{"id":"court_sdny_2509_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":2509,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":null,"title":"SDNY ECF 2509","summary_zh":"破产程序动议（附拟议裁定）——郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）康涅狄格州破产法院 In re Ho Wan Kwok 案（Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)）文件 ECF #2509。破产受托人 Luc Despins 请求法院依据《破产法》第108、546(a)、549条延长其提起撤销之诉等诉因的时效期限，理由是对债务人复杂财务状况的调查持续遭遇阻挠拖延，尚未完成对全部潜在被告及诉因的排查；文件所附拟议裁定将该时效延展至2024年8月15日。","summary_en":"Bankruptcy motion with proposed order — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), District of Connecticut Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), ECF #2509. Chapter 11 Trustee Luc Despins moved under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 to extend the deadline for commencing avoidance actions and related causes of action, citing ongoing conduct by the Debtor that the Trustee says has impeded and delayed his investigation into Kwok's financial affairs; the accompanying proposed order extends the deadline through August 15, 2024.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                       | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |             |                         |  |  |\n\n# **MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby files this motion (the \"Motion\"), pursuant to section 105(a) of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") and Rule 9006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\"), for an order, substantially in the form of the proposed order attached as **Exhibit 1** hereto (the \"Proposed Order\"), extending the deadlines set forth in sections 108, 546(a), and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code for the Trustee to commence certain causes of action. In support of the Motion, the Trustee respectfully states as follows:\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Since his appointment in July 2022, the Trustee has been diligently pursuing a\n\nwide-ranging investigation into the Debtor's complex financial affairs and, where, appropriate\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nhas pursued litigation to, among other things, recover assets of the estate and avoid fraudulent transfers. The Trustee has made significant progress in his investigation and, in addition to the actions he has already commenced, will be filing numerous complaints prior to the current deadline. However, for various reasons described herein, the Trustee has not yet finished identifying all potential causes of action (and the potential defendants to such causes of action) to obtain value for the Debtor's creditors, including potential additional defendants and potential additional claims against defendants that the Trustee has already identified and against whom the Trustee will be bringing claims prior to the current deadline. By this Motion, the Trustee seeks an order equitably tolling the statute of limitations as to such causes of action so that the Trustee may pursue them after the February 15, 2024 deadline for doing so.\n\n2. The Court may equitably toll a statute of limitations where the movant shows (i) extraordinary circumstances and (ii) that he exercised reasonable diligence to commence litigation before the expiration of the limitations period. The factual record of this Chapter 11 Case easily satisfies these standards and unequivocally justifies an extension of the limitations periods.2 Further, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), the Bankruptcy Court may extend a time period—including statutes of limitations—for \"cause shown.\"\n\n3. Bankruptcy courts frequently deal with the aftermath of large-scale fraud and other illegal conduct. Such cases, on their own, create enormous logistical and investigative difficulties, and this case is no different. However, the difficulties in this case go beyond the significant challenge of wading through the aftermath of such conduct. This case presents the additional extraordinary circumstance of ongoing and repeated efforts to impede, obstruct, and delay the Trustee's investigation. These efforts started with the very filing of the Debtor's\n\n<sup>2</sup> As discussed below, equitable tolling and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) each, on their own, provide legal support for the relief requested herein.\n\npetition and supporting papers, led to the appointment of the Trustee, and have continued unabated since then—even in the face of multiple Court orders, sanctions, and contempt rulings.\n\n4. Furthermore, the Trustee has diligently continued his investigation, notwithstanding the obstacles placed in his way at every turn. In fact, as detailed below, the Trustee has succeeded at nearly every turn. But those successes take time in the normal course, and have taken even longer because of the obstacles the Trustee has been forced to deal with.\n\n5. Moreover, because of the convoluted \"shell game\" the Debtor put in place, and continues to employ, each of the Trustee's successes does not bring his investigation to a close. Just the opposite, each success reveals more stones for the Trustee to turn over, and more assets hidden and/or transferred. This is not hyperbole: so far, the Trustee and his professionals have, through this process, identified more than 339 Kwok-related bank accounts, approximately 83,820 transactions in and out of these accounts, and over \\$3.2 billion transiting through these accounts. In short, and as explained below, the diligence prong requires the Trustee demonstrate that he has not \"slept on his rights.\" This prong is, also, easily satisfied by any clear-eyed evaluation of the record.\n\n6. Because the facts so strongly and obviously favor granting the requested relief, the real issue for the Court is to ensure that it has the authority to grant that relief. As indicated above, the Trustee brings this Motion under both bankruptcy law (specifically, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) and section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code) and non-bankruptcy law (specifically, the doctrine of equitable tolling). Both supply the required authority.\n\n7. Equitable Tolling. Bankruptcy courts in multiple jurisdictions have relied on equitable tolling to extend limitations periods even before the period has run. The Trustee submits that the Court should follow the guidance of these courts. While the Trustee recognizes\n\nthat other courts have declined to do so on notice and/or procedural grounds, these courts are concerned that potential defendants should have their day in court and an opportunity to challenge the application of equitable tolling to them. But those concerns are not applicable here, as the Trustee has already filed a motion proposing a large-scale, multi-prong, notice program to address these concerns (the \"Notice Motion\").3\n\n8. Bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is clear: bankruptcy courts can enlarge a \"specified period\" for \"cause shown.\" The Trustee recognizes that some courts have held this does not apply to the limitations period to bring claims under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code. But, as addressed in detail below, multiple courts in multiple jurisdictions have disagreed, holding that Rule 9006(b) *does* supply the required authority.\n\n9. The relief requested in this Motion is vital. Absent an extension, the Trustee will be forced to litigate the limitations period on a one-off basis in a free-standing adversary proceeding with any potential defendant who raises the issue. This is not just difficult; it is likely impossible—the Trustee has already identified over 83,000 transfers. Moreover, the cost, both in time and dollars, would be astronomical, and would directly harm creditors. Finally, the uncertainty would put the Trustee—who has to defend all of his actions and has already had to defend a motion seeking his removal as well as other scurrilous accusations—in an untenable position moving forward.\n\n10. The Trustee's proposal solves these problems. At the same time, and especially in conjunction with the Notice Motion, it preserves the rights of all potential defendants. It simply channels everything into one forum.\n\n<sup>3</sup> *See* ECF No. 2494.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n11. On June 15, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered a memorandum of decision and order [ECF No. 465] directing the United States Trustee to appoint a chapter 11 trustee. On July 8, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order [ECF No. 523] appointing the Trustee.\n\n12. The Debtor's bankruptcy schedules, filed in March 2022, claimed only \\$3,850 in assets compared to hundreds of millions of dollars of liabilities.4 The Debtor asserted in the Bankruptcy Court that he was essentially penniless, and that his luxurious homes, the Lady May yacht, and his other publicly flaunted trappings of wealth did not belong to him, but to companies purportedly owned by his family members.5 As several courts have now observed, the Debtor was able to maintain his opulent lifestyle while professing to own virtually no assets by constructing a vast maze of shell companies in which he hid his wealth in the names of family members and close associates.\n\n13. Since his appointment, the Trustee has been working diligently to identify and recover for the benefit of the estate the assets the Debtor has hidden. To that end, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Court's directive, the Trustee has launched a complex and thorough investigation and litigation process, focusing on the Debtor's \"shell game\"—*i.e.*, his use of alter ego companies to hide his assets from creditors. Broadly speaking, the process has included (a) discovery pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\") and (b) litigation to establish that certain entities are alter egos of the Debtor and/or recover specific property and assets. The Trustee has filed thirteen Rule 2004 motions, issued Rule 2004 subpoenas to over 250 parties, and reviewed hundreds of thousands of documents produced in discovery, and continues to take all reasonable steps to obtain additional records.\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See* Schedules of Assets & Liabilities, at 1 [ECF No. 78].\n\n<sup>5</sup> *See Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok in Support of the Chapter 11 Case and Certain Motions* [ECF No. 107].\n\n14. As the Court is well aware, the Debtor, his family members, and his associates have sought to obstruct the Trustee's efforts at every turn. Among other things:\n\n15. Flouting his statutory obligation to turn over his books and records,6 the Debtor claimed, essentially, that he had no business records, producing only forty-six documents in response to Rule 2004 discovery. The Debtor refused to produce documents related to assets he contended belonged to his family members or other persons and entities, (ii) collect and produce documents in the possession of his counsel and advisors, or (iii) sufficiently describe the efforts by which he searched for responsive documents. The Debtor's refusal to cooperate led the Trustee to seek and obtain (over the Debtor's objection) an order compelling production of documents responsive to the Trustee's requests and an explanation of the Debtor's efforts to search for such documents. [ECF No. 1353]. Instead of complying with the order to compel production, the Debtor asserted that he had no obligation to do so under the Fifth Amendment and \"act of production doctrine,\" requiring the Trustee to seek and obtain (again, over the Debtor's fierce opposition), and order holding the Debtor in contempt. [ECF No. 2035].\n\n16. Shortly after the Trustee's appointment, the Debtor sought to vacate the order appointing the Trustee, which motion the Bankruptcy Court denied on August 2, 2022 [ECF No. 667]. Later, in December 2022, the Debtor renewed his attempt to remove the Trustee, but this motion was withdrawn following vigorous opposition from various parties in interest. [ECF Nos. 1274, 1635].\n\n17. The Debtor unsuccessfully opposed the Trustee's motion to confirm that, upon his appointment, the Trustee holds all economic and corporate governance rights with respect to\n\n<sup>6</sup> *See* 11 U.S.C § 521(a)(4) (the debtor \"shall,\" where there is a trustee, \"surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate\").\n\nentities owned and/or controlled by the Debtor, including Genever Holdings Corporation and Genever US LLC [ECF No. 643].\n\n18. Despite the Debtor's statutory obligation to cooperate with the Trustee and surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any information relating to property of the estate, the Debtor and numerous of his family members, business associates, and affiliated companies have refused, at every turn, to cooperate with the Trustee's discovery efforts and surrender property of the estate to the Trustee, resulting in no less than seven (7) orders holding them in contempt of court [ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, and 2093].\n\n19. The Defendant's tactics have not been limited to the courtroom. From the outset of the Trustee's appointment, the Defendant has attempted to discredit the Trustee and his counsel (Paul Hastings LLP), with all means available to him. Perhaps most egregiously, beginning in mid-November 2022, the Defendant instigated an extensive social media intimidation campaign directed at the Trustee, his family, and his counsel, as well as one of the largest unsecured creditor in the chapter 11 cases (namely, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\")), the chief executive of PAX's parent company, his family, and PAX's counsel, including by disclosing home address information online and issuing threats against them personally. As a result, starting on November 20, 2022, a group of individuals aligned with the Defendant began picketing at the residence of the Trustee as well as the residencies of members of the Trustee's family, including his former spouse, and subsequently at the offices of counsel to the Trustee and counsel to PAX (O'Melveny & Myers LLP). Following several days of evidentiary hearings on these matters, the Bankruptcy Court issued a preliminary injunction to curtail this improper interference with the administration of the Bankruptcy Cases.\n\n20. Other efforts to harass the Trustee and his counsel included a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by various individuals affiliated with various of the Defendants' organizations, alleging that the Trustee and his counsel violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\") by failing to register as agents of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party. In the District Court, Judge Caproni dismissed this lawsuit and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs and their counsel because this meritless lawsuit was filed in bad faith and to harass the Trustee and his counsel.\n\n21. On March 15, 2023, the Debtor was arrested in connection with multiple charges of securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering.7 The related criminal indictment filed by the Unites States Attorney against the Debtor alleged that the Debtor was \"the leader of, and directed\"8 a scheme in which, among other things, the Debtor and his co-defendant William Je transferred money \"into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals.\"9 Also on March 15, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission initiated a lawsuit against the Debtor by filing a complaint alleging multiple securities law violations against the Debtor based on similar conduct as that described in the criminal indictment, which lawsuit was stayed. More recently, on January 3, 2024, the United States Attorney filed a superseding indictment against the Debtor alleging multiple criminal RICO allegations. The superseding indictment alleged, among other things, that the Debtor directed the \"Kwok Enterprise,\" made up of \"dozens of interrelated entities,\" as part of a\n\n<sup>7</sup> *See* Crim. Indictment, *United States v. Kwok*, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2023). (A related criminal complaint was also filed separately against the Debtor's employee, Yvette Wang, based on her participation in the Debtor's criminal scheme. Wang has been charged with wire fraud, securities fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud, and the making of an unlawful transaction.) 8\n\nCrim. Indictment ¶ 6.\n\n<sup>9</sup> *Id.* ¶ 3.\n\ncriminal scheme that was continually adapted to \"evade the enforcement of investor-protection, anti-money laundering, and bankruptcy laws in the United States.\"10\n\n22. Notably, in its April 20, 2023 order denying the Debtor's request for release on bail, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"Criminal Court\") highlighted the Debtor's \"history of obstructive behavior in prior cases,\"11 identifying conduct related to these chapter 11 cases such as, among other things, the Debtor misstating his assets12; posting false and harassing material on social media; encouraging others via social media to protest the bankruptcy trustee, his family, and his counsel and also file claims in his bankruptcy to drive up the trustee's attorney's fees13; and publicly publishing confidential settlement documents on the internet.14 The Debtor in a more recent renewed motion for release on bail filed represented to the Criminal Court that he \"apologizes for his past behavior and the upset he caused others.\"15\n\n23. The Debtor has attempted to use the Criminal Court as a forum in which to further seek to delay and obstruct the Trustee's efforts in these chapter 11 cases. On August 30, 2023, the Debtor filed a motion (joined by Yvette Wang) in his criminal case seeking to stay these chapter 11 cases, pending resolution of his criminal trial, which motion was denied on December 21, 2023 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 204]. Subsequently, on January 4, 2024, the Debtor filed yet another motion in his criminal case reiterating his request that these chapter 11 cases be stayed [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 218].\n\n24. Despite all of the efforts of the Debtor and his associates to obstruct and delay the Trustee, the Trustee has succeeded in recovering tens of millions of dollars for the estate through\n\n<sup>10</sup> *See* Jan. 3, 2024 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1, 6, *United States v. Kwok*, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y.) [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 215]. 11 Order, at 11 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 51].\n\n<sup>12</sup>*Id.* at 8 and 10. 13 *Id.* at 9. 14 *Id.* 15 Mem. in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Pretrial Release of Ho Wan Kwok, at 10 [Crim. Ct. ECF 178].\n\nadversary proceedings with respect to identified assets such as the Lady May yacht,16 the Sherry Netherland apartment,17 and identified bank accounts such as the accounts of the HCHK entities18 and the U.S. Bank escrow account.19 The Trustee has also initiated actions to recover, among other things, the Debtor's \\$26.5 million mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey.20 The Debtor's family members and acolytes have fiercely opposed the Trustee's efforts in these adversary proceedings. To give just one example, certain of the Debtor's followers, claiming to be creditors of the HCHK entities, sought to intervene to oppose the Trustee's alter ego claims against those entities. Though the intervention motion was denied by the Court in its recent decision issued on January 5, 2024, the intervention motion caused months of delay and necessitated an evidentiary hearing at which, among other things, one of the Debtor's followers \"brazenly and repeatedly refused to answer questions on cross examination despite the Court ordering her to do so,\" while another \"admit[ted] he forged a document to advance th[e] litigation.\"21\n\n25. Given the lack of funding to hire a forensic accountant until the sale of the Lady May, the Trustee and his counsel (which could until then only look to future-recovered assets for compensation) focused their initial asset recovery efforts on identified assets. As such, the necessary step of conducting a forensic accounting of the hundreds of accounts used by Kwok-\n\n<sup>16</sup> Recovered by the Trustee in connection with adversary proceeding 22-05003, *HK International Funds*\n\n*Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins*, and sold pursuant to the Court's order of June 27, 2023. [ECF No. 1953]. 17 Recovered by the Trustee in connection with adversary proceeding 22-05027, *Despins v. Bravo Luck Limited*. 18 These entities, HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property, Inc., are the subject of adversary proceeding 23-05013, *Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.*, in which the Trustee has sought an alter ego judgment. While the Trustee's adversary proceeding seeking the funds of the HCHK entities is not yet complete, those funds are in the Trustee's possession and safe from dissipation pending a final ruling, which the Trustee believes will be in his favor. 19 Recovered by the Trustee in connection with adversary proceeding 22-05003, *HK International Funds*\n\n*Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins*, and adversary proceeding 23-05012, *U.S Bank National Association v. HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, et al.*\n\n<sup>20</sup> The Mahwah mansion is the subject of adversary proceeding 23-05017, *Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC, et al*.. 21 Mem. of Decision & Order, at 28 [Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, ECF No. 239].\n\nrelated entities did not commence in earnest until the Trustee retained Kroll, LLC (\"Kroll\") as the Trustee's forensic investigator in August 2023, pursuant to the Court's order entered on September 29, 2023 [ECF No. 2241].\n\n26. Since its retention, Kroll has been hard at work assisting the Trustee to lay the foundation for, among other things, the prosecution of avoidance actions arising out of the thousands of transfers made, effectively by the Debtor, using numerous Kwok-related entities. Thus far, Kroll has identified more than 339 Kwok-related bank accounts, approximately 83,820 transactions in and out of these accounts, and over \\$3.2 billion transiting through these accounts. These numbers grow literally every day as Kroll's analysis progresses.\n\n#### **RELIEF SOUGHT**\n\n27. The Trustee requests entry of the Proposed Order extending the statute of limitations in sections 108, 546, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, which will allow the Trustee to continue his investigation and bring additional actions under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n#### **BASIS FOR RELIEF**\n\n### **I. Court Has Authority to Grant Requested Relief**\n\n28. Bankruptcy courts frequently grant the relief requested herein under nonbankruptcy law (specifically, the doctrine of equitable tolling) and/or bankruptcy law (specifically, Rule 9006).\n\n# A. Equitable Tolling Applies to Bankruptcy Code Statutes of Limitations and Can be Applied Prospectively\n\n29. Courts have confirmed that the non-bankruptcy law doctrine of equitable tolling authorizes the extension of a statute of limitations, including the time period set forth in section 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. *See Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's*\n\n*Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.)*, 288 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (\"It is well-settled that equitable tolling may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to toll the statute of limitations imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a).\"); *Fogel v. Shabat (In re Draiman)*, 714 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 2013) (\"Furthermore, the statute of limitations in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) is subject to equitable tolling.\"). Any inconsistency in the caselaw, instead, arises when equitable toiling is requested prior to the expiration of the limitations period.\n\n30. As an initial matter, many courts have granted this relief prospectively. *See, e.g.*, *In re Farwest Pump Co.*, No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) (granting motion to equitably toll statute of limitations that was filed prior to expiration); *Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C*.), 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (order that granted motion to extend section 546(a) before it expired was proper); *In re Dwek,* No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3790] (prospectively granting motion to extend limitations periods); *In re Rockport Dev., Inc*., No. 20-11339-SC (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) [ECF No. 822] (same); *In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties*, No. 18-16908-MH (Bankr C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) [ECF No. 683] (same); *In re Builders Holding Co.*, No. 16-06643-EAG7 (Bankr. D.P.R. April 25, 2019) [ECF No. 501] (same).22\n\n31. Other courts, however, have held that courts should not grant requests for prospective equitable tolling. For example, the court in *Walnut Hill* held that it was \"wholly premature\" to grant an equitable tolling motion where the limitations period had not yet expired. *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, No. 16–20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\* 2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018). And *In re Randolph Hospital, Inc.* denied, without prejudice, a motion to equitably toll\n\n<sup>22</sup> Copies of the orders entered in *In re Dwek, In re Rockport Dev*., *In re Visiting Nurse Assoc. of Inland Counties*, and *In re Builders Holding Co. Corp*. are attached as **Exhibits 2-5** hereto.\n\nthe limitations period, to be renewed after the trustee \"initiates actions against identifiable and *properly noticed defendants*.\" *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (emphasis added). For the reasons discussed below, this concern should not prevent the Court from granting the instant Motion under the circumstances present here.\n\n32. Courts that have declined to rely on equitable tolling to prospectively toll a statute of limitations make clear that the primary concern with prospective equitable tolling is notice: parties who may ultimately be defendants should have an opportunity to argue that equitable tolling is not appropriate under a given set of circumstances, and a court should not preemptively take away that opportunity.\n\n33. The flip side of this focus on notice is that courts have held that, where notice *is* received, it is incumbent on the potential defendant to object. *See In re Martin Levy of Berlin*, 416 B.R. at 8 (\"Defendants can not avoid trustees who seek information, ignore a trustee request to extend the statute of limitations, wait for the limitations period to pass and then, months later after a complaint is filed, claim that the trustee is out of luck. Given the circumstances, the Trustee showed more than sufficient cause for the Court to extend the deadline, even had the defendants objected. Their failure to respond provides that much more justification for the extension. Accordingly, this Court finds and rules that because the defendants waived their rights by their inaction, the § 546(a) deadline was properly extended, and the Trustee timely filed the Complaint.\").\n\n34. This is precisely why this Motion, under these circumstances, could, and should, be granted. The Trustee has identified hundreds of parties that may ultimately be sued. The Trustee will, with great effort and at significant expense, serve those parties with notice of the\n\ninstant Tolling Motion, all in accordance with the Notice Motion (which itself was served on as many potential defendants as possible). And if the Court grants the Notice Motion, the Court will have determined that this notice was sufficient. In short, the parties impacted by this tolling request *will* get notice—actual, constructive, or both.\n\n### B. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Also Supplies Authority to Extend Limitations Period\n\n35. As one court has explained, \"Rule 9006(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure gives the Court authority 'for cause' ... 'at any time in its discretion' to order the time within which an act is specified to take place enlarged. This includes the period of time for commencing avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a).\" *Frentz v. Stites & Harbison (In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.)*, 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008) (internal references omitted). Multiple other courts, in multiple jurisdictions, agree.23 *See, e.g.*, *In re Campbellton-Graceville Hosp. Corp.*, 616 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2019) (\"Bankruptcy Courts have authority to enlarge the two-year statute of limitations period under Section 546 for cause, pursuant to Rule 9006(b).\"); *see also In re D & L Energy, Inc.*, No. 13-40813 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2015) [ECF No. 1377] (finding court has authority under Rule 9006(b) to extend limitations period in section 546); *In re Network Services Sols., LLC*, No. 17-50309-gwz (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2019) [ECF No. 503] (granting motion to enlarge time to commence actions under sections 108 and 546 of the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to Rule 9006); *In re Farm-Rite, Inc*., No. 20-19379-JNP (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2022) [ECF No. 551] (granting motion to extend deadline in section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code under Rule 9006(b)); *In re Anton & Chia, LLP*,\n\n<sup>23</sup> To be clear, these two approaches—extension based on Rule 9006 and extension based on equitable tolling are not exclusive. They can exist in the same case, and basis to extend the limitations period can exist under either, or both. For example, in *International Administrative Services*, the court held that Rule 9006(b) granted authority to extend the deadline, but also decided to \"reach the question of whether the trustee demonstrated an equitable basis for extending the limitations period.\" *IBT Int'l, Inc. v. Northern (In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689, 700 (11th Cir. 2005).\n\nNo. 18-12565-TA (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) [ECF No. 136] (same); *In re Uplift RX, LLC*, No. 17-32186 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019) [ECF No. 1005] (same).24\n\n36. The Trustee recognizes that, notwithstanding the caselaw cited above, some courts have held that Rule 9006(b) does not authorize the extension of statutory limitations period. *See, e.g.*, *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n37. The Trustee submits, however, that the Court should adopt the analysis endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In *International Administrative Services*, the defendants pointed \"to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) which does not specifically provide for enlargement of time period created by statute.\" *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d at 699. The court, though, found \"no merit in this argument.\" *Id*. The court pointed out that the definition and commencement of an adversary proceeding are also governed by Bankruptcy Rules 7001 and 7003, respectively, and held that Rule 9006 does grant bankruptcy courts discretion to enlarge statutory time periods, *even though* the rule does not \"explicitly encompass statutory timeframes.\" *Id*.\n\n38. Furthermore, the position advanced by the *Walnut Hill* court suffers from a logical deficiency. In *Walnut Hill*, the court framed the issue as a \"yes or no\" inquiry: Can a rule override a statute? Yet even that court acknowledged that Rule 9006(a) does apply to statutes because that specific subsection of Rule 9006 says that it applies to \"any statute.\"25 Admittedly, this \"any statute\" language is missing from Rule 9006(b). But this exercise demonstrates that the correct question is not whether Rule 9006(b) *can* be used to extend a statutory timeframe, as\n\n<sup>24</sup> Copies of the orders entered in *In re D & L Energy*, *In re Network Services Solutions, LLC*, *In re Farm-Rite, Inc*., *In re Anton & Chia, LLP*, and *In re Uplift RX, LLC* are attached as **Exhibits 6-10** hereto. 25 The relevant language, in full, of subsection (a) of Rule 9006 provides that \"[t]he following rules apply in\n\ncomputing any time period specified in these rules, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in any local rule or court order, or in any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a).\n\n*Walnut Hill* suggests. In other words, *Walnut Hill* got the wrong answer because it asked the wrong question.\n\n39. Instead, the correct inquiry is whether Rule 9006(b) *does* grant the Bankruptcy Court such authority. This converts the question from an absolute \"yes or no\" inquiry to a question of interpretation: what is the best way to read, understand, and apply Rule 9006(b), and whether Rule 9006(b) should extend to section 546(a) (and, equally, other limitations periods governing avoidance actions). And, in this regard, the Trustee submits that the better answer is the one given by the Eleventh Circuit and numerous other bankruptcy courts across multiple jurisdictions: even though it \"does not explicitly encompass statutory timeframes,\" to hold that Rule 9006(b) does not apply to the 546(a) deadline would lead to \"absurd results.\" *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d at 699.26\n\n40. Indeed, no case better illustrates the \"absurdity\" the Eleventh Circuit was concerned about than the present case. The Court is well aware of the complex nature of these chapter 11 cases, and the unending efforts of the Debtor and his associates to hinder the Trustee's investigation. The Debtor should not be able to simply \"run out the clock\" for only two years and, in doing so, escape liability and effectively put an end to his bankruptcy case, thwarting not just his creditors and the Trustee, but Congress' intent. Nor is it a practical solution to address this on an *ex post facto* basis after the limitations period has run. The complexity of this case, and the sheer volume of information and parties is such that this would border on the impossible—and would, certainly, impose such a burden and expense on the\n\n<sup>26</sup> The *Walnut Hill* court also observed (correctly) that the Bankruptcy Rules cannot \"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2. But the limitations period in section 546(a) is a statute of limitations not a \"substantive right.\" *See Collins v. J & N Rest. Assocs., Inc. (In re Mendolia)*, No. 12-60219, 2015 WL 475966, at \\*8 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015) (\"The statute of limitations, however, by its very nature is procedural and does not confer or enlarge a substantive right.\"); *Moglia v. Inland Plywood Co. (In re Outboard Marine Corp*.), 299 B.R. 488, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding section 546(a) is a statute of limitations); *Pryor v. Barbara (In re Rodriguez)*, 283 B.R. 112 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).\n\nTrustee as to directly impact creditors ultimate recovery. *See In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.*, 381 B.R. at 227 (granting extension motion under Rule 9006(b) in \"an exceedingly complex case in which the Trustee has pursued and filed nearly 400 adversary proceedings\"). As noted above, the correct inquiry is not if Rule 9006 can give the Court the necessary authority, but rather whether it does. It cannot be the case that Congress intended bankruptcy courts to be without recourse in cases such as this—and any other reading of Rule 9006(b) would lead to perverse and inequitable outcomes. *See In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) (\"If the Court does not enlarge the period for bringing avoidance actions, it will, in effect, be rewarding the targets' opposition (even if justified) during the discovery process. And it would create a perverse incentive for targets of avoidance actions (in this case and others) to oppose discovery.\").27\n\n41. Moreover, there is statutory authority to extend the limitations period set out in the Bankruptcy Code. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (which is, of course, a statute), grants bankruptcy courts the authority to \"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.\" And courts have specifically relied on section 105(a) to extend limitations periods set out in the Bankruptcy Code. *See Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan)*, 182 F.3d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1999) (section 105(a) may be used to toll three-year period in section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)); *United States v. Richards (In re Richards)*, 994 F.2d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 1993) (\"11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is broad enough to permit the Bankruptcy Court's order to suspend the 240–day assessment period in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii) for the time Richards was in his first bankruptcy.\").\n\n<sup>27</sup> If this result would be inequitable even where the discovery opposition may have been \"justified,\" that concern is exponentially heightened here, where there is no such justification.\n\n42. While the Trustee recognizes section 105(a) cannot be used to take an action the Bankruptcy Code prohibits, *see Law v. Siegel*, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014), extending the limitations period pursuant to section 105(a) would not violate this principle. Tolling the statute of limitations in sections 108, 546 and 549 is not prohibited by these sections or any other section of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, equitable tolling is a remedy read *into* every federal statute of limitations, including sections 108, 546, and 549. *See Young v. United States*, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (\"It is hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling . . . Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this background principle. *That is doubly true when it is enacting limitations periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity and apply the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence*.\") (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and references omitted) .\n\n43. Accordingly, and especially when taken together, section 105(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) are best understood as granting the authority to extend the limitations period in 546(a).\n\n#### **II. Court Should Grant Requested Relief**\n\n44. Having established that the Court has authority to grant the requested relief, application of the applicable standards demonstrates that such relief is proper and necessary here.\n\nA. Equitable Tolling Standard\n\n45. A trustee may equitably toll the statute of limitations \"if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.\" *Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States*, 518 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling must be decided on a case-by-case basis and is not limited to a particular set of facts. *See Young*, 535 U.S. at 48-50.\n\n46. While fraudulent concealment is certainly a basis for equitable tolling, \"equitable tolling is often confused with fraudulent concealment,\" *Valdez*, 518 F.3d at 182-83, and\n\n\"equitable tolling is not limited to situations involving . . . the adversary's misconduct.\" *In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Cts.*, 288 B.R. at 705-06 (internal references omitted). In other words, equitable tolling does not require any particular misconduct by the defendant. *See Heyman v. Dec (In re Dec)*, 272 B.R. 218, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) (\"The statute of limitations under Code § 546(a) may also be tolled where the fraud goes undiscovered even though the defendant does nothing to conceal it.\").\n\n47. \"To obtain the benefit of the doctrine, the Trustee bears the burden of establishing that []he (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.\" *In re Anderson*, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020); *see also Castilloex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States*, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n# B. Equitable Tolling Is Warranted In This Case28\n\n48. The entirety of the factual record easily demonstrates that (i) extraordinary circumstances prevented the Trustee from bringing the Avoidance Actions and (ii) the Trustee acted diligently in pursuing his rights.\n\n### *a. Extraordinary Circumstances*\n\n49. \"An extraordinary circumstance … derives from some external obstacle to timely filing beyond the plaintiff's control, not from self-inflicted delay.\" *Schmidt v. Twosons Corp. (In re Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC)*, No. 15-34287, 2022 WL 1589190, at \\*11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 19, 2022) (as modified) (internal quotation marks and references omitted). This has particular application to bankruptcy cases, where the debtor's conduct can\n\n<sup>28</sup> To the extent the Court agrees that Rule 9006(b) and/or section 105(a) provide authority for the relief requested herein, the Trustee submits that the same reasons that justify equitable tolling also constitute \"cause\" under Rule 9006(b).\n\njustify tolling against non-debtors. *Kearns Motor Co. v. Cimino (In re Dreiling)*, 233 B.R. 848, 878 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (\"a debtor's fraudulent concealment may be imputed to other defendants for purposes of equitable tolling\"); *In re Dec*, 272 B.R. at 227 (\"A bankruptcy case presents a rather different slant on equitable tolling. In the typical situation, it is the debtor's conduct rather than the defendant's conduct which invokes equitable tolling.\"); *Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen)*, 36 F.3d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding debtor's sale of estate property to family without notifying the court or parties in interest was basis for equitable tolling of fraudulent transfer because \"because the trustee remained in the dark without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part\") (internal quotation marks and references omitted).\n\n50. Accordingly, courts consistently find extraordinary circumstances when a plaintiff is unable to make progress on discovery, especially in light of the debtor's obstruction:\n\n- *In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc*., 408 F.3d 689, 702 (11th Cir. 2005) (tolling statute of limitations based, in part, on debtor and defendant's attempts to interfere with trustee's investigation into asset diversion plan by hiding their activities and violating discovery requests).\n- *Bender v. Mann (In re Bender)*, No. 02-00773-RTB, 2010 WL 6467681, at \\*9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010), aff'd, 480 F. App'x 445 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming lower court decision for equitable tolling where the debtor's obstruction \"stood in the way\" of the trustee's filing of an avoidance action and noting the \"case law is replete with examples where courts have allowed equitable tolling in response to obstructive behavior by a party\").\n- *Freeland v. CPA Warehouse (In re Livemercial Aviation Holding, LLC)*, 508 B.R. 58, 71(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2014) (\"The Trustee's inability, despite due diligence, to obtain information/documentation highly material to the core of this case—for whatever reason caused Mathis' inability or failure to promptly produce or provide it—amply supports the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling to this case in order to extend the limitation period of 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)(A)\").\n- *Ochs Charitable Remainder Trust v. Ochs (In re Ochs)*, 608 B.R. 252, 261–62 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (finding that the extraordinary circumstances include, among others, the \"[Defendant's] obstruction of legitimate discovery, requiring the Court to intervene twice in the bankruptcy discovery disputes and rule against the Defendant both times; . . . his failure to provide a complete document production, requiring the Plaintiffs to direct\n\ndiscovery to several third-party financial institutions to obtain documents in 2019; and . . . when finally deposed after multiple delays, his vague and indefinite answers to questions under oath.\").\n\n *In re Farwest Pump Co*., No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) (\"It is also clear that the Committee is faced with extraordinary circumstances in this case, which circumstances were caused and have been perpetuated by the Vaughts, one and/or both of whom own and manage the Debtor [and related entities]. . . [including because] [t]he Vaughts have refused to disclose financial documents about their entities.\").\n\n51. Moreover, the Trustee need not prove that any (let alone all) potential defendant engaged or participated in blocking the Trustee's discovery. That \"some targets may not be responsible for impeding or delaying the Trustee's investigation is not a basis, by itself, for refusing to enlarge the two-year limitations period for bringing avoidance actions.\" *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc*., 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013). \"If the Trustee has been impeded from discovering potential avoidance actions, then the deadline ought to be enlarged as to all claims—not on a party-by-party basis.\" *Id.*\n\n52. Here, it has been amply demonstrated that the Debtor and his associates have, and continue to, actively interfered with the Trustee's discovery efforts, including from the very commencement of the case. *See In re Bender,* 2010 WL 6467681, at \\*8 (\"There is nothing in the case law that would prevent the bankruptcy court from concluding that [debtor's] misconduct, as it found, in 'going to great lengths to conceal real property in Hawaii from his Arizona chapter 7 trustee' does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance that \"stood in the way\" and delayed timely compliance with the statute of limitations by Trustee.\").\n\n#### i. Pending Criminal Case Is Also an Extraordinary Circumstance\n\n53. Extraordinary circumstances are also found in external events, such as \"the pendency of other legal proceedings which prevent enforcement of the subject claim.\" *Collins v. Decker (In re Decker)*, No. 06-60886, 2011 WL 2174349, at \\*5 n. 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. June 1,\n\n2011) (citation omitted); *Jobin v. Boryla (In re M & L Bus. Machine Co*.*)*, 75 F.3d 586, 591 (10th Cir.1996) (stating trustee's allegation that extraordinary circumstances were present where she was unable to obtain key records which had been seized by the Justice Department in connection with criminal charges filed against debtor's principals may be basis for equitable tolling); Hr'g Tr. at 9:10-17, *In re Dwek,* No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916] (\"[E]quitable tolling of the Statute of Limitations is appropriate here given the recent activities by the U.S. Attorney and the FBI in conducting their investigations. That has involved a lengthy delay of continued 2004 deposition of the Debtor, and that's beyond the control of the Trustee.\").29\n\n54. As the Court is well aware, the Debtor is a defendant in a wide-ranging criminal case brought after the petition date. The pendency of this criminal case has required the Trustee to navigate a number of issues that have complicated his investigation. For example, as the Court is aware, the Trustee originally sought discovery of the documents produced to the debtor by the government in the criminal case, which request was opposed by the Debtor and ultimately led or contributed to motion practice in both this Court and the court overseeing the criminal case, including a motion by the Debtor to stay this chapter 11 case in its entirety. As a result of this motion practice, the Trustee eventually agreed to not pursue at this time his request to obtain from the Debtor documents produced by the government to the Debtor in the criminal case. The Trustee now expects he will gain access to at least some of these documents to the extent they are disclosed in open court as part of the trial in the criminal case, which is presently scheduled to begin in May 2024. The impending criminal trial has also led to complications in the Trustee's ability to obtain critical deposition testimony from certain individuals who are likely to\n\n<sup>29</sup> *In re Dwek*, No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916], attached hereto as **Exhibit 11**.\n\nbe witnesses or otherwise involved in the criminal case. Thus, the criminal case presents an extraordinary circumstance that has delayed the Trustee's investigation in ways beyond his control.\n\n#### b. Trustee Acted Diligently\n\n55. The Supreme Court has cautioned that \"[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is *reasonable diligence*, not maximum feasible diligence.\" *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010) (as modified) (internal quotation marks and references omitted) (emphasis added). Consistent with this, and especially relevant to the bankruptcy context, courts have explained that \"what constitutes due diligence is limited by the circumstances of the case, and specifically by economic exigencies.\" *In re Dreiling*, 233 B.R. at 878.\n\n56. A trustee has been sufficiently diligent where he \"work[s] long and hard to discover all the intricacies\" of a debtor's assets and financial affairs. *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d at 708; *see also In re Couchell*, No. 19 B 7328, 2020 WL 6438511, at \\*3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2020) (diligence requirement satisfied where movant \"attended [debtor's] § 341 meeting, filed a proof of claim, issued 2004 subpoenas, conducted examinations and compelled production of documents\"); *In re Farwest Pump Co.*, No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) (\"In this case it is clear that the Committee has diligently pursued its rights by, among other things, filing the Motion for Standing, requesting an expedited hearing on the Motion for Standing . . . and applying for Rule 2004 examinations with respect to Reliant, Vaught Equipment, and the Vaughts.\"); *Tese-Milner v. Kim (In re Level 8 Apparel, LLC)*, No. 16-13164 (JLG), 2021 WL 1977161, at \\*7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (finding trustee demonstrated diligence when she sought information related to the debtor's accounts by obtaining documents from debtor and serving Rule 2004 discovery requests).\n\n57. \"To act diligently is to demonstrate to the Court that one has not slept on his rights.\" *In re Ramsoomair*, No. 21-11215 (DSJ), 2022 WL 828307, at \\*6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022) (internal quotation marks and references omitted). For all the reasons detailed above, there can be no dispute that the Trustee has acted diligently and has not slept on his rights.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court\n\nenter the Proposed Order granting the relief requested herein and grant any other relief as the\n\nCourt considers proper.\n\nDated: January 18, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Douglass Barron*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                       | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |             |                         |  |  |\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on January 18, 2024, the foregoing Motion, and all declarations, exhibits and attachments thereto, was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: January 18, 2024 New Haven, Connecticut\n\nBy: */s/ Douglass Barron*\n\nDouglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n *Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Exhibit 1**\n\n**Proposed Order**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------  | x                                     |  |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|\n| In re:                                                  | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11                  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,30                                  | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)     |  |\n| Debtors.                                                | :<br>:<br>(Jointly Administered)<br>: |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x |                                       |  |\n\n### **[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nUPON CONSIDERATION OF the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Motion for Entry of Order*\n\n*Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108,*\n\n*546(a), and 549* (the \"Motion\"), and good cause having been shown, and the Court having\n\nconsidered any and all objections and other responses to the Motion, and the Court finding that\n\n(i) there is good cause for the relief requested, (ii) there are extraordinary circumstances\n\njustifying the relief requested, (iii) the Trustee has acted diligently, and (iv) the Motion has been\n\nserved in accordance with the Court's prior Order granting the Notice Motion, and such notice is\n\nproper and sufficient under the circumstances and no other notice is required, and the relief\n\nprovided herein being narrowly tailored to serve the foregoing purposes, it is by the Court,\n\nhereby\n\nORDERED, that the Motion is granted as set forth herein; and it is further\n\n<sup>30</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nORDERED, that the time limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549 for the Trustee to commence avoidance actions and other actions on behalf of the estate, as well as for amending any pending complaints, are extended through and including August 15, 2024, which date may be further extended; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that any party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the Motion and did not object to the Motion has waived its right to assert a limitations period defense if ultimately named in an action that is timely brought under the terms of this Order; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the Trustee is authorized to take all actions necessary to effectuate the relief granted herein; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the interpretation or implementation of this Order.\n\nDated: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, 2024\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_","body_zh":"United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut Bridgeport Division（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n案件涉及：\n第11章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，1\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n（合并审理）\n\n根据《破产法典》第108条、第546(a)条及第549条请求作出延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼截止期限之裁定的动议\n\nLuc A. Despins 以其在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，以下简称“债务人”）的第11章破产案中获任命的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）之身份，特由其署名代理律师，依据《美国法典》第11篇（以下简称“《破产法典》”）第105(a)条及《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》（以下简称“《破产规则》”）第9006条提出本动议（以下简称“本动议”），请求法院作出实质上与本动议所附附件1拟议裁定（以下简称“拟议裁定”）格式一致的裁定，延长《破产法典》第108条、第546(a)条及第549条所规定的受托人提起若干诉由的截止期限。为支持本动议，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 自2022年7月获任命以来，受托人一直恪尽职守地对债务人复杂的财务状况进行广泛调查，并在适当时提起诉讼，以追回破产财产并撤销欺诈性转让等。受托人在其调查中已取得重大进展，除已提起的诉讼外，还将在当前截止期限之前提交大量起诉书。然而，出于本文所述的各种原因，受托人尚未完成确定为债务人债权人获取价值的所有潜在诉由（以及此类诉由的潜在被告），包括受托人已经确定并将在当前截止期限之前对其提起主张的被告的潜在追加被告以及针对该等被告的潜在追加诉求。通过本动议，受托人请求法院作出裁定，对该等诉由的诉讼时效进行衡平法中止，以便受托人可以在2024年2月15日这一截止期限之后继续追究该等诉由。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称郭文贵、Miles Guo 以及 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Ho Wan Kwok 财产受托人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于送达通知及联络目的）。\n\n2. 在动议人证明存在以下情形时，法院可对诉讼时效适用衡平法中止：(i) 存在非同寻常的情形，且 (ii) 动议人已尽合理之勤勉在诉讼时效届满前提起诉讼。本第11章案件的事实记录充分满足这些标准，并无可争议地证明延长诉讼时效期间具有充分理由。2 此外，根据《破产规则》第9006(b)条，破产法院可因“查明原因”而延长某一期间——包括诉讼时效。\n\n3. 破产法院经常处理大规模欺诈及其他非法行为的善后事宜。此类案件本身就会造成巨大的后勤和调查困难，本案亦不例外。然而，本案中的困难远超处理此类行为善后事宜所带来的重大挑战。本案还存在一种非同寻常的额外情形，即有人持续且反复地企图阻碍、妨碍并拖延受托人的调查。这些企图始于债务人提交申请书及辅助文件之时，直接导致了受托人的获任，并且自此之后一直未见收敛——即便面对法院的多项裁定、制裁及藐视法庭裁定也是如此。\n\n2 如下所述，衡平法中止和《破产规则》第9006(b)条各自独立地为本文所请求的救济提供法律依据。\n\n4. 此外，尽管每一步都面临人为设置的障碍，受托人仍恪尽职守地继续推进其调查。事实上，如下文详述，受托人几乎在每一个节点上都取得了成功。但在通常情况下，这些成功本身就需要时间，并且由于受托人被迫应对这些障碍，所耗费的时间甚至更长。\n\n5. 此外，由于债务人所设置并持续使用的错综复杂的“障眼法”，受托人的每一次成功并不会使调查走向终结。恰恰相反，每一次成功都揭示了更多有待受托人深挖的线索，以及更多被隐匿和/或被转让的资产。这绝非夸大其词：截至目前，受托人及其专业人员通过这一程序，已确定了339个以上的郭氏相关银行账户、进出这些账户的约83,820笔交易，以及流经这些账户的超过32亿美元的资金。简而言之，且如下文所解释，勤勉要件要求受托人证明其并未“怠于行使其权利”。对案卷记录进行任何客观审视，亦可轻易满足该要件。\n\n6. 由于事实如此有力且显而易见地支持准予所请求的救济，法院面临的真正问题是确保其拥有准予该救济的权力。如上所述，受托人依据破产法（具体而言是《破产规则》第9006(b)条和《破产法典》第105(a)条）以及非破产法（具体而言是衡平法中止原则）提起本动议。二者均提供了必要的授权。\n\n7. 衡平法中止。多个司法管辖区的破产法院曾依据衡平法中止原则在诉讼时效届满之前延长该期间。受托人主张法院应遵循这些法院的指引。虽然受托人认识到，\n\n其他法院出于送达通知和/或程序性理由拒绝这样做，但这些法院所关切的是潜在被告应享有出庭抗辩的权利以及就对其适用衡平法中止提出质疑的机会。但这些关切在本案中并不适用，因为受托人已经提交了一项动议，提议实施一项大规模、多管齐下的通知方案以解决这些关切（以下简称“《通知动议》”）。3\n\n8. 破产法。《破产规则》第9006(b)条明确规定：破产法院可因“查明原因”延长“指定期间”。受托人认识到，某些法院曾裁定该规定不适用于根据《破产法典》第5章提起诉求的诉讼时效期间。但是，如下文详述，多个司法管辖区的多家法院对此持不同意见，裁定第9006(b)条确实提供了必要的授权。\n\n9. 本动议所请求的救济至关重要。若不予延长，受托人将被迫在独立的对抗性诉讼中，与提出此时效异议的任何潜在被告逐一就诉讼时效问题进行诉讼。这不仅极其困难，而且几乎是不可能的——受托人已查明了83,000多笔转让。此外，无论是在时间上还是金钱上，其成本都将是天文数字，并将直接损害债权人的利益。最后，这种不确定性将使受托人——其必须为其所有行为进行辩护，且此前已不得不针对一项要求罢免他的动议以及其他污蔑性指控进行辩护——在未来的工作中处于难以为继的境地。\n\n10. 受托人的提议解决了这些问题。与此同时，特别是结合《通知动议》，该提议保护了所有潜在被告的权利。它只是将所有事务集中并入单一司法审理平台。\n\n3 参见 ECF No. 2494。\n\n背景\n\n11. 2022年6月15日，破产法院作出判决备忘录及裁定 [ECF No. 465]，指示美国联邦破产受托人任命一名第11章受托人。2022年7月8日，破产法院作出裁定 [ECF No. 523]，任命受托人。\n\n12. 债务人于2022年3月提交的破产财产明细表声称其资产仅有3,850美元，而负债高达数亿美元。4 债务人在破产法院声称自己基本上身无分文，其豪华住宅、Lady May（梅号）游艇以及他在公开场合炫耀的其他财富象征均不归其所有，而是归其家族成员名义上拥有的公司所有。5 正如若干法院目前所注意到的，债务人通过构建庞大的空壳公司迷宫，将自己的财富隐藏在家族成员和亲信的名下，从而在声称几乎没有任何资产的同时维持其奢靡的生活方式。\n\n13. 自获任命以来，受托人一直在恪尽职守地开展工作，以便为破产财产的利益查明并追回债务人所隐匿的资产。为此，根据破产法院的指示，受托人启动了复杂而彻底的调查和诉讼程序，重点针对债务人的“障眼法”——即其利用人格混同/兼具第二自我（alter ego）公司向债权人隐匿资产的行为。概括而言，该程序包括：(a) 根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》（以下简称“《破产规则》”）第2004条进行的证据开示，以及 (b) 旨在确立某些实体属于债务人之第二自我及/或追回特定财产和资产的诉讼。受托人已提交了十三份第2004条动议，向250多方当事人发出了第2004条传票，审查了证据开示中出示的数十万份文件，并继续采取一切合理措施以获取额外的记录。\n\n4 参见《资产与负债明细表》第1页 [ECF No. 78]。\n\n5 参见《郭文贵先生支持第11章案件及若干动议之声明》[ECF No. 107]。\n\n14. 诚如法院所深知，债务人、其家族成员及其亲信千方百计地企图阻碍受托人的工作。其中包括：\n\n15. 债务人无视其交出账簿和记录的法定义务，6 声称自己基本上没有任何业务记录，仅出示了四十六份文件以应对第2004条证据开示。债务人拒绝 (i) 出示与其声称属于其家族成员或其他个人及实体的资产相关的文档，(ii) 收集并出示由其律师和顾问占有的文档，或 (iii) 充分说明其检索应予出示文件的努力过程。债务人拒绝配合的态度迫使受托人申请并获得（在债务人反对的情况下）一项强制令，责令债务人出示响应受托人请求的文件并就债务人检索此类文件的努力作出说明。[ECF No. 1353]。债务人并未遵守该强制出示裁定，反而声称根据第五修正案及“出示行为原则”其没有义务出示，这导致受托人不得不申请并获得（再次在债务人的激烈反对下）一项认定债务人藐视法庭的裁定。[ECF No. 2035]。\n\n16. 在受托人获任命后不久，债务人企图撤销任命受托人的裁定，破产法院于2022年8月2日驳回了该动议 [ECF No. 667]。随后在2022年12月，债务人再次企图罢免受托人，但在各利害关系方的强烈反对下，该动议被撤回。[ECF Nos. 1274, 1635]。\n\n17. 债务人提出异议反对受托人关于确认受托人一经任命即享有针对以下实体的全部经济权利和公司治理权利的动议，但未能成功：\n\n6 参见 11 U.S.C § 521(a)(4)（债务人“应当”，在设有受托人的情况下，“向受托人交出破产财产的所有财产以及与破产财产相关的任何记录信息，包括账簿、文件、记录和文书”）。\n\n由债务人拥有和/或控制的实体，包括 Genever Holdings Corporation 和 Genever US LLC [ECF No. 643]。\n\n18. 尽管债务人负有与受托人配合并向受托人交出破产财产的所有财产及与破产财产相关的任何信息的法定义务，但债务人及其众多家族成员、商业伙伴和关联公司在每一个关头都拒绝配合受托人的证据开示工作，并拒绝向受托人交出破产财产，导致法院作出了不少于七（7）项认定其藐视法庭的裁定 [ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, and 2093]。\n\n19. 被告的手段并不仅限于法庭之内。自受托人获任命之初，被告就企图动用一切可用手段来败坏受托人及其律师（Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所））的名誉。或许最为恶劣的是，自 2022 年 11 月中旬起，被告发起了一场针对受托人、其家人及其律师，以及第 11 章案件中最大的无担保债权人之一（即 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（“PAX”，太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙））、PAX 母公司首席执行官、其家人以及 PAX 的律师的大规模社交媒体恐吓活动，手段包括在网上披露住址信息以及对其人身发出威胁。结果，自 2022 年 11 月 20 日起，一群与被告结盟的人士开始在受托人的住所及受托人家庭成员（包括其前配偶）的住所前进行纠察抗议，随后又前往受托人律师和 PAX 律师（O'Melveny & Myers LLP（美迈斯律师事务所））的办公室前抗议。在就这些事项进行了为期数天的证据听证会后，破产法院发布了一项初步禁令，以制止这种对破产案件管理的不当干预。\n\n20. 骚扰受托人及其律师的其他行径，还包括隶属于被告各组织的各类人士在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）提起的诉讼，指控受托人及其律师因未登记为中华人民共和国或中国共产党的代理人而违反了 Foreign Agents Registration Act（“FARA”，《外国代理人登记法》）。在地区法院，Caproni 法官驳回了该诉讼，并根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 11 条对原告及其律师实施了制裁，因为该毫无依据的诉讼是出于恶意且为了骚扰受托人及其律师而提起的。\n\n21. 2023 年 3 月 15 日，债务人因涉及证券欺诈、电信欺诈和洗钱等多项指控被捕。7 联邦检察官针对债务人提起的刑事起诉书指控，债务人是一个计划的“领导者和指挥者”8，在该计划中，债务人及其同案被告 William Je 等人将资金转入并穿透转移至“以至少 80 个不同实体或个人名义开立的约 500 多个账户中”。9 同样在 2023 年 3 月 15 日，Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会）通过提交起诉状对债务人提起诉讼，基于与刑事起诉书中所述类似的指控行为，指控债务人多项违反证券法的行为，该诉讼已被中止。近期，在 2024 年 1 月 3 日，联邦检察官对债务人提交了一份替代起诉书，提出了多项刑事 RICO（《反勒索与受贿组织法》）指控。该替代起诉书指控，债务人指挥了由“数十个相互关联的实体”组成的“郭氏企业”（“Kwok Enterprise”），该企业作为一项犯罪计划的一部分，不断演变以\n\n7 参见刑事起诉书，United States v. Kwok，No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2023)。（针对债务人的雇员 Yvette Wang（王雁平），基于其参与债务人犯罪计划的行为，也单独提起了相关刑事诉状。Wang 被指控犯有电信欺诈、证券欺诈、共谋实施电信欺诈和证券欺诈，以及进行非法交易。） 8\n\n刑事起诉书第 6 段。\n\n9 同上，第 3 段。\n\n“逃避美国投资者保护法、反洗钱法和破产法的执行”。10\n\n22. 值得注意的是，在 2023 年 4 月 20 日驳回债务人保释释放申请的裁定中，纽约南区联邦地区法院（“刑事法院”）强调了债务人“在以往案件中阻碍司法的行为历史”11，并指出了与这些第 11 章案件相关的行为，例如债务人虚报其资产12；在社交媒体上发布虚假和骚扰性内容；通过社交媒体煽动他人向破产受托人、其家人及其律师抗议，并在其破产案中申报债权以推高受托人的律师费13；以及在互联网上公开发布保密和解文件等。14 债务人在近期提交的一份重新提出的保释释放动议中向刑事法院表示，他“对其过去的行为以及给他人带来的困扰表示歉意”。15\n\n23. 债务人企图利用刑事法院作为一个平台，进一步寻求拖延和阻碍受托人在这些第 11 章案件中的工作。2023 年 8 月 30 日，债务人（Yvette Wang 共同加入）在其刑事案件中提出动议，请求在刑事审判作出判决前中止这些第 11 章案件，该动议于 2023 年 12 月 21 日被驳回 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 204]。随后，在 2024 年 1 月 4 日，债务人在其刑事案件中又提出了一项动议，重申其要求中止这些第 11 章案件的请求 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 218]。\n\n24. 尽管债务人及其同伙竭力阻挠和拖延受托人，受托人仍成功通过\n\n10 参见 2024 年 1 月 3 日替代起诉书第 1、6 段，United States v. Kwok，No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y.) [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 215]。 11 裁定书第 11 页 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 51]。\n\n12 同上，第 8 页和第 10 页。 13 同上，第 9 页。 14 同上。 15 关于 Ho Wan Kwok 审前释放重新提出的动议支持备忘录第 10 页 [Crim. Ct. ECF 178]。\n\n针对已识别资产（例如 Lady May（梅号）游艇16、Sherry Netherland 公寓17）以及已识别银行账户（例如 HCHK 实体账户18和 U.S. Bank（美国银行）托管账户19）的对席诉讼，为破产财产追回了数千万美元。受托人还提起了诉讼，以追回包括债务人位于新泽西州马瓦市价值 2650 万美元的豪宅等在内的财产。20 债务人的家族成员和追随者在这些对席诉讼中对受托人的工作进行了激烈的反对。仅举一例，债务人的某些追随者自称是 HCHK 实体的债权人，试图申请干预诉讼，以反对受托人针对这些实体提出的人格混同主张。尽管法院在 2024 年 1 月 5 日发布的最新判决中驳回了该干预诉讼动议，但该干预诉讼动议导致了数月的拖延，并引发了一场必要的证据听证会。在该听证会上，债务人的一名追随者“尽管法院命令其回答问题，却公然且屡次拒绝在交叉询问中回答问题”，而另一名追随者则“承认其伪造了一份文件以推进该诉讼”。21\n\n25. 鉴于在 Lady May 游艇出售之前缺乏聘请法务会计师的资金，受托人及其律师（在此之前只能寄希望于未来追回的资产来获得报酬）将其最初的资产追回工作集中在已识别的资产上。因此，针对郭氏\n\n16 由受托人在 22-05003 号对席诉讼 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins 中追回，并根据法院 2023 年 6 月 27 日的裁定予以出售。[ECF No. 1953]。 17 由受托人在 22-05027 号对席诉讼 Despins v. Bravo Luck Limited 中追回。 18 这些实体（HCHK Technologies, Inc.、HCHK Property Management, Inc. 和 Lexington Property, Inc.）是 23-05013 号对席诉讼 Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al. 的标的，受托人在该诉讼中寻求作出人格混同判决。虽然受托人索要 HCHK 实体资金的对席诉讼尚未审结，但这些资金已由受托人占有，并在最终裁决作出前免于被挥霍流失，受托人相信最终裁决将对其有利。 19 由受托人在 22-05003 号对席诉讼 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins 以及 23-05012 号对席诉讼 U.S Bank National Association v. HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, et al. 中追回。\n\n20 马瓦豪宅是 23-05017 号对席诉讼 Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC, et al. 的标的。 21 决议备忘录与裁定书第 28 页 [Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, ECF No. 239]。\n\n关联实体所使用的数百个账户进行法务会计审计这一必要步骤，直到受托人根据法院于 2023 年 9 月 29 日作出的裁定 [ECF No. 2241] 在 2023 年 8 月聘请 Kroll, LLC（“Kroll”）作为受托人的法务调查员后，才真正开始全力开展。\n\n26. 自获聘以来，Kroll 一直在全力协助受托人，为针对债务人实际利用众多郭氏关联实体所进行的数千笔转账提起撤销权诉讼等工作奠定基础。到目前为止，Kroll 已识别出 339 个以上的郭氏关联银行账户、进出这些账户的约 83,820 笔交易，以及流经这些账户的超过 32 亿美元的资金。随着 Kroll 分析工作的推进，这些数字实际上每天都在增加。\n\n请求的救济\n\n27. 受托人请求作出拟议裁定，延长《破产法典》第 108、546 和 549 条规定的诉讼时效，这将允许受托人继续其调查，并根据《破产法典》第 5 章提起进一步的诉讼。\n\n救济依据\n\nI. 法院有权批准所请求的救济\n\n28. 破产法院经常根据非破产法（具体为衡平法上的诉讼时效中止原则）和/或破产法（具体为《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9006 条）批准此处请求的救济。\n\nA. 衡平法诉讼时效中止原则适用于《破产法典》的诉讼时效，且可前瞻性适用\n\n29. 各法院已确认，非破产法中的衡平法诉讼时效中止原则授权延长诉讼时效，包括《破产法典》第 546(a) 条规定的期限。参见 Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.), 288 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)（“在适当情况下，可适用衡平法诉讼时效中止来中止 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 规定的诉讼时效，这一点是毋庸置疑的”）；Fogel v. Shabat (In re Draiman), 714 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 2013)（“此外，11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 中的诉讼时效受衡平法诉讼时效中止原则的约束”）。相反，判例法中存在的任何不一致，仅出现在于诉讼时效届满之前请求衡平法诉讼时效中止的情形中。\n\n30. 首先，许多法院已前瞻性地准予了此项救济。参见例如 In re Farwest Pump Co. 案，No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at *3（Bankr. D. Ariz.［亚利桑那区破产法院］2020年1月15日）（准予在届满前提出的衡平法中止诉讼时效动议）；Marsh 诉 Levy（In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.）案，416 B.R. 1, 8（Bankr. D. Mass.［马萨诸塞区破产法院］2009年）（准予在第 546(a) 条届满前延长该条期限的动议的裁定是适当的）；In re Dwek 案，No. 07-11757 (KCF)（Bankr. D.N.J.［新泽西区破产法院］2009年2月2日）[ECF No. 3790]（前瞻性地准予延长时效期间的动议）；In re Rockport Dev., Inc. 案，No. 20-11339-SC（Bankr. C.D. Cal.［加州中区破产法院］2022年4月12日）[ECF No. 822]（同上）；In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties 案，No. 18-16908-MH（Bankr. C.D. Cal.［加州中区破产法院］2020年7月30日）[ECF No. 683]（同上）；In re Builders Holding Co. 案，No. 16-06643-EAG7（Bankr. D.P.R.［波多黎各区破产法院］2019年4月25日）[ECF No. 501]（同上）。22\n\n31. 然而，其他法院则认定，法院不应准予前瞻性衡平法中止的请求。例如，Walnut Hill 案中的法院认定，在时效期间尚未届满的情况下准予衡平法中止动议是「完全过早的」。In re Walnut Hill, Inc. 案，No. 16–20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at *2（Bankr. D. Conn.［康涅狄格区破产法院］2018年6月1日）。且 In re Randolph Hospital, Inc. 案在不影响再次提出权利的前提下驳回了衡平法中止时效期间的动议，允许在信托受托人「对可识别且已获得适当通知的被告提起诉讼」后重新提出。In re Randolph Hosp., Inc. 案，No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at *1（Bankr. M.D.N.C.［北卡罗来纳中区破产法院］2022年4月25日）（强调为后加）。基于下文讨论的理由，在当前存在的情形下，这一担忧不应阻止本法院准予本动议。\n\n22 在 In re Dwek 案、In re Rockport Dev. 案、In re Visiting Nurse Assoc. of Inland Counties 案以及 In re Builders Holding Co. Corp. 案中作出的裁定副本作为本文件附件 2-5 附后。\n\n32. 拒绝依据衡平法中止来前瞻性中止诉讼时效的法院明确表示，对前瞻性衡平法中止的主要担忧是通知：最终可能成为被告的当事人应当有机会主张在特定情形下衡平法中止是不适当的，法院不应预先剥夺该机会。\n\n33. 对通知关注的另一面是，法院已认定，在收到通知的情况下，潜在被告有责任提出异议。参见 In re Martin Levy of Berlin 案，416 B.R. at 8（「被告不能避开寻求信息的信托受托人、无视信托受托人延长诉讼时效的请求、等待时效期间过去，然后在起诉状提交数月之后声称信托受托人运气不佳。鉴于相关情形，即使被告提出了异议，信托受托人也向法院展示了充分的延长截止期限的事由。他们未作出答复的事实为延期提供了更多理由。因此，本法院认定并裁定，由于被告因其不作为而放弃了权利，第 546(a) 条的截止期限已获正当延长，信托受托人及时提交了起诉状。」）。\n\n34. 这正是本动议在这些情形下可以且应当获得准予的原因。信托受托人已确定了数百名最终可能被起诉的当事人。信托受托人将付出巨大努力并承担重大费用，按照通知动议（该动议本身已送达给尽可能多的潜在被告）的规定，向这些当事人送达本中止动议的通知。如果法院准予通知动议，法院将已确定该通知是充分的。简而言之，受该中止请求影响的当事人将获得通知——实际通知、拟制通知，或二者兼具。\n\nB. 《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 9006(b) 条亦提供了延长时效期间的权力\n\n35. 正如一家法院所阐释的那样，「《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》（Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure）第 9006(b) 条赋予法院在『有正当理由』且『随时自行裁量』的情况下下令延长指定行为发生时间的权力。这包括根据 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 提起撤销权之诉的时间期间。」Frentz 诉 Stites & Harbison（In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.）案，381 B.R. 225, 227（Bankr. W.D. Ky.［肯塔基西区破产法院］2008年）（内部引用省略）。位于多个司法管辖区的其他多家法院均表示认同。23 参见例如 In re Campbellton-Graceville Hosp. Corp. 案，616 B.R. 177, 182（Bankr. N.D. Fla.［佛罗里达北区破产法院］2019年）（「破产法院有权根据第 9006(b) 条，出于正当理由延长第 546 条规定的两年诉讼时效期间。」）；亦见 In re D & L Energy, Inc. 案，No. 13-40813（Bankr. N.D. Ohio［俄亥俄北区破产法院］2015年3月25日）[ECF No. 1377]（认定法院有权根据第 9006(b) 条延长第 546 条中的时效期间）；In re Network Services Sols., LLC 案，No. 17-50309-gwz（Bankr. D. Nev.［内华达区破产法院］2019年3月6日）[ECF No. 503]（准予根据第 9006 条延长根据《破产法典》第 108 条和第 546 条提起诉讼的时间的动议）；In re Farm-Rite, Inc. 案，No. 20-19379-JNP（Bankr. D.N.J.［新泽西区破产法院］2022年8月3日）[ECF No. 551]（准予根据第 9006(b) 条延长《破产法典》第 546 条截止期限的动议）；In re Anton & Chia, LLP 案，No. 18-12565-TA（Bankr. C.D. Cal.［加州中区破产法院］2020年8月13日）[ECF No. 136]（同上）；In re Uplift RX, LLC 案，No. 17-32186（Bankr. S.D. Tex.［德克萨斯南区破产法院］2019年3月28日）[ECF No. 1005]（同上）。24\n\n23 需要明确的是，这两种路径——基于第 9006 条的延期与基于衡平法中止的延期——并非排他的。它们可以存在于同一案件中，延长时效期间的依据可以基于其中之一或兼而有之。例如，在 International Administrative Services 案中，法院认定第 9006(b) 条赋予了延长截止期限的权力，但同时也决定「涉及信托受托人是否证明了延长时效期间的衡平法依据的问题」。IBT Int'l, Inc. 诉 Northern（In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.）案，408 F.3d 689, 700（11th Cir.［第十一巡回上诉法院］2005年）。\n\n24 在 In re D & L Energy 案、In re Network Services Solutions, LLC 案、In re Farm-Rite, Inc. 案、In re Anton & Chia, LLP 案以及 In re Uplift RX, LLC 案中作出的裁定副本作为本文件附件 6-10 附后。\n\n36. 信托受托人承认，尽管有上述引用的判例法，但一些法院已认定第 9006(b) 条并未授权延长法定诉讼时效期间。参见例如 In re Walnut Hill, Inc. 案，2018 WL 2672242, at *2。\n\n37. 然而，信托受托人主张，法院应当采纳第十一巡回上诉法院所支持的分析。在 International Administrative Services 案中，被告指出「《破产规则》第 9006(b) 条并未明确规定延长由制定法创设的时间期间」。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc. 案，408 F.3d at 699。然而，法院认定「该主张毫无根据」。同上。法院指出，对抗性诉讼的定义和提起分别亦受《破产规则》第 7001 条和第 7003 条管辖，并认定第 9006 条确实赋予了破产法院延长法定时间期间的裁量权，即便该规则并未「明确涵盖法定时间框架」。同上。\n\n38. 此外，Walnut Hill 案法院所提出的立场存在逻辑缺陷。在 Walnut Hill 案中，法院将该问题构建为一个「非此即彼（是或否）」的询问：诉讼程序规则能否优先于制定法？然而，即便是该法院也承认第 9006(a) 条确实适用于制定法，因为第 9006 条的该特定款项规定其适用于「任何制定法」。25 诚然，第 9006(b) 条缺少这句「任何制定法」的表述。但这一论证表明，正如 Walnut Hill 案所暗示的那样，正确的问题并非第 9006(b) 条是否可以用于延长法定时间框架。换句话说，Walnut Hill 案得出了错误的答案，是因为它问错了问题。\n\n25 第 9006 条 (a) 款的相关完整表述规定，「在计算本规则、联邦民事诉讼程序规则、任何地方规则或法院命令、或未指定时间计算方法的任何制定法中指定的任何时间期间时，适用下列规则。」Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a)。\n\n39. 相反，正确的探究是第 9006(b) 条是否确实赋予了破产法院此项权力。这将问题从绝对的「非此即彼」询问转变为一个法律解释问题：阅读、理解和适用第 9006(b) 条的最佳方式是什么，以及第 9006(b) 条是否应当延伸适用于第 546(a) 条（以及同等地适用于管辖撤销权之诉的其他时效期间）。就此而言，信托受托人主张，更好的答案是第十一巡回法院及多个司法管辖区内的无数其他破产法院所给出的答案：尽管其「未明确涵盖法定时间框架」，但若认定第 9006(b) 条不适用于第 546(a) 条的截止期限，将导致「荒谬的结果」。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc. 案，408 F.3d at 699。26\n\n26 Walnut Hill 案法院亦（正确地）指出，《破产规则》不得「剥夺、扩大或修改任何实体权利」。2018 WL 2672242, at *2。但第 546(a) 条中的时效期间是诉讼时效，而非「实体权利」。参见 Collins 诉 J & N Rest. Assocs., Inc.（In re Mendolia）案，No. 12-60219, 2015 WL 475966, at *8（Bankr. N.D.N.Y.［纽约北区破产法院］2015年2月3日）（「然而，诉讼时效就其本质而言属于程序性的，并不赋予或扩大实体权利。」）；Moglia 诉 Inland Plywood Co.（In re Outboard Marine Corp.）案，299 B.R. 488, 500（Bankr. N.D. Ill.［伊利诺伊北区破产法院］2003年）（认定第 546(a) 条属于诉讼时效）；Pryor 诉 Barbara（In re Rodriguez）案，283 B.R. 112（Bankr. E.D.N.Y.［纽约东区破产法院］2001年）（同上）。\n\n40. 事实上，没有任何案件比本案更能说明第十一巡回法院所担忧的「荒谬性」。法院深知这些第 11 章破产案件的复杂性质，以及债务人及其关联方阻碍信托受托人调查的无休止企图。债务人不应仅凭「拖延时间」短短两年，便借此逃避责任并实质上终结其破产案件，从而不仅挫败其债权人和信托受托人，也挫败了国会的立法意图。在时效期间届满后以事后追溯的方式来处理此事，也不是一种切合实际的解决方案。本案的复杂程度，以及信息和当事人的庞大规模，使得这一做法无异于不可能之举——并且无疑会给信托受托人带来极大的负担和费用，以至于直接影响债权人的最终受偿。参见 In re ThermoView Indus., Inc. 案，381 B.R. at 227（在「信托受托人提起并已提起近 400 起对抗性诉讼的极其复杂的案件」中准予依据第 9006(b) 条的延期动议）。如上所述，正确的探究并非第 9006 条是否能赋予法院必要的权力，而是其是否确实赋予了该权力。国会绝不可能有意让破产法院在诸如此类的案件中无计可施——而对第 9006(b) 条的任何其他解读都将导致不合理且不公平的后果。参见 In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc. 案，501 B.R. 784, 791（Bankr. M.D. Fla.［佛罗里达中区破产法院］2013年）（「如果法院不延长提起撤销权之诉的期间，实际上将是在奖赏目标对象在证据开示过程中的阻抗（即使其阻抗是正当的）。并且这将为撤销权之诉的目标对象（在本案及其他案件中）提供阻抗证据开示的不良激励。」）。27\n\n41. 此外，《破产法》（Bankruptcy Code）中明确规定了延长诉讼时效期限的法定职权。《破产法》第 105(a) 条（这当然属于制定法）赋予破产法院“发布为执行本编规定所必需的任何命令、程序或判决”的职权。且法院已明确依据第 105(a) 条来延长《破产法》规定的诉讼时效期限。参见 Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan), 182 F.3d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1999)（第 105(a) 条可用于中止第 507(a)(8)(A)(i) 条规定的三年期限）；United States v. Richards (In re Richards), 994 F.2d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 1993)（“11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 的范围足够宽泛，允许破产法院在 Richards 处于其首次破产程序期间中止 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii) 规定的 240 天核定评估期限的命令。”）。\n\n27 即使在反对证据开示可能“合理”的情况下，这种结果若是不公平的，那么在毫无此类正当理由的本案中，该担忧更是成倍增加。\n\n42. 尽管受托人承认第 105(a) 条不能用于采取《破产法》所禁止的行为，参见 Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014)，但依据第 105(a) 条延长诉讼时效期限并不会违反这一原则。在第 108 条、第 546 条和第 549 条中中止诉讼时效并未被这些条款或《破产法》的任何其他条款所禁止。事实上，衡平法中止（equitable tolling）是应被解释融入每一项联邦诉讼时效法规中的救济途径，包括第 108 条、第 546 条和第 549 条。参见 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002)（“诉讼时效期限通常受制于衡平法中止，这是基本法律常识……必须推定国会在起草诉讼时效期限时已考虑了这一背景原则。当国会制定由作为衡平法院并适用衡平法学原则与规则的破产法院所适用的诉讼时效期限时，尤为如此。”）（强调为后加）（内部引号和出处省略）。\n\n43. 因此，特别是将两者结合起来看，第 105(a) 条和《联邦破产诉讼规则》（Bankruptcy Rule）第 9006(b) 条最好被理解为赋予了延长第 546(a) 条中诉讼时效期限的职权。\n\nII. 法院应批准所请求的救济\n\n44. 在确立了法院具有批准所请求救济的职权后，适用相关标准表明，在本案中给予此类救济是正当且必要的。\n\nA. 衡平法中止标准\n\n45. 如果受托人“尽管已尽到一切应有的勤勉，但仍无法获得与其主张存在相关的关键信息”，则可以衡平法中止诉讼时效。Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2008)。衡平法中止必须依个案具体判定，且不局限于特定的一套事实。参见 Young, 535 U.S. at 48-50。\n\n46. 虽然欺诈性隐瞒当然是衡平法中止的依据，但“衡平法中止经常与欺诈性隐瞒相混淆”，Valdez, 518 F.3d at 182-83，并且\n\n“衡平法中止并不局限于涉及……对方当事人不当行为的情形。”In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Cts., 288 B.R. at 705-06（内部出处省略）。换言之，衡平法中止不需要被告存在任何特定的不当行为。参见 Heyman v. Dec (In re Dec), 272 B.R. 218, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001)（“在欺诈行为未被发现的情况下，即使被告没有采取任何隐瞒行为，《破产法》第 546(a) 条规定的诉讼时效也可以被中止。”）。\n\n47. “为获得该原则的益处，受托人承担证明责任，须证明其 (1) 在其寻求中止的期限内已尽到合理的勤勉，且 (2) 证明情况如此异常以致应当适用该原则。”In re Anderson, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)；亦见 Castillo ex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\nB. 本案中衡平法中止具有充分正当理由28\n\n48. 事实记录的全部内容轻易地表明：(i) 异常情况阻止了受托人提起撤销权诉讼（Avoidance Actions），并且 (ii) 受托人在行使其权利时已尽到勤勉。\n\na. 异常情况\n\n49. “异常情况……源于超出原告控制范围的阻止其及时提起的某种外部障碍，而非由其自身造成的拖延。”Schmidt v. Twosons Corp. (In re Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC), No. 15-34287, 2022 WL 1589190, at *11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 19, 2022)（经修改）（内部引号和出处省略）。这在破产案件中尤为适用，在破产案件中，债务人的行为可以\n\n28 若法院同意第 9006(b) 条和/或第 105(a) 条为本动议所请求的救济提供了职权依据，受托人主张，支持衡平法中止的相同理由亦构成第 9006(b) 条下的“正当理由”。\n\n证明对非债务人中止时效具有正当性。Kearns Motor Co. v. Cimino (In re Dreiling), 233 B.R. 848, 878 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999)（“出于衡平法中止的目的，债务人的欺诈性隐瞒可归责于其他被告”）；In re Dec, 272 B.R. at 227（“破产案件对衡平法中止呈现出截然不同的视角。在典型情况下，是债务人的行为而非被告的行为引发了衡平法中止。”）；Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen), 36 F.3d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 1994)（认定债务人在未通知法院或利害关系人的情况下向家庭成员出售破产财产构成欺诈性转让衡平法中止的依据，因为“受托人在自身没有任何过错、缺乏勤勉或注意的情况下一直蒙在鼓里”）（内部引号和出处省略）。\n\n50. 因此，当原告无法在证据开示方面取得进展时，尤其是鉴于债务人的阻挠，法院一贯认定存在异常情况：\n\n- In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 702 (11th Cir. 2005)（部分基于债务人和被告通过隐瞒其活动并违反证据开示请求，企图干扰受托人对资产转移计划的调查，从而中止诉讼时效）。\n- Bender v. Mann (In re Bender), No. 02-00773-RTB, 2010 WL 6467681, at *9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010), aff'd, 480 F. App'x 445 (9th Cir. 2012)（维持下级法院适用衡平法中止的裁定，其中债务人的阻挠“阻碍了”受托人提起撤销权诉讼，并指出“判例法中充斥着法院因一方当事人的阻挠行为而准予衡平法中止的先例”）。\n- Freeland v. CPA Warehouse (In re Livemercial Aviation Holding, LLC), 508 B.R. 58, 71 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2014)（“受托人尽管尽到了应有的勤勉，但仍无法获得对本案核心极其重要的信息/文件——无论何种原因导致了 Mathis 无法或未能及时提供或出具这些材料——均充分支持本案适用衡平法中止原则，以延长 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)(A) 的时效期限”）。\n- Ochs Charitable Remainder Trust v. Ochs (In re Ochs), 608 B.R. 252, 261–62 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019)（认定异常情况包括但不限于：[被告]“阻挠合法的证据开示，致使法院两次介入破产证据开示争议并两次作出不利于被告的裁定；……其未能提供完整的文件出具，迫使原告在 2019 年向数家第三方金融机构进行\n\n证据开示以获取文件；以及……在多次拖延后最终接受宣誓取证时，其对宣誓提问作出的回答含糊不清且不明确。”）。\n\n- In re Farwest Pump Co., No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at *3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020)（“同样显而易见的是，委员会在本案中面临异常情况，这些情况是由 Vaught 夫妇造成并持续存在的，他们其中一人和/或两人拥有并管理债务人[及关联实体]……[包括因为] Vaught 夫妇拒绝披露有关其关联实体的财务文件。”）。\n\n51. 此外，受托人无需证明任何（更不用说所有）潜在被告从事或参与了阻碍受托人证据开示的行为。“某些目标对象可能未对妨碍或拖延受托人的调查负责，这本身并不是拒绝延长提起撤销权诉讼的两年时效期限的理由。”In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013)。“如果受托人在发现潜在的撤销权诉讼方面受到妨碍，那么截止期限应当针对所有索赔一并延长——而不是逐个当事人分别处理。”同上。\n\n52. 在本案中，已有充分证据表明，债务人及其关联方已经且持续主动干扰受托人的证据开示工作，包括自本案一开始便如此。参见 In re Bender, 2010 WL 6467681, at *8（“判例法中没有任何规定阻止破产法院认定，正如其所认定的，[债务人]‘竭力向其亚利桑那州第 7 章受托人隐瞒夏威夷不动产’的不当行为构成‘阻碍’并拖延了受托人及时遵守诉讼时效的异常情况。”）。\n\ni. 正在审理的刑事案件亦构成异常情况\n\n53. 外部事件中亦可认定存在异常情况，例如“阻碍标的债权主张执行的其他法律程序的未决状态”。Collins v. Decker (In re Decker), No. 06-60886, 2011 WL 2174349, at *5 n. 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. June 1,\n\n2011)（引用省略）；Jobin v. Boryla (In re M & L Bus. Machine Co.), 75 F.3d 586, 591 (10th Cir. 1996)（指出受托人主张存在异常情况——即因司法部就针对债务人负责人的刑事指控扣押了关键记录而导致其无法获取这些记录——可作为衡平法中止的依据）；听证庭审记录 9:10-17, In re Dwek, No. 07-11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916]（“鉴于联邦检察官和联邦调查局（FBI）近期开展调查的行动，在此适用诉讼时效的衡平法中止是适当的。这导致对债务人继续进行的 2004 条款宣誓取证产生了漫长的拖延，且这超出了受托人的控制范围。”）。29\n\n54. 诚如法庭所熟知，债务人是在申请日之后提起的某起广泛刑事案件中的被告。该刑事案件的未决状态要求受托人处理一系列使他的调查复杂化的问题。例如，诚如法庭所知，受托人最初曾寻求获取政府在该刑事案件中向债务人提供的文件证据开示，该请求遭到债务人的反对，并最终导致或促成了在本法庭以及负责审理该刑事案件的法庭中的动议程序，包括债务人提出的一项中止整个第 11 章案件的动议。作为该等动议程序的结果，受托人最终同意目前暂不寻求向债务人索取政府在该刑事案件中向债务人提供的文件。受托人目前预计，在这些文件作为刑事案件庭审的一部分在公开法庭上予以披露的范围内，他将获得至少部分该等文件的查阅权限，而该刑事审判目前定于 2024年5月 开始。即将进行的刑事审判还导致受托人难以从某些很可能是该刑事案件的证人或以其他方式卷入该案的特定个人处获取关键的证言笔录。因此，该刑事案件构成了一项异常情势，以超出其控制的方式拖延了受托人的调查。\n\n29 In re Dwek, No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916]，作为附件 11 附于本文件。\n\nb. 受托人已勤勉尽责\n\n55. 最高法院已提醒，“为衡平法诉讼时效中止之目的所要求的勤勉是合理勤勉，而非最大可行勤勉”。Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010)（经修改）（省略内部引号及引用）（强调为后加）。与此一致且尤其适用于破产语境的是，法院已解释称“何为尽职调查受制于案件的具体情况，特别是经济紧迫性”。In re Dreiling, 233 B.R. at 878。\n\n56. 如果受托人“付出长期而艰苦的努力去发掘债务人资产和财务事务的所有复杂细节”，则受托人已被认定为足够勤勉。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d at 708；亦参见 In re Couchell, No. 19 B 7328, 2020 WL 6438511, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2020)（动议人“出席了[债务人的]第 341 条会议，提交了债权证明，发出了第 2004 条传票，进行了询问并强制提供了文件”，勤勉要求已得到满足）；In re Farwest Pump Co., No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at *3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020)（“在本案中，显而易见委员会已勤勉地行使其权利，其中包括提交起诉资格动议，请求对起诉资格动议进行加急听证……并针对 Reliant、Vaught Equipment 及 Vaught 家族申请依第 2004 条规则进行询问。”）；Tese-Milner v. Kim (In re Level 8 Apparel, LLC), No. 16-13164 (JLG), 2021 WL 1977161, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021)（认定受托人通过向债务人获取文件并送达第 2004 条规则证据开示请求以寻求与债务人账户相关的信息，证明了其勤勉尽责）。\n\n57. “勤勉行事即向法庭证明当事人未在自己的权利上睡觉”。In re Ramsoomair, No. 21-11215 (DSJ), 2022 WL 828307, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022)（省略内部引号及引用）。基于上述所有详述的理由，受托人已勤勉行事且未在自己的权利上睡觉，这一点是无可争议的。\n\n[本页余下部分有意留白。]\n\n鉴于上述理由，受托人谨请求法庭作出拟议裁定，准予此处所请求的救济，并准予法庭认为适当的任何其他救济。\n\n日期：2024年1月18日\n康涅狄格州纽黑文\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，第 11 章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nAvram E. Luft（特别获准出庭代理）\nDouglass Barron（特别获准出庭代理）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（特别获准出庭代理）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第 11 章受托人代理律师\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，1\n债务人。\n\n第 11 章\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n\n送达证明书\n\n签署人特此证明，于 2024年1月18日，上述动议以及随附的所有声明、证据和附件均已完成电子归档。本项归档的通知已通过法院的电子归档（“CM/ECF”）系统自动向上述标题项下第 11 章案件的所有当事人发送电子邮件，或按照电子归档通知上的指示向任何无法接受电子归档的当事人寄发信件。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次归档文件。\n\n日期：2024年1月18日\n康涅狄格州纽黑文\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nDouglass Barron（特别获准出庭代理）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6000\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第 11 章受托人代理律师\n\n1 这些第 11 章案件中的债务人包括 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及诸多其他化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财团的受托人（仅用于通知与通信目的）。\n\n附件 1\n\n拟议裁定\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK 等，30\n债务人。\n\n第 11 章\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n\n关于准予就延长受托人根据《破产法典》第 108 条、第 546(a) 条和第 549 条提起撤销权诉讼之截止期限作出裁定的动议的[拟议]裁定\n\n经审议第 11 章受托人提出的《关于请求就延长受托人根据<破产法典>第 108 条、第 546(a) 条和第 549 条提起撤销权诉讼之截止期限作出裁定的动议》（下称“动议”），且已证明存在正当理由，且法庭已审议对该动议的任何及所有异议与其他答复，并且法庭认定：(i) 所请求的救济具有正当理由；(ii) 存在证明所请求之救济属合情合理的异常情势；(iii) 受托人已勤勉尽责；以及 (iv) 本动议已按照法庭先前准予通知动议的裁定进行了送达，且在当前情况下该等通知属适当且充分，无需再进行其他通知，且此处所给予的救济系为实现上述目的而量身定制，本法庭特此：\n\n裁定，按此处所载准予该动议；并进一步\n\n30 这些第 11 章案件中的债务人包括 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及诸多其他化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财团的受托人（仅用于通知与通信目的）。\n\n裁定，11 U.S.C. 108、546 和 549 规定的受托人代表破产财团提起撤销权诉讼及其他诉讼，以及修改任何未决起诉状的时限，延长至 2024年8月15日（含当日），该日期可进一步延长；并进一步\n\n裁定，任何已收到本动议之通知（无论是实际通知还是推定通知）且未对本动议提出异议的当事人，如果最终在根据本裁定条款及时提起的诉讼中被列为当事人，则其已放弃主张诉讼时效抗辩的权利；并进一步\n\n裁定，本裁定的条款与条件在作出后应立即生效并具有可执行性；并进一步\n\n裁定，受托人有权采取为落实此处准予的救济所必需的一切行动；并进一步\n\n裁定，对于因本裁定的解释或执行而产生或与之相关的一切事项，法庭应保留管辖权。\n\n日期：______________，2024年\n\nJulie A. Manning，美国破产法官\n\n____________________________________","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":8783,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:09:43"}