对其进行审查”）。本案也不例外。\n\n被告所依赖的强迫政府在庞大的证据开示中指明特定交易或虚假陈述的先例判决均不适用。例如，被告依赖于 Bortnovsky案, 820 F.2d at 575，这是一起RICO（敲诈勒索与腐败组织法）保险欺诈案件，在该案中，政府在审判前没有指明十五起入室盗窃案和四千份文件中的哪些涉嫌伪造。在审判中，政府最终仅指控四起入室盗窃案和四千份文件中的仅三份是虚假的。第二巡回法院认定，在这些情况下，举证责任已被不可允许地转移给了被告，被告“被迫解释围绕八起实际入室盗窃的事件，并面对大量与未决指控无关的文件”。同上，第574-75页。本案并非如此。本案并非政府打算仅证明某些个别交易属于欺诈性但未能指明此类交易、从而给被告造成“大海捞针”难题的案件。除了通常会被驳回诉状细节说明清单的共谋指控之外，6 政府还指控了四起相关的欺诈方案（涉及GTV、农场贷款计划［Farm Loan Program］、\n\n6 “对于要求提供关于政府将指控被告与何人、于何时、何地共谋的具体信息的诉求，通常予以驳回。”Trippe，171 F. Supp. 2d at 240（汇集判例）；参见，例如，United States v. Barrera，950 F. Supp. 2d 461, 478 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）2013)（“一般规则是，被告无权在详目清单中获得政府共谋指控的细节。”）；United States v. Wilson，493 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)（同上，驳回要求提供关于被告及其共谋者加入所指控共谋日期的详目清单动议）；Rivera，2017 WL 1843302, at *3（援引 Torres，901 F.2d at 233-34（维持驳回关于被告‘被指控何时加入’共谋、共谋者身份以及公开行为的‘确切日期和地点’的详目清单的裁定））；United States v. Nachamie，91 F. Supp. 2d 565, 575 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2000)（被告无权获得关于其参与提交虚假 Medicare（联邦医疗保险）索赔的细节，包括其促使此类索赔提交的方式）；United States v. Mittal，No. 98 Cr. 1302, 1999 WL 461293, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1999)（“[各]法院一贯驳回要求提供关于共谋形成或特定被告或同伙加入共谋的细节诉求。”）（援引判例）；United States v. Johnson-Guzman，No. 98 CR. 350 (RWS), 1998 WL 730327, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1998)（“特别是就共谋罪名而言，由于政府无需确切证明共谋何时或如何形成，或者特定被告何时或如何加入该图谋，且政府通常赖以证明图谋存在的间接证据往往不揭示此类细节，因此法院一贯驳回要求提供关于共谋形成或特定被告或同伙加入共谋的细节诉求。”）；United States v. Perez，940 F. Supp. 540, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)（政府无需具体列明指控被告‘参与、知晓或对其承担责任’的具体行为）（引文省略）。\n\nG|CLUBS 和 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所））详述于一份篇幅冗长的陈述性起诉书中，并就这些图谋出示了详细的开示证据。\n\n被告所援引的 United States v. Savin，No. 00 Cr. 45 (RWS), 2001 WL 243533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 一案对被告同样毫无助益。在 Savin 案中，起诉书指控一名投资顾问在六年期间通过“一系列未指明的‘公司间转账’侵占客户资金，而未明确涉及的金额、日期、手段、公司实体或共谋者。”同上，at *3。因政府出示了证明资金转账的大量文件，却未指明指控哪些转账属不当转账，法院部分准许了详目清单请求。同上，at *2。与此相反，本案中政府已指明其指控构成侵占的具体资金转账，包括按日期、涉及实体、受益人以及用该资金购买的物品。（参见，例如，起诉书 ¶¶ 4, 5, 16.h, 17.f, 18.h, 24, 25）。被告援引的其他判例亦属同类性质，因而不适用于本案。参见，例如，United States v. Davidoff，845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院）1988)（当被告因针对一家公司的敲诈图谋被起诉，但在审判中却面临针对完全不同公司的敲诈证据时，本应裁定提供详目清单以明确被告被指控作为 RICO（《反敲诈勒索与腐败组织法》）图谋一部分所敲诈的公司）。\n\n简而言之，被告面前已有关于涉嫌欺诈图谋及其将被如何证明的大量信息。法院通常认定此类信息和开示证据足以供被告准备审判，且被告有大量时间进行审查。在这些情况下，实质上意在要求披露政府审判证据且繁琐苛刻的详目清单，既无必要亦不适当。\n\nIV. 分案审理并无依据\n\n王（Wang）的分案动议远未推翻被一同起诉的被告应当一同审理这一强烈且确立已久的推定，而是基于对证据及政府关于其行为指控的误解。所谓“绝大多数[开示证据]与针对王女士的指控毫无关联”的说法是不正确的。（王动议 at 22）。相反，政府的调查、出示的开示证据以及政府将在审判中证明的事实表明，王深入参与了所指控罪行的各个方面。（参见起诉书 ¶ 11（“王在作为 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）组成部分及本文件所述欺诈工具的各类实体中担任职务并实施控制”）；同上（“王曾为郭工作……并曾担任郭及郭氏企业的‘幕僚长’”））。事实上，针对郭与王的审判证据和证人几乎完全相同。正是王执行了郭的指示，并确保郭氏企业为了郭及其自身的利益而运作。王参与了郭氏企业的方方面面——分案审理将严重破坏诉讼经济，要求证人和受害者作证两次，并给后受审的被告带来不公正的优势。由于被告未能克服支持合并审理的推定——这一推定在此尤为强烈，因为“指控各被告参与了一项共同计划或图谋”——其分案审理动议应予驳回。United States v. Fazio，770 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 2014)（援引 United States v. Salameh，152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998)）。\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 8 条相关部分规定：\n\n(a) 罪名项的合并。起诉书或检察官起诉书可在不同罪名项中指控一名被告犯有 2 项或以上罪行，条件是指控的罪行……具有相同或相似的性质，或基于同一行为或\n\n交易，或相互关联，或构成共同图谋或计划的组成部分。\n\n(b) 被告的合并。起诉书或检察官起诉书可指控 2 名或以上被告，条件是指控他们参与了构成一项或多项罪行的同一行为或交易，或同一系列行为或交易。被告可在一个或多个罪名项中被共同指控或分别指控。并非所有被告都必须在每个罪名项中被指控。\n\n《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 14 条允许审理法院依其自由裁量权，对适当合并的指控\n\n或被告进行分案审理，以避免对被告或政府造成不公损害。\n\n根据第 8 条，“对于被一同起诉的被告，倾向于……进行合并审理。”Salameh，152 F.3d at 115（援引 Zafiro v. United States，506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993)）；参见 United States v. Miller，116 F.3d 641, 679 (2d Cir. 1997)。“在……指控各被告参与了共同计划或图谋的情况下，这种倾向尤为强烈。”参见 Salameh，152 F.3d at 115；United States v. Cardascia，951 F.2d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 1991)；United States v. Turoff，853 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d Cir. 1988)。正如最高法院所阐明：\n\n许多合并审理——例如涉及进口和分销非法毒品的大型共谋案件——涉及十几名或更多的共同被告。……如果要求……检察官提起各自独立的诉讼程序、一次又一次出示相同的证据、要求受害者和证人重复作证的不便（有时是创伤），并不加区分地偏向因事先知晓控方案情而享有优势的最后受审被告，将既损害刑事司法体系的效率，又损害其公正性。……即使抛开这些战术考量，合并审理通过避免不一致判决的丑闻和不公，总体上有利于司法利益。\n\nRichardson v. Marsh，481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987)；亦参见 United States v. Zafiro，945 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir.（第七巡回上诉法院）1991)（合并审理不仅降低了诉讼成本，而且降低了“错误成本”，即因剥夺陪审团基于“全貌”作出裁决而产生的成本），aff'd，506 U.S. 534 (1993)。\n\n简而言之，存在着强烈且确立已久的推定，即被一同起诉的被告将一同受审。参见，例如，Zafiro，506 U.S. at 537；United States v. Blount，291 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2002)；United States v. Diaz，176 F.3d 52, 102 (2d Cir. 1999)。鉴于这一推定，“不公损害”的标准很难达到。事实上，如果特定被告因合并审理而在某种程度上受到不公损害，该不公损害必须“严重到足以压倒通过避免冗长的多次审判所实现的诉讼经济。”United States v. Lanza，790 F.2d 1015, 1019 (2d Cir. 1986)（援引 United States v. Panza，750 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1984)）。因此，根据最高法院在 Zafiro 案中的裁决，只有在“存在严重风险表明合并审理将损害某一被告的具体审判权利，或阻止陪审团对有罪或无罪作出可靠判断时”，才应准予裁量性分案审理。506 U.S. at 539。\n\n在共谋案件中，法院在评估发生实质性不公损害的可能性时必须考虑到，一旦被告成为共谋的成员，“为证明该共谋而获准采信的所有证据，即使是涉及共同被告所实施行为的证据，均可用来针对该被告。”Salameh，152 F.3d at 111。因此，仅仅存在可能采信关于合并受审被告所实施行为（甚至是暴力行为）的证据这一事实本身，并不足以支持分案审理。“数名共同被告中有一人因另一共同被告未犯的罪行受审这一事实，在没有其他情况的前提下，并不构成需要[分案审理]的那种司法不公。”United States v. Hernandez，85 F.3d 1023, 1029 (2d Cir. 1996)；United States v. Rittweger，524 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2008)（“证据可针对一名被告采信但不可针对另一名被告采信这一事实，并不必然要求分案审理。”）（援引 United States v. Carson，702 F.2d 351, 367 (2d Cir. 1983)）。此外，即使在“不公损害的风险很高……不太严厉的措施——例如限制性指示——通常足以作为\n\n准予第 14 条分案动议的替代方案。”United States v. Feyrer，333 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2003)；亦参见 Zafiro，506 U.S. at 538-39（“即使证明存在不公损害，第 14 条亦不要求分案审理；相反，它将所给予的救济（如有）的拟定交由地区法院审慎自由裁量。”）。\n\n鉴于对一同起诉的被告进行合并审理的倾向，以及赋予地区法院在处理任何潜在不公损害方面的自由裁量权，根据第 14 条就驳回分案审理寻求复审的被告承担着“极其沉重的证明责任”，United States v. Casamento，887 F.2d 1141, 1149-50 (2d Cir. 1989)（引文省略），即证明其因合并审理受到如此严重的不公损害，以至于遭受了“司法不公”或被剥夺了符合宪法要求的公正审判。参见 United States v. Locascio，6 F.3d 924, 947 (2d Cir. 1993)（“分案审理动议属于地区法院的审慎自由裁量权范围，其处理决定在上诉中几乎不可复审。”）。\n\nB. 讨论\n\nWang（王雁平）和 Kwok（郭文贵）在同一份起诉书的相同十一个罪名项中被指控参与同一个敲诈勒索企业——Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）——并对相同的受害人实施相同的巨额欺诈，以及通过相同的洗钱共谋隐匿相同的收益。[7] 在审判中，政府方拟依靠通过许多相同证人提出的很大程度上相同的证据来证明他们的罪行。由此可见，合并审理可以节约司法资源，避免证人不得不作证两次所带来的费用和不便，避免允许一名被告预先了解\n\n7 S2起诉书包含十三个罪名项。王在第一至第十项以及第十二项中被指控。郭在第一至第十二项中被指控。王未被指控的罪名项仅有第十一项（涉及喜马拉雅交易所电汇欺诈）和第十三项（指控Je妨碍司法公正）。\n\n政府方的案情所产生的不公，并“通过避免不一致判决的丑闻和不公来服务于司法利益”。Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210；另见 Zafiro, 945 F.2d at 886。\n\n如果王的动议有其他主张，她的论点要么是依赖于现已过时的起诉书，要么是对证据存在误解。但即使在先前的替代起诉书下，且毫无疑问在现行起诉书下，王都参与了郭氏企业的方方面面，例如包括 GTV Private Placement（GTV私募）、Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目）、G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）以及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）。确实，尽管王未被指控与喜马拉雅交易所相关的实质性电汇欺诈指控，但政府方在审判中将证明王在共谋中的参与包括为喜马拉雅交易所面试人员，以及为推进郭氏企业而实施的其他行为。简而言之，王是郭氏运作不可分割的一部分，为了证明这一点，政府方将对郭和王两人提出大量相同的证人和相同的证据。如果对王和郭进行分案审理，证明郭氏企业的存在和运作的大量此类证据将被向两个不同的陪审团出示两次，从而造成不必要的重复和低效——鉴于审判预计将持续约两个月，这种资源浪费将尤为严重。\n\n王主张分案审理是恰当的，因为她获得的个人利益少于郭。起诉书确实指控王从郭氏企业中获得了经济利益（起诉书第5段），但即使王没有获得经济利益，这种差异也远远无法承担沉重的举证责任，即证明王“将因合并审理受到如此严重的偏见，以至于实际上剥夺了其获得公正审判的权利”。United States v. An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (援引 United States v. Rucker, 586 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1978))。\n\n其次，王主张由于郭“频繁的网络活动”，她可能会遭受“溢出偏见”（Wang Mot. at 26）。这一主张未能切中要害。郭的陈述（以及王的陈述）作为共谋人陈述，是可以妥当地作为针对郭和王两人的证据出示的。[8] 此外，不存在溢出偏见。郭和王都被指控犯有相同的基本行为：对相同的受害人实施巨额欺诈。本案并不属于郭的行为比王的行为更耸人听闻的情形——他们两人实施了相同的金融欺诈。不存在发生溢出偏见的风险。\n\n最后，王假定她在审判中“可能”会与郭提出相冲突的辩护，但王并未说明相冲突的辩护是什么。因此，这一论点完全是推测性的。即使并非如此，被告“不能仅仅因为在分案审理中可能有更好的被判无罪的机会，就有权获得[根据第14条规则的]分案审理”。Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540。[9] 被告也不能仅仅因为针对共同被告的证据比针对他们自己的证据更具破坏性或数量更多，就有权获得分案审理。参见如 Spinelli, 352 F.3d at 55。确实，“将轻度参与的被告与深度参与的被告一起进行合并审理，在宪法上是允许的”。Locascio, 6 F.3d at 947。无论如何，根据确立已久的判例，审判将涉及郭的陈述这一事实——这些陈述旨在推进王以领导角色积极参与的共谋——\n\n8 王关于所有此类陈述必须在“审判前很久”予以明确的主张，是一种变相获取具体罪状说明书的企图——如上所述，这是毫无根据的。此外，起诉书以及提供给被告的其他法律程序文书中引用了郭的大量陈述。并且所有此类陈述均已在证据开示中提供。\n\n9 认为合并审理对罪责较轻的被告更具偏见的前提并非普遍真理。参见 Marsh, 481 U.S. at 210 (1987)（“合并审理通常通过避免不一致的判决以及能够更准确地评估相对罪责来服务于司法利益——这些优势有时对被告有利。”）。\n\n甚至完全达不到支持分案审理的潜在偏见程度。[10]\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，法院应当驳回王的动议。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n联邦检察官\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\nRyan B. Finkel\nMicah F. Fergenson\n助理联邦检察官\n212-637-2276/-2314/-6612/-2190\n\n10 王企图利用政府方取消其前任律师资格的动议作为辩护冲突的证据，这一企图不能成立。该冲突涉及前任律师持有政府机密信息的问题。这并不重要，因为该律师不再担任王的辩护律师，且她现任的辩护律师不存在此类冲突。","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","GTV","CIPA","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Saraca","Torres","Yanping Wang","Farm Loan","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","RICO","Ho Wan Kwok","Kin Ming Je","Kaley","GETTR"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":56,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":196,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":199,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":215,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":230,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":15427,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-01-18 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-01-18","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:21:49"}