{"id":"court_sdny_251_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":251,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2024-03-22","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\\n*\\**\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"法庭裁定书（Order）—— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #251（2024年3月22日立案）。主审法官 Analisa Torres 就被告王燕萍（Yanping Wang）提出的一揽子审前动议作出裁定：部分批准其要求检方提供详情说明书（bill of particulars）的动议，驳回其与郭文贵分案审理的请求，驳回对其公寓搜查所获证据的排除申请；但就其被捕后陈述及提供手机密码是否发生在她已主张律师在场权之后，法院下令另行举行证据排除听证会。","summary_en":"Court order — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #251 (filed March 22, 2024). District Judge Analisa Torres ruled on defendant Yanping Wang's omnibus pretrial motions: granting in part her motion for a bill of particulars, denying her motion to sever her trial from co-defendant Ho Wan Kwok's, and denying suppression of evidence seized from her apartment, while ordering a suppression hearing on whether her post-arrest statements and phone passwords were obtained after she invoked her right to counsel.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\\n*\\**\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\n| Labels      | Values     |\n|-------------|------------|\n| DOC #:      |            |\n| DATE FILED: | 03/22/2024 |\n\n-against-\n\nYANPING WANG,\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nDefendant.\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\n\nOn January 3, 2024, a Manhattan grand jury returned a superseding indictment (\"S2\") charging Defendant, Yanping Wang, with eleven counts of wire fraud, securities fraud, and unlawful monetary transactions, as well as conspiring to commit racketeering offenses, wire and bank fraud, money laundering, and securities fraud. S2, ECF No. 215. Wang moves for an order (1) directing the Government to provide a bill of particulars, (2) severing her trial from that of co-defendant Ho Wan Kwok, (3) suppressing evidence seized from her Manhattan apartment pursuant to a search warrant, and (4) suppressing post-arrest statements that she made to investigators.\\$^1\\$ Def. Mot., ECF No. 196; *see* Def. Mem., ECF No. 197; ECF No. 231. For the reasons stated below, (1) Wang's motion for a bill of particulars is GRANTED IN PART, (2) her motion to sever her trial is DENIED, (3) her motion to suppress evidence from her apartment is DENIED, and (4) the Court shall hold a suppression hearing regarding her post-arrest statements.\n\nWang and two co-defendants, Ho Wan Kwok and Kin Ming Je, are charged with operating a scheme to defraud thousands of investors out of more than \\$1 billion, laundering the\n\nproceeds through foreign and domestic entities, and misappropriating the funds for their own use. The indictment alleges that four \"opportunities\" comprise the alleged fraud scheme: (1) the \"GTV Private Placement,\" an unregistered stock offering in Kwok's \"citizen journalism\" company; (2) the \"Farm Loans Program,\" which solicited funds that Defendants promised would be convertible to GTV stock; (3) \"G|CLUBS,\" a \"high-end membership program\"; and (4) the \"Himalaya Exchange,\" a cryptocurrency offering. S2 ¶¶ 16–19. It also alleges that Kwok, Je, and Wang transferred money through \"more than approximately 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals.\" *Id.* ¶ 4.\n\nOn March 6, 2023, Kwok and Je were initially indicted for wire fraud, securities fraud, money laundering, and unlawful monetary transactions, as well as conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities and bank fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 2. On March 10, 2023, the Government filed a complaint (the \"Complaint\") charging Wang with wire fraud, securities fraud, unlawful monetary transactions, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud. Compl., ECF No. 1. The same day, the Honorable Gabriel W. Gorenstein issued an arrest warrant for Wang. ECF No. 2, Dkt. Entry 3/10/2023.\n\nWang was first indicted on four counts on March 29, 2023: (1) wire fraud and (2) securities fraud arising from the GTV Private Placement, (3) unlawful monetary transactions, and (4) conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, money laundering, and securities fraud. S1 ¶¶ 1–36, 51–52, ECF No. 19. S2—filed on January 3, 2024—charges Wang with eleven counts.<sup>2</sup> In addition to separating the conspiracy charge into three separate counts, S2 ¶¶ 27–40, the superseding indictment adds Wang to the wire fraud and securities fraud charges for both the\n\n<sup>2</sup> Wang filed her omnibus motion papers that are the subject of this order on December 15, 2023, before S2 was issued. Def. Mot. By letter dated January 18, 2024, she informed the Court that she did not seek to file new papers in light of S2, *see* ECF No. 231, and the parties addressed the impact of S2 on her motions in their opposition and reply papers. *See* Gov. Opp., ECF No. 232; Def. Reply, ECF No. 236.\n\nFarm Loans Program and G|CLUBS, S2 ¶¶ 45–52, and charges all Defendants with one count of conspiring to commit racketeering offenses (\"RICO\"), *id.* ¶¶ 1–26. Je alone is charged with obstruction of justice, *id.* ¶¶ 57–58, and Je and Kwok are charged with wire fraud arising from the Himalaya Exchange, *id.* ¶¶ 53–54.\n\n### II. The Warrant\n\nOn March 14, 2023, Judge Gorenstein issued a search and seizure warrant (the \"Warrant\") for the apartment located at 188 East 64th Street, Apt. 1601, New York, NY 10065 (the \"Apartment\"). Warrant, ECF No. 199-8. Wang resided at the Apartment. Wang Aff. ¶ 1, ECF No. 199-4. The Warrant specified the crimes under investigation (the \"Subject Offenses\"). Warrant at 4. It was supported by an affidavit submitted and sworn to by Nicholas DiMarino, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the \"FBI\"). DiMarino Aff., ECF No. 199-1. The March 6, 2023 indictment of Kwok and Je as well as the Complaint are attached as exhibits to the affidavit. *Id.* ¶¶ 7–8.\n\n### III. Wang's Arrest\n\nAt approximately 6:00 a.m. on March 15, 2023, FBI agents arrested Wang and executed the Warrant at the Apartment. Wang Aff. ¶ 2; *see* ECF No. 199-2 at USAO\\_00110620; ECF No. 199-3 at USAO\\_00111198. When Wang opened the door, the agents asked her to enter the hallway, handcuffed her, and told her that she was under arrest. Wang Aff. ¶ 4. At approximately 6:05 a.m., Wang was read her *Miranda* rights. ECF No. 199-3 at USAO\\_00111199. Wang claims that she invoked her right to counsel while still handcuffed in the hallway. Wang Aff. ¶ 5. By contrast, the Government's records do not state that Wang invoked her right to counsel in the hallway. ECF No. 199-2 at USAO\\_00110620.\n\nThe agents \"cleared the residence pursuant to the [Warrant].\" *Id*. They then took Wang to a bedroom area, and Wang \"advised [that] the cellular phone by her bed was one she used often.\" *Id.* Wang was then asked if she would like to provide a statement, and she said that \"she would like to have her lawyer present.” *Id.*; *see* ECF No. 199-3 at USAO\\_00111199 (“Wang would later invoke her right to counsel at approximately 6[:]15am.\"). Wang agrees that she invoked her right to counsel in the bedroom, but claims that she had also invoked it earlier while in the hallway. *See* Wang Aff. ¶¶ 4–6.\n\nThe agents also found multiple phones on the kitchen counter; Wang stated \"she used them all.\" ECF No. 199-2 at USAO\\_00110620. \"When asked, Wang provided the phones' passcodes, (where applicable) prior to Wang leaving the residence to be transported.\" *Id.* The agents' report does not state the time or place of this questioning, but Wang says that it also occurred in the bedroom. Wang Aff. ¶ 6. At approximately 7:00 a.m., the agents transported Wang to an FBI office. ECF No. 199-3 at USAO\\_00111199.\n\n### **DISCUSSION**\n\n### I. Motion for a Bill of Particulars\n\n### A. Legal Standard\n\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) gives the Court the authority to order a bill of particulars \"to permit a defendant 'to identify with sufficient particularity the nature of the charge pending against [her], thereby enabling [a] defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should [s]he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.'\" *United States v. Davidoff*, 845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting *United States v. Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). The decision to\n\ngrant or deny a bill of particulars \"rests within the sound discretion of the district court.\" *Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d at 574.\n\n\"In determining whether a bill of particulars is warranted, the important question is whether the information sought is necessary, not whether it is helpful.\" *United States v. Tournant*, No. 22 Cr. 276, 2023 WL 8649893, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The defendant cannot use the bill of particulars to \"obtain the government's evidence; restrict the government's evidence prior to trial; assist the defendant's investigation; obtain the precise way in which the government intends to prove its case; interpret its evidence for the defendant[;] or disclose its legal theory.\" *United States v. Carroll*, No. 19 Cr. 545, 2020 WL 1862446, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020).\n\nParticulars are necessary \"only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which [s]he is accused.\" *United States v. Chen*, 378 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Although \"'mountains' of discovery without more\" will not render an indictment constitutionally sound if the defendant is not \"apprise[d] . . . of the parameters of the scheme with which [s]he is charged,\" *Tournant*, 2023 WL 8649893, at \\*2, \\*4 (citation omitted), \"the provision of voluminous discovery in combination with some guidance about what is most relevant can vitiate a need for further particulars.\" *Carroll*, 2020 WL 1862446, at \\*6.\n\nFactors considered in determining whether to order a bill of particulars include \"the clarity of the indictment; the duration and breadth of the alleged conspiracy, i.e., the complexity of the crime charged; whether the government has provided adequate notice of the particulars; the potential danger to co-conspirators, witnesses, or victims; and the nature of the alleged criminal conduct.\" *Tournant*, 2023 WL 8649893, at \\*2. The length of the indictment is not\n\ndispositive if the defendant is still left with an insufficient understanding of the parameters of the scheme with which she is charged. *See id.* at \\*4. On the other hand, the Government is not required to \"set forth the precise details of a charged criminal conspiracy.\" *United States v. Cave*, No. 18 Cr. 689-1, 2019 WL 2764081, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2019) (citation omitted).\n\n### B. Analysis\n\nS2, which is forty-nine pages, describes the four interrelated schemes in detail and is not \"so general that [it does] not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which [s]he is accused.\" *Id.* at \\*2 (citation omitted). However, Wang requests five categories of additional information with respect to the allegations: (1) the identities of victims of the fraud, (2) how she conducted the GTV Private Placement, (3) how she enriched herself as a result of the fraud, (4) which businesses are instrumentalities of the fraud, and (5) which wire transfers are illegal. *See* Def. Reply at 21–25, ECF No. 236.\n\nWang's first three requests are meritless. First, Wang seeks the identity and location of purported victims, and asks whether the Government will call those victims at trial. The prosecution states that \"the discovery materials already contain\" the information about the victims. Gov. Opp. at 36, ECF No. 232. Wang does not dispute this, *see* Def. Reply at 21–23, which is alone sufficient to deny her request. *Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d at 574 (\"[I]f the information sought by the defendant is provided in . . . some acceptable alternate form, no bill of particulars is required.\"). Wang's latter request, which seeks disclosure of trial witnesses, is premature. *United States v. Gibson*, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (\"A bill of particulars is not . . . a means to compel the government to disclose evidence or witnesses to be offered prior to trial.\").\n\nWang relies on the recent decision in *United States v. Tournant*, which required the Government to particularize the alleged fraud victims. *Tournant* similarly featured a lengthy indictment that provided a detailed overview of the complex fraud scheme, including examples of alleged misrepresentations, and discovery that listed investors in the defendant's funds. 2023 WL 8649893, at \\*3–4. But, in that case, the defendant was charged with fraud based on individual misrepresentations made to particular investors, and had to identify the victims out of over 100 sophisticated institutional and individual investors spread across seventeen different funds. *Id.* at \\*1, 3–4. The defendant contended that the scheme charged was \"highly individualized,\" as the investors all had \"different investment objectives, risk strategies, and disclosures.\" *Id.* at \\*3–4. The court agreed, finding that it \"would be a daunting and potentially impossible undertaking\" to \"extrapolate\" the full list of victims from the \"limited set of examples” in the indictment. *Id.* at \\*4; *see also United States v. Vaid*, No. 16 Cr. 763, 2017 WL 3891695, at \\*11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (requiring the Government in an insurance-fraud case to specify which claims were fraudulent because it had to show at trial that each fraudulent claim was medically unnecessary or not provided).\n\nBy contrast, the frauds alleged by the Government in S2 are not \"highly individualized,\" and their details are not so \"obscure.\" *Tournant*, 2023 WL 8649893, at \\*3–4 (citing *Bortnovsky*, 820 F.2d 572). For example, the Government alleges that the GTV Private Placement raised \\$452 million from 5,500 investors—based on a social media video by Kwok and written materials distributed en masse—and misappropriated \"the vast majority of the proceeds.\" S2 ¶ 16(a), (e)–(f). The Government similarly alleges that the Farm Loan Program and the G|CLUBS programs were rife with fraud and points to particular mass statements distributed by the Defendants in support of these claims. *Id.* ¶¶ 17(e)–(f), 18(d), (e), (h). Wang, therefore, has\n\na sufficient description of the frauds of which she is accused, as well as the purported victims of the schemes—who are, in the Government's account, nearly all of the investors in the three schemes.<sup>3</sup> Wang’s request is an impermissible attempt to use the bill of particulars as “a general investigative tool.\" *United States v. Rivera*, No. 16 Cr. 175, 2017 WL 1843302, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017).\n\nSecond, Wang seeks particulars regarding how the Government alleges that she \"conducted the GTV Private Placement,\" including which securities purchases and sales were involved. Def. Reply at 24. But, the indictment has already provided this information, detailing Wang's involvement in controlling bank accounts in which investor funds were deposited and misappropriating the funds in those accounts. S2 ¶ 16(f), (h). Wang's request \"impermissibly seeks evidentiary detail.\" *Vaid*, 2017 WL 3891695, at \\*12.\n\nThird, Wang calls for the Government to specify how she allegedly enriched herself as part of the schemes. Def. Reply at 24–25. Again, the indictment provides this information, stating that Wang was \"paid at least approximately \\$500,000 per year, was gifted an approximately \\$1.1 million-dollar Manhattan condominium, and was promised millions of dollars' worth of a purported cryptocurrency.\" S2 ¶ 5. Further specification is not necessary. *See United States v. Savin*, No. 00 Cr. 45, 2001 WL 243533, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001) (denying a request for evidentiary detail regarding defendant's \"alleged role\" in the offense).\n\n<sup>3</sup> Wang speculates that the investors in the GTV Private Placement \"may have had a variety of motivations, expectations, and beliefs about why they were investing.\" Def. Mem. at 18. But unlike the defendant in *Tournant*, who was alleged to have made \"different misrepresentations to different investors who were invested in different [f]unds . . . at different times,\" Defendants are not alleged to have personalized their outreach to any specific victims. 2023 WL 8649893, at \\*3. Whether Defendants conceived of and carried out any \"scheme to defraud\" investors by their misrepresentations, therefore, will be a question common to most (if not all) of the investors. *See United States v. Shellef*, 507 F.3d 82, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that, in order to prove the \"scheme to defraud\" element of a wire fraud claim, a defendant must have \"contemplated actual harm that would befall victims due to his deception\").\n\nWang's final two requests are justified. Wang seeks a list of the businesses that the Government alleges to be fraudulent or fictitious, interrelated, and instrumentalities of the fraud. Def. Reply at 23–24. She also asks which wire transfers the Government alleges are illegal. *Id.* at 25. Courts regularly require the Government to provide information about wire transfers through particulars when the defendant is faced with wire-fraud charges and voluminous discovery. *See United States v. Silver*, 117 F. Supp. 3d 461, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); *United States v. Rajaratnam*, No. 09 Cr. 1184, 2010 WL 2788168, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) (citations omitted); *United States v. Reale*, No. 96 Cr. 1069, 1997 WL 580778, at \\*14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1997).\n\nThe Government states that such information is \"contained in the bank and financial records produced in discovery and already in the defendant's possession.\" Gov. Opp. at 35 & n.5. It is true that the Government has done more than provide an \"unspecified series of intercompany transfers without identifying the amounts, dates, means, corporate entities, or coconspirators involved.\" *Savin*, 2001 WL 243533, at \\*3 (quotation marks omitted). The indictment names forty-four entities that it alleges were part of the RICO enterprise. S2 ¶ 3(a); *see* Gov. Opp. at 33–34. The prosecution further alleges that Kwok and Je transferred money to purchase a New Jersey mansion, at least two luxury vehicles, and a luxury yacht; invested \\$100 million in a high-risk hedge fund; transferred \\$10 million into Je's accounts; and paid Wang and bought her a Manhattan condominium. S2 ¶ 5; *see also id.* ¶¶ 16(h), 17(f), 18(h). In the securities fraud conspiracy count, it also alleges that Wang \"opened a particular bank account in the name of GTV\" and transferred approximately \\$200 million into it around May 20, 2020, and \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from Saraca to Fund-1\" around June 5, 2020. *Id.* ¶ 40(b), (c). Each of these examples has specified dollar amounts and beneficiaries. *See United*\n\n*States v. Kozel*, No. 19 Cr. 460, 2020 WL 4751498, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) (suggesting that these were necessary particulars).\n\nBut, the indictment makes clear that these transfers are only examples of Wang and her co-defendants' money transfers \"through more than 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 entities or individuals, including entities that are part of the Kwok Enterprise.\" *Id.* ¶ 4; *see id.* ¶¶ 4, 17(f), 18(h) (stating that these transactions were examples). The indictment does not specify these accounts or entities, beyond naming forty-four entities as part of the RICO enterprise and stating that some proceeds were transferred to \"bank accounts in the United States, the Bahamas, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates\" and \"held in the name of entities owned or otherwise controlled by Je, including ACA Capital, Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., and Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC.\" *Id.* ¶ 4.\n\nSpecifying four countries and forty-seven entities—when a \"complex web\" of over 500 accounts and eighty entities are allegedly implicated by the scheme—does not provide Wang with enough information about the accounts and entities at issue. S2 ¶ 18(h); *see Silver*, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 470–71 (requiring a bill of particulars where the indictment could implicate \"hundreds of thousands\" of wire transmissions and lacked \"specific information regarding the dates of the allegedly offending mailings and wire transmissions\"). And, the Government cannot rely on discovery where, as here, the \"large volume of material disclosed\" forces the defendant to \"attempt to guess at which transactions, during a [five]-year period, were allegedly improper.\" *Rajaratnam*, 2010 WL 2788168, at \\*2 (citations omitted); *accord Tournant*, 2023 WL 8649893, at \\*4 (requiring particulars to provide the defendant with knowledge of the \"parameters of the scheme\").\n\nIn \"complex conspiracy cases like this one, the potential for unfair surprise and the difficulty of preparing a defense are amplified.\" *United States v. Bonventre*, No. 10 Cr. 228, 2013 WL 2303726, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2013); *see Reale*, 1997 WL 580778, at \\*14 (\"[E]ach use of the mail or wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud constitutes a separate crime.\"). Still, the Government need not \"disclose in advance of trial every act it will prove that may violate some criminal statute,\" *Davidoff*, 845 F.2d at 1154, or \"itemize all the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy,\" *Rajaratnam*, 2010 WL 2788168, at \\*3. The Court shall not require the Government to point to every transfer that it contends is illegal in light of the detail and guidance provided in S2. However, the Government is directed to provide to Wang a list of the specific accounts and entities at issue so that she can understand the parameters of the scheme and prepare for trial.<sup>4</sup>\n\nAccordingly, Wang's motion for a bill of particulars is GRANTED IN PART. By **April 2, 2024**, the Government shall indicate to Wang the entities and bank accounts that it contends were involved in the scheme and the dates for any transfers alleged in S2.\n\n### II. Motion to Sever Trial\n\n### A. Legal Standard\n\n\"There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.\" *Zafiro v. United States*, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993). However, under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, \"[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment . . . for trial appears to prejudice a defendant . . . , the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.\" Fed. R. Crim. P.\n\n<sup>4</sup> The prejudice to the Government's investigation from this disclosure is limited, as trial is set to begin in less than 60 days. *See Bonventre*, 2013 WL 2303726, at \\*7 (requiring disclosure of exhibits and copies of the exhibits no later than 60 days before trial, in lieu of a bill of particulars); *United States v. Wey*, No. 15 Cr. 611, 2017 WL 237651, at \\*22 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (same).\n\n14(a). Severance is \"an extreme remedy.\" *United States v. Lopez*, No. 18 Cr. 736, 2019 WL 4733603, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019). \"The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that severance is proper,\" *id.*, and this burden can be satisfied only by a showing that \"a joint trial would subject [her] to 'legally cognizable prejudice,'\" *United States v. Pirro*, 76 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 541).\n\nThe preference for joint trials reflects the idea that \"[t]hey promote efficiency and serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.\" *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 537 (quotation marks omitted); *see also Richardson v. Marsh*, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (explaining that joint trials \"enabl[e] [a] more accurate assessment of relative culpability advantages which sometimes operate to the defendant's benefit\"). The Supreme Court has, therefore, instructed that \"a district court should grant a Rule 14 severance motion only when 'there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.'\" *United States v. Feyrer*, 333 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 539). Even in situations \"where the risk of prejudice is high,\" the court should consider \"less drastic measures—such as limiting instructions—[which] often suffice as an alternative to granting a Rule 14 severance motion.\" *Id.* The preference for joint trials \"is particularly strong where . . . the defendants are alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme.\" *United States v. Salameh*, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998); *see also Pirro*, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 483.\n\n# B. Analysis\n\nThe cases against Wang and Kwok are overlapping, and judicial efficiency and the interests of justice weigh in favor of trying the two together. The indictment charges Wang and Kwok with the same eleven counts and only charges Kwok with one additional count for the\n\nalleged Himalaya Exchange fraud. *See generally* S2. The Government alleges that Wang \"was intimately involved in every aspect of the charged offenses.\" Gov. Opp. at 40. And, the Government intends to introduce \"virtually identical\" trial evidence against her and Kwok through “many of the same witnesses.” *Id.* at 40, 43–44.\n\nWang contends that severance is nonetheless warranted because of marked differences in evidence and \"alleged culpability\" between her and Kwok, pointing to the fact that, according to the indictment, she received far fewer financial benefits and made fewer allegedly fraudulent statements than Kwok. Def. Mem. at 23–25. As the Second Circuit has recognized, \"disparity in the quantity of evidence and of proof of culpability are inevitable in any multidefendant trial, and by themselves do not warrant a severance,\" particularly when the unrelated evidence does not \"reflect[] activities of a violent nature.\" *United States v. Cardascia*, 951 F.2d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 1991); *see also United States v. Spinelli*, 352 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"[E]ven the fact that evidence may be admissible against one defendant but not another does not necessarily require a severance.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)). \"[I]t is well established that defendants who played a minor role in a conspiracy may be tried with those who played a larger or dominant role.\" *United States v. Hameedi*, No. 17 Cr. 137, 2017 WL 5152991, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); *see also Richardson*, 481 U.S. at 210.\n\nAlthough prejudice may occur when \"proof inadmissible against a defendant becomes a part of [her] trial solely due to the presence of co-defendants as to whom its admission is proper,\" \"[t]his is an unlikely occurrence when [both] defendants are charged under the same conspiracy count.\" *Salameh*, 152 F.3d at 115. Evidence of criminal acts by co-conspirators are often admissible to prove the existence of the criminal racketeering enterprise in which the defendant participated. *United States v. Matera*, 489 F.3d 115, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2007). Kwok's\n\nallegedly fraudulent statements may be admissible against Wang at a separate trial, and their admission during a joint trial is \"neither spillover nor prejudicial.\" *United States v. Ramos*, 346 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).<sup>5</sup>\n\nAccordingly, Wang has not made the weighty showing which would warrant severance of her trial from Kwok's, and her motion is DENIED.\n\n### III. Motion to Suppress Apartment Evidence\n\n### A. Legal Standard\n\nPursuant to the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of the right to be free from \"unreasonable searches and seizures,\" \"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.\" U.S. Const. amend. IV.\n\nWhen reviewing a challenged warrant, the Court \"accord[s] considerable deference to the probable cause determination of the issuing magistrate\" and ensures only that \"the totality of the circumstances afforded the magistrate 'a substantial basis' for making the requisite probable cause determination.\" *United States v. Thomas*, 788 F.3d 345, 350 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Probable cause is a \"fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.\" *Maryland v. Pringle*, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003) (citation omitted).\n\nThe Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement seeks \"to prevent general searches.\" *Maryland v. Garrison*, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). To satisfy the requirement, a warrant must (1)\n\n<sup>5</sup> Wang claims that she \"may have conflicting defenses with Kwok.\" Def. Mem. at 25; Def. Reply at 29. But, she does not specify what these defenses may be, why they could not be presented with Kwok as a co-defendant, or why measures such as limiting instructions—\"commonly used in multi-defendant, racketeering conspiracy cases such as this\"—are insufficient. *United States v. Eley*, No. 20 Cr. 78-3, 2022 WL 1608068, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2022).\n\n\"identify the specific offense for which the police have established probable cause,\" (2) \"describe the place to be searched,\" and (3) \"specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes.\" *United States v. Purcell*, 967 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). A warrant is facially unconstitutional if it fails to comply with any of these requirements—for example, if the warrant does not tell the officer what crime is at issue in the search, or if it provides no limitation on the \"kind of evidence sought.\" *Id.* (collecting cases).\n\nA warrant that satisfies particularity may still be defective if the \"description of the objects to be seized . . . is broader than can be justified by the probable cause upon which the warrant is based.\" *United States v. Galpin*, 720 F.3d 436, 446 (2d Cir. 2013). The Circuit has cautioned that, \"[n]evertheless, in many cases, the volume of records properly subject to seizure because of their evidentiary value may be vast.\" *Purcell*, 967 F.3d at 179 (citation omitted); *accord United States v. Johnson*, 93 F.4th 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2024).\n\n\"[E]vidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant will not be suppressed if it was 'obtained in objectively reasonable reliance' on the invalid warrant.\" *Purcell*, 967 F.3d at 179 (quoting *United States v. Leon*, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)). The good-faith exception does not apply \"(1) where the issuing magistrate has been knowingly misled; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) where the application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient that reliance upon it is unreasonable.\" *United States v. Moore*, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Warrants without a reference to alleged crimes or a temporal scope fall into the fourth category. *In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props.*, 934 F.3d 147, 163 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\n## B. Analysis\n\nWang challenges Judge Gorenstein's determination of probable cause and argues that the Warrant was insufficiently particular and overbroad. Def. Mem. at 5–10.\n\n1. Probable Cause\n\nWang argues that the Warrant lacks probable cause because DiMarino's affidavit ties her only to the GTV Private Placement in 2020 and fails to establish that evidence of a crime would still be found at the Apartment. *Id.* at 5–7. The Court disagrees with Wang's cramped reading of the affidavit.\n\nFirst, the affidavit ties Wang to the Apartment. Wang's name appears on purchase records for the Apartment. DiMarino Aff. ¶ 19(a). Second, contrary to Wang's assertion that she was only linked to the GTV Private Placement, the affidavit provides sufficient facts to infer Wang's extensive involvement with Kwok's alleged schemes. The affidavit identifies Wang as the \"New York-based functional head of various of the KWOK-affiliated entities that have operated the [f]raud [s]cheme,\" *id*. ¶ 9, and states that she exchanged messages with Kwok and Je about \"various of the fraud-related ventures, including GTV and G|Fashion,\" *id.* ¶ 16(b). The Complaint—incorporated into the affidavit, *id.* ¶ 8—states that Wang \"has had a close personal relationship with\" Kwok, and \"is the [p]resident, [t]reasurer, and [s]ecretary of an entity that manages [Kwok]'s purportedly vast personal wealth.\" Compl. ¶ 10(e).\n\nThird, and finally, the affidavit makes clear that these schemes extended from 2018 through March 2023, defeating Wang's contention of staleness. *See* DiMarino Aff. ¶ 6. In addition, the warrant application primarily sought cell phone communications and business records, which constitute \"property of a more permanent nature that is likely to be maintained in one place for longer periods of time.\" *United States v. Salomon-Mendez*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 340,\n\n347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); *see United States v. Yu*, No. 22 Cr. 208, 2023 WL 4687970, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2023). Therefore, Wang has not made a sufficient showing for the Court to second-guess Judge Gorenstein's considered determination of probable cause.\n\n2. Particularity\n\nOn particularity, Wang does not contest that the Warrant facially meets the three criteria set forth by the Second Circuit in *Purcell*: it sets forth the Subject Offenses and explicitly incorporates Attachment A-2, which specifies the relevant time period and lists twelve categories of information to be seized. *See* Warrant at USAO\\_00110309, USAO\\_00110311 to USAO\\_00110315; *Purcell*, 967 F.3d at 179 (permitting a court to examine supporting documents in a particularity determination only if those documents are \"incorporated by reference in the warrant itself and attached to it\").\n\nWang argues—relying on *United States v. Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) that the Warrant defined two categories of information vaguely and, therefore, gave the FBI agents unbounded discretion to search the Apartment. The Warrant is a far cry from the warrant examined in *Wey*, which not only failed to specify the crimes or time period at issue but also, when setting forth \"expansive categories of often generic items subject to seizure,\" omitted \"any linkage to the suspected criminal activity.\" 256 F. Supp. 3d at 385. By contrast, the first category that Wang objects to is the authorized seizure of evidence concerning entities allegedly involved in the Subject Offenses. *See* Def. Mem. at 8–9. But, the Warrant names nine specific entities involved in the fraud scheme and, although it includes broad language about \"other entities and/or individuals,\" this language is cabined by the nine named entities and the requirement that the entities be tied to the Subject Offenses. *See* Warrant at USAO\\_00110311 to USAO\\_00110312. The next objected-to category is items \"that may have been purchased using\n\nfunds originally sourced from proceeds derived from the Subject Offenses.\" Def. Mem. at 9. Again, this broad language is cabined by the category in which it is contained, namely \"[e]vidence concerning the possession, receipt, use, transfer, or laundering of funds obtained in connection with the Subject Offenses.\" Warrant at USAO\\_00110312. The limitations imposed by the Warrant's references to the Subject Offenses and by DiMarino's affidavit, which is also incorporated into the Warrant, prevent the \"seizure of sweeping categories of materials, regardless of their potential connection (or lack thereof) to any suspected criminal activities.\" *Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 387. It may be that this category is vast, given the nature of the Subject Offenses, but vastness alone does not make a warrant defective. *Purcell*, 967 F.3d at 179. Accordingly, the Warrant is not insufficiently particular.\n\n## 3. Overbreadth\n\nFinally, Wang contends that the Warrant authorizes seizure of materials related to entities that the affidavit does not sufficiently tie her to and, therefore, is overbroad. But, as the Court has already found, the affidavit permits a probable-cause inference that Wang was an integral member of Kwok's alleged fraud schemes. The affidavit also offers factual content in support of the inference that Wang used electronic devices to communicate and make transfers in service of those schemes. Therefore, the Warrant authorizing seizure of items related to those schemes including electronic information—is not overbroad.<sup>6</sup>\n\nAccordingly, Wang's motion to suppress the evidence from the Apartment is DENIED.\n\n<sup>6</sup> Even if the Warrant were defective, which it is not, suppression is unwarranted because Wang has not shown that it was objectively unreasonable for the FBI agents to rely on the Warrant. *See United States v. Rosenfeld*, No. 23 Cr. 65, 2023 WL 8471947, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2023).\n\n### IV. Motion to Suppress Post-Arrest Statement\n\n### A. Legal Standard\n\nThe Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination guarantees that custodial interrogation \"must cease until an attorney is present\" if the defendant requests counsel. *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). \"[W]hen an accused has invoked [her] right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, . . . [she] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to [her], unless the accused [herself] initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.\" *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). The invocation of the right \"requires a *clear* assertion of the right to counsel,\" not an ambiguous reference such as, \"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.\" *United States v. Medunjanin*, 752 F.3d 576, 586–87 (2d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up and emphasis in original). Interrogation includes both express questioning and \"any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\" *Rhode Island v. Innis*, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). But, \"routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation protected by *Miranda*.\" *United States v. Haygood*, 157 F. App'x 448, 449 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order).\n\nUnder the Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Patane*, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), a failure to give *Miranda* warnings does not require suppression of nontestimonial \"physical evidence discovered as a consequence of unwarned statements that are voluntary and uncoerced.\" *United States v. McCoy*, 407 F. App'x 514, 516 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order); *accord United States v. Sharma*, No. 18 Cr. 340, 2019 WL 3802223, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2019).This is because *Miranda* is a prophylactic rule that safeguards the Fifth Amendment's \"prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial.\" *Patane*, 542\n\nU.S. at 637. \"The exclusion of unwarned statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived *Miranda* violation.\" *United States v. Tirado*, No. 17 Cr. 668, 2018 WL 3432040, at \\*21 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2018) (quoting *Patane*, 542 U.S. at 641–42) (cleaned up); *see United States v. Wilson*, 914 F. Supp. 2d 550, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).\n\nUnder the \"inevitable-discovery exception,\" to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, moreover, the Government may \"rely on unlawfully seized evidence if it can prove that it would have inevitably obtained the evidence absent the constitutional violation.\" *In re 650 Fifth Ave.*, 934 F.3d at 164 (citation omitted). But, to do so, the Government must \"prove that each event leading to the discovery of the evidence would have occurred with a sufficiently high degree of confidence for the district judge to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.\" *Id.* (citation omitted).\n\nB. Analysis\n\nThe *Patane* rule may not neatly apply in this case for two reasons. First, although the Second Circuit has noted that \"failure to give *Miranda* warnings does not require suppression of physical evidence discovered as a consequence of . . . voluntary statements,\" *McCoy*, 407 F. App'x at 516, the Circuit has not yet determined whether the same standards of voluntariness apply for statements obtained in violation of *Edwards*.<sup>7</sup>\n\n<sup>7</sup> It is true that, like *Miranda*, the *Edwards* rule is \"judicially prescribed prophylaxis,\" *Maryland v. Shatzer*, 559 U.S. 98, 105 (2010). But, the Third Circuit has explicitly reserved judgment on whether *Patane* applies equally to physical evidence obtained pursuant to an *Edwards* violation. *United States v. Caesar*, 2 F.4th 160, 168 n.4 (3d Cir. 2021); *see also United States v. McCluskey*, Cr. No. 10-2734, 2013 WL 12330211, at \\*3–4 (D.N.M. June 14, 2013). There is reason to believe that the answer may be different. \"The merit of the *Edwards* decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application.\" *Minnick v. Mississippi*, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990). When a defendant invokes their right to silence under *Miranda*, the police must cut off questioning but can resume questioning after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings. *Michigan v. Mosley*, 423 U.S. 96, 105 (1975). By contrast, *Edwards* demands that questioning cease until an attorney is present or unless there is a break in custody lasting at least fourteen days. *Shatzer*, 559 U.S. at 104, 110. Moreover, one district court has found:\n\nAs a practical matter, once an arrestee has invoked the right to counsel, the police know that the interview is the last opportunity they will have to interrogate the arrestee without counsel. There is\n\nSecond, it is unresolved whether the provision of a password or code in this manner is indeed nontestimonial. The Government cites a Fifth Circuit case holding that when the evidence seized is \"physical, nontestimonial evidence, an *Edwards* violation itself would not justify suppression.\" Gov. Opp. at 24 (citing *United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia*, 708 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2013)). But, that same case—although permitting guns discovered in violation of *Edwards* to be admitted—held that the defendant's act of \"unlocking the combination locks\" on the gun cases was \"testimonial and communicative in nature.\" *Id.* \"Several courts to consider the issue have specifically held that asking a suspect to enter his phone passcode after the suspect has requested an attorney is an *Edwards* violation requiring suppression of the contents of the phone.\" *United States v. Pinto-Thomaz*, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing *United States v. Gilkeson*, 431 F. Supp. 2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) and *United States v. Mitchell*, 76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017)),<sup>8</sup> *see Seo v. State*, 148 N.E.3d 952, 957–58 (Ind. 2020) (\"[A] suspect surrendering an unlocked smartphone implicitly communicates, at a minimum, three things: (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) the suspect possessed those files. And, unless the State can show it already knows this information, the communicative aspects of the production fall within the Fifth Amendment's protection.\").\n\nThe Court shall not wade into these novel constitutional waters when there are factual disputes that may obviate the need for such a decision. First, Wang claims that she invoked her\n\nno incentive to cease questioning if the arrestee can be induced to make incriminating statements or to reveal information which leads to physical evidence that can be admitted in a subsequent criminal case. The fact that the statements themselves would not be admissible is not a sufficient remedy to protect the individual's right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.\n\n*United States v. Gilkeson*, 431 F. Supp. 2d 270, 294 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).\n\n<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the *Pinto-Thomaz* court later stated that \"being made to produce a phone password—at least, where, as here, there is no real dispute that the person in fact owns the phone and knows its password—does not violate the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incriminating testimony.\" *United States v. Smith*, 673 F. Supp. 3d 381, 388 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).\n\nright to counsel prior to being asked about the phones or providing her passwords. Wang Aff. ¶¶ 4–6. But, the warrant reports created by the FBI agents indicate that Wang first invoked her right to counsel only after being taken to the bedroom. *See* ECF No. 199-2 at USAO\\_00110620. Moreover, neither Wang's affidavit nor the reports are clear as to whether Wang re-initiated contact with the agents after invoking the right to counsel. If Wang provided the passwords before invoking her right to counsel or re-initiated contact with the agents after her invocation, then there was no *Edwards* violation, and the issue is moot.\n\nSecond, the Government claims that it would have inevitably accessed the phones because the Warrant permitted them to compel Wang's use of the phones' biometrics and because \"tools employed by the FBI . . . are sometimes able to access cellphones without passcodes.\" Gov. Opp. at 28–29. But, the Government has not submitted an affidavit demonstrating that each of the phones had biometrics that could be so accessed or establishing the FBI's ability to access the phones. Therefore, the Government has not made the necessary showing to demonstrate inevitable discovery.\n\nAccordingly, the Court finds that a suppression hearing is necessary to determine (1) whether Wang invoked her right to counsel prior to being questioned regarding her phone passwords, and (2) whether the Government would have inevitably accessed the phones. The hearing shall be held on **April 9, 2024**, at **11:00 a.m.**\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, Wang's motion for a bill of particulars is GRANTED IN PART, her motion to sever her trial is DENIED, and her motion to suppress the Apartment evidence is DENIED. The Court shall hold a suppression hearing regarding the post-arrest statements on **April 9, 2024**, at **11:00 a.m.** The Government is directed to provide to Wang a list\n\nof the entities and bank accounts that it contends were involved in the schemes and the dates for\n\nany transfers alleged in S2 by **April 2, 2024**.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: March 22, 2024 New York, New York\n\nQS","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n* *\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）,\n\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\nLabels Values\nDOC #:\nDATE FILED: 03/22/2024\n\n-against-（诉）\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平）,\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nDefendant（被告）.\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge（地区法官）:\n\n2024年1月3日，曼哈顿大陪审团作出了一份附随起诉书（“S2”），指控被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）犯有十一项电汇欺诈、证券欺诈和非法货币交易罪名项，以及共谋实施诈骗犯罪（RICO）、电汇和银行欺诈、洗钱和证券欺诈。S2，ECF No. 215。王提出动议，请求法院作出命令：(1) 指示政府提供明细指控书；(2) 将其审理程序与共同被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）分离；(3) 排除依据搜查令从其曼哈顿公寓扣押的证据；以及 (4) 排除其被捕后向调查人员所作的陈述。$^1$ Def. Mot.，ECF No. 196；参见 Def. Mem.，ECF No. 197；ECF No. 231。基于下述理由，(1) 王关于明细指控书的动议获部分批准，(2) 其关于分离审理的动议被驳回，(3) 其关于排除其公寓证据的动议被驳回，以及 (4) 本院将就其被捕后陈述举行证据排除听证会。\n\n王与两名共同被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）和 Kin Ming Je（余建明）被指控运作一项骗取数千名投资者超过 10 亿美元的欺诈计划，将\n\n收益通过境内外实体进行洗钱，并挪用资金供个人使用。起诉书指控涉嫌的欺诈计划由四项“投资机会”构成：(1) “GTV私募”，即郭的“公民记者”公司的一项未经注册的股票发售；(2) “农场贷款项目”，该项目募集资金并由被告承诺可转换为 GTV 股票；(3) “G|CLUBS”，一项“高端会员计划”；以及 (4) “喜马拉雅交易所”（Himalaya Exchange），一项加密货币发售。S2 ¶¶ 16–19。起诉书还指控郭、余和王通过“以至少 80 个不同实体或个人名义持有的约 500 多个账户”转移资金。同上 ¶ 4。\n\n2023年3月6日，郭和余最初被控犯有电汇欺诈、证券欺诈、洗钱和非法货币交易，以及共谋实施电汇欺诈、证券及银行欺诈和洗钱。ECF No. 2。2023年3月10日，政府提交了一份刑事起诉状（“Complaint”），指控王犯有电汇欺诈、证券欺诈、非法货币交易，以及共谋实施电汇欺诈和证券欺诈。Compl.，ECF No. 1。同日，Gabriel W. Gorenstein 治安法官对王签发了逮捕令。ECF No. 2，Dkt. Entry 3/10/2023。\n\n2023年3月29日，王首次被提起四项罪名项的起诉：(1) 源于 GTV 私募的电汇欺诈和 (2) 证券欺诈，(3) 非法货币交易，以及 (4) 共谋实施电汇及银行欺诈、洗钱和证券欺诈。S1 ¶¶ 1–36, 51–52，ECF No. 19。2024年1月3日提交的 S2 指控王犯有十一项罪名项。2 除了将共谋指控分拆为三个单独的罪名项（S2 ¶¶ 27–40）之外，该附随起诉书还在\n\n2 王于2023年12月15日（在 S2 作出之前）提交了作为本裁定对象的综合动议文书。Def. Mot.。在日期为2024年1月18日的信函中，她告知法院鉴于 S2 的出台她不打算提交新的文书，参见 ECF No. 231，且各方在反对和回复文书中论述了 S2 对其各项动议的影响。参见 Gov. Opp.，ECF No. 232；Def. Reply，ECF No. 236。\n\n农场贷款项目和 G|CLUBS 的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈指控中增加了王（S2 ¶¶ 45–52），并指控所有被告犯有一项共谋实施诈骗犯罪（“RICO”）的罪名项，同上 ¶¶ 1–26。余单独被控妨碍司法，同上 ¶¶ 57–58，余和郭被控源于喜马拉雅交易所的电汇欺诈，同上 ¶¶ 53–54。\n\nII. 搜查令\n\n2023年3月14日，Gorenstein 法官就位于 188 East 64th Street, Apt. 1601, New York, NY 10065 的公寓（“Apartment”）签发了搜查与扣押令（“Warrant”）。Warrant，ECF No. 199-8。王居住在该公寓。Wang Aff. ¶ 1，ECF No. 199-4。搜查令载明了正在调查的罪行（“Subject Offenses”）。Warrant 第 4 页。搜查令由 Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局，简称“FBI”）特工 Nicholas DiMarino 提交并宣誓的宣誓书支持。DiMarino Aff.，ECF No. 199-1。2023年3月6日对郭和余的起诉书以及刑事起诉状均作为附件附于宣誓书之后。同上 ¶¶ 7–8。\n\nIII. 王的被捕\n\n2023年3月15日约早上 6:00，FBI 特工在该公寓逮捕了王并执行了搜查令。Wang Aff. ¶ 2；参见 ECF No. 199-2 第 USAO_00110620 页；ECF No. 199-3 第 USAO_00111198 页。王开门后，特工要求她走到走廊，给她戴上手铐，并告知她已被捕。Wang Aff. ¶ 4。约早上 6:05，特工向王宣读了米兰达权利（Miranda rights）。ECF No. 199-3 第 USAO_00111199 页。王声称她在走廊戴着手铐时就援引了获得律师协助的权利。Wang Aff. ¶ 5。相比之下，政府的记录中并未记载王曾在走廊援引过其获得律师协助的权利。ECF No. 199-2 第 USAO_00110620 页。\n\n特工“依据[搜查令]对住所进行了排查”。同上。随后他们将王带至卧室区域，王“告知其床边的蜂窝电话是她经常使用的”。同上。随后王被问及是否愿意提供陈述，她说“她希望有她的律师在场”。同上；参见 ECF No. 199-3 第 USAO_00111199 页（“王随后在约 6:15 援引了其获得律师协助的权利”）。王认同她在卧室援引了其获得律师协助的权利，但声称她此前在走廊时也援引过。参见 Wang Aff. ¶¶ 4–6。\n\n特工还在厨房柜台上发现了多部手机；王陈述称“她都使用过”。ECF No. 199-2 第 USAO_00110620 页。“在被问及时，王在离开住所被押送前提供了手机密码（适用情况下）”。同上。特工的报告中未说明此项询问的时间或地点，但王称这也发生在卧室。Wang Aff. ¶ 6。约早上 7:00，特工将王押送至 FBI 办公室。ECF No. 199-3 第 USAO_00111199 页。\n\n论述\n\nI. 明细指控书动议\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 7(f) 条赋予法院命令提供明细指控书的权力，“以使被告‘能够充分具体地确定针对[其]待决指控的性质，从而使被告能够为审判做准备、防止突袭，并在[其]因同一罪行被第二次起诉时提出一事不再理答辩。’”United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988)（援引 United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam)）。作出\n\n批准或驳回明细指控书的决定“属于地区法院的合理自由裁量权范围”。Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 574。\n\n“在确定是否有必要提供明细指控书时，关键问题在于所寻求的信息是否必要，而不在于其是否有帮助。”United States v. Tournant, No. 22 Cr. 276, 2023 WL 8649893, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2023)（内部引号和引文省略）。被告不能利用明细指控书来“获取政府的证据；在审判前限制政府的证据；协助被告的调查；获取政府打算证明其案情的具体方式；为被告解读其证据；或披露其法律理论。”United States v. Carroll, No. 19 Cr. 545, 2020 WL 1862446, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020)。\n\n只有在“起诉书的指控过于概括，以致未能告知被告指控其从事的具体行为时”，明细指控方属必要。United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir. 2004)（引文省略）。尽管如果未“告知……被告其被指控的计划的界限”，仅提供“‘堆积如山’的证据开示”并不能使起诉书符合宪法要求，Tournant, 2023 WL 8649893, at *2, *4（引文省略），但“提供大量证据开示并结合关于何为最相关内容的某些指引，可以消除对进一步明细指控的需求。”Carroll, 2020 WL 1862446, at *6。\n\n在决定是否命令提供明细指控书时所考量的因素包括“起诉书的明确性；涉嫌共谋的持续时间和广度，即所指控罪行的复杂程度；政府是否已充分告知细节；对共同共谋者、证人或受害者的潜在危险；以及涉嫌犯罪行为的性质。”Tournant, 2023 WL 8649893, at *2。如果被告对\n\n其被指控计划的界限仍缺乏充分了解，起诉书的篇幅长短并非决定性因素。参见同上 at *4。另一方面，政府无需“阐明所指控犯罪共谋的精确细节。”United States v. Cave, No. 18 Cr. 689-1, 2019 WL 2764081, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2019)（引文省略）。\n\nB. 分析\n\n长达四十九页的 S2 详细描述了这四个相互关联的计划，并非“过于概括以致未能告知被告指控其从事的具体行为。”同上 at *2（引文省略）。然而，王就指控请求提供五类补充信息：(1) 欺诈受害者的身份，(2) 她如何开展 GTV 私募，(3) 她如何通过欺诈获利，(4) 哪些企业是欺诈的工具，以及 (5) 哪些电汇交易是非法的。参见 Def. Reply at 21–25，ECF No. 236。\n\n王的前三项请求不能成立。首先，王寻求所谓受害者的身份和所在地，并询问政府是否会在审理中传唤这些受害者。检方指出“证据开示材料中已包含”关于受害者的信息。Gov. Opp. at 36，ECF No. 232。王对此并无争议，参见 Def. Reply at 21–23，仅此一点就足以驳回其请求。Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 574（“如果被告寻求的信息已以……某种可接受的替代形式提供，则无需提供明细指控书。”）。王后一项寻求披露出庭证人的请求尚属过早。United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)（“明细指控书并非……强迫政府在审判前披露所提供的证据或证人的手段。”）。\n\nWang（王雁平）援引了最近在 United States v. Tournant 一案中的裁定，该案要求政府明确指控的欺诈受害者的具体细节。Tournant 案同样具有一份篇幅冗长的起诉书，其中对复杂的欺诈计划进行了详细概述，包括所指控的不实陈述的示例，以及列出被告基金中投资者的证据开示材料。2023 WL 8649893, at *3–4。但是，在该案中，被告因对特定投资者作出的个别不实陈述而被控欺诈，并且必须从分布在十七支不同基金中的100多名成熟机构和个人投资者中识别出受害者。同上，*1, 3–4。被告辩称，被指控的计划具有“高度个性化”，因为投资者都具有“不同的投资目标、风险策略和披露内容”。同上，*3–4。法院对此表示赞同，裁定从起诉书中“有限的示例集”中“推断出”全部受害者名单“将是一项艰巨且可能无法完成的任务”。同上，*4；另见 United States v. Vaid, No. 16 Cr. 763, 2017 WL 3891695, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）Sept. 5, 2017)（在起诉保险欺诈的案件中要求政府指明哪些索赔具有欺诈性，因为政府在审判时必须证明每笔欺诈性索赔在医学上是不必要的或未实际提供的）。\n\n相比之下，政府在 S2（第二份替代起诉书）中指控的欺诈并非“高度个性化”，其细节也并非如此“模糊不清”。Tournant, 2023 WL 8649893, at *3–4（引用 Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572）。例如，政府指控 GTV Private Placement（GTV私募）基于 Kwok（郭文贵）发布的社交媒体视频和大规模分发的大宗书面材料，从5,500名投资者处募集了4.52亿美元，并挪用了“绝大部分收益款项”。S2 ¶ 16(a), (e)–(f)。政府同样指控 Farm Loan Program（农场贷款计划）和 G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）项目充斥着欺诈，并指出被告分发的大规模特定声明以支持这些主张。同上，¶¶ 17(e)–(f), 18(d), (e), (h)。因此，王获得了对其被指控的欺诈行为以及该计划据称受害者的充分描述——根据政府的陈述，这些受害者几乎是这三项计划中的所有投资者。3 王的请求属于不可采纳的企图将具体事实说明书（bill of particulars）用作“通用调查工具”的行为。United States v. Rivera, No. 16 Cr. 175, 2017 WL 1843302, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017)。\n\n第二，王请求获得有关政府如何指控她“实施了GTV私募”的详细事实说明，包括涉及哪些证券的买卖。Def. Reply（被告回复）at 24。但是，起诉书已经提供了这方面的信息，详细说明了王参与控制存入投资者资金的银行账户，并挪用这些账户中资金的行为。S2 ¶ 16(f), (h)。王的请求“不可采纳地索取了证据细节”。Vaid, 2017 WL 3891695, at *12。\n\n第三，王要求政府具体说明她据称是如何作为计划一部分获取不当利益的。Def. Reply at 24–25。起诉书同样提供了这一信息，陈述称王“每年获得至少约50万美元的报酬，获赠一套价值约110万美元的曼哈顿公寓，并被承诺给予价值数百万美元的所谓加密货币”。S2 ¶ 5。没有必要作进一步的具体说明。见 United States v. Savin, No. 00 Cr. 45, 2001 WL 243533, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001)（驳回了关于被告在犯罪中“所起据称作用”的证据细节请求）。\n\n3 王推测GTV私募中的投资者“对于其为何投资可能存在各种不同的动机、期望和信念”。Def. Mem.（被告备忘录）at 18。但与 Tournant 案中的被告不同（该案中指控其“在不同时间向投资于不同基金的不同投资者作出了不同的不实陈述”），本案中并未指控被告针对任何特定受害者进行了个性化的联络接触。2023 WL 8649893, at *3。因此，被告是否通过其不实陈述构想并实施了针对投资者的任何“欺诈计划”，将是对大多数（如果不是全部的话）投资者而言普遍存在的问题。见 United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 107 (2d Cir. 2007)（指出为了证明电信欺诈指控中的“欺诈计划”要件，被告必须“预见到由于其欺骗行为将降临到受害者身上的实际损害”）。\n\n王的最后两项请求是合理的。王请求提供一份政府指控为欺诈性或虚假的、相互关联的且作为欺诈工具的商业实体名单。Def. Reply at 23–24。她还询问政府指控哪些电汇属于非法行为。同上，25。当被告面临电信欺诈指控以及卷帙浩繁的证据开示时，法院通常会要求政府通过具体事实说明书提供有关电汇的信息。见 United States v. Silver, 117 F. Supp. 3d 461, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)；United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184, 2010 WL 2788168, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010)（引用判例省略）；United States v. Reale, No. 96 Cr. 1069, 1997 WL 580778, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1997)。\n\n政府陈述称，此类信息“包含在证据开示中提供且已由被告占有的银行和财务记录中”。Gov. Opp.（政府反对意见）at 35 & n.5。诚然，政府所做的工作不仅限于提供“一系列未指明的公司间转账，而未指明所涉及的金额、日期、方式、公司实体或共谋者”。Savin, 2001 WL 243533, at *3（内部引号省略）。起诉书列出了指控属于 RICO（反勒索与受贿组织法）企业一部分的四十四个实体。S2 ¶ 3(a)；见 Gov. Opp. at 33–34。检方进一步指控郭与 Je（余建明）转账购买了一栋新泽西豪宅、至少两辆豪华汽车和一艘豪华游艇；向一家高风险对冲基金投资了1亿美元；向余的账户转账了1,000万美元；向王支付了报酬并为她购买了一套曼哈顿公寓。S2 ¶ 5；亦见同上，¶¶ 16(h), 17(f), 18(h)。在证券欺诈共谋罪名项中，起诉书还指控王“以GTV的名义开设了一个特定的银行账户”，并在2020年5月20日左右向该账户转入约2亿美元，以及在2020年6月5日左右“批准了一笔从 Saraca（萨拉卡公司）向 Fund-1（一号基金）转账1亿美元的电汇”。同上，¶ 40(b), (c)。这些示例中的每一个都指明了具体美元金额和受益人。见 United States v. Kozel, No. 19 Cr. 460, 2020 WL 4751498, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020)（表明这些属于必要的事实说明）。\n\n但是，起诉书明确指出，这些转账仅仅是王及其共同被告“通过以至少80个实体或个人名义持有的500多个账户（包括属于郭氏企业一部分的实体）”进行的资金转账的示例。同上，¶ 4；见同上，¶¶ 4, 17(f), 18(h)（陈述这些交易属于示例）。除了列出作为 RICO 企业一部分的四十四个实体，并陈述部分收益被转入“位于美国、巴哈马、瑞士和阿拉伯联合酋长国的银行账户”且“以余拥有或以其他方式控制的实体（包括 ACA Capital、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 和 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC）的名义持有”之外，起诉书并未具体指明这些账户或实体。同上，¶ 4。\n\n当该计划据称牵涉到由500多个账户和八十个实体构成的“复杂网络”时，仅指明四个国家和四十七个实体，并未就争议账户和实体向王提供足够的信息。S2 ¶ 18(h)；见 Silver, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 470–71（在起诉书可能牵涉“数十万笔”电汇且缺乏“关于据称违法的邮寄和电汇日期的具体信息”的情况下，要求提供具体事实说明书）。而且，如果像本案这样“披露的大量材料”迫使被告“试图去猜测在长达5年的期间内哪些交易据称是不正当的”，政府便不能仅依赖证据开示。Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 2788168, at *2（引用判例省略）；一致意见见 Tournant, 2023 WL 8649893, at *4（要求提供具体事实说明以使被告获知“计划的范围边界”）。\n\n在“像本案这样复杂的共谋案件中，发生不当突袭的可能性以及准备辩护的困难度均被放大”。United States v. Bonventre, No. 10 Cr. 228, 2013 WL 2303726, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2013)；见 Reale, 1997 WL 580778, at *14（“为推进欺诈计划而每一次使用邮寄或电汇均构成单独的犯罪。”）。尽管如此，政府无需“在审判前披露其将要证明的可能违反某项刑事法规的每项行为”，Davidoff, 845 F.2d at 1154，也无需“逐项列出为推进共谋而实施的所有明显作为”，Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 2788168, at *3。鉴于 S2 中提供的细节和指引，本法院不应要求政府指明其主张为非法的每一次转账。然而，现指示政府向王提供一份涉及的具体账户和实体名单，以便其能够了解该计划的范围边界并为审判做准备。4\n\n据此，王关于具体事实说明书的动议获得部分批准（GRANTED IN PART）。在 2024年4月2日 之前，政府应向王指明其主张涉及该计划的实体和银行账户，以及 S2 中所指控之任何转账的日期。\n\nII. 分案审判动议\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n“在联邦司法体系中，倾向于对共同被起诉的被告进行合并审判。”Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993)。然而，根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure）第14条，“如果在起诉书中……将罪名或被告合并审判似乎损害了被告的利益……，法院可以命令就各罪名项分别审判、对各被告分案审判，或提供司法公正所要求的任何其他救济。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a)。\n\n4 鉴于审判定于60天内开庭，该项披露对政府调查造成的损害是有限的。见 Bonventre, 2013 WL 2303726, at *7（要求最迟在开庭前60天披露证据及证据副本，以代替具体事实说明书）；United States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611, 2017 WL 237651, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017)（同上）。\n\n分案是“一项极端的救济措施”。United States v. Lopez, No. 18 Cr. 736, 2019 WL 4733603, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019)。“证明分案适切的举证责任由被告承担”，同上，并且只有在证明“合并审判将使[她]遭受‘法律上可认定的损害’”时，该举证责任方可得到满足，United States v. Pirro, 76 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)（引自 Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541）。\n\n对合并审理的偏好反映了这样一种理念，即“它们通过避免不一致判决的丑闻和不公，提高效率并服务于司法利益。”*Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 537（省略引文引号）；*另见 Richardson v. Marsh*, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987)（解释合并审理“能够更准确地评估相对可归责性——这些优势有时对被告有利”）。因此，最高法院指示，“只有当‘合并审理存在严重风险会损害某一被告的具体审判权利，或阻止陪审团对有罪或无罪作出可靠判断’时，地方法院才应当批准《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第14条规定的分案动议。”*United States v. Feyrer*, 333 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2003)（援引 *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 539）。即使在“损害风险很高”的情况下，法院也应考虑“较不严厉的措施——例如限制性指示——作为准予第14条分案动议的替代方案，往往已足够。”*同上*。对合并审理的偏好“在……被告被指控参与了共同计划或方案的情况下尤为强烈。”*United States v. Salameh*, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998)；*另见 Pirro*, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 483。\n\nB. 分析\n\n针对 Wang（王雁平）和 Kwok（郭文贵）的案件存在重叠，司法效率和司法利益均倾向于对二人进行合并审理。起诉书对王和郭指控了相同的十一个罪名项，仅对郭就\n\n指控的喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）欺诈案增加指控了一个罪名项。*通见* S2。政府指控王“深度参与了所指控罪行的方方面面。”政府反对意见书（Gov. Opp.）第40页。而且，政府打算通过“许多相同的证人”对她和郭提出“几乎完全相同”的庭审证据。*同上*，第40、43–44页。\n\n王主张分案审理仍然是必要的，因为她与郭之间在证据和“被指控的可归责性”方面存在显著差异，并指出根据起诉书，她获得的经济利益远少于郭，且作出的涉嫌欺诈性陈述也少于郭。被告备忘录（Def. Mem.）第23–25页。正如第二巡回法院所确认的，“在任何多被告审判中，证据数量和可归责性证明的不均等是不可避免的，其本身并不构成准予分案的理由”，特别是当不相关的证据并未“反映暴力性质的活动”时更是如此。*United States v. Cardascia*, 951 F.2d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 1991)；*另见 United States v. Spinelli*, 352 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2003)（“即使证据可能对某一名被告具有可采性而对另一名被告不具有可采性，这一事实本身也并不必然要求分案审理。”（省略内部引文引号））。“在共谋中扮演次要角色的被告可以与扮演较大或主导角色的被告一起受审，这是确立已久的规则。”*United States v. Hameedi*, No. 17 Cr. 137, 2017 WL 5152991, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）Nov. 3, 2017)（省略引文）（原修正）；*另见 Richardson*, 481 U.S. at 210。\n\n尽管当“对某一被告不具可采性的证据仅仅因为存在适于采纳该证据的共同被告而成为对其审判的一部分”时可能会产生不利影响，但“当两名被告均根据同一共谋罪名项受到指控时，这种情况极不可能发生。”*Salameh*, 152 F.3d at 115。共谋者的犯罪行为证据通常可用于证明被告参与的犯罪敲诈勒索企业（racketeering enterprise）的存在。*United States v. Matera*, 489 F.3d 115, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2007)。郭的\n\n涉嫌欺诈性陈述在单独审判中可能对王具有可采性，而在合并审判中予以采纳“既非溢出效应亦无实质损害。”*United States v. Ramos*, 346 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)。5\n\n因此，王并未作出足以证明将其审判与郭分案是合理的高标准证明，其动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n\nIII. 排除公寓证据的动议\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n根据第四修正案关于免受“不合理搜查和扣押”权利的保障，“除非有相当理由（probable cause），并经宣誓或代誓宣言确认，且详细描述了要搜查的地点以及要扣押的人或物，否则不得签发搜查令。”U.S. Const. amend. IV。\n\n在审查受到质疑的搜查令时，本法院“对签发搜查令的治安法官（magistrate）的相当理由认定给予相当大的尊重”，并仅确保“案情的全部情况为治安法官作出必要的相当理由认定提供了‘实质性依据’。”*United States v. Thomas*, 788 F.3d 345, 350 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)）。相当理由是一个“流动的概念——取决于在特定事实背景下对概率的评估——不能轻易、甚至不能有效地归结为一套整齐的法律规则。”*Maryland v. Pringle*, 540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003)（省略引文）。\n\n第四修正案的具体性要求旨在“防止概括性搜查（general searches）。”*Maryland v. Garrison*, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)。为满足该要求，搜查令必须 (1)\n\n5 王声称她“可能与郭存在相冲突的辩护理由。”被告备忘录第25页；被告答复书（Def. Reply）第29页。但是，她并未指明这些辩护理由可能是什么，为何不能在与郭作为共同被告的情况下提出这些辩护理由，或者为何诸如限制性指示等措施——“通常用于此类多被告敲诈勒索共谋案件中”——不足以解决问题。*United States v. Eley*, No. 20 Cr. 78-3, 2022 WL 1608068, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2022)。\n\n“指明警察已确立相当理由的具体罪行”，(2) “描述要搜查的地点”，以及 (3) “指明要扣押的物品及其与指定罪行的关系。”*United States v. Purcell*, 967 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2020)（省略引文）。如果搜查令未能遵守这些要求中的任何一项，则在形式上即属违宪——例如，如果搜查令没有告知执法人员搜查所涉的罪名，或者如果搜查令对“所寻求证据的种类”没有提供任何限制。*同上*（汇集案例）。\n\n满足具体性要求的搜查令如果其“对拟扣押物品的描述……超出了作为该搜查令基础的相当理由所能证明合理的范围”，则仍可能存在缺陷。*United States v. Galpin*, 720 F.3d 436, 446 (2d Cir. 2013)。巡回法院提醒道，“尽管如此，在许多案件中，由于其证据价值而正当受到扣押的记录数量可能是庞大的。”*Purcell*, 967 F.3d at 179（省略引文）；*一致意见见 United States v. Johnson*, 93 F.4th 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2024)。\n\n“根据有缺陷的搜查令扣押的证据，如果是‘基于对无效搜查令的客观合理信赖而获得的’，则不会被排除。”*Purcell*, 967 F.3d at 179（援引 *United States v. Leon*, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)）。善意例外不适用于以下情形：“(1) 签发搜查令的治安法官被明知地误导；(2) 签发搜查令的治安法官完全放弃了其司法职责；(3) 申请极度缺乏相当理由的表征，以致于对它的信赖是不合理的；以及 (4) 搜查令在形式上存在严重缺陷，以致于对它的信赖是不合理的。”*United States v. Moore*, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992)（省略引文）。未提及涉嫌罪名或时间范围的搜查令属于第四类。*In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props.*, 934 F.3d 147, 163 (2d Cir. 2019)。\n\nB. 分析\n\n王对 Gorenstein（戈伦斯坦）法官对相当理由的认定提出异议，并辩称搜查令不够具体且范围过宽。被告备忘录第5–10页。\n\n1. 相当理由\n\n王辩称搜查令缺乏相当理由，因为 DiMarino（迪马里诺）的宣誓书仅将她与 2020 年的 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）联系在一起，且未能证明在该公寓中仍能找到犯罪证据。*同上*，第5–7页。法院不同意王对宣誓书的狭隘解读。\n\n首先，宣誓书将王与该公寓联系起来。王的名字出现在该公寓的购买记录上。迪马里诺宣誓书（DiMarino Aff.）¶ 19(a)。其次，与王声称自己仅与 GTV 私募有关联相反，宣誓书提供了充分的事实来推断王广泛参与了郭涉嫌的各项骗局。宣誓书指明王为“常驻纽约的、运营该欺诈骗局的各郭关联实体的实际负责人”，*同上*，¶ 9，并指出她与郭和 Je（余建明）就“包括 GTV 和 G|Fashion 在内的各项欺诈相关企业”交换了讯息，*同上*，¶ 16(b)。并入宣誓书的刑事起诉书（Complaint，*同上*，¶ 8）指出，王“与郭有着密切的个人关系”，并且“是一家管理郭据称数额庞大的个人财富的实体的总裁、财务主管和秘书。”起诉书 ¶ 10(e)。\n\n第三，也是最后一点，宣誓书明确表明这些骗局从 2018 年一直持续到 2023 年 3 月，从而推翻了王关于证据已过时效（staleness）的主张。*见* 迪马里诺宣誓书 ¶ 6。此外，搜查令申请主要寻求手机通信和商业记录，这些构成了“更具永久性质、可能在较长时间内保存在一处的财产。”*United States v. Salomon-Mendez*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 340,\n\n347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)；*见 United States v. Yu*, No. 22 Cr. 208, 2023 WL 4687970, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区）July 21, 2023)。因此，王未能作出充分的证明以使本法院去质疑戈伦斯坦法官经过深思熟虑后作出的相当理由认定。\n\n2. 具体性\n\n关于具体性，王并不否认搜查令在形式上符合第二巡回法院在 *Purcell* 案中提出的三项标准：它列明了目标罪行（Subject Offenses），并明确并入了附件 A-2（Attachment A-2），该附件指明了相关时间段并列出了拟扣押信息的十二个类别。*见* 搜查令 USAO_00110309, USAO_00110311 至 USAO_00110315；*Purcell*, 967 F.3d at 179（允许法院在具体性认定中审查支持文件，前提是这些文件“在搜查令本身中通过引用并入并附于其后”）。\n\n王依赖 *United States v. Wey*, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 辩称，搜查令对两类信息的界定模糊不清，因此赋予了联邦调查局（FBI）特工搜查该公寓的无限自由裁量权。本案搜查令与 *Wey* 案中审查的搜查令大相径庭，后者不仅未能指明所涉罪名或时间范围，而且在列出“广泛的通常为通用物品的扣押类别”时，省略了“与涉嫌犯罪活动的任何关联。”256 F. Supp. 3d at 385。相比之下，王反对的第一类是经授权扣押关于涉嫌参与目标罪行的实体的证据。*见* 被告备忘录第8–9页。但是，搜查令点名了参与该欺诈骗局的九个具体实体，尽管它包含了关于“其他实体和/或个人”的宽泛措辞，但该措辞受到了这九个被指名实体的限制，并受到实体必须与目标罪行相关联这一要求的约束。*见* 搜查令 USAO_00110311 至 USAO_00110312。下一个受到反对的类别是“可能已使用……购买”的物品\n\n“最初源自因涉案罪行而获得的收益的资金。”被告备忘录第 9 页。同样，这一宽泛的措辞受到其所在类别的限制，即“与持有、接收、使用、转移或洗钱因涉案罪行而获得的资金有关的证据”。搜查令编号 USAO_00110312。搜查令中对涉案罪行的引用以及同样纳入搜查令的 DiMarino（迪马里诺）宣誓书所施加的限制，防止了“无论其与任何涉嫌犯罪活动是否存在潜在联系（或缺乏联系），扣押范围广泛的各类材料”。见 Wey（韦案），256 F. Supp. 3d at 387。鉴于涉案罪行的性质，该类别可能确实庞大，但仅凭庞大本身并不会使搜查令存在缺陷。见 Purcell（珀塞尔案），967 F.3d at 179。因此，该搜查令并非缺乏特定性。\n\n3. 范围过宽\n\n最后，Wang（王）辩称，搜查令授权扣押与宣誓书并未充分将其联系起来的实体有关的材料，因此范围过宽。但是，正如法院已经认定的那样，宣誓书允许作出存在合理根据的推论，即王是 Kwok（郭文贵）被指控的欺诈计划中不可或缺的成员。宣誓书还提供了事实内容，以支持王使用电子设备进行通信和转账以服务于这些计划的推论。因此，授权扣押与这些计划相关的物品（包括电子信息）的搜查令并没有范围过宽。6\n\n据此，王关于压制来自该公寓证据的动议被驳回。\n\n6 即使搜查令存在缺陷（事实并非如此），压制也是不合理的，因为王尚未证明联邦调查局特工信赖该搜查令在客观上是不合理的。参见 United States v. Rosenfeld（美国诉罗森菲尔德案），No. 23 Cr. 65, 2023 WL 8471947, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2023)（纽约南区联邦地区法院2023年12月7日）。\n\nIV. 压制被捕后陈述的动议\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n第五修正案关于禁止强迫自证其罪的规定保证，如果被告要求律师，羁押讯问“必须停止，直至律师到场”。Miranda v. Arizona（米兰达诉亚利桑那州案），384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)。“当被指控人在羁押讯问期间主张其要求律师在场的权利时，……在向其提供律师之前，其不再受到当局的进一步讯问，除非被指控人本人主动与警方开展进一步的沟通、交流或对话。”Edwards v. Arizona（爱德华兹诉亚利桑那州案），451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981)。对该权利的主张“要求明确主张获得律师协助的权利”，而不是模棱两可的言辞，例如“也许我应该和律师谈谈”。United States v. Medunjanin（美国诉梅敦亚宁案），752 F.3d 576, 586–87 (2d Cir. 2014)（联邦第二巡回上诉法院2014年）（已清理引文且原文即为强调）。讯问既包括明示的提问，也包括“警方的任何言语或行为……只要警方应当知道这些言语或行为合理地可能引起嫌疑人的自罪回应”。Rhode Island v. Innis（罗得岛州诉因尼斯案），446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)。但是，“常规的登记提问并不构成受米兰达规则保护的讯问”。United States v. Haygood（美国诉海古德案），157 F. App'x 448, 449 (2d Cir. 2005)（简要裁定）。\n\n根据最高法院在 United States v. Patane（美国诉帕塔内案），542 U.S. 630 (2004) 中的判决，未作米兰达警告并不要求压制“因未获警告但出于自愿且未受强迫的陈述而发现的物理证据”等非证言性证据。United States v. McCoy（美国诉麦考伊案），407 F. App'x 514, 516 (2d Cir. 2010)（简要裁定）；一致意见参见 United States v. Sharma（美国诉夏尔马案），No. 18 Cr. 340, 2019 WL 3802223, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2019)。这是因为米兰达规则是一项预防性规则，旨在保障第五修正案中“禁止强迫刑事被告在审判中作不利于自己的证言”的规定。Patane，542 U.S. at 637。\n\n“排除未获警告的陈述，对于任何被认知的米兰达侵权行为而言，都是完全且充分的救济。”United States v. Tirado（美国诉蒂拉多案），No. 17 Cr. 668, 2018 WL 3432040, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2018)（引用 Patane，542 U.S. at 641–42）（已清理引文）；参见 United States v. Wilson（美国诉威尔逊案），914 F. Supp. 2d 550, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)。\n\n此外，根据第四修正案排除规则的“必然发现例外”，如果政府能够“证明在没有宪法侵权行为的情况下其必然会获得该证据”，则政府可以“信赖非法扣押的证据”。In re 650 Fifth Ave.（涉及第五大道650号案），934 F.3d at 164（引用省略）。但是，要做到这一点，政府必须“证明导致发现该证据的每一个事件都会以足够高的确定性发生，以使地区法官能够根据优势证据标准得出该证据必然会被发现的结论”。同上（引用省略）。\n\nB. 分析\n\n帕塔内规则在本案中可能无法直接适用，原因有二。首先，尽管第二巡回法院指出“未作米兰达警告并不要求压制因……自愿陈述而发现的物理证据”，McCoy，407 F. App'x at 516，但巡回法院尚未确定相同的自愿性标准是否适用于违反爱德华兹规则而获得的陈述。7\n\n7 诚然，与米兰达规则一样，爱德华兹规则也是“司法设定的预防性措施”，Maryland v. Shatzer（马里兰州诉沙策案），559 U.S. 98, 105 (2010)。但是，第三巡回法院明确保留了关于帕塔内规则是否同样适用于依据违反爱德华兹规则获取的物理证据的判断。United States v. Caesar（美国诉凯撒案），2 F.4th 160, 168 n.4 (3d Cir. 2021)（联邦第三巡回上诉法院2021年）；亦见 United States v. McCluskey（美国诉麦克拉斯基案），Cr. No. 10-2734, 2013 WL 12330211, at *3–4 (D.N.M. June 14, 2013)（新墨西哥区联邦地区法院2013年6月14日）。有理由相信答案可能会有所不同。“爱德华兹裁决的价值在于其命令的明确性及其适用的确定性。”Minnick v. Mississippi（米尼克诉密西西比州案），498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990)。当被告依据米兰达规则主张其保持沉默的权利时，警方必须停止提问，但在经过相当长的一段时间并重新提供一套警告后，可以恢复提问。Michigan v. Mosley（密歇根州诉莫斯利案），423 U.S. 96, 105 (1975)。相比之下，爱德华兹规则要求停止提问，直至律师到场，或者除非羁押中断持续至少十四天。Shatzer，559 U.S. at 104, 110。此外，一家地区法院认定：\n\n从实际操作来看，一旦被捕者主张了获得律师协助的权利，警方就知道这次讯问是在没有律师在场的情况下讯问被捕者的最后机会。如果诱导被捕者做出自罪陈述或透露导致可在随后的刑事案件中被采纳的实物证据的信息，那么警方就没有任何动力停止讯问。陈述本身不具可采性这一事实，不足以作为保护个人免受强迫自证其罪权利的充分救济。\n\nUnited States v. Gilkeson（美国诉吉尔克森案），431 F. Supp. 2d 270, 294 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)（纽约北区联邦地区法院2006年）。\n\n其次，以此种方式提供密码或代号是否确实属于非证言性，尚未得到解决。政府引用了第五巡回法院的一个判例，该判例认为，当扣押的证据是“物理的、非证言性证据时，违反爱德华兹规则本身并不能证明压制证据是正当的”。政府反对意见书第 24 页（引用 United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia（美国诉冈萨雷斯-加西亚案），708 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2013)（联邦第五巡回上诉法院2013年））。但是，该判例虽然允许采纳违反爱德华兹规则而发现的枪支，但认定被告“打开枪盒上的密码锁”的行为“在性质上具有证言性和交流性”。同上。“审理该问题的几家法院已明确认定，在嫌疑人要求律师后要求嫌疑人输入其手机密码属于违反爱德华兹规则的行为，要求压制手机内容。”United States v. Pinto-Thomaz（美国诉平托-托马斯案），352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)（引用 United States v. Gilkeson，431 F. Supp. 2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 以及 United States v. Mitchell（美国诉米切尔案），76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017)（武装部队上诉法院2017年）），8 参见 Seo v. State（徐诉州政府案），148 N.E.3d 952, 957–58 (Ind. 2020)（印第安纳州最高法院2020年）（“嫌疑人交出已解锁的智能手机，至少含蓄地传达了三点：(1) 嫌疑人知道密码；(2) 设备上的文件存在；以及 (3) 嫌疑人持有这些文件。而且，除非州政府能够证明其已知晓该信息，否则该提交行为的交流层面属于第五修正案的保护范围。”）。\n\n在存在可能免除作出此类裁决必要性的事实争议时，本院不应涉足这些新颖的宪法领域。首先，王声称她在被问及手机或提供密码之前就主张了获得律师协助的权利。王宣誓书第 4–6 段。但是，联邦调查局特工制作的搜查令报告表明，王仅在被带到卧室后才首次主张其获得律师协助的权利。参见 ECF No. 199-2 第 USAO_00110620 页。此外，无论是王的宣誓书还是报告，都不清楚王在主张获得律师协助的权利后是否重新主动与特工接触。如果王在主张获得律师协助的权利之前提供了密码，或者在她主张权利后重新主动与特工接触，那么就不存在违反爱德华兹规则的情况，该问题也就失去了实际意义。\n\n8 另一方面，审理平托-托马斯案的法院后来指出，“被迫提供手机密码——至少在像本案这样，对于当事人实际拥有该手机并知晓其密码并无实质争议的情况下——并不违反第五修正案关于禁止自证其罪证言的保障。”United States v. Smith（美国诉史密斯案），673 F. Supp. 3d 381, 388 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)。\n\n其次，政府声称其必然会访问这些手机，因为搜查令允许他们强迫王使用手机的生物识别功能，并且因为“联邦调查局使用的工具……有时能够在没有密码的情况下访问手机”。政府反对意见书第 28–29 页。但是，政府并未提交宣誓书证明每部手机都具有可以通过这种方式访问的生物识别功能，也未确立联邦调查局访问这些手机的能力。因此，政府未能作出证明必然发现所必需的证明。\n\n据此，本院认为有必要举行证据压制听证会，以确定：(1) 王在被问及手机密码之前是否主张了获得律师协助的权利，以及 (2) 政府是否必然会访问这些手机。听证会定于 2024年4月9日 上午11:00 举行。\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，王关于提供更详细罪状说明的动议部分获准，其关于分案审理的动议被驳回，其关于压制公寓证据的动议被驳回。法院将于 2024年4月9日 上午11:00 就被捕后陈述举行证据压制听证会。责令政府于 2024年4月2日 之前向王提供一份其主张参与了这些计划的实体和银行账户的清单，以及第二份替代起诉书（S2）中指控的任何转账的日期。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n日期：2024年3月22日 纽约州纽约市\n\nQS","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","GTV","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Farm Loan","RICO","Ho Wan Kwok","Yanping Wang","CIPA","Guo","Kin Ming Je","Torres","Analisa Torres","Saraca"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":196,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":197,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":199,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":215,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":231,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":232,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":236,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":7213,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-03-22 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-03-22","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:06:09"}