{"id":"court_sdny_264_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":264,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"陪审团指示请求 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）及 Yanping Wang 案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #264。检控方与被告人联合提交关于 RICO 阴谋、电汇欺诈、证券欺诈、洗钱等指控的法律定义与要件的陪审团指示请求。","summary_en":"Joint Requests to Charge — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Miles Guo, Guo Wengui) and Yanping Wang, 1:23-cr-00118, SDNY, ECF #264. Prosecution and defendants jointly request jury instructions defining legal elements for RICO conspiracy, wire fraud, securities fraud, money laundering, and related charges.","body_en":"### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\" a/k/a \"Boss,\" and\n\nYANPING WANG, a/k/a \"Yvette,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendants.\n\n**S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\n# **THE PARTIES' JOINT REQUESTS TO CHARGE**\n\nPursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the parties respectfully request that the Court include the following in its instructions to the jury. Proposed instructions highlighted in blue are proposed solely by the Government and are objected to by the defendants. Proposed instructions highlighted in yellow are proposed solely by the defendants and are objected to by the Government.\n\nThe parties respectfully reserve the right to modify or supplement these requests to charge based on the Court's ruling on defendants' pending motion to dismiss and the evidence and arguments offered at trial.\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| REQUEST NO.
1 –
General Requests1 | |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| REQUEST NO.
2 –
Summary
of the Indictment
2 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
3 –
Multiple Counts/Multiple Defendants
6 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
4 –
Conspiracy and Substantive Counts
7 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
5 –
Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: General Instructions
9 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
6 –
Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: First Element—Scheme
or Artifice to Defraud….
12 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
7 –
Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: Second Element—
Participation in the Scheme with the Specific \"Intent to Defraud\"

17 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
8 –
Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: Third Element—
Interstate Wire………22 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
9 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud—Statutory Purpose and
Indictment24 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
10 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Elements of the Securities Fraud Offenses.
27 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
11 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Fraudulent
Act…………
29 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
12
–
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Materiality
31 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
13 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Puffery and
Forward-Looking Statements32 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
14 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Fraudulent
Act—Definition of a \"Security\"33 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
15 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Fraudulent
Act—In Connection With35 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
16 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: Second Element—
Knowledge, Intent, and Willfulness39 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
17 –
Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: Third Element—
Instrumentality of Interstate Commerce42 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
18 –
Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction

44 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
19 –
Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction—
First Element……………46 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
20 –
Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction—
Second Element…….
47 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
21 –
Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction—
Third and Fourth
Elements48 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
22 –
Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction— | |\n| Fifth Element50 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
23 –
Counts Five through Twelve—Willful Causation
51 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
24 –
Counts Five through Twelve—Aiding and Abetting
54 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
25 –
Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud—
Generally………………………57 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
26 –
Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud—First
Element—Existence of the Conspiracy59 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
27 –
Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud—Second
Element—Membership in the Conspiracy62 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
28 –
Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud
Conspiracy—Objects…………67 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
29 –
Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Generally

72 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
30 –
Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Objects –
Concealment
73 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
31 –
Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Objects –
International
Concealment78 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
32 –
Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Objects –
International
Promotion…….
81 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
33 –
Count Four: Securities Fraud and Bank False Statements Conspiracy—
Generally……83 | |\n| REQUEST NO.
34 –
Count Four: Securities Fraud and Bank False Statements Conspiracy—
Overt Act…………85 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 35 –
Count Four: Securities Fraud and False Statements Conspiracy—
Object of
False Statements to
Financial Institutions87 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 36 –
Count One: Racketeering Conspiracy—Generally
88 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 37 –
Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy—Elements
90 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 38 –
Count One: Racketeering Conspiracy –
First Element –
Enterprise
92 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 39 –
Count One: Racketeering Conspiracy –
Second Element –
Effect on
Interstate Commerce94 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 40 –
Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy –
Third Element –
Association with
the Enterprise………
95 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 41 –
Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy –
Fourth Element –
Conduct or
Participate
in Affairs of the Enterprise
97 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 42 –
Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy –
Predicates
104 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 43 –
Pinkerton
Liability106 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 44 –
Conscious Avoidance
108 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 45 –
Venue111 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 46 –
Negligence of a Victim Not a Defense
112 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 47 –
Multiple Conspiracies
113 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 48 –
Variance in Dates114 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 49 –
Particular Investigative Techniques Not Required
115 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 50 –
Use of Evidence Obtained Pursuant to Searches and Seizures
116 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 51 –
Stipulations117 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 52 –
Law Enforcement and Government Employee Witnesses
118 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 53 –
Preparation of Witnesses
119 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 54 –
Accomplice/Cooperating Witness Testimony
120 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 55 –
Non-Prosecution Agreement
122 | |\n| REQUEST NO. 56 – Immunized Witnesses | 123 |\n| REQUEST NO. 57 – Uncalled Witnesses—Equally Available | 125 |\n| REQUEST NO. 58 – Persons Not on Trial | 126 |\n| REQUEST NO. 59 – Limiting Instruction – Similar Act Evidence | 127 |\n| REQUEST NO. 60 – Expert Witnesses | 128 |\n| REQUEST NO. 61 – Charts and Summaries (In Evidence) | 129 |\n| REQUEST NO. 62 – Charts and Summaries (Not In Evidence) | 130 |\n| REQUEST NO. 63 – Recordings and Transcripts, Generally | 131 |\n| REQUEST NO. 64 – Foreign Language Translations | 132 |\n| REQUEST NO. 65 – Defendant's Testimony | 133 |\n| REQUEST NO. 66 – Defendant's Right Not to Testify | 134 |\n| REQUEST NO. 67 – Redaction of Evidentiary Items | 135 |\n| Defense Request 1 – Role of the Jury | 136 |\n| Defense Request 2 – Caution-Consider Only Crimes Charged | 138 |\n| Defense Instruction 3 – Credibility of Witnesses | 139 |\n| Defense Instruction 5 – Reasonable Doubt | 141 |\n| Defense Instruction 6 – Large Sums of Money | 143 |\n| Defense Instruction 7 – Direct and Circumstantial Evidence | 146 |\n| Defense Instruction 8 – Duty of Jury | 146 |\n| Defense Instruction 9 – Defendant's Election to Testify | 147 |\n| Defense Instruction 10 – Victims of the Offense | 148 |\n| REQUEST NO. 68 – Conclusion | 149 |\n\n# **General Requests**\n\nThe parties respectfully request that the Court give its usual instructions to the jury on the\n\nfollowing matters:\n\n- a. Function of Court and Jury\n- b. Indictment not Evidence\n- c. Statements of Court and Counsel not Evidence\n- d. Burden of Proof and Presumption of Innocence\n- e. Reasonable Doubt\n- f. Jury's Recollection Controls\n- g. Government Treated Like Any Other Party\n- h. Definitions and Examples of Direct and Circumstantial Evidence\n- i. Inferences\n- j. Credibility of Witnesses\n- k. Interest in Outcome\n- l. Right to See Exhibits and Have Testimony Read During Deliberations\n- m. Sympathy: Oath as Jurors\n- n. Punishment Is Not to Be Considered by the Jury\n- o. Verdict of Guilt or Innocence Must Be Unanimous\n- p. Duties of Foreperson and Return of Verdict Form\n\n### **Summary of the Indictment**\n\nThe defendants, HO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\" a/k/a \"Boss,\" (whom I will refer to as \"Mr. Kwok\") and YANPING WANG, a/k/a \"Yvette,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" (whom I will refer to as \"Ms. Wang\") have been charged in what is called an Indictment. An Indictment is simply an accusation. It is not evidence. It creates no presumption, and it permits no inference, that a defendant is guilty. You are to give no weight to the fact that an Indictment has been returned against the defendants. My description of the charges, which I will now give, merely summarizes the government's allegations using the government's terminology.\n\nThe charges in the Indictment relate to allegations that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang conspired to defraud victims of money through a series of schemes and an organization referred to as the Kwok Enterprise. The Kwok Enterprise is alleged to be a series of complex fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities. There are twelve relevant counts in the Indictment, charging Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with committing—and conspiring to commit—wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, providing false statements to banks, and money laundering. The Indictment also charges Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with conspiring to use the Kwok Enterprise to commit those offenses—a charge known as RICO conspiracy, which I will tell you more about later. The Indictment contains 12 counts. Ms. Wang is charged in Counts One through Ten and Count Twelve. Mr. Kwok is charged in Counts One through Twelve.\n\nCount One of the Indictment charges that Mr. Kwok and Mr. Wang conspired to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(d). As I will explain in more detail, this charge alleges that Guo and Wang agreed to operate an organization referred to as the Kwok Enterprise through various acts of wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, and securities fraud. The counts that follow Count One focus on certain of those acts and conspiracies to commit them.\n\nCount Two of the Indictment charges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang conspired to commit wire fraud and bank fraud by (i) agreeing to join a conspiracy to obtain money from victims individuals by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises transmitted over wires; (ii) agreeing to participate in a conspiracy to obtain money, and property, owned by, or under the custody and control of, a financial institution by making, or causing others to make, false representations to financial institutions.\n\nIn a moment, I will explain the difference between conspiracy charges (an agreement to commit a crime) and substantive charges (or committing the underlying crime itself). I just explained that Count Two of the Indictment charges the defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. Counts Five, Seven, Nine, and Eleven of the Indictment charge the defendants with the substantive offense of wire fraud. Count Five alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the GTV Private Placement to sell GTV stock and fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations.\" Count Seven alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the Farm Loan Program to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations.\" Count Nine alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"promoted and marketed G|CLUBS to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations.\" And Count Eleven—which charges only Mr. Kwok and not Ms. Wang—alleges that Mr. Kwok \"operated the Himalaya Exchange to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money.\"\n\nCount Four of the Indictment charges Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with conspiracy to commit the crime of securities fraud by agreeing \"to fraudulently induce investors to participate in the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS by providing materially false and misleading information and representations in connection with purported shares of GTV common stock and purported companies affiliated with GTV,\" and with conspiracy to provide false statements to banks by lying, and causing others to lie, to banks in connection with applications for bank accounts.\n\nCounts Six, Eight, and Ten charge Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with the substantive offense of securities fraud. Count Six alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the GTV Private Placement to sell GTV stock and obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations.\" Count Eight alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the Farm Loan Program to obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations,\" including by \"promising that such loans would be convertible into GTV common stock.\" And Count Ten alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"promoted and marketed G|CLUBS to obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations.\"\n\nCount Three of the Indictment charges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang conspired to commit money laundering, and relates to transactions involving proceeds of the alleged wire fraud and securities fraud offenses charged in Counts Five through Eleven.\n\nCount Twelve of the Indictment charges that the defendants engaged in a monetary transaction with property derived from a crime—the defendants made, and directed others to make, a wire transfer of approximately \\$100 million derived from the wire fraud and securities fraud offenses charged in Counts Five and Six.\n\nIn a moment, I will instruct you on each of these charges in more detail.\n\nMr. Kwok and Ms. Wang have pleaded not guilty to each of these charges.\n\n### **Multiple Counts/Multiple Defendants**\n\nEach count charges a different crime. You must consider each count of the Indictment separately, and you must return a separate verdict as to each count. The case on each count stands or falls upon the proof or lack of proof with respect to that count. Your verdict on one count should not control your decision as to any other count. In reaching your verdict, bear in mind that guilt is personal and individual. Your verdict of guilty or not guilty must be based solely upon the evidence about each defendant. The case against each defendant, on each count, stands or falls upon the proof or lack of proof against that defendant alone, and your verdict as to any defendant on any count should not control your decision as to any other defendant or any other count. No other considerations are proper.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 3-8.\n\n# **Conspiracy and Substantive Counts**\n\nAs I have just described, there are certain counts in the Indictment that are conspiracy counts, while others are what are referred to as substantive counts. Unlike the conspiracy charges, which allege agreements to commit certain offenses, the substantive counts are based on the actual commission of offenses, or aiding and abetting others to actually commit offenses. Counts One through Four of the Indictment each charge Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with conspiracy. The other counts charge what we call substantive offeneses. Although I will provide you with more information about this shortly, let me briefly summarize the difference now.\n\nA conspiracy count is different than a substantive count. A conspiracy charge, generally speaking, alleges that two or more person agreed to accomplish an unlawful objective. The focus of a conspiracy count, therefore, is on whether there was an unlawful agreement. There can be no conspiracy unless at least two people reached such an agreement A substantive count, on the other hand, charges a defendant with the actual commission,\n\nor with aiding and abetting or causing the actual commission, of an offense. A substantive offense, therefore, may be committed by a single person, and it need not involve any agreement with anyone.\n\nA conspiracy to commit a crime is an entirely separate and different offense from a substantive crime which may be the object of the conspiracy. Congress has deemed it appropriate to make conspiracy, standing alone, a separate crime, even if the object of the conspiracy is not achieved. This is because collective criminal activity poses a greater threat to the public's safety and welfare than individual conduct, and increases the likelihood of success of a particular criminal venture.\n\nThe essence of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement or understanding to violate other laws. Thus, if a conspiracy exists, even if it fails, it is still punishable as a crime. Since the essence of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime , it does not matter if the crime, the commission of which was an objective of the conspiracy, was ever committed. In other words, if a conspiracy exists and certain other requirements are met, it is punishable as a crime even if its purpose is not accomplished. Consequently, in a conspiracy charge, there is no need to prove that the crime or crimes that were the objective or objectives of the conspiracy actually were committed.\n\nBy contrast, the substantive counts require proof that the crime charged was actually\n\ncommitted, but do not require proof of an agreement. Of course, if a defendant both participates\n\nin a conspiracy to commit a crime and then actually commits that crime, that defendant may be\n\nguilty of both the conspiracy and the substantive crime, as I will instruct you shortly.\n\nWe will turn first to the substantive charges in the Indictment, which are more convenient\n\nto consider before the conspiracy charges.\n\nAdapted from Sand, et al., *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 19-2; Jury Charge of Hon. Sidney H. Stein in *United States v. Duncan*, et al., 18 Cr. 289 (SHS); Jury Charge of Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., *United States v. Helmsley*, 88 Cr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). *See also United States v. Labat*, 905 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"Since the essence of conspiracy is the agreement and not the commission of the substantive offense that is its objective, the offense of conspiracy may be established even if the collaborators do not reach their goal.\").\n\n### **Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: General Instructions**\n\nCounts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven charge both defendants Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with substantive wire fraud, and Count Two, in relevant part, charges both defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud. These wire fraud counts relate to an alleged scheme by both defendants to fraudulently induce victims to send money by providing materially false and misleading information and representations.\n\nLet me first turn to the substantive counts, which are listed as Counts Five through Twelve in the Indictment. Then I will address the conspiracy counts.\n\nFirst, counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven charge both Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with substantive wire fraud. These wire fraud counts relate to multiple alleged schemes by them to fraudulently induce individuals to send money by providing materially false and misleading information and representations.\n\nIn particular:\n\nCount Five alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the GTV Private Placement to sell GTV stock and fraudulently obtain money from victimsindividualsthrough false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money\" false statements and misrepresentations about how the GTV investors' money would be used.\n\nCount Seven alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the Farm Loan Program to fraudulently obtain money from victims indivduals through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money\" false statements and misrepresentations about how the Farm Loans participantss' money would be used.\n\nCount Nine alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"promoted and marketed G|CLUBS to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, to obtain money from victims individuals through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money\" false statements and misrepresentations about how the money G|CLUBS' members paid to buy memberships would be used.\n\nCount Eleven alleges that Mr. Kwok \"operated the Himalaya Exchange to fraudulently obtain money from victims individuals through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money\" false statements and misrepresentaions about how the funds raised would be used. Ms. Wang is not charged in Count Eleven.\n\nAnd Count Two, in relevant part, alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang conspired to commit wire fraud by \"fraudulently induc[ing] victims to send money by providing materially false and misleading information and representations.\" As I have said, I will explain the distinct elements of conspiracy later in these instructions. For now, I am going to explain the elements of the wire fraud that is charged in Counts Five, Seven, Nine, and Eleven, and which is one of the objects Count Two.\n\nWire fraud involves the following elements:\n\nTo find that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang committed wire fraud you must conclude that the government has proved each of the following beyond an reasonable doubt:\n\n*First*, that there existed a scheme or artifice to defraud, or to obtain money or property, by materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.\n\n*Second*, that the relevant defendant participated in the scheme to defraud knowingly with intent to defraud.\n\n*Third*, that one or more interstate or foreign wire communications were used in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.\n\nI'll describe these each in more detail now.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 44-3.\n\n### **Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: First Element—**\n\n### **Scheme or Artifice to Defraud**\n\nFor these wire fraud counts, the first element the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that there was a scheme or artifice to defraud victims people of money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.\n\nAs to the first element, a \"scheme or artifice\" is a plan for the accomplishment of an object a fraudulent objective. A scheme to defraud is a plan, device, or course of action to obtain the money or property of others through misrepresentations or false promises reasonably calculated to deceive persons of average prudence. \"Fraud\" is a general term. It is a term that includes all the possible variousmeans by which a person seeks to gain some unfair advantage over another person for the purpose of depriving them of their money or property by false representations, false suggestions, false pretenses, or concealment of the truth. Thus, a scheme to defraud is merely a plan to deprive another of money or property by trick, deceit, deception, or swindle.\n\nA statement or representation is false if it is untrue when made and was then known to be untrue by the person making it or causing it to be made. A statement may also be false if it contains half-truths, conceals material facts, or is ambiguous or incomplete in a manner that makes what is said, or represented, misleading or deceptive. Statements, representations, promises, or pretenses are fraudulent if they were made falsely and with intent to deceive at the time the statement was made. The expression of an opinion not honestly entertained may also constitute false or\n\nfraudulent statements under the statute[.1](#page-17-0) The deception need not be based upon spoken or written words alone. The arrangement of the words, the circumstances in which they are used, or the defendant's conduct may convey the false and deceptive appearance. If there is deception, the manner in which it is accomplished is immaterial.[2](#page-17-1) A scheme to defraud need not be shown by direct evidence, but may be established by all the circumstances and facts in the case.\n\nHowever, I caution you that fraud requires more than simply proof that a promise was made and then not fulfilled. Failing to maintain a promise or to abide by a term in a contract or other document is not by itself fraudulent. Instead, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering, at the time they made the statement or promise, *never intended* to honor it. A subsequent decision by a defenfdant not to abide by the terms of a promise, contract or document, even one that is willful, cannot be the basis for a conviction[3.](#page-17-2)\n\nThe false or fraudulent statement, representation, promise, or pretense must relate to a material fact or matter. A material fact is one which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision. That means that, if you find a particular statement or representation false, you must determine whether that statement or representation was one that a reasonable person might have\n\n¹ All of the edits on this page are based on Sand, Instr. 44-4.\n\n² Changes in this paragarph are consistent with and based on the Sand instruction.\n\n³ *U.S. ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,* 822 F.3d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 2016) (\"[O]ur Court has consistently applied this principle: A breach of contract does not amount to mail fraud. Failure to comply with a contractual obligation is only fraudulent when the promisor never intended to honor the contract.'\" (quoting *United States v. D'Amato*, 39 F.3d 1249, 1261 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1994)).\n\nconsidered important in making his or her decision. The same principle applies to fraudulent halftruths or omissions, that is, failures to disclose facts that made what was said deliberately misleading.\n\nIn addition, the misrepresentation or false promise must be material. This means that if you find that a particular representation or promise was knowingly false when made, you must then separately determine whether it was material by asking whether the misrepresentation or false promise was capable of influencing the decision of the person to whom it was addressed[.4](#page-18-0) A material fact is one which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision.\n\nIt is not necessary for the Government to prove that a false or fraudulent representation or statement was made prior to a victim's decision to part with money or property. Rather, if after having obtained money or property, the defendant you are considering devises or participates in a fraudulent scheme to deprive the alleged victim of that money or property by keeping the money or property through making a subsequent false or fraudulent representation as to a material fact, that is sufficient to establish the existence of a scheme to defraud.\n\nIt is not necessary for the Government to prove that the scheme to defraud actually succeeded, that any particular person actually relied upon a statement or representation, or that any victim actually suffered damages as a consequence of any false or fraudulent representations, promises, or pretenses. Nor do you need to find that the defendant profited from the fraud or realized any gain. You must concentrate on whether there was such a scheme, not the consequences\n\n⁴ *Neder* at 16.\n\nof the scheme, although proof concerning accomplishment of the goals of the scheme may be persuasive evidence of the existence of the scheme itself. In determining whether a scheme to defraud existed, it is irrelevant whether a victim might have discovered the fraud if he, she, or it had looked more closely or probed more extensively. A victim's negligence or gullibility in failing to discover a fraudulent scheme is not a defense to wire fraud.\n\nA scheme to defraud need not be shown by direct evidence, but may be established by all the circumstances and facts in the case.\n\nLastly, I instruct you that if you find that the government has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a material misrepresentation or material false promise was made by a defendant, all of you must be unanimous as to the particular misrepresentation or false promise at issue. [5](#page-19-0)\n\nIn addition to proving that a statement was false or fraudulent and related to a material fact, in order to establish a scheme to defraud, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering contemplated derpiving another of money or property. It is not enough that some other person or company could have acquired money or property.\n\nHowever, it is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant actually realized any gain from the scheme or that the intended individuals actually suffered any loss. At the same\n\n⁵ Adapted from Final Jury Charge of Hon. Robert Chatigny in *United States v. Shapiro*, No. 15-CR-00155 (RNC) (D. Conn. June 1, 2017) (Dkt. 462) (Trial Tr. at 2645:18-24).\n\ntime, however, to prove the scheme to defraud element of a wire fraud claim, a defendant must\n\nhave \"contemplated actual harm would befall victims due to his deception.\" [6](#page-20-0)\n\nIf you find the Government has sustained its burden of proof that a scheme to defraud, as\n\ncharged, existed of proving that the relevant defendant made a fale representation or promse that\n\nwas also material, you should next consider the second element.\n\nAdapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023), the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Milton*, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022), and the Honorable Jesse M. Furman in *United States v. Avenatti*, No. 19 Cr. 374 (Feb. 1, 2022); *see also Neder v. United States*, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (\"In general, a false statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.\" (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)); *id.* 24-25 (the \"common-law requirements of 'justifiable reliance' and 'damages' . . . plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes\").\n\nThe proposed instruction about retaining money or property is also adapted from the charge of the Honorable Denis R. Hurley in *United States v. Schneider*, 02 Cr. 128, 2002 WL 34348617 (Oct. 23, 2002). *See also United States v. Gole*, 158 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1998) (scheme to defraud where the defendant \"intentionally misrepresented his income in order to retain pension overpayments\").\n\n⁶ Additions on this page based on Sand, 44-4 and *Percoco v. United States*, 143 S. Ct. 1130 (2023); *Ciminelli v. United States*, 143 S. Ct. 1121 (2023). Deletions are based on reptitivness and *Countrywide*.\n\n### **Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: Second Element— Participation in the Scheme with the Specific \"Intent to Defraud\"**\n\nThe second element that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt for the wire fraud counts is that the Defendant devised or participated in the scheme to defraud knowingly, willfully, and with the specific intent to defraud.\n\nThe words \"devised\" and \"participated\" are words that you are familiar with and, therefore, I do not need to spend much time defining them for you.\n\nTo \"devise\" a scheme to defraud is to concoct or plan it.\n\nTo \"participate\" in a scheme to defraud means to associate oneself with it with a view and intent toward making it succeed. While a mere onlooker is not a participant in a scheme to defraud, it is not necessary that a participant be someone who personally and visibly executes the scheme to defraud.\n\nTo act \"knowingly\" means to act voluntarily and deliberately, rather than mistakenly or inadvertently.\n\nTo act \"willfully\" means to act knowingly and purposely, with an intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. [7](#page-21-1)\n\nTo act with a \"specific intent to defraud\" requires that the defendant engaged or participated in the fraudulent scheme with some realization of its fraudulent or deceptive character and with an intention to be involved in the scheme to defraud and to help it succeed with a purpose of obtaining money or property from one or more of the victims. The Government does not need to prove that\n\n⁷ *See* Sand 44-5.\n\nany intended victim was actually harmed, only that the defendant intended to harm the victim by obtaining money or property. Actual financial harm includes depriving someone of the real and immediate control over the use of assets. Thus, even if the defendant believed the money obtained by fraudulent means would one day be repaid and therefore believed that ultimately no harm would come to the owner of the funds, his intention eventually to repay is no defense. Additionally, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that the Defendant was motivated solely by improper considerations. The Government will have satisfied its burden of proof on this element if you find that the Defendant had an intent wrongfully to obtain funds of another, even if the Defendant also had other proper or neutral intents reasons for his or her actions. A defendant may have the required intent to defraud even if the defendant was motivated by other lawful purposes as well.\n\nTo participate in a scheme means to engage in it by taking some affirmative step to help it succeed. Merely associating with people who are participating in a scheme is not participation. It is not necessary that the defendant originated the scheme to defraud. It is sufficient if you find that a scheme to defraud existed, even if someone else originated it, and that the defendant, while aware of the scheme's existence, knowingly participated in it with intent to defraud. Nor is it required that the defendant participated in or had knowledge of all of the operations of the scheme. The responsibility of the defendant is not governed by the extent of his participation. It is not necessary that the defendant have participated in the alleged scheme from the beginning. A person who comes in at a later point with knowledge of the scheme's general operation, although not necessarily all of its details, and who knowingly acts in a way to further its goals, becomes a participant in the scheme and is legally responsible for all that may have been done in the past in furtherance of the criminal objective and all that is done subsequently. Even if the defendant\n\nparticipated in the scheme to a degree less than others, he nevertheless is equally guilty as long as the defendant knowingly participated in the scheme to defraud with knowledge of its general scope and purpose and with specific intent to defraud. [8](#page-23-0)\n\nTo act with a specific \"intent to defraud\" or \"fraudulent intent\" means to act with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing some financial or property loss to another.[9](#page-23-1) Put differently, to find specific \"intent to defraud\" or \"fraudulent intent\" you must find that the relevant defendant had the intent to cheat or steal money from others at the time the misrepresentation or false promise was made.[10](#page-23-2)\n\nBecause an essential element of wire fraud is the \"intent to defraud,\" it follows that good faith on the part of a defendant is a complete defense to the charge of wire fraud. An honest belief in the truth of the representations made or caused to be made by a defendant is a complete defense, however inaccurate the statements may turn out to be. What is good faith? Good faith is an honest belief by the relevant defendant at the time of the alleged statement in the truth of the representations or promsies he or she made or caused to be made,even if the statements or promises turn out to be inaccurate or false. Similarly, if the defendant in good faith believed that he was entitled to take the money or property, even though that belief was mistaken, then you must find\n\n⁸ The defendants note that this instruction is \"Duplicative of the circumstantial vs. direct charge.\"\n\n⁹ Sand 44-5 (\"Intent to defraud\" means to act knowingly and with the specific intent to deceive, for the purpose of causing some financial or property loss to another\"); Jury Charge of Hon. William Kuntz, *U.S. v. Boustani*, 18 Cr. 681 (EDNY 2020), ECF No. 384 at 4443 ¹⁰ Adapted from Final Jury Charge of Hon. Robert Chatigny in *United States v. Shapiro*, No. 15-CR-00155 (RNC) (D. Conn. June 1, 2017) (Dkt. 462) Tr. at 2648:24-2649:14.\n\nhim not guilty even if others were injured by the defendant's conduct. I caution you that the defendant has no burden to establish good faith. The burden is on the Government to prove \"fraudulent intent\" and the consequent lack of good faith beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nHowever, in considering whether or not the defendant acted in good faith, you are instructed that an honest belief on the part of the defendant, if such a belief existed, that ultimately everything would work out does not necessarily mean that the defendant acted in good faith. If the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the scheme with the intent to deceive for the purpose of depriving a victim an individualof money or property, even if only for a period of time, then no amount of honest belief on the part of the defendant that customers or lenders ultimately would be benefited will excuse false representations that a defendant made.\n\nDirect proof of knowledge and fraudulent intent is almost never available. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that, as of a given time in the past, he committed an act with fraudulent intent. Such direct proof is not required. Instead, the ultimate facts of knowledge and intent, though subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon a person's words, his conduct, his acts, and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn from them. You may also infer, but are not required to infer, that people intend the natural and probable consequences of their actions. Accordingly, when the necessary result of a scheme is to injure others, fraudulent intent may be inferred from the scheme itself. As I instructed you earlier, circumstantial evidence, if believed, is of no less value than direct evidence.\n\nTo conclude on this element, if you find that Mr. Kwok or Ms. Wang was not a knowing and willful participant in the scheme or that either of them lacked the required \"intent to defraud\" at the time of the operative false statement or false promise, then you should find the relevant defendant not guilty. On the other hand, if you find that the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt not only the first element, namely the existence of the scheme to defraud, but also this second element, that the defendant was a knowing participant and acted with specific \"intent to defraud,\" then you should proceed to the third element, as to which I am about to instruct you. [11](#page-25-0)\n\n> Adapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023), the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Milton*, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022), and the Honorable Jesse M. Furman in *United States v. Avenatti*, No. 19 Cr. 374 (Feb. 1, 2022); *see also United States v. Jabar*, 19 F.4th 66, 77 (2d Cir. 2021) (\"Proof of actual injury to the victim is not required . . . .\"); *United States v. Calderon*, 944 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2019) (\"A 'no ultimate harm' instruction advises the jury that where some immediate loss to the victim is contemplated by a defendant, the fact that the defendant believes (rightly or wrongly) that he will ultimately be able to work things out so that the victim suffers no loss is no excuse for the real and immediate loss contemplated to result from defendant's fraudulent conduct.\"); *United States v. Technodyne LLC*, 753 F.3d 368, 385 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"It is commonplace that the law recognizes that there may be multiple motives for human behavior; thus, a specific intent need not be the actor's sole, or even primary, purpose.\")[12](#page-25-1)\n\n¹¹ Sand 44-5\n\n¹² The defendants note \"*Technodyne* is inapposite as it is about the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, not the wire fraud statute.\"\n\n### **Counts Five, Seven, Nine and Eleven—Wire Fraud: Third Element—Interstate Wire**\n\nThe third and final element that the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that one or more interstate or foreign wires were used in furtherance of the scheme to defraud and that use of interstate wires was foresseable to the defendant youare considering. An \"interstate wire\" means a wire that passes between two or more states. A \"foreign\" wire means a wire that travels between the United States and a foreign country. Examples of wires include telephone calls and messages, communications over the internet, commercials on television, and financial wires between bank accounts.\n\nA wire communication need not itself be fraudulent. Indeed, it may be completely innocent, as long as it was made in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. To be in furtherance of the scheme, the wire communication must further or assist in some way in carrying out the scheme to defraud. A wire communication can also include a communication made after a victim's an individual's funds were obtained if the communication was designed to lull that person into a false sense of security, to postpone his or her complaint to the authorities, or to keep the money obtained from the scheme.\n\nIt is not necessary for the defendant to have been directly or personally involved in a wire communication, as long as the wire was reasonably foreseeable in the execution of the alleged scheme to defraud in which the defendant is accused of participating. In this regard, it is sufficient to establish this element of the crime if the evidence justifies a finding that the defendant caused the wires to be used by others. The wire communication requirement can be satisfied even if the wire communication was done by the person being defrauded or some other innocent party. When\n\none does an act with knowledge that the use of the wires will follow in the ordinary course of business or where such use of the wires reasonably can be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he causes the wires to be used. Thus, there is no requirement that the defendant specifically authorize others to make a communication by wire.\n\nFinally, if you find that a wire communication was reasonably foreseeable and that the interstate or foreign wire communication charged in the indictment took place, then this element is satisfied even if it was not foreseeable that the wire communication would cross state lines, or that it would travel between the United States and a foreign country.\n\nThis concludes what the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt for a wire fraud charge. Now, I will discuss the securities fraud charges.\n\n> Adapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023), the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Milton*, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022), the Honorable Jesse M. Furman in *United States v. Avenatti*, No. 19 Cr. 374 (Feb. 1, 2022), and the Honorable John G. Koeltl in *United States v. Dunseath*, No. 98 Cr. 493 (Apr. 14, 1999); *see also* Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 44-5; *United States v. Jergensen*, 797 F. App'x 4, 6 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\n### **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud—Statutory Purpose and Indictment**\n\nCounts Six, Eight, and Ten of the Indictment charge both defendants with securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and the related Rule 10b-5. Count Four of the Indictment charges both defendants with conspiring to commit securities fraud in violation of those same two provisions and of the general federal conspiracy statute in Section 371 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Before I give you an overview of the securities fraud charges in the Indictment, I am going to give you some background on the purpose of the securities fraud law.\n\nSection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it \"unlawful,\" in pertinent part, \"for any person . . . to use or employ, any security . . . , any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.\" 15 U.S.C. § 78j. Rule 10b-5, which implements this provision, forbids the use, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, of \"any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud\" or any other \"act, practice, or course of business\" that \"operates . . . as a fraud or deceit.\" 17 CFR § 240.10b-5.\n\nThe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the second of two laws passed by Congress to provide a comprehensive plan to protect the investing public in the purchase and sale of securities that are publicly distributed. Among Congress's objectives in passing the Act was to ensure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence after the stock market crash of 1929. Generally, Congress sought to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of \"buyer beware\" and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry. More specifically, the 1934 Act was intended to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions on securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges.\n\nCounts Six, Eight, and Ten of the Indictment charge both defendants with substantive securities fraud, and Count Four charges both defendants with conspiracy to commit securities fraud. These securities fraud counts relate to an alleged scheme by both defendants to \"fraudulently induce investors to participate in the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS by providing materially false and misleading information and representations in connection with purported shares of GTV common stock and purported companies affiliated with GTV.\"\n\nIn particular:\n\nCount Six alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the GTV Private Placement to sell GTV stock and obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money\" false statements and misrepresentations about how the GTV investors' money would be used.\n\nCount Eight alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"conducted the Farm Loan Program to obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money\" false statements and misrepresentations about how the Farm Loans participants' money would be used, and including by \"promising,\" among other things, \"that such loans would be convertible into GTV common stock.\"\n\nCount Ten alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang \"promoted and marketed G|CLUBS to obtain money from victims through false representations and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money\" false statements and misrepresentations about how the G|CLUBS' members' money would be used and including by \"promising,\" among other things, \"that their purchase of G|CLUBS memberships would entitle them to stock in [Kwok]-related entities, such as GTV and G|Fashion.\"\n\nAnd Count Four alleges, in relevant part, that both defendants conspired to commit securities fraud by agreeing \"to fraudulently induce investors to participate in the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS by providing materially false and misleading information and representations in connection with purported shares of GTV common stock and purported companies affiliated with GTV.\"\n\nMr. Kwok and Ms. Wang deny these allegations and have pleaded not guilty to the securities fraud charges.\n\n> Adapted from the charges of the Honorable Ronnie Abrams in *United States v. Galanis et al.*, No. 16 Cr. 371 (RA)(June 27, 2018); *see also* 3 Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal P 57.03 (2023); *United States v. O'Hagan*, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); *Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder*, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); *see also* S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934).\n\n### **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Elements of the Securities Fraud Offenses**\n\nCounts Six, Eight, and Ten allege securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. As I have explained, Count Four alleges a conspiracy to commit a violation of this same securities-fraud law. I will explain the elements of its conspiracy charge later, but I am referencing it here because the elements of securities fraud are also relevant to the securities-fraud conspiracy count.\n\nTo prove these allegations, the Government must prove each of the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt, with respect to each of the three securities fraud counts relating to GTV, the Farm Loans Program and G|CLUBS, respectively:\n\n*First*, that in connection with the purchase or sale of shares in GTV, G|Fashion, or some other purported security, the defendant you are considering did any one or more of the following:\n\n(1) employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or\n\n(2) made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact which made what was said, under the circumstances, misleading, or\n\n(3) engaged in an act, practice, or course of business that operated, or would operate, as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser or seller;\n\n*Second*, that the defendant acted knowingly, willfully, and with the intent to defraud; and\n\n*Third*, that, in furtherance of the fraudulent conduct, the defendant used or caused to be used, any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, or the mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange.\n\nI will discuss each of these elements in greater detail now.\n\nAdapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023), and the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Milton*, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022); Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 57-20; *see also United States v. Litvak*, 808 F.3d 160, 178 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that scienter for securities fraud is \"intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud\" and does not require an intent to harm); *United States v. Gleason*, 616 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1979).\n\n### **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Fraudulent Act**\n\nFor the securities fraud counts, the first element that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, the defendant you are considering did any one or more of the following:\n\n(1) employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or\n\n(2) made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact which made what was said, under the circumstances, misleading, or\n\n(3) engaged in an act, practice, or course of business that operated, or would operate, as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser or seller.\n\nIt is not necessary for the Government to prove that the scheme involved all three types of unlawful conduct. Any one will be sufficient to satisfy this element of the offense. You must, however, be unanimous as to which type of unlawful conduct, if any, occurred.\n\nI have already instructed you on what constitutes a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, and what constitutes false and misleading statements, and you should apply those same instructions here.\n\nIn addition, there are several additional considerations you should be aware of about these terms in the securities fraud context.\n\nUnder the securities laws, a scheme or artifice to defraud requires that the government prove the defendant engaged fraudulent conduct that went beyond the use of material misstatements and omissions. Material misstatements and omissions can be part of a fraudulent scheme, but they are not sufficient, standing alone, to establish a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. To find a defendant made an untrue statement of material fact, you must find that defendant personally made a materially false statement to investors, or was the person with ultimate authority over a false statement, including its content and how to communicate it. It not sufficient for the government to prove that the defendant may have been involved--even significantly involved--in the preparation of a document that may have contained a materially false statement. Put another way, involvement alone is not enough to be the one who \"made\" a statement.\n\nAs with a scheme or artifice to defraud, an act, practice, or course of business that operated as a fraud requires more than material misstatements or omissions. In addition, you must find that the defendant you are considering took one or more additional steps in connection with the purchase or sale of security to deceive or defraud investors in the offering. [13](#page-34-0)\n\nIt is not necessary for the Government to prove that the scheme involved all three types of\n\nunlawful conduct. Any one will be sufficient to satisfy this element of the offense. You must,\n\nhowever, be unanimous as to which type of unlawful conduct, if any, occurred.\n\nAdapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023); the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Milton*, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022); the Honorable Ronnie Abrams in *United States v. Galantis* et al., No. 16 Cr. 371 (RA)(June 27, 2018); and the Honorable Paul G. Gardephe in *United States v. Tuzman*, No. 15 Cr. 536 (Dec. 22, 2017); *see also* Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 57-21.\n\n¹³ Additions in these paragraphs based on Charge of the Hon. Katherine B. Forrest, *SEC v. Tourre*, 2013 WL 5823080 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) and *SEC v. Rio Tinto plc*, 41 F.4th 47, 54 (2d Cir. 2022).\n\n# **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Materiality**\n\nIn addition to proving the existence of a misrepresentation, the Government must also prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misrepresentation was material. I have already instructed you as to what constitutes a \"material\" misstatement or promise in the wire fraud instructions. The definition of materiality in the context of secuirites fraud is close, but not quite the same, as in wire fraud. For purposes of secuirites fraud, a material misrepresentation is one that would have had actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable investor when that investor was making their investment decision. A misrepresentation is not material simply because it may have been \"important\" to an investor. [14](#page-35-1) However, a misstatement need not determine any particular outcome in order to be material. [15](#page-35-2) Further, I instruct you that you may not assess materiality from the perspective of hindsight.[16](#page-35-3) Additionally, expressions of corporate optimism and puffery are not material.[17](#page-35-4)\n\n¹⁴ *City of Pontiac Policemen's & Firemen's Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG*, 752 F.3d 173, 185 (2d Cir. 2014) (\"while importance is undoubtedly a necessary element of materiality, importance and materiality are not synonymous.\"); *Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co*., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000)(\"it is not sufficient to allege that the investor might have considered the misrepresentation or omission important.\")\n\n¹⁵ *Petrossi* Jury Charge Excerpt at 1131:20-21.\n\n¹⁶ *Shapiro* at 2648:24-2649:14.\n\n¹⁷ *In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig.*, 838 F.3d 223, 245 (2d Cir. 2016).\n\n# **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element— Puffery and Forward-Looking Statements**\n\nIn considering whether any given statement that the government alleges was false or misleading, you must distinguish between statements of fact and forward-looking statements.\n\n Predictions, projections and other forward-looking statements, even if ultimately proven incorrect, are generally not statements of fact, but instead forecasts about what may or may not occur in the future.\n\nSimilarly, transparently aspirational statements, as well as vague statements of optimism or general puffery are not material unless the statements provide a concrete description of the past and present that affirmatively creates a misleading impression of a state of affairs that differed in a material way from the one that actually existed.\"[18](#page-36-1)\n\n Predictions, projections and other forward-looking statements may, however, be considered material if, at the time the forward-looking statements were made, (1) the defendant did not actually believe the statements, (2) there was no reasonable basis for the defendant to believe the statements, or (3) the defendant was aware of undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statements.\n\n¹⁸ *In re Alphabet, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 1 F.4th 687, 700 (9th Cir. 2021); *c.f Novak v. Kasaks*, 216 F.3d 300, 315 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding statements as non-puffery when defendants told investors the inventory situation was \"in good shape\" or \"under control\" while they knew the contrary was true).\n\n# **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Fraudulent Act— Definition of a \"Security\"**\n\nThere are two additional components that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish the first element of securities fraud. They are that the alleged transactions at issue—here with respect to GTV, the Farm Loans and GCLUBS—were transactions \"in connection with\" the purchase or sale of a \"security.\" In this instruction, I will define for you what constiatutes a \"security,\" a purchase and a sale, and in the next instruction, I will address the separate \"in connection with\" requirement.\n\nWhether a particular transaction is a securities transaction turns on whether the thing purchased or sold is an investment contract. An investment contract means a contract or transaction that has three characteristics, all of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the investment of money by an investor, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation that profits will be derived by that investor solely from the efforts of a promoter or third party who is not the investor. [19](#page-37-1)\n\nThus, in order to determine whether the government has established that a transaction constituted a securities transaction, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable purchaser's motivation for participating in the transaction would have been solely to secure a profit or financial return.[20](#page-37-2) Typically, profits come from either capital appreciation\n\n¹⁹ Adapted from *Howey*\n\n²⁰ Adapted from *SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.*, 87 F. 3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1996); *Howey*, 328 U.S. at 300.\n\nthrough the development of the initial investment or from participation in the earnings made by the joint enterprise. By contrast, when the purchase is motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased, even in part, it is not a security for purposes of this count. [21](#page-38-0)\n\nIn addition, the law presumes that an instrument called a note is a security. However, that presumption can be rebutted, because not all notes are securities. Whether a note qualifies as a security for purposes of federal law depends on the context in which it was issued. The securities laws apply only to notes or debt instruments that are part of or were issued in connection with an investment. Consumer notes – such as the note you signed if you took out a loan when you bought your car – or notes that are issued in the ordinary course of an ongoing business to the person who supplies you with the goods you need to carry out your businness—those are not securities. Only notes that are issued in connection with investments are securities. [22](#page-38-1)\n\nA \"sale\" is every contract of sale or disposition of a security or security-based swap agreement, or interest in a security or security-based swap agreement, for value. A \"purchase\" means to buy. [23](#page-38-2)\n\n²¹ Adapted from *Forman*, 421 U.S. at 852-53.\n\n²² Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Colleen McMahon in *United States v. Carton*, 17 Cr. 680 (CM), Tr. 943-44; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).\n\n²³ *See* Charge of the Hon. Katherine B. Forrest in *SEC v. Tourre*.\n\n# **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: First Element—Fraudulent Act— In Connection With**\n\nTo establish that the Government has proven the first element of securities fraud beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find that the defendant you are considering agreed to participate in fraudulent conduct that was \"in connection with\" the purchase or sale of a security. The term \"security\" includes any stock, any option or privilege on any stock, and any right to purchase any stock.\n\nThe requirement that the fraudulent conduct be \"in connection with\" a purchase or sale of securities is satisfied so long as there was some nexus or relation between the allegedly fraudulent conduct and the sale or purchase of purported securities. It is not necessary that any actual securities be sold or delivered, so long as purported securities were offered as an inducement to transact.\n\nYou need not find that the defendant you are considering actually participated in any specific purchase or sale of a purported security if you find that the defendant participated, or agreed to participate, in the fraudulent conduct that was \"in connection with\" a \"purchase or sale\" of purported securities. It is not necessary for you to find that the defendant was or would be the actual seller of the purported securities. It is sufficient if the misrepresentation or omission of material fact involved the purchase or sale of securities.\n\nAs for the second additional requirement—that the alleged fraudulent conduct was \"in connection with\" the purchase or sale of securities—you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was the allegedly fraudulent conductconincides with the sale or purchase of securities. To establish the specific required link, the government must prove both that the deceptive conduct coincided with particular securities sales, and that the deceptive conduct was material to the investors' decision to buy particular securities. Thus, this element is not met simply because an alleged fraud happens to involve securities; it requires something more. [24](#page-40-0) If the alleged deceptive conduct and the purchases or sales of securities were independent events, or if the alleged deceptive conduct did not make a significant difference to someone's decision to purchase or sell particular securities, then the \"in connection with\" requirement is not satisfied.[25](#page-40-1)\n\nFurther, in order to find that the \"in connection with\" requirement has been established, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's false statements or other deceptive conduct concerned the value, nature, or investment characteristics of the securities that the counterparty sold. [26](#page-40-2) This requires a specific type of connection or nexus between the alleged\n\n²⁴ *See Alex. Brown & Sons Inc. v. Marine Midland Banks, Inc.*, No. 96-cv-2549, 1997 WL 97837, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997) (dismissing claim brought by securities clearing broker against bank, where the broker alleged that the bank had misrepresented that funds were available to purchase the securities at issue); *see also Chem. Bank*, 726 F.2d at 943 (dismissing claim where securities were pledged as collateral in the transaction in which fraud was alleged to have occurred). Rather, the government must specifically demonstrate that the alleged fraud was connected to the purchase, sale, or offer of securities. *Id.*; *see also Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co. v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc.*, 770 F. Supp. 176, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (\"something more than a 'de minimis' relationship between the fraudulent scheme and the purchase or sale of securities is required\").\n\n²⁵ *See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit*, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (holding that the in-connection-with requirement is satisfied by proof that the alleged fraud \"coincide[d] with a securities transaction[]\"); *Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice*, 571 U.S. 377, 387 (2014) (reaffirming Dabit and adding a requirement that the misrepresentation must be \"material to a decision by one or more individuals . . . to buy or to sell[,]\" or must \"make[] a significant difference to someone's decision to purchase or to sell\").\n\n²⁶ *See*, *e.g.*, *Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp.*, 883 F.3d 68, 96 (2d Cir. 2018) (\"A claim fails where the plaintiff does 'not allege that [a defendant] misled him concerning the value of the securities he sold or the consideration he received in return,'\" and plaintiff \"received exactly what\n\nconduct and the particular securities sale. If the defendant's alleged misrepresentations did not concern the value, nature, or investment characteristics of the securities, then this element is not satisfied.[27](#page-41-0) In addition, alleged misrepresentations that occurred after a securities sale cannot have \"coincided with\" such purchase or sale,[28](#page-41-1) and therefore cannot have been material to such sale.\n\nThe Government need not prove that the defendant you are considering agreed to\n\npersonally make a misrepresentation or omit a material fact. It is sufficient if the Government\n\nit expected\" in disputed securities transactions) (alteration in original) (quoting *Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co.*, 789 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1986); *Taylor v. Westor Cap. Grp.*, 943 F. Supp. 2d 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"[C]ourts have drawn a line separating fraud claims that impact the fundamental valuation of the securities at issue, and the operation of securities markets, as distinguished from those that do not.\"); *Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co. v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc.*, 770 F. Supp. 176, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (\"Misrepresentations or omissions involved in a securities transaction but not pertaining to the securities themselves cannot form the basis of a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b–5.\"); *Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. Stonebridge Partners Equity Fund, L.P.*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 236, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (misrepresentations are not made \"in connection with the purchase or sale of securities [when they do] not pertain to the value, nature or investment characteristics of the securities in issue\"); *Abrash v. Fox*, 805 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (\"[E]ven when there is a clear causal connection between the misrepresentations and the investment decision, there is no securities law violation unless the misrepresentations or omissions involved in a securities transaction pertain to the securities themselves.\"); *Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.*, 624 F. Supp. 751, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (\"The Second Circuit court has stated that the misrepresentation must relate to the securities alleged to satisfy the purchase and sale requirement, and not just to the transaction in its entirety.\").\n\n²⁷ *See*, *e.g.*, *Chem. Bank*, 726 F.2d at 943 (\"in connection with\" requirement not satisfied where bank was defrauded into making lending decisions based upon misrepresentations relating to certain stock pledged as collateral for a loan); *Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc.*, 933 F. Supp. 325, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), a*ff'd*, 159 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing securities fraud claim based on the defendant's nondisclosure of interest earned on collateral posted to cover short sale because the nondisclosure related only \"to the terms of the relationship between the broker and the customer\"); *Bissell*, 937 F. Supp. at 243-44 (same); *Alex, Brown*, 1997 WL 97837 at \\*6 (\"in connection with\" prong not met where the misrepresentations pertained to the status of an investor's \"credit and the availability of funds in his account\").\n\n²⁸ *See Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. Danske Bank A/S*, 11 F.4th 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that plaintiff cannot maintain securities fraud claim based exclusively on statements made after final purchase of securities).\n\nestablishes that the defendant intended to cause the statement to be made or the fact to be omitted.\n\nYou need not find that the defendant you are considering actually participated in any specific purchase or sale of a purported security if you find that the defendant participated, or agreed to\n\nparticipate, in the fraudulent conduct that was \"in connection with\" a \"purchase or sale\" of\n\npurported securities. [29](#page-42-0)\n\nAdapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023); the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Milton*, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022); and the Honorable Paul G. Gardephe in *United States v. Tuzman*, No. 15 Cr. 536 (Dec. 22, 2017); *see also* 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (\"The term 'security' means any . . . stock [and] any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security . . .[and] any . . . warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.\"); *SEC v. Lauer*, 52 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (\"[I]t is the representations made by the promoters, not their actual conduct, that determine whether an interest is an investment contract (or other security).\"); *In re J.P. Jeanneret Assocs., Inc.*, 769 F. Supp. 2d 340, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (surveying cases to conclude that the connection requirement is satisfied \"where the [victims] part with money intending that it be invested in securities, only to have the person to whom that money is entrusted steal it\"); *Pail v. Precise Imports Corp.*, No. 99 Cv. 1624 (DLC), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 90,642, 1999 WL 681384, at \\*3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999) (promise of future stock is sufficient connection to purchase or sale of securities).\n\n²⁹ The Government has proposed to include this language earlier in the instruction.\n\n### **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: Second Element— Knowledge, Intent, and Willfulness**\n\nThe second element of securities fraud that the Government must establish is that the defendant acted knowingly, willfully, and with intent to defraud.\n\nI have already defined these terms for you in connection with the wire fraud charges and\n\nwill not re-define them at length here. Briefly though:\n\n\"Knowingly\" means to act voluntarily and deliberately, rather than mistakenly or inadvertently.\n\nTo act \"willfully\" means to act voluntarily and with a wrongful purpose.\n\n\"Intent to defraud\" in the context of the securities laws means to act knowingly and with intent to manipulate or deceive.\n\nAs I explained in my wire fraud instructions, direct proof of knowledge and fraudulent intent is almost never available. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that, as of a given time in the past, he committed an act with fraudulent intent. Such direct proof is not required.\n\nThe ultimate facts of knowledge and criminal intent, though subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon a person's outward manifestations, his words, his conduct, his acts, and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom.\n\nWhat is referred to as drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence is no different from what people normally mean when they say, \"use your common sense.\" Using your common sense\n\nmeans that, when you come to decide whether a defendant possessed or lacked an intent to defraud, you do not limit yourself to what the defendant said, but you also look at what he did and what others did in relation to the defendant and, in general, everything that occurred.\n\nAs I have previously explained, circumstantial evidence, if believed, is of no less value than direct evidence. In either case, the essential elements of the crime charged must be .\n\nIn order for you to find the defendant you are considering guilty of securities fraud, the Government need prove that the defendant acted with an intent only to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. The Government need not show that the defendant acted with an intent to cause harm.\n\nBecause an essential element of the crime charged is intent to deceive or intent to manipulate, good faith on the part of the defendant you are considering is a complete defense to the charge of securities fraud. That is, the law is not violated if the defendant held an honest belief that his actions were proper and not in furtherance of any unlawful scheme. An honest belief in the truth of the representations made by a defendant is a complete defense, however inaccurate the statements may turn out to be. Because as with wire fraud, since an essential element of the crime charged is intent to defraud, it follows that good faith on the part of a defendant is a complete defense to a charge of securities fraud. A defendant, however, has no burden to establish a defense of good faith. It remains the Government's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted knowingly, willfully, and with intent to deceive or manipulate. The burden is on the government to prove fraudulent intent and consequent lack of good faith beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nIn considering whether or not a defendant acted in good faith, however, you are instructed that a belief by the defendant, if such belief existed, that ultimately everything would work out so that no investors would lose any money does *not* necessarily constitute good faith. No amount of honest belief on the part of a defendant that the scheme will ultimately make a profit for the investors will excuse fraudulent actions or false representations by him.\n\nAs a practical matter, then, to prove the charge against the defendants, the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering knew that his or her conduct was calculated to deceive and that he or she nevertheless associated himself or herself with the alleged fraudulent scheme.[30](#page-45-0)\n\nEven false representations or statements of material facts do not amount to a fraud unless done with fraudulent intent. However misleading or deceptive a plan may be, it is not fraudulent if it was devised or carried out in good faith. An honest belief in the truth of the representations made by a defendant is a good defense, however inaccurate the statements may have turned out to be.[31](#page-45-1)\n\nThe question of whether a person acted knowingly, willfully, and with intent to defraud is a question of fact for you to determine, like any other fact question. This question involves one's state of mind.\n\n> Adapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023), the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Milton*, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022), and the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff in *United States v. Petit*, No. 19 Cr. 850; Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 57-16; *see also United States v. Litvak*, 808 F.3d 160, 178 (2d Cir. 2015) (intent element for securities fraud is \"intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud\" not \"intent to harm\").\n\n³¹ Sand, Instruction 57-24.\n\n³⁰ The defendants propose to delete some of the Government's proposed language in this instruction and note, \"Deleted sections are redundantof the wire fraud charges and the standard instructions on direct and circumstantial evidence.\"\n\n### **Counts Six, Eight, and Ten—Securities Fraud: Third Element— Instrumentality of Interstate Commerce**\n\nThe third and final element of the Section 10(b) counts that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant you are considering knowingly used, or caused to be used, the mails or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as interstate wires, in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.\n\nLet me first note that it is unnecessary for the Government to prove that both the mails and an instrumentality of interstate commerce were used in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. Either one of the above—either the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce—is enough. But you must be unanimous as to at least one.\n\nIn considering this element, it is not necessary for you to find that the defendant was or would have been directly or personally involved in any mailing or the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. If the defendant was an active participant in the scheme and took steps or engaged in conduct alleged that he knew or could reasonably foresee would naturally and probably result in the use of the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce, this element would be satisfied then you may find that he caused the mails or interstate commerce to be used. [32](#page-46-1)\n\nNor is it necessary that the items sent through the mails or communicated through an instrumentality of interstate commerce did or would contain the fraudulent material, or anything criminal or objectionable. The matter mailed or communicated may be entirely innocent so long as it is in furtherance of the scheme to defraud or fraudulent conduct.\n\n³² Sand. Instr. 57-25.\n\nThe use of the mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce need not be central to the execution of the scheme or even be incidental to it. All that is required is that the use of the mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce bear some relation to the object of the scheme or fraudulent conduct.\n\nIn fact, the actual purchase or sale of a security need not be accompanied by the use of the mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce, so long as the mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce are used in furtherance of the scheme and the defendant is still engaged in actions that are part of the a fraudulent scheme when the mails or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used.[33](#page-47-0)\n\nThe use of the term \"mails\" is self-explanatory, and includes the U.S. Mail and Federal\n\nExpress. Examples of instrumentalities of interstate commerce include telephone calls, emails,\n\nvideos transmitted over wire, or text messages.\n\nThis concludes what the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt for a securities\n\nfraud charge. Now, I will discuss the money laudering charge.\n\nAdapted from the charge of the Honorable Edgardo Ramos in *United States v. Cole*, 19 Cr. 869, and the Honorable Ronnie Abrams in *United States v. Hild*, 19 Cr. 602, and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instrs. 57-20, 57-25. *See also United States v. Giordano*, 442 F.3d 30, 40 & n.11 (2d Cir. 2006) (defining \"instrumentality of interstate commerce\").\n\n³³ The defendants note that they propose to delete sections of this instruction as redundant with the above.\n\n### **Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction**\n\nCount Twelve charges Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with engaging in a monetary transaction over \\$10,000 in property derived from specified unlawful activity—here, a transaction of approximately \\$100 million from Saraca to a private investment fund—in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957. The elements of this offense are as follows: In order to prove the crime of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity in violation of section 1957, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:\n\n*First*, that the defendant engaged (or attempted to engage) in a monetary transaction in or affecting interstate commerce.\n\n*Second*, that the monetary transaction involved criminally derived property of a value greater than \\$10,000.\n\n*Third*, that the property was derived from specified unlawful activity.\n\n*Fourth*, that the defendant acted knowing that the transaction involved proceeds of a criminal offense knowingly that is, with knowledge that the transaction involved proceeds of a criminal offense.\n\n*Fifth*, that the transaction took place in the United States (or the defendant is a United States person, as I will define that term for you).\n\nIf you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant agreed with at least one other person to engage in monetary transactions over \\$10,000 in property derived from specified unlawful activity, then the second object of Count Twelve would be proved. However, if you find that the Government has not met its burden to prove that the defendant agreed with at least one\n\nother person to engage in monetary transactions over \\$10,000 in property derived from specified\n\nunlawful activity, then the object would not be proved.\n\nAdapted from the Jury Charge in *United States v. Adelekan*, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021) (Tr. 886); *see also* Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 50A-26.\n\n### **Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction—First Element**\n\nThe first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant was a United States person or in the United States and agreed to engage in a monetary transaction with a value greater than \\$10,000.\n\nThe term \"monetary transaction\" means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument by, through, or to a financial institution.\n\nThe term \"interstate or foreign commerce\" means commerce between any combination of states, territories or possessions of the United States, or between the United States and a foreign country.\n\nYou must find that, had the object of the conspiracy been completed, the transaction affected interstate commerce in some way, however minimal. As I explained earlier, the effect on interstate commerce can be established in several ways, including but not limited to that the source of the funds used in the transaction affected interstate commerce, or that the transaction itself involved an interstate transfer of funds.\n\nThe amount or value of the \"financial transaction\" must be greater than \\$10,000.\n\nAdapted from the jury charges of the Honorable Loretta A. Preska in *United States v. Adelekan*, 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (Oct. 26, 2021) and from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 50A-27. There is no need to treat an effect on interstate commerce as a separate element because proof of an effect on interstate commerce is required by the definition of the term \"monetary transaction.\" *See* Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 50A-26, Cmt.\n\n# **Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction—Second Element**\n\nThe second element of this offense that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the monetary transactions involved criminally derived property having a value in excess of \\$10,000 the defendant knew the property involved in the transaction was criminally derived property.\n\n\"Criminally derived property\" means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense. The term \"proceeds\" means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity. I instruct you as a matter of law that wire fraud and securities fraud are both criminal offenses and specified unlawful activity.\n\nThe Government is not required to prove that all of the property involved in the transaction was criminally derived property. However, the Government must prove that more than \\$10,000 of the property involved was criminally derived property.\n\nThe Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the transaction involved the proceeds of a criminal offense. However, the Government is not required to prove that the defendant knew the particular offense from which the criminally derived property was derived.\n\n> Adapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instrs. 50A-28, 50A-30; adapted from the Jury Charge in *United States v. Adelekan*, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021) (Tr. 887- 88).\n\n# **Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction—Third and Fourth Elements**\n\nThe third and fourth elements of this object offense that the government must be proved\n\nbeyond a reasonable doubt is are that the property derived from specified unlawful activity and\n\nthat the defendant acted knowing that the transaction involved proceeds of a criminal offense\n\ninvolved in the transaction was actually derived from specified unlawful activity.\n\nThe term \"specified unlawful activity\" means any one of a variety of offenses defined by\n\nthe statute.\n\nHere, the government allegs that the specified unlawful activity is the wire fraud scheme and/or the securities fraud scheme regarding the GTV Private Placement charged in Counts Five and Six.\n\nThe term \"specified unlawful activity\" was defined previously, and that definition applies equally to this object of the conspiracy charged in Count Twelve.\n\nI instruct you that the Government is not required to prove that the defendant knew the particular offense from which the criminally derived property was derived. However, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knew that the transaction involved criminally derived property, which, I remind you, means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.\n\nIf you find that the Government has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants knew that the transaction involved property derived from a criminal offense, then this element is satisfied.\n\nAdapted from the jury charges of the Honorable J. Paul Oetken in *United States v. Mizrahi*, No. 22 Cr. 650; the Jury Charge in *United States v. Adelekan*, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021) (Tr. 888-89); and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 50A-29.\n\n**Count Twelve—Money Laundering: Unlawful Monetary Transaction—Fifth Element**\n\nThe fifth element of this object is that the agreed upon transaction took place in\n\nthe United States.\n\nAdapted from the Jury Charge in *United States v. Adelekan*, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021) (Tr. 889); *see also* 3 *Modern Federal Jury Instructions—Criminal*, Instr. 50A-31.\n\n### **Counts Five through Twelve—Willful Causation**\n\nWith respect to all of the substantive counts, that is, Counts Five through Twelve, the first theory on which a defendant can be guilty of the substantive offenses is by committing them directly. I just provided those instructions to you. There are also two theories on which a defendant can be guilty of the substantive offense indirectly—by willfully causing another to commit the offense or by aiding and abetting the commission of the offense. I will explain those concepts A defendant can be guilty of the substantive crimes charged in those counts as a principal when he possessed the requisite criminal intent and willfully caused someone else to engage in actions necessary to commit the crimes. So, I am now going to take a minute to discuss what it means guilty as a principal through willful causation in the context of this case.\n\nIn this case, the government does not contend that the defendant actually committed the crime charged in the indictment. Instead, it contendsthat the defendant caused another person to physically commit the crime.\n\nIt is the law of the United States \"that Section 2(b) of the aiding and abetting statute reads asfollows: \"Whoeverwillfully causes an actto be done which,if directly performed by him, would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.\"\n\nWhat does the term \"willfully caused\" mean? It does not mean that the defendant must himself need have physically have committed the crime or supervised or participated in the actual criminal conduct charged. Rather, anyone who causes the doing of an act which if done by him directly would render him guilty of an offense against the United States is guilty as a principal. Accordingly, one who intentionally causes someone else to make false or fraudulent statements or\n\nrepresentations is guilty as a principal if the Government proves that the person who causes the making of that false or fraudulent representation, or who causes the fraudulent misappropriation, acted knowingly, willfully, defraud and satisfies the other elements of the substantive fraud counts that I have described to you. Similarly, if a defendant intentionally causes someone else to take a step in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, for example, by transmitting money or any other step you deem to be part of the scheme, if the Government proves that the person who causes the step in furtherance of the scheme acted knowingly, willfully, and with the specific intent to defraud and satisfies the other elements of the substantive fraud counts that I have described to you. This is so even if the individual that was caused to make the false statement, or undertake a step in furtherance of the scheme, had no criminal intent.\n\nThe meaning of the term \"willfully caused\" can be found in the answers to the following questions:\n\nDid the defendant [*describe mental state required for principal offense,* e.g., know that drugs were being imported into the United States; intend that [the victim] be murdered, etc.]?\n\nDid the defendant intentionally cause another person to [describe requisite act]?\n\nIf you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to both of these questions\n\nis \"yes,\" then the defendant is guilty of the crime charged just as if he himself had actually\n\ncommitted it.\n\nNOTE: The defendants reserve the right to argue that there is not an appropriate factual predicate for this charge.\n\n> Adapted from the charges of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2,\n\n2023); and the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Gatto*, No. 17 Cr. 686 (Oct. 1, 2018).\n\n### **Counts Five through Twelve—Aiding and Abetting**\n\nNow, in addition to charging the defendants with the substantive counts of wire fraud, securities fraud, and illegal monetary transaction, all eight of these counts also charge the defendants with what is called aiding and abetting.\n\nAiding and abetting a crime is one manner of committing that crime. The defendant you are considering can be convicted of committing a crime if he helps someone else to commit the crime. For example, if the Government proves the defendant you are considering committed wire fraud alleged in, just as an example, Count Five, then you need not consider aiding and abetting with respect to that count. If, however, you find that the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering engaged in wire fraud, to continue using Count Five as an example, you should consider whether the Government has nonetheless proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant aided and abetted someone else in the commission of aggravated identity theft as alleged in that count.\n\nThe concept of aiding and abetting is alleged in all substantive counts, that is Counts Five through Twelve.\n\nEach of Counts 5 through 12 also contain an allegation of \"aiding and abetting.\" Under the federal aiding and abetting statute, whoever \"aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures\" the commission of an offense is punishable as a principal. A person who aids and abets another to commit a substantive crime is just as guilty of that crime as if he had personally committed it. You may thus find the defendant you are considering guilty if you find beyond a\n\nreasonable doubt that the Government has proven that someone committed the substantive offense, and that the defendant aided and abetted that person in the commission of the offense.\n\nThe first requirement of aiding and abetting liability that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that somebody else has committed the crime at issue. The defendant cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting if nobody committed the underlying crime. But if you do find that the underlying crime at issue was committed by someone other than the defendant, you should consider whether the defendant aided or abetted the person who actually committed the crime.\n\nTo aid and abet another to commit a crime, the defendant must have beyond a reasonable doubt willfully and knowingly associated himself in some way with the crime, and he must have willfully and knowingly sought by some act to help make the crime succeed. Participation in a crime is willful if action is taken voluntarily and intentionally.\n\nThe mere presence of the defendant in a place where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is not enough to make him an aider and abettor. The defendant's acquiescence in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is not enough to establish aiding and abetting. An aider and abettor must have his own affirmative interest in the criminal venture.\n\nTo determine whether the defendant aided and abetted the commission of the crime, ask yourself these questions:\n\nDid someone other than the defendant commit the crime at issue? If no, please go on to the next count.\n\nDid the defendant knowingly and willfully participate in the crime charged as something\n\nthat he wished to bring about?\n\nDid the defendant knowingly and willfully associate himself with the the crime committed\n\nby other people?\n\nDid he seek by his actions to make their criminal venture succeed? If so, the defendant is\n\nan aider and abettor, and therefore he is guilty of the offense under consideration. If not, then he\n\nis not an aider and abettor, and he is not guilty of the offense under consideration.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 11-2, and jury charges given by the Honorable Sidney H. Stein in *United States v. Duncan*, 18 Cr. 289 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2019); and the Honorable Colleen McMahon in *United States v. Cherico*, 08 Cr. 786 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. October 31, 2011).\n\n### **Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud—Generally**\n\nNow that I have explained the Indictment's substantive counts, I am going to explain its conspiracy counts. Here, the conspiracy offenses charged are: in Count One, a conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; in Count Two, a conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud; in Count Three, a conspiracy to commit money laundering; and in Count Four, a conspiracy to commit securities fraud and to provide false statements to financial institutions. Because it will be easier to explain, I am going to go through the conspiracy counts out of order. Let's start with Count Two, which charges both Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud.\n\nAs I have said, a conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership—a combination or agreement of two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose.\n\nThe crime of conspiracy to violate a federal law is an independent offense. It is separate and distinct from the actual violation of any specific federal laws, which the law refers to as \"substantive crimes.\"\n\nIn order to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to the allegation of conspiracy, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following two elements:\n\n*First*, that the conspiracy charged in Count Two of the Indictment existed; that is, that there was an agreement or understanding between two or more people to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, as charged in the Indictment; and\n\n*Second*, that the defendant you are considering knowingly and willfully[34](#page-62-0) became a\n\nmember of the alleged conspiracy.\n\nI'll explain more about these elements, and about the objects of the conspiracy, next.\n\nAdapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Valerie E. Caproni in *United States v. Christopher Campos*, 16 Cr. 396 (VEC) (June 22, 2017) and the Honorable John F. Keenan in *United States v. Rasheen Jordan*, 03 CR 399 (JFK) (2004), and from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 19-3; *see also United States v. Svoboda*, 347 F.3d 471, 476-77 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing three elements of conspiracy).\n\n³⁴ Sand, Instr. 19-01.\n\n### **Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud—First Element— Existence of the Conspiracy**\n\nThe first element you must find beyond a reasonable doubt is that the wire fraud and bank fraud conspiracy charged in Count Two of the Indictment existed.\n\nIn order to show that a conspiracy existed, the evidence must show that two or more people, including the relevant defendant, in some way or manner, through any contrivance, explicitly or implicitly (that is, spoken or unspoken), came to a mutual understanding to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful plan. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more persons came to an understanding, express or implied, to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful plan, then the Government will have sustained its burden of proof as to this element.\n\nTo satisfy the first element of Count Two—namely, to show that the conspiracy existed the Government is not required to show that two or more people sat around a table and entered into a solemn pact, orally or in writing, stating that they had formed a conspiracy to violate the law and spelling out all of the details. Common sense tells you that when people, in fact, agree to enter into a criminal conspiracy, much is left to unexpressed understanding. It is rare that a conspiracy can be proven by direct evidence of an explicit agreement but only that two or more persons explicity or implicitly came to an understanding to achieve the specified unlawful objective, whether or not they were successful. [35](#page-63-1)\n\n³⁵ Sand, Instr. 19-3S. The defendants propose to delete the Government's preceding language, noting: \"The deleted language is argumentive. The added language is directly from Sand.\"\n\nWhen people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, they become agents and partners of one another in carrying out the conspiracy. In determining whether there has been an unlawful agreement as alleged, you may consider the acts and conduct of the alleged coconspirators that were done to carry out the apparent criminal purpose. In addition, in determining whether such an agreement existed, you may consider direct as well as circumstantial evidence. The old adage, \"Actions speak louder than words,\" applies here. Often, the only evidence that is available with respect to the existence of a conspiracy is that of disconnected acts and conduct on the part of the alleged individual co-conspirators. When taken together and considered as a whole, however, these acts and conduct may warrant the inference that a conspiracy existed as conclusively as would direct proof. On this question, you should refer back to my earlier instructions on direct and circumstantial evidence and inferences.\n\nIt is sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy, as I've already said, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt, from proof of all the relevant facts and circumstances, that the minds of at least two alleged co-conspirators met to accomplish, by the means alleged, the object of the conspiracy.\n\nSo, you must first determine whether the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count Two.\n\nThe objects of a conspiracy are the illegal purposes the co-conspirators agree or hope to achieve. The objects of the conspiracy charged in Count Two are wire fraud and bank fraud.\n\nIt is not necessary for the Government to prove that the defendant you are considering\n\nconspired to commit both objects of the conspiracy. You must, however, be unanimous as to which\n\nobject or objects of the conspiracy, if any, you find was proven.\n\nAdapted from jury charges given by the Hon. Valerie E. Caproni in *United States v. Campos*, 16 Cr. 395 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. 2017); the Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin in *United States v. Vasilevsky*, 08 Cr. 903 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009); the Hon. Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Peirce*, 06 Cr. 1032 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. 2008); the Hon. Denise Cote in *United States v. Enrique*, 04 Cr. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 19-4; *see also Griffin v. United States*, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) (upholding verdict on a multiple-object conspiracy charge where evidence was inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects but not the other); *United States v. Rea*, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992) (\"In order to prove conspiracy, the government need not present evidence of an explicit agreement; proof of a tacit understanding will suffice. The coconspirators need not have agreed on the details of the conspiracy, so long as they have agreed on the essential nature of the plan, and their goals need not be congruent, so long as they are not at cross-purposes.\"); *United States v. Montour*, 944 F.2d 1019, 1025 (2d Cir. 1991) (\"To prove the existence of an agreement, the government need not present evidence of a formal arrangement between the co-conspirators. Rather, it is sufficient if the government can demonstrate that the defendant acted together with others to realize a common goal.\").\n\n### **Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud—Second Element— Membership in the Conspiracy**\n\nIf you conclude that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy charged in Count Two existed, then you must next determine the second question, which is whether the defendant knowingly, wilfully, [36](#page-66-1) and intentionally became a member of that conspiracy, that is, whether the defendant participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose or purposes and with the specific intention of furthering its unlawful objective or objectives.\n\n\"Unlawful\" simply means contrary to law; a defendant need not have known that he or she was breaking any particular law, but the defendant must have been aware of the generally unlawful nature of his or her acts.\n\nIn that regard, it has been said that in order for a defendant to be deemed a participant in a conspiracy, he must have had a stake in the venture or its outcome. You are instructed that, while proof of a financial interest in the outcome of a scheme is not essential, if you find that the defendant had such an interest, that is a factor that you may properly consider in determining whether or not the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. [37](#page-66-2) This also is true in the inverse, if you find that the defendant did not have a financial interest in the outcome of the scheme, you may properly consider this as a factor in determining whether or not defendant was a member of the conspiracy.\n\n³⁶ Sand.\n\n³⁷ Sand, Instr. 19-6.\n\nAs I mentioned a moment ago, before the defendant you are considering can be found to have been a conspirator, you must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she knowingly joined the unlawful agreement or plan. The key question, therefore, is whether the defendant you are considering joined the conspiracy with an awareness of the basic aims and purposes of the unlawful agreement. A defendant's knowledge is a matter of inference from facts proved. It is not necessary for the Government to show that the defendant was fully informed as to all the details of the conspiracy in order for you to infer knowledge on his or her part.\n\nTo have guilty knowledge, a defendant need not have known the full extent of the conspiracy, or all of the activities of all its participants. It is not even necessary that a defendant knew every other member of the conspiracy. Moreover, the defendant you are considering need not have been fully informed as to all of the details, or the scope, of the conspiracy in order to justify an inference of knowledge on his part. Furthermore, the defendant you are considering need not have joined in all of the conspiracy's unlawful objectives. Nor is it necessary that a defendant received any monetary benefit from his participation in the conspiracy, or had a financial stake in the outcome, so long as he or she in fact joined in the conspiracy in the manner I have explained.\n\nThe duration and extent of a defendant's participation has no bearing on the issue of the defendant's guilt. A defendant need not have joined the conspiracy at the outset. A defendant may have joined it for any purpose at any time in its progress. A defendant is responsible for everything that was reasonably foreseeable and that was done while it was in existence and while he or she was a member. Indeed, each member of the conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times. Some conspirators may play major roles, while others play\n\nminor roles. An equal role is not what the law requires. In fact, even a single act may be sufficient to draw a defendant within the scope of the conspiracy.\n\nI want to caution you, however, that a defendant's mere presence at the scene of the alleged crime or his or her association or communications with others involved in the alleged crime does not, by itself, make him or her a member of the conspiracy.[38](#page-68-0) Similarly, a person may know, assemble with, associate with, or be friendly with, one or more members of a conspiracy, without being a conspirator himself. Mere similarity of conduct or the fact that the defendant may have discussed common aims and interests does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy or the defendant's membership in the conspiracy. I also want to caution you that mere knowledge or acquiescence, without participation, in the unlawful plan is not sufficient.\n\nMoreover, the fact that the acts of the defendant, without knowledge, merely happen to further the purposes or objectives of the conspiracy, does not make the defendant a member of the conspiracy. More is required under the law. What is necessary is that the defendant must have participated with knowledge of at least some of the illegal purposes or objects of the conspiracy and with the intention of aiding in the accomplishment of those unlawful ends.\n\nWhen people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, they become agents or partners of one another in carrying out the conspiracy. In determining the factual issues before you, you may, but are not required to, take into account any acts or statements made by the defendant's co-conspirators, which were made during, in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though such acts or statements were not made in the presence of the defendant\n\n³⁸ Sand, Instr. § 19-6.\n\nor were made without his or her knowledge. However, it is important for you to note that the defendant's participation in the conspiracy must be established by independent evidence of his or her own acts or statements.[39](#page-69-0) Acts or statements made in furtherance of the common purpose of the conspiracy are deemed, under the law, to be the acts or statements of all of the members, and all of the members are responsible for such acts or statements\n\nOnce a conspiracy is formed, it is presumed to continue until either its objective is accomplished or there is some affirmative act of termination by the members. So too, once a person is found to be a member of a conspiracy, he or she is presumed to continue as a member in the conspiracy until the conspiracy is terminated, unless it is shown by some affirmative proof that the person withdrew and disassociated himself from the conspiracy.\n\nIn sum, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering, with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, intentionally engaged, advised, or assisted in the conspiracy for the purpose of furthering the illegal undertaking. He or she thereby becomes a knowing and willing participant in the unlawful agreement—that is to say, a conspirator.\n\n> Adapted from jury charges given by the Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin in *United States v. Vasilevsky*, 08 Cr. 903 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009) and the Hon. Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Peirce*, 06 Cr. 1032 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. 2008), and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instrs. 19-6, 3A-1, 3A-3; *see also United States v. Aleskerova*, 300 F.3d 286, 292-93 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing manner in which government may show participation in conspiracy with required state of mind); *United States v. Rea*, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992) (\"The defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy and participation in it with the requisite criminal intent may be established through circumstantial evidence. A defendant need not\n\n³⁹ Sand, Instr. § 19-6.\n\nhave joined a conspiracy at its inception in order to incur liability for the unlawful acts of the conspiracy committed both before and after he or she became a member.”) (citations omitted); *United States v. Miranda-Ortiz*, 926 F.2d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1991) (generally discussing proof required to show membership in conspiracy).\n\n### **Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud Conspiracy—Objects**\n\nThere are two alleged objects of the conspiracy charged in Count Two: wire fraud and bank\n\nfraud. Remember, the objects of a conspiracy are the illegal goals that the conspirators agree on.\n\nI have already described the elements of wire fraud during my discussion of Counts Five, Seven, Nine, and Eleven, and you should apply those same instructions here to the wire fraud object of the conspiracy charged in Count Two\n\nI will describe now the elements of bank fraud that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Bank fraud has the following three elements.\n\n*First*, that there was a scheme to defraud a bank or there was a scheme to obtain money owned by or under the custody or control of a bank by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;\n\n*Second*, that the defendant executed or attempted to execute the scheme with intent to defraud the bank or to obtain money or funds owned by or under the custody or control of a bank; and\n\n*Third*, that at the time of the execution of the scheme, the bank involved had its deposits federally insured.\n\nNow, I will explain each of the three elements of bank fraud in more detail.\n\nThe first element of bank fraud that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that there was a scheme to defraud a bank or a scheme to obtain money owned by or under the custody or control of a bank, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. This element requires proof of the existence of only one of these. That is, either that there existed a scheme to defraud a bank or a scheme to obtain property under the custody or control of a bank by means of fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. However, the jury must be unanimous on which theory was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nIn order to prove the first theory of bank fraud—that there was a scheme to defraud a bank—the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a pattern or course of conduct concerning a material matter designed to deceive a federally insured bank into releasing money or property.\n\nI have already instructed you on the defitinion of \"scheme to defraud\" and you should apply those instructions here.\n\nAs with wire fraud, which I instructed you on earlier, a fraudulent representation must relate to a material fact or matter. A material fact is one that would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision. This means that if you find a particular statement of fact to have been false, you must determine whether that statement was one that a reasonable person might have considered important in making his or her decision. The same principle applies to fraudulent halftruths or omissions of material facts.\n\nIn order to prove the second theory of bank fraud, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a scheme to obtain money or property owned by or under the custody or control of a bank or credit union by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises. A representation is fraudulent if it was falsely made with the intent to deceive. Deceitful statements of half-truth, the concealment of material facts, and the constitute false or fraudulent representations under the statute. With respect to the second theory of bank\n\nfraud, it is not necessary that the false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises were made directly to the bank itself. It is sufficient if they were made to any person, so long as the false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises were the mechanism naturally inducing the bank (or custodian of bank property) to part with money in its control. [40](#page-73-0) The scheme must be directed at the financial institution to some degree.[41](#page-73-1)\n\nAs to either theory, the deception need not be premised upon spoken or written words alone. The arrangement of the words, the omission of words, or the circumstances in which they are used may convey a false and deceptive appearance. If there is intentional deception, the manner in which it is accomplished does not matter.\n\nIn considering this element of bank fraud, it is unimportant whether a bank actually relied on a misrepresentation. It is sufficient if the misrepresentation is one that is merely capable of influencing the bank's decision. Further, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that the financial institutions actually lost money or were deprived of property as a result of the scheme. It also does not matter whether any of the banks involved might have discovered the fraud had the bank probed further. If you find that a scheme existed, it is irrelevant whether you believe that any of the banks involved was careless, gullible, or even negligent.\n\nThe second element of bank fraud that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is about the defendant's intent. There are two ways that this element can be met. The first way this element can be met is if the defendant executed, attempted to execute, or participated in\n\n⁴⁰ The defendants propose to delete the preceding Government language, noting that \"the deleted portions are either duplicative of prior instructions or do not accurately represent the law.\"\n\n⁴¹ Sand, Instr. 44-10 commentary.\n\nthe scheme or artifice knowingly, willfully, and with the intent to defraud a bank or credit union. I've already provided you with the definitions of knowingly and willfully and you should apply those same definitions here. To act with a \"specific intent to defraud\" requires that the defendant intended, at least in part, to deceive one or more banks or credit unions. The defendant need not intend to cause the banks or credit unions any financial loss.\n\nThe second way this element can be met is if beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant executed or attempted to execute the scheme knowingly and willfully and with the intent to obtain money or funds owned or under the custody or control of the bank. It is not necessary that the defendant intended to defraud a bank. It is also not necessary that the defendant intended to cause harm to the issuing bank or credit union (such as by causing them to lose money), or to anyone else. This element requires that the defendant engaged in, or participated in, the scheme alleged with an understanding of its fraudulent or deceptive character and with an intention to help it succeed. It is not required that the defendant participate in or have knowledge of all the operations of the scheme.\n\nThe third element of the crime of bank fraud that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that at least one of the financial institutions in question was federally insured at the time of the scheme. This simply means that the financial institution was a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (or FDIC) during the time frame alleged in the Indictment. The Government need not show that the defendant knew the identity of the particular financial institution or that the defendant knew that the financial institution was federally insured to satisfy this third element.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 44-10, 44-11, 44-12, and the charges of the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff in *United States v. Weigand*, 29 Cr. 188 (Mar. 1, 2021), the Hon. Paul A. Engelmayer in *United States v. Teman*, 19 Cr. 696 (Jan. 21, 2020), and the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in *United States v. Stasiv*, 18 Cr. 259 (May 14, 2019)*. See Neder v. United States*, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (holding that federal fraud statutes do not incorporate a reliance element); *United States v. Shapiro*, 29 F. App'x 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (\"[A]ctual reliance is not an element of bank fraud.\"); *United States v. Rodriguez*, 140 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 1998) (\"A misrepresentation is material if it's capable of influencing the bank's actions.\"); *Loughrin v. United States*, 573 U.S. 351, 363 (2014) (\"Section 1344(2)'s 'by means of' language is satisfied when, as here, the defendant's false statement is the mechanism naturally inducing a bank (or custodian of bank property) to part with money in its control.\").\n\n### **Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Generally**\n\nAs I said, Count Three charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy to commit money laundering offenses.\n\nTo prove Count Three, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following two elements:\n\n*First*, the existence of the conspiracy charged. In other words, that two or more persons entered into the unlawful agreement to commit money laundering offenses.\n\n*Second*, that the defendant willfully and knowingly became a member of the conspiracy charged in Count Three.\n\nThese are the same two basic elements as the charge in Count Two alleging conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. Accordingly, except for certain differences I will explain to you in a moment, you should follow the instructions I have previously provided to you about conspiracies in connection with Count Two.\n\nThe conspiracy charged in Count Three has a different object or criminal goal than the object of the conspiracy charged in Count Two or the other conspiracy counts I've summarized and will later address in detail. The object of Count Three's conspiracy is money laundering.\n\n> Adapted from the jury charge given by the Honorable Loretta A. Preska in *United States v. Adelekan*, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021).\n\n### **Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Objects – Concealment**\n\nI will now give you the elements of the objects of the money laundering conspiracy that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt charged in Count Three. The primary federal money laundering statute can be violated in several ways. Three such violations are alleged to be the objects of the money laundering conspiracy charged in Count Three. I will explain each in turn.\n\n*First*, it is a violation of the money laundering statute to engage in domestic concealment that is, to participate in a domestic financial transaction that involves the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, knowing that the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. This type of money laundering is known as \"domestic concealment\" money laundering.\n\n*Second*, it is a violation of the money laundering statute to engage in international concealment—that is, to participate in a foreign financial transaction that involves the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, knowing that the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.\n\nIn order to find either type of concealment, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants' purpose was to evade detection by the United States or other law enforcement authorities, not to evade detection from the Chinese Communist Party or CCP. [42](#page-77-1)\n\n⁴² The Government notes that this proposed language misstates the elements of the money laundering statute, which neither requires that the concealment was for the purpose of evading law enforcement detection, nor mentions the Chinese Communist Party.\n\n*Third*, it is a violation of the money laundering statute to engage in international promotion—that is, to participate in a foreign financial transaction with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.\n\nEach of these money laundering violations has unique elements, which I will now go over.\n\nLet me now describe the elements of domestic concealment money laundering. There are three elements to concealment money laundering that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:\n\n*First*, that the defendant conducted or attempted to conduct a \"financial transaction\" involving property constituting the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, specifically, wire fraud and securities fraud.\n\n*Second*, that the defendant knew that the property involved in the financial transaction was the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.\n\n*Third*, that the defendant knew that the transaction was designed in whole or in part either to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.\n\nThe first element of concealment money laundering that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant conducted a financial transaction involving property constituting the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, specifically, wire fraud and securities fraud.\n\nThe term \"conducts\" includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.\n\nThe term \"financial transaction\" means a transaction involving a financial institution that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree, or a transaction that in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce and involves the movement of funds by wire or other means, or involves one or more monetary instruments. I instruct you that a federally insured bank constitutes a \"financial institution.\"\n\nA \"transaction involving a financial institution\" includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase of sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution by whatever means.\n\nThe term \"interstate or foreign commerce\" means commerce between any combination of states, territories or possessions of the United States, or between the United States and a foreign country. In determining whether someone is engaged in, or whether his activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce, the involvement in interstate or foreign commerce can be minimal. Any involvement at all will satisfy this element.\n\nThe term \"monetary instrument\" includes, among other things, coin or currency of the United States or any other country, personal checks, traveler's checks, cashier's checks, bank checks, money orders, and investment securities or negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.\n\nThe term \"proceeds\" means any property derived, directly or indirectly, from some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity. Proceeds can be any kind of property, not just money.\n\nI have already described the meaning of \"specified unlawful activity.\" In this case, the Government has alleged that the funds in question were the proceeds of wire fraud and securities fraud—that is, the conduct alleged in Counts Five through Eleven that I have already described to you. I instruct you that, as a matter of law, wire fraud and securities fraud fall within the definition of \"specified unlawful activity.\" However, it is for you to determine whether the funds here were in fact the proceeds of wire fraud and securities fraud. The Government does not need to prove both of these specified unlawful activities. It is sufficient if you find that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the financial transaction involved the proceeds of wire fraud, or that it involved the proceeds of securities fraud. But you must agree unanimously as to which of these specified unlawful activities the Government has proven, and you must agree unanimously that a financial transaction involved the proceeds of that specified unlawful activity. I have previously instructed you on the elements of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with Counts Five through Eleven.\n\nThe second element of domestic concealment money laundering that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knew that the property involved in the financial transaction was the proceeds of someform of unlawful activity. The defendant must have known that the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state, federal, or foreign law. Thus, to satisfy this element, the Government does not have to prove that the defendant specifically knew that the property involved in the transaction represented the proceeds of wire fraud, securities fraud, or any other specific offense. The Government only has to prove that the defendant knew it\n\nrepresented the proceeds of some illegal activity that was a felony. I instruct you as a matter of law that wire fraud and securities fraud are felonies under federal law.\n\nThe third element of domestic concealment money laundering that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt concerns the purpose of the transaction. Specifically, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with knowledge that the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the proceeds' nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Thus, if the defendant knew that a transaction was designed, at least in part, either to conceal or disguise the true nature, location, source, ownership or control of the property in question, this element is satisfied. However, if the defendant knew of the transaction, but did not know that it was designed, at least in part, either to conceal or disguise, this element has not been satisfied.\n\n> Adapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instrs. 50A-26, Instr. 50A-7, 50A-8, 50A-9; *United States* v. *Henry*, 325 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).\n\n### **Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Objects – International Concealment**\n\nI will now describe the elements to international concealment money laundering. There are three elements to concealment money laundering that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:\n\n*First*, that the defendant knowingly transported, transmitted, or transferred a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States *or* to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States.\n\n*Second*, that the defendant did so with knowledge that the monetary instrument or funds involved represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity;\n\n*Third*, that the defendant knew that the transportation, transmission, or transfer was designed, in whole or in part, to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.\n\nThe first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant transported, transmitted, or transferred, or attempted to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States (or to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States).\n\nThe term \"monetary instrument\" means coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, investment securities in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery, and negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.\n\nThe term \"funds\" refers to money or negotiable paper that can be converted into currency.\n\n\"Transport,\" \"transmit,\" and \"transfer\" are not words that require a definition; you should give them their ordinary, everyday meaning. The Government need not prove that the defendant physically carried funds or monetary instruments in order to prove that he is responsible for transferring or transporting or transmitting. All that is required is proof that the defendant caused the funds or monetary instrument to be transported or transferred or transmitted by another person or entity.\n\nThe second and third elements that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime constituting the second object of the money laundering conspiracy charged in Count Three refer to concepts previously defined with respect to the first object of Count Three, namely the term \"some form of unlawful activity\" and the concept of concealment of or disguising the location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. The same definitions and instructions provided previously apply to these terms as they appear in connection with this second object of Count Three. As I told you before, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the financial transactions at issue involved the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, but not necessarily which form of unlawful activity.\n\nWith respect to concealment, as that concept relates to this second object of the conspiracy charged in Count Three, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant transported, transmitted, or transferred the property involved in the transaction\n\nwith knowledge that the transportation, transfer, or transmission was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the wire fraud and securities fraud offenses. I've already provided you with the definition of wire fraud and securities fraud, and you should apply that same definition here. As I instructed you before, as a matter of law, the term \"specified unlawful activity\" includes wire fraud and securities fraud.\n\nProof only that the funds were concealed is not sufficient to satisfy this element. Instead, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of the transfer was to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds and that the defendant knew that this was the purpose of the transfer.\n\n> Adapted from Sand *et al.*, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 50A-16 - 19; *Cuellar v. United States*, 553 U.S. 550, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 170 L. Ed. 2d 942 (2008).\n\n### **Count Three: Money Laundering Conspiracy—Objects – International Promotion**\n\nI will now describe the elements of international promotional money laundering that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. There are three elements to international promotional money laundering that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:\n\n*First*, that the defendant conducted (or attempted to conduct) a financial transaction involving property constituting the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, specifically, wire fraud and securities fraud.\n\n*Second*, that the defendant knew that the property involved in the financial transaction was the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.\n\n*Third*, that the defendant acted with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.\n\nI have already described the first and second elements to you, in connection with the first money laundering object (domestic concealment money laundering), and you should apply those same instructions here.\n\nThe third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted with intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, specifically, wire fraud and securities fraud.\n\nTo act intentionally means to act willfully, not by mistake or accident, with the deliberate purpose of promoting, facilitating or assisting the carrying on of wire fraud and securities fraud. If you find that the defendant acted with the intention or deliberate purpose of promoting, facilitating, or assisting in the carrying on of wire fraud and securities fraud, then the third element is satisfied.\n\nAdapted from Sand *et al.*, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 50A-1-5.\n\n### **Count Four: Securities Fraud and Bank False Statements Conspiracy—Generally**\n\nCount Four charges both defendants with a conspiracy to commit securities fraud and making false statements to a financial institution. The Indictment alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang conspired to commit securities fraud by agreeing \"to fraudulently induce investors to participate in the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, and G|CLUBS by providing materially false and misleading information and representations in connection with purported shares of GTV common stock and purported companies affiliated with GTV.\" And the Indictment alleges that Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang conspired to provide false statements to financial institutions by lying, and causing others to lie, to banks or other financial institutions in connection with applications for bank accounts.\n\nIn order to prove the defendants guilty of Count Four, the Government must establish the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\n\n*First*, that the conspiracy charged in Count Four of the Indictment existed; that is, that there was an agreement or understanding between two or more people to commit the crime of (i) securities fraud; or (ii) making false statements to a financial institution, as charged in the Indictment;\n\n*Second*, that the defendant you are considering knowingly became a member of the alleged conspiracy; and\n\n*Third*, that one of the members of the conspiracy—it does not have to be the defendants knowingly committed at least one overt act for the purpose of furthering some object of the conspiracy.\n\nThe first two of those elements—that the conspiracy existed, and that the defendant you are considering knowingly joined it—are the same as the first two elements for the wire fraud and bank fraud conspiracy alleged in Count Two and the money laundering conspiracy alleged in Count Three. Accordingly, except for certain differences I will explain to you in a moment, you should follow the instructions I have previously provided to you about conspiracies in connection with Counts Two and Three.\n\nI will explain the third element—requiring an overt act—next.\n\nAdapted from charge of the Hon. Jesse M. Furman in *United States v. Dambelly*, 16 Cr. 2 (S.D.N.Y.) and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 19-3.\n\n### **Count Four: Securities Fraud and Bank False Statements Conspiracy—Overt Act**\n\nThe third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the offense of conspiracy charged in Count Four is that at least one overt act was committed in furtherance of that conspiracy by at least one of the co-conspirators—not necessarily Mr. Kwok or Ms. Wang themselves.\n\nAn overt act is any act that is done to further an object of the conspiracy. An overt act may be a criminal act or the crime that is the object of the conspiracy, but it need not be. It may even be a seemingly innocent act so long as it is a step in carrying out the conspiratorial scheme.\n\nIn simple language, the overt act element is a requirement that the agreement went beyond the mere discussion stage. The overt act requirement means that you must find, beyond a reasonble doubt, that one of the conconspirators took some action during the life of the conspiracy to further the conspiracy.\n\nIn order for the Government to satisfy the overt act requirement, it is not necessary for the Government to prove the overt acts alleged in the Indictment. That is, you might find that overt acts were committed that were not alleged at all in the Indictment. It is sufficient for the Government to show that the defendant, or one of his alleged coconspirators, knowingly committed any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy during the life of the conspiracy.\n\nYou need not reach unanimous agreement on whether a particular overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; you just need to all agree that at least one overt act was so committed.\n\nAdapted from charge of the Hon. Jesse M. Furman in *United States v. Dambelly*, 16 Cr. 2 (S.D.N.Y.) and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instrs. 19-7, 19-8.\n\n### **Count Four: Securities Fraud and False Statements Conspiracy— Object of False Statements to Financial Institutions**\n\nThe objects of Count Four—the illegal goals of this conspiracy—is to commit securities fraud and to make false statements to financial institutions. You must be unanimous as to which object the defendants allegedly conspired to accomplish.\n\nI have already instructed you on the elements of securities fraud and you should apply those instructions here.\n\nI will now instruct you on the elements of making false statements to a financial institution,\n\nin violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014.\n\nThe crime of making false statements to financial institutions requires proof beyond a\n\nreasonable doubt of the following four elements.\n\n*First*, that the defendant made or caused to be made a false statement or report relating to an application to a bank;\n\n*Second*, that the defendant acted knowingly;\n\n*Third*, that the false statement or report was made for the purpose of influencing in any way the bank's action; and\n\n*Fourth*, that the bank was then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.\n\nAdapted from Sand, 2 Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal, comment to Instr. 37-15.\n\n### **Count One: Racketeering Conspiracy—Generally**\n\nI will now turn to Count One of the Indictment. Count One charges Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang with conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—also known as the RICO statute.\n\nThe relevant part of the RICO statute—Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c) makes it a crime for\n\n> any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.\n\nThe RICO statute, in essence, makes it a crime for a person to participate in the conduct of\n\nan enterprise's affairs through a pattern of violations of law known as \"racketeering acts.\"\n\nThe word \"racketeering\" may have implications in our society. Do not infer anything from\n\nit. The use of the term in the applicable statute and here in this courtroom should not be regarded\n\nas having anything to do with your determination of whether the guilt of the defendant you are\n\nconsidering has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The term is merely a term used by\n\nCongress to describe the statute.\n\nAdapted from the charges of the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Merlino*, No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), and the Honorable Katherine B. Forrest in *United States v. Delligatti*, No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also United States v. Applins*, 637 F.3d 59, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2011); *United States v. Basciano*, 599 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2010); *United States v. Yannotti*, 541 F.3d 112, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2008); *United States v. Zemlyansky*, 908 F.3d 1, 11 (2d Cir. 2018) (\"RICO conspiracy requires proof: (a) of an agreement to join a racketeering scheme, (b) of the defendant's knowing engagement in the scheme with the intent that its overall goals be effectuated, and (c) that the scheme involved, or by\n\nagreement between any members of the conspiracy was intended to involve, two or more predicate acts of racketeering.”).\n\n### **Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy—Elements**\n\nCount One of the Indictment charges the defendants with participating in a racketeering conspiracy from at least in or about 2018 through in or about March 2023.\n\nIn order to meet its burden of proving that the defendant you are considering is guilty of the racketeering conspiracy charged in Count One, the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:\n\nFirst, that an enterprise was, or would be, established as charged in the indictment.\n\nFirst, that there was an agreement among two or more persons to participate in an\n\nenterprise that would affect interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity;\n\nSecond, that the enterprise was, or would be engaged in, or its activities would affect,\n\ninterstate or foreign commerce.\n\nSecond, that the defendants knowingly and willfully became members of that\n\nagreement; and\n\nThird, that the defendant you are considering was, or would be, employed by or associated with the enterprise.\n\nThird, that a defendant or another member of the conspiracy agreed to commit two or more racketeering acts, as I will define that term for you. [43](#page-94-1)\n\n⁴³ The defendants note that they believe the three-element formuation in Sand, Instr. 52-28 and *United States v. Laurent*, 33 F.3d 4th 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2022) is clearer and more appropriate.\n\nAnd fourth, that the defendant you are considering knowingly and intentionally agreed with\n\nat least one other person that either the defendant or a coconspirator would participate (or did\n\nparticipate) directly or indirectly in the conduct of the affairs of the charged enterprise.\n\nI will now instruct you on the meaning of the terms \"enterprise\" and\n\n\"racketeering activity.\"\n\nAdapted from the charge of the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Merlino*, No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); and the charge of the Honorable Katherine B. Forrest in *United States v. Delligatti*, No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also United States v. Applins*, 637 F.3d 59, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2011); *United States v. Basciano*, 599 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2010); *United States v. Yannotti*, 541 F.3d 112, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2008); *United States v. Allen*, 155 F.3d 35, 40 (2d. Cir. 1998)\n\n### **Count One: Racketeering Conspiracy – First Element – Enterprise**\n\nI will now instruct you on the law applicable to each of these elements.\n\nThe first element the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendants agreed to establish an enterprise, or that an enterprise was actually established. What is an enterprise? Under the racketeering statute, an enterprise includes any legal entity such as a partnership, corporation, or association, or a group of individuals who are associated in fact, although not a legal entity. The enterprise does not need to have a particular name, or for that matter, have any name at all. Nor need it be registered or licensed as an enterprise. It does not have to be a commonly recognized legal entity, such as a corporation, a trade union, a partnership, or the like. But an enterprise could be a legal entity or a group of legal entities.\n\nAn enterprise may be a group of people informally associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. This group may be organized for a legitimate and lawful purpose or it may be organized for an unlawful purpose. In addition to having a common purpose, this group of people must have a core of personnel who function as a continuing unit. Furthermore, the enterprise would continue to exist (or did continue to exist) in substantially similar form through the period charged. This does not mean that the membership must remain exactly identical, but the enterprise must have a recognizable core that continues through a substantial period during the time frame charged in Count One of the Indictment, which is from 2018 through March 2023.\n\nHere, Count One of the Indictment charges an agreement to participate in the conduct of an organization referred to as the Kwok Enterprise.\n\nThe term \"Kwok Enterprise\" is simply a form of reference adopted by the government for the purposes of the Indictment to describe the group of businesses and individuals who participated in the alleged racketeering conspiracy.\n\nI note further that the government is not required to prove each and every allegation about the Kwok Enterprise. It is sufficient if the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement to conduct or participate in the conduct of a group of people characterized by (1) a common purpose or purposes, (2) an ongoing formal or informal organization or structure, and (3) core personnel who would function as a continuing unit during a substantial period within the time frame charged in the Indictment.\n\n> Adapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal*, Instr. 19-4; the charges of the Honorable Alison J. Nathan in *United States v. Berry*, No. 20 Cr. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), and *United States v. Allen*, No. 15 Cr. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); the charge of the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Merlino*, No. S44 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); and the charge of the Honorable Katherine B. Forrest in *United States v. Delligatti*, No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\n### **Count One: Racketeering Conspiracy – Second Element – Effect on Interstate Commerce**\n\nThe second element the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to Count One is that the criminal enterprise itself, or the racketeering activities of those associated with it, would have had some effect on interstate or foreign commerce, or in fact had such an effect. This effect on interstate commerce could have occurred in any way and it need only have been minimal.\n\nInterstate commerce includes the movement of goods, services, money, and individuals between states. It is not necessary for the Government to prove that any particular acts affected interstate commerce or even that acts that the defendant personally committed affected interstate commerce. It need prove only that some act or acts of the enterprise—even perfectly legal acts of the enterprise—had such an effect on interstate commerce. It is not necessary for you to find that the defendant knew the enterprise was engaged in interstate commerce. All that is necessary is that you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the activities of the enterprise would affect, or did affect, interstate or foreign commerce in some minimal way.\n\n> Adapted from the charges of the Honorable Colleen McMahon in *United States v. Mendoza*, No. 11 Cr. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); and the Honorable William H. Pauley III in *United States v. Meregildo*, No. 11 Cr. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).\n\n### **Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy – Third Element – Association with the Enterprise**\n\nThe third element the Government must prove beyond a rsaonable doubt is that a conspirator (which may include the defendant you are considering) was or would be \"employed by\" or \"associated with\" the Kwok Enterprise about which I have already instructed you. The government need not prove both; either \"employed by\" or \"associated with\" is sufficient to establish this element. The term \"employed by\" should be given its common, plain meaning. Thus, a person is \"employed by\" an enterprise when, for example, he is on the payroll of the enterprise and performs services for the enterprise, holds a position in the enterprise, or has an ownership interest in the enterprise.\n\n\"Associated with\" also should be given its plain meaning. To \"associate\" means \"to join, often in a loose relationship as a partner, fellow worker, colleague, friend, companion or ally . . . to join or connect with one another.\" Therefore, a person is \"associated with\" an enterprise when, for example, he or she joins with other members of the enterprise and he or she knowingly aids or furthers the activities of the enterprise, or he or she conducts business with or through the enterprise. Thus, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant had a formal position in the enterprise.\n\nIt is not required that the defendant you are considering agree that any particular conspirator was or would be \"employed by\" or \"associated with\" the enterprise for the entire time the enterprise existed. The Government also is not required to prove that the defendant you are considering agreed that any particular conspirator had a formal position in the enterprise, or participated in all the activities of the enterprise, or had full knowledge of all the activities of the enterprise, or knew about the participation of all the other members of the enterprise. Rather, it is sufficient that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at some time during the existence of the enterprise as alleged in the indictment, a conspirator was or would be \"employed by\" or \"associated with\" the enterprise within the meaning of those terms as I have just explained and that he or she knew or would know of the general nature of the enterprise, and knew or would know that the enterprise extended beyond his or her own role in the enterprise.\n\n> Adapted from the charge of the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Merlino*, No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); and the Honorable Katherine B. Forrest in *United States v. Delligatti*, No. 15 Cr. 491 ( (S.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also* Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal*, Instr. 19-6. *United States v. Applins*, 637 F.3d 59, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2011); *United States v. Zichettello*, 208 F.3d 72, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2000); *United States v. Rastelli*, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989) (collecting cases).\n\n### **Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy – Fourth Element – Conduct or Participate in Affairs of the Enterprise**\n\nThe fourth element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant must have knowingly conspired (that is, agreed) that a conspirator would conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.\n\nAs I've previously instructed you, a conspiracy is an agreement or partnership by two or more persons to violate the law. A defendant may be convicted of a RICO conspiracy offense even if he did not personally participate in the operation or management of the enterprise when the evidence establishes that the defendant knowingly agreed to facilitate a scheme which, if completed, would constitute a RICO substantive violation. [44](#page-101-1)\n\nSimilarly, the Government need not prove that the defendant you are considering agreed with every other member of the enterprise, knew all the other members of the enterprise, or had full knowledge of all the details of the enterprise. However, in proving this element, the Government was connected to the enterprise in some meaningful way, and that the defendant knew the general nature of the enterprise and knew that the enterprise existed beyond his individual role.\n\nWhen considering if a defendant joined the conspiracy you may consider evidence, if any, that the defendant agreed that a conspirator would intentionally perform acts, functions or duties which are necessary to, or helpful in, the operation of the enterprise, or that a conspirator had some part in directing the enterprise's affairs. However, the Government need not prove that a defendant\n\n⁴⁴ The defendants note that what they have proposed to delete is unnecessary given reference to general conspiracy instructions.\n\nwould exercise significant control over or within the enterprise, or that he had a formal position in the enterprise, or that he had primary responsibility for the enterprise's affairs. An enterprise is operated not just by upper management but also by lower-rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management or carry out upper management's orders.\n\nI want to caution you, however, that a defendant's mere presence at the scene of an alleged crime does not, by itself, make him a member of the conspiracy. Similarly, mere association with one or more members of the conspiracy does not automatically make the defendant a member. A person may know, or be friendly with, a criminal, without being a criminal himself. Mere similarity of conduct or the fact that they may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests does not necessarily establish membership in the conspiracy. What is necessary is that the defendant participated with knowledge of the unlawful objective of the conspiracy and with intent to aid in the accomplishment of that objective.\n\nUltimately, the question is this: Has the Government proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering joined the conspiracy and knowingly and intentionally participated in it with the awareness of its basic purpose and as something he wished to bring about?\n\nThe \"object\" of a conspiracy is the illegal purpose the conspirators agree or hope to achieve. The object of the conspiracy charged in Count One is to violate the RICO statute, in other words, to conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.\n\nIn other words, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering agreed to participate in the enterprise, with the intent that he or another member or members of the conspiracy would commit two or more acts of racketeering of the types specified in the Indictment as part of a pattern of racketeering activity. You must be unanimous as to which particular types of racketeering crimes, if any, the defendant agreed would be committed.\n\nAs I have told you, it is not necessary that a conspiracy actually succeed in its purpose for you to conclude that it existed. Because the agreement to commit a racketeering offense is the essence of Count One, the Government need prove only that if the conspiracy achieved its objective as contemplated, the enterprise would be established, that its members would participate in conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and that those activities would affect interstate or foreign commerce. Of course, proof that the objective of the conspiracy was accomplished, if you find it was, may be persuasive evidence of the existence of the conspiracy.\n\nA pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering, the last of which occurred within ten years excluding any period of imprisonment after the commission of a prior act of racketeering. To establish an agreement that the enterprise would engage in a \"pattern of racketeering activity,\" the Government must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt:\n\n*First*, that the defendant you are considering agreed that a conspirator, which could include the defendant himself or any other member of the conspiracy, would intentionally commit, or cause, or aid and abet the commission of, two or more of racketeering acts of the types alleged in the Indictment. At the end of this instruction, I will instruct you on the charged categories of racketeering activity.\n\n*Second*, that the racketeering acts have a \"nexus\" to the enterprise and are \"related\" to one another. A racketeering act has a \"nexus\" to the enterprise if it has a meaningful connection to the enterprise. To be \"related,\" the racketeering acts must have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victim, or methods of commission, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and not be merely isolated events. Two racketeering acts may be \"related\" even though they are dissimilar or not directly related to each other, provided that the racketeering acts are related to the same enterprise. For example, for both \"nexus\" and \"relatedness\" purposes, the requisite relationship between the RICO enterprise and a predicate racketeering act may be established by evidence that the defendant was enabled to commit the racketeering act solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over its affairs, or by evidence that the defendant's position in the enterprise facilitated his commission of the racketeering act, or by evidence that the racketeering act benefitted the enterprise, or by evidence that the racketeering act was authorized by the enterprise or by evidence the racketeering act promoted or furthered the purposes of the enterprise.\n\n*Third*, to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, the Government must prove that the racketeering acts themselves either would have extended over a substantial period of time or posed or would pose a threat of continued criminal activity. A \"substantial period of time\" is considered two or more years[45](#page-104-0) of predicate activity. The Government need not prove such a threat of continuity by any mathematical formula or by any particular method of proof, but rather may prove it in a variety of ways. For example, the threat of continued unlawful activity may be established when the evidence shows that the racketeering acts are part of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes or when the racketeering acts are shown to be the regular way of conducting\n\n⁴⁵ *Grace Int'l Assembly of God v. Festa*, 797 F. App'x 603, 605 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\nthe affairs of the enterprise. Moreover, in determining whether the Government has proven the threat of continued unlawful activity, you are not limited to consideration of the specific racketeering acts that the defendants themselves are alleged to have committed; rather, in addition to considering such acts, you also may consider the nature of the enterprise, and other unlawful activities of the enterprise and its members viewed in their entirety, including both charged and uncharged unlawful activities.\n\nFor the Government to meet its burden of proof on Count One, the Government must prove that the defendant you are considering intended to further an endeavor that, if completed, would have satisfied all the elements of a substantive racketeering offense. The Government is not required to prove that the defendant personally committed or agreed to commit any act of racketeering, nor is it required to prove that any acts of racketeering actually occurred. Rather, the Government must prove that the defendant you are considering agreed to participate in the enterprise with the knowledge and intent that at least one member of the racketeering conspiracy, which could be the defendant or a coconspirator, would commit at least two racketeering acts in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise and that those acts would constitute a pattern of racketeering activity as defined above.\n\nAn enterprise is not the same thing as the pattern of racketeering activity. To convict, the Government must prove that if the conspiracy achieved its objective there would be an enterprise and that the enterprise's affairs would be conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. As I have mentioned, the enterprise in this case is alleged to be a group of individuals who associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. A pattern of racketeering activity, on the other hand, is a series of criminal acts.\n\nThe existence of the enterprise is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, with a common purpose and by evidence that various core personnel of the group functioned as a continuing unit.\n\nThe pattern of racketeering activity, on the other hand, is proved by evidence of a minimum of two acts of racketeering that the participants in the enterprise committed or aided and abetted. The proof used to establish those separate elements may be the same or overlapping. For example, if you find that an ongoing enterprise existed, the existence of this enterprise may help establish that the separate racketeering acts were part of a \"pattern\" of continuing criminal activity. Nevertheless, you should bear in mind that proof of an enterprise does not necessarily establish proof of a pattern of racketeering activity, and vice versa.\n\nFinally, although you need not decide whether the defendant you are considering agreed to the commission of any particular racketeering act in order to convict that defendant of the RICO conspiracy offense, you must be unanimous as to which type or types of predicate racketeering crimes the defendant agreed would be committed; for example, at least two acts of, or any combination of: wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, securities fraud.\n\nI will now instruct you on the substantive law governing the racketeering crimes that the Indictment alleges were part of the pattern of racketeering activity in this case.\n\n> Adapted from the charges of Honorable Jesse M. Furman in *United States v. Blondet*, No. 16 Cr. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Merlino*, No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), and the Honorable Katherine B. Forrest in *United States v. Delligatti*, No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.*, 492 U.S. 299, 242-43 (1989); *United States v. Alkins*, 925 F.2d 541, 551-53 (2d Cir. 1991); *United States v.*\n\n*Coiro*, 922 F.2d 1008, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991); *United States v. Kaplan*, 886 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1989); *United States v. Indelicato*, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383-84 (2d Cir. 1989) (*en banc*).\n\n### **Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy – Predicates**\n\nThe Indictment alleges that the following categories of criminal violations were committed or were intended to be committed as part of the racketeering conspiracy charged in Count One:\n\n- (1) Acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (relating to wire fraud);\n- (2) Acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud, also known as bank fraud);\n- (3) Acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments, also known as money laundering);\n- (4) Acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity); and\n- (5) Offenses involving fraud in the sale of securities, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78j (b) and 78ff, and Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 240.10b-5 (also known as securities fraud).\n\nI previously instructed you on violations of the wire fraud statute, in connection with Counts Five, Seven, Nine, and Eleven. You should use those instructions in assessing whether \"acts indictable under Title 18 of the United States Code relating to wire fraud\" were committed or intended to be committed.\n\nI previously instructed you on violations of the statute prohibiting financial institution fraud (or bank fraud), in connection with the bank fraud object of Count Two's conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. You should use those instructions in assessing whether \"acts indictable\n\nunder Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud, also known as bank fraud)\" were committed or intended to be committed.\n\nI previously instructed you on violations of the money laundering statute, in connection with the objects of the money laundering conspiracy alleged in Count Three. You should use those instructions in assessing whether \"acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments, also known as money laundering)\" were committed or intended to be committed.\n\nI previously instructed you on violations of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, in connection with Count Twelve. You should use those instructions in assessing whether \"acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957\" were committed or intended to be committed.\n\nAnd I also previously instructed you on violations of Section 10(b), the shorthand for the securities fraud statute, in connection with Counts Six, Eight, and Ten. You should use those instructions in assessing whether \"offenses involving fraud in the sale of securities, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78j (b) and 78ff, and Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 240.10b-5\" were committed or intended to be committed.\n\n# *Pinkerton* **Liability**\n\nIf you find the defendant you are considering guilty of any or all of the conspiracy offenses charged in Counts One through Four, you may also consider whether the defendant you are considering is guilty of the related substantive offenses in Counts Five through Twelve under a theory called *Pinkerton* liability. *Pinkerton* liability provides that a defendant who is a member of a conspiracy may be held liable for a crime committed by a co-conspirator. Pinkerton liability may be considered by you in connection with Counts Five through Twelve—the substantive counts in the Indictment—only if you do not find the defendant you are considering personally committed or aided and abetted the commission of that offense.\n\nIf you find that a defendant was a part of the RICO conspiracy charged in Count One that is, if you find that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the elements as to Count One—then you may, but are not required to, find that defendant liable for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator, provided that the Government has proven the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:\n\n*First*, that a crime charged in the substantive count you are considering was committed; *Second,* that the person or persons you find actually committed the crime were members\n\nof the RICO conspiracy charged in Count One;\n\n*Third*, that the substantive crime was committed pursuant to the common plan and understanding you found to exist among the conspirators;\n\n*Fourth*, that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the substantive crime you are considering was committed (that is, had entered into the conspiracy); and\n\n*Fifth*, that the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that the substantive crime you are\n\nconsidering might be committed by his co-conspirators.\n\nIf you find that the Government has proven all five of these elements beyond a reasonable\n\ndoubt, then you may find that defendant guilty of a substantive offense charged against him, even\n\nif he did not personally participate in the acts constituting the crime, and even if he did not have\n\nactual knowledge of it.\n\nAdapted from the charge given by the Honorable Cathy Seibel in *United States v. Madonna*, No. S18 17 Cr. 89. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Gershman*, 31 F.4th 80 (2d Cir. 2022); *United States v. Parkes*, 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007); *United States v. Masotto*, 73 F.3d 1233 (2d Cir. 1996); *United States v. Romero*, 897 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1990); *see also Pinkerton v. United States*, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).\n\nNOTE: The defense objects to the giving of a *Pinkerton* charge, which the Second Circuit has repeatedly cautioned \"should not be given as a matter of course.\" *See, e.g., United States v. Salameh*, 152. F.3d 88, 149 (2d Cir. 1998).\n\n### **Conscious Avoidance**\n\n### [If Applicable][46](#page-112-1)\n\nAs I have explained, charges in the Indictment require the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly. In determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may consider whether the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious.\n\nI would like to point out that the necessary knowledge on the part of the defendant with respect to any particular charge cannot be established by showing that that defendant was careless, negligent, or foolish. However, one may not willfully and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact material and important to his conduct in order to escape the consequences of criminal law. The law calls this \"conscious avoidance\" or \"willful blindness.\" In other words, the Government can prove either that the defendant actually knew the objective of the conspiracy or he consciously avoided knowledge of the object of the conspiracy.\n\nThus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that there was a high probability that a crime was being committed, but that the defendant deliberately and consciously avoided confirming this fact, such as by purposely closing his or her eyes to it or intentionally failing to investigate it, then you may treat this deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you find that the defendant actually believed that he was not engaged in such unlawful behavior. In other words, a defendant cannot avoid\n\n⁴⁶ NOTE: The defense objects to the giving of a conscious avoidance charge.\n\ncriminal responsibility for his own conduct by \"deliberately closing his eyes,\" or remaining purposefully ignorant of facts which would confirm to him that he was engaged in unlawful conduct. Put another way, a person cannot look at all sorts of things that make it obvious to any reasonable person what is going on and then claim in court that, because he deliberately avoided learning what was explicitly obvious, he did not know the incriminating fact.\n\nYou must also keep in mind that there is an important difference between knowingly and intentionally participating in the conspiracy—which I just explained to you—and knowing the specific objective of the conspiracy on the other. You may consider conscious avoidance in deciding whether the defendant knew the objective of the conspiracy, that is, whether he reasonably believed that there was a high probability that a goal of the conspiracy was to commit the crime charged as objects of the conspiracy and took deliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming that fact but participated in the conspiracy anyway. But conscious avoidance cannot be used as a substitute for finding that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy in the first place. It is logically impossible for a defendant to intend and agree to join a conspiracy if he or she does not actually know it exists. However, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly chose to participate in such a joint undertaking, you may consider whether the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming otherwise obvious facts about the purpose of that undertaking.\n\nIn sum, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant believed there was a high probability that a fact was so and that the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid learning the truth of that fact, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly with respect to that\n\nfact. However, if you find that the defendant actually believed the fact was not so, then you may\n\nnot find that he acted knowingly with respect to that fact.\n\nAdapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Loretta A. Preska in *United States v. Tanner et al.*, 17 Cr. 61 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018); the Honorable P. Kevin Castel in *United States v. William Walters*, 16 Cr. 338 (S.D.N.Y. April 6, 2017); and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 3A-2.\n\n### **Venue**\n\nWith respect to each count in the Indictment, the Government, in addition to proving the essential elements of that charge, must also prove that at least one act in furtherance of the charge occurred in the Southern District of New York. This is called establishing venue.\n\nThe Southern District of New York includes all of Manhattan and the Bronx, as well as Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, Orange, and Sullivan Counties.\n\nThe Government does not have to prove that a completed crime was committed within the Southern District of New York, or that the defendant was ever in the Southern District of New York. It is sufficient to satisfy the venue requirement if any act in furtherance of the crime charged occurred in this District. The act itself need not be a criminal act. And the act need not have been taken by the defendant, so long as the act was part of the crime that you find the defendant committed.\n\n# **Negligence of a Victim Not a Defense**\n\nIt is unimportant whether a victim might have discovered the charged fraud schemes had\n\nthe victim probed further. If you find that existed, it is irrelevant whether you believe that a\n\nvictim was careless, gullible, or even negligent.\n\nNegligence, carelessness, or gullibility on the part of the victims is no defense to a charge\n\nof fraud.\n\nAdapted from the jury charge given by the Honorable Loretta A. Preska in *United States v. Adelekan*, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021).\n\n### **Multiple Conspiracies[47](#page-117-1)**\n\nThe government has charged the existence of a single conspiracy in Count 1, Count 2, Count 3, and Count 4. For each of these counts, the government must prove the existence of a single conspiracy.\n\nA single conspiracy exists when two or more people join together to further one common unlawful design or purpose. By way of contrast, multiple conspiracies exist when there are separate unlawful agreements to achieve distinct purposes, even if the conspiracies have similar goals or overlapping membership. Proof of several separate and independent conspiracies is not proof of the single conspiracy alleged in any one count. For each conspiracy count, the governmentmust convince you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the particular conspiracy charged in the that count existed and that the defendant you are considering was a member of that specific conspiracy, not some other conspiracy. Similalry, if you find that a particular defendant was a member of another conspiracy, and not the one charged in the Count you are considering, you must acquit that defendant of that conspiracy charge. Proof of several separate and independent conspiracies is not proof of any single conspiracy. [48](#page-117-2)\n\n⁴⁷ The Government requests that the Court reserve judgment regarding whether this charge is appropriate until the end of trial, once all the evidence has been admitted.\n\n⁴⁸ Adapted from Sand, Instr. 19-5.\n\n# **Variance in Dates**\n\nThe Indictment alleges that the defendants engaged in the charged offenses during certain\n\ntime frames. It is not essential that the Government prove that the defendants committed the\n\ncharged offenses during these exact time frames. The law only requires a substantial similarity\n\nbetween the dates alleged in the Indictment and the date or dates established by the evidence.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 3-12, and the jury charges given by the Honorable Colleen McMahon in *United States v. Omar Gonzalez*, 10 Cr. 588 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2010).\n\n# **Particular Investigative Techniques Not Required**\n\n[If Applicable][49](#page-119-1)\n\nYou have heard reference, [*If applicable:* in the arguments of defense counsel in this case,] to the fact that certain investigative techniques were or were not used by law enforcement authorities. There is no legal requirement that law enforcement agents investigate crimes in a particular way or that the Government prove its case through any particular means. While you are to carefully consider the evidence presented, you need not speculate as to why certain techniques were used or why others were not used. The Government is not on trial. Law enforcement\n\n### techniques are not your concern.\n\nYour concern is to determine whether or not, based on the evidence or lack of evidence,\n\nthe guilt of the defendant has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, reasonable doubt\n\narise from a lack of evidence.[50](#page-119-2)\n\nAdapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable William H. Pauley III in *United States v. Meregildo, et al.*, 11 Cr. 576 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2012); the Honorable Pierre N. Leval in *United States v. Mucciante*, 91 Cr. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); and the Honorable John F. Keenan in *United States v. Medina*, 91 Cr. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).\n\n⁴⁹ The defense objects to this instruction as a whole, although if it is given, the additional language should be used. *See, e.g.*, Order, *United States v. Nordlicht*, Jul. 1, 2019 (denying government's request to give a similar charge \"as the jury instructions already instruct the jury on what it may and may not consider in reaching a verdict.\"\n\n⁵⁰ Jury Charge of Hon. William Kuntz, *U.S. v. Boustani*, 18 Cr. 681 (EDNY 2020), ECF No. 384 at 4443.\n\n# **Use of Evidence Obtained Pursuant to Searches and Seizures**\n\nYou have heard testimony about evidence seized in connection with certain searches or seizures conducted by law enforcement officers, and in particular, of email and other electronic evidence obtained pursuant to court-approved search warrants. Evidence obtained from these searches and seizures was properly admitted in this case, and may be properly considered by you. Such searches and seizures were entirely appropriate law enforcement actions. Whether you approve or disapprove of how evidence was obtained should not enter into your deliberations, because I instruct you that the Government's use of the evidence is entirely lawful.\n\nYou must, therefore, regardless of your personal opinions, give this evidence full consideration along with all the other evidence in the case in determining whether the Government has proven a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\n> Adapted from the Jury Charge given by the Honorable Jesse M. Furman in *United States v. Avenatti*, No. 19 Cr. 373 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (Tr. 1732-33).\n\n### **Stipulations**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nYou have heard evidence in the form of stipulation[s] of testimony. A stipulation of testimony is an agreement among the parties that, if called as a witness, the person would have given certain testimony. You must accept as true the fact that the witness would have given that testimony. It is for you, however, to determine the effect to be given that testimony.\n\nYou have also heard evidence in the form of stipulations of fact. A stipulation of fact is an\n\nagreement among the parties that a certain fact is true. You must regard such agreed facts as true.\n\nIt is for you, however, to determine the effect to be given to any stipulated fact.\n\nAdapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Sidney H. Stein in *United States v. Pierre*, 19 Cr. 783 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021);*see also* Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 5-6.\n\n### **Law Enforcement and Government Employee Witnesses**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nYou have heard testimony from law enforcement officers and employees of the FBI. The fact that a witness may be employed by the FBI does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary witness.\n\nIn this context, it is perfectly appropriate for defense counsel is allowed to attemptto attack the credibility of such a witness on the ground that his or her testimony may be colored by a personal or professional interest in the outcome of the case.\n\nIt is your decision, after reviewing all the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of the law enforcement officer or employee witness and to give to that testimony the weight you find it deserves.\n\nAdapted from Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 7-16.\n\n### **Preparation of Witnesses**\n\nYou heard evidence during the trial that witnesses had discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in court.\n\nAlthough you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness's credibility, I should tell you that there is nothing unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying so that the witness can be aware of the subjects he or she will be questioned about, focus on those subjects, and have the opportunity to review relevant exhibits before being questioned about them. Such consultation helps conserve your time and the Court's time. In fact, it would be unusual for a lawyer to call a witness without such consultation.\n\nAgain, the weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for his or her testimony and what inferences you draw from such preparation are matters completely within your discretion.\n\n> Adapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Peirce*, 06 Cr. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008).\n\n### **Accomplice/Cooperating Witness Testimony**\n\n[If applicable]\n\nYou have also heard from witness(es) who testified that they pled guilty to criminal charges. They each testified pursuant to an agreement to cooperate with the Government. The law allows the use of accomplice testimony. Indeed, it is the law in federal courts that the testimony of an accomplice may be enough in and of itself for conviction if the jury finds that the testimony establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also the case, however, that accomplice testimony is of such a nature that it must be scrutinized with great care and viewed with particular caution when you decide how much of that testimony to believe.\n\nI have given you some general considerations on credibility and I will not repeat them all here. Nevertheless, let me say a few things that you might want to consider during your deliberations on the subject of accomplices. You should ask yourself whether the witness would benefit more by lying or by telling the truth. Was the witness's testimony made up in any way because he believed or hoped that he would somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely? Or did he believe that his interests would be best served by testifying truthfully? If you believe that the witness you are considering was motivated by hopes of personal gain, was the motivation one that would cause him to lie, or was it one that would cause him to tell the truth? Did this motivation color his testimony? Has the witness previously testified falsely or made false statements? Does the witness appear to have any bias against either of the defendants? In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what credence and what weight, if any, to give to an accomplice witness.\n\nAdapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Laura T. Swain in *United States v. Stewart*, 15 Cr. 287 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2016).\n\n### **Non-Prosecution Agreement**\n\n(If Applicable)\n\nYou have heard testimony from at least one witness who entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the Government arising out of facts that are at issue in this case. You are instructed that you are to draw no conclusions or inferences of any kind about the guilt of the defendant you are considering from the fact that a witness entered into such an agreement, even involving similar conduct. The decision of that witness to enter into that agreement and of the Government to enter into that agreement were personal decisions on the part of the witness and the Government and an exercise of the Government's lawful discretion in the case of the Government. It may not be used by you in any way for or against the defendant you are considering.\n\nHowever, the testimony of a witness who has been promised that he will not be prosecuted should be examined by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. You should scrutinize it closely to determine whether or not it is colored in such a way as to place guilt upon the defendant in order to further the witness' own interests; for, such a witness, confronted with the realization that he can win his own freedom by helping to convict another, has a motive to falsify his testimony.\n\nSuch testimony should be received by you with suspicion and you may give it such weight, if any, as you believe it deserves. [51](#page-126-1)\n\n> Adapted from the charge of the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan in *United States v. Dumitru*, 18 Cr. 243 (Nov. 6, 2018).\n\n⁵¹ Sand.Instr. 7-9\n\n### **Immunized Witnesses**\n\nYou have heard the testimony of [a] certain witness[es] who testified under a grant of immunity from this Court. What this means is that the testimony of the witness may not be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the immunity order of this court.\n\nYou are instructed that the Government is entitled to call, as a witness, a person who has been granted immunity by order of this Court and that you may convict a defendant on the basis of such a witness's testimony alone, if you find that the testimony proves the defendant you are considering guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nHowever, the testimony of a witness who has been granted immunity should be examined by you with great care greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. [52](#page-127-1) You should scrutinize it closely to determine whether or not it is colored in such a way as to place guilt upon the defendant in order to further the witness's own interests; for such a witness, confronted with the realization that he can win his own freedom by helping to convict another, has a motive to falsify his testimony.\n\nSuch testimony should be scrutinized by you with great care, and you should act upon it with caution. If you believe it to be true, and determine to accept the testimony, you may give it such weight, if any, as you believe it deserves.\n\n⁵² Sand, Instr. 7-8.\n\nIf after a careful examination of the witness's testimony and demeanor upon the witness stand, you are satisfied that the witness told the truth, you should accept it as credible and act upon it accordingly.\n\nIn addition, it does not follow that simply because a person may have participated in criminal conduct, that he is incapable of giving truthful testimony. Further, it is of no concern of yours why a witness received court-ordered immunity. Your sole concern is whether a witness has given truthful testimony in this courtroom before you. As with any witness, let me emphasize that the issue of credibility need not be decided in an all-or-nothing fashion. Even if you find that a witness testified falsely in one part, you still may accept his testimony in other parts, or may disregard all of it. That is a determination entirely for you, the jury.\n\n> Adapted from the charge of the Honorable William H. Pauley III, in *United States* v. *Dominguez,* S1 16 Cr. 108 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2016); and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 7-8; *see United States v. Gleason*, 616 F.2d 2, 15 (2d Cir. 1979) (\"Where the court points out that testimony of certain types of witnesses may be suspect and should therefore be scrutinized and weighed with care, such as that of accomplices or coconspirators . . . it must also direct the jury's attention to the fact that it may well find these witnesses to be truthful, in whole or in part.\") (citations omitted), and *United States v. Cheung Kin Ping*, 555 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977) (same).\n\n# **Uncalled Witnesses—Equally Available [53](#page-129-1)**\n\n# [If Applicable]\n\nThere are individuals whose names you have heard during the course of the trial but who\n\ndid not appear here to testify. I instruct you that each party had an equal opportunity, or lack of\n\nopportunity, to call any of these witnesses. Therefore, you shouldnot draw any inferences or reach\n\nany conclusions as to what they would have testified to had they been called. Their absence should\n\nnot affect your judgment in any way.\n\nYou should, however, remember my instruction that the law does not impose on a\n\ndefendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 6-7; *see United States v. Super*, 492 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1974) (proper to instruct jury that no inference should be drawn from the absence of a witness who was equally unavailable to both sides); *accord United States v. Brown*, 511 F.2d 920, 925 (2d Cir. 1975).\n\n⁵³ NOTE: The defense objects to this instruction, particularly under the unique circumstances of this case.\n\n# **Persons Not on Trial**\n\nYou may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, towards the Government or the defendant you are considering from the fact that any person other than the defendant you are considering is not on trial here. You also may not speculate as to the reasons why other persons are not on trial. Those matters are wholly outside your concern and have no bearing on your function as jurors.\n\n> Adapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable J. Paul Oetken in *United States v. Block*, 16 Cr. 595 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2017); and the Honorable Gregory Woods in *United States v. Chow*, 17 Cr. 667 (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2018).\n\n### **Limiting Instruction – Similar Act Evidence**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nThe Government has offered evidence tending to show that, on different occasions, the defendants engaged in conduct similar to the charges in the Indictment.\n\nIn that connection, let me remind you that the defendants are not on trial for committing acts not alleged in the Indictment. Accordingly, you may not consider this evidence of similar acts as a substitute for proof that the defendant committed the crime charged. Nor may you consider this evidence as proof that the defendant has a criminal personality or bad character. The evidence of the other, similar acts was admitted for a much more limited purpose of [provide explanation if applicable], as I instructed you at the time that evidence was admitted, and you may consider it only for that limited purpose and to provide background for the charges in the Indictment.\n\nIf you determine that the relevant defendant committed the acts charged in the indictment and similar acts as well, then you may, but need not, draw an inference that in doing the acts charged in the indictment, the defendant under consideration acted [provide specific explanation if applicable]. However, evidence of similar acts may not be considered by you for any other purpose. Specifically, you may not use this evidence to conclude that, because the defendant committed the other act or acts, he must also have committed the act charged in the Indictment.\n\n> Adapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 5-25, and the jury charges given by the Honorable Loretta A. Preska in *United States v. Tanner et al.*, 17 Cr. 61 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018).\n\n### **Expert Witnesses**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nIn this case, I permitted certain witnesses to express opinions about certain matters that are at issue. Such testimony, which we refer to as \"expert testimony,\" was presented to you on the theory that someone who is experienced and knowledgeable in the field can assist you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts.\n\nIn weighing expert testimony, you may consider that witness's qualifications, his opinions, the reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply when you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness's testimony. You may give the opinion testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all of the evidence in this case. You should not, however, credit the opinion testimony just because I allowed the witness to testify as an expert. Nor should you substitute the expert's opinion for your own reason, judgment, and common sense. The determination of the facts in this case rest solely with you.\n\n> Adapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Valerie Caproni in *United States v. Riley*, 13 Cr. 339 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2014).\n\n# **Charts and Summaries (In Evidence)**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nNow, some of the exhibits that were admitted into evidence were in the form of charts and\n\nsummaries. For these charts and summaries that were admitted into evidence, you should consider\n\nthem as you would any other evidence.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 5-12. *See also* Fed. R. Evid. 1006.\n\n### **Charts and Summaries (Not In Evidence)**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nThere have been summary charts and exhibits that were shown to you but not admitted into evidence. For these charts and exhibits, they serve merely as summaries and analyses of testimony or documents in the case and are here to act as visual aids for you. It is the underlying evidence and the weight which you attribute to it that gives value and significance to these charts. To the extent that the charts conform to what you determine the underlying facts to be, you should accept them. To the extent that the charts differ from what you determine the underlying evidence to be, you may reject them.\n\n> Adapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Peirce*, 06 Cr. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008), and Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 5-13.\n\n# **Recordings and Transcripts, Generally**\n\nThe Government has introduced evidence in the form of audio and video recordings.\n\nWhether you approve or disapprove of the recording of these conversations may not enter\n\ninto your deliberations. I instruct you that these recordings were made in a lawful manner, that no\n\none's rights were violated, that the Government's use of this evidence is lawful, and that these\n\nrecordings were properly admitted into evidence at this trial. You must, therefore, regardless of\n\nany personal opinions, give this evidence consideration along with all the other evidence in the case\n\nin determining whether the Government has proved a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\n If you wish to hear any of the recordings again, or see any of the transcripts of those recordings, they will be made available to you during your deliberations.\n\n> Adapted from the charges of the Honorable William H. Pauley III in *United States v. Felton*, 17 Cr. 21 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2019), the Honorable J. Paul Oetken in *United States v. Matthews*, 18 Cr. 124 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. 2018), and the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan in *United States v. Awuley*, 13 Cr. 875 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. 2014).\n\n### **Foreign Language Translations**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nDuring the trial, you were given transcripts of recordings which were admitted into evidence. The transcripts were translations of foreign language recordings in [foreign language]. You were also shown translations of foreign language documents.\n\nAlthough some of you may know [foreign language], it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the English translations that are in evidence and disregard any different meaning.\n\n# **Defendant's Testimony**\n\n# [If Applicable]\n\nThe defendant in a criminal case never has any duty to testify or come forward with any\n\nevidence. This is because, as I have told you, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains\n\non the Government at all times, and the defendant is presumed innocent. That burden remains with\n\nthe Government throughout the entire trial and never shifts to the defendant. The defendant is never\n\nrequired to prove that he or she is innocent.\n\nIn this case, [Mr. Kwok / Ms. Wang / the defendants] did testify and [he/she/they]\n\n[was/were] subject to cross-examination like any other witness. You should examine and evaluate\n\n[his/her/their] testimony just as you would the testimony of any witness with an interest in the\n\noutcome of the case.\n\nAdapted from the jury instructions of the Honorable Kimba M. Wood in *United States v. Cespedes-Pena*, 14 Cr. 520 (KMW). *See* also *United States v. Solano*, 966 F.3d 184, 194-200 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing appropriate charges when a defendant testifies); *United States v. Brutus*, 505 F.3d 80, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2007) (same).\n\n### **Defendant's Right Not to Testify**\n\n### [If Applicable and Requested By Defense]\n\nThe defendants did not testify in this case. Under our Constitution, a defendant has no obligation to testify or to present any evidence, because it is the Government's burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden remains with the Government throughout the entire trial and never shifts to the defendants. A defendant is never required to prove that he or she is innocent.\n\nYou may not attach any significance to the fact that the defendants did not testify. No adverse inference against them may be drawn by you because they did not take the witness stand. You may not consider this against the defendant you are considering in any way in your deliberations in the jury room.\n\nAdapted from Sand, *Modern Federal Jury Instructions*, Instr. 5-21.\n\n# **Redaction of Evidentiary Items**\n\n[If Applicable]\n\nWe have, among the exhibits received in evidence, some exhibits that are redacted.\n\n\"Redacted\" means that part of the document or recording was taken out. You are to concern\n\nyourself only with the part of the item that has been admitted into evidence. You should not\n\nspeculate as to any reason why the other part of it has been redacted.\n\nAdapted from the jury charges given by the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin in *United States v. DiTomasso*, 14 Cr. 160 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016).\n\n# **Defense Request 1**\n\n# **Role of the Jury[54](#page-140-1)**\n\nYou are the sole judges of the facts. It is your duty to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and you resolve any conflicts that there may be in the testimony. You draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide from the facts as you have determined them. In carrying out this duty, remember that you took an oath to render judgment fairly and impartially, without prejudice or sympathy, and without any favor. You took an oath to base your verdict solely on the evidence in the case and the applicable law as I give it to you. You must also remember that all parties are here equally before you today. The fact that the government is a party and the prosecution is brought in the name of the United States does not entitle the government or its witnesses to any different consideration than the defendants. You must not be swayed by sympathy for any of the parties or what the reaction of the parties or the public to your verdict may behave a reasonable doubt as to any defendant's guilt, you should not hesitate to acquit him or her. But if you find that the government has met its burden of proving a , you should not hesitate because of sympathy or any other reason to find him or her guilty.\n\nYou must not be influenced by any feelings you might have about the nature of the crimes charged or by any feelings you might have about the race, religion, national origin, gender, age or political affiliation of the parties or anyone participating in the trial or anyone mentioned in the trial. You must not bear any prejudice against any attorney or their client because the attorney made an objection, asked for a side-bar out of your hearing or asked me for a ruling on the law. If\n\n⁵⁴ As set forth above, the Government requests that the Court give its standard instruction on the Role of the Jury.\n\nyou formed opinions reactions of any kind to the lawyers in this case, I instruct you to disregard them. The personalities and conduct of counsel are not in issue here. [55](#page-141-0)\n\n⁵⁵ Final Instructions, *United States v. Nordlicht*, 16 Cr. 640 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2021); *see also* Sand, Instr. 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-8, and 2-11.\n\n# **Defense Request 2**\n\n# **Caution-Consider Only Crimes Charged**\n\nYou are here to decide whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The defendant is not on trial for any act, conduct or offense not alleged in the indictment. Neither are you called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt of any other person or persons not on trial as a defendant in this case, except as you are otherwise instructed.[56](#page-142-1)\n\n⁵⁶ Fifth Circuit Pattern Justry Instruction No. 1-21.\n\n# **Credibility of Witnesses**\n\nIt must be clear to you by now that the Government and the defendants are asking you to draw very different conclusions about variousfactual issues in the case. Deciding these issues will involve makingjudgments aboutthe testimony of the witnesses you have listenedto and observed. In making these judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, and any other matter in evidence that may help you to decide the truth and the importance of each witness's testimony.\n\nYour decision whether or not to believe a witness may depend on how that witness impressed you. How did the witness appear? Was the witness candid, frank, and forthright; or, did the witness seem to be evasive or suspect in some way? How did the way the witness testified on direct examination compare with how the witnesstestified on cross-examination?Was the witness consistentor contradictory? Did the witness appearto know whathe or she wastalking about? Did the witnessstrike you assomeone who wastryingto reporthis or her knowledge accurately? These are examples of the kinds of common sense questions you should ask yourselves in deciding whether a witness is, or is not, truthful.\n\nHow much you choose to believe a witness may also be influenced by the witness's bias. Does the witness have a relationship with the Government or the defendant that may affect how he or she testified? Does the witness have some incentive, loyalty, or motive that might cause him or her to shade the truth? Does the witness have some bias, prejudice, or hostility that may cause the witness to give you something other than a completely accurate account of the facts he or she testified to? [57](#page-143-1)\n\n⁵⁷ Sand Instr. 7-1\n\nYou should also consider whether a witness had an opportunity to observe the facts he or she testified about. Also, you should consider whether the witness's recollection of the facts stands up in light of the other evidence in this case.\n\nIn other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size up a person just as you would in any important matter when you are trying to decide if a person is truthful, straightforward, and accurate in his or her recollection.\n\n# **Reasonable Doubt**\n\nThe defendants have pleaded not guilty to the charges in the indictment. To convict the defendants, the burden is on the prosecution to prove each defendant's guilt of each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant, for the simple reason that the law presumes a defendant to be innocent and never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence.\n\nIn other words, each defendantstarts with a clean slate and is presumed innocent of each charge until such time, if ever, that you as a jury are satisfied that the government has proven a given defendant is guilty of a given charge beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nNow the question arises: what, exactly, is a reasonable doubt? The words almost define themselves. It is a doubt a reasonable person has after considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense—the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in a matter of importance in his or her personal life. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.\n\nThe law does not require the government to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a caprice or whim. It is not a speculation or suspicion. It is always the government's burden to prove each of the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang are under no duty to present evidence, nor do you have to accept the testimony of any witness, even one who has not been contradicted or impeached, if you find that witness not to be credible. You must decide which witnesses to believe and which testimony\n\nis true. To do this, you must look at all the evidence, drawing upon your own common sense and personal experiences. If after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or lack of evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant on the count you are considering, then you must acquit the defendant on the count you are considering. On the other hand, if after fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or lack of evidence, you are satisfied of the guilt of the defendant on a count you are considering beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must convict the defendant on that count. [58](#page-146-0)\n\n⁵⁸ Adapted from Sand, Instr. 4-1 and 4-2.\n\n### **Large Sums of Money**\n\nSome of the testimony and the exhibits in this trial were connected with large sums of money – but that fact alone has nothing to do with whether or not the government has proven the elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the charges in this case may have involved large sums of money does not mean that the defendants are held to a greater standard of conduct than had the case involved smaller sums of money. The presumption of innocence applies to every defendant in every case equally without regard to the amount of money involved. [59](#page-147-1)\n\n⁵⁹ *United States v. Ghavami et al.*, No. 10-cr-1217 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012), ECF No. 278.\n\n# **Direct and Circumstantial Evidence [60](#page-148-0)**\n\nThere are two types of evidence that you may properly use in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. One type of evidence is called direct evidence. Direct evidence is a witness's testimony as to what he or she personally saw, heard, or observed. In other words, when a witness testifies about what is known of the witness's own knowledge, by virtue of his or her own senses, what he or she sees, feels, touches, or hears, that is called direct evidence.\n\nThe second type of evidence is circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that tends to prove one fact indirectly, by inference from another fact. For example, if a fact in dispute is whether it is raining at the moment, none of us in this room can testify directly to that without looking out a window. Assume, however, that we cannot see outside, and that as we are sitting here, a person walks in the courtroom wearing a raincoat that is dripping wet and carrying an umbrella dripping water. We may infer that it is raining outside. On the other hand, that inference might be incorrect because it may have stopped raining before the person entered the courtroom. In other words, the fact of rain is an inference that could be drawn from the wet raincoat and dripping umbrella, but need not be. Each juror must be guided by his or her own common sense, experience or judgment, in determining what inference, if any, is justified or reasonable under all the circumstances presented.\n\n You are to consider both direct and circumstantial evidence. The law permits you to give equal weight to both, but it is for you to decide how much weight to give to any evidence. The law requires that before any defendant may be convicted, the jury must be satisfied that the government\n\n⁶⁰ As set forth above, the Government requests that the Court give its standard instruction as to Direct versus Circumstantial Evidence.\n\nhas proved Mr. Kwok's and Ms. Wang's guilt on a particular charge beyond a reasonable doubt after review of all the evidence in the case, direct and circumstantial. If you find that the evidence gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence on a particular charge then you must find Mr. Kwok and Ms. Wang not guilty of that charge.\n\n# **Duty of Jury**\n\nYou are now the jury in this case, and I want to take a few minutes to tell you something about your duties as jurors and to give you some preliminary instructions. At the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed instructions that will control your deliberations. When you deliberate, it will be your duty to weigh and to evaluate all the evidence received in the case and, in that process, to decide the facts. It is your duty to find the facts and I will instruct you as to the law to apply to those facts.\n\nYou must decide the case solely on the evidence and the law before you and must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, sympathy, or biases, including unconscious bias.[61](#page-150-1) Unconscious or \"implicit\" biases are stereotypes, attitudes, or preferences that people may consciously reject but which may be expressed without conscious awareness, control, or intention. Like conscious bias, unconscious bias, too, can affect how we evaluate information and make decisions. All of us, no matter how hard we try, tend to look at others and weigh what they say through the lens of our own experience and background. We may stereotype others and make assumptions about them. You must do the best you can not to do that: you must try to put aside any such stereotypes, assumptions, and prejudices. You should be guided in this case by the evidence and by my instructions on the law.\n\n⁶¹ This charge is based on a jury instruction drafted by the Western District of Washington's Bench-Bar-Academic Committee. *See also United States v. Jamie Frierson*, 17 Cr. 782 (AT), Jury Charge at Tr. 31-32 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018). Implicit bias instructions are appropriate given the growing body of research that supports the proposition that \"awareness and mindfulness about one's own unconscious associations are important\" and that \"a decision-maker's ability to avoid these associations . . . will likely result in fairer decisions.” *See* Jury Instruction on Unconscious Bias, *available at* htt\n\n# **Defendant's Election to Testify[62](#page-151-1)**\n\nAs I instructed you earlier, the defendant in a criminal case never has any duty to testify or come forward with any evidence. This is because the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the government at all times, and Mr. Kwok is presumed innocent.\n\nIn this case, Mr. Kwok did testify and he was subject to cross-examination, like any other witness. The fact that he testified does not in any way remove or lessen the burden on the government to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Kwok did not have to testify and, in fact, did not have to present any evidence whatsoever.\n\nYou should examine and evaluate his testimony just as you would the testimony of any witness with an interest in the outcome of this case. You should not disregard or disbelieve his testimony simply because he is charged as the defendant.\n\nI also remind you that Mr. Kwok's decision to testify does not in any way shift the burden of proof to him. Do not ask yourself whether his testimony convinces you of his innocence. Rather, you must consider all the evidence or lack of evidence, and ask yourselves whether or not the prosecution has proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. [63](#page-151-2)\n\n⁶² The Government's requested instruction on this subject is set forth as Requested Instruction No. 65.\n\n⁶³ Adapted from Sand, Instr. 7-4; *see also* Charge in *United States v. Jose De La Cruz-Ramirez*, 97 Cr. 711 (RPP).\n\n# **Victims of the Offense [64](#page-152-1)**\n\nNeither the Chinese Communist Party nor the government of China is alleged by the\n\ngovernment to be a victim of any offense charged in the Indictment.\n\n⁶⁴ This Instruction is proposed solely by Ms. Wang.\n\n### **Conclusion**\n\nMembers of the jury, that about concludes my instructions to you. You are about to go into the jury room to begin your deliberations. If during those deliberations you want to see any of the exhibits, you may request to see them and we will either send them into the jury room or we will bring you back out to the courtroom to see them. If you want any of the testimony read back or any of the recordings played again, you may also request that. Please remember that it is not always easy to locate what you might want, so be as specific as you possibly can in requesting exhibits or portions of the testimony. If you want any further explanation of the law as I have explained it to you, you may also request that from the Court. If there is any doubt or question about the meaning of any part of this charge, you should send me a note asking for clarification or for a further explanation. Your requests for exhibits or testimony—in fact any communications with the Court—should be made to me in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to one of the marshals. In any event, do not tell me or anyone else how the jury stands on any issue until after a unanimous verdict is reached.\n\nMany of you have taken notes periodically throughout this trial. I want to emphasize to you, as you are about to begin your deliberations, that notes are simply an aid to memory. Notes that any of you may have made may not be given any greater weight or influence in determination of the case than the recollections or impressions of other jurors, whether from notes or memory, with respect to the evidence presented or what conclusions, if any, should be drawn from such evidence. Any difference between a juror's recollections and another juror's notes should be settled by asking to have the court reporter read back the transcript, for it is the court record rather than any juror's notes upon which the jury must base its determination of the facts and its verdict.\n\nYour verdict must be based solely upon the evidence developed at trial or the lack of evidence. It would be improper for you to consider, in reaching your decision as to whether the Government sustained its burden of proof, any personal feelings you may have about any defendant's race, religion, national origin, sex, or age. The parties in this case are entitled to a trial free from prejudice and our judicial system cannot work unless you reach your verdict through a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.\n\nYour function now is to weigh the evidence in this case and to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant with respect to each count of the Indictment.\n\nYou must base your verdict solely on the basis of the evidence and these instructions as to the law, and you are obliged on your oath as jurors to follow the law as I instruct you, whether you agree or disagree with the particular law in question.\n\nThe verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree to the verdict. Your verdict must be unanimous. It is your duty, as jurors, however, to consult with one another, and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can possibly do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for him or herself, but do so only after an impartial discussion and consideration of all the evidence in the case with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your own views, and change an opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence, solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors.\n\nRemember at all times, you are not partisans. You are judges—judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case.\n\nYou should by your own vote select one of you to sit as your foreperson. The foreperson will send out any notes, and when the jury has reached a verdict, he or she will notify the marshal that the jury has reached a verdict, and when you come into open court, the foreperson will be asked to state what the verdict is.\n\nWe have prepared a verdict form for you to use in recording your decisions. After you have reached a verdict, the foreperson should fill in the verdict sheet, sign and date it, and then give a note to the marshal outside your door stating that you have reached a verdict. Do not specify what the verdict is in your note. Instead, the foreperson should retain the verdict sheet, and hand it to us in open court when you are all called in. If you are divided, do not report how the vote stands.\n\nI will stress again that each of you must be in agreement with the verdict that is announced in court. Once your verdict is announced by your foreperson in open court and officially recorded, it cannot ordinarily be revoked.\n\nIn conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure that if you listen to the views of your fellow jurors and if you apply your own common sense you will reach a fair verdict here. Remember that your verdict must be rendered without fear, without favor, and without prejudice or sympathy.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nThe parties respectfully reserve the right to submit additional or modified requests at or near the close of evidence.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”、“Miles Kwok”、“Guo Wengui”、“七哥”、“校长”、“老板”，以及\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”、“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\nS2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n双方当事人联合陪审团指示请求\n\n根据《Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure（联邦刑事诉讼规则）》第30条，双方当事人谨请求法院在其对陪审团的指示中纳入以下内容。以蓝色高亮显示的拟议指示仅由政府提出，被告对此提出异议。以黄色高亮显示的拟议指示仅由被告提出，政府对此提出异议。\n\n双方当事人谨保留根据法院对被告待决的驳回起诉动议的裁定，以及审判中提出的证据和辩论，修改或补充这些指示请求的权利。\n\n目录\n请求编号 1 – 一般请求 1\n请求编号 2 – 起诉书摘要\n请求编号 3 – 多个罪名项/多名被告\n请求编号 4 – 共谋及实质性罪名项\n请求编号 5 – 罪名项五、七、九和十一——电汇欺诈：一般指示\n请求编号 6 – 罪名项五、七、九和十一——电汇欺诈：第一项构成要件——欺诈方案或手段……\n请求编号 7 – 罪名项五、七、九和十一——电汇欺诈：第二项构成要件——具有特定“欺诈意图”参与方案 17\n请求编号 8 – 罪名项五、七、九和十一——电汇欺诈：第三项构成要件——跨州电汇……22\n请求编号 9 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈——法定目的与起诉书 24\n请求编号 10 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈罪的构成要件\n请求编号 11 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一项构成要件——欺诈行为……\n请求编号 12 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一项构成要件——重要性\n请求编号 13 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一项构成要件——夸大吹捧与前瞻性陈述 32\n请求编号 14 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一项构成要件——欺诈行为——“证券”的定义 33\n请求编号 15 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一项构成要件——欺诈行为——与……有关联 35\n请求编号 16 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第二项构成要件——知情、意图与蓄意性 39\n请求编号 17 – 罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第三项构成要件——跨州商业工具 42\n请求编号 18 – 罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易\n请求编号 19 – 罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第一项构成要件……46\n请求编号 20 – 罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第二项构成要件……\n请求编号 21 – 罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第三和第四项构成要件 48\n请求编号 22 – 罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第五项构成要件 50\n请求编号 23 – 罪名项五至十二——蓄意促成\n请求编号 24 – 罪名项五至十二——帮助与教唆\n请求编号 25 – 罪名项二：共谋实施电汇欺诈及银行欺诈——概述……57\n请求编号 26 – 罪名项二：共谋实施电汇欺诈及银行欺诈——第一项构成要件——共谋的存在 59\n请求编号 27 – 罪名项二：共谋实施电汇欺诈及银行欺诈——第二项构成要件——共谋成员资格 62\n请求编号 28 – 罪名项二：共谋实施电汇欺诈及银行欺诈——共谋目的……67\n请求编号 29 – 罪名项三：洗钱共谋——概述\n请求编号 30 – 罪名项三：洗钱共谋——目的——隐匿\n请求编号 31 – 罪名项三：洗钱共谋——目的——跨境隐匿 78\n请求编号 32 – 罪名项三：洗钱共谋——目的——跨境促进……\n请求编号 33 – 罪名项四：证券欺诈及向银行作虚假陈述共谋——概述……83\n请求编号 34 – 罪名项四：证券欺诈及向银行作虚假陈述共谋——明显行为……85\n请求编号 35 – 罪名项四：证券欺诈及虚假陈述共谋——向金融机构作虚假陈述之目的 87\n请求编号 36 – 罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——概述\n请求编号 37 – 罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——构成要件\n请求编号 38 – 罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——第一项构成要件——企业\n请求编号 39 – 罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——第二项构成要件——对跨州商业的影响 94\n请求编号 40 – 罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——第三项构成要件——与企业的关联……\n请求编号 41 – 罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——第四项构成要件——从事或参与企业事务\n请求编号 42 – 罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——前提行为 104\n请求编号 43 – Pinkerton（平克顿）责任 106\n请求编号 44 – 有意回避 108\n请求编号 45 – 审判地 111\n请求编号 46 – 被害人的过失不构成抗辩 112\n请求编号 47 – 多起共谋 113\n请求编号 48 – 日期差异 114\n请求编号 49 – 不需要特定侦查技术 115\n请求编号 50 – 使用依据搜查和扣押所获证据 116\n请求编号 51 – 约定事项 117\n请求编号 52 – 执法人员及政府雇员证人 118\n请求编号 53 – 证人准备 119\n请求编号 54 – 共犯/配合证人证言 120\n请求编号 55 – 不起诉协议 122\n请求编号 56 – 获得豁免的证人 123\n请求编号 57 – 未传唤证人——双方均可促其出庭 125\n请求编号 58 – 未受审人员 126\n请求编号 59 – 限制性指示——类似行为证据 127\n请求编号 60 – 专家证人 128\n请求编号 61 – 图表与摘要（已采纳为证据） 129\n请求编号 62 – 图表与摘要（未采纳为证据） 130\n请求编号 63 – 录音与文字记录，概述 131\n请求编号 64 – 外语翻译 132\n请求编号 65 – 被告作证 133\n请求编号 66 – 被告不作证的权利 134\n请求编号 67 – 证据材料的涂盖删节 135\n辩方请求 1 – 陪审团的作用 136\n辩方请求 2 – 告诫-仅考虑被指控的罪行 138\n辩方指示 3 – 证人的可信度 139\n辩方指示 5 – 合理怀疑 141\n辩方指示 6 – 大额款项 143\n辩方指示 7 – 直接证据与间接证据 146\n辩方指示 8 – 陪审团的职责 146\n辩方指示 9 – 被告选择作证 147\n辩方指示 10 – 犯罪被害人 148\n请求编号 68 – 结语 149\n\n一般请求\n\n双方当事人谨请求法院就以下事项向陪审团作出常规指示：\n\n- a. 法院与陪审团的职能\n- b. 起诉书不是证据\n- c. 法院与律师的陈述不是证据\n- d. 举证责任与无罪推定\n- e. 合理怀疑\n- f. 以陪审团的记忆为准\n- g. 政府被视为与任何其他当事人相同\n- h. 直接证据与间接证据的定义及示例\n- i. 推论\n- j. 证人的可信度\n- k. 对结果的利害关系\n- l. 评议期间查阅物证及要求宣读证言的权利\n- m. 同情心：作为陪审员的誓言\n- n. 陪审团不得考虑刑罚\n- o. 有罪或无罪的裁决必须全体一致\n- p. 陪审团团长的职责与裁决书的呈交\n\n起诉书摘要\n\n被告 HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”、“Miles Kwok”、“Guo Wengui”、“七哥”、“校长”、“老板”（我将称其为“郭先生”），以及 YANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”、“Y”（我将称其为“王女士”），已在一份被称为起诉书的文书中受到指控。起诉书仅仅是一项指控。它不是证据。它不产生任何假定，也不允许作出被告有罪的任何推论。你们不得对针对被告作出起诉书这一事实赋予任何分量。我现在将作出的对指控的描述，仅仅是使用政府的术语对政府的主张所作的概述。\n\n起诉书中的指控涉及有关 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）和 Wang 女士（王雁平）通过一系列计划和一个被称为 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）的组织共谋诈骗受害者资金的指控。据称，郭氏企业是由一系列复杂的欺诈性和虚构性业务及投资机会组成，将数十个相互关联的实体连接在一起。起诉书中有十二项相关罪名项，指控郭先生和王女士实施了——以及共谋实施——电汇诈骗、银行诈骗、证券诈骗、向银行提供虚假陈述以及洗钱。起诉书还指控郭先生和王女士共谋利用郭氏企业实施上述犯罪——这项指控被称为 RICO（《反勒索及受贿组织法》）共谋，稍后我将向你们详细说明。起诉书共包含 12 项罪名项。王女士被控于罪名项第一至第十项以及第十二项。郭先生被控于罪名项第一至第十二项。\n\n起诉书第一项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士共谋通过模式化的敲诈勒索活动经营某企业的事务，违反了《美国法典》第 18 编第 1962 条 (d) 款（Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(d)）。正如我将更详细解释的那样，该项指控称郭和王合意通过电汇诈骗、银行诈骗、洗钱、从事源自特定非法活动的财产的货币交易以及证券诈骗等各种行为来运作一个被称为郭氏企业的组织。第一项罪名项之后的各罪名项侧重于其中的某些行为以及实施这些行为的共谋。\n\n起诉书第二项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士共谋实施电汇诈骗和银行诈骗，其手段为：(i) 合意加入一项共谋，通过经由电汇传输的虚假和欺诈性借口、陈述及承诺，从受害人处获取资金；(ii) 合意参与一项共谋，通过向金融机构作出或指使他人作出虚假陈述，获取由金融机构拥有或在其保管和控制下的资金及财产。\n\n稍后，我将解释共谋罪名（合意犯罪）与实质罪名（或实施基础犯罪本身）之间的区别。我刚才解释了起诉书第二项罪名项指控各被告人共谋实施电汇诈骗和银行诈骗。起诉书第五、第七、第九和第十一项罪名项指控各被告人犯有电汇诈骗的实质罪名。第五项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“实施了 GTV 私募，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述出售 GTV 股票并欺诈性地从受害者处获取资金。”第七项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“实施了农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program），通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述欺诈性地从受害者处获取资金。”第九项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“推广并营销了 G|CLUBS，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述欺诈性地从受害者处获取资金。”第十一项罪名项——该项仅指控郭先生而未指控王女士——指控郭先生“运营了喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange），通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述欺诈性地从受害者处获取资金，包括除其他事项外涉及受害者资金的目的与用途。”\n\n起诉书第四项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士共谋犯有证券诈骗罪，手段为合意“通过就所谓的 GTV 普通股股份及所谓的 GTV 关联公司提供重大虚假和误导性信息与陈述，欺诈性地诱导投资者参与 GTV 私募、农场贷款项目和 G|CLUBS”，并共谋向银行提供虚假陈述，手段为在银行开户申请中向银行说谎并指使他人说谎。\n\n第六、第八和第十项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士犯有证券诈骗的实质罪名。第六项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“实施了 GTV 私募，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述出售 GTV 股票并从受害者处获取资金。”第八项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“实施了农场贷款项目，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金”，包括通过“承诺此类贷款可转换为 GTV 普通股”。第十项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“推广并营销了 G|CLUBS，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金。”\n\n起诉书第三项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士共谋实施洗钱，并涉及含有第五至第十一项罪名项所指控的涉嫌电汇诈骗和证券诈骗犯罪收益的交易。\n\n起诉书第十二项罪名项指控各被告人从事了涉及源自犯罪的财产的货币交易——各被告人进行了并指示他人进行了约 $100 million 的电汇转账，该资金源自第五和第六项罪名项所指控的电汇诈骗和证券诈骗犯罪。\n\n稍后，我将就这些指控中的每一项向你们作更详细的指示。\n\n郭先生和王女士对上述每项指控均作了无罪答辩。\n\n多项罪名/多名被告人\n\n每一项罪名项指控一项不同的犯罪。你们必须单独考虑起诉书的每一项罪名项，并且你们必须就每一项罪名项分别作出裁决。每一项罪名项的案情成败取决于与该罪名项相关的证据或证据不足。你们对一项罪名项的裁决不应支配你们对任何其他罪名项的决定。在作出裁决时，请记住，刑事责任是个人的、个别的。你们的有罪或无罪裁决必须完全基于关于每名被告人的证据。针对每名被告人在每项罪名项上的案情成败，完全取决于针对该单独被告人的证据或证据不足，你们针对任何被告人在任何罪名项上的裁决，不应支配你们针对任何其他被告人或任何其他罪名项的决定。任何其他考虑因素都是不恰当的。\n\n改编自 Sand，《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions），指示 3-8。\n\n共谋与实质罪名项\n\n正如我刚才所描述的，起诉书中的某些罪名项是共谋罪名项，而其他罪名项则是所谓的实质罪名项。与指控合意实施特定犯罪的共谋指控不同，实质罪名项是基于犯罪的实际实施，或帮助和教唆他人实际实施犯罪。起诉书第一至第四项罪名项分别指控郭先生和王女士犯有共谋罪。其他罪名项则指控我们所称的实质犯罪。虽然我稍后会向你们提供关于此事的更多信息，但现在让我简要总结一下两者的区别。\n\n共谋罪名项与实质罪名项不同。一般而言，共谋指控是指控两人或两人以上合意实现某个非法目的。因此，共谋罪名项的焦点在于是否存在非法合意。除非至少有两人达成该等合意，否则不可能存在共谋。另一方面，实质罪名项是指控被告人实际实施，\n\n或帮助、教唆或促成实际实施了一项犯罪。因此，实质犯罪可由单个人实施，且无需涉及与任何人的任何合意。\n\n共谋犯罪与可能作为共谋目的的实质犯罪是完全分开且不同的犯罪。国会认为，即使共谋的目的未能实现，将共谋本身单独定为一项独立的犯罪是恰当的。这是因为集体犯罪活动对公众安全和福祉构成的威胁大于个人行为，并且增加了特定犯罪图谋成功的可能性。\n\n共谋罪的本质是违反其他法律的合意或谅解。因此，如果存在共谋，即使失败了，它仍然作为一项犯罪应受惩处。由于共谋罪的本质是犯罪的合意，因此作为共谋目的的犯罪是否曾被实际实施并不重要。换句话说，如果存在共谋并满足了某些其他法定要求，即使其目的未达成，它仍然作为犯罪应受惩处。因此，在共谋指控中，没有必要证明作为共谋目的的一项或多项犯罪确实已被实施。\n\n相比之下，实质罪名项要求证明所指控的犯罪确实已被\n\n实施，但并不要求证明存在合意。当然，如果一名被告人既参与了\n\n犯罪的共谋，随后又实际实施了该犯罪，那么该被告人可能同时\n\n犯有共谋罪和实质犯罪，正如我稍后将向你们指示的那样。\n\n我们将首先转向起诉书中的实质指控，在审理共谋指控之前\n\n先考虑这些指控会更为方便。\n\n改编自 Sand 等人，《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions），指示 19-2；Hon. Sidney H. Stein（西德尼·H·斯坦法官）在 United States v. Duncan 等案中的陪审团指示，案号 18 Cr. 289 (SHS)；Hon. John M. Walker, Jr.（小约翰·M·沃克法官）的陪审团指示，United States v. Helmsley 案，案号 88 Cr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)。另见 United States v. Labat 案，905 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990)（“由于共谋的本质是合意而非作为其目的的实质犯罪的实施，因此即使合作者未达成其目标，共谋罪仍可成立。”）。\n\n第五、第七、第九和第十一项罪名项——电汇诈骗：一般指示\n\n第五、第七、第九和第十一项罪名项指控被告人郭先生和王女士犯有实质电汇诈骗罪，第二项罪名项在相关部分指控两名被告人共谋实施电汇诈骗。这些电汇诈骗罪名项涉及两名被告人涉嫌通过提供重大虚假和误导性信息及陈述欺诈性诱导受害者寄汇资金的计划。\n\n让我首先转向实质罪名项，它们在起诉书中被列为第五至第十二项罪名项。然后我将讲解共谋罪名项。\n\n首先，第五、第七、第九和第十一项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士犯有实质电汇诈骗罪。这些电汇诈骗罪名项涉及他们涉嫌通过提供重大虚假和误导性信息及陈述欺诈性诱导个人寄汇资金的多项计划。\n\n具体而言：\n\n第五项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“实施了 GTV 私募，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述出售 GTV 股票并欺诈性地从受害者个人处获取资金，包括除其他事项外涉及受害者资金的目的与用途”关于 GTV 投资者的资金将如何使用的虚假陈述和误导性陈述。\n\n第七项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“实施了农场贷款项目，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述欺诈性地从受害者个人处获取资金，包括除其他事项外涉及受害者资金的目的与用途”关于农场贷款参与者的资金将如何使用的虚假陈述和误导性陈述。\n\n第九项罪名项指控郭先生和王女士“推广并营销了 G|CLUBS，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述欺诈性地从受害者处获取资金，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者个人处获取资金，包括除其他事项外涉及受害者资金的目的与用途”关于 G|CLUBS 会员购买会员资格所支付的资金将如何使用的虚假陈述和误导性陈述。\n\n罪名项十一（Count Eleven）指控Kwok先生（Mr. Kwok，郭文贵）“经营喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange），通过虚假陈述和不实陈述，包括关于受害者资金的目的和用途等方面的虚假陈述和不实陈述，以欺诈手段从受害者个人处获取资金”，即关于所筹集资金将如何使用的虚假陈述和不实陈述。Wang女士（Ms. Wang，王雁平）未在罪名项十一中受到指控。\n\n罪名项二（Count Two）的相关部分指控Kwok先生和Wang女士共谋实施电信欺诈（wire fraud），即“通过提供重大的虚假与误导性信息及陈述，欺诈性地诱导受害者汇款”。正如我所说，我稍后将在这些指示中解释共谋罪的各项独立构成要件。目前，我将解释罪名项五、七、九和十一中所指控的、同时也是罪名项二之目的之一的电信欺诈罪的构成要件。\n\n电信欺诈包含以下构成要件：\n\n要认定Kwok先生和Wang女士犯有电信欺诈罪，你们必须得出结论，即政府已排除合理怀疑证明了以下每一项：\n\n第一，存在通过重大的虚假或欺诈性借口、陈述或承诺，以进行欺诈或获取金钱或财产的计划或计谋（scheme or artifice）。\n\n第二，相关被告人明知且带有欺诈意图（intent to defraud）参与了该欺诈计划。\n\n第三，在推进该欺诈计划的过程中使用了一次或多次州际或涉外电信通信（wire communications）。\n\n我现在将更详细地描述其中的每一项。\n\n改编自Sand所著《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions）第44-3条指示。\n罪名项五、七、九和十一——电信欺诈：第一构成要件——\n欺诈计划或计谋\n\n对于这些电信欺诈罪名项，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第一构成要件是，存在通过虚假或欺诈性借口、陈述或承诺，欺诈受害者个人的金钱或财产的计划或计谋。\n\n关于第一构成要件，“计划或计谋”是为实现某一目的即欺诈目的而制定的方案。欺诈计划是指通过足以合理欺骗普通谨慎程度人士的不实陈述或虚假承诺，获取他人金钱或财产的方案、策略或行动过程。“欺诈”（Fraud）是一个通用术语。该术语包括一个人企图通过虚假陈述、虚假暗示、虚假借口或隐瞒真相，以剥夺他人金钱或财产为目的，谋求获取超越他人的某种不当优势的一切可能手段。因此，欺诈计划仅仅是指通过花招、欺瞒、欺骗或骗局来剥夺他人金钱或财产的方案。\n\n一项陈述或表示如果在作出时不属实，且当时作出该陈述或致使作出该陈述的人明知其不属实，则该陈述或表示即为虚假。如果一项陈述包含半真半假之辞、隐瞒重要事实，或者其含糊不清或不完整以致使所言或所陈述的内容具有误导性或欺骗性，该陈述也可能属于虚假。陈述、表示、承诺或借口如果是在作出陈述时不实作出且带有欺骗意图，则属于欺诈性。发表并非真诚持有的意见，也可能构成法令项下的虚假或\n\n欺诈性陈述。欺骗不必仅仅基于口头或书面言词。言词的排列、使用言词的环境或被告人的行为均可传达出虚假和欺骗性的表象。如果存在欺骗，其实现的方式并不重要。欺诈计划无需通过直接证据予以证明，而是可以通过本案中的所有情况和事实加以确立。\n\n然而，我提醒你们，欺诈所要求的不仅仅是证明作出了承诺而后未予履行的证据。未遵守承诺或未遵守合同或其他文件中的条款，其本身并不构成欺诈。相反，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明，你们正在审议的被告人在作出该陈述或承诺时，根本无意履行它。被告人事后决定不遵守承诺、合同或文件的条款，即使是故意的，也不能作为定罪的依据。\n\n该虚假或欺诈性陈述、表示、承诺或借口必须与重大事实或重大事项（material fact or matter）相关。重大事实是指理性谨慎的人在依赖该陈述或表示作出决定时，按常理预期会予以关心的事实。这意味着，如果你们认定某项特定陈述或表示属于虚假，你们必须确定该陈述或表示是否是理性人在\n\n注1：本页所有修改均基于Sand第44-4条指示。\n\n注2：本段中的修改与Sand指示一致并基于该指示。\n\n注3：参见U.S. ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 2016)（“本法院一贯适用此原则：违约不构成邮政欺诈。只有当承诺人根本无意履行合同时，未能履行合同义务才构成欺诈。”（引自United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1261 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1994)））。\n\n作出其决定时可能会认为重要的内容。同样的原则也适用于欺诈性的半真半假之辞或隐瞒，即未能披露导致所言内容产生蓄意误导的事实。\n\n此外，不实陈述或虚假承诺必须具有重大性（material）。这意味着，如果你们认定某项特定陈述或承诺在作出时系明知虚假，你们随后必须通过询问该不实陈述或虚假承诺是否有能力影响被陈述对象的决定，来单独确定其是否具有重大性。重大事实是指理性谨慎的人在依赖该陈述或表示作出决定时，按常理预期会予以关心的事实。\n\n政府没有必要证明虚假或欺诈性陈述或表示是在受害者决定交出金钱或财产之前作出的。相反，如果在获得金钱或财产之后，你们正在审议的被告人策划或参与了一项欺诈计划，通过就重大事实作出后续的虚假或欺诈性陈述以保留该金钱或财产，从而剥夺指控受害者的该金钱或财产，这便足以确立欺诈计划的存在。\n\n政府没有必要证明欺诈计划实际取得了成功、任何特定的人实际信赖了某项陈述或表示，或者任何受害者因任何虚假或欺诈性陈述、承诺或借口而实际遭受了损害。你们也无需认定被告人从欺诈中获利或获得了任何利益。你们必须专注于是否存在这样一项计划，而不是该计划的后果，\n\n注4：参见Neder案第16页。\n\n尽管关于实现该计划目标的证据可能成为证明该计划本身存在的有力证据。在确定是否存在欺诈计划时，受害者如果更仔细地观察或更广泛地探究是否本可能发现欺诈，是无关紧要的。受害者未能发现欺诈计划的疏忽或轻信，不能成为电信欺诈罪的抗辩理由。\n\n欺诈计划无需通过直接证据予以证明，而是可以通过本案中的所有情况和事实加以确立。\n\n最后，我指示你们，如果你们认定政府已排除合理怀疑证明被告人作出了重大不实陈述或重大虚假承诺，你们全体必须就涉案的具体不实陈述或虚假承诺达成一致意见。\n\n为了确立欺诈计划，除了证明陈述具有虚假性或欺诈性且与重大事实相关之外，政府还必须排除合理怀疑证明，你们正在审议的被告人图谋剥夺他人的金钱或财产。仅仅某些其他人或公司本可能获取金钱或财产是不够的。\n\n然而，政府没有必要证明被告人实际从该计划中获得了任何利益，或者预期的个人实际遭受了任何损失。但与此同时，\n\n注5：改编自Robert Chatigny法官在United States v. Shapiro, No. 15-CR-00155 (RNC) (D. Conn. 2017年6月1日) (Dkt. 462) 案中的最终陪审团指示（审判记录第2645:18-24页）。\n\n要证明电信欺诈指控中的欺诈计划构成要件，被告人必须\n\n“预见到受害者会因其欺骗而遭受实际伤害”。\n\n如果你们认定政府已承担了证明如指控所述的欺诈计划存在的举证责任，即证明相关被告人作出了具有重大性的虚假陈述或承诺，你们接下来应当考虑第二构成要件。\n\n改编自Lewis A. Kaplan法官在United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (2023年11月2日) 案、Edgardo Ramos法官在United States v. Milton, No. 21 Cr. 478 (2022年10月14日) 案以及Jesse M. Furman法官在United States v. Avenatti, No. 19 Cr. 374 (2022年2月1日) 案中的指示；并参见Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999)（“一般而言，如果一项虚假陈述具有影响被陈述之决策机构决定的自然倾向，或有能力影响该决定，则该陈述即为重大陈述。”（内部引号、括号和引用省略））；同上，第24-25页（“合理信赖”和“损害”的普通法要求……在联邦欺诈法规中显然没有立足之地”）。\n\n关于保留金钱或财产的拟议指示亦改编自Denis R. Hurley法官在United States v. Schneider, 02 Cr. 128, 2002 WL 34348617 (2002年10月23日) 案中的指示。另见United States v. Gole, 158 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1998)（被告人“为了保留超额领取的养老金而蓄意虚报收入”的欺诈计划）。\n\n注6：本页新增内容基于Sand第44-4条以及Percoco v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 1130 (2023)；Ciminelli v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 1121 (2023)。删除内容基于重复性及Countrywide案。\n罪名项五、七、九和十一——电信欺诈：第二构成要件——带有特定“欺诈意图”参与该计划\n\n政府对电信欺诈罪名项必须排除合理怀疑证明的第二构成要件是，被告人明知、故意且带着特定的欺诈意图策划或参与了该欺诈计划。\n\n“策划”（devised）和“参与”（participated）是你们熟悉的词语，因此，我不需要花很多时间为你们定义它们。\n\n“策划”一项欺诈计划就是捏造或规划该计划。\n\n“参与”一项欺诈计划意味着使自己与该计划联系在一起，并抱有使其成功的看法和意图。虽然单纯的旁观者不是欺诈计划的参与者，但参与者不必是亲自且显见地执行欺诈计划的人。\n\n“明知”（knowingly）行事意味着出于自愿且故意行事，而不是由于错误或疏忽。\n\n“故意”（willfully）行事意味着明知且有意行事，意图做出法律所禁止的事情；也就是说，怀有不服从或漠视法律的不良目的。注7\n\n具「特定欺诈意图」而行事，要求被告在从事或参与该欺诈方案时，在一定程度上认识到其具有欺诈或欺骗性质，并且怀有卷入该欺诈方案、协助其得逞并以从一名或多名受害人处获取金钱或财产为目的之意图。政府无需证明\n\n7 参见 Sand 44-5。\n\n任何预定受害人实际遭受了损害，只需证明被告意图通过获取金钱或财产来损害受害人即可。实际财务损害包括剥夺某人对资产使用的现实且直接的控制权。因此，即使被告相信通过欺诈手段获得的资金有朝一日会被偿还，并因此认为最终不会对资金所有者造成损害，其最终偿还的意图也不能构成抗辩事由。此外，政府无需证明被告仅仅出于不当考量而受到驱使。如果您认定被告具有不当获取他人资金的意图，即便被告的行为同时还存在其他正当或中立的意图原因，政府即已就该要件完成了举证责任。即便被告同时也受到其他合法目的的驱使，其仍可能具备法定的欺诈意图。\n\n参与某项方案意味着通过采取某些积极步骤来投身于其中以协助其得逞。仅仅与参与方案的人交往并不构成参与。被告并不必然要是该欺诈方案的发起人。只要您认定存在一项欺诈方案（即使由他人发起），并且被告在知悉该方案存在的情况下，故意参与其中且具有欺诈意图，即已足够。也不要求被告参与了该方案的所有运作或知晓其所有运作。被告的责任不受其参与程度的制约。被告并不必然要从一开始就参与所指控的方案。一个人如果在较后阶段加入，知晓该方案的大致运作（尽管不一定知晓其全部细节），并且故意采取行动推进其目标的实现，即成为该方案的参与者，并在法律上对过去为推进该犯罪目的而可能实施的一切行为以及随后实施的一切行为承担责任。即使被告\n\n参与该方案的程度低于他人，只要被告在知悉其总体范围和目的的情况下故意参与该欺诈方案并具备特定欺诈意图，其同样构成有罪。8\n\n具特定「欺诈意图」而行事，意味着具欺骗的特定意图而行事，其目的是为了给他人造成某些财务或财产损失。9 换言之，要认定特定「欺诈意图」，您必须认定相关被告在作出虚假陈述或虚假承诺时，具有欺骗或窃取他人钱财的意图。10\n\n因为电汇欺诈罪的一项实质要件是「欺诈意图」，所以被告一方的善意构成对电汇欺诈指控的完全抗辩。对被告作出或致使作出的陈述之真实性的真诚确信构成完全抗辩，无论这些陈述事后被证明是多么不准确。什么是善意？善意是指相关被告在涉案陈述作出之时，对其本人作出或致使作出的陈述或承诺的真实性持有真诚确信，即使这些陈述或承诺事后被证明是不准确或虚假的。同样，如果被告善意地认为自己有权获取该金钱或财产，即便该确信属于认识错误，您也必须认定\n\n8 被告指出该指示「与间接证据对比直接证据的指示相重叠」。\n\n9 Sand 44-5（「欺诈意图」是指故意并具有欺骗的特定意图而行事，其目的是为了给他人造成某些财务或财产损失）；Hon. William Kuntz（威廉·昆茨法官）的陪审团指示，U.S. v. Boustani（美国诉布斯塔尼案），18 Cr. 681 (EDNY（纽约东区） 2020)，ECF No. 384 at 4443。10 改编自 Hon. Robert Chatigny（罗伯特·夏蒂尼法官）在 United States v. Shapiro（美国诉沙皮罗案），No. 15-CR-00155 (RNC) (D. Conn.（康涅狄格区） June 1, 2017) (Dkt. 462) 庭审记录 at 2648:24-2649:14 中的最终陪审团指示。\n\n其无罪，即使他人的利益因被告的行为而受损。我提醒各位，被告没有确立善意的举证责任。举证责任由政府承担，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明「欺诈意图」以及由此导致的缺乏善意。\n\n然而，在审酌被告是否出于善意行事时，对各位的指示是：被告一方即使存在最终一切都会迎刃而解的真诚确信，也并不必然意味着被告是出于善意行事。如果被告故意且蓄意参与该方案，具有欺骗意图并以剥夺受害个人金钱或财产为目的（即使仅在一段时期内），那么被告一方对于客户或贷款人最终将获益的任何真诚确信，都不能免除被告作出虚假陈述的责任。\n\n关于知情和欺诈意图的直接证据几乎从来无法获得。在极少数案件中才能证明某人曾书面记录或陈述自己在过去的某个特定时间出于欺诈意图实施了某种行为。法律不要求此类直接证据。相反，关于知情和意图的主观最终事实，可以通过基于一个人的言语、其操行、其行为以及证据所揭示的所有周围环境，并结合可从中得出的合理或逻辑推论的间接证据来确立。各位也可以推断（但并非必须推断）人们意图追求其行为的自然和可能结果。相应地，当一个方案的必然结果是损害他人时，欺诈意图可从方案本身推定。正如我早前向各位指示的那样，间接证据如果被采信，其证明价值并不低于直接证据。\n\n关于该要件作个总结，如果您认定 Mr. Kwok（郭先生）或 Ms. Wang（王女士）并非故意且蓄意参与该方案，或者他们中任何一人在作出涉案虚假陈述或虚假承诺时缺乏法定的「欺诈意图」，那么您应当认定相关被告无罪。另一方面，如果您认定政府不仅排除合理怀疑证明了第一项要件，即欺诈方案的存在，而且还证明了这第二项要件，即被告是知情参与者且具有特定「欺诈意图」，那么您应当进而审阅第三项要件，关于该要件我接下来将向各位进行指示。11\n\n改编自 Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan（刘易斯·A·卡普兰法官）在 United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried（美国诉塞缪尔·班克曼-弗里德案），No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023) 中的指示、Honorable Edgardo Ramos（埃德加多·拉莫斯法官）在 United States v. Milton（美国诉米尔顿案），No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022) 中的指示，以及 Honorable Jesse M. Furman（杰西·M·弗曼法官）在 United States v. Avenatti（美国诉阿弗纳蒂案），No. 19 Cr. 374 (Feb. 1, 2022) 中的指示；亦参见 United States v. Jabar（美国诉贾巴尔案），19 F.4th 66, 77 (2d Cir. 2021)（「不要求对受害人造成实际损害的证明……」）；United States v. Calderon（美国诉卡尔德隆案），944 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2019)（「『无最终损害』指示告知陪审团，在被告预料到会对受害人造成某种直接损失的情况下，被告相信（无论正确与否）自己最终能够解决问题从而使受害人免受损失的事实，不能成为被告欺诈行为所预料导致的现实且直接损失的免责理由。」）；United States v. Technodyne LLC（美国诉泰克诺达因有限责任公司案），753 F.3d 368, 385 (2d Cir. 2013)（「法律公认人类行为可能有多种动机，这是常识；因此，特定意图不必然是行为人的唯一甚至是主要目的。」）12\n\n11 Sand 44-5\n\n12 被告指出「Technodyne 案并不适用，因为该案涉及逃犯权利剥夺原则，而非电汇欺诈法规。」\n\n罪名项五、七、九及十一——电汇欺诈：第三项要件——跨州电汇\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第三项亦即最后一项要件是：使用了一处或多处跨州或涉外电汇以推进欺诈方案，并且对于各位正在审议的被告而言，跨州电汇的使用是可以预见的。「跨州电汇」是指在两个或多个州之间传输的电汇。「涉外」电汇是指在美国与外国之间传输的电汇。电汇的示例包括电话通话和短信、互联网通信、电视商业广告以及银行账户之间的资金电汇。\n\n电汇通信本身并不必然具有欺诈性。事实上，只要它是为了推进欺诈方案而进行的，它可能完全是无辜合法的。要构成推进方案，该电汇通信必须以某种方式推进或协助实施该欺诈方案。电汇通信还可以包括在获取受害个人的资金后进行的通信，只要该通信旨在使该人产生虚假的安全感、推迟其向当局投诉，或保住从该方案中获得的款项。\n\n不要求被告直接或亲自卷入电汇通信，只要在执行指控被告参与的涉案欺诈方案过程中该电汇是合理可预见的即可。就此而言，如果证据足以认定被告促使了他人使用电汇，即足以确立该项犯罪要件。即使电汇通信是由被欺诈人或某个其他无辜第三方实施的，电汇通信要件亦可得以满足。当\n\n某人在明知在通常业务过程中将随之发生电汇使用、或者在合理可预见将发生此类电汇使用（即使并非实际意图追求）的情况下实施某一行为时，其即促成了电汇的使用。因此，并不要求被告明确授权他人进行电汇通信。\n\n最后，如果您认定电汇通信是合理可预见的，且起诉书中指控的跨州或涉外电汇通信确实发生了，那么即使对于电汇通信会跨越州界或在美国与外国之间传输并非可预见，该要件亦告满足。\n\n以上总结了政府就电汇欺诈指控所必须排除合理怀疑证明的事项。现在，我将讲解证券欺诈指控。\n\n改编自 Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan（刘易斯·A·卡普兰法官）在 United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried（美国诉塞缪尔·班克曼-弗里德案），No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023) 中的指示、Honorable Edgardo Ramos（埃德加多·拉莫斯法官）在 United States v. Milton（美国诉米尔顿案），No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022) 中的指示、Honorable Jesse M. Furman（杰西·M·弗曼法官）在 United States v. Avenatti（美国诉阿弗纳蒂案），No. 19 Cr. 374 (Feb. 1, 2022) 中的指示，以及 Honorable John G. Koeltl（约翰·G·科尔特尔法官）在 United States v. Dunseath（美国诉邓斯思案），No. 98 Cr. 493 (Apr. 14, 1999) 中的指示；亦参见 Sand，《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》（现代联邦陪审团指示），Instr. 44-5；United States v. Jergensen（美国诉耶根森案），797 F. App'x 4, 6 (2d Cir. 2019)。\n\n罪名项六、八及十——证券欺诈——法定目的与起诉书\n\n起诉书第 6、第 8 和第 10 项罪名指控两名被告均犯有证券欺诈罪，违反了《Securities Exchange Act（证券交易法）》第 10(b) 条及相关的 Rule 10b-5（第 10b-5 号规则）。起诉书第 4 项罪名指控两名被告共谋犯下证券欺诈罪，违反了上述两项规定以及 United States Code（《美国法典》）第 18 编第 371 条关于联邦共谋罪的通用法规。在我向你们概述起诉书中的证券欺诈指控之前，我将向你们介绍有关证券欺诈法立法目的的一些背景。\n\n《证券交易法》第 10(b) 条在相关部分规定，“任何人……使用或利用任何证券……违反 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）可能制定的规章制度，采用任何操纵性或欺骗性手段或计策”，均属“违法”。15 U.S.C. § 78j。用于实施该条款的第 10b-5 号规则禁止在涉及购买或出售任何证券时，使用“任何欺诈手段、方案或诡计”，或采取“产生……欺诈或欺骗效果”的任何其他“行为、做法或业务过程”。17 CFR § 240.10b-5。\n\n1934 年《证券交易法》是 Congress（国会）通过的两部法律中的第二部，旨在提供一项全面的方案，以在公开配售的证券买卖中保护投资大众。国会通过该法案的目标之一是在 1929 年股市崩盘后确保诚实守信的证券市场，从而提振投资者信心。总体而言，国会试图以充分披露的理念取代“买者自负”的理念，从而在证券行业建立高标准的商业道德。更具体而言，1934 年法案旨在通过规范证券交易所和场外交易市场的交易，保护投资者免受股票价格操纵的影响，并对股票在全国性证券交易所上市的公司施加定期报告要求。\n\n起诉书第 6、第 8 和第 10 项罪名指控两名被告犯有实质性证券欺诈罪，第 4 项罪名指控两名被告共谋犯下证券欺诈罪。这些证券欺诈罪名涉及两名被告被指控的一项方案，即“通过提供与所谓的 GTV 普通股股票及所谓的 GTV 关联公司有关的重大虚假和误导性信息与陈述，以欺诈手段诱导投资者参与 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募）、Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目）以及 G|CLUBS”。\n\n具体而言：\n\n第 6 项罪名指控 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）和 Wang 女士（王雁平）“实施了 GTV 私募以出售 GTV 股票，并通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金，其中包括（除其他事项外）关于受害者资金的目的和用途的”关于 GTV 投资者的资金将如何被使用的虚假陈述和误导性陈述。\n\n第 8 项罪名指控郭先生和王女士“实施了农场贷款项目，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金，其中包括（除其他事项外）关于受害者资金的目的和用途的”关于农场贷款参与者的资金将如何被使用的虚假陈述和误导性陈述，并包括通过（除其他事项外）“承诺此类贷款可转换为 GTV 普通股股票”。\n\n第 10 项罪名指控郭先生和王女士“宣传和营销 G|CLUBS，通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金，其中包括（除其他事项外）关于受害者资金的目的和用途的”关于 G|CLUBS 会员的资金将如何被使用的虚假陈述和误导性陈述，并包括通过（除其他事项外）“承诺他们购买 G|CLUBS 会员资格将使其有权获得郭氏关联实体（如 GTV 和 G|Fashion）的股票”。\n\n并且第 4 项罪名在相关部分指控，两名被告共谋犯下证券欺诈罪，其方式是约定“通过提供与所谓的 GTV 普通股股票及所谓的 GTV 关联公司有关的重大虚假和误导性信息与陈述，以欺诈手段诱导投资者参与 GTV 私募、农场贷款项目以及 G|CLUBS”。\n\n郭先生和王女士否认这些指控，并对证券欺诈指控作了无罪答辩。\n\n改编自 Ronnie Abrams 法官在 United States v. Galanis et al.（美国诉加拉尼斯等案），案号 No. 16 Cr. 371 (RA)（2018年6月27日）中的陪审团指示；另见 3 Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal P 57.03 (2023)；United States v. O'Hagan，521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)；Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder，425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)；15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)；另见 S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934)。\n第 6、第 8 和第 10 项罪名——证券欺诈罪的构成要件\n\n第 6、第 8 和第 10 项罪名指控违反《证券交易法》第 10(b) 条的证券欺诈行为。正如我已经解释过的，第 4 项罪名指控共谋违反这一项证券欺诈法律。我稍后将解释其共谋指控的构成要件，但我在此提及它是由于证券欺诈的构成要件也与证券欺诈共谋罪名相关。\n\n为证明这些指控，政府必须在排除合理怀疑的前提下，分别就涉及 GTV、农场贷款项目和 G|CLUBS 的三项证券欺诈罪名中的每一项，证明以下全部三项要件：\n\n第一，在涉及购买或出售 GTV、G|Fashion 的股份或某种其他所谓证券时，你们正在审议的该名被告实施了以下行为中的任何一项或多项：\n\n(1) 采用了欺诈手段、方案或诡计，或者\n\n(2) 作出了关于重大事实的不实陈述，或者遗漏了导致所说内容在当时情况下具有误导性的重大事实，或者\n\n(3) 从事了对买方或卖方产生或将产生欺诈或欺骗效果的行为、做法或业务过程；\n\n第二，被告系明知、故意且怀有欺诈意图行事；以及\n\n第三，为推进该欺诈行为，被告在州际贸易中使用了或促使使用了任何运输或通信手段或工具，或使用了邮件，或使用了任何全国性证券交易所的任何设施。\n\n我现在将更详细地讨论这些要件中的每一项。\n\n改编自 Lewis A. Kaplan 法官在 United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried（美国诉塞缪尔·班克曼-弗里德案），案号 No. 22 Cr. 673（2023年11月2日）以及 Edgardo Ramos 法官在 United States v. Milton（美国诉米尔顿案），案号 No. 21 Cr. 478（2022年10月14日）中的陪审团指示；Sand，《现代联邦陪审团指示》，指示 57-20；另见 United States v. Litvak，808 F.3d 160, 178 (2d Cir. 2015)（指出证券欺诈的主观恶性为“欺骗、操纵或欺诈的意图”，并不要求具有造成伤害的意图）；United States v. Gleason，616 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1979)。\n第 6、第 8 和第 10 项罪名——证券欺诈：第一项要件——欺诈行为\n\n对于证券欺诈罪名，政府必须在排除合理怀疑的前提下证明的第一项要件是：在涉及购买或出售证券时，你们正在审议的该名被告实施了以下行为中的任何一项或多项：\n\n(1) 采用了欺诈手段、方案或诡计，或者\n\n(2) 作出了关于重大事实的不实陈述，或者遗漏了导致所说内容在当时情况下具有误导性的重大事实，或者\n\n(3) 从事了对买方或卖方产生或将产生欺诈或欺骗效果的行为、做法或业务过程。\n\n政府没有必要证明该方案包含了所有这三种类型的违法行为。任何一种均足以满足本罪的该要件。然而，如果存在违法行为，你们必须就发生了哪种类型的违法行为达成一致意见。\n\n我已经就何为欺诈手段、方案或诡计，以及何为虚假和误导性陈述向你们作出了指示，你们在此应当适用相同的指示。\n\n此外，关于这些术语在证券欺诈语境下的含义，你们还应当注意其他几项考量因素。\n\n根据证券法，欺诈方案或诡计要求政府证明被告从事了超出使用重大不实陈述和重大遗漏范围的欺诈行为。重大不实陈述和遗漏可以作为欺诈方案的一部分，但仅凭其本身，不足以确立欺诈手段、方案或诡计。要认定被告作出了重大事实的不实陈述，你们必须认定该被告亲自向投资者作出了重大虚假陈述，或者是对虚假陈述拥有最终决定权的人，包括其内容以及如何传达该陈述。政府仅证明被告可能参与了——哪怕是深度参与了——可能包含重大虚假陈述的文件的准备工作，这是不够的。换言之，仅有参与并不足以使其成为陈述的“作出者”。\n\n与欺诈方案或诡计一样，产生欺诈效果的行为、做法或业务过程要求的不仅仅是重大不实陈述或遗漏。此外，你们必须认定，你们正在审议的该名被告在涉及购买或出售证券时采取了一项或多项额外步骤，以在发行中欺骗或欺诈投资者。 [13](#page-34-0)\n\n政府没有必要证明该方案包含了所有这三种类型的违法行为。任何一种均足以满足本罪的该要件。然而，如果存在违法行为，你们必须就发生了哪种类型的违法行为达成一致意见。\n\n改编自 Lewis A. Kaplan 法官在 United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried，案号 No. 22 Cr. 673（2023年11月2日）；Edgardo Ramos 法官在 United States v. Milton，案号 No. 21 Cr. 478（2022年10月14日）；Ronnie Abrams 法官在 United States v. Galantis et al.，案号 No. 16 Cr. 371 (RA)（2018年6月27日）；以及 Paul G. Gardephe 法官在 United States v. Tuzman，案号 No. 15 Cr. 536（2017年12月22日）中的陪审团指示；另见 Sand，《现代联邦陪审团指示》，指示 57-21。\n\n13 这些段落中的补充内容基于 Katherine B. Forrest 法官在 SEC v. Tourre，2013 WL 5823080 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 中的陪审团指示以及 SEC v. Rio Tinto plc，41 F.4th 47, 54 (2d Cir. 2022)。\n第 6、第 8 和第 10 项罪名——证券欺诈：第一项要件——重大性\n\n除证明存在不实陈述外，政府还必须在排除合理怀疑的前提下证明该不实陈述具有重大性。我已经在电信欺诈指示中就何为“重大”不实陈述或承诺向你们作出了指示。在证券欺诈语境下对重大性的定义与电信欺诈中的定义相近，但并不完全相同。就证券欺诈而言，重大不实陈述是指理性投资者在作出投资决定时，在其权衡考量中本会具有实际重要意义的陈述。不实陈述并不仅仅因为可能对投资者而言是“重要的”，就构成重大不实陈述。 [14](#page-35-1) 但是，不实陈述无需决定任何特定结果即可构成重大陈述。 [15](#page-35-2) 此外，我向你们指示，你们不得从事后诸葛的角度来评估重大性。[16](#page-35-3) 另外，表达公司乐观情绪的言论和夸大宣传不具有重大性。[17](#page-35-4)\n\n14 City of Pontiac Policemen's & Firemen's Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 185 (2d Cir. 2014)（“尽管重要性无疑是重大性的必要要素，但重要性与重大性并非同义词。”）；Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000)（“仅主张投资者可能认为该虚假陈述或遗漏重要是不充分的。”）\n\n15 Petrossi 陪审团指示摘录，第 1131:20-21 页。\n\n16 Shapiro，第 2648:24-2649:14 页。\n\n17 In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 245 (2d Cir. 2016)。\n罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一要素——吹嘘与前瞻性陈述\n\n在考虑政府指控为虚假或误导性的任何特定陈述时，你们必须区分事实陈述与前瞻性陈述。\n\n预测、推测及其他前瞻性陈述，即使最终被证明不正确，通常也不是事实陈述，而是关于未来可能发生或可能不发生的情况的预测。\n\n同样，显而易见的愿望性陈述，以及模糊的乐观陈述或一般的吹嘘，均不具有重大性，除非该等陈述提供了对过去和现在的具体描述，从而明确造成了对某种事态的误导性印象，而该事态与实际存在的事态存在重大差异。”[18]\n\n然而，预测、推测及其他前瞻性陈述如果在作出该前瞻性陈述之时满足以下条件，则可被视为具有重大性：(1) 被告当时实际上并不相信该等陈述，(2) 被告相信该等陈述缺乏合理依据，或 (3) 被告当时知晓足以严重削弱陈述准确性的未披露事实。\n\n18 In re Alphabet, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1 F.4th 687, 700 (9th Cir. 2021)；比较 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 315 (2d Cir. 2000)（认定在被告明知相反事实的情况下告知投资者库存状况“良好”或“处于控制之中”的陈述不属于吹嘘）。\n罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一要素——欺诈行为——“证券”的定义\n\n为了确立证券欺诈的第一要素，政府还必须排除合理怀疑证明另外两个组成部分。即涉案的指控交易——此处涉及 GTV、农场贷款（Farm Loans）以及 GCLUBS——是“与”“证券”的购买或出售“相关”的交易。在本指示中，我将向你们定义何为“证券”、购买和出售，在下一项指示中，我将阐述单独的“与……相关”之要求。\n\n某项特定交易是否为证券交易，取决于所购买或出售的标的是否为投资合同。投资合同是指具有三个特征的合同或交易，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明所有这三个特征：(1) 投资者投入资金，(2) 投入到一个共同事业中，(3) 且该投资者期望纯粹通过发起人或非该投资者的第三方的努力来获取利润。[19]\n\n因此，为了确定政府是否已证明某项交易构成证券交易，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明，理性购买者参与该交易的动机纯粹是为了获取利润或财务回报。[20] 通常，利润来自于通过对初始投资的开发而实现的资本增值，\n\n19 改编自 Howey 案。\n\n20 改编自 SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F. 3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1996)；Howey, 328 U.S. at 300。\n\n或是来自于分享联营企业所赚取的收益。相比之下，当购买的动机是出于使用或消费所购买物品的愿望（即使只是部分出于此愿望）时，就本罪名项而言，其不属于证券。[21]\n\n此外，法律推定称为本票（note）的票据属于证券。但是，该推定可以被反驳，因为并非所有的本票都是证券。就联邦法而言，一份本票是否符合证券的资格取决于其发行的背景。证券法仅适用于属于投资一部分或与投资相关而发行的本票或债务票据。消费性本票——例如你们在买车申请贷款时所签署的本票——或在持续经营的业务过程中向为你提供开展业务所需货物的供货人发行的本票——这些都不是证券。只有与投资相关发行的本票才是证券。[22]\n\n“出售”是指以有价对价转让或处分证券、基于证券的掉期协议，或证券或基于证券的掉期协议中的权益的每一种合同。“购买”是指买入。[23]\n\n21 改编自 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53。\n\n22 改编自 Colleen McMahon（科琳·麦克马洪）法官在 United States v. Carton, 17 Cr. 680 (CM), 庭审记录 943-44 中的陪审团指示；另见 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)。\n\n23 参见 Katherine B. Forrest（凯瑟琳·B·福雷斯特）法官在 SEC v. Tourre 中的陪审团指示。\n罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第一要素——欺诈行为——与……相关\n\n为了确立政府已排除合理怀疑证明证券欺诈的第一要素，你们必须认定你们正在审理的被告同意参与了“与”证券的购买或出售“相关”的欺诈行为。“证券”一词包括任何股票、任何股票的期权或特权，以及购买任何股票的任何权利。\n\n欺诈行为须“与”证券购买或出售“相关”的要求，只要在指控的欺诈行为与声称的证券的出售或购买之间存在某种关联或关系即可得到满足。并不要求必须出售或交付了任何实际的证券，只要提供了声称的证券作为促成交易的诱因即可。\n\n如果你们认定你们正在审理的被告参与或同意参与了“与”声称证券的“购买或出售”“相关”的欺诈行为，你们无需认定该被告实际参与了声称证券的任何具体购买或出售。你们没有必要认定被告是或将会是声称证券的实际出卖人。只要重大事实的虚假陈述或遗漏涉及证券的购买或出售即为充分。\n\n至于第二项额外要求——即指控的欺诈行为是“与”证券的购买或出售“相关”——你们必须排除合理怀疑认定指控的欺诈行为与证券的出售或购买相吻合。为了确立特定的必要关联，政府必须同时证明欺诈行为与特定的证券出售相吻合，并且欺诈行为对于投资者购买特定证券的决定具有重大性。因此，不能仅仅因为指控的欺诈碰巧涉及证券就满足该要素；它需要更多的关联。[24] 如果指控的欺诈行为与证券的购买或出售是各自独立的事件，或者如果指控的欺诈行为并未对某人购买或出售特定证券的决定产生重大影响，则“与……相关”的要求未得到满足。[25]\n\n此外，为了认定已确立“与……相关”的要求，你们必须排除合理怀疑认定，被告的虚假陈述或其他欺诈行为关涉交易相对方所出售证券的价值、性质或投资特征。[26] 这要求在指控的行为与特定证券出售之间存在特定类型的联系或关联。如果被告被指控的虚假陈述并未关涉证券的价值、性质或投资特征，则该要素未得到满足。[27] 此外，在证券出售之后发生的指控虚假陈述不可能与该等购买或出售“相吻合”，[28] 因此不可能对该等出售具有重大性。\n\n24 参见 Alex. Brown & Sons Inc. v. Marine Midland Banks, Inc., No. 96-cv-2549, 1997 WL 97837, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997)（驳回证券清算经纪商针对银行提起的索赔，其中经纪商指控银行作出了有资金可用于购买涉案证券的虚假陈述）；另见 Chem. Bank, 726 F.2d at 943（在被指控发生欺诈的交易中以证券作为质押担保的情况下驳回索赔）。相反，政府必须明确证明指控的欺诈与证券的购买、出售或要约相关。同上；另见 Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co. v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc., 770 F. Supp. 176, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)（“要求欺诈计划与证券购买或出售之间的关系不仅是‘微不足道’的关系”）。\n\n25 参见 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006)（裁定通过证明指控的欺诈“与证券交易相吻合”，即可满足与……相关之要求）；Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 387 (2014)（重申 Dabit 案原则，并增加了一项要求，即虚假陈述必须“对一个或多个人……买入或卖出的决定具有重大性”，或必须“对某人购买或出售的决定产生重大影响”）。\n\n26 参见，例如，Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 96 (2d Cir. 2018)（“若原告‘未指控［某被告］就其出售的证券价值或其换取的回报对价误导了他’，且原告‘完全得到了\n\n行为与特定证券出售之间的关联。如果被告被指控的虚假陈述并未关涉证券的价值、性质或投资特征，则该要素未得到满足。[27] 此外，发生在证券出售之后的指控虚假陈述不可能与该等购买或出售“相吻合”，[28] 因此不可能对该等出售具有重大性。\n\n政府无需证明你们正在审理的被告同意\n\n亲自作出虚假陈述或遗漏重大事实。只要政府证明如下情况即为充分：\n\n其预期的收益」）（原文有改动）（引自 Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1986)；Taylor v. Westor Cap. Grp., 943 F. Supp. 2d 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2013)（「法院已划定界线，将影响涉案证券基本估值和证券市场运作的欺诈主张，与不影响上述事项的主张区分开来」）；Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co. v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc., 770 F. Supp. 176, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)（「涉及证券交易但不涉及证券本身的虚假陈述或遗漏，不能构成违反 Section 10(b) 或 Rule 10b–5 的基础」）；Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. Stonebridge Partners Equity Fund, L.P., 6 F. Supp. 2d 236, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)（虚假陈述「不涉及涉案证券的价值、性质或投资特征时」，并非『与证券的买入或卖出相关联』作出）；Abrash v. Fox, 805 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)（「即便虚假陈述与投资决定之间存在明确的因果关系，除非证券交易中涉及的虚假陈述或遗漏与证券本身有关，否则不构成违反证券法」）；Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 624 F. Supp. 751, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)（「Second Circuit（联邦第二巡回上诉法院）已指出，虚假陈述必须与指控的证券相关以满足买卖要件，而不仅仅是与整个交易相关」）。\n\n27 参见，例如，Chem. Bank, 726 F.2d at 943（银行因基于作为贷款质押品的某些股票相关的虚假陈述而受骗作出放贷决定，不满足「与……相关联」要件）；Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 325, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 159 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998)（驳回基于被告未披露为补交卖空保证金而质押的抵押品所赚取利息的证券欺诈主张，因为该未披露事项仅涉及「经纪人与客户之间关系的条款」）；Bissell, 937 F. Supp. at 243-44（同上）；Alex, Brown, 1997 WL 97837 at *6（虚假陈述涉及投资者的「信用状况及其账户中资金的可用性」，未满足「与……相关联」要件）。\n\n28 参见 Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. Danske Bank A/S, 11 F.4th 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2021)（裁定原告不能仅基于在最终买入证券之后作出的陈述而维持证券欺诈指控）。\n\n证明被告意图促使该陈述被作出或该事实被遗漏。\n\n如果您认定被告参与了或同意\n\n参与「与」所谓的证券「买入或卖出」「相关联」的欺诈行为，则无需认定您正在考虑的被告实际参与了该所谓证券的任何具体买入或卖出行为。29\n\n改编自 Lewis A. Kaplan（刘易斯·A·卡普兰）法官在 United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried（美国诉塞缪尔·班克曼-弗里德案）, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023)；Edgardo Ramos（埃德加多·拉莫斯）法官在 United States v. Milton, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022)；以及 Paul G. Gardephe（保罗·G·加德菲）法官在 United States v. Tuzman, No. 15 Cr. 536 (Dec. 22, 2017) 中的陪审团指示；另见 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)（「『证券』一词指任何……股票[以及]任何证券的任何看跌期权、看涨期权、跨式期权、期权或特权……[以及]认购或购买前述任何一项的任何……认股权证或权利」）；SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.（波斯纳法官）)（「决定某项权益是否为投资合同（或其他证券）的是发起人的陈述，而非其实际行为」）；In re J.P. Jeanneret Assocs., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 340, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（综述各案例得出结论，在「[受害者]出资意图投资于证券，结果该资金所委托之人将其窃取」的情况下，满足关联要件）；Pail v. Precise Imports Corp., No. 99 Cv. 1624 (DLC), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 90,642, 1999 WL 681384, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999)（对未来股票的承诺足以构成与证券买卖的关联）。\n\n29 政府提议将本段文字放在指示中较早的位置。\n罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第二项要件——明知、故意和蓄意\n\n政府必须确立的证券欺诈的第二项要件是：被告明知、蓄意且怀有欺诈意图行事。\n\n我此前已在电汇欺诈指控中为各位界定了这些术语，\n\n在此不再赘述。简而言之：\n\n「明知」是指自愿且有意地行事，而非出于错误或疏忽。\n\n「蓄意」行事是指自愿且出于不当目的行事。\n\n在证券法语境下，「欺诈意图」是指明知并怀有操纵或欺骗意图行事。\n\n正如我在电汇欺诈指示中所解释的，关于知情和欺诈意图的直接证据几乎从不可得。极少有案件能证明某人曾书面记录或陈述自己在过去的某个时间怀有欺诈意图实施了某项行为。法律并不要求此类直接证据。\n\n知情和犯罪意图这些最终事实虽属主观，但可以通过间接证据来确立，依据一个人的外在表现、言语、举止、行为，以及证据所揭示的所有周围环境情况，和从中可以得出的合情合理的逻辑推论。\n\n所谓的从间接证据中得出推论，与人们通常所说的「运用你的常识」并无二致。运用常识\n\n意味着，当各位判定被告是否具有或缺乏欺诈意图时，不仅要看被告说了什么，还要看被告做了什么、他人针对被告做了什么，以及总体而言发生的一切情况。\n\n正如我此前所解释的，间接证据如果可信，其价值不亚于直接证据。无论哪种情况，所指控罪名的基本要件必须被……\n\n为了让各位认定您正在考虑的被告犯有证券欺诈罪，政府只需证明被告在行事时仅怀有欺骗、操纵或欺诈的意图。政府无需证明被告怀有造成损害的意图。\n\n由于所指控罪名的一项基本要件是欺骗意图或操纵意图，因此您正在考虑的被告如果具有善意，即构成对证券欺诈指控的完全抗辩。也就是说，如果被告真诚地确信其行为是正当的且并非为了推进任何非法计划，则并未违反法律。真诚地相信被告所作陈述的真实性构成完全抗辩，无论这些陈述事后被证明多么不准确。因为与电汇欺诈一样，既然所指控罪名的基本要件是欺诈意图，由此可知，被告的善意构成对证券欺诈指控的完全抗辩。然而，被告没有责任证明善意抗辩。政府仍承担排除合理怀疑证明被告系明知、蓄意且怀有欺骗或操纵意图行事的举证责任。政府承担排除合理怀疑证明欺诈意图及由此导致的缺乏善意的举证责任。\n\n然而，在考虑被告是否出于善意行事时，指示各位：被告所持有的、若存在此种信念的话即最终一切都会得到妥善解决从而没有投资者会损失任何金钱的信念，并不必然构成善意。被告认为该计划最终将为投资者带来利润的任何真诚信念，都不能免除其实施欺诈行为或虚假陈述的责任。\n\n因此，在实际操作中，为了证明对被告人的指控，政府必须排除合理怀疑确立：您正在考虑的被告明知其行为旨在欺骗，但仍使自己参与到所指控的欺诈计划中。30\n\n即便是虚假陈述或对重要事实的陈述，除非出于欺诈意图，否则不构成欺诈。无论一项计划多么具有误导性或欺骗性，如果它是出于善意设计或实施的，则不具有欺诈性。真诚地相信被告所作陈述的真实性构成有效抗辩，无论这些陈述事后被证明多么不准确。31\n\n一个人是否明知、蓄意且怀有欺诈意图行事的问题，与其他任何事实问题一样，是由各位陪审员认定的事实问题。该问题涉及一个人的心理状态。\n\n改编自 Lewis A. Kaplan 法官在 United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (Nov. 2, 2023)；Edgardo Ramos 法官在 United States v. Milton, No. 21 Cr. 478 (Oct. 14, 2022)；以及 Jed S. Rakoff（杰德·S·拉科夫）法官在 United States v. Petit, No. 19 Cr. 850 中的指示；Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 57-16；另见 United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160, 178 (2d Cir. 2015)（证券欺诈的意图要件是「欺骗、操纵或欺诈的意图」，而非「造成损害的意图」）。\n\n31 Sand, Instruction 57-24.\n\n30 被告方提议删除本指示中政府提议的部分文字并指出：「删除的部分与电汇欺诈指控以及关于直接证据和间接证据的标准指示重复。」\n罪名项六、八和十——证券欺诈：第三项要件——州际贸易工具\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的 Section 10(b) 罪名项的第三项也是最后一项要件是：您正在考虑的被告为推进该欺诈计划，明知而使用了或促使使用了邮政或州际贸易工具（例如州际电汇）。\n\n首先让我指出，政府无需证明同时使用了邮政和州际贸易工具来推进欺诈计划。上述两者之一——无论是邮政还是州际贸易工具——即已足够。但各位必须就至少其中一项达成一致意见。\n\n在考虑该要件时，各位无需认定被告直接或亲自参与了任何邮寄或使用州际贸易工具的行为。如果被告是该计划的积极参与者，并采取了措施或从事了所指控的行为，且其明知或可合理预见到该行为自然且很可能导致使用邮政或州际贸易工具，则该要件将得到满足，据此各位可以认定其促使了邮政或州际贸易的使用。32\n\n通过邮政发送或通过州际贸易工具传播的物品，也无需包含或本应包含欺诈材料，或任何犯罪或不良内容。所邮寄或传播的事项可以是完全清白无害的，只要其是为了推进欺诈计划或欺诈行为即可。\n\n32 Sand. Instr. 57-25.\n\n使用邮政或州际贸易工具不必是实施该计划的核心手段，甚至不必是其附带手段。唯一的要求是，使用邮政或州际贸易工具与该计划或欺诈行为的目的具有某种关联。\n\n事实上，实际购买或出售证券本身并不需要伴随使用邮政或州际贸易工具，只要使用邮政或州际贸易工具是为了推进该计划，并且在使用邮政或州际贸易工具时被告仍在参与构成欺诈计划一部分的行为即可。[33]\n\n“邮政”一词的含义不言自明，包括 U.S. Mail（美国邮政）和 Federal Express（联邦快递）。州际贸易工具的示例包括电话、电子邮件、通过有线电传输的视频或短信。\n\n以上就是政府对证券欺诈指控必须排除合理怀疑予以证明的内容。现在，我将讨论洗钱指控。\n\n改编自 Edgardo Ramos 法官在 United States v. Cole（19 Cr. 869）案中的指示、Ronnie Abrams 法官在 United States v. Hild（19 Cr. 602）案中的指示，以及 Sand 著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》（现代联邦陪审团指示）第 57-20、57-25 条指示。另见 United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 40 & n.11 (2d Cir. 2006)（定义“州际贸易工具”）。\n\n33 被告指出，他们建议删除本指示的部分内容，理由是与上述内容重复。\n\n罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易\n\n罪名项十二指控 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）和 Wang 女士（王雁平）参与涉及源自特定非法活动的财产且金额超过 $10,000 的货币交易——在此指从 Saraca 向一家私人投资基金转账约 $100 million——违反了《美国法典》第 18 编第 1957 条（Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957）。本罪的构成要件如下：为了证明违反第 1957 条的参与涉及源自特定非法活动财产的货币交易罪，政府必须排除合理怀疑确立以下每一项要件：\n\n第一，被告在州际贸易中或在影响州际贸易的情况下从事（或企图从事）货币交易。\n\n第二，该货币交易涉及价值大于 $10,000 的源自犯罪的财产。\n\n第三，该财产源自特定非法活动。\n\n第四，被告明知该交易涉及犯罪所得而故意为之，即明知该交易涉及犯罪所得。\n\n第五，该交易发生在美国境内（或者被告是美国人，我稍后将为您定义该术语）。\n\n如果您排除合理怀疑认定被告与至少一人合谋参与涉及源自特定非法活动财产且金额超过 $10,000 的货币交易，那么罪名项十二的第二个目标罪行即得到证明。然而，如果您认定政府未能履行其举证责任证明被告与至少一人合谋参与涉及源自特定非法活动财产且金额超过 $10,000 的货币交易，那么该目标罪行即未得到证明。\n\n改编自 United States v. Adelekan, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021)（庭审记录第 886 页）中的陪审团指示；另见 Sand 著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》第 50A-26 条指示。\n\n罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第一要件\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第一项要件是被告为美国人或位于美国境内，并同意参与价值大于 $10,000 的货币交易。\n\n“货币交易”一词是指在州际或对外贸易中或影响州际或对外贸易的情况下，通过金融机构、向金融机构或由金融机构进行的资金或货币工具的存入、提取、转账或兑换。\n\n“州际或对外贸易”一词是指美国任何州、领地或属地之间的贸易，或者美国与外国之间的贸易。\n\n您必须认定，倘若共谋目标得以完成，该交易会以某种方式影响州际贸易，无论影响多么微小。正如我先前所解释的，对州际贸易的影响可以通过多种方式确立，包括但不限于交易中所用资金的来源影响了州际贸易，或者交易本身涉及资金的州际转移。\n\n“金融交易”的金额或价值必须大于 $10,000。\n\n改编自 Loretta A. Preska 法官在 United States v. Adelekan, 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (Oct. 26, 2021) 案中的陪审团指示以及 Sand 著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》第 50A-27 条指示。无需将对州际贸易的影响作为单独的要件处理，因为“货币交易”一词的定义本身就要求证明对州际贸易产生了影响。见 Sand 著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》第 50A-26 条指示评注。\n\n罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第二要件\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的本罪第二项要件是，货币交易涉及价值超过 $10,000 的源自犯罪的财产，且被告明知交易所涉及的财产为源自犯罪的财产。\n\n“源自犯罪的财产”是指构成或源自犯罪所得的任何财产。“所得”一词是指通过某种形式的非法活动直接或间接派生、获取或保留的任何财产，包括此类活动的总收益。我作为法律问题指示您，电汇欺诈和证券欺诈均属于犯罪行为和特定非法活动。\n\n政府无需证明交易所涉及的所有财产均为源自犯罪的财产。然而，政府必须证明所涉财产中有超过 $10,000 为源自犯罪的财产。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明被告明知该交易涉及犯罪所得。但是，政府无需证明被告确切知晓源自犯罪的财产具体来自何种特定罪行。\n\n改编自 Sand 著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》第 50A-28、50A-30 条指示；改编自 United States v. Adelekan, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021)（庭审记录第 887-88 页）中的陪审团指示。\n\n罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第三与第四要件\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的本目标罪行的第三和第四要件是，该财产源自特定非法活动，且被告明知交易涉及犯罪所得，交易中所涉及的财产实际上源自特定非法活动。\n\n“特定非法活动”一词是指成文法所定义的各种罪行中的任何一种。\n\n在此，政府指控特定非法活动是指罪名项五和罪名项六中指控的关于 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）的电汇欺诈计划和/或证券欺诈计划。\n\n“特定非法活动”一词先前已有定义，该定义同样适用于罪名项十二中指控的该共谋目标。\n\n我指示您，政府无需证明被告确切知晓源自犯罪的财产具体来自何种特定罪行。但是，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明被告明知该交易涉及源自犯罪的财产；我提醒您，这指的是构成或源自犯罪所得的任何财产。\n\n如果您认定政府已排除合理怀疑确立被告明知该交易涉及源自犯罪的财产，则本要件即告满足。\n\n改编自 J. Paul Oetken 法官在 United States v. Mizrahi, No. 22 Cr. 650 案中的陪审团指示；United States v. Adelekan, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021)（庭审记录第 888-89 页）中的陪审团指示；以及 Sand 著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》第 50A-29 条指示。\n\n罪名项十二——洗钱：非法货币交易——第五要件\n\n该目标的第五项要件是，约定的交易发生在美国境内。\n\n改编自 United States v. Adelekan, No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021)（庭审记录第 889 页）中的陪审团指示；另见《Modern Federal Jury Instructions—Criminal》（现代联邦陪审团指示——刑事篇）第 3 卷第 50A-31 条指示。\n\n罪名项五至十二——故意致使\n\n关于所有实质罪名项，即罪名项五至十二，被告可构成实质罪行的第一种理论是通过直接实施该罪行。我刚才已经向您提供了这些指示。被告还可通过两种理论间接构成实质罪行——通过故意致使他人实施该罪行，或者通过协助和教唆实施该罪行。我将解释这些概念：当被告具备必要的犯罪意图并故意致使他人从事实施犯罪所必需的行为时，被告可作为主犯构成这些罪名项中指控的实质罪行。因此，我现在将花一点时间讨论在本案背景下通过故意致使作为主犯承担罪责意味着什么。\n\n在本案中，政府并未主张被告实际实施了起诉书中指控的罪行。相反，政府主张被告致使他人实际实施了该罪行。\n\n美国的法律规定，协助和教唆成文法的第 2(b) 条规定如下：“任何人故意致使实施某一行为，而该行为若由其直接实施即构成危害美国的犯罪，则应作为主犯予以惩处。”\n\n“故意致使”一词是什么意思？它并不意味着被告本人必须亲自实施了犯罪，或者监督或参与了所指控的实际犯罪行为。相反，任何人只要致使实施某一行为，而该行为若由其直接实施将使其构成危害美国的犯罪，该人即作为主犯承担罪责。因此，如果政府证明致使作出虚假或欺诈性陈述、或致使欺诈性侵占的人是故意、蓄意欺诈且满足我向您阐明过的实质欺诈罪名项的其他要件，那么故意致使他人作出虚假或欺诈性陈述或陈述的人即作为主犯承担罪责。同样，如果被告故意致使他人采取步骤推进欺诈计划（例如通过汇款或您认定属于该计划一部分的任何其他步骤），且如果政府证明致使采取推进该计划步骤的人是故意、蓄意且怀有欺诈的特定意图，并满足我向您阐明过的实质欺诈罪名项的其他要件，情况亦是如此。即使被致使作出虚假陈述或采取推进该计划步骤的个人本身并无犯罪意图，亦是如此。\n\n“故意致使”一词的含义可以从以下问题的答案中找到：\n\n被告人是否具有［描述主罪所需的犯意，例如，明知毒品正被进口到美国；意图使［受害人］被谋杀，等等］？\n\n被告人是否故意致使另一人实施［描述必要行为］？\n\n如果您被排除合理怀疑地确信对这两个问题的回答都是“是”，那么被告人即犯有被指控的罪行，如同其本人实际实施了该罪行一样。\n\n注：被告人保留主张本项指控缺乏适当事实依据的权利。\n\n改编自 Lewis A. Kaplan（刘易斯·A·卡普兰）法官在 United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried（美国诉塞缪尔·班克曼-弗里德案），案号 No. 22 Cr. 673（2023年11月2日）中的陪审团指示；以及 Lewis A. Kaplan 法官在 United States v. Gatto（美国诉加托案），案号 No. 17 Cr. 686（2018年10月1日）中的陪审团指示。\n\n罪名项五至十二——协助及教唆\n\n现在，除了指控被告人犯有电汇欺诈、证券欺诈以及非法货币交易的实质性罪名项外，所有这八个罪名项还指控被告人犯有通常所称的协助及教唆罪。\n\n协助及教唆犯罪是实施该罪行的一种方式。如果您正在审议的被告人帮助他人实施犯罪，则可被判犯有该罪。例如，如果政府证明您正在审议的被告人实施了（仅举一例）罪名项五中所指控的电汇欺诈，那么就该罪名项而言，您无需考虑协助及教唆。然而，如果您认定政府未能排除合理怀疑证明您正在审议的被告人从事了电汇欺诈（继续以罪名项五为例），您应当考虑政府是否仍排除合理怀疑证明了被告人协助并教唆他人实施了该罪名项中所指控的加重身份盗窃罪。\n\n协助及教唆的概念在所有实质性罪名项中均有指控，即罪名项五至十二。\n\n罪名项5至12中的每一项也都包含关于“协助及教唆”的指控。根据联邦协助及教唆法，凡“协助、教唆、向其提供咨询、命令、诱使或促成”实施犯罪者，均作为主犯予以处罚。协助并教唆他人实施实质性犯罪的人，对该罪行承担的罪责如同其亲自实施了该罪行一样。因此，如果您排除合理怀疑认定政府已证明有人实施了实质性犯罪，并且被告人在实施犯罪过程中协助并教唆了该人，您即可认定您正在审议的被告人有罪。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的协助及教唆责任的第一项要件是，已有其他人实施了涉案犯罪。如果没有人实施基础犯罪，则不能判定被告人犯有协助及教唆罪。但如果您确实认定涉案基础犯罪是由被告人以外的人实施的，您应当考虑被告人是否协助或教唆了实际实施犯罪的人。\n\n为了协助及教唆他人犯罪，被告人必须已被排除合理怀疑证明以某种方式故意且明知地将自己与犯罪联系在一起，并且其必须已故意且明知地通过某种行为试图帮助使犯罪得逞。如果行为是自愿且蓄意采取的，则对犯罪的参与属于故意。\n\n被告人仅仅出现在正在实施犯罪的场所，即使结合了明知正在实施犯罪的情况，也不足以使其成为协助教唆者。被告人对他人犯罪行为的默认，即使具有罪过心理，也不足以确立协助及教唆。协助教唆者必须在犯罪事业中具有其自身的积极利益。\n\n为确定被告人是否协助并教唆了犯罪的实施，请扪心自问以下问题：\n\n涉案犯罪是否是由被告人以外的人实施的？如果不是，请继续审议下一个罪名项。\n\n被告人是否明知且故意参与了被指控的罪行，并将其作为自己希望实现的事情？\n\n被告人是否明知且故意将自己与他人实施的犯罪联系在一起？\n\n其是否通过自己的行为试图使其犯罪事业取得成功？如果是，则被告人属于协助教唆者，因此其犯有正在审议的罪行。如果不是，则其不属于协助教唆者，其并未犯有正在审议的罪行。\n\n改编自 Sand（桑德）著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》（现代联邦陪审团指示），指示 11-2；以及 Sidney H. Stein（西德尼·H·斯坦）法官在 United States v. Duncan（美国诉邓肯案），18 Cr. 289 (SHS)（Southern District of New York（纽约南区），2019年5月6日）中作出的陪审团指示；以及 Colleen McMahon（科琳·麦克马洪）法官在 United States v. Cherico（美国诉切里科案），08 Cr. 786 (CM)（Southern District of New York，2011年10月31日）中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n罪名项二：共谋实施电汇欺诈和银行欺诈——概述\n\n既然我已经解释了起诉书中的实质性罪名项，我现在将解释其中的共谋罪名项。在此，被指控的共谋犯罪为：罪名项一中的共谋违反《Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act（受敲诈勒索者影响和腐败组织法）》；罪名项二中的共谋实施电汇欺诈和银行欺诈；罪名项三中的共谋实施洗钱；以及罪名项四中的共谋实施证券欺诈并向金融机构提供虚假陈述。因为这样更易于解释，我将不按顺序逐一审视这些共谋罪名项。让我们从罪名项二开始，该项指控 Kwok（郭）先生和 Wang（王）女士共同犯有共谋实施电汇欺诈和银行欺诈罪。\n\n正如我所说，共谋是一种犯罪合伙关系——即两人或两人以上为了实现某种非法目的而联合在一起的结合或协议。\n\n共谋违反联邦法律的罪行是一项独立的罪名。它与实际违反任何特定联邦法律的行为（法律称之为“实质性犯罪”）是分离且截然不同的。\n\n为了在共谋指控方面完成其举证责任，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明以下两项要件：\n\n第一，起诉书罪名项二所指控的共谋确实存在；也就是说，如起诉书所指控，两人或两人以上之间存在实施电汇欺诈和银行欺诈的协议或谅解；以及\n\n第二，您正在审议的被告人明知且故意[34](#page-62-0)成为了被指控共谋的成员。\n\n接下来我将对这些要件以及共谋的目的做出进一步解释。\n\n改编自 Valerie E. Caproni（瓦莱丽·E·卡普罗尼）法官在 United States v. Christopher Campos（美国诉克里斯托弗·坎波斯案），16 Cr. 396 (VEC)（2017年6月22日）以及 John F. Keenan（约翰·F·基南）法官在 United States v. Rasheen Jordan（美国诉拉辛·乔丹案），03 CR 399 (JFK)（2004年）中作出的陪审团指示，并参考 Sand 著《Modern Federal Jury Instructions》，指示 19-3；另见 United States v. Svoboda（美国诉斯沃博达案），347 F.3d 471, 476-77 (2d Cir. 2003)（讨论共谋的三项要件）。\n\n34 Sand，指示 19-01。\n\n罪名项二：共谋实施电汇欺诈和银行欺诈——第一要件——共谋的存在\n\n您必须排除合理怀疑认定的第一项要件是，起诉书罪名项二中所指控的电汇欺诈和银行欺诈共谋确实存在。\n\n为了证明共谋的存在，证据必须表明两人或两人以上（包括相关被告人）以某种方式或方法，通过任何手段，明示或默示（即口头或非口头地）达成了违反法律和实现非法计划的共同谅解。如果您排除合理怀疑认定两人或两人以上达成了违反法律和实现非法计划的明示或默示谅解，则政府即已就本要件完成了其举证责任。\n\n为了满足罪名项二的第一要件——即证明共谋的存在——政府并不被要求证明两人或两人以上围坐在桌旁，口头或书面订立了庄严契约，声明他们已经结成违反法律的共谋并详细阐明了所有细节。常识告诉您，当人们实际同意加入犯罪共谋时，很大程度上依赖于未明言的默契。共谋极少能通过明示协议的直接证据来证明，而只需证明两人或两人以上明示或默示地达成了实现特定非法目的的谅解，无论他们最终是否成功。[35](#page-63-1)\n\n35 Sand，指示 19-3S。被告人提议删除政府的前述表述，指出：“被删除的表述具有辩论性。所增加的表述直接来源于 Sand。”\n\n当人们为了实现非法目的而加入共谋时，他们在执行共谋过程中即互为代理人和合伙人。在确定是否存在所指控的非法协议时，您可以考虑被指控的共谋者为了实现表面的犯罪目的而实施的作为和行为。此外，在确定该等协议是否存在时，您既可以考虑直接证据，也可以考虑间接证据。古话说“行胜于言”，在此同样适用。通常，关于共谋存在所能获得的唯一证据，是被指控的单个共谋者各自互不关联的作为和行为。然而，当把这些作为和行为结合在一起并作为整体考虑时，它们所能支持推定共谋存在的确定性，可以与直接证据完全相同。关于这个问题，您应当回顾我此前关于直接证据、间接证据及推定的指示。\n\n正如我已经说明的，如果您从所有相关事实和情况的证明中排除合理怀疑认定，至少两名被指控的共谋者在意志上达成一致，意图通过所指控的手段实现共谋的目的，这便足以确立共谋的存在。\n\n因此，您必须首先确定证据是否排除合理怀疑证明了罪名项二中所指控的共谋的存在。\n\n共谋的目的，是指共谋者同意或希望实现的非法意图。罪名项二所指控共谋的目的为电汇欺诈和银行欺诈。\n\n政府并无必要证明您正在审议的被告人共谋实施了该共谋的全部两个目的。但是，对于您认定得以证明的共谋目的（无论是哪一个或哪几个目的，如果有的话），陪审团必须达成一致意见。\n\n改编自以下法官作出的陪审团指示：Hon. Valerie E. Caproni（瓦莱丽·E·卡普罗尼法官）在 United States v. Campos 案，16 Cr. 395 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. 2017)；Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin（希拉·A·沙因德林法官）在 United States v. Vasilevsky 案，08 Cr. 903 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009)；Hon. Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文法官）在 United States v. Peirce 案，06 Cr. 1032 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. 2008)；Hon. Denise Cote（丹妮丝·科特法官）在 United States v. Enrique 案，04 Cr. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)；以及 Sand 所著 Modern Federal Jury Instructions，Instr. 19-4；并参见 Griffin v. United States，502 U.S. 46 (1991)（维持对多重目标共谋罪名项的裁决，即使证据不足以支持对其中一个目标的定罪，但足以支持对另一个目标的定罪）；United States v. Rea，958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992)（“为证明共谋，政府无需出示明确协议的证据；默示谅解的证明即已足够。共谋者无需就共谋细节达成一致，只要他们就计划的基本性质达成一致即可，且他们的目标无需完全一致，只要不相冲突。”）；United States v. Montour，944 F.2d 1019, 1025 (2d Cir. 1991)（“为证明协议的存在，政府无需出示共谋者之间正式安排的证据。相反，如果政府能够证明被告与他人共同行动以实现共同目标，即已足够。”）。\n\n罪名项二：共谋实施电信欺诈和银行欺诈——第二要件——共谋成员身份\n\n如果您得出结论，认为政府已排除合理怀疑证明了罪名项二所指控的共谋确实存在，那么您接下来必须判定第二个问题，即被告是否明知、故意且蓄意地成为了该共谋的成员，也就是说，被告是否在知晓该共谋的一个或多个非法目的的情况下参与其中，并具有推进其一个或多个非法目标的具体意图。\n\n“非法”仅指违反法律；被告无需知晓自己违反了任何特定法律，但被告必须知晓其行为具有一般性的非法性质。\n\n在这方面，有人曾说，被告要被视为共谋的参与者，必须在该项事业或其结果中拥有重大利害关系。现向您发出指示：虽然证明在该计划的结果中具有经济利益并非必不可少，但如果您认定被告具有此类利益，这是您在判定被告是否为起诉书中指控的共谋成员时可以适当考虑的因素。反之亦然，如果您认定被告在该计划的结果中不具有经济利益，您可以适当地将此作为判定被告是否为共谋成员的一项考量因素。\n\n36 Sand。\n\n37 Sand, Instr. 19-6。\n\n正如我刚才所提到的，在认定您正在审议的被告为共谋者之前，您必须首先排除合理怀疑地认定其明知并加入了该非法协议或计划。因此，关键问题在于您正在审议的被告在加入共谋时是否知晓该非法协议的基本宗旨和目的。被告的知情属于从已证明的事实中推断的事项。政府无需证明被告完全知悉共谋的所有细节即可让您推断其知情。\n\n要具有有罪的明知，被告无需知晓共谋的全部范围，也无需知晓其所有参与者的全部活动。被告甚至无需认识共谋中的每一位其他成员。此外，您正在审议的被告无需完全知悉共谋的所有细节或范围，即足以正当推断其知情。再者，您正在审议的被告无需加入共谋的所有非法目标。只要被告事实上以我所解释的方式加入了共谋，被告也无需从其参与共谋中获得任何金钱利益，或在结果中拥有经济利益。\n\n被告参与的持续时间和程度与被告的有罪与否无关。被告无需在共谋一开始就加入。被告可以在共谋过程中的任何时间出于任何目的加入。被告应对在共谋存在期间及其作为成员期间所发生的所有可合理预见的行为承担责任。事实上，共谋的每位成员可以实施各自独立且不同的行为，并且可以在不同时间实施。有些共谋者可能扮演主要角色，而其他共谋者则扮演\n\n次要角色。法律并不要求角色平等。事实上，单单一项行为就可能足以将一名被告拉入共谋的范围之内。\n\n但是，我想提醒您，被告仅仅出现在涉嫌犯罪的现场，或者与涉及涉嫌犯罪的其他人有交往或沟通，其本身并不能使其成为共谋的成员。同样，一个人可以认识共谋的一名或多名成员，与其聚会、交往或保持友好关系，而其本人并非共谋者。单纯的行为相似性，或者被告可能讨论过共同宗旨和利益的事实，并不必然构成共谋存在或被告具有共谋成员身份的证据。我还想提醒您，仅仅知晓或默许非法计划，而未参与其中，是不足够的。\n\n此外，在不知情的情况下，被告的行为仅仅碰巧推进了共谋的宗旨或目标这一事实，并不能使被告成为共谋的成员。法律要求更多条件。必要的是，被告必须在知晓共谋的至少某些非法目的或目标的情况下参与，并且抱有协助实现那些非法目的的意图。\n\n当人们为了实现某个非法目的而结成共谋时，他们在执行该共谋的过程中便成为了彼此的代理人或合伙人。在判定呈现在您面前的事实问题时，您可以（但非必须）考虑被告的共同共谋者所实施的任何行为或作出的任何陈述，前提是此类行为或陈述是在共谋期间、在共谋过程中以及为了推进共谋而实施或作出的，即使此类行为或陈述并非在被告在场时作出\n\n38 Sand, Instr. § 19-6。\n\n或是在其不知情的情况下作出的。然而，需要您注意的是，被告参与共谋的事实必须通过其自身行为或陈述的独立证据来确立。为推进共谋的共同目的而实施的行为或作出的陈述，在法律上被视为所有成员的行为或陈述，且所有成员均对这些行为或陈述承担责任。\n\n共谋一经形成，即推定持续存在，直至其目标达成或成员采取某种终止的肯定性作为。同样，一旦认定某人是共谋的成员，即推定其继续作为共谋的成员，直至共谋终止，除非有确凿证据表明该人已退出并脱离了该共谋。\n\n总而言之，您必须排除合理怀疑地认定，您正在审议的被告在理解共谋的非法性质的情况下，为了推进该非法事业的目的，故意参与、建议或协助了共谋。其由此成为非法协议明知且自愿的参与者——也就是说，成为了一名共谋者。\n\n改编自以下法官作出的陪审团指示：Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin（希拉·A·沙因德林法官）在 United States v. Vasilevsky 案，08 Cr. 903 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009)；以及 Hon. Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文法官）在 United States v. Peirce 案，06 Cr. 1032 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. 2008)；以及 Sand 所著 Modern Federal Jury Instructions，Instrs. 19-6, 3A-1, 3A-3；并参见 United States v. Aleskerova，300 F.3d 286, 292-93 (2d Cir. 2002)（描述政府如何证明以所要求的心态参与共谋的方式）；United States v. Rea，958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992)（“被告对共谋的知情以及以所要求的犯罪意图参与其中，可通过间接证据予以证明。被告无需\n\n39 Sand, Instr. § 19-6。\n\n在共谋成立之初就加入，即可对其成为成员之前和之后所实施的共谋非法行为承担责任。”）（引文省略）；United States v. Miranda-Ortiz，926 F.2d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1991)（总体讨论证明共谋成员身份所要求的证据）。\n\n罪名项二：共谋实施电信欺诈和银行欺诈共谋——目标\n\n罪名项二所指控的共谋有两个指控的目标：电信欺诈和银行\n\n欺诈。请记住，共谋的目标是共谋者达成一致的非法目的。\n\n在讨论罪名项五、七、九和十一期间，我已经描述了电信欺诈的要件，您在此应当对罪名项二所指控共谋的电信欺诈目标适用同样的指示。\n\n我现在将描述政府必须排除合理怀疑予以证明的银行欺诈的要件。银行欺诈包含以下三个要件。\n\n第一，存在欺诈银行的计划，或者存在通过虚假或欺诈性的借口、陈述或承诺获取由银行拥有或处于银行托管或控制之下的金钱的计划；\n\n第二，被告实施或企图实施该计划，并具有欺诈银行或获取由银行拥有或处于银行托管或控制之下的金钱或资金的意图；以及\n\n第三，在实施该计划时，涉案银行的存款受到联邦保险承保。\n\n现在，我将更详细地解释银行欺诈的这三个要件中的每一项。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的银行欺诈的第一要件是，存在欺诈银行的计划，或者存在通过虚假或欺诈性的借口、陈述或承诺获取由银行拥有或处于银行托管或控制之下的金钱的计划。该要件仅需证明存在其中之一即可。也就是说，要么存在欺诈银行的计划，要么存在通过欺诈性借口、陈述或承诺获取处于银行托管或控制之下的财产的计划。然而，陪审团必须在排除合理怀疑证明了哪一种理论上达成一致意见。\n\n为了证明银行欺诈的第一种理论——即存在欺诈银行的计划——政府必须排除合理怀疑地证明存在涉及重大事项的惯常做法或行为过程，旨在欺骗一家受联邦保险承保的银行发放金钱或财产。\n\n我已经就“欺诈计划”的定义向您作出了指示，您在此应当适用那些指示。\n\n与我此前向你们指示过的电汇欺诈一样，欺诈性陈述必须涉及实质性事实或事项。实质性事实是指在做出决定时依赖该陈述或声明的合理谨慎之人，按常理预计会予以关注的事实。这意味着，如果你们认定某项特定的事实陈述是虚假的，你们必须判定该陈述是否属于合理之人在此类决定中可能认为重要的事项。同样的原则也适用于带有欺诈性的半真半假之辞或对实质性事实的隐瞒。\n\n为了证明银行欺诈的第二种理论，政府方必须排除合理怀疑证明存在一项通过虚假和欺诈性托辞、陈述或承诺，获取由银行或信用社拥有、或在其保管或控制下的资金或财产的计划。如果一项陈述是出于欺骗意图而虚假作出的，则该陈述属于欺诈性陈述。欺骗性的半真半假之辞、对实质性事实的隐瞒，均构成成文法下的虚假或欺诈性陈述。关于银行欺诈的第二种理论，\n\n并不要求虚假或欺诈性的托辞、陈述或承诺是直接向银行本身作出的。只要这些虚假或欺诈性的托辞、陈述或承诺作为一种机制，自然地促使银行（或银行财产的保管人）交出其控制下的资金，向任何人作出此类陈述即已足够。[40] 该计划必须在某种程度上针对该金融机构。[41]\n\n对于这两种理论而言，欺骗并不一定仅以口头或书面言语为前提。言词的排列、言词的省略或使用这些言词的情境，都可能传达出虚假和欺骗性的表象。如果存在故意欺骗，其达成的方式并不重要。\n\n在审议银行欺诈的这一要件时，银行是否实际依赖了不实陈述并不重要。只要该不实陈述仅仅具备影响银行决定的能力即已足够。此外，政府方没有必要证明金融机构因该计划而实际遭受了资金损失或被剥夺了财产。涉案银行中的任何一家如果在进一步调查后本可能发现该欺诈行为，这一点也无关紧要。如果你们认定存在一项计划，你们是否认为任何涉案银行存在疏忽、轻信甚至过失均与本案无关。\n\n政府方必须排除合理怀疑证明的银行欺诈的第二个要件与被告人的意图有关。满足该要件有两种方式。满足该要件的第一种方式是被告人明知、故意且怀有诈骗银行或信用社的意图，实施、企图实施或参与了\n\n40 被告人提议删除前述政府方文句，指出“删除的部分要么与先前的指示重复，要么未能准确代表法律规定”。\n\n41 桑德（Sand），指示 44-10 评注。\n\n该计划或诡计。我已经向你们提供了明知和故意的定义，你们在此应适用完全相同的定义。怀有“诈骗的特定意图”行事，要求被告人至少在一定程度上具有欺骗一家或多家银行或信用社的意图。被告人无需具有造成银行或信用社任何财务损失的意图。\n\n满足该要件的第二种方式是，排除合理怀疑地证明被告人明知且故意，并怀有获取银行拥有或在其保管或控制下的金钱或资金的意图，实施或企图实施了该计划。被告人无需具有诈骗银行的意图。被告人也无需具有对发卡/出资银行或信用社（例如导致其损失资金）或对任何其他人造成损害的意图。该要件要求被告人在理解所指控计划的欺诈或欺骗性质的情况下从事或参与了该计划，并怀有帮助其取得成功的意图。不要求被告人参与或知晓该计划的所有运作。\n\n政府方必须排除合理怀疑证明的银行欺诈罪的第三个要件是，涉案金融机构中至少有一家在该计划实施期间受联邦保险保护。这仅仅意味着该金融机构在起诉书中指控的时间范围内是受联邦存款保险公司（Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation，简称 FDIC）保险的银行。为了满足这第三个要件，政府方无需证明被告人知晓该特定金融机构的身份，也无需证明被告人知晓该金融机构受联邦保险保护。\n\n改编自桑德，《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions），指示 44-10、44-11、44-12，以及杰德·S·拉科夫（Jed S. Rakoff）法官在 United States v. Weigand 案中的陪审团指示，案号 29 Cr. 188（2021年3月1日）；保罗·A·恩格尔迈耶（Paul A. Engelmayer）法官在 United States v. Teman 案中的陪审团指示，案号 19 Cr. 696（2020年1月21日）；以及 P·凯文·卡斯特尔（P. Kevin Castel）法官在 United States v. Stasiv 案中的陪审团指示，案号 18 Cr. 259（2019年5月14日）。参见 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999)（裁定联邦欺诈成文法不包含依赖要件）；United States v. Shapiro, 29 F. App'x 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)（“[实际依赖不是银行欺诈的一项要件。”）；United States v. Rodriguez, 140 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 1998)（“如果不实陈述具有影响银行行为的能力，则该不实陈述属于实质性的。”）；Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 363 (2014)（“正如本案一样，当被告人的虚假陈述作为一种机制自然地诱使银行（或银行财产的保管人）交出其控制下的资金时，即满足了第 1344(2) 条‘通过…手段’的措辞要求。”）。\n\n第三项罪名：共谋洗钱——概述\n\n正如我所说，第三项罪名指控被告人参与了实施洗钱犯罪的共谋。\n\n为证明第三项罪名，政府方必须排除合理怀疑证明以下两个要件：\n\n第一，所指控共谋的存在。换言之，两人或两人以上达成了实施洗钱犯罪的非法协议。\n\n第二，被告人故意且明知地成为了第三项罪名中所指控共谋的一员。\n\n这两个基本要件与第二项罪名中指控的共谋实施电汇欺诈和银行欺诈的要件相同。因此，除我稍后向你们解释的某些差异外，关于第三项罪名，你们应当遵循我此前就共谋向你们提供的与第二项罪名相关的指示。\n\n第三项罪名所指控的共谋与第二项罪名所指控的共谋目标或犯罪目标，或我已概述且稍后将详细阐述的其他共谋罪名具有不同的目标。第三项罪名中共谋的目标是洗钱。\n\n改编自洛丽塔·A·普雷斯卡（Loretta A. Preska）法官在 United States v. Adelekan 案中作出的陪审团指示，案号 19 Cr. 291 (LAP)（纽约南区联邦地区法院（S.D.N.Y.），2021年10月26日）。\n\n第三项罪名：共谋洗钱——目标——隐瞒\n\n我现在将向你们说明政府方在第三项罪名中指控的、必须排除合理怀疑证明的共谋洗钱目标的要件。违反主要的联邦洗钱成文法有几种方式。第三项罪名中指控的三种此类违法行为即为共谋洗钱的目标。我将依次进行解释。\n\n第一，从事境内隐瞒属于违反洗钱成文法的行为——即参与涉及特定非法活动收益的境内金融交易，且明知该交易旨在隐瞒或掩饰特定非法活动收益的性质、地点、来源、所有权或控制权。这类洗钱被称为“境内隐瞒”洗钱。\n\n第二，从事国际隐瞒属于违反洗钱成文法的行为——即参与涉及特定非法活动收益的外国金融交易，且明知该交易旨在隐瞒或掩饰特定非法活动收益的性质、地点、来源、所有权或控制权。\n\n为了认定任一类型的隐瞒，你们必须排除合理怀疑认定被告人的目的是逃避美国或其他执法机关的查处，而不是逃避中国共产党（Chinese Communist Party，简称 CCP）的查处。[42]\n\n42 政府方指出，该拟议文句错误阐述了洗钱成文法的要件，该法既不要求隐瞒是为了逃避执法机关查处的目的，也未提及中国共产党。\n\n第三，从事国际促进属于违反洗钱成文法的行为——即怀有促进特定非法活动继续进行的意图参与外国金融交易。\n\n这些洗钱违法行为中的每一项都具有独特的要件，我现在将逐一说明。\n\n现在让我来说明境内隐瞒洗钱的要件。隐瞒洗钱有三个要件，政府方必须排除合理怀疑予以证明：\n\n第一，被告人进行或企图进行涉及构成特定非法活动（具体而言是电汇欺诈和证券欺诈）收益之财产的“金融交易”。\n\n第二，被告人明知该金融交易涉及的财产是某种形式的非法活动的收益。\n\n第三，被告人明知该交易的全部或部分设计目的在于隐瞒或掩饰特定非法活动收益的性质、地点、来源、所有权或控制权。\n\n政府方必须排除合理怀疑证明的隐瞒洗钱的第一个要件是，被告人进行了涉及构成特定非法活动（具体而言是电汇欺诈和证券欺诈）收益之财产的金融交易。\n\n“进行”一词包括发起、完成交易，或参与发起或完成交易。\n\n“金融交易”一词是指涉及从事州际或对外贸易、或其活动以任何方式或程度影响州际或对外贸易的金融机构的交易；或者是指以任何方式或程度影响州际或对外贸易、且涉及通过电汇或其他方式转移资金、或涉及一种或多种货币工具的交易。我指示你们，受联邦保险保护的银行构成“金融机构”。\n\n“涉及金融机构的交易”包括存款、取款、账户间转账、货币兑换、贷款、信用展期、买卖任何股票、债券、存单或其他货币工具、使用保险箱，或通过、由或向金融机构以任何手段进行的任何其他付款、转账或交付。\n\n“州际或对外贸易”一词是指美国各州、准州或属地之间的任何组合的贸易，或美国与外国之间的贸易。在确定某人是否从事州际或对外贸易，或者其活动是否影响州际或对外贸易时，对州际或对外贸易的牵涉程度可以是极微小的。任何程度的牵涉都将满足该要件。\n\n“货币工具”一词包括（除其他外）美国或任何其他国家的硬币或货币、个人支票、旅行支票、本票、银行支票、汇票，以及无记名形式或在交付时所有权即发生转移的其他形式的投资证券或流通票据。\n\n“收益”一词是指直接或间接来源于某种形式的非法活动的任何财产，包括该等活动的总收入。收益可以是任何种类的财产，而不仅限于金钱。\n\n我已经说明了“指定非法活动”的含义。在本案中，政府指控涉案资金是电信欺诈和证券欺诈的收益——即我已向你们说明过的起诉书中罪名项五至十一项所指控的行为。我从法律层面向你们作出指示：电信欺诈和证券欺诈均属于“指定非法活动”的定义范围。然而，本案中的资金是否实际上系电信欺诈和证券欺诈的收益，由你们来判定。政府无需证明这两种指定非法活动同时存在。只要你们认定政府已排除合理怀疑证明该金融交易涉及电信欺诈的收益，或者涉及证券欺诈的收益，即已足够。但你们必须就政府所证明的是哪一项指定非法活动达成一致意见，并且你们必须一致同意某笔金融交易涉及该项指定非法活动的收益。此前，我已就涉及罪名项五至十一项的电信欺诈和证券欺诈的构成要件向你们作出了指示。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的国内隐瞒型洗钱罪的第二个要件是，被告明知参与该金融交易的财产系某种形式的非法活动的收益。被告必须明知交易中涉及的财产代表某种形式（尽管不一定确知具体是哪种形式）构成州法、联邦法或外国法项下重罪的活动的收益。因此，为满足这一要件，政府无需证明被告具体明知交易涉及的财产代表电信欺诈、证券欺诈或任何其他特定犯罪的收益。政府只需证明被告明知其代表构成重罪的某种非法活动的收益。我从法律层面对你们作出指示：电信欺诈和证券欺诈在联邦法项下均属于重罪。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的国内隐瞒型洗钱罪的第三个要件涉及交易的目的。具体而言，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明被告在行事时明知该交易旨在隐瞒或伪装收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权。因此，如果被告明知某项交易的设计目的（至少部分目的）是为了隐瞒或伪装涉案财产的真实性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权，则本要件即获满足。然而，如果被告虽知晓该交易，但不知晓其设计目的（至少部分目的）是为了隐瞒或伪装，则本要件未获满足。\n\n> 改编自 Sand，《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions），指示 50A-26、指示 50A-7、50A-8、50A-9；United States v. Henry, 325 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2003)。\n罪名项三：洗钱共谋——客体——国际隐瞒\n\n我现在向你们说明国际隐瞒型洗钱罪的构成要件。隐瞒型洗钱罪共有三个要件须由政府排除合理怀疑予以证明：\n\n第一，被告明知而将货币工具或资金从美国境内某地运输、传送或转移至美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地，或者从美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地运输、传送或转移至美国境内某地。\n\n第二，被告在进行上述行为时，明知所涉及的货币工具或资金代表某种形式的非法活动的收益；\n\n第三，被告明知该运输、传送或转移旨在全部或部分隐瞒或伪装指定非法活动收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第一个要件是，被告将货币工具或资金从美国境内某地运输、传送或转移（或企图运输、传送或转移）至美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地（或从美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地至美国境内某地）。\n\n“货币工具”一词是指美国或任何其他国家的硬币或货币、旅行支票、个人支票、银行支票、汇票、无记名形式或在交付时所有权即发生转移的其他形式的投资证券，以及无记名形式或在交付时所有权即发生转移的其他形式的流通票据。\n\n“资金”一词是指金钱或可兑换为货币的流通票券。\n\n“运输”、“传送”和“转移”无需作出专门定义；你们应按其通常的日常含义来理解。政府无需证明被告实际随身携带了资金或货币工具即可证明其应对转移、运输或传送承担责任。所要求的仅是证明被告促使了另一人或实体对资金或货币工具进行了运输、转移或传送。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的指控于罪名项三中的洗钱共谋第二项客体之罪的第二和第三个要件，涉及此前就罪名项三的第一项客体所定义的概念，即“某种形式的非法活动”这一术语，以及隐瞒或伪装指定非法活动收益的所在地、来源、所有权或控制权的概念。此前就这些术语提供的相同定义和指示同样适用于其在罪名项三这第二项客体中的出现。正如我之前告知你们的，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明被告明知涉案金融交易涉及某种形式的非法活动的收益，但不一定必须明知是哪种形式的非法活动。\n\n关于隐瞒，就该概念与指控于罪名项三中的共谋第二项客体的关联而言，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明被告在运输、传送或转移交易涉及的财产时，明知该运输、转移或传送旨在隐瞒或伪装电信欺诈和证券欺诈犯罪收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权。我此前已向你们提供了电信欺诈和证券欺诈的定义，你们在此应适用相同的定义。正如我之前指示你们的那样，从法律层面上讲，“指定非法活动”一词包括电信欺诈和证券欺诈。\n\n仅证明资金被隐瞒不足以满足此要件。相反，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明转移的目的就是为了隐瞒或伪装收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权，并且被告明知这是转移的目的。\n\n> 改编自 Sand 等人，《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions），指示 50A-16 - 19；Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 170 L. Ed. 2d 942 (2008)。\n罪名项三：洗钱共谋——客体——国际促进\n\n我现在向你们说明国际促进型洗钱罪中必须由政府排除合理怀疑证明的构成要件。国际促进型洗钱罪共有三个要件须由政府排除合理怀疑予以证明：\n\n第一，被告进行（或企图进行）了一笔涉及构成指定非法活动（具体而言即电信欺诈和证券欺诈）收益之财产的金融交易。\n\n第二，被告明知该金融交易中涉及的财产系某种形式的非法活动的收益。\n\n第三，被告在行事时具有促进指定非法活动继续进行的意图。\n\n关于第一和第二个要件，我此前已结合第一项洗钱客体（国内隐瞒型洗钱）向你们作了说明，你们在此应适用相同的指示。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第三个要件是，被告在行事时具有促进指定非法活动（具体而言即电信欺诈和证券欺诈）继续进行的意图。\n\n蓄意行事是指故意行事，而非出于失误或意外，其明确目的在于促进、便利或协助电信欺诈和证券欺诈的继续进行。如果你们认定被告在行事时具有促进、便利或协助电信欺诈和证券欺诈继续进行的意图或明确目的，则第三个要件即获满足。\n\n改编自 Sand 等人，《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions），指示 50A-1-5。\n罪名项四：证券欺诈及对金融机构作虚假陈述共谋——概述\n\n罪名项四指控两名被告均犯有共谋实施证券欺诈及对金融机构作虚假陈述罪。起诉书指控 Mr. Kwok（郭先生）和 Ms. Wang（王女士）通过协议“就 GTV 普通股的所谓股份以及所谓的 GTV 关联公司提供重大虚假和误导性信息及陈述，以欺诈手段诱导投资者参与 GTV 私募、农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）和 G|CLUBS”，从而共谋实施证券欺诈。起诉书还指控郭先生和王女士通过在银行账户申请过程中向银行或其他金融机构说谎及指使他人说谎，共谋向金融机构提供虚假陈述。\n\n为了证明被告在罪名项四中有罪，政府必须排除合理怀疑确立以下三个要件：\n\n第一，起诉书罪名项四所指控的共谋确实存在；即，两人或两人以上之间存在实施起诉书所指控的 (i) 证券欺诈；或 (ii) 对金融机构作虚假陈述之罪行的协议或谅解；\n\n第二，你们正在审议的被告明知而加入了所指控的共谋；以及\n\n第三，共谋成员之一——不一定是各被告——为推进共谋的某一客体而明知实施了至少一项公开行为（overt act）。\n\n前两个要件——即共谋存在，以及你们正在审议的被告明知而加入其中——与罪名项二所指控的电信欺诈和银行欺诈共谋以及罪名项三所指控的洗钱共谋的前两个要件相同。因此，除我稍后将向你们解释的某些差异外，你们应遵循我此前就罪名项二和罪名项三向你们提供的关于共谋的指示。\n\n接下来我将解释第三个要件——即要求有一项公开行为。\n\n改编自 Hon. Jesse M. Furman（杰西·M·弗曼法官）在 United States v. Dambelly（美国诉丹贝利案），16 Cr. 2（S.D.N.Y.，纽约南区）中的指示以及 Sand 的 Modern Federal Jury Instructions（《现代联邦陪审团指示》）第 19-3 号指示。\n罪名项四：证券欺诈及银行虚假陈述共谋——公开作为\n\n政府为确立罪名项四所指控的共谋罪行而必须排除合理怀疑证明的第三项要件是，共谋者中至少有一人为了推进该共谋而实施了至少一项公开作为——不一定必须是 Mr. Kwok（郭先生）或 Ms. Wang（王女士）本人。\n\n公开作为是指为推进共谋目标而实施的任何行为。公开作为可以是犯罪行为或作为共谋目标的犯罪本身，但并非必须如此。它甚至可以是一种表面上看似无辜的行为，只要它是实施共谋计划中的一个步骤即可。\n\n用通俗的语言来说，公开作为要件是一项要求协议已超出单纯讨论阶段的规定。公开作为要件意味着，你们必须排除合理怀疑认定，共谋者之一在共谋存续期间采取了某种行动以推进该共谋。\n\n政府为了满足公开作为要件，并不需要证明起诉书中所指控的公开作为。也就是说，你们可能会认定实施了起诉书中根本未予指控的公开作为。政府只要证明被告人或其被指控的共谋者之一在共谋存续期间明知地实施了推进该共谋的任何公开作为，即为充分。\n\n你们无需就某一特定的公开作为是否是为推进共谋而实施达成一致意见；你们只需全体一致同意至少实施了一项此类公开作为即可。\n\n改编自 Hon. Jesse M. Furman（杰西·M·弗曼法官）在 United States v. Dambelly（美国诉丹贝利案），16 Cr. 2（S.D.N.Y.）中的指示以及 Sand 的 Modern Federal Jury Instructions（《现代联邦陪审团指示》）第 19-7、19-8 号指示。\n罪名项四：证券欺诈及虚假陈述共谋——向金融机构作虚假陈述之目标\n\n罪名项四的目标——即该共谋的非法目的——是实施证券欺诈以及向金融机构作虚假陈述。关于被告人被指控共谋实现哪一个目标，你们必须达成一致意见。\n\n我已经就证券欺诈的要件向你们作出了指示，你们应当在此处适用这些指示。\n\n我现在将就向金融机构作虚假陈述的要件向你们作出指示，\n\n该行为违反了 Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014（《美国法典》第 18 编第 1014 条）。\n\n向金融机构作虚假陈述罪要求排除\n\n合理怀疑证明以下四项要件。\n\n第一，被告人作出或促使作出了与向银行提出的申请有关的虚假陈述或报告；\n\n第二，被告人系明知而为；\n\n第三，作出该虚假陈述或报告的目的是为了以任何方式影响该银行的行为；以及\n\n第四，该银行当时受 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation（联邦存款保险公司）承保。\n\n改编自 Sand 的 2 Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal（《现代联邦陪审团指示：刑事卷二》）第 37-15 号指示评注。\n罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——通则\n\n我现在转向起诉书的罪名项一。罪名项一指控郭先生和王女士共谋违反 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act（《受敲诈勒索者影响和腐败组织法》）——亦称 RICO 法案。\n\nRICO 法案的相关部分——Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c)（《美国法典》第 18 编第 1962(c) 条）规定下列行为构成犯罪：\n\n受雇于从事州际或对外贸易、或其活动影响州际或对外贸易的任何企业，或与该企业有关联的任何人，通过敲诈勒索活动模式直接或间接地经办或参与经办该企业事务。\n\nRICO 法案实质上规定，任何人通过被称为“敲诈勒索作为”的违法模式参与经办\n\n企业事务，均构成犯罪。\n\n“敲诈勒索”（racketeering）一词在我们社会中可能带有特定含义。请不要从中推断出\n\n任何含义。在适用法规中以及在此法庭中使用该术语，不应被视为\n\n与你们确定所审议被告人的罪责是否已被排除合理怀疑地证明\n\n有任何关系。该术语仅是\n\n国会用来描述该法规的一个词语。\n\n改编自 Honorable Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文法官阁下）在 United States v. Merlino（美国诉梅尔利诺案），No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 以及 Honorable Katherine B. Forrest（凯瑟琳·B·福雷斯特法官阁下）在 United States v. Delligatti（美国诉戴利加蒂案），No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 中的指示；亦见 United States v. Applins（美国诉阿普林斯案），637 F.3d 59, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2011)；United States v. Basciano（美国诉巴夏诺案），599 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2010)；United States v. Yannotti（美国诉扬诺蒂案），541 F.3d 112, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2008)；United States v. Zemlyansky（美国诉泽姆良斯基案），908 F.3d 1, 11 (2d Cir. 2018)（“RICO 共谋需要证明：(a) 存在加入敲诈勒索计划的协议，(b) 被告人明知地参与该计划且意图实现其总体目标，以及 (c) 该计划涉及、或经共谋任何成员之间的协议意图涉及两项或多项敲诈勒索基础行为。”）。\n罪名项一，敲诈勒索共谋——要件\n\n起诉书罪名项一指控各被告人自至少约 2018 年起至约 2023 年 3 月止参与了敲诈勒索共谋。\n\n为了履行其证明你们所审议的被告人犯有罪名项一所指控的敲诈勒索共谋罪的举证责任，政府必须排除合理怀疑确立以下每一项要件：\n\n第一，按起诉书所指控建立或将建立企业。\n\n第一，两人或两人以上达成协议，通过敲诈勒索活动模式参与将影响州际贸易的企业；\n\n第二，该企业从事或将从事州际或对外贸易，或其活动将影响\n\n州际或对外贸易。\n\n第二，被告人明知且故意成为该协议的\n\n成员；以及\n\n第三，你们所审议的被告人受雇于该企业或与该企业有关联，或将受雇于该企业或与其有关联。\n\n第三，一名被告人或该共谋的另一名成员同意实施两项或两项以上的敲诈勒索作为（我将为你们定义该术语）。[43](#page-94-1)\n\n43 被告人指出，他们认为 Sand 第 52-28 号指示及 United States v. Laurent（美国诉劳伦特案），33 F.3d 4th 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2022) 中的三要件表述更为清晰和适当。\n\n以及第四，你们所审议的被告人明知且故意地与\n\n至少另一人达成协议，由该被告人或一名共谋者直接或间接地参与（或已经\n\n参与）经办所指控企业的事务。\n\n我现在将就“企业”（enterprise）和\n\n“敲诈勒索活动”（racketeering activity）这两个术语的含义向你们作出指示。\n\n改编自 Honorable Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文法官阁下）在 United States v. Merlino（美国诉梅尔利诺案），No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 中的指示；以及 Honorable Katherine B. Forrest（凯瑟琳·B·福雷斯特法官阁下）在 United States v. Delligatti（美国诉戴利加蒂案），No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 中的指示；亦见 United States v. Applins（美国诉阿普林斯案），637 F.3d 59, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2011)；United States v. Basciano（美国诉巴夏诺案），599 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2010)；United States v. Yannotti（美国诉扬诺蒂案），541 F.3d 112, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2008)；United States v. Allen（美国诉艾伦案），155 F.3d 35, 40 (2d. Cir. 1998)。\n罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——第一项要件——企业\n\n我现在将就适用于这些要件中每一项的法律向你们作出指示。\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第一项要件是被告人同意建立企业，或者企业实际上已经建立。什么是企业？在敲诈勒索法规下，企业包括合伙企业、公司或协会等任何法律实体，或者事实上相关联的一群个人（尽管并非法律实体）。企业不需要有特定的名称，就此而言，也不需要有任何名称。它也不需要在注册或取得许可后才成为企业。它不一定是普遍公认的法律实体，如公司、工会、合伙企业等。但企业可以是一个法律实体或一组法律实体。\n\n企业可以是为从事某种行为进程的共同目的而以非正式方式关联在一起的一群人。该群体可以是为了正当和合法的目的而组织起来的，也可以是为了非法的目的而组织起来的。除了具有共同目的外，这群人还必须拥有作为持续运作单位的核心人员。此外，该企业在所指控的期间内以基本类似的形式持续存在（或确实持续存在）。这并不意味着成员必须保持完全一致，但该企业必须拥有一个在起诉书罪名项一所指控的时间框架（即 2018 年至 2023 年 3 月）内的相当长时期内持续存在的可识别核心。\n\n在本案中，起诉书罪名项一指控了参与经办被称为“Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）”的组织的协议。\n\n“郭氏企业”这一术语仅仅是政府为起诉书之目的而采用的一种指称形式，用以描述参与被指控敲诈勒索共谋的企业和个人群体。\n\n我进一步指出，政府无需证明关于郭氏企业的每一项指控。如果政府排除合理怀疑证明存在经办或参与经办一群人事务的协议，且该群人具有以下特征：(1) 一个或多个共同目的，(2) 持续的正式或非正式组织或架构，以及 (3) 在起诉书所指控时间框架内的相当长时期内作为持续运作单位的核心人员，即为充分。\n\n改编自 Sand 的 Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal（《现代联邦陪审团指示：刑事》）第 19-4 号指示；Honorable Alison J. Nathan（艾莉森·J·内森法官阁下）在 United States v. Berry（美国诉贝里案），No. 20 Cr. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) 和 United States v. Allen（美国诉艾伦案），No. 15 Cr. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 中的指示；Honorable Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文法官阁下）在 United States v. Merlino（美国诉梅尔利诺案），No. S44 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 中的指示；以及 Honorable Katherine B. Forrest（凯瑟琳·B·福雷斯特法官阁下）在 United States v. Delligatti（美国诉戴利加蒂案），No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 中的指示。\n罪名项一：敲诈勒索共谋——第二项要件——对州际贸易的影响\n\n关于罪名项一，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第二项要件是，该犯罪企业本身，或与其相关联人员的敲诈勒索活动，会对州际或对外贸易产生某种影响，或者事实上已产生此类影响。这种对州际贸易的影响可以以任何方式发生，且只需是微小的。\n\n州际贸易包括货物、服务、资金和个人在各州之间的流动。政府无需证明任何特定行为影响了州际贸易，甚至无需证明被告人亲自实施的行为影响了州际贸易。政府只需证明该企业的某项或某些行为——甚至是该企业完全合法的行为——对州际贸易产生了此类影响。你们无需认定被告人知悉该企业从事州际贸易。所有必要的事项就是，你们排除合理怀疑认定该企业的活动将以某种微小的方式影响州际或对外贸易，或已经产生了此类影响。\n\n> 改编自 Colleen McMahon（科琳·麦克马洪）法官在 United States v. Mendoza 案（案号：No. 11 Cr. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)）以及 William H. Pauley III（威廉·H·鲍利三世）法官在 United States v. Meregildo 案（案号：No. 11 Cr. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)）中的陪审团指示。\n罪名项一，敲诈勒索共谋——第三要件——与企业关联\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第三个要件是，共谋者（可包括你们正在审议的被告人）曾经或将要“受雇于”或“关联于”我此前已向你们作出指示的 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）。政府无需同时证明两者；证明“受雇于”或“关联于”其中之一即足以确立该要件。“受雇于”一词应赋予其通常、朴素的含义。因此，例如当某人在该企业的工资单上并为该企业提供服务、在该企业中任职或拥有该企业的所有权权益时，该人即“受雇于”该企业。\n\n“关联于”同样应赋予其朴素含义。“关联”（associate）意为“加入，通常以合伙人、同事、工友、朋友、同伴或盟友的松散关系加入……彼此结合或联系”。因此，例如当某人与该企业的其他成员联合，且明知地协助或推动该企业的活动，或者通过该企业或与该企业开展业务时，该人即“关联于”该企业。因此，无需证明被告人在该企业中拥有正式职务。\n\n并不要求你们正在审议的被告人同意任何特定共谋者在该企业存续的整个期间都曾经或将要“受雇于”或“关联于”该企业。政府也无需证明你们正在审议的被告人同意任何特定共谋者在该企业中拥有正式职务、参与了该企业的所有活动、对该企业的所有活动完全知情，或知晓所有其他成员的参与情况。相反，政府只需排除合理怀疑证明，在起诉书所指控的企业存续期间的某一时期，某一共谋者按照我刚刚解释的含义曾经或将要“受雇于”或“关联于”该企业，且其知晓或将要知晓该企业的大致性质，并知晓或将要知晓该企业的范围超出了其自身在该企业中的角色，便已足够。\n\n> 改编自 Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文）法官在 United States v. Merlino 案（案号：No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)）以及 Katherine B. Forrest（凯瑟琳·B·福里斯特）法官在 United States v. Delligatti 案（案号：No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)）中的指示；并参见 Sand，《Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal》，指示 19-6。United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2011)；United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2000)；United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989)（汇集相关判例）。\n罪名项一，敲诈勒索共谋——第四要件——实施或参与企业事务的运营\n\n政府必须排除合理怀疑证明的第四个要件是，被告人必须明知地共谋（即达成协议），同意共谋者将通过敲诈勒索活动模式实施或参与实施该企业事务的运营。\n\n正如我此前向你们指示的，共谋是两人或两人以上为违法而达成的协议或合伙关系。即使被告人未亲自参与企业的运营或管理，只要证据确立被告人明知地同意促成一项一旦完成即构成 RICO 实质性违法的方案，该被告人仍可被判定犯有 RICO 共谋罪。44\n\n同样，政府无需证明你们正在审议的被告人与该企业的每一名其他成员均达成了协议、认识该企业的所有其他成员，或完全知晓该企业的所有细节。然而，在证明本要件时，政府必须证明其以某种实质性的方式与企业相关联，且被告人知晓企业的大致性质并知晓企业的存在超越了其个人角色。\n\n在审议被告人是否加入了共谋时，你们可以考量相关证据（若有）：即被告人同意某一协议参与者将故意实施对企业运营所必需或有助的作为、职能或职责，或者某一共谋者在指导企业事务方面发挥了某些作用。然而，政府无需证明被告人\n\n44 被告人指出，鉴于已提及一般共谋指示，其提议删除的内容是不必要的。\n\n将对企业行使或在企业内部行使重大控制权，或其在企业中拥有正式职务，或其对企业事务负有主要责任。企业的运营不仅由高层管理人员进行，也由受高层管理人员指导或执行高层管理人员命令的企业底层参与者进行。\n\n然而，我要提醒你们注意，被告人仅仅出现在被指控犯罪的现场，本身并不使其成为共谋的成员。同样，仅与共谋的一名或多名成员有关联，并不自动使被告人成为成员。一个人可以认识罪犯或与罪犯保持友好关系，而其本人并非罪犯。仅仅行为相似，或他们可能聚集在一起讨论共同目标和利益的事实，并不必然确立其共谋成员身份。所必需的是，被告人在知晓共谋的非法目标并怀有协助实现该目标的意图的情况下参与其中。\n\n归根结底，问题在于：政府是否已排除合理怀疑证明，你们正在审议的被告人加入了共谋，并在知悉其基本目的并希望促成该目的的情况下，明知且故意地参与了共谋？\n\n共谋的“目的”（object）是指共谋者同意或希望实现的非法意图。罪名项一中所指控的共谋目的，是违反 RICO 制定法，换言之，即通过敲诈勒索活动模式实施或参与实施企业事务的运营。\n\n换言之，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明，你们正在审议的被告人同意参与该企业，并抱有其本人或共谋的其他一名或多名成员将实施起诉书中所指明类型的两项或两项以上敲诈勒索作为（作为敲诈勒索活动模式的一部分）的意图。对于被告人同意实施哪些特定类型的敲诈勒索犯罪（若有），你们的意见必须一致。\n\n正如我已告知你们的，并不要求共谋实际上达成其目的，你们才可以认定共谋存在。因为同意实施敲诈勒索犯罪是罪名项一的核心要义，政府只需证明：如果共谋实现了其设想的目标，该企业便会建立，其成员将通过敲诈勒索活动模式参与实施该企业事务的运营，且这些活动将对州际或外国商业产生影响。当然，如果你们认定共谋的目标得以实现，那么关于目标已实现的证明可以成为证明共谋存在的有力证据。\n\n敲诈勒索活动模式要求至少有两项敲诈勒索作为，其中最后一项作为发生在实施前一项敲诈勒索作为之后的十年内（扣除任何监禁期间）。为了确立关于该企业将从事“敲诈勒索活动模式”的协议，政府必须排除合理怀疑证明三项内容：\n\n第一，你们正在审议的被告人同意某一共谋者（可包括被告人本人或共谋的任何其他成员）将故意实施、促成或协助教唆实施起诉书中所指控类型的两项或两项以上敲诈勒索作为。在本指示结束时，我将就所指控的敲诈勒索活动类别向你们作出指示。\n\n第二，这些敲诈勒索作为与企业之间存在“关联纽带”（nexus），且彼此之间具有“关联性”（related）。如果一项敲诈勒索作为与企业存在实质性联系，则该敲诈勒索作为与企业具有“关联纽带”。要具有“关联性”，敲诈勒索作为必须具有相同或相似的目的、结果、参与者、受害者或实施方法，或者在其他方面通过显著特征相互关联，而非仅仅是孤立事件。两项敲诈勒索作为即使彼此不相似或没有直接关联，只要它们与同一企业相关联，即可具有“关联性”。例如，就“关联纽带”和“关联性”而言，RICO 企业与某一前提敲诈勒索作为之间所必需的关系，可通过证明被告人仅仅凭借其在企业中的职位或对企业事务的参与或控制便得以实施敲诈勒索作为的证据来确立；或通过证明被告人在企业中的职位促成了其敲诈勒索作为实施的证据来确立；或通过证明敲诈勒索作为使企业获益的证据来确立；或通过证明敲诈勒索作为得到了企业授权的证据来确立；亦或通过证明敲诈勒索作为推动或促进了企业目的实现的证据来确立。\n\n第三，为了确立敲诈勒索活动模式，政府必须证明这些敲诈勒索作为本身要么已延续相当长的一段时间，要么造成或将要造成持续犯罪活动的威胁。“相当长的一段时间”被视为两年或两年以上45的前提活动。政府无需通过任何数学公式或任何特定证明方法来证明这种持续性威胁，而是可以通过多种方式予以证明。例如，当证据表明敲诈勒索作为是为犯罪目的而存在的长期联合的一部分时，或者当敲诈勒索作为被证明是开展企业事务的常规方式时，即可确立持续非法活动的威胁。\n\n45 Grace Int'l Assembly of God v. Festa, 797 F. App'x 603, 605 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\n此外，在判定政府是否已证明存在持续非法活动威胁时，你们并不局限于仅考量指控被告人自身实施的特定敲诈勒索作为；相反，除了考量此类作为之外，你们还可以考量企业的性质，以及从整体上考量该企业及其成员的其他非法活动，包括已指控和未指控的非法活动。\n\n政府若要在罪名项一中履行其举证责任，政府必须证明您正在考虑的被告意图推进一项如果完成即会符合实体勒索敲诈犯罪全部要件的企图。政府无需证明被告亲自实施或同意实施任何勒索敲诈行为，亦无需证明任何勒索敲诈行为实际发生。相反，政府必须证明您正在考虑的被告明知且意图使该勒索敲诈共谋的至少一名成员（该成员可以是被告本人或同谋）在从事该企业事务过程中实施至少两起勒索敲诈行为，并且该等行为将构成如上文所定义的勒索敲诈活动模式，而同意加入该企业。\n\n企业与勒索敲诈活动模式并非同一回事。为了定罪，政府必须证明如果共谋实现其目标，将会存在一个企业，并且该企业的事务将通过勒索敲诈活动模式来开展。正如我所提及的，在本案中指控的企业是由为从事某种行为进程的共同目的而联合在一起的一群人组成的。另一方面，勒索敲诈活动模式则是一系列犯罪行为。\n\n企业的存在是通过以下证据来证明的：存在一个具有共同目的的持续性组织（不论是正式的还是非正式的），以及该团伙的多名核心人员作为一个持续的单元发挥职能作用。\n\n另一方面，勒索敲诈活动模式则是通过以下证据来证明的：该企业的参与者实施或协助及教唆实施了至少两起勒索敲诈行为。用于确立这些各自独立要件的证据可以是相同的或重叠的。例如，如果您认定存在一个持续性的企业，则该企业的存在可能有助确立各独立的勒索敲诈行为属于持续性犯罪活动“模式”的一部分。尽管如此，您应当牢记，证明了企业的存在并不必然证明了勒索敲诈活动模式的存在，反之亦然。\n\n最后，虽然您无需裁定您正在考虑的被告是否同意实施任何特定的勒索敲诈行为即可认定该被告犯有 RICO（《反勒索敲诈与腐败组织法》）共谋罪，但您必须就被告同意将要实施哪一种或哪几种作为前提犯罪的勒索敲诈罪名达成一致意见；例如，以下罪名中至少两起行为，或任何组合：电汇欺诈、银行欺诈、洗钱、从事源自特定非法活动的财产的货币交易、证券欺诈。\n\n我现在将就管辖勒索敲诈犯罪的实体法向您作出指示，起诉书指控这些犯罪构成了本案中勒索敲诈活动模式的一部分。\n\n改编自 Jesse M. Furman 法官在 United States v. Blondet 案（案号：No. 16 Cr. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)）、Richard J. Sullivan 法官在 United States v. Merlino 案（案号：No. 16 Cr. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)）以及 Katherine B. Forrest 法官在 United States v. Delligatti 案（案号：No. 15 Cr. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)）中的陪审团指示；另见 H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.，492 U.S. 299, 242-43 (1989)；United States v. Alkins，925 F.2d 541, 551-53 (2d Cir. 1991)；United States v.\n\nCoiro，922 F.2d 1008, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991)；United States v. Kaplan，886 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)；United States v. Indelicato，865 F.2d 1370, 1383-84 (2d Cir. 1989)（全院庭审）。\n\n罪名项一，勒索敲诈共谋——前提罪行\n\n起诉书指控，作为罪名项一中所控勒索敲诈共谋的一部分，实施了或意图实施下列类别的犯罪违法行为：\n\n- (1) 根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 1343 条可予起诉的行为（涉及电汇欺诈）；\n- (2) 根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 1344 条可予起诉的行为（涉及金融机构欺诈，亦称为银行欺诈）；\n- (3) 根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 1956 条可予起诉的行为（涉及货币工具洗钱，亦称为洗钱）；\n- (4) 根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 1957 条可予起诉的行为（涉及从事源自特定非法活动的财产的货币交易）；以及\n- (5) 涉及在证券出售中进行欺诈的犯罪，违反《美国法典》第 15 编第 78j (b) 条和第 78ff 条，以及《联邦法规汇编》第 17 编第 240.10b-5 条（亦称为证券欺诈）。\n\n关于罪名项五、七、九和十一，我此前已就违反电汇欺诈法规向您作出了指示。在评估是否实施了或意图实施“根据《美国法典》第 18 编涉及电汇欺诈的可予起诉的行为”时，您应当使用那些指示。\n\n关于罪名项二中共谋实施电汇欺诈与银行欺诈中的银行欺诈目的，我此前已就违反禁止金融机构欺诈（或银行欺诈）法规向您作出了指示。在评估是否实施了或意图实施\n\n“根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 1344 条可予起诉的行为（涉及金融机构欺诈，亦称为银行欺诈）”时，您应当使用那些指示。\n\n关于罪名项三中所指控洗钱共谋的目的，我此前已就违反洗钱法规向您作出了指示。在评估是否实施了或意图实施“根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 1956 条可予起诉的行为（涉及货币工具洗钱，亦称为洗钱）”时，您应当使用那些指示。\n\n关于罪名项十二，我此前已就违反从事源自特定非法活动的财产的货币交易向您作出了指示。在评估是否实施了或意图实施“根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 1957 条可予起诉的行为”时，您应当使用那些指示。\n\n而且，关于罪名项六、八和十，我此前也已就违反第 10(b) 条（证券欺诈法规的简称）向您作出了指示。在评估是否实施了或意图实施“涉及在证券出售中进行欺诈的犯罪，违反《美国法典》第 15 编第 78j (b) 条和第 78ff 条，以及《联邦法规汇编》第 17 编第 240.10b-5 条”时，您应当使用那些指示。\n\nPinkerton（平克顿）责任\n\n如果您认定您正在考虑的被告在罪名项一至四中所控的任何或全部共谋罪名中成立有罪，您还可以根据称为 Pinkerton 责任的法理，考虑您正在考虑的被告是否在罪名项五至十二的相关实体罪名中成立有罪。Pinkerton 责任规定，作为共谋成员的被告可对同谋实施的犯罪承担责任。仅当您未认定您正在考虑的被告亲自实施或协助及教唆实施了该犯罪时，您方可在罪名项五至十二——即起诉书中的实体罪名项——中考虑 Pinkerton 责任。\n\n如果您认定某位被告是罪名项一中所控 RICO 共谋的一部分——也就是说，如果您认定政府已排除合理怀疑证明了罪名项一的各项要件——那么只要政府排除合理怀疑证明了下列要件，您可以（但非必须）认定该被告对同谋实施的实体犯罪承担责任：\n\n第一，您正在考虑的实体罪名项中所指控的犯罪已被实施；\n\n第二，您认定实际实施该犯罪的人属于罪名项一中所控 RICO 共谋的成员；\n\n第三，该实体犯罪是依据您认定共谋者之间存在的共同计划和谅解实施的；\n\n第四，在您正在考虑的实体犯罪被实施时，该被告属于该共谋的成员（即已加入该共谋）；以及\n\n第五，该被告能够合理预见到其同谋可能会实施您正在考虑的实体犯罪。\n\n如果您认定政府已排除合理怀疑证明了所有这五项要件，那么即使该被告并未亲自参与构成该犯罪的行为，并且即使该被告对该犯罪并无实际知情，您也可以认定该被告被指控犯有的实体犯罪成立有罪。\n\n改编自 Cathy Seibel 法官在 United States v. Madonna 案（案号：No. S18 17 Cr. 89）中作出的指示。参见例如 United States v. Gershman，31 F.4th 80 (2d Cir. 2022)；United States v. Parkes，497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007)；United States v. Masotto，73 F.3d 1233 (2d Cir. 1996)；United States v. Romero，897 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1990)；另见 Pinkerton v. United States，328 U.S. 640 (1946)。\n\n注：辩方反对作出 Pinkerton 指示，第二巡回法院曾反复警告“不应将其作为惯例给出”。参见例如 United States v. Salameh，152. F.3d 88, 149 (2d Cir. 1998)。\n\n蓄意回避\n[如适用] 46\n\n正如我所解释的，起诉书中的指控要求政府排除合理怀疑证明被告是明知而为。在判定被告是否系明知而为时，您可以考虑被告是否故意对原本显而易见的事实视而不见。\n\n我想指出的是，不能通过证明被告存在粗心、过失或愚蠢来确立被告在任何特定指控上所必需的知情。然而，任何人不得为了逃避刑法的后果而故意且蓄意对自己行为所涉及的重大且重要的事实保持无知。法律将此称为“蓄意回避”或“故意盲目”。换言之，政府可以证明被告实际知晓共谋的目标，或者他蓄意回避知晓共谋的目的。\n\n因此，如果您排除合理怀疑认定被告意识到极有可能正在发生犯罪，但被告故意且蓄意回避证实这一事实，例如故意对其视而不见或故意不对其进行调查，那么您可以将这种对明确知情的蓄意回避视为等同于知情，除非您认定被告实际确信自己并未参与此类非法行为。换言之，被告不能通过\n\n46 注：辩方反对作出蓄意回避指示。\n\n“故意视而不见”或对自己所从事的非法行为得以证实的诸多事实保持故意无知，来回避对其自身行为的刑事责任。换个角度说，一个人不能在眼见各种对任何通情达理之人而言都显而易见的状况后，又在法庭上声称因为自己蓄意回避了解那件显而易见的事实，从而对该定罪事实不知情。\n\n你们还必须牢记，一方面是明知且故意参与共谋——这我刚才已经向你们解释过——另一方面是知悉该共谋的具体目标，二者之间存在重要区别。在判定被告是否知悉共谋的目标时，你们可以考虑故意规避，即他是否合理地确信该共谋的目标极有可能包含实施作为共谋目标所指控的犯罪，并采取了深思熟虑的故意行为来避免证实该事实，但仍参与了该共谋。但是，故意规避不能用作认定被告最初明知且故意加入共谋的替代依据。如果被告实际上并不知悉共谋的存在，那么其在逻辑上就不可能意图并同意加入该共谋。然而，如果你们排除合理怀疑地认定被告明知地选择参与此类共同行动，你们可以考虑被告是否采取了深思熟虑的故意行为，来避免证实关于该行动目的显而易见的事实。\n\n总而言之，如果你们排除合理怀疑地认定被告确信某一事实极有可能属实，且被告采取了深思熟虑的故意行为来避免了解该事实的真相，你们可以认定被告就该事实而言系明知而为。但是，如果你们认定被告实际上确信该事实并非如此，那么你们便不能认定他就该事实系明知而为。\n\n改编自 Honorable Loretta A. Preska（洛雷塔·A·普雷斯卡法官）在 United States v. Tanner et al.（美国诉坦纳等案），17 Cr. 61（S.D.N.Y. 2018年5月3日）；Honorable P. Kevin Castel（P·凯文·卡斯特法官）在 United States v. William Walters（美国诉威廉·沃尔特斯案），16 Cr. 338（S.D.N.Y. 2017年4月6日）中作出的陪审团指示；以及 Sand（桑德），Modern Federal Jury Instructions（现代联邦陪审团指示），第 3A-2 号指示。\n\n审判地\n\n关于起诉书中的每一项罪名，政府除了证明该罪名的必要构成要件外，还必须证明为推进该罪名所指控的罪行，至少有一项行为发生在 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）。这被称为确立审判地。\n\n纽约南区包括曼哈顿和布朗克斯全境，以及威斯特彻斯特县、罗克兰县、帕特南县、达奇斯县、奥兰治县和沙利文县。\n\n政府无需证明已完成的犯罪是在纽约南区内实施的，也无需证明被告曾到过纽约南区。只要为推进所指控犯罪的任何行为发生在本司法管辖区内，即足以满足审判地要求。该行为本身无需构成犯罪行为。且该行为无需由被告亲自实施，只要该行为是你们认定被告所实施犯罪的一部分即可。\n\n被害人的过失不构成抗辩理由\n\n即使被害人进一步探查本可能发现所指控的欺诈计划，这一点也无关紧要。如果你们认定该计划存在，你们是否认为被害人粗心大意、易受骗、甚至是存在过失，均与本案无关。\n\n被害人方面的过失、粗心大意或易受骗，均不构成对欺诈罪指控的抗辩理由。\n\n改编自 Honorable Loretta A. Preska 在 United States v. Adelekan（美国诉阿德莱坎案），No. 19 Cr. 291 (LAP)（S.D.N.Y. 2021年10月26日）中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n多重共谋[47]\n\n政府在第 1 项罪名、第 2 项罪名、第 3 项罪名和第 4 项罪名中指控存在单一共谋。对于每一项此类罪名，政府必须证明存在单一共谋。\n\n单一共谋是指两人或两人以上联合起来推进一项共同的非法计划或目的。相比之下，当存在为实现不同目的而达成的多项独立非法协议时，即便这些共谋具有相似的目标或重叠的成员，也构成多重共谋。证明存在数个各自独立的共谋，并非证明任何一项罪名中所指控的单一共谋。对于每一项共谋罪名，政府必须排除合理怀疑地使你们确信，该罪名中所指控的特定共谋确实存在，且你们正在审议的被告是该特定共谋的成员，而非其他共谋的成员。同样地，如果你们认定某特定被告是另一共谋的成员，而非你们正在审议的罪名中所指控共谋的成员，你们必须裁定该被告在该共谋指控上无罪。证明存在数个各自独立的共谋，并不构成对任何单一共谋的证明。[48]\n\n47 政府请求法院在庭审结束且所有证据均已采纳之后，再对该指示是否适当保留裁决。\n\n48 改编自 Sand，第 19-5 号指示。\n\n日期差异\n\n起诉书指控被告在特定时间范围内实施了所指控的罪行。政府证明被告在这些完全精确的时间范围内实施了所指控罪行，并非必要条件。法律仅要求起诉书中指控的日期与证据确立的日期之间具有实质相似性。\n\n改编自 Sand，Modern Federal Jury Instructions，第 3-12 号指示，以及 Honorable Colleen McMahon（科琳·麦克马洪法官）在 United States v. Omar Gonzalez（美国诉奥马尔·冈萨雷斯案），10 Cr. 588 (CM)（S.D.N.Y. 2010年11月19日）中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n不要求采用特定侦查手段\n\n[若适用][49]\n\n你们已听到了[若适用：在本案辩护律师的辩论中]提及执法机关使用或未使用某些侦查手段的事实。法律并未要求执法人员必须以特定方式侦查犯罪，也未要求政府必须通过任何特定手段来证明其指控。虽然你们应当仔细考虑所出示的证据，但你们无需推测为何使用了某些手段，或为何未使用其他手段。接受审判的不是政府。执法手段不是你们应当关注的问题。\n\n你们关注的问题是，根据有证据或缺乏证据，被告的有罪是否已被排除合理怀疑地加以证明。然而，合理怀疑可以源于缺乏证据。[50]\n\n改编自 Honorable William H. Pauley III（威廉·H·鲍利三世法官）在 United States v. Meregildo, et al.（美国诉梅雷吉尔多等案），11 Cr. 576（S.D.N.Y. 2012年11月28日）；Honorable Pierre N. Leval（皮埃尔·N·莱瓦尔法官）在 United States v. Mucciante（美国诉穆恰特案），91 Cr. 403（S.D.N.Y. 1992年）；以及 Honorable John F. Keenan（约翰·F·基南法官）在 United States v. Medina（美国诉麦地那案），91 Cr. 894（S.D.N.Y. 1992年）中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n49 辩方对该指示整体提出异议，但如果作出该指示，则应使用附加措辞。参见例如裁定，United States v. Nordlicht（美国诉诺德利希特案），2019年7月1日（驳回政府作出类似指示的请求，“因为陪审团指示已就陪审团在作出裁决时可以和不可以考虑的事项作出了指示。”）\n\n50 Hon. William Kuntz（威廉·孔茨法官）的陪审团指示，U.S. v. Boustani（美国诉布斯塔尼案），18 Cr. 681（EDNY 2020年），ECF No. 384 第 4443 页。\n\n依据搜查和扣押获取证据的使用\n\n你们已听取了关于执法人员在进行某些搜查或扣押中所扣押证据的证言，特别是依据法院批准的搜查令所获取的电子邮件及其他电子证据的证言。通过这些搜查和扣押所获取的证据已在本案中被正当采纳，并可由你们正当予以考虑。此类搜查和扣押完全属于正当的执法行为。你们是否赞同或反对获取证据的方式，不应纳入你们的评议之中，因为我指示你们，政府对该证据的使用完全合法。\n\n因此，无论你们个人的观点如何，在判定政府是否已排除合理怀疑地证明被告有罪时，你们必须将该证据与本案中的所有其他证据一并予以充分考虑。\n\n改编自 Honorable Jesse M. Furman（杰西·M·弗曼法官）在 United States v. Avenatti（美国诉阿韦纳蒂案），No. 19 Cr. 373 (JMF)（S.D.N.Y. 2022年2月2日）（庭审笔录 1732-33）中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n协议承认\n\n[若适用]\n\n你们听取了以证言协议形式呈现的证据。证言协议是指当事人之间达成的一项协议，即如果传唤某人作为证人，该人将会作出某些证言。你们必须将该证人本会作出该证言这一事实认定为真实。但是，由你们来决定该证言所具有的效力。\n\n你们还听取了以事实协议形式呈现的证据。事实协议是指当事人之间关于某一特定事实属实的协议。你们必须将此类达成一致的事实认定为真实。\n\n但是，由你们来决定给予任何协议承认的事实以何种效力。\n\n改编自 Honorable Sidney H. Stein（西德尼·H·斯坦法官）在 United States v. Pierre（美国诉皮埃尔案），19 Cr. 783 (SHS)（S.D.N.Y. 2021年5月17日）中作出的陪审团指示；并参见 Sand，Modern Federal Jury Instructions，第 5-6 号指示。\n\n执法人员及政府雇员证人\n\n[若适用]\n\n你们听取了来自执法人员以及 FBI（联邦调查局）雇员的证言。证人可能受雇于联邦调查局这一事实，并不意味着其证言必然比普通证人的证言值得更多或更少的考虑，或者享有更大或更小的证明力。\n\n在此背景下，辩护律师完全有权试图以该证人的证言可能因其对案件结果存在个人或职务利害关系而带有偏向为由，对其可信度提出质疑。\n\n在审查所有证据之后，由你们来决定是否采信该执法人员或雇员证人的证言，并由你们决定给予该证言以你们认为其应得的证明力。\n\n改编自 Sand，Modern Federal Jury Instructions，第 7-16 号指示。\n\n证人准备\n\n你们在庭审期间听取了证人在出庭作证前曾与律师讨论案件事实及其证言的证据。\n\n虽然你们在评估证人的可信度时可以考虑该事实，但我应当告知你们，证人在作证前与律师会面，以便证人了解其将要被询问的主题、专注于这些主题，并有机会在被询问相关证物前对其进行审查，这并没有任何异常或不当之处。此类协商有助于节省你们的时间和法院的时间。事实上，律师如果不进行此类协商就传唤证人反而是反常的。\n\n同样，对于证人就其证言进行准备的事实或性质，你们赋予多大的证明力，以及你们从该准备工作中得出何种推论，完全属于你们的裁量范围。\n\n改编自 Honorable Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·苏利文法官）在 United States v. Peirce（美国诉皮尔斯案），06 Cr. 1032（S.D.N.Y. 2008年2月22日）中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n同谋/配合调查证人的证言\n\n[若适用]\n\n你们还听取了作证称其已对刑事指控认罪答辩的证人的证言。他们每个人都是依据与政府达成的配合协议作证的。法律允许使用同谋的证言。实际上，联邦法院的法律规定，如果陪审团认定该证言排除合理怀疑地确立了罪行，那么同谋的证言本身就足以用于定罪。然而实际情况也是，同谋证言具有这样的性质：当你们决定对该证言予以多大程度的相信时，必须对其进行极其仔细的审视，并以特别谨慎的态度予以看待。\n\n我已经就可信度向你们提出了一些一般性的考量因素，在此我不再一一赘述。尽管如此，请允许我就你们在评议关于从犯的问题时可能需要考虑的几点作些说明。你们应当扪心自问，该证人究竟是通过说谎还是通过说真话能获得更大的利益。该证人的证言是否在任何程度上属于编造，是因为他相信或希望通过作伪证而以某种方式获得从宽处理？抑或是他认为如实作证最符合其自身利益？如果你们认为你们正在考量的证人是出于对个人利益的期望，那么这种动机是会促使他说谎，还是会促使他说真话？这种动机是否影响了他的证言？该证人此前是否曾作过伪证或发表过虚假陈述？该证人是否看似对任何一名被告人存有任何偏见？总而言之，在决定对从犯证人的证言给予何种程度的信任和证明力（如果有的话）时，你们应当审视全部证据。\n\n改编自 Honorable Laura T. Swain（劳拉·T·斯温法官）在 United States v. Stewart（美国诉斯图尔特案），15 Cr. 287 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）2016年8月2日) 中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n不起诉协议\n\n（如适用）\n\n你们已经听取了至少一名证人的证言，该证人基于本案争议事实与政府达成了不起诉协议。现指示你们，不得仅凭某位证人达成了此类协议（即便涉及类似行为）这一事实，就对你们正在考量的被告人的有罪与否得出任何结论或推断。该证人决定达成该协议以及政府决定达成该协议，是该证人和政府各自作出的个人决定，就政府而言则是其合法裁量权的行使。你们不得将其以任何方式用作有利于或不利于你们正在考量的被告人的证据。\n\n然而，对于获得不起诉承诺的证人的证言，你们在审查时应当比审查普通证人的证言更为谨慎。你们应当对其进行密切审查，以确定其是否受到了某种影响，从而通过将罪责归咎于被告人来谋取证人自身的利益；因为，这样的证人一旦意识到自己可以通过协助给他人定罪来换取自身的自由，便具有作伪证的动机。\n\n对于此类证言，你们应当带着怀疑予以接受，并可以根据你们认为其应得的程度，给予其相应的证明力（如果有的话）。[51]\n\n改编自 Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan（刘易斯·A·卡普兰法官）在 United States v. Dumitru（美国诉杜米特鲁案），18 Cr. 243 (2018年11月6日) 中的指示。\n\n51 Sand.Instr. 7-9\n\n获得豁免的证人\n\n你们已经听取了根据本法院授予的豁免权作证的某些证人的证言。这意味着该证人的证言不得在任何刑事案件中被用作不利于该证人的证据，但在因伪证、作虚假陈述或在其他方面未遵守本法院豁免命令而提起的起诉中除外。\n\n现指示你们，政府有权传唤经本法院命令授予豁免权的人作为证人，并且如果你们认定该证人的证言已排除合理怀疑地证明了你们正在考量的被告人有罪，你们可以仅凭该证人的证言便判定被告人有罪。\n\n然而，对于获得豁免权的证人的证言，你们在审查时应当极其谨慎，比审查普通证人的证言更为谨慎。[52] 你们应当对其进行密切审查，以确定其是否受到了某种影响，从而通过将罪责归咎于被告人来谋取证人自身的利益；因为这样的证人一旦意识到自己可以通过协助给他人定罪来换取自身的自由，便具有作伪证的动机。\n\n对于此类证言，你们应当极其谨慎地予以审查，并在依据其采取行动时保持审慎。如果你们相信其为真实并决定采纳该证言，你们可以根据你们认为其应得的程度，给予其相应的证明力（如果有的话）。\n\n52 Sand, Instr. 7-8.\n\n如果在仔细审查了该证人的证言以及在证人席上的神态举止之后，你们确信该证人说了真话，你们应当认定其具有可信度并相应地依此行事。\n\n此外，不能仅仅因为某人可能曾参与过犯罪行为，就推断出他没有能力作出真实的证言。再者，证人为何获得法院命令的豁免权与你们无关。你们唯一关心的应当是证人是否在你们面前的这个法庭上作出了真实的证言。与对任何证人的考量一样，让我强调的是，可信度问题不必以“非全即无”的方式来决定。即便你们认定某位证人在某一部分作了虚假陈述，你们仍然可以采纳他在其他部分的证言，或者也可以不予理会其全部证言。这完全是由你们陪审团作出的决定。\n\n改编自 Honorable William H. Pauley III（威廉·H·保利三世法官）在 United States v. Dominguez（美国诉多明格斯案），S1 16 Cr. 108 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 中的指示；以及 Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions（《现代联邦陪审团指示》），Instr. 7-8；参见 United States v. Gleason（美国诉格里森案），616 F.2d 2, 15 (2d Cir.（第二巡回法院）1979)（“当法院指出某些类型的证人证言可能存疑并因此应当谨慎审查和衡量时，例如从犯或共谋者的证言……法院还必须提请陪审团注意，陪审团很可能会发现这些证人的全部或部分证言是真实的这一事实。”）（引文省略），以及 United States v. Cheung Kin Ping（美国诉张建平案），555 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977)（同上）。\n\n未被传唤但双方均可接触到的证人 [53]\n\n[如适用]\n\n有些人的名字你们在审理过程中已经听说过，但他们并未出庭作证。我指示你们，诉讼双方传唤这些证人中的任何一位的机会，或者缺乏此类机会的情况，都是均等的。因此，你们不应当对如果他们被传唤出庭会作何种证言作出任何推断或得出任何结论。他们的未出庭不应当以任何方式影响你们的判断。\n\n然而，你们应当记住我的指示，即法律并未给刑事案件中的被告人强加传唤任何证人或出示任何证据的举证责任或义务。\n\n改编自 Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions（《现代联邦陪审团指示》），Instr. 6-7；参见 United States v. Super（美国诉休珀案），492 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1974)（指示陪审团不应对双方均无法接触到的证人的缺席作出任何推断是正当的）；另见 United States v. Brown（美国诉布朗案），511 F.2d 920, 925 (2d Cir. 1975)。\n\n53 注：辩方对本条指示提出异议，特别是在本案的特殊情况下。\n\n未受审人员\n\n你们不得仅仅因为除你们正在考量的被告人之外的任何其他人未在此受审这一事实，就对政府或你们正在考量的被告人作出任何有利或不利的推断。你们也不得对其他人未受审的原因进行揣测。这些事项完全不在你们的考量范围之内，与你们作为陪审员的职责无关。\n\n改编自 Honorable J. Paul Oetken（J·保罗·厄特肯法官）在 United States v. Block（美国诉布洛克案），16 Cr. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2017年6月29日) 中作出的陪审团指示；以及 Honorable Gregory Woods（格雷戈里·伍兹法官）在 United States v. Chow（美国诉周案），17 Cr. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2018年4月10日) 中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n限制性指示——类似行为证据\n\n[如适用]\n\n政府已提出倾向于表明被告人在不同场合从事了与起诉书中所指控罪名相似的行为的证据。\n\n就此而言，请允许我提醒你们，被告人并未因实施起诉书中未指控的行为而在此受审。因此，你们不得将此类类似行为的证据用作证明被告人实施了所指控罪行的替代证明。你们也不得将此证据用作证明被告人具有犯罪人格或不良品格的证明。其他类似行为的证据获准采纳仅出于更为有限的目的，即[如适用，在此提供说明]，正如我在采纳该证据时向你们指示的那样，你们仅可出于该有限目的并为了提供起诉书中所指控罪名的背景情况而考量该证据。\n\n如果你们认定相关被告人实施了起诉书中所指控的行为以及类似行为，那么你们可以（但并非必须）推断出在实施起诉书中所指控的行为时，正在被考量的被告人的行为是[如适用，在此提供具体说明]。然而，你们不得出于任何其他目的考量类似行为的证据。具体而言，你们不得利用此证据得出以下结论：因为被告人实施了该另一行为或多项行为，所以他也必定实施了起诉书中所指控的行为。\n\n改编自 Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions（《现代联邦陪审团指示》），Instr. 5-25，以及 Honorable Loretta A. Preska（洛丽塔·A·普雷斯卡法官）在 United States v. Tanner et al.（美国诉坦纳等人案），17 Cr. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2018年5月3日) 中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n专家证人\n\n[如适用]\n\n在本案中，我准许了某些证人就争议的某些事项发表意见。此类被称为“专家证言”的证言呈现给你们，是基于这样一种理论，即在该领域具有丰富经验和知识的人能够协助你们理解证据或就事实独立作出决定。\n\n在衡量专家证言时，你们可以考量该证人的资质、其意见、作证的原因，以及在你们决定是否相信某位证人的证言时通常适用的所有其他考量因素。结合本案的全部证据，你们可以根据你们认为其应得的程度，给予该意见证言任何证明力（如果有的话）。然而，你们不应仅仅因为我允许该证人作为专家作证就相信其意见证言。你们也不得以专家的意见替代你们自己的理性、判断和常识。本案事实的认定完全取决于你们。\n\n改编自 Honorable Valerie Caproni（瓦莱丽·卡普罗尼法官）在 United States v. Riley（美国诉莱利案），13 Cr. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2014年9月8日) 中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n图表和汇总材料（已作为证据采纳）\n\n[如适用]\n\n现在，有些获准作为证据采纳的物证是以图表和汇总材料的形式呈现的。对于这些已获准作为证据采纳的图表和汇总材料，你们应当像对待任何其他证据一样予以考量。\n\n改编自 Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions（《现代联邦陪审团指示》），Instr. 5-12。另见 Fed. R. Evid.（《联邦证据规则》）1006。\n\n图表和汇总材料（未作为证据采纳）\n\n[如适用]\n\n曾向你们展示过但未获准作为证据采纳的汇总图表和展示物。对于这些图表和展示物，它们仅作为本案证言或文件的汇总和分析，在此作为你们的直观辅助工具。赋予这些图表价值和意义的是基础证据以及你们归于该基础证据的证明力。在这些图表符合你们所认定的基础事实的范围内，你们应当接受它们。在这些图表与你们所认定的基础证据不符的范围内，你们可以予以拒绝。\n\n改编自 Honorable Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文法官）在 United States v. Peirce（美国诉皮尔斯案），06 Cr. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 2008年2月22日) 中作出的陪审团指示，以及 Sand, Modern Federal Jury Instructions（《现代联邦陪审团指示》），Instr. 5-13。\n\n录音和录像及文字记录——通则\n\n政府已出示了录音和录像形式的证据。\n\n无论你们赞同还是反对对这些对话进行录制，都不得进入\n\n纳入你们的评议之中。我指示你们，这些录音是以合法方式取得的，没有任何人的权利受到侵犯，政府对该等证据的使用是合法的，且这些录音在本案审理中已被适当地采纳为证据。因此，无论存在任何个人观点，你们都必须在确定政府是否已排除合理怀疑证明被告有罪时，将此项证据与本案中的所有其他证据一并予以考虑。\n\n如果你们希望再次听取任何录音，或查看该等录音的任何文字记录，在你们评议期间均可向你们提供。\n\n改编自 William H. Pauley III（威廉·H·鲍利三世）法官在 United States v. Felton, 17 Cr. 21 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 案、J. Paul Oetken（J·保罗·厄特肯）法官在 United States v. Matthews, 18 Cr. 124 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 案，以及 Richard J. Sullivan（理查德·J·沙利文）法官在 United States v. Awuley, 13 Cr. 875 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 案中的陪审团指示。\n\n外语翻译\n\n[如适用]\n\n在审判期间，你们获得了已被采纳为证据的录音文字记录。这些记录是对以 [外语] 录制的外语录音的翻译。你们还看到了外语文件的译文。\n\n虽然你们中的某些人可能懂 [外语]，但所有陪审员考虑相同的证据至关重要。因此，你们必须接受已作为证据采纳的英文译文，并对任何不同的含义不予理会。\n\n被告人的证词\n\n[如适用]\n\n刑事案件中的被告人绝无任何作证或提出任何证据的义务。这是因为，正如我已经告知你们的，排除合理怀疑的举证责任始终由政府承担，且被告人被推定无罪。该举证责任在整个审判过程中始终由政府承担，绝不会转移给被告人。被告人绝不被要求证明其自身无罪。\n\n在本案中，[Kwok 先生（郭先生）/ Wang 女士（王女士）/ 各被告人] 确实作了证，且 [他/她/他们] 与其他任何证人一样接受了交叉盘问。你们应当审查和评估 [他/她/他们] 的证词，就像你们审查和评估对案件结果有利害关系的任何证人的证词一样。\n\n改编自 Kimba M. Wood（金巴·M·伍德）法官在 United States v. Cespedes-Pena, 14 Cr. 520 (KMW) 案中的陪审团指示。另见 United States v. Solano, 966 F.3d 184, 194-200 (2d Cir. 2020)（讨论被告人作证时的适当指示）；United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2007)（同上）。\n\n被告人不作证的权利\n\n[如适用并由辩方请求]\n\n各被告人在本案中未作证。根据我国宪法，被告人没有作证或出示任何证据的义务，因为证明被告人排除合理怀疑有罪是政府的责任。该举证责任在整个审判过程中始终由政府承担，绝不会转移给各被告人。被告人绝不被要求证明其自身无罪。\n\n你们不得对各被告人未作证的事实赋予任何意义。你们不得因他们未出庭作证而对其作出任何不利推定。你们在陪审团室进行评议时，绝不得以任何方式将此作为不利于你们正在考虑的被告人的因素。\n\n改编自 Sand，《现代联邦陪审团指示》，指示 5-21。\n\n证据材料的删改涂改\n\n[如适用]\n\n在已被采纳为证据的物证中，我们有部分物证经过了删改涂改。\n\n“删改涂改”是指文件或录音的一部分被移除。你们只需关注已被采纳为证据的该项材料的部分。你们不应对其另一部分被删改涂改的任何原因进行揣测。\n\n改编自 Shira A. Scheindlin（希拉·A·欣德林）法官在 United States v. DiTomasso, 14 Cr. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2016年3月7日) 案中作出的陪审团指示。\n\n辩方请求 1\n\n陪审团的职责 54\n\n你们是事实的唯一裁判者。确定证据的证明力大小和证人的可信度是你们的职责，并且你们应解决证词中可能存在的任何冲突。你们根据自己所认定的事实作出你们决定的任何合理解释与推定。在履行这项职责时，请记住你们曾宣誓公正无私地作出裁决，不带偏见或同情，也不偏袒任何一方。你们曾宣誓使你们的裁决完全基于本案中的证据以及我向你们提供的适用法律。你们还必须记住，今天所有当事人在你们面前都是平等的。政府是一方当事人且公诉以合众国名义提起这一事实，并不赋予政府或其证人享有相比被告人而言任何不同的考量。你们不得被对任何一方当事人的同情所左右，也不得被当事人或公众对你们裁决的可能反应所左右。如果对任何被告人的罪行存有合理怀疑，你们应当毫不犹豫地判定其无罪。但如果你们认定政府已完成其举证责任证明了被告人有罪，你们不应出于同情或任何其他原因而犹豫判定其有罪。\n\n你们不得受到你们对被指控罪行的性质可能抱有的任何情绪的影响，也不得受到你们对当事人、任何参与审判的人或审判中提及的任何人的种族、宗教、国籍来源、性别、年龄或政治派别可能抱有的任何情绪的影响。你们不得仅仅因为某位律师提出异议、要求在你们听不到的地方进行法官席私下交谈、或要求我对法律问题作出裁定，而对该律师或其委托人抱有任何偏见。如果\n\n54 如上所述，政府请求法院就陪审团的职责作出其标准指示。\n\n你们对本案中的律师形成了任何意见或反应，我指示你们不予理会。律师的性格与举止并不是本案的争议焦点。55\n\n55 最终指示，United States v. Nordlicht, 16 Cr. 640 (E.D.N.Y. 2021年3月2日)；另见 Sand，指示 2-3、2-4、2-5、2-8 及 2-11。\n\n辩方请求 2\n\n告诫——仅考虑被指控的罪名\n\n你们在此是为了判定政府是否已排除合理怀疑证明被告人犯有被指控的罪行。被告人并未因起诉书中未指控的任何行为、举止或违法行为而受审。除另有指示外，你们也无需就本案中未作为被告人受审的任何其他人是否有罪作出裁决。56\n\n56 第五巡回上诉法院标准陪审团指示第 1-21 号。\n\n证人的可信度\n\n现在你们一定很清楚，政府和各被告人正要求你们对本案中的各项事实争议得出截然不同的结论。裁决这些争议将涉及对你们所听取和观察到的证人证词作出判断。在作出这些判断时，你们应当仔细审查每位证人的全部证词、每位证人作证时的具体情况，以及有助于你们判断每位证人证词的真实性与重要性的任何其他在案证据材料。\n\n你们决定是否相信某位证人，可能取决于该证人给你们留下的印象。该证人表现如何？该证人是否坦率、真诚且直率；抑或该证人显得在闪烁其词或在某些方面可疑？该证人在主询问中的作证方式与在交叉盘问中的作证方式相比如何？该证人是前后一致还是自相矛盾？该证人是否显得清楚知晓其所谈论的内容？该证人是否给你们留下了试图准确陈述其所知情况的印象？这些都是你们在决定证人是否真实可信时应当扪心自问的常识性问题范例。\n\n你们选择在多大程度上相信一名证人，也可能受到该证人偏见的影响。该证人是否与政府或被告人存在可能影响其作证方式的关系？该证人是否具有可能促使其掩饰真相的某种利益诱因、忠诚关系或动机？该证人是否具有可能促使其未能就其作证的事实向你们提供完全准确陈述的某种偏见、成见或敌意？57\n\n57 Sand 指示 7-1。\n\n你们还应当考虑证人是否有机会观察到其所作证的事实。此外，你们应当考虑该证人对事实的回忆结合本案的其他证据是否站得住脚。\n\n换句话说，在判定可信度时你们必须尝试去做的，就是在你们试图判定一个人在其回忆中是否真实、坦诚且准确时，像在任何重大事务中一样去评估一个人。\n\n合理怀疑\n\n各被告人对起诉书中的指控已作无罪答辩。要判定各被告人有罪，举证责任由控方承担，即排除合理怀疑证明每名被告人均符合每项指控的各个构成要件。该举证责任绝不转移给被告人，其简单原因在于法律推定被告人无罪，且绝不对刑事案件中的被告人施加传唤任何证人或出示任何证据的责任或义务。\n\n换句话说，每名被告人均自一张白纸开始，并被推定无罪于每项指控，直至且仅当你们作为陪审团确信政府已排除合理怀疑证明特定被告人犯有特定指控的罪行之时。\n\n现在问题来了：究竟什么是合理怀疑？这些词几乎是不言自明的。它是一个合理的人在考虑了所有证据或缺乏证据之后所产生的怀疑。合理怀疑是基于理智和常识的怀疑——即那种会使一个合理的人在其个人生活的重要事务中犹豫不决的怀疑。因此，排除合理怀疑的证明必须具有如此令人信服的性质，以至于一个合理的人在其自身最重要的事务中会毫不犹豫地信赖并据此行事。\n\n法律并不要求政府排除所有可能的怀疑来证明有罪。合理怀疑不是反复无常或心血来潮。它不是推测或猜疑。排除合理怀疑证明被指控罪行的各个构成要件始终是政府的举证责任。Kwok 先生（郭先生）和 Wang 女士（王女士）均无出示证据的义务，而且如果你们认定某位证人不可信，你们也无需采信其证词，即使该证人未被反驳或质疑弹劾。你们必须决定相信哪些证人以及哪些证词\n\n属实。为此，你们必须审视所有证据，运用你们自己的常识和个人经验。如果经过对所有证据或缺乏证据的仔细且公正的考虑后，你们对被告人在你们正在考虑的罪名项上的罪行存有合理怀疑，那么你们必须在你们正在考虑的罪名项上判定被告人无罪。另一方面，如果经过对所有证据或缺乏证据的公正且客观的考虑后，你们排除合理怀疑确信被告人在你们正在考虑的罪名项上有罪，那么你们必须在该罪名项上判定被告人有罪。58\n\n58 改编自 Sand，指示 4-1 和 4-2。\n\n巨额资金\n\n本案审理中的部分证言和证物涉及巨额资金——但仅凭这一事实，与政府是否已排除合理怀疑证明了被指控罪行的构成要件毫无关系。本案指控可能涉及巨额资金这一事实，并不意味着被告应当承担比案件涉及较少资金时更高的行为标准。无罪推定平等适用于每一案件中的每一名被告，不论涉及的金额多寡。[59](#page-147-1)\n\n59 United States v. Ghavami et al., No. 10-cr-1217 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）Aug. 29, 2012), ECF No. 278.\n\n直接证据与间接证据 [60](#page-148-0)\n\n在判定被告有罪或无罪时，你们可以正当适用的证据有两种。一种证据被称为直接证据。直接证据是证人就其亲眼所见、亲耳所闻或亲身观察所作的证言。换句话说，当证人凭借自身的感官，就其通过亲眼所见、亲身所感、亲手所触或亲耳所闻而亲自知悉的事项作证时，这就称为直接证据。\n\n第二种证据是间接证据（旁证）。间接证据是指通过从另一事实中进行推论，进而间接证明某一事实的证据。例如，如果争议的事实是此刻外面是否在下雨，如果不看窗外，我们在这个房间里的任何人都无法就此提供直接证言。然而，假设我们看不到外面，而当我们坐在这里时，一个人走进法庭，身上穿着湿淋淋的雨衣，手里拿着滴水的雨伞。我们可以推断外面正在下雨。另一方面，这种推论也可能是不正确的，因为在该人进入法庭之前雨可能就已经停了。换言之，下雨这一事实是可以从湿雨衣和滴水雨伞中得出的推论，但并非必然如此。每位陪审员在根据所呈现的一切具体情况确定何种推论（如有）是合情合理时，必须以自身的常识、经验或判断为指引。\n\n你们必须同时考虑直接证据和间接证据。法律允许你们对二者赋予同等的证明力，但是对任何证据赋予多大的证明力由你们决定。法律要求，在判定任何被告有罪之前，陪审团必须确信政府\n\n60 如上文所述，政府请求法院就直接证据与间接证据作出其标准指示。\n\n在审查了案件中包括直接证据和间接证据在内的所有证据后，已排除合理怀疑证明了 Mr. Kwok（郭先生）和 Ms. Wang（王女士）就某一特定指控有罪。如果你们发现，证据就某一特定指控对有罪理论和无罪理论给予了同等或几乎同等的间接支持，那么你们必须裁定郭先生和王女士在该项指控上无罪。\n\n陪审团的职责\n\n你们现在是本案的陪审团，我想花几分钟时间向你们说明作为陪审员的职责，并向你们作出一些初步指示。在审理结束时，我将向你们作出更为详细的指示，这些指示将约束你们的评议。当你们评议时，你们的职责是权衡和评估本案所采纳的所有证据，并在这一过程中认定事实。认定事实是你们的职责，而我将向你们指示适用于这些事实的法律。\n\n你们必须完全依据呈现在你们面前的证据和法律来裁决本案，绝不能受到任何个人好恶、意见、偏见、同情心或偏向的影响，包括无意识偏见。[61](#page-150-1) 无意识或“隐性”偏见是人们在意识上可能予以拒绝、但却在没有自觉意识、控制或意图的情况下表现出来的刻板印象、态度或倾向。与显性偏见一样，无意识偏见也会影响我们评估信息和作出决定的方式。我们所有人，无论多么努力尝试，往往都会通过自身经验和背景的视角来看待他人并权衡他人所说的话。我们可能会对他人产生刻板印象并对他们作出假设。你们必须尽最大努力不这样做：你们必须努力抛开任何此类刻板印象、假设和偏见。在本案中，你们应当以证据以及我对法律的指示为指引。\n\n61 本项指示基于 Western District of Washington（华盛顿西区联邦地区法院）法官-律师-学者委员会起草的陪审团指示。另见 United States v. Jamie Frierson, 17 Cr. 782 (AT), Jury Charge at Tr. 31-32 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018)。鉴于越来越多的研究支持“对自身无意识关联的觉察和警惕非常重要”以及“裁判者避免这些关联的能力……可能促成更公正的决定”这一论点，给予隐性偏见指示是适当的。参见 Jury Instruction on Unconscious Bias, 可查阅于 htt\n\n被告选择出庭作证 [62](#page-151-1)\n\n正如我早前向你们指示的那样，刑事案件中的被告绝无任何义务出庭作证或提出任何证据。这是因为排除合理怀疑的举证责任始终在政府一方，且推定郭先生无罪。\n\n在本案中，郭先生确实出庭作证了，并且与其他任何证人一样接受了交叉询问。他出庭作证这一事实绝未免除或减轻政府排除合理怀疑证明各项指控的举证责任。郭先生本不必出庭作证，事实上，他也根本不必提出任何证据。\n\n你们应当审查和评估他的证言，正如你们审查和评估任何与本案结果有利害关系的证人的证言一样。你们不应仅仅因为他是被指控的被告，就忽视或不相信他的证言。\n\n我还提醒你们，郭先生决定作证并不以任何方式将举证责任转移给他。不要问自己他的证言是否让你们确信他是无罪的。相反，你们必须考虑所有证据或证据的匮乏，并问自己控方是否已排除合理怀疑证明了各项指控。[63](#page-151-2)\n\n62 政府就此事项请求的指示载于第 65 号请求指示。\n\n63 改编自 Sand, Instr. 7-4；另见 United States v. Jose De La Cruz-Ramirez, 97 Cr. 711 (RPP) 中的指示。\n\n犯罪受害人 [64](#page-152-1)\n\n政府并未指控 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党）或中国政府是起诉书中所指控之任何罪行的受害人。\n\n64 本项指示仅由王女士提出。\n\n结语\n\n陪审团成员们，我对你们的指示就到此结束。你们即将进入陪审团室开始评议。如果在评议期间你们希望查看任何证物，可以请求查看，我们将把证物送进陪审团室，或者把你们带回法庭查看。如果你们希望重新宣读任何证言或重新播放任何录音，也可以提出该请求。请记住，要找到你们可能需要的内容并不总是容易的，因此在请求调阅证物或证言片段时请尽可能具体。如果你们需要对我向你们解释过的法律作进一步解释，也可以向法院提出该请求。如果对本指示的任何部分的含义存有任何疑问或问题，你们应当向我发送便条要求澄清或进一步解释。你们调阅证物或证言的请求——事实上是与法院的任何沟通——均应当以书面形式向我提出，由你们的陪审团团长签名，并交给一名法警。在任何情况下，在达成一致裁决之前，都不要向我或任何其他人透露陪审团在任何问题上的投票立场。\n\n在整个庭审过程中，你们中的许多人都定期记了笔记。在你们即将开始评议之际，我想向你们强调，笔记仅仅是记忆的辅助工具。在确定案件时，对于所提出的证据或应当从该等证据中得出何种结论（如有），任何陪审员所作的笔记均不得赋予其比其他陪审员凭借笔记或记忆所保留的回忆或印象更大的分量或影响。陪审员的回忆与另一陪审员的笔记之间的任何分歧，都应当通过请求法庭速记员重新宣读庭审记录来解决，因为陪审团认定事实和作出裁决所依据的必须是法庭记录，而不是任何陪审员的笔记。\n\n你们的裁决必须完全基于庭审中形成的证据或证据的匮乏。在就政府是否完成了举证责任作出决定时，考虑你们对任何被告的种族、宗教、国籍、性别或年龄可能抱有的任何个人情绪都是不当的。本案当事人有权获得不受偏见影响的审判，除非你们通过对证据进行公平且不偏不倚的考量来作出裁决，否则我们的司法制度将无法运作。\n\n你们现在的职能是权衡本案的证据，并就起诉书中的每一项罪名项判定被告有罪或无罪。\n\n你们必须完全基于证据以及这些关于法律的指示作出裁决，无论你们赞同还是不赞同所涉及的具体法律，你们作为陪审员都有誓言约束去遵循我所指示的法律。\n\n裁决必须代表每位陪审员经过深思熟虑后的判断。为了作出裁决，必须征得每一位陪审员对裁决的同意。你们的裁决必须是一致的。然而，作为陪审员，你们有责任互相协商，并在不违背个人判断的前提下，以达成一致为目的进行评议。你们每个人都必须为自己作出案件裁决，但只有在与你们的陪审员同僚对案件中的所有证据进行了公正的讨论和考量之后方可作出。在评议过程中，不要犹豫重新审视自己的观点，如果在确信自身观点有误时，应当改变意见。但是，绝不要仅仅因为其他陪审员的意见，就放弃自己对证据证明力或效果的真诚确信。\n\n时刻记住，你们不是党派偏袒者。你们是法官——是事实的法官。你们唯一的利益就是从案件的证据中探寻真相。\n\n你们应当通过自行投票选出你们中的一人担任陪审团团长。陪审团团长将负责发出任何便条，并且在陪审团达成裁决时，由其通知法警陪审团已达成裁决；当你们来到公开法庭时，陪审团团长将被要求陈述裁决内容。\n\n我们已经准备了一份裁决表供你们记录裁决。在达成裁决后，陪审团团长应当填写裁决表，签署姓名和日期，然后向门外的法警递交一张便条，说明你们已达成裁决。不要在便条中具体说明裁决是什么。相反，陪审团团长应当保留裁决表，并在你们全体被召入法庭时在公开法庭上交给我们。如果你们存在分歧，不要报告投票的比例情况。\n\n我将再次强调，你们每个人都必须同意在法庭上宣布的裁决。一旦你们的裁决由陪审团团长在公开法庭上宣布并正式记录在案，通常即不可撤销。\n\n总之，女士们、先生们，我确信，只要你们倾听其他陪审员的意见，并运用你们自己的常识，你们就会在此做出公正的裁决。请记住，你们的裁决必须在不怀恐惧、不偏不倚、不带偏见或同情的情况下做出。\n\n* * *\n\n各方当事人谨保留在举证阶段结束时或临近结束时提交补充或修改请求的权利。","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Kwok","GTV","RICO","Farm Loan","Guo","Chinese Communist Party","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Yanping Wang","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Saraca","CCP"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":278,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":384,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":462,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":35689,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:39:38"}