{"id":"court_sdny_258_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":258,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"法院命令 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #258（2024年4月2日签发）。主审法官 Analisa Torres 驳回郭文贵就第二次替代起诉书（S2）提出的全案撤销动议，包括其关于 GTV 私募、Farm Loan Program 相关指控及第十二项洗钱罪名（援引 McCarthy、Szur 先例）与电信/证券欺诈指控重复的异议；共同被告 Yanping Wang（王燕平）就重叠罪名加入了该动议。","summary_en":"Order — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #258 (filed April 2, 2024). Judge Analisa Torres denies Kwok's motion to dismiss the second superseding indictment (S2) in its entirety, including his argument that the money-laundering charge in Count Twelve (citing McCarthy and Szur) is duplicative of the wire/securities fraud counts tied to the GTV private placement and Farm Loan Program allegations; co-defendant Yanping Wang had joined the motion as to overlapping counts.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n-against-\n\nHO WAN KWOK and YANPING WANG,\n\nUSDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED: 04/02/2024\n\n23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n**ORDER**\n\nDefendants.\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\n\nOn January 3, 2024, a Manhattan grand jury returned a superseding indictment (\"S2\") charging Defendant, Ho Wan Kwok, with twelve counts of wire fraud, securities fraud, and unlawful monetary transactions, as well as conspiring to commit racketeering offenses, wire and bank fraud, money laundering, and securities fraud. S2, ECF No. 215. Kwok now moves to dismiss S2 in its entirety.[1](#page-0-0) ECF No. 238; *see* Def. Mem., ECF No. 240. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\n# I. Factual Allegations[2](#page-0-1)\n\nKwok and two co-defendants, Kin Ming Je and Yanping Wang, are charged with operating a scheme from 2018 to March 2023 to defraud thousands of investors of more than \\$1 billion, laundering the proceeds through foreign and domestic entities, and misappropriating the funds for their own use. S2 ¶ 1. S2, the operative indictment, describes Kwok as an \"exiled\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> Kwok's co-defendant, Yanping Wang, joins Kwok's motion \"as it pertains to the counts in the S2 Indictment in which [she] is also charged\"—Counts One through Ten and Count Twelve. ECF No. 241. For the sake of clarity, and because Wang does not make any standalone arguments, the Court will attribute Defendants' arguments to Kwok.\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> The following allegations are taken from S2, which the Court must accept as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss the indictment. *See United States v. Skyfield*, No. 23 Cr. 569, 2023 WL 8879291, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2023). The Court has not held an evidentiary hearing and makes no findings of fact or credibility determinations.\n\nChinese businessman who fled to the United States in or about 2015\" and \"garnered a substantial online following\" by \"claiming to advance a movement against the Chinese Communist Party.\" *Id.* ¶ 9(a). Je \"served as the financial architect and key money launderer\" to Kwok, and Wang \"operated as a 'chief of staff' for Kwok.\" *Id.* ¶¶ 10, 11. S2 alleges that Defendants \"took advantage of Kwok's prolific online presence and hundreds of thousands of online followers to solicit investments in various entities and programs by promising outsized financial returns and other benefits.\" *Id.* ¶ 2. In reality, it alleges, \"the scheme allowed Kwok, Je, and Wang to enrich themselves, their family members, and their co-conspirators, and to fund Kwok's extravagant lifestyle.\" *Id.*\n\nS2 names more than 40 \"interrelated and overlapping entities that form the Kwok Enterprise.\" *Id.* ¶ 3(a). The Kwok Enterprise \"engaged in criminal activity, [] includ[ing] wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and securities fraud,\" in service of \"the objectives of the enterprise.\" *Id.* ¶ 3(b). One such objective was to \"[e]nrich[] the members and associates of the enterprise\": the indictment alleges that with \"fraudulently obtained victim money,\" Kwok purchased \"a \\$26.5 million . . . mansion in New Jersey,\" at least two luxury vehicles and a \\$37 million yacht, and \"two approximately \\$36,000 mattresses,\" among other things. *Id.* ¶¶ 5, 7. Another objective was to \"[c]onceal[] and launder[] fraud proceeds\": S2 alleges that the Defendants transferred \"money into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals,\" including accounts in the Bahamas, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates. *Id.* ¶¶ 4, 7.\n\n#### A. The GTV Private Placement\n\nThe indictment describes four alleged fraud schemes. First, between April and June 2020, Defendants \"obtained more than \\$400 million in victim funds through an illegal private stock offering related to\" GTV Media Group, Inc. (\"GTV\"), Kwok's \"news-focused social media platform\" for which Wang was an executive director. *Id.* ¶¶ 13, 16. On April 21, 2020, Kwok posted a video on social media announcing an offering of GTV common stock via a private placement (the \"GTV Private Placement\"). *Id.* ¶ 16(a). A memorandum describing the terms of the GTV Private Placement stated that GTV planned to use the proceeds \"to expand and strengthen the business,\" and included a chart detailing how the funds would be spent. *Id.* ¶ 16(d).\n\nThe GTV Private Placement raised approximately \\$452 million from more than 5,500 investors located in the United States. *Id.* ¶ 16(e). The \"vast majority of the proceeds\" were used not to grow GTV, but were \"deposited directly into bank accounts held in the name of Saraca, GTV's parent company, which is beneficially owned by\" one of Kwok's \"close family members.\" *Id.* ¶¶ 5, 16(f). Defendants also \"misappropriated approximately \\$100 million raised from investors,\" placing those funds into a high-risk hedge fund (\"Fund-1\") for the benefit of Saraca and Kwok's family member. *Id.* ¶ 16(h). The GTV Private Placement \"was not made pursuant to a registration statement filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.\" *Id.* ¶ 16(g).\n\n#### B. The Farm Loan Program\n\nAround June 2020, domestic banks \"began to freeze and close GTV-associated bank accounts,\" in part because transfers to the accounts \"referenced an unregistered stock offering.\" *Id.* ¶ 17(a). Defendants continued to solicit funds from the GTV Private Placement investors. Around July 22, 2020, Kwok posted a video on social media announcing the \"Farm Loan Program,\" through which investors could loan money to informal \"Farms\" in the \"Himalaya Farm Alliance.\" *Id.* ¶ 17. Kwok promised that the loans \"would be convertible into GTV\n\ncommon stock at a conversion rate of one share per dollar loaned.\" *Id.* ¶ 17, 17(c). Kwok also stated, in an August 2, 2020 social media video, that GTV had \"a market value of 2 billion US dollars,\" even though it was in fact \"a new business that generated no revenue.\" *Id.* ¶ 17(d).\n\nThousands of people sent money to the Farms. *Id.* ¶ 17(e). And, although the loan agreements stated that the funds were to be used for a Farm's \"general working capital purposes,\" Kwok transferred millions of dollars to his family members, including to pay for a flight crew on a private jet and maintenance expenses on a yacht. *Id.* ¶ 17(f).\n\n## C. G|CLUBS\n\nOn June 20, 2020, Kwok posted a video on social media encouraging viewers to purchase a \"G Club . . . membership card.\" *Id.* ¶ 18(a). A few months later, in October 2020, Kwok launched G|CLUBS, an \"exclusive, high-end membership program offering a full spectrum of services.\" *Id.* ¶ 18(b). G|CLUBS memberships began at \\$10,000, with top-tier memberships running up to \\$50,000. *Id.* ¶ 18(c). By August 2021, G|CLUBS documents \"reflected approximately 5,900 active members.\" *Id.* ¶ 18(d).\n\nG|CLUBS \"provided its members few to no discernable membership benefits.\" *Id.* ¶ 18(e). Instead, Kwok told his online followers that \"their purchase of G|CLUBS memberships would entitle them to stock in Kwok-affiliated entities, such as GTV and G|Fashion.\" *Id.* ¶ 18(f). On July 30, 2021, for example, Kwok stated that he \"ha[d] to promise that anyone who buys G-Club membership before September 17 must be allotted shares, which is exactly the same.\" *Id.*\n\nDefendants used G|CLUBS money to purchase luxury automobiles (including a \"custombuild Bugatti sports car\") and the New Jersey mansion (including \"extravagant renovations\" and assorted expensive decorations). *Id.* ¶ 18(h).\n\n#### D. Himalaya Exchange\n\nFrom April 2021 to March 2023, Kwok and Je operated the \"Himalaya Exchange,\" a \"purported cryptocurrency 'ecosystem.'\" *Id.* ¶ 19. The Himalaya Exchange hosted both a \"purported stablecoin called the Himalaya Dollar\" (\"H Dollar\"), which Defendants claimed had a \"fixed 1-to-\\$1 value backed by reserves,\" and a \"trading coin called Himalaya Coin\" (\"H Coin\"), valued based on supply and demand. *Id.*\n\nKwok \"trumpeted the prosects and valuation\" of H Dollar and H Coin online. *Id.* ¶ 19(a). In a video posted on October 20, 2021, for example, Kwok stated that \"[i]f anyone loses money, I can say that I will compensate 100%,\" and that he could \"sell the H Coin in the market in one minute and get it back to my H Dollar, and back to your fiat money unit.\" *Id.* The initial coin offering of both H Coin and H Dollar occurred around November 1, 2021. *Id.* ¶ 19(b).\n\nIn fact, H Coin and H Dollar were not \"real cryptocurrencies\": they were \"recorded in an internal database,\" not on a publicly accessible blockchain, and could not be traded anywhere other than the Himalaya Exchange. *Id.* ¶ 19(e), (f). White papers on the Himalaya Exchange website provided, \"in fine print,\" that H Coin and H Dollar \"were merely 'Credits'\" that could only be used on the Himalaya Exchange and did \"not carry any right to require their exchange for fiat currency or crypto-assets.\" *Id.* ¶ 19(f).\n\nIn April 2022, Kwok and Je arranged for the transfer of approximately \\$37 million in Himalaya Exchange funds to an escrow account, which was used to guarantee the cost of a yacht that Kwok had purchased. *Id.* ¶ 19(g).\n\n## II. Charges\n\nS2 contains thirteen counts. Count One charges all Defendants with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (\"RICO\") Act conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), predicated on acts indictable under several federal statutes[3](#page-5-0) and spanning from 2018 to March 2023. *Id.* ¶¶ 1–26. Count One does not specify who agreed to commit which acts, or when each act was committed, but does state that each Defendant agreed that a conspirator would commit at least two predicate acts. *Id.* ¶ 25.\n\nKwok refers to Counts Two and Four as the \"Bank Fraud Counts.\" Count Two charges all Defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. S2 ¶¶ 27–30. Count Four charges all Defendants with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and to provide false statements to a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. *Id.* ¶¶ 36–40. Specifically, Count Four alleges that the Defendants \"agreed to fraudulently induce investors to participate in the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS by providing materially false and misleading information and representations in connection with purported shares of GTV common stock and purported companies affiliated with GTV.\" S2 ¶ 38. The count cites several of Kwok's statements as overt acts, including his representations that the Farm Loan Program \"is a loan, and then you can ask for stocks\"; that GTV had \"a market value of \\$2 billion US dollars\"; and that \"anyone who buys G-Clubs membership before September 17 must be allotted shares.\" *Id.* ¶ 40(d), (e), (f).\n\nCounts Three and Twelve, which Kwok calls the \"Money Laundering Counts,\" charge all Defendants with conspiring to launder money and committing unlawful monetary transactions. Count Three alleges that the Defendants conspired to launder the proceeds of the GTV Private Placement, Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and Himalaya Exchange schemes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). *Id.* ¶¶ 31–35. And, Count Twelve alleges that the Defendants made and\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> Namely, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (financial institution fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (laundering of monetary instruments); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity); and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (securities fraud). S2 ¶ 24.\n\ndirected others to make \"a wire transfer of approximately \\$100 million derived from\" the GTV Private Placement to Fund-1, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. *Id.* ¶¶ 55–56.\n\nCounts Five through Eleven, which Kwok calls the \"Alleged Fraud Counts,\" charge Defendants with wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private Placement, Farm Loan, G|CLUBS, and Himalaya Exchange schemes.[4](#page-6-0) *Id.* ¶¶ 41–54. The counts allege that Defendants conducted the schemes to \"fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations\" (wire fraud) and \"used and employed . . . a manipulative and deceptive device and contrivance\" (securities fraud). *Id.*\n\nKwok moves to dismiss S2 in full pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b).\n\n#### **LEGAL STANDARD**\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1), an indictment must contain a \"plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.\" An indictment satisfies Rule 7(c) if it \"first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.\" *United States v. Stringer*, 730 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting *Hamling v. United States*, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). To satisfy this pleading standard, \"an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.\" *United States v. Benjamin*, 95 F.4th 60, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). A defendant, therefore, \"faces a high standard in seeking to dismiss an indictment.\" *United States v. Taveras*, 504 F. Supp. 3d 272, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Count Eleven charges only Kwok and Je—not Wang—with wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange scheme. And, S2 does not include a corresponding securities fraud charge for the Himalaya Exchange scheme. *Id.* ¶¶ 53–54.\n\nIn addition, \"the sufficiency of the evidence is not appropriately addressed on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment\" unless \"the government has made what can fairly be described as a full proffer of the evidence it intends to present at trial.\" *United States v. Alfonso*, 143 F.3d 772, 776–77 (2d Cir. 1998).\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\n#### I. RICO Conspiracy (Count One)\n\nKwok moves to dismiss Count One, arguing that it fails to allege a pattern of racketeering activity or a \"RICO enterprise.\" Def. Mem. at 10–19. The Court disagrees.\n\nA. Predicate Acts\n\nFirst, Kwok contends that S2 fails to allege \"valid predicate acts\" to support Count One. *Id.* at 12. He argues that the predicate acts related to GTV, the Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS only involve \"false promise[s]\" to \"fulfill contractual obligations,\" which do not constitute predicate criminal acts in the RICO context, and that these predicate acts are inadequately pleaded in any case. *Id.* at 13.\n\nKwok's arguments are premature. \"[A] RICO conspiracy charge need not specify the predicate or racketeering acts that the defendants agreed would be committed.\" *United States v. Applins*, 637 F.3d 59, 81 (2d Cir. 2011). Instead, it is sufficient if the indictment \"tracks the applicable language of the RICO statute,\" \"states the approximate time and place\" of the alleged conspiracy, \"lists the state and federal statutory offenses that allegedly comprise the pattern of racketeering,\" and describes \"the nature and structure of the charged enterprise, its purposes, [and its] methods and means.\"[5](#page-7-0) *United States v. D'Amico*, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); *see Alfonso*, 143 F.3d at 776.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Kwok largely cites civil authority in support of his request to dismiss the RICO conspiracy count. *See* Def. Mem. at 13–18; Def. Reply at 4–7, ECF No. 245. But, while the Government \"must prove the same elements *at trial* as a\n\nS2's allegations fulfill these requirements. Count One tracks the applicable language of the RICO statute, alleging that Defendants and others \"willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated, and agreed together and with each other to violate the racketeering laws of the United States . . . , that is, to conduct and participate in the affairs of the Kwok Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.\" S2 ¶ 24. It states the approximate time and place of the alleged conspiracy: from 2018 to March 2023, \"in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere.\" *Id.* And, it lists the statutory offenses allegedly comprising the pattern of racketeering activity. *Id.* ¶ 24(a)–(e). This is sufficient to apprise Kwok of the \"types of predicate crimes allegedly committed.\" *United States v. Raniere*, 384 F. Supp. 3d 282, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). The twenty-six pages of Count One also provide substantial detail about the nature and structure of the Kwok Enterprise, including details about the four alleged fraud schemes, the relevant persons and entities, and the \"purposes\" and \"means and methods\" of the conspiracy. *Id.* ¶¶ 1–26. The Court, therefore, shall not dismiss Count One for failure to allege specific predicate acts.\n\n#### B. Continuity\n\nKwok also argues that S2 fails to allege \"continuity,\" as required to establish the \"pattern\" element of a RICO conspiracy charge at trial. Def. Mem. at 14–18; *see United States v. Cain*, 671 F.3d 271, 284 (2d Cir. 2012). As numerous courts have held, however, \"the Government does not have to plead\" continuity in the indictment \"with the particularity that [Kwok] suggest[s].\" *Raniere*, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 301 (collecting cases). Rather, the indictment need only \"specify at least two racketeering acts within a 10-year period . . . that evidence\n\ncivil plaintiff,\" the \"criminal and civil *pleading standards* are different, even in RICO cases.\" *Raniere*, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 302 (emphasis in original); *see also United States v. Marchese*, No. 89 Cr. 229, 1991 WL 60338, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1991) (noting that cases involving motions to dismiss civil RICO complaints \"are inapposite\" when examining a criminal indictment).\n\ncontinuity.\" *United States v. Giovannelli*, No. 01 Cr. 749, 2004 WL 48869, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)). In *Giovanelli*, for example, the court found that an indictment adequately alleged continuity where \"the relevant counts allege four timely predicate acts—obstruction of justice, illegal trafficking in motor vehicle parts, extortion, and operation of an illegal gambling business—that are alleged to have been performed in furtherance of an ongoing enterprise.\" *Id.*\n\nCount One's allegations meet this low bar, alleging at least five types of predicate acts wire fraud, financial institution fraud, money laundering, unlawful monetary transactions, and securities fraud—in furtherance of an ongoing enterprise within a ten-year period. S2 ¶ 24. Kwok cites no criminal RICO cases dismissing an indictment for failure to allege a pattern of racketeering, and the Court is aware of none in this District. Whether the Government can ultimately prove continuity, as required to establish a pattern of racketeering, is a matter for trial. *See United States v. Messina*, No. 11 Cr. 31, 2012 WL 463973, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2012) (rejecting similar challenge as premature).\n\n#### C. RICO Enterprise\n\nKwok also contends that Count One should be dismissed \"because it fails to allege a RICO enterprise\"—specifically, that it fails to \"allege relationships among those [entities] associated with the Kwok Enterprise or that it existed for any period of time.\" Def. Mem. at 18– 19. Again, however, Kwok's argument goes to the Government's evidentiary burden at trial, not its pleading burden in an indictment. Kwok identifies no caselaw requiring the Government to\n\nallege the \"relationships\" or duration of the entities within a criminal enterprise with particularity.[6](#page-10-0)\n\nAccordingly, Kwok's motion to dismiss Count One is DENIED.\n\n## II. Alleged Fraud (Counts Five through Eleven)\n\nA. Wire Fraud\n\nKwok contends that Counts Five, Seven, Nine, and Eleven—the wire fraud charges for the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and Himalaya Exchange schemes, respectively—must be dismissed for failure to allege a material misrepresentation. Def. Mem. at 33–54.\n\nThe wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, proscribes the use of wire communications in interstate and foreign commerce in furtherance of \"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.\" *Fountain v. United States*, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004). The Circuit has summarized the \"essential elements\" of the wire fraud offense as: \"(1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property as the object of the scheme, and (3) use of the [] wires to further the scheme.\" *United States v. Binday*, 804 F.3d 558, 569 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), *abrogated on other grounds by Ciminelli v. United States*, 598 U.S. 306 (2023). \"Courts generally find that indictments sufficiently allege wire fraud where they track the language of the wire fraud statute, and where they set forth approximate details about the alleged scheme to defraud.\" *United States v. Cornelson*, 609 F. Supp. 3d 258, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).\n\n<span id=\"page-10-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> By order dated March 22, 2024, the Court ordered the Government to provide \"a list of the entities and bank accounts that it contends were involved in the schemes and the dates for any transfers alleged in S2,\" which will provide further detail on the entities involved in the alleged Kwok Enterprise. ECF No. 251 at 22–23.\n\nKwok argues that S2 does not allege a scheme to defraud because it does not allege a \"material misrepresentation\" in connection with any of the four fraudulent schemes. At trial, the Government will be required to prove that the Defendants \"employed a falsehood that was 'material.'\" *United States v. Connolly*, 24 F.4th 821, 833 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting *Neder v. United States*, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999)) (emphasis omitted). \"To be material, the information withheld either must be of some independent value or must bear on the ultimate value of the transaction.\" *United States v. Mittelstaedt*, 31 F.3d 1208, 1217 (2d Cir. 1994). At the motion-todismiss stage, however, Kwok does not cite any caselaw suggesting a heightened pleading requirement that would require the wire fraud counts to do more than track the language of § 1343 and set forth \"approximate details\" of the alleged schemes. *Cornelson*, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 267; *cf. United States v. Wey*, No. 15 Cr. 611, 2017 WL 237651, at \\*10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (rejecting defendant's argument that wire fraud count should be dismissed for failure to \"identify any allegedly fraudulent wires\"). An inquiry into the materiality of the Defendants' alleged falsehoods would entail a premature \"challenge to the sufficiency of the Government's anticipated evidence.\" *Wey*, 2017 WL 237651, at \\*13.\n\nThe Court is satisfied that Counts Five, Seven, Nine, and Eleven adequately track the statutory language, \"apprise[] [Kwok] of the nature of the accusations against him, and—when read in conjunction with the [rest] of the [i]ndictment, which [the counts] incorporate[] by reference—provide[] notice generally of where and when the crime occurred.\" *United States v. Avenatti*, 432 F. Supp. 3d 354, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). For the GTV Private Placement, Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS charges, S2 alleges (among other things) that Defendants told potential investors that their funds would be used to support the businesses, while Defendants in fact misappropriated much of the money for themselves. *See* S2 ¶¶ 16(d) and (f), 17(e) and (f),\n\n12\n\n18(f) and (h). For the Himalaya Exchange count, S2 alleges that Kwok and Je promoted H Coin and H Dollar as \"real cryptocurrencies,\" when in fact they were not recorded on a blockchain and could not be traded anywhere other than the Himalaya Exchange. *Id.* ¶ 19(e), (f). And, S2 alleges that Kwok misappropriated the Himalaya Exchange funds, too. *Id.* ¶ 19(g).\n\nRelying entirely on posttrial and/or civil caselaw, Kwok raises a battery of challenges to the Government's case on these counts.[7](#page-12-0) Although his rebuttals to the indictment's allegations will be tested at trial, \"[s]uch factual disputes are simply not matters that the Court may consider at this stage.\" *Wey*, 2017 WL 237651, at \\*10.\n\nFor these reasons, Kwok's motion to dismiss Counts Five, Seven, Nine, and Eleven is DENIED.\n\n## B. Securities Fraud\n\nKwok next argues that Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—the securities fraud charges for the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS, respectively—should be dismissed. The charging language in each of these counts specifies that Defendants \"willfully and knowingly, . . . used and employed, in connection with a purchase and sale of a security . . . , a manipulative and deceptive device and contrivance,\" in violation of 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5. S2 ¶¶ 44, 48, 52. The counts track the language of Rule 10b–5, *id.*, and incorporate the detailed factual allegations of paragraphs 1–23 by reference, *id.* ¶¶ 43, 47, 51. No more is needed to satisfy the indictment pleading standards. *See, e.g.*, *Wey*, 2017 WL 237651, at \\*9–10; *United States v. Greebel*, No. 15 Cr. 637, 2017 WL 3610570, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017); *United States v. Zaslavskiy*, No. 17 Cr. 647, 2018 WL 4346339, at \\*3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018).\n\n<span id=\"page-12-0\"></span><sup>7</sup> *See, e.g.*, Def. Mem. at 36 (arguing that the GTV Private Placement materials did not commit Defendants to use the funds in a particular way); *id.* at 41 (arguing that \"no reasonable investor would rely\" on Kwok's statement that the Farm Loan investments would be convertible to stock); *id.* at 46 (arguing that Defendants did not promise to use G|CLUBS membership dues for any specific purpose).\n\nKwok nevertheless contends that the counts are deficient because they (1) fail to allege a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) for the Farm Loan or G|CLUBS schemes, do not allege a securities transaction; and (3) do not allege scheme liability.\n\n1. Material Misrepresentation or Omission\n\nFirst, mirroring his wire-fraud arguments, Kwok argues that Counts Six, Eight, and Ten must be dismissed for failure to allege a material misrepresentation or omission. Def. Mem. at 33–54. To prove securities fraud at trial, the Government will have to establish that Defendants willfully \"made a material misrepresentation (or a material omission if [they] had a duty to speak) or used a fraudulent device.\" *United States v. Vilar*, 729 F.3d 62, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting *VanCook v. SEC*, 653 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2011)). In this context, \"materiality\" means that \"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would find the omission or misrepresentation important in making an investment decision.\" *Id.* (cleaned up).\n\nBut again, the ultimate truth or falsity of Defendants' alleged misrepresentations—and the materiality of those misrepresentations—are factual questions for trial. *See United States v. Brooks*, No. 08 Civ. 35, 2008 WL 2092433, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008) (in case involving false statements made to the government, holding that materiality and \"truth and falsity\" are \"issue[s] of fact to be determined at trial\"). Kwok argues, for example, that his statements about the GTV Private Placement funds were \"too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them,\" and that \"no reasonable investor would rely on [Kwok's statements] in loaning money to the Farms.\" Def. Mem. at 38, 41 (cleaned up); *see also* Def. Reply at 23–25, ECF No. 245. But, \"[d]etermination of materiality under the securities laws is a mixed question of law and fact that the Supreme Court has identified as especially well suited for jury determination.\" *United States*  *v. Gramins*, 939 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). These arguments are not properly considered on a Rule 12(b) motion.\n\n2. Securities Transaction\n\nKwok also argues that Counts Eight (Farm Loans) and Ten (G|CLUBS) should be dismissed because they did not involve a securities transaction. \"The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Rule 10b–5's requirement that a fraud be 'in connection with' the purchase or sale of a security is easily satisfied,\" covering \"deceptive devices 'touching' a sale or purchase of a security.\" *United States v. Nouri*, 711 F.3d 129, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). The indictment's allegations here suffice.\n\nFirst, Kwok contends that S2 equivocates about what securities are at issue in the Farm Loans and G|CLUBS schemes, rendering the counts \"impermissibly vague\" and violative of due process. Def. Mem. at 21, 25; *see* Def. Reply at 14–16. The Court disagrees. The indictment alleges that investors in the Farm Loan Program were \"promis[ed] that such loans would be convertible into GTV common stock at a conversion rate of one share per dollar loaned.\" S2 ¶ 17. S2 also alleges that Kwok told his \"online followers that their purchase of G|CLUBS memberships would entitle them to stock in Kwok-related entities, such as GTV and G|Fashion.\" *Id.* ¶ 18. Far from being \"hopelessly confused\" on the issue, Def. Reply at 16, the indictment is sufficiently clear as to which alleged securities are at issue.\n\nKwok then argues that if GTV equity is the security underlying Counts Eight and Ten, S2 does not allege that the Farm Loan Program or G|CLUBS involved the \"sale or purchase\" of the stock—only a promise that the Farm Loans and G|CLUBS memberships would be convertible to stock at some unspecified future date. Def. Mem. at 22–23, 26–27. But, \"the question of whether the conspirators *in fact* offered a security, currency, or another financial instrument\n\naltogether, is best left to the finder of fact.\" *Zaslavskiy*, 2018 WL 4346339, at \\*4 (emphasis in original). A reasonable jury could find that the Farm Loans and G|CLUBS memberships were stock transactions by another name—or, it could agree with Kwok that the membership and loan agreements were too vague to violate Rule 10b–5. The Court, however, will not \"evaluate documents and evidence outside of the four corners of the [i]ndictment\" to make that determination at this stage. *Id.*\n\n#### 3. Scheme Liability\n\nKwok argues that Counts Six, Eight, and Ten should be dismissed \"[t]o the extent they purport to assert 'scheme liability'\" under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b–5, \"as distinct from liability for a misrepresentation under [subsection] (b).\" Def. Mem. at 55 (citation omitted). Kwok cites *SEC v. Rio Tinto PLC*, 41 F.4th 47 (2d Cir. 2022), in which the Circuit held (in a civil enforcement action) that \"a scheme liability claim [] requires something beyond misstatements and omissions, such as dissemination\" of false information. *Id.* at 49 (emphasis omitted). Even assuming that *Rio Tinto* applies in the criminal context and affects the pleading standards for indictments, S2 adequately alleges that Kwok participated in the dissemination of the misstatements by posting videos to his large following on social media. *See, e.g.*, S2 ¶¶ 16(a), 17(c)–(d), 18(a), (d), and (f), 19(a).\n\nAccordingly, Kwok's motion to dismiss Counts Six, Eight, and Ten is DENIED.\n\n#### III. Bank Fraud and Money Laundering (Counts Two, Three, Four, and Twelve)\n\nKwok's requests to dismiss the remaining Bank Fraud and Money Laundering Counts are largely derivative of his challenges to the substantive Alleged Fraud Counts. He argues that \"the securities fraud portion of Count Four (alleging a conspiracy to commit securities and bank fraud)\" must be dismissed because S2 does not allege any material misrepresentation made in\n\nconnection with the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, or G|CLUBS. Def. Mem. at 29. The Court has rejected that argument, *see supra* Part II.B.1, so this challenge to Count Four fails for the same reasons. Kwok also argues that all of the Bank Fraud and Money Laundering Counts should be dismissed because the \"predicate acts\"—the Alleged Fraud Counts—are \"deficient as a matter of law.\" Def. Mem. at 58. Because they are not, *see supra* Part II, the related conspiracy and unlawful transactions counts will not be dismissed on this basis.\n\nKwok's two other challenges merit slightly more discussion. First, he contends that the Bank Fraud Counts must be dismissed because S2 only alleges that Defendants \"deposit[ed] funds allegedly procured by fraud into a federally-insured bank,\" which (he argues) \"is not sufficient to allege violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 1014.\" Def. Mem. at 57.\n\nCount Two charges Defendants with conspiracy to commit bank fraud under 18 U.S.C § 1349, with the object of violating the substantive bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C § 1344. S2 ¶¶ 27–30. Section 1344, in turn, criminalizes schemes to knowingly \"defraud a financial institution,\" 18 U.S.C § 1344(1), or \"to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by . . . a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,\" *id.* § 1344(2). The two subsections \"defin[e] different ways in which a defendant may commit the offense of bank fraud,\" and violation of either is sufficient to support a conviction. *United States v. Crisci*, 273 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 2001).\n\nCount Two tracks the language of the statute, alleging that Defendants \"made false representations . . . to financial institutions to . . . open and maintain bank accounts used in furtherance of their fraud and obtain funds under the custody and control of those financial institutions.\" S2 ¶ 30. Although Kwok argues that Defendants did not expose the financial institutions to \"actual or potential loss,\" Def. Mem. at 57, \"[t]here is no requirement under the bank fraud statute that a scheme to obtain money or property must 'create[] a risk of financial loss to the bank.'\" *United States v. Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673, 2023 WL 4194773, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2023) (quoting *Loughrin v. United States*, 573 U.S. 351, 366 n.9 (2014)). Instead, an indictment sufficiently states a bank fraud conspiracy offense where it alleges that the defendant \"conspired to send false information to a financial institution to disguise the true nature of an account and to obtain funds from that account that were in the custody and control of the financial institution.\" *Id.* (citing *United States v. Lebedev*, 932 F.3d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 2019), *abrogated on other grounds by Ciminelli v. United States*, 598 U.S. 306 (2023)). Count Two does so and is, therefore, legally sufficient.\n\nCount Four, similarly, charges Defendants with conspiring to provide false statements to a financial institution, in underlying violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. S2 ¶¶ 36–40. Section 1014 provides that \"[w]hoever knowingly makes any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . any institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . upon any application\" is guilty of a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1014. The charging language in S2 tracks the language of the statute and specifies, \"to wit,\" that Defendants \"lied, and caused others to lie, to financial institutions in connection with applications for bank accounts, including concerning the source and ownership of funds to be deposited and the intended purpose of the accounts.\" S2 ¶ 39. Kwok notes that the indictment does not allege that Defendants lied to any financial institution \"in connection with procuring a loan or any related transaction.\" Def. Mem. at 57. But that is not a required element of the offense, which, by its plain language, covers any \"application.\" *See United States v. Wade*, 266 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 1014 extends to an \"application to open a checking account\"); *United States v. UBS Sec. LLC*, No. 18 Civ. 6369, 2019 WL 6721718, at \\*20 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2019) (\"Persuasive appellate authority favors the Government's position that § 1014 liability extends beyond lending.” (citation omitted)).[8](#page-18-0) Accordingly, Count Four is also legally sufficient, and Kwok's motion to dismiss the Bank Fraud Counts is DENIED.\n\nFinally, Kwok argues that Count Twelve, unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, \"should be dismissed for the independent reason that it impermissibly merges with its predicate offenses.\" Def. Mem. at 59. Section 1957 subjects to criminal penalties \"[w]hoever . . . knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than \\$10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). To be considered \"criminally derived property,\" the funds must have been \"obtained from a prior, separate criminal act\" other than the unlawful transaction itself. *United States v. \\$1,399,313.74 in U.S. Currency*, 591 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing *United States v. McCarthy*, 271 F.3d 387, 395 (2d Cir. 2001), *abrogated on other grounds by Eberhart v. United States*, 546 U.S. 12 (2005)). That is, \"when the underlying crime is completed, a transaction conducted with the proceeds from that crime may provide the basis for a money laundering conviction.\" *McCarthy*, 271 F.3d at 395.\n\nCount Twelve alleges that Defendants \"made, and directed others to make, a wire transfer of approximately \\$100 million derived from the offenses charged in Counts Five and Six\"—the\n\n<span id=\"page-18-0\"></span><sup>8</sup> In his reply brief, Kwok contends that the Second Circuit's decision in *United States v. Krown*, 675 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982), limits § 1014 to statements made in connection with \"an advance or loan or other credit transaction listed in the statute.\" Def. Reply at 32 (citing *Krown*, 675 F.2d at 51). In that case, the Circuit held that merely depositing worthless checks at an FDIC-insured bank did not violate § 1014 where there was no evidence that the defendant \"had the purpose of influencing the bank to use the [] checks in connection with an advance, loan, application or commitment.\" *Krown*, 675 F.2d at 50. *Krown*'s holding is \"narrow\"—turning on the defendant's intent, not the meaning of \"application\"—and does not foreclose the Court's conclusion here. *UBS Sec. LLC*, 2019 WL 6721718, at \\*19; *cf. id.* at \\*18–20 (holding that *Krown* \"has no bearing on whether a securities offering can be considered an 'advance' or 'purchase' under section 1014\").\n\nGTV Private Placement—to Fund-1. S2 ¶ 56. Kwok claims that this transfer \"is at the heart of the alleged fraud in Counts Five and Six,\" so it \"cannot also serve as the basis for a separate money laundering offense.\" Def. Mem. at 60. Not so. In *McCarthy*, the Second Circuit explained that funds derived from a crime become \"proceeds\" within § 1957 when they are either \"derived from an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense.\" 71 F.3d at 395 (citations omitted). The next year, in *United States v. Szur*, the Circuit held that funds obtained from a wire fraud scheme \"comprised 'proceeds' at the moment they were in 'the control of the perpetrators'\"—that is, \"as soon as [the defendant] received them.\" 289 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Circuit found, therefore, that the wire fraud was \"sufficiently distinct\" from the subsequent money laundering. *Id.*\n\n*Szur* applies here, where the Government alleges that Defendants conducted a wire and securities fraud scheme and then unlawfully transferred the funds they received from it. At a minimum, S2 alleges that \"a discrete phase\" of the GTV Private Placement \"ha[d] been completed so as to generate 'proceeds'\" under § 1957. *Id.* The indictment's allegations about the GTV Private Placement are not, as Kwok argues, limited to the impropriety of the alleged \\$100 million transfer. *See* Def. Reply at 33–34; *see also* S2 ¶ 16(b)–(c), (f). Kwok's motion to dismiss Count Twelve is, therefore, DENIED.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, Kwok's motion to dismiss S2 is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 238 and 241.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: April 2, 2024 New York, New York\n\nStylized cursive signature or initials.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n-诉-\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）以及 YANPING WANG（王雁平）\n\nUSDC SDNY 文件 电子归档 文件编号： 归档日期：04/02/2024\n\n23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n裁定\n\n被告。\n\n地区法官 ANALISA TORRES（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）：\n\n2024年1月3日，曼哈顿大陪审团作出了一份替代起诉书（“S2”），指控被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）犯有电信欺诈、证券欺诈和非法货币交易等十二项罪名，以及串谋从事敲诈勒索犯罪、电信及银行欺诈、洗钱和证券欺诈。S2，ECF No. 215。郭现动议全盘驳回 S2。[1] ECF No. 238；参见被告答辩备忘录，ECF No. 240。基于下文所述理由，该动议被驳回。\n\n背景\n\n一、 事实指控[2]\n\n郭与另外两名共同被告 Kin Ming Je（余建明）和 Yanping Wang（王雁平）被指控在2018年至2023年3月期间实施一项计划，骗取数千名投资者超过10亿美元，通过境内外实体清洗收益，并将资金挪作个人自用。S2 ¶ 1。作为有效起诉书的 S2 将郭描述为一名“于2015年左右逃往美国的流亡中国商人”，并“声称推进反对中国共产党的运动”而“在网络上获得了大量的追随者”。同上，¶ 9(a)。余“担任郭的财务架构师和主要洗钱者”，而王“担任郭的‘幕僚长’”。同上，¶¶ 10, 11。S2 指控各被告“利用郭强大的网络影响力及数十万网络追随者，通过承诺巨额财务回报和其他利益，招揽对各类实体和项目的投资”。同上，¶ 2。而实际上，起诉书指控，“该计划使郭、余和王得以中饱私囊、使他们的家庭成员及其共谋者受益，并资助郭的奢靡生活”。同上。\n\n1 郭的共同被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）加入了郭的动议，“因为该动议涉及 S2 起诉书中她同样被指控的罪名项”——即第一项至第十项罪名及第十二项罪名。ECF No. 241。为了行文清晰，且由于王并未提出任何独立论点，本法院将把被告方的论点归于郭名下。\n\n2 以下指控均引自 S2，就驳回起诉书的动议而言，本法院必须推定其为真实。参见 United States v. Skyfield, No. 23 Cr. 569, 2023 WL 8879291, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2023)。本法院尚未举行证据听证会，亦未作出任何事实认定或可信度判定。\n\nS2 列出了构成“郭氏企业”的40多个“相互关联且重叠的实体”。同上，¶ 3(a)。郭氏企业为服务于“该企业的宗旨”而“从事犯罪活动，包括电信欺诈、银行欺诈、洗钱和证券欺诈”。同上，¶ 3(b)。其中一个宗旨是“使该企业的成员和关联人员中饱私囊”：起诉书指控，郭利用“欺诈所得的受害者资金”购买了包括“新泽西州价值2650万美元的……豪宅”、至少两辆豪华汽车和一艘价值3700万美元的游艇，以及“两张价值约36,000美元的床垫”等物品。同上，¶¶ 5, 7。另一个宗旨是“隐匿和清洗欺诈收益”：S2 指控被告将“资金转入并穿透以至少80个不同实体或个人名义开立的约500多个账户”，其中包括在巴哈马、瑞士和阿拉伯联合酋长国的账户。同上，¶¶ 4, 7。\n\nA. GTV 私募\n\n起诉书描述了四起涉嫌欺诈的计划。首先，在2020年4月至6月期间，被告“通过与 GTV Media Group, Inc.（“GTV”）相关的非法私人股票发行，获取了超过4亿美元的受害者资金”，GTV 是郭的“主打新闻的社交媒体平台”，王曾担任其执行董事。同上，¶¶ 13, 16。2020年4月21日，郭在社交媒体上发布视频，宣布通过私募方式发售 GTV 普通股（“GTV 私募”）。同上，¶ 16(a)。一份说明 GTV 私募条款的备忘录称，GTV 计划将收益“用于拓展和巩固业务”，并附有一份详述资金用途的图表。同上，¶ 16(d)。\n\nGTV 私募从位于美国的5,500多名投资者处筹集了约4.52亿美元。同上，¶ 16(e)。“绝大部分收益”并未用于发展 GTV，而是“直接存入以 Saraca 名义开立的银行账户，Saraca 是 GTV 的母公司，由郭的一名‘直系家庭成员’实益拥有”。同上，¶¶ 5, 16(f)。被告还“挪用了向投资者筹集的约1亿美元”，将这些资金投入一家高风险对冲基金（“Fund-1”），以使 Saraca 和郭的家庭成员受益。同上，¶ 16(h)。GTV 私募“并未依据向美国证券交易委员会提交的注册声明进行”。同上，¶ 16(g)。\n\nB. 农场贷款项目\n\n2020年6月左右，美国国内银行“开始冻结并关闭与 GTV 相关的银行账户”，部分原因是转入这些账户的款项“提及了未注册的股票发行”。同上，¶ 17(a)。被告继续向 GTV 私募投资者招揽资金。2020年7月22日左右，郭在社交媒体上发布视频，宣布推出“农场贷款项目”，投资者可通过该项目向“喜马拉雅农场联盟”旗下的非正式“农场”出借资金。同上，¶ 17。郭承诺这些贷款“可以按每出借一美元折算一股的转换率转换为 GTV 普通股”。同上，¶ 17, 17(c)。郭还在2020年8月2日的一段社交媒体视频中声称，GTV 拥有“20亿美元的市值”，尽管它实际上是“一家未产生任何收入的新企业”。同上，¶ 17(d)。\n\n数千人向这些农场汇了款。同上，¶ 17(e)。而且，尽管贷款协议规定资金将用于农场的“一般营运资金用途”，但郭向其家庭成员转账了数百万美元，其中包括用于支付私人飞机的机组人员费用以及游艇的维护费用。同上，¶ 17(f)。\n\nC. G|CLUBS\n\n2020年6月20日，郭在社交媒体上发布视频，鼓励观众购买“G Club……会员卡”。同上，¶ 18(a)。几个月后，即2020年10月，郭推出了 G|CLUBS，一个“提供全方位服务的专属高端会员项目”。同上，¶ 18(b)。G|CLUBS 会员资格起价为10,000美元，最高级别的会员费用高达50,000美元。同上，¶ 18(c)。截至2021年8月，G|CLUBS 文件“显示约有5,900名活跃会员”。同上，¶ 18(d)。\n\nG|CLUBS “向其会员提供的显性会员福利极少甚至根本没有”。同上，¶ 18(e)。相反，郭告诉他的网络追随者，“他们购买 G|CLUBS 会员资格将使他们有权获得郭旗下关联实体（如 GTV 和 G|Fashion）的股票”。同上，¶ 18(f)。例如，在2021年7月30日，郭声称他“必须保证，在9月17日之前购买 G-Club 会员资格的任何人，都必须获得配股，这是完全一样的”。同上。\n\n被告使用 G|CLUBS 的资金购买了豪华汽车（包括一辆“定制布加迪跑车”）以及新泽西州的豪宅（包括“奢华翻修”和各类昂贵的装饰品）。同上，¶ 18(h)。\n\nD. 喜马拉雅交易所\n\n从2021年4月至2023年3月，郭和余运营了“喜马拉雅交易所”，一个“所谓的加密货币‘生态系统’”。同上，¶ 19。喜马拉雅交易所同时托管了一种“所谓的稳定币，称为喜马拉雅美元”（“H Dollar”），被告声称其具有“由储备金支持的1对1美元固定价值”，以及一种“称为喜马拉雅币的交易币”（“H Coin”），其价值基于供求关系。同上。\n\n郭在网络上“大肆吹嘘 H Dollar 和 H Coin 的前景和估值”。同上，¶ 19(a)。例如，在2021年10月20日发布的视频中，郭声称“如果有人赔钱，我可以说我将100%赔偿”，并且他可以“在一分钟内在市场上卖出 H Coin，将其换回我的 H Dollar，再换回你们的法定货币单位”。同上。H Coin 和 H Dollar 的首次代币发行发生于2021年11月1日左右。同上，¶ 19(b)。\n\n事实上，H Coin 和 H Dollar 并不是“真正的加密货币”：它们被“记录在一个内部数据库中”，而非记录在可公开访问的区块链上，并且无法在喜马拉雅交易所之外的任何地方进行交易。同上，¶ 19(e), (f)。喜马拉雅交易所网站上的白皮书以“小号字体”规定，H Coin 和 H Dollar “仅是‘积分’”，只能在喜马拉雅交易所使用，且“不附带任何要求将其兑换为法定货币或加密资产的权利”。同上，¶ 19(f)。\n\n2022年4月，郭和余安排将喜马拉雅交易所的约3700万美元资金转入一个托管账户，该账户用于为郭购买的一艘游艇的费用提供担保。同上，¶ 19(g)。\n\n二、 罪名指控\n\nS2 包含十三项罪名项。第一项罪名指控所有被告犯有《反勒索与受贿组织法》（“RICO”）串谋罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) 及 (d)，其前提行为依据数条联邦成文法[3]可予起诉，时间跨度从2018年至2023年3月。同上，¶¶ 1–26。第一项罪名未具体指明谁同意实施了哪些行为，亦未指明每项行为于何时实施，但确实指明每名被告均同意某名共谋者将实施至少两项前提行为。同上，¶ 25。\n\n郭将第二项和第四项罪名称为“银行欺诈罪名项”。第二项罪名指控所有被告串谋实施电信欺诈和银行欺诈，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1349。S2 ¶¶ 27–30。第四项罪名指控所有被告串谋实施证券欺诈并向金融机构提供虚假陈述，违反 18 U.S.C. § 371。同上，¶¶ 36–40。具体而言，第四项罪名指控被告“同意通过就所谓的 GTV 普通股股份及所谓的 GTV 关联公司提供重大虚假和误导性信息及陈述，欺诈性地诱导投资者参与 GTV 私募、农场贷款项目以及 G|CLUBS”。S2 ¶ 38。该罪名项引用了郭的多项言论作为明显公开行为，包括他关于农场贷款项目“这是一笔借款，之后你可以要求获得股票”的陈述；关于 GTV 拥有“20亿美元的市值”的陈述；以及关于“在9月17日之前购买 G-Clubs 会员资格的任何人必须获得配股”的陈述。同上，¶ 40(d), (e), (f)。\n\n被郭称为“洗钱罪名项”的第三项和第十二项罪名，指控所有被告串谋洗钱并实施非法货币交易。第三项罪名指控被告串谋清洗 GTV 私募、农场贷款项目、G|CLUBS 以及喜马拉雅交易所计划的收益，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)。同上，¶¶ 31–35。并且，第十二项罪名指控被告实施并指示他人实施“源自 GTV 私募的约1亿美元的电汇”，转账至 Fund-1，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1957。同上，¶¶ 55–56。\n\n3 即 18 U.S.C. § 1343（电信欺诈）；18 U.S.C. § 1344（金融机构欺诈）；18 U.S.C. § 1956（货币工具洗钱）；18 U.S.C. § 1957（在源自特定非法活动的财产中进行货币交易）；以及 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 和 78ff，与 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5（证券欺诈）。S2 ¶ 24。\n\n第5至第11项罪名——Kwok（郭文贵）称之为「指控欺诈罪名项」——指控各被告人在与 GTV 私募、农场贷款（Farm Loan）、G|CLUBS 以及喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）骗局相关的行为中犯有电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪。[4] 同上，¶¶ 41–54。各罪名项指控被告人实施上述骗局，以「通过虚假陈述和不实陈述欺诈性地从受害者处获取资金」（电汇欺诈），并「使用并雇用了……操纵性和欺骗性手段及计谋」（证券欺诈）。同上。\n\n郭文贵根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 12(b) 条动议全面驳回 S2（第二份替代起诉书）。\n法律标准\n\n根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 7(c)(1) 条，起诉书必须包含对「构成所指控罪行的基本事实所作的简明、扼要且明确的书面陈述」。一份起诉书若满足以下条件即符合第 7(c) 条：「第一，包含所指控罪行的构成要件，并合理告知被告其必须进行抗辩的指控；第二，使其能够在未来就同一罪名被起诉时以被判无罪或定罪为由提出抗辩。」United States v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2013)（援引 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)）。为了满足此项诉答标准，「起诉书只需紧扣所指控法规的法定条文用语，并载明被指控犯罪发生的时间和地点（大致条款即可）。」United States v. Benjamin, 95 F.4th 60, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2024)（引文省略）。因此，被告在「寻求驳回起诉书时面临很高的标准。」United States v. Taveras, 504 F. Supp. 3d 272, 277 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院） 2020)。\n\n4 第11项罪名仅指控郭文贵和 Je（余建明）——未指控 Wang（王雁平）——在与喜马拉雅交易所骗局相关的行为中犯有电汇欺诈罪。并且，S2 未包含针对喜马拉雅交易所骗局的相应证券欺诈指控。同上，¶¶ 53–54。\n\n此外，「在审前驳回起诉书的动议中，不适宜对证据充分性进行审理」，除非「政府已经作出了可合理被描述为其意图在庭审中出示之证据的全面出示」。United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776–77 (2d Cir. 1998)。\n讨论\nI. RICO（《反勒索与受贿组织法》）共谋（第1项罪名）\n\n郭文贵动议驳回第1项罪名，理由是该项罪名未能指控敲诈勒索活动模式或「RICO 犯罪组织」。被告备忘录第 10–19 页。本法院不予认同。\n\nA. 前提行为\n\n首先，郭文贵主张 S2 未能指控支持第1项罪名的「有效前提行为」。同上，第 12 页。他辩称，与 GTV、农场贷款计划以及 G|CLUBS 相关的先决行为仅涉及「履行合同义务」的「虚假承诺」，这在 RICO 语境下并不构成先决犯罪行为，且无论如何这些前提行为在诉答上都是不充分的。同上，第 13 页。\n\n郭文贵的主张为时尚早。「RICO 共谋指控无需具体指明被告人合谋将要实施的前提行为或敲诈勒索行为。」United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 81 (2d Cir. 2011)。相反，只要起诉书「紧扣 RICO 法规的适用条文用语」，「载明被指控共谋的大致时间和地点」，「列出被指控构成敲诈勒索模式的州及联邦法定罪行」，并描述「被指控组织的性质与结构、其宗旨、[及其]方法与手段」，即已足矣。[5] United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)；参见 Alfonso, 143 F.3d at 776。\n\n5 郭文贵主要引用民事判例来支持其驳回 RICO 共谋罪名项的请求。参见被告备忘录第 13–18 页；被告答辩状第 4–7 页，ECF No. 245。但是，尽管政府「在庭审中必须证明与民事原告相同的构成要件」，\n\nS2 的指控满足了这些要求。第1项罪名紧扣 RICO 法规的适用条文用语，指控被告人及其他人「故意且明知地共同、共谋、同盟并不谋而合，相互约定违反美国敲诈勒索相关法律……即通过敲诈勒索活动模式管理和参与郭氏组织（Kwok Enterprise）的事务。」S2 ¶ 24。它载明了被指控共谋的大致时间和地点：自 2018 年至 2023 年 3 月，「在纽约南区及其他地方」。同上。并且，它列出了被指控构成敲诈勒索活动模式的法定罪行。同上，¶ 24(a)–(e)。这足以使郭文贵知晓「被指控实施的前提犯罪的类型」。United States v. Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d 282, 300 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院） 2019)。第1项罪名长达二十六页的内容还提供了关于郭氏组织性质和结构的大量细节，包括关于四起被指控欺诈骗局、相关人员和实体的细节，以及该共谋的「宗旨」与「手段与方法」。同上，¶¶ 1–26。因此，本法院不应以未能指控具体前提行为为由驳回第1项罪名。\nB. 连续性\n\n郭文贵还辩称，S2 未能指控「连续性」，而这是在庭审中确立 RICO 共谋指控之「模式」要件所必需的。被告备忘录第 14–18 页；参见 United States v. Cain, 671 F.3d 271, 284 (2d Cir. 2012)。然而，正如众多法院所裁定的那样，「政府在起诉书中无需按照[郭文贵]所主张的详细程度来对连续性进行诉答」。Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 301（汇集判例）。相反，起诉书只需「具体指明在 10 年期限内至少发生两次……能够证明连续性的\n\n民事原告」，但「刑事和民事诉答标准是不同的，即便在 RICO 案件中亦是如此。」Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 302（原文强调）；另见 United States v. Marchese, No. 89 Cr. 229, 1991 WL 60338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1991)（指出在审查刑事起诉书时，涉及驳回民事 RICO 诉状动议的判例「不适用」）。\n\n连续性的敲诈勒索行为」。United States v. Giovannelli, No. 01 Cr. 749, 2004 WL 48869, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2004)（引用 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)）。例如，在 Giovanelli 案中，法院认定起诉书充分指控了连续性，因为「相关罪名项指控了四项及时的前提行为——妨碍司法公正、非法买卖机动车零部件、勒索以及经营非法赌博业务——这些行为被指控是为推进一个持续存在的组织而实施的。」同上。\n\n第1项罪名的指控符合这一较低标准，其指控了在十年期间内为推进一个持续存在的组织而实施的至少五种类型的前提行为——电汇欺诈、金融机构欺诈、洗钱、非法货币交易以及证券欺诈。S2 ¶ 24。郭文贵未引用任何以未能指控敲诈勒索模式为由驳回起诉书的刑事 RICO 判例，且本法院在本司法管辖区亦未发现此类判例。政府最终能否证明连续性（此为确立敲诈勒索模式所必需），属于庭审解决的事项。参见 United States v. Messina, No. 11 Cr. 31, 2012 WL 463973, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2012)（驳回类似异议，认为其为时尚早）。\nC. RICO 犯罪组织\n\n郭文贵还主张第1项罪名应予驳回，「因其未能指控一个 RICO 犯罪组织」——具体而言，它未能「指控与郭氏组织相关的各[实体]之间的关系，或未能指控该组织存在了任何一段时间」。被告备忘录第 18–19 页。然而，郭文贵的主张再次关涉到政府在庭审中的举证责任，而非其在起诉书中的诉答责任。郭文贵未能指出任何要求政府必须\n\n详细指控犯罪组织内部实体之间的「关系」或存续期间的判例法。[6]\n\n据此，郭文贵关于驳回第1项罪名的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\nII. 指控欺诈（第5至第11项罪名）\n\nA. 电汇欺诈\n\n郭文贵主张，第5、第7、第9和第11项罪名——分别针对 GTV 私募、农场贷款计划、G|CLUBS 和喜马拉雅交易所骗局的电汇欺诈指控——必须因未能指控重大不实陈述而予以驳回。被告备忘录第 33–54 页。\n\n电汇欺诈法规 18 U.S.C. § 1343 禁止在州际和对外贸易中使用电汇通讯，以推进「任何欺诈方案或计谋，或通过虚假或欺诈性的借口、陈述或承诺获取金钱或财产」。Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004)。巡回上诉法院将电汇欺诈罪的「基本构成要件」概括为：「(1) 欺诈方案，(2) 以金钱或财产作为该方案的目标，以及 (3) 使用[]电汇以推进该方案。」United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 569 (2d Cir. 2015)（引文省略），因其他理由被 Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306 (2023) 废止。「法院通常认定，若起诉书紧扣电汇欺诈法规的法条用语，并阐明被指控欺诈方案的大致细节，则起诉书对电汇欺诈的指控即为充分。」United States v. Cornelson, 609 F. Supp. 3d 258, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)。\n\n6 根据日期为 2024 年 3 月 22 日的裁定，本法院命令政府提供「其主张卷入上述骗局的实体和银行账户清单，以及 S2 中指控的任何转账的日期」，这将就涉嫌郭氏组织所涉及的实体提供进一步细节。ECF No. 251 at 22–23。\n\n郭文贵辩称，S2 并未指控欺诈方案，因为它并未指控与该四起欺诈骗局中的任何一起存在「重大不实陈述」。在庭审中，政府将被要求证明被告人「使用了具有『重大性』的虚假陈述」。United States v. Connolly, 24 F.4th 821, 833 (2d Cir. 2022)（援引 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999)）（强调省略）。「要具有重大性，隐瞒的信息要么必须具有某种独立价值，要么必须关乎交易的最终价值。」United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208, 1217 (2d Cir. 1994)。然而，在动议驳回阶段，郭文贵并未引用任何表明存在更高诉答要求的判例法——即要求电汇欺诈罪名项不仅要紧扣第 1343 条的用语并载明涉嫌方案的「大致细节」。Cornelson, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 267；比较 United States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611, 2017 WL 237651, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017)（驳回被告关于电汇欺诈罪名项应因未能「指明任何涉嫌欺诈性电汇」而予以驳回的主张）。对被告人涉嫌虚假陈述之重大性的调查，将构成对「政府预期证据之充分性」的过早挑战。Wey, 2017 WL 237651, at *13。\n\n本法院确信，第5、第7、第9和第11项罪名充分紧扣法定条文用语，「使[郭文贵]知悉针对他的指控性质，并且——在与起诉书的[其余部分]（[各罪名项]通过援引将其并入）一并解读时——总体上提供了关于犯罪发生地点和时间的通知。」United States v. Avenatti, 432 F. Supp. 3d 354, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)。就 GTV 私募、农场贷款计划和 G|CLUBS 的指控而言，S2 指控（除其他事项外）被告人告知潜在投资者其资金将用于支持企业运营，而被告人实际上将大部分资金侵吞据为己有。参见 S2 ¶¶ 16(d) 及 (f)、17(e) 及 (f)、18(f) 及 (h)。就喜马拉雅交易所罪名项而言，S2 指控郭文贵和余建明将喜币（H Coin）和喜美元（H Dollar）宣传为「真正的加密货币」，而事实上它们并未记录在区块链上，且除喜马拉雅交易所外无法在任何其他地方进行交易。同上，¶ 19(e)、(f)。并且，S2 指控郭文贵同样侵吞了喜马拉雅交易所的资金。同上，¶ 19(g)。\n\nKwok（郭文贵）完全依据审后和/或民事判例法，对政府就这些罪名项的指控提出了一连串的质疑。[7](#page-12-0) 尽管他对起诉书指控的反驳将在审判中接受检验，但“此类事实争议根本不是法院在现阶段可以考虑的事项。”Wey 案，2017 WL 237651，第 *10 页。\n\n基于上述原因，Kwok 要求驳回罪名项五、七、九和十一的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\nB. 证券欺诈\n\nKwok 接下来主张，罪名项六、八和十——分别针对 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）、农场贷款计划（Farm Loan Program）和 G|CLUBS 的证券欺诈指控——应当予以驳回。这些罪名项中的每一项指控措辞均明确指出，被告“故意且明知地……在与证券买卖相关的过程中……使用和采用了操纵性和欺诈性的手段与策略”，违反了 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5。S2 第 44、48、52 段。各罪名项紧扣 Rule 10b–5（第 10b–5 条规则）的措辞，见同上，并通过引用合并了第 1 至 23 段中详尽的事实指控，见同上第 43、47、51 段。满足起诉书诉状标准无需更多内容。参见，例如，Wey 案，2017 WL 237651，第 *9–10 页；United States v. Greebel 案，案号 15 Cr. 637，2017 WL 3610570，第 *4 页（E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区）2017年8月4日）；United States v. Zaslavskiy 案，案号 17 Cr. 647，2018 WL 4346339，第 *3 页（E.D.N.Y. 2018年9月11日）。\n\n7 参见，例如，被告备忘录第 36 页（辩称 GTV 私募材料并未承诺被告以特定方式使用资金）；同上第 41 页（辩称“任何理性的投资者都不会依赖”Kwok 关于农场贷款投资可转换为股票的陈述）；同上第 46 页（辩称被告并未承诺将 G|CLUBS 会员费用于任何特定目的）。\n\nKwok 仍主张这些罪名项存在缺陷，因为它们 (1) 未能指控存在重大虚假陈述或遗漏；(2) 针对农场贷款或 G|CLUBS 方案，未指控存在证券交易；以及 (3) 未指控方案责任（scheme liability）。\n\n1. 重大虚假陈述或遗漏\n\n首先，Kwok 仿照其关于电汇欺诈的主张，辩称罪名项六、八和十必须因未能指控重大虚假陈述或遗漏而予以驳回。被告备忘录第 33–54 页。为了在审判中证明证券欺诈，政府必须确立被告故意“作出了重大虚假陈述（或在[其]负有陈述义务时作出了重大遗漏）或使用了欺诈手段。”United States v. Vilar 案，729 F.3d 62，88（2d Cir.（第二巡回法院）2013年）（引自 VanCook v. SEC 案，653 F.3d 130，138（2d Cir. 2011年））。在此语境下，“重大性”（materiality）意味着“极有可能一个理性的投资者会在作出投资决定时认为该遗漏或虚假陈述十分重要。”同上（已清理引文格式）。\n\n但同样，被告被指控的虚假陈述最终是真实还是虚假——以及这些虚假陈述的重大性——均属于待审判确定的事实问题。参见 United States v. Brooks 案，案号 08 Civ. 35，2008 WL 2092433，第 *3 页（S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）2008年5月16日）（在涉及对政府作出虚假陈述的案件中，裁定重大性以及“真实性与虚假性”是“在审判中确定的事实问题”）。例如，Kwok 辩称，他关于 GTV 私募资金的陈述“过于宽泛，以至于无法使理性投资者对其产生信赖”，并且“任何理性投资者在向各农场借出款项时都不会信赖[Kwok 的陈述]”。被告备忘录第 38、41 页（已清理引文格式）；亦见被告答辩状第 23–25 页，ECF No. 245。但是，“证券法项下重大性的认定属于法律与事实的混合问题，最高法院已认定其尤其适合由陪审团裁定。”United States v. Gramins 案，939 F.3d 429，446（2d Cir. 2019年）（引用省略）。这些论点在 Rule 12(b) 动议中不予适当考虑。\n\n2. 证券交易\n\nKwok 还辩称，罪名项八（农场贷款）和十（G|CLUBS）应当予以驳回，因为它们不涉及证券交易。“最高法院一再认定，Rule 10b–5 关于欺诈必须‘与证券买卖相关’的要求很容易得到满足，”涵盖“‘触及’证券买卖的欺骗手段。”United States v. Nouri 案，711 F.3d 129，143（2d Cir. 2013年）（引用省略）。起诉书在此处的指控已足够充分。\n\n首先，Kwok 主张 S2 在农场贷款和 G|CLUBS 方案中涉及何种证券方面含糊其辞，导致各罪名项“不可容许地模糊”并违反了正当程序。被告备忘录第 21、25 页；见被告答辩状第 14–16 页。法院不予认同。起诉书指控农场贷款计划中的投资者得到了“承诺，即此类贷款将能够以每借出一美元兑换一股的转换率转换为 GTV 普通股。”S2 第 17 段。S2 还指控 Kwok 告诉其“网络追随者，他们购买 G|CLUBS 会员资格将使其有权获得 Kwok 相关实体的股票，例如 GTV 和 G|Fashion。”同上第 18 段。起诉书绝非在此问题上“无可救药地混乱”，被告答辩状第 16 页，而是对所涉及的涉案证券足够明确。\n\nKwok 随后辩称，如果 GTV 股权是罪名项八和十所依据的基础证券，S2 并未指控农场贷款计划或 G|CLUBS 涉及股票的“买卖”——仅指控承诺农场贷款和 G|CLUBS 会员资格将在未来的某个未明确日期可转换为股票。被告备忘录第 22–23、26–27 页。但是，“合谋者是否*实际上*提供了证券、货币还是完全另一种金融工具的问题，最好留给事实审理者。”Zaslavskiy 案，2018 WL 4346339，第 *4 页（强调见原文）。一个理性的陪审团可以认定农场贷款和 G|CLUBS 会员资格换了个名称的股票交易——或者，也可以认同 Kwok 的观点，即会员协议和贷款协议过于模糊，不构成违反 Rule 10b–5。然而，法院在现阶段不会“评估起诉书四角范围之外的文件和证据”来作出该裁定。同上。\n\n3. 方案责任\n\nKwok 辩称，罪名项六、八和十应当予以驳回，“如果它们意图主张”Rule 10b–5 第 (a) 和 (c) 款项下的“‘方案责任’，‘以区别于[第 (b) 款]项下虚假陈述的责任’。”被告备忘录第 55 页（引用省略）。Kwok 引用了 SEC v. Rio Tinto PLC 案，41 F.4th 47（2d Cir. 2022年），巡回法院在该案中（在民事执法诉讼中）裁定，“方案责任主张[]需要除虚假陈述和遗漏之外的其他行为，例如传播”虚假信息。同上第 49 页（强调省略）。即使假设 Rio Tinto 案适用于刑事语境并影响起诉书的诉状标准，S2 亦充分指控了 Kwok 通过向其在社交媒体上的大量追随者发布视频而参与了虚假陈述的传播。参见，例如，S2 第 16(a)、17(c)–(d)、18(a)、(d) 和 (f)、19(a) 段。\n\n因此，Kwok 要求驳回罪名项六、八和十的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\nIII. 银行欺诈与洗钱（罪名项二、三、四和十二）\n\nKwok 要求驳回其余银行欺诈和洗钱罪名项的请求，主要派生自他对实体性涉嫌欺诈罪名项（Alleged Fraud Counts）的质疑。他辩称，“罪名项四中的证券欺诈部分（指控合谋实施证券及银行欺诈）”必须予以驳回，因为 S2 并未指控在与 GTV 私募、农场贷款计划或 G|CLUBS 相关过程中作出了任何重大虚假陈述。被告备忘录第 29 页。法院已驳回该论点，见前文第二部分.B.1，因此针对罪名项四的该项质疑基于相同理由不成立。Kwok 还辩称，所有银行欺诈和洗钱罪名项均应予以驳回，因为“前置行为”（predicate acts）——即各涉嫌欺诈罪名项——“在法律上存在缺陷”。被告备忘录第 58 页。由于它们并无缺陷，见前文第二部分，相关的合谋和非法交易罪名项不会以此为由予以驳回。\n\nKwok 的另外两项质疑值得稍加讨论。首先，他主张银行欺诈罪名项必须予以驳回，因为 S2 仅指控被告“将涉嫌通过欺诈获取的资金存入受联邦保险的银行”，而（他辩称）这“不足以指控违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 及 1014。”被告备忘录第 57 页。\n\n罪名项二指控被告根据 18 U.S.C § 1349 合谋实施银行欺诈，其目的是违反实体性银行欺诈成文法 18 U.S.C § 1344。S2 第 27–30 段。第 1344 条进而将明知而实施的“欺诈金融机构”方案，18 U.S.C § 1344(1)，或“通过虚假或欺诈性的托辞、陈述或承诺，获取金融机构拥有……的任何金钱、资金、信贷、资产、证券或其他财产”的方案规定为犯罪，同上 § 1344(2)。这两个款项“界定了被告可能构成银行欺诈罪的不同方式”，违反其中任何一项均足以支持定罪。United States v. Crisci 案，273 F.3d 235，239（2d Cir. 2001年）。\n\n罪名项二紧扣成文法的措辞，指控被告“向金融机构作出虚假陈述……以……开设和维持用于推进其欺诈行为的银行账户，并获取处于这些金融机构保管和控制之下的资金。”S2 第 30 段。虽然 Kwok 辩称被告并未使金融机构面临“实际或潜在损失”，被告备忘录第 57 页，但“银行欺诈成文法项下并不要求获取金钱或财产的方案必须‘对银行造成财务损失风险’。”United States v. Bankman-Fried 案，案号 22 Cr. 673，2023 WL 4194773，第 *8 页（S.D.N.Y. 2023年6月27日）（引自 Loughrin v. United States 案，573 U.S. 351，366 n.9（2014年））。相反，起诉书指控被告“合谋向金融机构发送虚假信息以掩饰账户的真实性质，并从该账户获取处于金融机构保管和控制之下的资金”，即已充分陈述了合谋实施银行欺诈罪。同上（引用 United States v. Lebedev 案，932 F.3d 40，49（2d Cir. 2019年），因其他理由被 Ciminelli v. United States 案，598 U.S. 306（2023年）废止）。罪名项二符合该要求，因此在法律上是充分的。\n\n罪名项四（Count Four）同样指控被告人共谋向金融机构提供虚假陈述，触犯了 18 U.S.C. § 1014 底层条款。S2 第 36–40 段。第 1014 条规定，“任何人明知而在任何申请中做出任何虚假陈述或报告……以企图以任何方式影响……账户由联邦存款保险公司（Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation，简称 FDIC）承保的任何机构……之作为”，即构成犯罪。18 U.S.C. § 1014。S2 中的指控用语遵循了该成文法用语，并明确指出“即”被告人“就开设银行账户的申请向金融机构撒谎并致使他人撒谎，包括涉及拟存入资金的来源与所有权以及账户的预期用途”。S2 第 39 段。Kwok（郭文贵）指出，起诉书并未指控被告人“就获取贷款或任何相关交易”向任何金融机构撒谎。被告人备忘录（Def. Mem.）第 57 页。但这并非该罪名的必要构成要件，从其字面含义来看，该罪名涵盖任何“申请”。参见 United States v. Wade 案，266 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001)（裁定第 1014 条适用于“开设支票账户的申请”）；United States v. UBS Sec. LLC 案，No. 18 Civ. 6369, 2019 WL 6721718, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2019)（“具有说服力的上诉判例支持政府关于第 1014 条的责任范围超出贷款领域的立场。”（引文省略））。[8] 因此，罪名项四在法律上也是充分的，Kwok 驳回银行欺诈罪名项的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n\n最后，Kwok 主张，罪名项十二（Count Twelve，即违反 18 U.S.C. § 1957 的非法货币交易）“应予驳回，独立理由为其不可允许地与其前置犯罪相吸收合并”。Def. Mem. 第 59 页。第 1957 条对“明知而在源自特定非法活动的、价值大于 $10,000 的犯罪所得财产中进行或企图进行货币交易的任何人”处以刑事处罚。18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)。若要被认定为“犯罪所得财产”，该资金必须是“从除该非法交易本身之外的先前、独立的犯罪行为中获取的”。United States v. $1,399,313.74 in U.S. Currency 案，591 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)（引用 United States v. McCarthy 案，271 F.3d 387, 395 (2d Cir. 2001)，因其他理由被 Eberhart v. United States 案废止，546 U.S. 12 (2005)）。也就是说，“当下游底层犯罪完成时，使用该犯罪所得进行的交易可构成洗钱定罪的依据”。McCarthy 案，271 F.3d at 395。\n\n罪名项十二指控被告人“进行了、并指示他人进行了一笔约 $1 亿美元的电汇，该款项源自罪名项五和罪名项六所指控的犯罪”——即\n\n8 在其答辩状中，Kwok 主张第二巡回法院在 United States v. Krown 案（675 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982)）中的判决将第 1014 条限制在与“法条中列出的垫款、贷款或其他信贷交易”相关的陈述。被告人答辩状（Def. Reply）第 32 页（引用 Krown 案，675 F.2d at 51）。在该案中，巡回法院裁定，在没有证据表明被告人“意图影响银行将支票用于与垫款、贷款、申请或承诺相关的用途”的情况下，仅在由 FDIC 承保的银行存入无价值支票并未违反第 1014 条。Krown 案的判决是“狭义的”——取决于被告人的意图，而非“申请”的含义——并且不妨碍本院在此作出的结论。UBS Sec. LLC 案，2019 WL 6721718, at *19；对比该案 at *18–20（裁定 Krown 案“与证券发行是否可被视为第 1014 条下的‘垫款’或‘购买’无关”）。\n\nGTV 私募——转至 Fund-1。S2 第 56 段。Kwok 称该笔转账“处于罪名项五和罪名项六所指控欺诈的核心”，因此“不能同时作为单独洗钱罪名的依据”。Def. Mem. 第 60 页。事实并非如此。在 McCarthy 案中，第二巡回法院解释称，源自犯罪的资金在“源自已经完成的犯罪，或正在进行的犯罪中已完成的阶段”时，即成为第 1957 条范围内的“收益”。271 F.3d at 395（引文省略）。次年，在 United States v. Szur 案中，巡回法院裁定，从电信欺诈计划中获取的资金在其处于“犯罪分子的控制之下”的那一刻——即“一经[被告人]收到”——便“构成了‘收益’”。289 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2002)（引文省略）。因此，巡回法院认定，电信欺诈与随后的洗钱行为是“充分可区分的”。同上。\n\nSzur 案适用于本案，在本案中，政府指控被告人实施了电信和证券欺诈计划，随后非法转移了从中收到的资金。至少，S2 指控 GTV 私募的“一个独立阶段已经完成，从而产生了”第 1957 条下的“‘收益’”。同上。起诉书中关于 GTV 私募的指控并不像 Kwok 所辩称的那样仅限于所指控的 $1 亿美元转账的不当性。参见 Def. Reply 第 33–34 页；亦参见 S2 第 16(b)–(c)、(f) 段。因此，Kwok 驳回罪名项十二的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，Kwok 驳回 S2 的动议被驳回（DENIED）。法院书记官长受命终结 ECF 编号 238 和 241 下的动议。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n日期：2024年4月2日 纽约州纽约市\n\n艺术花体签名或姓名缩写。","key_entities":["Kwok","GTV","Je","Farm Loan","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","RICO","CIPA","Yanping Wang","Ho Wan Kwok","Saraca","Kin Ming Je","Torres","Analisa Torres","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":215,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":238,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":240,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":241,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":245,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":251,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":6413,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:00:34"}