{"id":"court_sdny_2432_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":2432,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":null,"title":"SDNY ECF 2432","summary_zh":"对特权豁免动议的异议——美国康州破产法院，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）破产案，案号 22-50073，ECF 2432（2023年12月13日提交）。个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok 异议 Chapter 11 受信人就 Bombardier 对抗诉讼文件所请求的特权豁免，以保护其在并行联邦刑事诉讼中的权益。","summary_en":"Objection to Motion for Privilege Waiver—Connecticut Bankruptcy Court, In re Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo), Case No. 22-50073, ECF 2432 (filed December 13, 2023). The individual debtor objected to the Chapter 11 Trustee's motion to waive attorney-client privilege regarding documents in the Bombardier adversary proceeding, citing concerns about impact on his concurrent criminal litigation.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n : Debtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n:\n\n# **THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING (A) CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO USE POTENTIALLY PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS IN BOMBARDIER ADVERSARY PROCEEDING ON A SEALED BASIS WITHOUT WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, (B) LIMITED WAIVER OF TRUSTEE PRIVILEGE AS TO SUBJECT MATTER OF BOMBARDIER AND BOMBARDIER PROCEEDS**\n\nThe individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., respectfully submits his Objection to the Chapter 11 Trustee's (the \"Trustee\") Motion for Order Authorizing, (A) Chapter 11 Trustee to Use Potentially Privileged Documents in Bombardier Adversary Proceeding on a Sealed Basis Without Waiver of Privilege or, Alternatively, (B) Limited Waiver of Trustee Privilege as to Subject Matter of Bombardier and Bombardier Proceeds (the \"Privilege Waiver Motion\"), and in support thereof respectfully states:\n\n## **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Individual Debtor opposes the Privilege Waiver Motion to protect his rights in the criminal action pending against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York captioned *USA v. Kwok*, 1:23CR118 (the \"Criminal Action\"), and more particularly to prevent the United States Attorney's Office from obtaining and using against him attorney-client privileged communications that it would not be able to obtain absent the privilege waiver sought by the Trustee.\n\n2. The Trustee is fully aware that the Individual Debtor opposes the Trustee's waiver of privilege because the Individual Debtor is gravely concerned about the effects such a waiver would have in the pending Criminal Action. Indeed, the Trustee's counsel was told as much on multiple occasions while counsel engaged in discussions to try to arrive at a resolution of the present dispute, and the potential for the Trustee to waive attorney-client privilege is a primary focus of the Individual Debtor's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases which is pending in the Criminal Action. (*See* Criminal Action Doc. No. 131, at 23-25, filed in this case by the Trustee at Doc. No. 2158). Despite this knowledge, the Trustee still goes to great lengths to disparage the Individual Debtor and his motives for refusing to consent to a privilege waiver while he is incarcerated and fighting to regain his liberty.\n\n3. During the discussions between counsel regarding the Trustee's requested privilege waiver, the Individual Debtor's counsel invited the Trustee's counsel to provide authority permitting this Court to enter an enforceable order that would allow the Trustee, as the holder of the attorney-client privilege, to provide the documents at issue in this motion to the defendant's counsel in *Despins v. Guo*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (the \"Whitecroft Adversary\"), as he would be required to do in order to affirmatively use them, and then affirmatively use those same documents to prove his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary, all without waiving any applicable privilege as to the documents.\n\n4. The Individual Debtor's counsel only asked the Trustee's counsel to provide such authority because the Trustee's counsel had suggested that a consensual order of the type now sought via the Privilege Waiver Motion could allow for the Trustee's affirmative use of attorneyclient privileged communications while preserving privilege, and the Individual Debtor's counsel wanted to satisfy themselves that what the Trustee's counsel was suggesting was possible. The\n\nTrustee's counsel never provided the requested authority, and the Individual Debtor's counsel has likewise been unable to locate any such authority because the voluntary disclosure of privileged information, which is what the Trustee as the privilege holder seeks to do, constitutes a privilege waiver.\n\n5. In the alternative, and again completely ignoring the Individual Debtor's stated legitimate concerns about the impact of a privilege waiver in the Criminal Case, the Trustee asks this Court to waive the attorney-client privilege, but fails to undertake the necessary analysis balancing the Trustee's needs for the documents at issue against the harm to the Individual Debtor of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.\n\n6. The Trustee fails to conduct the requisite balancing test because he knows that the scales tip decidedly in favor of the Individual Debtor and the denial of the requested privilege waiver.\n\n7. The Trustee misleadingly identifies and attaches to the Privilege Waiver Motion a much broader set of documents then are truly at issue because some of the documents are duplicative of one another, and with others the Individual Debtor does not even contend there is any attorney-client or other privilege to protect. The Trustee also fails to articulate why the handful of documents at issue are vital to proving his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary and why he cannot do so without them in light of the information he has obtained in the Whitecroft Adversary from third-parties, and through the more than 220 2004 Examinations this Court has authorized, many of which have presumedly been conducted. Indeed, the information for which the Trustee seeks to waive the attorney-client privilege via the Privilege Waiver Motion was obtained via Rule 2004 Examinations, not as part of the discovery process in the Whitecroft Adversary. Surely the Trustee has obtained nonprivileged information as part of his investigation that could be used to\n\nsupport his claims in lieu of the documents at issue. The fact that the Truste may want to waive privilege rather than utilize other evidence should not be a sufficient reason to waive privilege. Indeed, under the present circumstance a privilege waiver should be permitted only as a last resort, not for convenience.\n\n8. Lastly, the Trustee's half-hearted and indirect argument that because the Individual Debtor and Ms. Guo are represented by the same counsel the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege has somehow been waived as to Ms. Guo is unsupported, unsupportable, and must be rejected.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\n#### **A**. **The Privileges Order**\n\n9. On February 15, 2022 the Individual Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and on July 8, 2022, this Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as Chapter 11 trustee in this case.\n\n10. On July 28, 2022, within weeks of his appointment, the Trustee filed the first three of what would become numerous motions to conduct Rule 2004 examinations. The first three motions included the motion to conduct a Rule 2004 examination of the Individual Debtor (Doc. No. 636) and motion to conduct Rule 2004 examinations of \"various legal and financial advisors to the [Individual] Debtor\" (the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\") (Doc. No. 637). The Professionals 2004 Motion sought leave to obtain documents and testimony from twelve different law firms or attorneys who had potentially provided legal services to the Individual Debtor (Doc. No. 637, at Exhibit B).\n\n11. On August 22, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion . . . For Entry of Order (A)\n\nProviding That Control of Any Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product Protection, and Other Privileges Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents Passed to the Trustee Upon Appointment, [and] (B) Directing that [the Individual] Debtor and Other Examinees not Withhold Documents on Account of Such Privileges, . . . (the \"2004 Exam Privileges Motion\" (Doc. No. 777)). The Individual Debtor opposed the 2004 Exam Privileges Motion. The dispute was resolved on September 14, 2022 via the entry of a Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information (the \"Privileges Order\" (Doc. No. 856)).\n\n12. The Privileges Order provides that the Trustee controls the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege and/or work-product protection with respect to specifically enumerated topics defined in the Privileges Order as the Investigation Topics, and further provides that with respect to the Investigation Topics:\n\nNeither the Debtor nor his counsel (based on instructions from the Debtor or any person acting on behalf of the Debtor), nor any other examinee, is entitled to withhold any of the documents and information requested in the attachments to the Rule 2004 subpoenas on the basis of any Trustee Privileges concerning the Investigation Topics.\n\n(Privileges Order, at ¶¶2-3). Thus, the intent of the Privileges Order was to allow the Trustee to conduct his investigation, and in particular via the use of Rule 2004, without concern that documents or information would be withheld on the basis of the Individual Debtor's attorneyclient privilege and/or on the basis of attorney work product.\n\n13. The Privileges Order reserves to the Individual Debtor the right to assert privilege over \"legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application . . .\". (Privileges Order, at ¶4).\n\n14. The Privileges Order does not permit the Trustee to waive the attorney-client privilege or work product protection:\n\n. . . provided, however, the Trustee shall not be entitled to waive any Trustee Privilege (for example, by disclosing privileged documents or information in open court or on any public docket or by sharing such documents or information with a third party) absent the Debtor's written consent or further order of the Court, . . .\n\n(Privileges Order, at ¶5).\n\n15. On the morning of March 15, 2023, a twelve count indictment was unsealed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging the Individual Debtor with various federal crimes. The Individual Debtor was arrested by federal law enforcement authorities on March 15, 2023. On March 29, 2023, a superseding indictment was filed in the Criminal Case. (Criminal Case, Doc. No. 19). The Individual Debtor remains in custody awaiting trial which is currently scheduled for April 2024. Thus, from the Individual Debtor's perspective, the world in which the Privileges Order entered bears no resemblance to the world today, and it is the state of the world today that drives the Individual Debtor's position vis-à-vis the Trustee's effort to waive attorney-client privilege.\n\n## **B. The Whitecroft Adversary**\n\n16. The Trustee Commenced the Whitecroft Adversary on May 16, 2023, seeking to recover, *inter alia*, the proceeds of a purported post-petition sale of alleged estate property, a Bombardier aircraft.[1](#page-5-0) Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\") is the only named defendant in the Whitecroft Adversary.\n\n17. On or about July 31, 2023, the Trustee served written discovery requests, interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for the production of documents, on Ms. Guo in the Whitecroft Adversary (the \"Trustee Discovery). Ms. Guo responded to the Trustee Discovery on or about August 30, 2023, and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Trustee seeks other relief in the Whitecroft Adversary but the documents at issue relate only to the Bombardier aircraft.\n\nincrimination in response to each request in the Trustee Discovery. The Trustee did not move to compel or otherwise seek leave of Court related to Ms. Guo's invocation of her Fifth Amendment Rights in response to the Trustee Discovery.\n\n18. Ms. Guo was deposed in the Whitecroft Adversary on November 1, 2023, and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination in response to a number of the questions posed. The Trustee did not move to compel or otherwise seek leave of Court related to Ms. Guo's invocation of her Fifth Amendment Rights in response to questions posed to her during her deposition.\n\n19. Ms. Guo served discovery on the Trustee in the Whitecroft Adversary, including requests for the production of documents.\n\n20. To date and based on the Bates stamps applied to documents by the Trustee, the Trustee has produced 8896 pages of documents to Ms. Guo in response to her requests for production, a subset of the more than 49,000 documents the Trustee's counsel represented that search terms run against document productions obtained by the Trustee pursuant to Rule 2004 had captured for further review by the Trustee's counsel in connection with Ms. Guo's discovery requests. (*See* October 9-12, 2023, email chain between, among others, the Trustee's counsel and the Individual Debtor's counsel, at October 9, 2023, 9:49 pm email. A copy of the email chain is attached hereto as Exhibit A).\n\n21. In connection with his search for documents responsive to Ms. Guo's requests for production the Trustee identified potentially privileged responsive documents and asked the Individual Debtor's counsel to consent to the production of those documents to Ms. Guo without undertaking any review. (*See generally id*).\n\n22. The Individual Debtor's counsel informed the Trustee's counsel that the Individual\n\nDebtor had not agreed to waive privilege and stated that the same process used to review privileged documents prior to production in *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al*. Adv. Pro. No. 5:23ap05005, should be used in the Whitecroft Adversary so that an informed decision regarding privilege could be made and any disputes could be limited. (*Id.*, at October 10, 2023, 4:40 pm email and responses thereto).[2](#page-7-0)\n\n23. The Trustee thereafter agreed to proceed in the same manner utilized in the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding and provided to the Individual Debtor's counsel 246 documents to review to determine the scope and substance of the waiver the Trustee was seeking, and to determine whether the Individual Debtor viewed each of the provided documents as privileged.[3](#page-7-1)\n\n24. Of the 246 documents provided for review, the Individual Debtor's counsel identified a total of 131 that the Individual Debtor viewed as privileged and objected to being produced, disclosed, or used for any purpose. The Individual Debtor further identified five (5) documents that included privileged information and his counsel returned to the Trustee redacted versions of those documents identifying those areas deemed to contain privileged information.[4](#page-7-2)\n\n<span id=\"page-7-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> In the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding the Trustee's counsel requested the Individual Debtor's consent to produce potentially privileged documents to the defendants. The Individual Debtor's counsel requested to review the documents before providing the Individual Debtor's position on the request for consent. The documents were provided to the Individual Debtor's counsel, reviewed, and the Individual Debtor identified the documents which he did not believe were subject to privilege, which could be immediately produced, and those that were subject to privilege and for which the Individual Debtor would not consent to production. The process utilized in the Greenwich Land adversary appeared to work well and did not result in any dispute presented to the Court. Thus, the Individual Debtor's counsel requested that the same process be used in the Whitecroft Adversary.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-1\"></span><sup>3</sup> It appears that the Trustee is treating every document obtained from a law firm or lawyer that may have previously represented the Individual Debtor as privileged. Thus, part of the Individual Debtor's Counsel's review included analyzing whether a document was even subject to attorneyclient privilege.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-2\"></span><sup>4</sup> One of the documents the Individual Debtor's counsel returned to the Trustee in redacted form is included as an Exhibit to the Privilege Waiver Motion, Exhibit J, without the redaction which\n\n25. The individual Debtor did not consider the other 101 documents privileged and did not object to their production, disclosure, or use. To the best of counsel's knowledge as of the filing of this Objection the Trustee's counsel has neither produced the documents identified as non-privileged to Ms. Guo's counsel nor provided a privilege log of the documents that the Individual Debtor identified as privileged but which the Trustee does not seek to affirmatively use and are therefore not at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion.\n\n26. Of the 136 documents that the Individual Debtor identified as privileged and to which he would not consent to a waiver only six (6) appear to be at issue as the remining 10, the Privilege Waiver Motion attaches 16 exhibits, do not appear to have been provide to the Individual Debtor's counsel for review based on the lack of the Bates stamp prefix \"MGAP\" which was affixed to the documents provided for review\n\n## **C. The Documents at Issue**\n\n27. The Privilege Waiver Motion includes as Exhibits A-P the documents for which the Trustee seeks to waive privilege. The Individual Debtor does not contend that the following documents are subject to attorney-client privilege: Exhibits C, G, O, and P (Exhibit G, O, and P do not include the MGAP Bates prefix, and the Individual Debtor has not located Exhibit C in the documents provided by the Trustee's counsel for review).\n\n28. The Individual Debtor does not contend that the following portions of Exhibits attached to the Privilege Waiver Motion are privileged:\n\n> • Exhibit F, all pages save for pages 137-140 (the Individual Debtor does contend that pages 137-140 contain privileged information);\n\ngives the impression that the Individual Debtor is asserting that communications between nonlawyers are privileged, he is not.\n\n- Exhibit J, all pages save for the first email in the chain at Bates stamp MGAP06178 from Ms. Wong to Mr. Shulman, and others, the email at Bates Stamp MGAP06198 from Mr. Shulman to Ms. Wong and others, and the email at Bates stamped pages MGAP06201-6203 between Ms. Wong and Messrs. Shulman and Barnett.\n- Exhibit M, the email at Bates stamp WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 is claimed as privileged, while the email at Bates stamp WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004784-85 is not claimed as privileged.\n\n29. Certain of the documents attached as Exhibits to the Privilege Waiver Motion are duplicative of one another. Exhibit B consists of an email chain containing three emails, Exhibit D is one of the emails contained in the Exhibit B chain and Exhibit E consists of two of the emails contained in the Exhibit B chain. Thus, Exhibits B, D and E are effectively one document. Likewise, Exhibit I is an email chain consisting of four emails, three of which are included within the documents that constitute Exhibit H.[5](#page-9-0)\n\n30. Based on the foregoing there is a very limited set of unique documents at issue on the Privilege Waiver Motion: Exhibits A, B (which includes D and E), F (pages 137-140 of the transcript only), H, I (only the first email in the chain is unique), J (only pages Bates stamped MGAP06178, MGAP06198, and MGAP 6201-6203 are at issue), K, L, M (only the email at WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 is at issue), and Exhibit N.\n\n## **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n# **A. The Trustee Provides No Authority That the Order He Seeks Will be Enforceable and not Simply Result in a Privilege Waiver**\n\n31. The Trustee asks this Court to enter an order permitting the Trustee, as the privilege\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Exhibit H is a composite exhibit that appears to be the entire contents of a law firm's file on a particular subject.\n\nholder, to affirmatively utilize the documents at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion to prove his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary, and to disclose them to Ms. Guo, the defendant in that adversary proceeding as he would have to do to utilize them, all without waiving privilege as to those documents.\n\n32. The Trustee cites no authority that such an order would be enforceable and would preclude a third-party from obtaining the documents at issue because no such authority appears to exist. Indeed, the Trustee's affirmative use of the documents would constitute a privilege waiver regardless of the entry of the requested order.\n\n33. The Trustee requested that the Individual Debtor agree to such an order and he refused to do so absent authority that the order would be enforceable against third-parties; the Trustee has not provided any such authority, either to the Individual Debtor or the Court in the Privilege Waiver Motion, and the Individual Debtor has not located any such authority.\n\n34. The authority located by the Individual Debtor is to the contrary: the affirmative use of privileged information by the privilege holder, in this case the Trustee, constitutes a privilege waiver, and not just in the particular action in which the privileged materials are utilized. *Chevron Corp. v. Salazar*, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y., 2011) (\"Where a party voluntarily discloses privileged documents to an adversary in one proceeding, it cannot withhold the same documents on the basis of privilege in a subsequent proceeding, even if the subsequent proceeding involves a different adversary.\") (citing cases). *See also In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.*, No. 04 MD 1653 (LAK) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88629, \\*28 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 1, 2006) (noting that \"voluntary or even inadvertent disclosure [of privileged communications] may result [in] a waiver of privilege\" whereas compelled disclosure does not result in a waiver) (citations omitted); *Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.*, 94 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"with some exceptions,\n\nthe attorney-client privilege is automatically waived when a privileged communication is disclosed to a third party or litigation adversary.\") (citing cases); *Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA Inc.*, Case No. CV 17-768, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, \\*13 (E.D.N.Y., March 28, 2019) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is not absolute and may be waived).\n\n35. The intentional waiver of the attorney-client privilege by the Trustee of a handful of documents on a particular subject also creates the risk of a broader subject matter waiver. *Speedfit LLC*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, at \\*13 (\"Subject matter waiver is a type of implied waiver 'which allows the attacking party to reach all privileged conversations regarding a particular subject once one privileged conversation on that topic disclosed,' and is grounded in 'fairness considerations at work in the context of litigations.'\") (*quoting Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co.* 193 F.R.D. 73, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)*. See also*, Fed. R. Evid. 502(a) (\"When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.\").\n\n36. Because the Individual Debtor has grave concerns about the enforceability of the Order requested by the Trustee, and the concomitant ability of prosecutors to obtain at least the documents used by the Trustee that are otherwise privileged, and potentially much more if there is subsequently deemed to be a subject matter waiver, the Individual Debtor Objects to the entry of the Order requested by the Trustee.\n\n#### **B. The Trustee Should not be Permitted to Waive Privilege**\n\n37. In the alternative to the requested Order permitting him to affirmatively use\n\ndocuments without waiving privilege, the Trustee asks the Court to enter an order permitting him to waive privilege as to the handful of documents at issue.\n\n38. The Trustee cites several cases where a bankruptcy trustee was permitted to waive a debtor's attorney-client privilege, but the Trustee performs no analysis under the prevailing balancing test. That analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that privilege should not be waived.\n\n39. The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of a bankruptcy trustee's authority to waive a debtor's pre-petition attorney-client privilege have utilized a balancing test. *See Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore)*, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (\"The filing of bankruptcy by an individual debtor requires a determination as to whether anyone else controls the privilege. The inquiry requires balancing the interests of a full and frank discussion in the attorney-client relationship and the harm to the debtor upon a disclosure with the trustee's duty to maximize the value of the debtor's estate and represent the interests of the estate\"). *See also*, *Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame)* 251 B.R. 367, 377 (D. Minn. 2000) (finding, based on the weight of authority, the balancing approach to be the applicable test in determining whether a bankruptcy trustee may waive a debtor's prepetition privilege); *Whatley v. Meyer Wilson Co., LPA (In re Chandar)*, Case No. 11-37360-B-7, Adv. No. 17-2057, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3903, at \\*2-3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017) (collecting cases); *In re Still*, 444 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (\"The trend of the cases is toward a balancing approach.\").\n\n40. In applying the balancing test courts determine whether \"on balance the trustee's duties to maximize the value of the estate outweigh the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege and the harm to the debtor of disclosure.\" *Ramette (In re Bame)* 215 B.R. 367, at 377 (citations omitted). *See also*, *Degirolamo v. Daily & Haskins (In re Wittmer)*, Case No. 08-61618,\n\n2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4727, at \\*7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2011) (\"This [balancing] approach blends the argument that a trustee cannot waive the attorney-client privilege because of the potential for personal harm to the debtor and impediment of the attorney-client communication with the argument that a trustee can waive the attorney-client privilege if there is no adverse effect on the debtor.\") (*citing In re Miller* 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)).\n\n41. In this case the adverse effect of a privilege waiver to the Individual Debtor is substantial because he has been charged in a superseding indictment with multiple violations of federal criminal law, and the allegations of the superseding indictment mirror certain of the allegations of the Whitecroft Adversary complaint. (Compare Whitecroft Adversary complaint, at ¶¶13-19 accusing the Individual Debtor of using numerous shell companies to keep assets from creditors, with superseding indictment at ¶¶1-3, including at ¶3 (\"To conceal the illegal source of the funds [the Individual Debtor and his alleged co-defendants] transferred, and directed the transfer of, money into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals, . . .\"). Certain of the documents for which the Trustee seeks to waive privilege, Exhibits A, B (and D and E as subsets of B), and F, relate to purported contemplated asset transfers during the time period at issue within the superseding indictment, *i.e.*, \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023\". (Superseding indictment, at ¶1).\n\n42. Based on a review of the docket of the Criminal Case the prosecutors in that case have not sought leave to obtain any of the Individual Debtor's privileged communications. Of course, if the Trustee waives the privilege the prosecutor's would be entitled to obtain all of the documents to which the waiver applies, including any subsequent subject matter waiver that the Court may find. The potential for criminal liability is a factor that courts look to when conducting the balancing test to determine whether privilege should be waived, and the potential for prosecutors to obtain access to documents that they would not otherwise be able to access should weigh even more heavily in refusing to permit waiver. *See Ramette (In re Bame)* 215 B.R. 367, at 377 (\"As to other questions, however, especially those going to activities giving rise to potential criminal prosecution, the balance would probably tip in favor of sustaining assertion of the privilege, in which case the trustee would have the opportunity to raise the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.\").\n\n43. On the other side of the scale, the Trustee has not identified any harm that would befall the estate if the Court refuses to permit the requested privilege waiver. Indeed, the only stated reason for seeking the privilege waiver is to use a handful of documents affirmatively in the Whitecroft Adversary, but as the Trustee states in the Privilege Waiver Motion he likely does not even need these few documents to prevail because Ms. Guo has not defended against the Trustee's allegations. (Privilege Waiver Motion, at ¶48 (\"Thus, Ms. Guo has failed to substantiate any basis to oppose the Trustee's claims in the Bombardier Adversary Proceeding\").\n\n44. The Privilege Waiver Motion also ignores the non-privileged information that the Trustee relies upon in support of his complaint, all as referenced therein and attached as exhibits thereto[6](#page-14-0) , as well as the substantive deposition testimony of Ms. Guo secured in January 2023, which was reaffirmed during her November 1, 2023 deposition in the Whitecroft Adversary, the substantial non-privileged information that the Trustee has obtained in connection with his sweeping investigation, and publicly available information such as that referenced at paragraph 20\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> The Trustee attached one or more of the documents at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion as an exhibit to the Whitecroft Adversary complaint without asking the Individual Debtor's counsel for consent or seeking leave of Court. Obviously, the Trustee's unilateral use of documents in violation of the Privileges Order does not constitute a waiver of the Individual Debtor's right to demand compliance with that order.\n\nof the Privilege Waiver Motion.\n\n45. As previously noted, in response to Ms. Guo's requests for production in the Whitecroft Adversary, many of which requests sought information concerning the Trustee's allegations regarding ownership of the Bombardier aircraft, the Trustee produced nearly 9,000 pages of documents. Moreover, the Trustee continues to seek information in support of his claims, having received documents in response to a subpoena from JetLaw, LLC within the last week, and thereafter issuing two additional subpoenas for documents and depositions. In addition, the Trustee will certainly seek adverse inferences against Ms. Guo based on her invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights and the Individual Debtor's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights during a March 2, 2023 deposition at which he was questioned regarding matters at issue in the Whitecroft Adversary even though it had yet to be filed and the deposition related to the claim and counterclaims asserted in *HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd. v. Despins*, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003. (*See* Whitecroft Complaint, at ¶¶26, 29, 42, 44(a)-(f), 49, 64, and 72).\n\n46. Based on the (i) massive volume of non-privileged information the Trustee has accrued, (ii) lack of any showing that the inability to use the handful of documents the Trustee seeks to use via the Privilege Waiver Motion will negate his ability to successfully prove his claims, and (iii) harm that will befall the Individual Debtor if privilege is waived, the Privilege Waiver Motion should be denied.\n\n## **C. Ms. Guo's Counsel's Knowledge of Certain Facts Does not Constitute a Privilege Waiver**\n\n47. The fact that Ms. Guo and the Individual Debtor are represented by the same counsel does not work a waiver of the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege or vice-versa simply because counsel has knowledge of privileged information and the Trustee cites no authority for his implied position that it does—the fact that the Trustee does not come right out and say that\n\nhe is arguing that Zeisler & Zeisler's representation of the Individual Debtor in the main bankruptcy case and Ms. Guo in the Whitecroft Adversary results in a waiver of the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege speaks volumes about the Trustee's own view of his argument.\n\n48. The cases cited by the Trustee do not support his implied waiver argument, and are utterly inapposite. *Helmedach v. Comm'r of Corr.,* 329 Conn. 726, 737 (2018) addresses the issue of notifying a criminal defendant client of a plea offer and whether the failure to do so in a timely manner constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. *Uchechukwu Egbujo v. Jackson Lewis, P.C.*, 2022 U.S. Dist LEXIS 177041, 2022 WL 4585688, \\*7 (D. Conn., Sept. 29, 2022) involves a defamation claim and whether a law firm's publication to its own client of the findings of its investigation conducted on behalf of the client constitutes publication to a third-party for purposes of satisfying the publication element of a defamation claim, it does not. Lastly, *Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC*, 802 F.3d 353 (2015) involves an interpretation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, and whether providing a required document to counsel satisfies the act's disclosure provisions, it does.\n\n49. The Trustee also contends that the Individual Debtor and Ms. Guo are seeking to use the attorney-client privilege as a sword and a shield. The sword and shield problem arises where one party seeks to use its privileged communications affirmatively without disclosing them. *Sims v. Blot*, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"In other words, a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party.\") (citations omitted). As between the Trustee, the Individual Debtor, and Ms. Guo the only party that is seeking to affirmatively use privileged information is the Trustee. Thus, the only one who could even potentially have a sword and shield problem is the Trustee (the Individual Debtor is not a party to the Whitecroft Adversary and is not seeking to use privileged communications for any purpose, he is simply seeking to have privileged communications remain privileged; Ms. Guo is not seeking to use privileged communications for any purpose and could not because she has no right or ability to use them).\n\nWHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons the Privilege Waiver Motion should be denied.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 13th day of December, 2023.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n */s/ James M. Moriarty*\n\nEric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n : Debtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 13th day of December, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ James M. Moriarty*  James M. Moriarty (ct21876)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n : Debtor. : _________________________________________:\n_________________________________________ :\n:\n个人债务人对授权以下事项动议的异议：(A) 授权第 11 章受托人在庞巴迪对抗性程序中以密封方式使用潜在受特权保护的文件且不放弃特权，或备选地，(B) 允许受托人就庞巴迪及庞巴迪收益之标的事项有限放弃受托人特权\n\n个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（下称「个人债务人」），由其下述署名律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 代表，谨此就第 11 章受托人（下称「受托人」）提起的《关于授权 (A) 第 11 章受托人在庞巴迪对抗性程序中以密封方式使用潜在受特权保护的文件且不放弃特权，或备选地，(B) 允许受托人就庞巴迪及庞巴迪收益之标的事项有限放弃受托人特权的命令的动议》（下称《放弃特权动议》）提交其异议，并为此谨陈述如下理由：\n\nI. 绪言\n\n1. 个人债务人反对《放弃特权动议》，以保护其在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）审理中案名为 USA v. Kwok、案号为 1:23CR118 的待决刑事诉讼（下称「刑事诉讼」）中的权利，更具体而言，是为了防止 United States Attorney's Office（美国联邦检察官办公室）获取并在对其不利的情况下使用若非受托人谋求特权放弃则其无法获取的律师-委托人特权保密通信。\n\n2. 受托人充分知晓个人债务人反对受托人放弃特权，因为个人债务人极其严重关切此类放弃在待决刑事诉讼中将产生的影响。事实上，在双方律师就试图解决当前争议而进行的讨论中，受托人的律师曾多次被明确告知此点，并且受托人可能放弃律师-委托人特权正是个人债务人在刑事诉讼中提起的、目前处于待决状态的《关于中止破产案件的命令及令状的动议》的主要焦点。（参见刑事诉讼 Doc. No. 131，第 23-25 页，由受托人在本案中归档于 Doc. No. 2158）。尽管知晓这些情况，受托人仍不遗余力地贬损个人债务人及其在身陷囹圄并全力争取重获自由期间拒绝同意放弃特权的动机。\n\n3. 在双方律师就受托人请求放弃特权进行讨论期间，个人债务人的律师曾邀请受托人的律师提供判例法源，以允许本法院作出一项可执行的裁定，该裁定将允许受托人作为律师-委托人特权的持有者，将本动议所涉争议文件提供给 Despins v. Guo 案（对抗性程序案号 Adv. Pro. No. 23-05008 (JAM)，下称「怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序」）中的被告律师（正如受托人若要主动使用这些文件所必须做的那样），随后主动使用这些相同文件来证明其在怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序中的主张，而这一切均不会放弃对该等文件所适用的任何特权。\n\n4. 个人债务人的律师之所以要求受托人的律师提供此类法源依据，仅是因为受托人的律师曾提出，目前通过《放弃特权动议》所谋求的这种经合意达成的命令类型可以在保留特权的同时允许受托人主动使用律师-委托人特权保密通信，而个人债务人的律师希望确认受托人律师所建议的做法是否具有可行性。受托人的律师从未提供过所要求的法源依据，个人债务人的律师同样也未能找到任何此类法源，因为自愿披露受特权保护的信息（这正是受托人作为特权持有者企图采取的行为）即构成特权放弃。\n\n5. 作为备选方案，受托人再次完全无视个人债务人就特权放弃在刑事案件中所产生影响所陈述的合理关切，要求本法院裁定放弃律师-委托人特权，但未能进行必要的权衡分析，即衡量受托人对涉案文件的需求与特权放弃对个人债务人造成的损害。\n\n6. 受托人未能进行必要的利益权衡检验，是因为他清楚天平决定性地倒向有利于个人债务人以及驳回其所请求的特权放弃这一边。\n\n7. 受托人在《放弃特权动议》中具有误导性地确定并附带了远比真正涉案范围广泛得多的文件，因为其中部分文件互为重复，而对于另一些文件，个人债务人甚至根本未主张存在任何律师-委托人特权或其他特权需要保护。受托人同样未能阐明，鉴于他在怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序中从第三方获取的信息，以及通过本法院已授权进行的 220 多次 Rule 2004 审查（其中多次推定已实际进行）所获取的信息，为何这区区几份涉案文件对其在怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序中证明其主张至关重要，以及为何没有这些文件他就无法证明其主张。事实上，受托人通过《放弃特权动议》试图放弃律师-委托人特权的信息是通过 Rule 2004 审查获得的，而不是作为怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序证据开示程序的一部分获得的。可以肯定的是，受托人在其调查中已经获得了可以替代涉案文件用于支持其主张的非特权信息。受托人可能想要放弃特权而不是利用其他证据这一事实，不应成为放弃特权的充分理由。事实上，在目前的情况下，只有在作为最后手段时才应允许放弃特权，而不能仅仅出于便利。\n\n8. 最后，受托人缺乏诚意且间接提出的论点——即由于个人债务人与 Guo 女士由同一律师代理，个人债务人的律师-委托人特权在某种程度上已针对 Guo 女士被放弃——是毫无依据且站不住脚的，必须予以驳回。\n\nII. 背景\nA. 特权命令\n\n9. 2022 年 2 月 15 日，个人债务人根据《破产法典》第 11 章提交了自愿救济申请；2022 年 7 月 8 日，本法院作出了《关于准予任命第 11 章受托人的命令》（Doc. No. 523），准予任命受托人作为本案的第 11 章受托人。\n\n10. 2022 年 7 月 28 日，即获得任命后的数周内，受托人提交了后来演变为多次动议的前三次进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议。前三次动议包括对个人债务人进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议（Doc. No. 636），以及对「个人债务人的各项法律和财务顾问」进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议（下称《专业人员 2004 动议》）（Doc. No. 637）。《专业人员 2004 动议》申请许可从可能向个人债务人提供过法律服务的十二家不同律师事务所或律师处调取文件并获取证言（Doc. No. 637，附件 B）。\n\n11. 2022 年 8 月 22 日，受托人提交了其《关于作出如下命令的动议：(A) 规定与 Rule 2004 传票所调取文件相关的任何律师-委托人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权在受托人获任命时已转移给受托人，[以及] (B) 责令个人债务人及其他受审查人不得以该等特权为由扣留文件……》（下称《2004 审查特权动议》（Doc. No. 777））。个人债务人反对《2004 审查特权动议》。该争议于 2022 年 9 月 14 日通过本院作出《关于与 Rule 2004 传票所调取文件及信息相关的律师-委托人特权与工作成果保护控制权的合意命令》（下称《特权命令》（Doc. No. 856））得以解决。\n\n12. 《特权命令》规定，受托人在《特权命令》中定义为「调查主题」的明确列举的主题范围内控制个人债务人的律师-委托人特权和/或工作成果保护，并进一步规定针对「调查主题」：\n\n债务人及其律师（基于债务人或代表债务人行事的任何人的指示），以及任何其他受审查人，均无权以涉及调查主题的任何受托人特权为由，扣留 Rule 2004 传票附件中所要求的任何文件和信息。\n\n（《特权命令》，第 2-3 段）。因此，《特权命令》的意图是允许受托人进行其调查，特别是通过使用 Rule 2004 进行调查，而不必担心文件或信息会因个人债务人的律师-委托人特权和/或律师工作成果为由而被扣留。\n\n13. 《特权命令》保留了个人债务人就「与调查主题无关的法律事务，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请……」主张特权的权利。（《特权命令》，第 4 段）。\n\n14. 《特权命令》并不允许受托人放弃律师-委托人特权或工作成果保护：\n\n……然而前提是，受托人无权在未经债务人书面同意或法院进一步命令的情况下放弃任何受托人特权（例如，通过在公开法庭上或在任何公开诉讼记录上披露受特权保护的文件或信息，或通过与第三方共享此类文件或信息）……\n\n（《特权命令》，第 5 段）。\n\n15. 2023 年 3 月 15 日上午，美国纽约南区联邦地区法院启封了一份包含十二项罪名项的起诉书，指控个人债务人犯有多项联邦罪行。个人债务人于 2023 年 3 月 15 日被联邦执法当局逮捕。2023 年 3 月 29 日，一份替代起诉书在该刑事案件中被提交归档。（刑事案件，Doc. No. 19）。个人债务人目前仍处于羁押状态，等待目前定于 2024 年 4 月进行的审判。因此，从个人债务人的角度来看，《特权命令》作出时的世界与当今的世界已毫无相似之处，而正是当今世界的现状决定了个人债务人针对受托人谋求放弃律师-委托人特权所持的立场。\n\nB. 怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序\n\n16. 受托人于 2023 年 5 月 16 日提起了怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序，寻求追回（除其他事项外）涉嫌属于破产财产的庞巴迪飞机的所谓申请后出售所得收益。1 Mei Guo（郭美）（下称「Guo 女士」）是怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序中唯一被列名的被告。\n\n17. 2023 年 7 月 31 日或前后，受托人在怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序中向 Guo 女士送达了书面证据开示请求，包括质询书、自认请求书以及调取文件请求书（下称「受托人证据开示」）。Guo 女士于 2023 年 8 月 30 日或前后对受托人证据开示作出了答复，并援引了其宪法第五修正案中反对自\n\n1 受托人在怀特克罗夫特对抗性程序中谋求其他救济，但涉案文件仅与庞巴迪飞机相关。\n\n证其罪的权利作为对受托人证据开示中每一项请求的答复。受托人并未针对 Guo 女士在答复受托人证据开示时援引其第五修正案权利之举动议强制作答或另行谋求法院许可。\n\n18. 郭女士于 2023年11月1日 在 Whitecroft 案对抗性程序（Whitecroft Adversary）中接受了宣誓作证，并针对提出的若干问题援引了其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利。针对郭女士在其宣誓作证期间回答所提问题时援引《第五修正案》权利一事，受托人（Trustee）未提出强制作证动议，亦未就此寻求法院许可。\n\n19. 郭女士在 Whitecroft 案对抗性程序中向受托人送达了证据开示请求，包括文件出示请求。\n\n20. 迄今为止，根据受托人对文件施加的贝茨编号（Bates stamps），受托人已向郭女士出示了 8896 页文件以回应其出示请求。受托人律师曾表示，根据《破产程序规则》第 2004 条（Rule 2004）针对受托人获取的出示文件运行检索词后，共抓取了逾 49000 份文件供受托人律师就郭女士的证据开示请求作进一步审查，上述出示的文件即为其中的一部分。（见 2023年10月9日至12日 受托人律师与个人债务人（Individual Debtor）律师等人之间的电子邮件往来记录，详见 2023年10月9日 晚上 9:49 的电子邮件。该电子邮件记录的副本作为证据 A 附于本文件）。\n\n21. 在检索回应郭女士出示请求的文件过程中，受托人识别出了可能享有特权的回应性文件，并要求个人债务人的律师同意在不进行任何审查的情况下将这些文件出示给郭女士。（整体参见同上）。\n\n22. 个人债务人的律师告知受托人的律师，个人债务人尚未同意放弃特权，并表示应在 Whitecroft 案对抗性程序中采用在 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al. 案（对抗性程序案号：5:23ap05005）中出示前审查特权文件的相同程序，以便就特权作出知情决定并尽量减少争议。（同上，详见 2023年10月10日 下午 4:40 的电子邮件及对其的回复）。[2]\n\n23. 受托人随后同意按照 Greenwich Land 案对抗性程序中使用的相同方式进行，并向个人债务人的律师提供了 246 份文件进行审查，以确定受托人寻求放弃特权的范围和实质内容，并确定个人债务人是否认为所提供的每份文件均享有特权。[3]\n\n24. 在提供审查的 246 份文件中，个人债务人的律师共识别出 131 份被个人债务人视为享有特权并反对出于任何目的而出示、披露或使用的文件。个人债务人进一步识别出五（5）份包含特权信息的文件，其律师向受托人退还了这些文件的修订涂黑版本，指明了被认定包含特权信息的区域。[4]\n\n2 在 Greenwich Land 案对抗性程序中，受托人的律师请求个人债务人同意向被告出示可能享有特权的文件。个人债务人的律师要求在就同意请求提供个人债务人的立场之前审查这些文件。文件已提供给个人债务人的律师并经审查，个人债务人识别出了他认为不受特权保护、可立即出示的文件，以及受特权保护且个人债务人不同意出示的文件。Greenwich Land 案对抗性程序中采用的程序运作良好，并未产生呈交法院解决的任何争议。因此，个人债务人的律师请求在 Whitecroft 案对抗性程序中采用相同程序。\n\n3 受托人似乎将在可能曾代表过个人债务人的律师事务所或律师处获得的每一份文件均视为享有特权。因此，个人债务人律师审查的一部分包括分析一份文件是否甚至属于律师-委托人保密特权的保护范围。\n\n4 个人债务人律师以修订涂黑形式退还给受托人的其中一份文件，作为证据 J 附于特权放弃动议（Privilege Waiver Motion）中，但未作涂黑，从而给人一种个人债务人主张非律师之间的通信享有特权的印象，其实不然。\n\n25. 个人债务人认为其余 101 份文件不享有特权，且不反对出示、披露或使用这些文件。据律师截至本异议提交之时的最大知悉范围，受托人的律师既未向郭女士的律师出示被认定为非特权的文件，亦未就个人债务人认定为享有特权但受托人并不寻求主动使用、因而不在特权放弃动议争议之列的文件提供特权清单（privilege log）。\n\n26. 在个人债务人认定为享有特权且不同意放弃特权的 136 份文件中，似乎只有六（6）份存在争议，因为其余 10 份（特权放弃动议附有 16 份证据）基于缺少提供审查的文件上所加盖的贝茨编号前缀“MGAP”，似乎未曾提供给个人债务人的律师进行审查。\n\nC. 争议文件\n\n27. 特权放弃动议包含证据 A 至 P，即受托人寻求放弃特权的文件。个人债务人并不主张以下文件受律师-委托人保密特权保护：证据 C、G、O 和 P（证据 G、O 和 P 未包含 MGAP 贝茨前缀，且个人债务人在受托人律师提供审查的文件中未找到证据 C）。\n\n28. 个人债务人并不主张特权放弃动议所附证据的以下部分享有特权：\n\n证据 F，除第 137-140 页外的所有页面（个人债务人确自主张第 137-140 页包含特权信息）；\n\n证据 J，除贝茨编号 MGAP06178 处 Wong 女士发给 Shulman 先生等人的邮件链中第一封电子邮件、贝茨编号 MGAP06198 处 Shulman 先生发给 Wong 女士等人的电子邮件、以及贝茨编号第 MGAP06201-6203 页处 Wong 女士与 Shulman 先生和 Barnett 先生之间的电子邮件之外的所有页面。\n\n证据 M，主张贝茨编号 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 处的电子邮件享有特权，而不主张贝茨编号 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004784-85 处的电子邮件享有特权。\n\n29. 特权放弃动议作为证据附具的某些文件彼此重复。证据 B 由包含三封电子邮件的邮件链组成，证据 D 是证据 B 邮件链中包含的其中一封电子邮件，证据 E 由证据 B 邮件链中包含的两封电子邮件组成。因此，证据 B、D 和 E 实际上是同一份文件。同样，证据 I 是一封由四封电子邮件组成的邮件链，其中三封包含在构成证据 H 的文件之中。[5]\n\n30. 基于前述情况，特权放弃动议中涉及的独立争议文件范围非常有限：证据 A、B（包括 D 和 E）、F（仅限笔录的第 137-140 页）、H、I（仅邮件链中的第一封电子邮件为独立文件）、J（仅贝茨编号 MGAP06178、MGAP06198 和 MGAP 6201-6203 的页面存在争议）、K、L、M（仅 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 处的电子邮件存在争议）以及证据 N。\n\nIII. 论证理由\n\nA. 受托人未提供任何法律依据证明其所寻求的裁定具有可执行性而不仅是导致特权放弃\n\n31. 受托人请求本法院作出一项裁定，允许受托人作为特权持有者，在 Whitecroft 案对抗性程序中主动使用特权放弃动议所涉及的争议文件以证明其主张，并向该对抗性程序的被告郭女士披露这些文件（因其使用这些文件必须进行披露），而这一切均不对这些文件构成特权放弃。\n\n5 证据 H 是一份综合证据，似乎是某律师事务所关于特定事项的全部案卷内容。\n\n32. 受托人未援引任何表明此类裁定具有可执行性并能阻止第三方获取争议文件的法律依据，因为似乎不存在此类法律依据。事实上，无论是否作出所请求的裁定，受托人主动使用这些文件均将构成特权放弃。\n\n33. 受托人曾请求个人债务人同意作出此类裁定，但在缺乏该裁定可对第三方强制执行的法律依据的情况下，个人债务人拒绝同意；受托人未向个人债务人或在特权放弃动议中向法院提供任何此类法律依据，个人债务人亦未找到任何此类法律依据。\n\n34. 个人债务人所查到的法律依据得出了相反的结论：特权持有者（在本案中为受托人）主动使用特权信息构成特权放弃，且不仅限于使用该特权材料的特定诉讼中。Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地方法院）, 2011)（“当一方当事人在一项程序中自愿向对手披露特权文件时，其不得在随后的程序中以特权为由拒不出示相同文件，即使随后的程序涉及不同的对手。”）（援引相关判例）。另见 In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., No. 04 MD 1653 (LAK) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88629, *28 (S.D.N.Y., 2006年12月1日)（指出“自愿甚至无意中披露［特权通信］可能导致特权放弃”，而受强制作出的披露则不导致特权放弃）（援引判例）；Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（“除某些例外情况外，当特权通信向第三方或诉讼对手披露时，律师-委托人保密特权即自动放弃。”）（援引相关判例）；Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA Inc., Case No. CV 17-768, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, *13 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地方法院）, 2019年3月28日)（指出律师-委托人保密特权并非绝对，可以被放弃）。\n\n35. 受托人故意放弃就某一特定事项的少数文件的律师-委托人保密特权，亦会产生导致更广泛的事项特权放弃（subject matter waiver）的风险。Speedfit LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, at *13（“事项特权放弃是一种默示放弃，‘一旦就某一主题披露了一次特权对话，即允许攻击方获取关于该特定主题的所有特权对话’，其根植于‘在诉讼背景下发挥作用的公平考量’。”）（引自 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co. 193 F.R.D. 73, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)。另见《联邦证据规则》第 502(a) 条（Fed. R. Evid. 502(a)）（“当披露是在联邦程序中或向联邦办公室或机构作出，且放弃了律师-委托人保密特权或工作成果保护时，仅在满足以下条件时，该放弃方延伸至联邦或州程序中未披露的通信或信息：(1) 放弃是故意的；(2) 已披露和未披露的通信或信息涉及同一事项；以及 (3) 出于公平考虑应当将它们一并考量。”）。\n\n36. 鉴于个人债务人对受托人所请求裁定的可执行性深感担忧，并担忧随之而来的检方获取受托人所使用的本享有特权的文件（若随后被认定存在事项特权放弃，检方可能获取的文件范围甚至远不止于此）的能力，个人债务人反对作出受托人所请求的裁定。\n\nB. 不应允许受托人放弃特权\n\n37. 作为允许其主动使用文件的所请求裁定的替代方案\n\n在不放弃特权的情况下，受托人（Trustee）请求法院作出一项命令（order），允许其就涉案的少数几份文件放弃特权。\n\n38. 受托人援引了若干允许破产受托人放弃债务人律师-委托人特权的判例，但受托人并未根据通行的利益衡量测试（balancing test）进行任何分析。而该分析必然得出不应放弃特权的不可避免的结论。\n\n39. 大多数审理过破产受托人是否有权放弃债务人破产申请前律师-委托人特权这一问题的法院，均采用了利益衡量测试。参见 Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore), 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998)（“个人债务人提起破产申请需要确定是否有其他人控制该特权。该调查需要衡量律师-委托人关系中进行充分且坦诚讨论的利益以及披露对债务人造成的损害，与受托人最大化债务人破产财产价值及代表破产财产利益的职责”）。亦参见 Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame) 251 B.R. 367, 377 (D. Minn. 2000)（根据权威判例的分量，认定利益衡量方法是在确定破产受托人是否可以放弃债务人破产申请前特权时所适用的测试标准）；Whatley v. Meyer Wilson Co., LPA (In re Chandar), Case No. 11-37360-B-7, Adv. No. 17-2057, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3903, at *2-3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017)（汇集判例）；In re Still, 444 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010)（“判例的趋势是倾向于利益衡量方法”）。\n\n40. 在适用利益衡量测试时，法院确定“总体而言，受托人最大化破产财产价值的职责是否重于律师-委托人特权所依据的政策以及披露对债务人造成的损害”。Ramette (In re Bame) 215 B.R. 367, at 377（引文省略）。亦参见 Degirolamo v. Daily & Haskins (In re Wittmer), Case No. 08-61618, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4727, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2011)（“这种[衡量]方法融合了以下两种主张：一种主张认为由于对债务人的潜在个人损害以及对律师-委托人交流的阻碍，受托人不能放弃律师-委托人特权；另一种主张认为如果对债务人没有不利影响，受托人可以放弃律师-委托人特权。”）（援引 In re Miller 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)）。\n\n41. 在本案中，特权放弃对个人债务人（Individual Debtor）的不利影响是巨大的，因为他已在一份替代起诉书（superseding indictment）中被指控犯有多项违反联邦刑法的行为，且替代起诉书中的指控与 Whitecroft 对抗性程序（Whitecroft Adversary）起诉状中的某些指控如出一辙。（对比 Whitecroft 对抗性程序起诉状第 13-19 段指控个人债务人利用众多空壳公司向债权人隐瞒资产，与替代起诉书第 1-3 段，包括第 3 段（“为了掩盖资金的非法来源，[个人债务人及其被指控的共同被告]将资金转移至并指示转移穿梭于以至少80个不同实体或个人名义开立的500多个账户，……”）。受托人寻求放弃特权的某些文件，即证据 A、B（以及作为 B 的子集的 D 和 E）和 F，涉及在替代起诉书所涉争议时间段内涉嫌拟进行的资产转移，即“至少在 2018 年前后至至少在 2023 年 3 月前后”。（替代起诉书第 1 段）。\n\n42. 根据对刑事案件（Criminal Case）案卷目录（docket）的审查，该案中的检察官并未申请许可获取个人债务人的任何受特权保护的通信。当然，如果受托人放弃特权，检察官将有权获取放弃所适用的所有文件，包括法院可能认定的任何后续标的事项特权放弃（subject matter waiver）。刑事责任的可能性是法院在进行利益衡量测试以确定是否应放弃特权时所考虑的一个因素，而检察官借此获得其本无法获取的文件的潜在可能性，在拒绝准许放弃特权方面应当具有更大的分量。参见 Ramette (In re Bame) 215 B.R. 367, at 377（“然而，至于其他问题，特别是涉及引发潜在刑事起诉的活动的问题，利益衡量可能会偏向于支持坚持主张特权，在这种情况下受托人将有机会提出特权的犯罪-欺诈例外（crime-fraud exception）。”）。\n\n43. 在天平的另一端，受托人并未指出如果法院拒绝准许所请求的特权放弃，破产财产将会遭受何种损害。事实上，寻求特权放弃的唯一声明理由是为了在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中主动使用少数几份文件，但正如受托人在特权放弃动议（Privilege Waiver Motion）中所述，他很可能根本不需要这几份文件即可胜诉，因为郭女士（Ms. Guo）并未对受托人的指控进行答辩。（特权放弃动议第 48 段（“因此，郭女士未能证实任何在庞巴迪对抗性程序（Bombardier Adversary Proceeding）中反对受托人主张的依据”）。\n\n44. 特权放弃动议还忽视了受托人赖以支持其起诉状的非受特权保护的信息（均如其中所述并作为附件附于其后[6]），以及郭女士于 2023 年 1 月获得的实质性证词（deposition testimony）（该证词在她于 2023 年 11 月 1 日在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中的证词陈述中得到了再次确认）、受托人在其全面调查中获得的实质性非受特权保护的信息，以及特权放弃动议第 20 段所引用的公开可得信息等。\n\n6 受托人将特权放弃动议中涉及的一份或多份文件作为附件附在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序起诉状之后，而未征得个人债务人律师的同意或寻求法院许可。显而易见，受托人违反《特权命令》（Privileges Order）单方面使用文件的行为，并不构成个人债务人放弃要求遵守该命令的权利。\n\n45. 如前所述，针对郭女士在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中的调取证据请求（production requests）（其中许多请求旨在获取有关受托人关于庞巴迪飞机所有权指控的信息），受托人提供了近 9,000 页的文件。此外，受托人继续寻求支持其诉求的信息，在过去一周内收到了 JetLaw, LLC 回应传票提供的文件，并在此后就文件和证词陈述发出了另外两份传票。此外，受托人必定会基于郭女士援引其《第五修正案》（Fifth Amendment）权利，以及个人债务人在 2023 年 3 月 2 日的证词陈述中援引其《第五修正案》权利，寻求对郭女士作出不利推定（adverse inferences）；尽管当时 Whitecroft 对抗性程序尚未提起，且该证词陈述涉及 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd. v. Despins, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003 中所主张的权利请求和反请求，但在该证词陈述中个人债务人受到了关于 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中所涉事项的讯问。（参见 Whitecroft 起诉状第 26、29、42、44(a)-(f)、49、64 和 72 段）。\n\n46. 基于 (i) 受托人积累的大量非受特权保护的信息，(ii) 未能证明无法使用受托人通过特权放弃动议寻求使用的少数几份文件会否定其成功证明其主张的能力，以及 (iii) 若特权被放弃将降临在个人债务人身上的损害，特权放弃动议应予驳回。\n\nC. 郭女士的律师获知某些事实并不构成特权放弃\n\n47. 郭女士与个人债务人由同一律师代表这一事实，并不单纯因为律师知悉受特权保护的信息就导致个人债务人的律师-委托人特权被放弃（反之亦然），且受托人并未就其暗示的这一立场援引任何判例依据——受托人没有直接明确表示其是在主张 Zeisler & Zeisler 在主破产案中代表个人债务人以及在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中代表郭女士会导致个人债务人的律师-委托人特权被放弃，这一事实充分说明了受托人对其自身主张的看法。\n\n48. 受托人援引的判例并不支持其默示放弃的主张，而且完全不切题。Helmedach v. Comm'r of Corr., 329 Conn. 726, 737 (2018) 涉及通知刑事被告人委托人认罪答辩提议（plea offer）的问题，以及未能及时通知是否构成不相称的律师协助（ineffective assistance of counsel）。Uchechukwu Egbujo v. Jackson Lewis, P.C., 2022 U.S. Dist LEXIS 177041, 2022 WL 4585688, *7 (D. Conn., Sept. 29, 2022) 涉及一项诽谤索赔，以及一家律师事务所向其自身委托人披露其代表委托人进行的调查结果是否构成诽谤索赔中满足传播要件的向第三方传播，结论是不构成。最后，Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC, 802 F.3d 353 (2015) 涉及对《州际土地销售完全披露法》（Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act）的解释，以及向律师提供所需文件是否满足该法的披露规定，结论是满足。\n\n49. 受托人还主张个人债务人和郭女士正试图将律师-委托人特权用作盾牌和利剑。当一方试图主动使用其受特权保护的通信而不予披露时，就会出现利剑与盾牌问题。Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)（“换言之，一方不能部分披露受特权保护的通信，或主动依赖受特权保护的通信来支持其主张或抗辩，然后又遮蔽基础通信以防对方当事人的审查。”）（引文省略）。在受托人、个人债务人和郭女士之间，唯一试图主动使用受特权保护信息的一方就是受托人。因此，唯一可能存在利剑与盾牌问题的一方只有受托人（个人债务人不是 Whitecroft 对抗性程序的当事人，且并未寻求将受特权保护的通信用于任何目的，他只是寻求让受特权保护的通信保持受特权保护状态；郭女士并未寻求将受特权保护的通信用于任何目的，且她也无法使用，因为她无权也没有能力使用它们）。\n\n据此，基于上述所有理由，特权放弃动议应予驳回。\n\n日期：2023 年 12 月 13 日，于康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport, Connecticut）。\n\n债务人：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/签名/ James M. Moriarty\n\nEric Henzy (ct12849)\nJames M. Moriarty\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮箱：ehenzy@zeislaw.com\nJmoriarty@zeislaw.com\n\n美国破产法院\n康涅狄格区\n布里奇波特分院\n\n: 债务人。: ___________________________________________:\n:\n___________________________________________ :\n事项：第 11 章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），: 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n送达证明书\n\n我特此证明，于2023年12月13日，前述文书的副本已通过电子方式归档。本项归档的通知将通过法院电子归档系统的运行以电子邮件形式发送给所有当事方。各方当事人均可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本项归档文书。\n\n/s/ James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）\nJames M. Moriarty (ct21876)","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":5592,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:44:58"}