{"id":"court_sdny_261_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":261,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"LETTER","filed_date":"2024-03-22","title":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) U.S. Department of Justice","summary_zh":"信件——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #261（2024年3月22日提交）。检方致函 Torres 法官，就即将围绕同案被告王雁萍（Yanping Wang）“排除证据”动议举行的听证会，预先陈述其拟主张的事实与法律依据，包括王雁萍在明确要求律师在场之前已提供设备解锁密码（含“777777”密码），以及依“不可避免发现”原则，FBI 本也会通过其他方式访问相关设备内容。","summary_en":"Letter — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 261 (filed March 22, 2024). The government wrote to Judge Torres previewing the facts and legal arguments it expected to establish at the forthcoming suppression hearing concerning co-defendant Yanping Wang's motion — that Wang provided a device passcode (including '777777') before clearly invoking her right to counsel, and that under the inevitable-discovery doctrine the FBI would have accessed her devices' contents regardless.","body_en":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n# **U.S. Department of Justice**\n\n*United States Attorney Southern District of New York*\n\n*Jacob K. Javits Federal Building 26 Federal Plaza, 37th Floor New York, New York 10278*\n\nApril 8, 2024\n\n# **VIA ECF AND EMAIL**\n\nThe Honorable Analisa Torres United States District Judge Southern District of New York Daniel Patrick Moynihan U.S. Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312\n\n## **Re:** *United States v. Yanping Wang***, S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nThe Government respectfully writes in advance of the April 9, 2024 suppression hearing to address the applicable law and to preview facts that the Government expects will be established by the evidence introduced at the hearing.\n\n## **I. Background**\n\nOn March 15, 2023, Wang was arrested, and her apartment and certain of its contents were searched and seized, pursuant to judicially authorized warrants. Among the items seized pursuant to the premises warrant were 13 mobile devices—12 iPhones and one iPad. After Wang's arrest and the reading of her *Miranda* rights, but before she requested a lawyer, Wang provided at least a single passcode (or \"PIN\") that opened eight of those devices. The other five of the seized devices either required a different PIN or no PIN at all. FBI digital forensic examiners later accessed and extracted the data from all 13 of those mobile devices.\n\nOn December 15, 2023, Wang filed pretrial motions seeking, among other relief, suppression of \"her post-arrest statements\"—in particular, the PINs to certain of those 13 mobile devices—\"and any fruits thereof\" as obtained in violation of Wang's *Miranda* rights to silence and counsel. (Dkt. 197 at 1). Wang filed an affidavit in which she claimed to have twice asked for a lawyer: once \"while I was still handcuffed in the hallway\" outside of her apartment, (Dkt. 197-4), and then again *after* she provided \"locations of, and passwords for, electronic devices, in the apartment,\" (*id.*).\n\nThe Government opposed Wang's motions. (Dkt. 232). With respect to Wang's *Miranda* suppression motion, the Government argued that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence derived from uncoerced statements that follow a request for counsel. (*See id.* at 23-28). The Government also argued that should the exclusionary rule apply, Wang's *Miranda* objection is\n\nnonetheless moot because the Government would inevitably have discovered the contents of her relevant devices even without her provision of her PINs. (*See id.* at 28-29).[1](#page-1-0)\n\nBy an order dated March 22, 2024 (Dkt. 251 (the \"Order\")), the Court, in relevant part, declined to decide whether the exclusionary rule applies to the purported fruits of statements allegedly obtained through violations of *Miranda*'s application to requests for counsel, *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), (*see* Dkt. 251), and instead ordered a hearing to determine \"whether Wang invoked her right to counsel prior to being questioned regarding her phone passwords,\" and, if she had, \"whether the Government would inevitably have accessed the phones.\" (*See id.* at 22).\n\n### **II. Applicable Law**\n\n## A. The *Miranda/Edwards* Right to Counsel\n\n\"[W]hen an accused has invoked [her] right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, . . . [she] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to [her], unless the accused [herself] initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.\" *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). The invocation of the right \"requires a *clear* assertion of the right to counsel,\" not an ambiguous statement such as, \"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.\" *United States v. Medunjanin*, 752 F.3d 576, 586–87 (2d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up and emphasis in original).[2](#page-1-1)\n\n# B. Inevitable Discovery\n\nThe doctrine of inevitable discovery caveats the exclusionary rule to permit the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence where the Government can \"establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.\" *Nix v. Williams*, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). A two-step process determines whether contested evidence avoids suppression on this ground. *In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties*, 830 F.3d 66, 103 (2d Cir. 2016). First, \"the court must evaluate the progress of the investigation\n\n<span id=\"page-1-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> Wang filed a reply in further support of her pretrial motions on February 1, 2024. (Dkt. 236).\n\n<span id=\"page-1-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> The Government respectfully maintains its position that *Miranda*'s exclusionary rule is limited to *statements* obtained in violation of a defendant's rights to silence or counsel, and that no controlling authority provides for suppression of *derivative evidence* as a remedy for purported violations of a defendant's *Edwards* right to counsel. (*See* Dkt. 232). A violation of *Miranda*'s prophylactic rules does not require \"suppression of the [nontestimonial] physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements.\" *United States v. Patane*, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (plurality opinion); *United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia*, 708 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2013) (when seized is \"physical, nontestimonial evidence, an *Edwards* violation itself would not justify suppression\"). As three Justices explained in *Patane*, \"the *Miranda* rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause. The Self-Incrimination Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement. Accordingly, there is no justification for extending the *Miranda* rule to this context.\" 542 U.S. at 636.\n\nat the time of the government misconduct to determine whether an active and ongoing investigation . . . was in progress.\" *Id.* Second, \"the court must, for each particular piece of evidence, specifically analyze and explain how, if at all, discovery of that piece of evidence would have been more likely than not inevitable absent the unlawful search.\" *Id.*\n\n#### C. Evidentiary Standards at Suppression Hearings\n\nThe Court is free to consider hearsay or any other nonprivileged evidence to decide a suppression motion. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (court \"is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege,\" when deciding whether \"evidence is admissible\"); Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(1) (evidentiary rules other than privilege do not apply to \"[t]he determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under rule 104\"); *see also United States v. Raddatz*, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) (\"At a suppression hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at trial.\"); *accord United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003).\n\nA defendant's affidavit should be disregarded if she chooses not to testify. *See United States v. Deleston*, No. 15 Cr. 113 (PKC), 2015 WL 4745252, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2015); *United States v. James*, No. 10 Cr. 1293 (RPP), 2011 WL 6306721, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2011); *United States v. Al-Marri*, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); *United States v. Polanco*, 37 F. Supp. 2d 262, 264 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (\"[T]he self-serving affidavit of the moving defendant is usually disregarded if [she] declines to testify at the hearing.\").\n\n#### **III. Anticipated Evidence**\n\n#### A. Overview\n\nAs a preliminary matter, the Government expects to offer evidence at the suppression hearing that five of the 13 mobile devices seized pursuant to the premises warrant were accessed without entering or referring to the PINs provided by Wang. In other words, these five devices cannot be subject to suppression, because their contents were *actually* discovered independent of Wang's provision of PINs to the FBI. The other eight devices were accessed using the 777777 PIN that Wang provided *before* she invoked her right to counsel. But even if that were not so, the contents of the remaining eight mobile devices would inevitably have been discovered through other means. Evidence from these devices should therefore be admissible at trial.\n\n#### B. Wang Provided the 777777 PIN Before Asking for an Attorney\n\nThe Government expects that Special Agent Melissa Baccari's testimony will establish that Wang provided the only relevant passcode—777777—prior to invoking her right to speak with an attorney. Special Agent Baccari is expected to testify that she participated in Wang's arrest on March 15, 2023. Agent Baccari read Wang her *Miranda* rights in the hallway outside of Wang's apartment. Wang acknowledged them, but she did not then ask for or mention a lawyer. After Agent Baccari and another female agent walked with Wang to her bedroom, Wang freely answered questions about her phones and provided the passcode \"777777.\" Thereafter, however, when Agent Baccari asked about Kwok's whereabouts, Wang asked for a lawyer.\n\nAgent Baccari's testimony will establish an independent basis for denying Wang's suppression motion, by establishing that Wang voluntarily provided at least the 777777 passcode after being read her *Miranda* rights and before invoking her right to counsel. (*See* Order at 22 (\"If Wang provided the passwords before invoking her right to counsel or re-initiated contact with the agents after her invocation, then there was no *Edwards* violation, and the issue is moot.\")).\n\n### C. The FBI Would Have Accessed the Devices Even Without Wang's Providing the PIN\n\nMoreover, the Government expects that additional witnesses will offer brief testimony about the extraction of Wang's mobile devices and the case-wide passcode list compiled by the FBI. This testimony will establish that, even without Wang's \"777777\" statement, the FBI would more likely than not have been able to access all of her devices. Without Wang's statement of the PIN, the FBI's forensic examiners would have consulted a passcode list that identified the same \"777777\" PIN at the top of a list of potential case-wide PINs based on its identification in a document recovered at a different premises search in Mahwah, New Jersey. And certain of the devices either did not require a PIN, or the PIN was obtained through means independent of Wang's statements.\n\nSpecial Agent Jessica Cardenas is expected to testify that she was present at the March 15, 2023 search of Kwok's apartment where Kwok and a confidant both voluntarily provided the passcode \"777777\" for cellphones in their possession, including a cellphone that Kwok was holding in his hand when he was arrested.[3](#page-3-0)\n\nDigital Forensics Examiner Jessica Volchko is expected to testify that, consistent with typical practice, FBI case agents provided the Bureau's Computer Analysis and Response Team (\"CART\") with a list of common passcodes sourced from evidence obtained during searches of *other sites* (namely, Kwok's premises) to use, when necessary, on devices across this case (the \"Passcode List\"). The first passcode on the list was \"777777\" and the FBI case agents directed CART examiners to \"try all 7s to start with.\"\n\nDigital Forensics Examiner Christian Isolda of CART's Mobile Device Unlock Service is expected to testify about technical capabilities that enable the FBI to access certain devices for which a PIN is necessary but unavailable.\n\n#### D. Summary of Relevant Mobile Devices\n\nTo aid the Court's understanding of the evidence that the Government expects to be adduced at the forthcoming hearing, this summary chart identifies the mobile devices at issue, and further identifies which devices are relevant to Wang's suppression motion:\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> \"Brother Seven\" is one of Kwok's aliases listed in the Indictment. Kwok used the name \"Brother Seven\" in his broadcasts, proclaiming he is the seventh of seven brothers.\n\n| FBI Reference<br>Number | Device    | PIN                            | FBI's Means of<br>Access | Government's<br>Inevitable<br>Means of<br>Access |\n|-------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n| 1B17                    | iPhone 13 | No PIN<br>required             | Freely accessible        | N/A                                              |\n| 1B19                    | iPhone 6s | 100423                         | \"Brute-force\"<br>entry4  | N/A                                              |\n| 1B 20                   | iPhone 14 | No PIN required                | Freely accessible        | N/A                                              |\n| 1B 68                   | iPhone XR | No PIN required                | Freely accessible        | N/A                                              |\n| 1B 77                   | iPad      | PIN not<br>provided by<br>Wang | AFU extraction           | N/A                                              |\n| 1B 15                   | iPhone 12 | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n| 1B 16                   | iPhone 13 | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n| 1B 18                   | iPhone 12 | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n| 1B 69                   | iPhone 12 | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n| 1B 70                   | iPhone 11 | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n| 1B 71                   | iPhone XR | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n| 1B 72                   | iPhone 12 | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n| 1B 93                   | iPhone 13 | 777777                         | Entry of PIN             | Passcode List                                    |\n\nThe Government expects that the testimony and the related exhibits will establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) five of the 13 Wang mobile devices were accessed without use of or reference to Wang's statement of her PIN and are not reasonably subject to suppression and that (2) the eight remaining devices would more likely than not have inevitably been accessed through reference to the Passcode List that identified the same \"777777\" code from other sources and agents' instructions to try that passcode first when encountering case-wide devices for which\n\n<span id=\"page-4-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> The Government expects that a witness from the FBI's Computer Analysis and Response Team (\"CART\") will testify about the FBI's technical capabilities to access mobile devices for which a confirmed PIN is unavailable. These include so-called \"brute force\" techniques that use software to access a locked device by guessing potentially millions of potential PINs until entering the correct one, and an \"AFU\" or \"after first unlock\" extraction by which FBI can extract substantially all of the data from a device that was unlocked at least once after the last time it was powered off.\n\na PIN was unavailable. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Eldarir*, No. 20 Cr. 243 (LDH), 2023 WL 4373551, at \\*9 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023) (publication forthcoming) (denying motion to suppress where Court \"[found] with high confidence that the evidence Defendant seeks to suppress would have been discovered even if, as Defendant argues, he had not been compelled to unlock the phone\"); *see also, e.g.*, *United States v. Jackson*, No. 19 Cr. 6026, 2020 WL 810747, at \\*12 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020) (\"On this record, I find that the evidence which Jackson seeks to suppress would have been discovered even if Jackson had not been compelled to provide the passcode to the phone or present his biometric features to unlock the phone\"); *United States v. Will*, No. 15 Cr. 6, 2015 WL 3822599, \\*16 (N.D. W. Va. June 19, 2015) (finding that suppression not warranted under doctrine of inevitable discovery where evidence demonstrated contents of phone would have been extracted without [a] password); *United States v. Todd*, No. 16 Cr. 305, 2017 WL 1197849, \\*13 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2017) (\"as [the agent] testified, [the] FBI offices ... had the technological capabilities to bypass the swipe pattern and access the contents of [d]efendant's cell phone[;] [t]hus, regardless of whether officers violated [d]efendant's Miranda rights in obtaining [d]efendant's swipe pattern, the inevitable discovery doctrine prevents suppression of the evidence attained from the cell phone search\"), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2017 WL 1172113 (S.D. Ga. March 29, 2017); *United States v. Ashmore*, No. 16 Cr. 20016, Dkt. 36 at 12 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 7, 2016) (denying suppression of contents of device where Government \"would have been able to access the information on [the defendant's] computer and cell phone without the passwords provided by [the defendant] at his residence\").\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nB\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin Horton Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys (212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314","body_zh":"U.S. Department of Justice（美国司法部）\n\nUnited States Attorney Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦检察官办公室）\n\nJacob K. Javits Federal Building 26 Federal Plaza, 37th Floor New York, New York 10278（纽约州纽约市联邦广场 26 号雅各布·K·贾维茨联邦大楼 37 层，邮编 10278）\n\n2024年4月8日\n\n通过 ECF 及电子邮件发送\n\n尊敬的 Analisa Torres（阿纳丽莎·托雷斯）美国联邦地区法官\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）\nDaniel Patrick Moynihan U.S. Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312（丹尼尔·帕特里克·莫伊尼汉美国联邦法院，纽约州纽约市珍珠街 500 号，邮编 10007-1312）\n\n事由：United States v. Yanping Wang（美国诉王雁平案），案号 S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n在2024年4月9日证据排除听证会召开之前，政府谨此致信，阐述适用的法律，并对政府预计将在听证会上出示之证据所确立的事实进行预告。\n\nI. 背景\n\n2023年3月15日，根据司法授权的令状，王被逮捕，其公寓及公寓内的特定物品被搜查和扣押。在依据住所搜查令扣押的物品中，包括 13 部移动设备——12 部 iPhone 和一部 iPad。在王被捕并向其宣读 Miranda（米兰达）权利之后、但在其要求聘请律师之前，王提供了至少一个密码（或称“PIN码”），该密码开启了其中的八部设备。扣押的其余五部设备要么需要不同的PIN码，要么根本无需PIN码。联邦调查局（FBI）的数字取证检验员随后访问并提取了所有这 13 部移动设备的数据。\n\n2023年12月15日，王提交了审前动议，除其他救济外，请求排除“其被捕后的陈述”——特别是这 13 部移动设备中特定设备的PIN码——“以及由此产生的任何衍生证据”，理由是这些陈述的获取侵犯了王享有的保持沉默和获得律师协助的米兰达权利。（Dkt. 197 第 1 页）。王提交了一份宣誓书，声称自己曾两次要求聘请律师：一次是“当我仍被戴着手铐在公寓外的走廊里时”，（Dkt. 197-4）；另一次是在其提供“公寓内电子设备的位置和密码”之后，（同上）。\n\n政府反对王的动议。（Dkt. 232）。关于王的米兰达证据排除动议，政府辩称，非法证据排除规则不适用于在要求获得律师协助后所作的非强迫性陈述所衍生的证据。（见同上，第 23-28 页）。政府还辩称，即使排除规则适用，王的米兰达异议\n\n仍然没有实际意义，因为即使王没有提供其PIN码，政府也将不可避免地发现其相关设备的内容。（见同上，第 28-29 页）。1\n\n通过日期为2024年3月22日的裁定（Dkt. 251（下称《裁定》）），法院在相关部分拒绝就排除规则是否适用于涉嫌通过侵犯米兰达在要求律师方面的适用（Edwards v. Arizona，451 U.S. 477 (1981)）而获取之陈述的所谓衍生证据作出决定（见 Dkt. 251），而是命令举行听证会，以确定“王在就其手机密码接受讯问之前是否主张了获得律师协助的权利”，如果确已主张，“政府是否会不可避免地访问这些手机”。（见同上，第 22 页）。\n\nII. 适用法律\n\nA. Miranda/Edwards 获得律师协助的权利\n\n“当被控告人在羁押讯问期间主张其要求律师在场的权利时，……在该被控告人获得律师协助之前，不得对其进行进一步的讯问，除非被控告人自身主动发起与警方的进一步沟通、交流或对话。”Edwards v. Arizona，451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981)。权利的主张“需要对获得律师协助之权利作出明确断言”，而非含糊不清的表述，例如“也许我应该和律师谈谈”。United States v. Medunjanin，752 F.3d 576, 586–87 (2d Cir. 2014)（已清洗引文，强调为原文所加）。2\n\nB. 必然发现原则\n\n必然发现原则对排除规则作出了限制，允许在政府能够“以优势证据证明该信息最终或必然会通过合法手段被发现”的情况下，采纳非法获取的证据。Nix v. Williams，467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)。两步审查程序决定争议证据是否可以依据该理由免于被排除。In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties，830 F.3d 66, 103 (2d Cir. 2016)。首先，“法院必须评估调查的进展情况\n\n1 王于2024年2月1日提交了进一步支持其审前动议的答辩状。（Dkt. 236）。\n\n2 政府谨此坚持其立场，即米兰达排除规则仅限于侵犯被告保持沉默或获得律师协助权利所获取的陈述，且没有任何具约束力的先例规定将排除衍生证据作为对涉嫌侵犯被告依 Edwards 享有的获得律师协助权利的救济手段。（见 Dkt. 232）。对米兰达预防性规则的违反并不要求“排除嫌疑人未获告知但自愿作出的陈述所产生的［非供述性］实物衍生证据”。United States v. Patane，542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004)（多数意见）；United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia，708 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2013)（当扣押的是“实物的、非供述性的证据时，违反 Edwards 本身并不构成排除证据的理由”）。正如三位大法官在 Patane 案中所阐释的那样，“米兰达规则是一种用于防止违反《自证其罪条款》的预防性措施。然而，将自愿陈述的实物衍生证据采纳为证据，并不涉及《自证其罪条款》。因此，没有理由将米兰达规则扩展到此种情形。”542 U.S. at 636。\n\n在政府发生不当行为之时，以确定当时是否正在进行一项积极且持续的调查……”。同上。其次，“法院必须针对每一项特定证据，具体分析并解释在没有非法搜查的情况下，发现该项证据为何更有可能是必然的”。同上。\n\nC. 证据排除听证会的证据标准\n\n法院在裁定排除证据动议时，可自由考虑传闻证据或任何其他非特权证据。见 Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)（在决定“证据是否具有可采性”时，法院“不受证据规则的约束，特权规则除外”）；Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(1)（除特权外的证据规则不适用于“根据第104条由法院确定证据可采性的初步事实问题”）；并见 United States v. Raddatz，447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980)（“在证据排除听证会上，法院可以依据传闻证据和其他证据，即使该等证据在审判中不具有可采性。”）；一致见 United States v. Yousef，327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003)。\n\n如果被告选择不出庭作证，其宣誓书应不予考虑。见 United States v. Deleston，No. 15 Cr. 113 (PKC), 2015 WL 4745252, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2015)；United States v. James，No. 10 Cr. 1293 (RPP), 2011 WL 6306721, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2011)；United States v. Al-Marri，230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)；United States v. Polanco，37 F. Supp. 2d 262, 264 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)（“若动议被告拒绝在听证会上作证，其自利性宣誓书通常不予考虑。”）。\n\nIII. 预期出示的证据\n\nA. 概述\n\n作为初步事项，政府预计在证据排除听证会上提出证据证明：依据住所搜查令扣押的 13 部移动设备中，有五部是在未输入或未参考王所提供PIN码的情况下被访问的。换言之，这五部设备不可能成为排除的对象，因为其内容实际上是在独立于王向FBI提供PIN码的情况下被发现的。其余八部设备是使用王在主张其获得律师协助权利之前提供的 777777 PIN码访问的。但即便事实并非如此，其余八部移动设备的内容也将不可避免地通过其他途径被发现。因此，来自这些设备的证据在审判中应具有可采性。\n\nB. 王在要求聘请律师之前提供了 777777 PIN码\n\n政府预计特别探员 Melissa Baccari（梅丽莎·巴卡里）的证词将确立：王在主张其与律师交谈的权利之前，提供了唯一的关联密码——777777。预计特别探员巴卡里将作证称，她参与了2023年3月15日对王的逮捕。探员巴卡里在王公寓外的走廊向王宣读了米兰达权利。王确认知悉该等权利，但当时并未要求或提及律师。在探员巴卡里和另一名女性探员陪同王走向其卧室后，王自愿回答了关于其手机的问题，并提供了密码“777777”。然而，在此之后，当探员巴卡里询问 Kwok（郭文贵）的下落时，王提出了要求聘请律师。\n\n探员巴卡里的证词将确立驳回王之排除动议的独立依据，即证明王在获宣读米兰达权利之后、在主张其获得律师协助权利之前，自愿提供了至少 777777 这一密码。（见《裁定》第 22 页（“如果王在主张其获得律师协助权利之前提供了密码，或者在其主张之后重新主动与探员接触，则不存在违反 Edwards 的情形，该问题亦无实际意义。”））。\n\nC. 即使王没有提供PIN码，FBI 也会访问这些设备\n\n此外，政府预计其他证人将就王之移动设备的数据提取以及 FBI 编制的全案密码清单提供简要证词。该证词将确立：即使没有王作出的“777777”陈述，FBI 也更有可能能够访问其所有的设备。即使没有王关于PIN码的陈述，FBI 的取证检验员也会查阅一份密码清单，该清单根据在 New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah（马瓦）的另一处住所搜查中查获的一份文件，将相同的“777777”PIN码列为全案潜在PIN码清单的首位。并且特定设备要么无需PIN码，要么其PIN码是通过独立于王之陈述的途径获取的。\n\n预计特别探员 Jessica Cardenas（杰西卡·卡德纳斯）将作证称，她出席了2023年3月15日对郭公寓的搜查，在该次搜查中，郭及其一名密友均就其持有的手机自愿提供了密码“777777”，其中包括郭被捕时手中正拿着的一部手机。3\n\n预计数字取证检验员 Jessica Volchko（杰西卡·沃尔奇科）将作证称，按照惯常做法，FBI 案件探员向联邦调查局的计算机分析与响应小组（CART）提供了一份常见密码清单，这些密码源自对其他地点（即郭的住所）搜查期间获取的证据，以便在必要时用于全案的各个设备（下称《密码清单》）。清单上的第一个密码是“777777”，FBI 案件探员指示 CART 检验员“首先尝试全 7”。\n\n预计来自 CART 移动设备解锁服务的数字取证检验员 Christian Isolda（克里斯蒂安·伊索尔达）将就使 FBI 能够访问需要PIN码但无法获取PIN码之特定设备的技术能力作证。\n\nD. 相关移动设备汇总\n\n为协助法院理解政府预计将在即将举行的听证会上出示的证据，本汇总表指明了争议涉及的移动设备，并进一步指明了哪些设备与王的证据排除动议相关：\n\n3 “七哥”（Brother Seven）是起诉书中列出的 Kwok（郭文贵）的化名之一。郭文贵在其广播节目中使用“七哥”这一称呼，声称自己在兄弟七人中排行第七。\n\nFBI（联邦调查局）编号 设备 PIN码 FBI获取访问权限的方式 政府必然获取访问权限的方式\n1B17 iPhone 13 无需PIN码 可自由访问 不适用\n1B19 iPhone 6s 100423 “暴力破解”进入4 不适用\n1B 20 iPhone 14 无需PIN码 可自由访问 不适用\n1B 68 iPhone XR 无需PIN码 可自由访问 不适用\n1B 77 iPad Wang未提供PIN码 AFU提取 不适用\n1B 15 iPhone 12 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n1B 16 iPhone 13 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n1B 18 iPhone 12 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n1B 69 iPhone 12 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n1B 70 iPhone 11 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n1B 71 iPhone XR 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n1B 72 iPhone 12 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n1B 93 iPhone 13 777777 输入PIN码 密码清单\n\n政府预计，证词及相关证物将以优势证据证明：(1) 在 Wang（王）的 13 部移动设备中，有 5 部是在未使用或未参考王关于其 PIN 码的陈述的情况下获取访问权限的，不属于合理排除证据的范围；以及 (2) 其余 8 部设备极有可能必然会通过参考密码清单而获取访问权限，该清单从其他来源确认了相同的“777777”密码，且探员收到指示，在遇到全案中未获得 PIN 码的设备时首先尝试该密码。\n\n4 政府预计，来自 FBI 计算机分析与响应小组（Computer Analysis and Response Team，简称“CART”）的证人将就 FBI 在无法获取已确认 PIN 码的情况下访问移动设备的技术能力作证。这些技术包括所谓的“暴力破解”技术（使用软件通过猜测可能多达数百万个潜在 PIN 码来访问已锁定的设备，直至输入正确的密码），以及“AFU”或“首次解锁后”（after first unlock）提取技术（FBI 借此可以从自上次关机后至少解锁过一次的设备中提取绝大部分数据）。\n\n参见例如 United States v. Eldarir, No. 20 Cr. 243 (LDH), 2023 WL 4373551, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023)（即将出版）（驳回排除证据动议，法院“高度确信，即使如被告所主张的那样其未被强迫解锁手机，被告寻求排除的证据也本来就会被发现”）；另见例如 United States v. Jackson, No. 19 Cr. 6026, 2020 WL 810747, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020)（“根据本案记录，我认定，即使 Jackson 未被强迫提供手机密码或提供其生物识别特征以解锁手机，Jackson 寻求排除的证据也本来就会被发现”）；United States v. Will, No. 15 Cr. 6, 2015 WL 3822599, *16 (N.D. W. Va. June 19, 2015)（认定在有证据证明即使没有密码手机内容也本来会被提取的情况下，根据必然发现原则无须排除证据）；United States v. Todd, No. 16 Cr. 305, 2017 WL 1197849, *13 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2017)（“正如［探员］作证所述，FBI 各办事处……具备绕过滑动解锁图案并访问被告手机内容的技术能力；因此，无论执法人员在获取被告的滑动解锁图案时是否侵犯了被告的米兰达权利（Miranda rights），必然发现原则均阻止排除从手机搜查中获得的证据”），report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1172113 (S.D. Ga. March 29, 2017)；United States v. Ashmore, No. 16 Cr. 20016, Dkt. 36 at 12 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 7, 2016)（在政府“本可以在没有［被告］在其住所提供的密码的情况下访问［被告］电脑和手机上的信息”的情况下，驳回排除设备内容的动议）。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\nUnited States Attorney（美国联邦检察官）\n\n签署人：\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\nAssistant United States Attorneys（助理美国联邦检察官）\n(212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Torres","CIPA","Guo","Yanping Wang","Analisa Torres","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":36,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":197,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":232,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":236,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":251,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":2586,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-03-22 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-03-22","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:31:17"}